UCPI Evidence Hearings | Tranche 3 (Phase 3) | Day 28 - (28 July 2026) - AM

Full transcript

00:45:01 Good morning everybody. Uh I apologize for the late start but everyone I believe knows the reason. Um the proceedings today will be live streamed with the usual 15minute delay. Those

00:45:12 with the usual 15minute delay. Those with mobile telephones may use them to report what they hear in the hearing room, but [clears throat] only after 15 minutes have elapsed since the event that they're reporting. They may not be used for recording or photography. May

00:45:23 used for recording or photography. May the witness be sworn, please.

00:45:31 I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth. The whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth and nothing but the truth. Please take a

00:45:42 and nothing but the truth. Please take a seat.

00:45:42 seat. Sit down. Um, I understand that for health reasons you occasionally need to stand up. Yes, I have.

00:45:48 have. Please do so without hesitation and it won't interrupt your evidence. Thank you very much, sir. Yes.

00:45:54 Yes. Thank you, sir. Can you give your full name to the inquiry, please? Yes, it's Janet Williams. Um, you have given two witness statements to the inquiry. I'm only going to be dealing with the first one

00:46:05 going to be dealing with the first one today. The sec the contents of your second statement will be dealt with in tranch 4. Um, your first witness statement is MPS0749778.

00:46:15 It's at tab A1 of the bundle, sir. Um, that's the front page of your witness statement shown on screen um, at the moment. And if we go to page 152,

00:46:27 moment. And if we go to page 152, please, you signed that statement, although your signature is redacted um, on the 3rd of September, 2025. Is that right?

00:46:38 Is that right? I did, sir. Um, can you confirm please that the contents of that statement is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

00:46:45 belief? It's it's it's true as far as I can rec recollect. Thank you. Um, we can take that down now. Thank you very much. Um, I'm just going to deal with some of

00:46:57 Um, I'm just going to deal with some of the background to your policing career and the um post that you came to um uh came into in Special Branch. You were served as a commander of special branch between November 2003 and December 2005.

00:47:11 between November 2003 and December 2005. Does do those dates sound right? That's correct, sir. You succeeded HN146 acting commander Colin Black and were succeeded by HN147

00:47:22 Colin Black and were succeeded by HN147 Philip Gormley. Is that right? That's correct. Um, going back in time a little, you joined the Metropolitan Police Service in 1982 and after a brief period in

00:47:33 in 1982 and after a brief period in uniform, you joined at C and were promoted up to detective inspector. Is that right? That's correct, sir. While serving as a detective inspector, you tell us at paragraph six of your

00:47:45 you tell us at paragraph six of your witness statement, page three, that you undertook a short period of undercover work. And your undercover work was in connection with the investigation into the murder of a woman on railway tracks

00:47:56 the murder of a woman on railway tracks in the late 1980s. Is that right? It was several women. It was um Tammy Mendoza and other women who were um attacked, raped, murdered and mutilated

00:48:08 attacked, raped, murdered and mutilated um near the railway lines in um West Hamstead. Um and I was part of the UN female undercover team. Thank you. Uh in 1996 you joined the

00:48:20 Thank you. Uh in 1996 you joined the anti-terrorist branch SO13 where you were then promoted to detective chief inspector and you were involved in investigating the IRA and the first aspects of Islamist inspired terrorism

00:48:32 aspects of Islamist inspired terrorism from about 1998 onwards. Is that right? That is correct sir. You were subsequently promoted to detective superintendent and spent 12 months as the head of the positive action team

00:48:45 the head of the positive action team developing policy to improve BME recruitment and retention following the McFersonen report. Is that right? That's correct. The the um proportion of black and minority ethnic um officers

00:48:58 black and minority ethnic um officers was abysmally low. Um and one of the McFersonson um inquiry recommendations was that we were to improve that and the unit was set up and I um I put it in

00:49:13 unit was set up and I um I put it in place and uh defined the strategy to try and improve that situation which we did. So you agreed that that team was um needed at that time. It was needed. Um did you have any view

00:49:27 It was needed. Um did you have any view on the extent to which progress was made in that area? Um it was difficult and it was slow. Uh sometimes it felt quite torturous. Um

00:49:40 quite torturous. Um and I think it was quite um a challenge in in the environment we found ourselves because um I think there had been some loss of public confidence in policing

00:49:51 loss of public confidence in policing and their ability to um police effectively minority ethnic communities in London. Um and therefore we were on an uphill it was an uphill task. Um, but

00:50:04 an uphill it was an uphill task. Um, but I was surrounded by very committed black and minority ethnic officers. Um, and and we persevered and tried our best and we did actually get some traction and

00:50:15 we did actually get some traction and build some confidence. Thank you. In 2003, you were promoted to commander of special branch uh when the SDS uh came under your responsibility

00:50:26 SDS uh came under your responsibility and I think you were first approached by HN144

00:50:30 HN144 assistant commissioner David Vaness on your senior command course and he asked you if you were interested in becoming commander of special branch. Is that right?

00:50:38 right? Yes, that's correct. Um I obviously knew um a little about special branch activity because um the anti-terrorist branch and special branch worked in

00:50:50 branch and special branch worked in tandem during my time in the anti-terrorist branch. I knew David Vanesse personally and um I I felt um I felt it was a real challenge but it it

00:51:01 felt it was a real challenge but it it would be a very interesting challenge. So I agreed to take on that role. Um you say uh in your statement at paragraph 306 that you weren't aware of

00:51:12 paragraph 306 that you weren't aware of any racist incidents when you were commander of special branch and you say I was not not aware of or told about any racist or sexist incidents taking place during my time as commander special

00:51:23 during my time as commander special branch. Um were you aware of um racist incidents within the police before you were commander special branch? Oh yes. I mean you'd be naive. You you

00:51:34 Oh yes. I mean you'd be naive. You you wouldn't expect me to sit here and say there weren't any racist incidents in the Metropolitan Police or indeed misogynistic incidents in the Metropolitan Police. Of [laughter] of course there were um I think in any

00:51:46 course there were um I think in any large organization um that are and and to say otherwise would be disingenuous. Um did you agree with the conclusions of the McFersonson report that the MPS was

00:51:58 the McFersonson report that the MPS was institutionally racist?

00:52:02 I found it very hard to agree at the time

00:52:07 time um

00:52:09 um because that felt like a step beyond what I I I saw incidents as individual incidents. But I um I read the McFerson report um

00:52:23 But I um I read the McFerson report um I understood the evidence um and I did I did agree the conclusion having done that.

00:52:29 that. Thank you. Um I want to look briefly at your um training and preparation for the role of commander special branch please. Um you say uh at paragraph 43 page 19 of

00:52:41 Um you say uh at paragraph 43 page 19 of your witness statement that acting commander Colin Black gave you a brief handover which was limited because of availability to several conversations during which he explained um what each

00:52:53 during which he explained um what each unit did. Um, what did uh, acting commander Black tell you in your handover about the SDS? Do you recall? I think it was quite limited in that it

00:53:04 I think it was quite limited in that it was an undercover unit uh, that had been running for many years um, and that um, that had uh, a good reputation and

00:53:16 that had uh, a good reputation and delivered good intelligence that the organization had found useful over those years. Um, and I I think he he told me roughly how many undercover officers

00:53:28 roughly how many undercover officers were in the unit. What I didn't appreciate was at the time um that how how long those officers were expected to serve uh undercover. [clears throat]

00:53:40 serve uh undercover. [clears throat] That that was not brief to me. Um probably because you know he had been in special branch a long time and just accepted that. However, for someone who

00:53:53 accepted that. However, for someone who hadn't been in special branch, who'd been in the crime world, which is where I came from, um that was very unusual. Well, it it was beyond my uh understanding.

00:54:05 understanding. Did he brief you on any particular issues which were of concern in relation to the SDS at all? No, because he didn't tell me that they were they they were undercover for years

00:54:16 were they they were undercover for years and years. Um, so I I didn't have cause for concern um when he briefed me. Um, in relation to the SDS's role in

00:54:27 Um, in relation to the SDS's role in conducting undercover deployments on you becoming commander of special branch, what did you understand from his handover or indeed from elsewhere? Was the purpose of SDS um undercover

00:54:39 the purpose of SDS um undercover deployments as distinct from any other units undercover deployments? Um my understanding was that they're there to provide um um

00:54:53 there to provide um um intelligence to prevent [snorts] subversion um and uh and serious public order that

00:55:04 um and uh and serious public order that uh uh and and give that intelligence to the operational teams. Um, Superintendent Alan Mitchell, who was a contemporary of yours when you

00:55:15 was a contemporary of yours when you were commander of special branch, um, recorded in the notes of his operation hear. We don't need to bring it on screen, but sir, for your reference, it's MPS738090

00:55:27 tab B42 of the bundle. and he stated this, "My understanding of their role," referring to the SDS, uh was to disrupt from within as opposed to traditional

00:55:38 from within as opposed to traditional sources who would simply report on the movements. The belief within the unit was that if it could channel an organization towards a path that had less impact upon the police, is that how

00:55:50 less impact upon the police, is that how you understood their role at the time? At the time of the I we're still talking about the time of the handover and at the time of the handover no I didn't I I I thought it was as I as I as per my

00:56:02 I thought it was as I as I as per my previous answer. Did you come to understand um that particular role at any time after the handover?

00:56:10 handover? Um yes I I began to understand that that's what that that's what was happening. Yes. Um did you regard that as lawful justified and appropriate?

00:56:21 justified and appropriate? um in each each I'm sure we'll come on to this but each deployment um I looked at the deployment

00:56:33 at the deployment I looked at ensure obviously we ensured that it was part of the control strategy and I can talk about

01:25:09 or 9939 and this is the ACPO crime committee steering group on national standards in covert policing which was also known as the national standards project. Were you

01:25:21 the national standards project. Were you aware at the time um of the national standards project? It was before your time as commander of special branch No, I was aware of ACPO crime committee and I was aware um there were national

01:25:34 I was aware um there were national standards for undercover policing. I didn't know there was a specific steering group put in place to develop that. It doesn't surprise me. No, thank you. Um at page 13 we we can

01:25:47 No, thank you. Um at page 13 we we can see that what was being considered as you said were new codes of practice on undercover operations use of informance and interception of communications and abstraction of communications data. It's

01:25:59 abstraction of communications data. It's the three numbers um towards the bottom of the page there. Um, we also know that there was um concern expressed by uh, Commander Barry Moss about that aspects

01:26:11 Commander Barry Moss about that aspects of the SDS work wouldn't fit with these new policies. A concern echoed also by Superintendent Eric McGlaughlin at pages 17 and 15 of this document um,

01:26:23 17 and 15 of this document um, respectively. um which leads to a response from um Colin Black um on page 16 stating we should now exempt the SDS and any other

01:26:34 should now exempt the SDS and any other parts of special branch work we special branch work we can justify from these protocols. Um were you aware um on becoming commander of special branch

01:26:45 becoming commander of special branch that the SDS was considered exempt from those protocols which otherwise were applicable to undercover operations? No.

01:26:56 I'll move on then. Um in relation to um your management responsibility, you say you had management that can be taken down. Thank you. Responsibility for detective chief

01:27:07 you. Responsibility for detective chief superintendence. And you say at paragraph 25 of your statement at page 10 that you took a more intrusive role in supervision and oversight than you

01:27:18 in supervision and oversight than you perhaps would normally have done in relation to the SDS. and you attribute that to your personal experience of working undercover uh in North London. Um when you say more intrusive than you

01:27:32 Um when you say more intrusive than you would normally have done, um was that solely related to the undercover work had you done or did you consider your approach was more intrusive than your predecessor's approach?

01:27:46 I don't think those there's two parts to that question, aren't there really? Um did I do that purely because um of my personal experience?

01:27:58 personal experience? Um

01:28:00 Um part I think partly I think partly partly because it was it was quite a traumatic experience when I was uh fairly young in service. Um and I um

01:28:13 fairly young in service. Um and I um post that experience I I was very intrusive always intrusive in terms of uh undercover operations that I authorized. Um, I wanted uh to dot the

01:28:30 authorized. Um, I wanted uh to dot the eyes and and cross the tees to make sure particularly I was very concerned about the welfare of the undercover officers and the legal framework they were

01:28:41 and the legal framework they were working under and making sure uh that they understood their responsibilities. Um,

01:28:50 Um, was I more intrusive than my predecessors?

01:28:57 Um, I I can't be sure because I obviously wasn't there, but I I got the impression I was. Thank you. Um, you were responsible for reviewing SDS UCO authorization

01:29:09 reviewing SDS UCO authorization applications under RIPER. Yes. Um, and we'll come to some of those in due course. But at paragraph 199, pages 88 to 89 of your statement, you discussed

01:29:20 discussed paragraph

01:29:21 paragraph 199 pages 88 to 89. Um, you discussed their unauthorized reporting on um, justice campaigns and you say it would

01:29:32 justice campaigns and you say it would have been the responsibility of SDS managers, namely the DI or DCI to determine whether or not such reporting was proportionate and justified.

01:29:43 was proportionate and justified. But do you accept that given your role as commander of special branch and your role in relation to authorizing deployments, it was also your responsibility to make sure that there was clarity

01:29:55 to make sure that there was clarity around the necessity, proportionality and justification of those um deployments.

01:30:07 Um I don't actually and I'll explain why. Um my responsibility was um to review the previous um

01:30:19 review the previous um uh the the previous deployment, look at the future deployment, establish whether it was lawful and justified and proportionate and uh

01:30:31 justified and proportionate and uh and necessary and and it was undiscriminatory. And I did that very carefully. And um once I had given those

01:30:44 And um once I had given those parameters, it is for more junior officers to police those parameters and look at the specific intelligence coming in on a day-to-day basis. My job would

01:30:56 in on a day-to-day basis. My job would not allow me to do that. There weren't enough hours in the day ever for me to do that properly. If I had been responsible for doing that, I wouldn't have done it effectively because I just

01:31:08 have done it effectively because I just there's just no human possibility that I could have done so. Um, knowing what we now know in relation to some of the misconduct and some of the unjustified reporting and collateral

01:31:20 the unjustified reporting and collateral intrusion into these types of campaigns, do you think looking back that your approach was intrusive enough? No.

01:31:30 No. Um, and would you accept that a more intrusive hands-on management style would have been appropriate in respect of the s given what we now know? Um, I don't

01:31:42 Um, I don't Okay, again, I'll divide your question. Do I think it was um do I do I think it was intrusive enough? The answer is no. I stand by that. However, could I have

01:31:53 I stand by that. However, could I have done the day-to-day stuff? No, I couldn't. Um because it just there were five ranks between me and those officers. Five ranks that were

01:32:04 officers. Five ranks that were responsible and accountable for their dayto-day activities. Um

01:32:11 Um my responsibility was much more strategic than that. Um by by the very

01:55:10 Thank you sir. Um you had been explaining about the control strategy. I we'll move on on from that but I just want to ask you um in terms of the intelligence briefings

01:55:22 in terms of the intelligence briefings that um you said you received intelligence summaries in relation to the review process but you didn't see the reporting itself. No that's correct. And um so I just want to ask you for your view as to um

01:55:34 to ask you for your view as to um whether you felt that you were well placed or not to assess the proportionality of the deployment, namely to balance the value of the intelligence against the degree of

01:55:45 intelligence against the degree of intrusion required. At the time I felt I was Is that still your view or has it changed?

01:55:54 changed? Um, no, it's it's still the same because I I

01:55:58 I I um

01:56:02 because I can only go on um those specific authorizations that came before me and looking at I'm I was confident in the decisions I made based on that

01:56:14 the decisions I made based on that specific information in front of me. C can we look at some of them then please? um MPS052

01:56:22 um MPS052 6873

01:56:24 6873 um that's tab B33 of the bundle sir this is um an application for um a cheers authorization in relation to HN3 an

01:56:35 authorization in relation to HN3 an officer we're calling HN3 and at page uh 35 um it records that a review of previous conduct has

01:56:48 that a review of previous conduct has shown no significant ificant collateral intrusion. It's page I'm sorry, I've got nothing on my screen.

01:56:53 screen. Page 35.

01:57:15 So this is section six of the application. um for you to authorize um this deployment and we know at page on page 48. There's no need to turn to it, but

01:57:26 48. There's no need to turn to it, but we know that you signed and authorized um this deployment on the 7th of June 2005.

01:57:33 2005. And here it records a review or I think it should say of previous conduct has shown no significant collateral intrusion. It's right at the end the

01:57:44 intrusion. It's right at the end the bottom of the page. Can I read this please? Of course.

01:58:34 [clears throat]

01:59:06 Is Is this the whole thing? I've never seen this. Um I haven't I didn't have this in my bundle, did I? You did. Yes. Oh, did I?

01:59:14 did I? Yes. Tab B33. It's one of your CHIS authorizations. You authorized this deployment on the basis of this application and you signed it at on the 7th of June 2005 at page

01:59:28 it at on the 7th of June 2005 at page 48.

01:59:30 48. Um,

01:59:33 Um, and this records a review of previous conduct has shown no significant collateral intrusion. You accept that? It's right at the bottom of the page. I accept that's what it says.

01:59:44 accept that's what it says. Um, and we can turn to page 48 so you can see that it is indeed your authorization.

01:59:52 There's your signature 7th of June 2005. Um at page 99 of this document,

02:00:03 of this document, this is a list of um intelligence reports

02:00:07 reports um that were associated with the application for this authorization in October 2004. And we can see at the top there, one

02:00:20 And we can see at the top there, one relates to Emily Apple having her baby. Were you aware at the time on the basis of um this document that HN3 had reported on the birth of Emily Apple's

02:00:32 reported on the birth of Emily Apple's baby?

02:00:34 baby? I honestly can't recall, but these are the documents that were appended to the application for you to authorize

02:00:43 authorize um the deployment. And on this occasion in October 2004, you authorized it for a period of 2 months and required further information to be submitted. But it's

02:00:55 information to be submitted. But it's clear that you had this information at the time you gave that authorization for two months. Would you accept that reporting on the birth of her baby was a significant collateral

02:01:07 her baby was a significant collateral intrusion?

02:01:12 It looks to be so. and that you would or should have been aware of it at the time given it was in the documents that were in the application for your authorization which you gave albeit for

02:01:24 authorization which you gave albeit for a short period of two months at the time.

02:01:28 I missed it. Thank you. That can be taken down now. I want to move on to um HN77

02:01:39 I want to move on to um HN77 please. HN77 uh her deployment related to um anarchists and extreme environmentalists. Her target groups were um Earth First, Disarm DSEI and um

02:01:54 were um Earth First, Disarm DSEI and um the G8 summit of 2005. If we look at the authorization please MPS0526927

02:02:04 and this is at tab B35 of the bundle sir. And if we could go to page 14

02:02:19 there we can see that a little bit bigger please. Yes, we can see. So there we can see target area environmental extremist target groups,

02:02:30 environmental extremist target groups, those that I've just described and um target area groups. This supports an application for a further limited authorization to allow FP, which is HN77

02:02:41 authorization to allow FP, which is HN77 to close her operation C below. You were asked about this and you dealt with it at paragraphs 150 to 151 at page 68 of your statement.

02:03:07 Yes. where you say um you refer to a file note

02:03:14 file note um the one we've just been to MPS0526927

02:03:20 um where you recorded on the 8th of October 2003. I'm of the view that there is insufficient information contained within the application and associated documents for me to make an informed

02:03:31 documents for me to make an informed decision as to whether to authorize this deployment for a full year or indeed to cancel it. I have asked Detective Superintendent Fuller to conduct a full review of Ripper and Human Rights Act

02:03:43 review of Ripper and Human Rights Act issues regarding this and other deployments. I feel I have sufficient information to renew this application for a period of two months after which time detective superintendent Fuller

02:03:54 time detective superintendent Fuller will have completed his review and I will be in a position to make a more informed judgment. And then at paragraph 151, you explain that you had been told

02:04:06 151, you explain that you had been told according to DCI Dell's file note, which is page 14, um, that we have here of of this document, that um, her operation had reached its natural end and her

02:04:17 had reached its natural end and her intelligence potential was ever diminishing as her withdrawal progressed. And DCI Dell had also stated that her intelligence product had for too long been limited to areas on the periphery of the control strategy. So in

02:04:31 periphery of the control strategy. So in your view, the necessity of the operation came into question um hence the reason for your um short authorization for only two months and a request for Detective Superintendent

02:04:43 request for Detective Superintendent Fuller to review it. Is that right? It is.

02:04:48 It is. Um

02:04:53 if we go please to So this was one of the um occasions where you you um had received this as a as a number in in with a number of other CHIS

02:05:04 with a number of other CHIS authorizations. You reviewed them and authorized only a short um deployment continuation because you were concerned you didn't have enough information.

02:05:15 you didn't have enough information. Um, what was the reaction of the SDS managers to um that outcome?

02:05:24 I think they accepted it. Um, I I don't ever I only ever um remember

02:05:36 remember um

02:05:39 um I I only ever remember um the SDS managers getting really concerned about um the crane review. I don't remember

02:05:50 um the crane review. I don't remember them ever getting concerned about uh my decisions um because they were clear and they were they I'd had a

02:06:02 clear and they were they I'd had a conversation with them. They understood my rationale um and they appreciated that I was uh

02:06:13 um and they appreciated that I was uh I was doing what I was required to do under the law. And so did you feel at the time that your concerns were being taken seriously by them? Yes.

02:06:24 Yes. Um

02:06:26 Um if we that can be taken down now please if we come to look at another one then this is in relation to [clears throat] uh HN118 who was also known by the code name ring. It's MPS0526807

02:06:39 name ring. It's MPS0526807 and it's at tab B25 of the bundle sir. Um, page four, please.

02:06:53 Can you just blow it up for me? Thank you.

02:06:57 you. So, this describes um the deployment into disscent and globalized resistance to identify left-wing extremists active in these groups. Um the deployment dates

02:07:10 in these groups. Um the deployment dates are listed at page two as being August 2001 to November 2006. So again another lengthy deployment. Um

02:07:20 Um there is an authorization signed by acting commander Alan Mitchell before it comes to you on the 6th of August 2004 to August 2005 at page 70. We don't need

02:07:32 to August 2005 at page 70. We don't need to go to that one. You were asked to authorize um this deployment in March 2005, which you Julie did so at page 51. Your signature appears there. And again

02:07:46 Your signature appears there. And again on the 7th of June 2005 at page um 36. Uh and then a last time on the um 22nd

02:07:57 Uh and then a last time on the um 22nd of September 2005, which is page six of the document. So, you appear to have been authorizing the deployment for um around 3 months at a time. Would you

02:08:10 around 3 months at a time. Would you agree?

02:08:15 Um I haven't got all those documents in front of me, but I'll take your word for that.

02:08:21 Yes, those those pages contain your signatures, which yes, we've seen on those on those dates, March, June, and September. Um, and

02:08:35 if we go to page six,

02:08:40 that's the September one. And there you are authorizing um the deployment um until the 1st of December 2005. So some

02:08:53 until the 1st of December 2005. So some slightly less than 3 months from the date on which you signed this one. And in this authorization um there there are various bullet points

02:09:04 um there there are various bullet points that set out the requirements that you've um laid out in order to agree to authorize the deployment. Would you agree with that? Yes.

02:09:16 Yes. [snorts]

02:09:16 [snorts] And so

02:09:17 And so can we this nominal this can can we just I just I need to just check who this is. Of course, it's HN118.

02:09:28 Of course, it's HN118. HN 1118.

02:09:30 HN 1118. He's open, isn't he? Simon. Simon Wellings.

02:09:44 Yeah. Is is his cover name.

02:09:52 Yeah. um also code named ring wraith in this documentation.

02:10:01 And what I'm asking about is it that it seems here in contrast to authorizations made by your pre predecessors, Commander Pierce and Commander Black, you were putting some conditions on the

02:10:13 putting some conditions on the authorization of these particular deployments as set out in these in these bullet points. So the investigation is to receive the personal and direct supervision of detective chief inspector

02:10:25 supervision of detective chief inspector Michael Dell who is to ensure compliance with the regulatory framework set out above and he is to ensure the operation is reviewed on the 2nd of October 2005 and the 2nd of November 2005. So

02:10:37 and the 2nd of November 2005. So although you authorized the deployment for three months, you wanted reviews to be undertaken monthly. Is that right? I think there was a specific reason for that.

02:10:48 that. Um, may I ask a question of you? Um, because it's such a long time ago, but was this the officer in Operation Dalliance? Yes.

02:11:00 Yes. Yes. in in which case um uh you will recall I took um a very active role um and I um I reviewed reviewed

02:11:16 role um and I um I reviewed reviewed every 3 months [clears throat] personally but I wanted much more proactive supervision in relation to him because of that potential compromise and

02:11:27 because of that potential compromise and I wanted um somebody being I I I wanted to um insist that senior managers really focused in to protect him to make sure

02:11:39 focused in to protect him to make sure he was okay. And uh indeed the next bullet point maybe goes to that as well. A full reauthorization application report including an updated risk assessment must be submitted to my office by the

02:11:51 must be submitted to my office by the 1st of December 2005. This report must contain details of any additional undercover officers deployed. Um does that relate to the same concern? Yes.

02:12:06 Um if we go to

02:12:11 page nine, please

02:12:18 can we blow it up for me, please?

02:12:24 I'll give you a moment to read it, but I'm interested. This is the intelligence case in the application for uh reauthorization of HN118's deployment, and it contains a

02:12:37 of HN118's deployment, and it contains a summary of reporting

02:12:46 [snorts]

02:13:28 Yes. Um would you agree um so first of all when you referred earlier to intelligence summaries is this what you were referring to? Um would you agree that it's it's quite

02:13:41 Um would you agree that it's it's quite high on assertion with little factual detail? For example, looking particularly at the second bullet point, the quality and quantity of both strategic and tactical

02:13:52 quantity of both strategic and tactical intelligence provided by UCO Ringra, uh, whose HN118, uh, subject of high praise was a crucial factor in the successful policing of the

02:14:04 factor in the successful policing of the anti-summit demonstrations. Well, I think that's quite factual because what he's saying is T-side police have given high praise for

02:14:15 T-side police have given high praise for the quality and quantity of the strategic and tactical intelligence and a crucial factor in the successful policing of the anti-summit demonstrations. It's it's quite bold language, isn't it?

02:14:29 He's the

02:14:34 the DCI was a very experienced intelligence officer, very experienced at providing intelligence summaries. Um

02:14:45 Um I certainly didn't see it as um broad brush when I read it. Could we look at page 10, please?

02:14:57 Could we look at page 10, please? [snorts]

02:14:59 [snorts] and blow it up a little bit. Particularly the top half. There we go. Um, this is the section labeled operational objectives and strategy.

02:15:12 operational objectives and strategy. I'll give you a moment to refresh your memory of of the content particularly. I'm looking at the top four paragraphs. Okay.

02:15:48 Yeah. Would you mind just putting the cipher list back in the folder, please? Just so it can't be seen. It is in the folder. Just close it over.

02:17:04 Yes. Um, this was the application that was sent to you to approve and authorize HN118's continued deployment. Would you agree that um, in this SE section on

02:17:16 agree that um, in this SE section on operational objectives and strategy, it's relatively low on specific details? I don't think it is low on detail. Were you shown anything else other than um

02:17:29 you shown anything else other than um this document in relation to were were there other associated documents or not? I 20 20 years later you can't remember that sort of level of detail. I'd have certainly um asked the DCI well he would

02:17:43 certainly um asked the DCI well he would have given me an oral briefing and I would have asked any questions in detail that I wanted to. I I just and I would have c I need to explain because um

02:17:54 have c I need to explain because um because I'd been brought up in the crime world and particularly the anti-terrorist world, I'd been using decision logs for all of my career since the ant terrorist branch. John Grieve

02:18:05 the ant terrorist branch. John Grieve sort of bulldozed me into that, you know, and and and I made sure that all my senior officers and myself did that all the time. Um, I've asked um and I

02:18:16 all the time. Um, I've asked um and I would for something like this, if I'd have if if I'd have had concerns or there was detail that I'd asked for that was not on the form, um, I would have I would have made a decision in the

02:18:27 would have made a decision in the decision log. And the decision logs are basically notebooks that have um are carbon copied. Um, and you would they're dated and they're numbered. And you

02:18:40 dated and they're numbered. And you would make a you would you would look at the type of decision you were making and write that down. You would detail the decision you'd made. Um, you would look at uh um the reasons for that decision,

02:18:54 at uh um the reasons for that decision, but you'd also look at things you disregarded and explain why you disregarded them. And then you would say where that decision was going um and who you'd referred it to and the time and

02:19:06 you'd referred it to and the time and date of that. And that the the the pull out part would then go to the person actioned to if you had someone to action a decision. And I've asked for reference

02:19:17 a decision. And I've asked for reference to those documents which would have been hugely comprehensive because I'm a real notetaker. Um but unfortunately that those have not been made available to me. So I can't give you the detail that

02:19:29 me. So I can't give you the detail that you're asking me. I'm sorry. No, thank you. Do if you can't answer the question or you don't recall, please do just say. Um, do do you think that the that granting the authorization for

02:19:40 the that granting the authorization for for only a period of 3 months related solely to the concern you had about compromise or do you think that on the face of the application you were concerned about the insufficiency of of of information you had to authorize for

02:19:53 of information you had to authorize for longer?

02:19:56 longer? If I'd have been if I would have been concerned about the insufficiency of uh the detail, I would have made a note of that [clears throat] either on

02:20:07 note of that [clears throat] either on here or on the decision log. I don't recall doing that for this officer. I re I do recall this officer very well because of my personal dealings with him. So um I can positively say that uh

02:20:22 him. So um I can positively say that uh no I was after the 3month reviews for the only for the reason I've given you and that was the only reason. Thank you. Uh can we take that down please and look at MPS0526804.

02:20:35 Before we go from that of course I don't want there to be a misapprehension. Um the do the authorizations that you gave this officer um uh authorized for longer

02:20:47 this officer um uh authorized for longer than three months but you required um a review every month. That's right. From the senior offices in the group. That's right. If we go back to page 51 in this bundle,

02:21:00 to page 51 in this bundle, we will see uh your authorization of the 10th of March 2005, which as you can see uh authorizes until the 1st of

02:21:11 can see uh authorizes until the 1st of December,

02:21:13 December, but you need a review on the 2nd of April and then assessments uh submitted on the 2nd of June. Yes, thank you. So that's correct. and and we see that pattern going throughout

02:21:25 and we see that pattern going throughout this year's authorization of this officer.

02:21:28 officer. Yes sir.

02:21:30 Yes sir. Thank you sir. Um yes. So MPS0526804

02:21:36 please. It's tab 30 B37 sir of the bundle.

02:21:43 This is in relation to an officer HN 104 Carlos Saraki. Do you recall that particular officer? No. [snorts] Um

02:21:56 page um three please.

02:22:06 Um this records um the authorization of this particular officer UCO Kraggy Island who is HN 104 into the Antifa and no platform groups

02:22:19 into the Antifa and no platform groups in order to identify the left-wing extremists active in these groups. Um if we look at the top paragraph, I'll allow you a moment to read that.

02:23:23 Thank you. Um if if we go um then please to page five, we can see from page five that on the 22nd of September 2005, you

02:23:36 that on the 22nd of September 2005, you again signed this particular authorization authorizing the deployment of um HN 104 until the 1st of December 2005 with as we can see from the third

02:23:49 2005 with as we can see from the third bullet point um reviews monthly on in October and November 2005. So it seems that in relation to HN 104

02:24:00 relation to HN 104 um as you did with HN118, you put these particular conditions in of monthly reviews um and uh updated application reports including updated

02:24:12 application reports including updated risk assessment in relation to this officer in the same way that you did with HN118 when there was no similar risk of compromise of this officer.

02:24:23 risk of compromise of this officer. Um, why was it necessary to do that with HN 104 in the absence of a compromise which was your reason for doing so in relation to HN118? I can't help you further in the

02:24:35 I can't help you further in the documentation. I can't recall. Um, if we look at page 16, please.

02:24:45 Um, we blow that up. And I'm looking particularly at the middle big paragraph.

02:24:53 again. I'll give you a moment to look at it.

02:26:03 Yes. So, the part I'm interested in is the the first line of the big middle paragraph, UCO Kraggy Island, which is HN 104, is currently providing coverage and assessment of the Socialist Party

02:26:15 and assessment of the Socialist Party and the reaction of the other hard left-wing group's reaction to the shooting of John Charles de Menz. Um, in your witness statement at paragraph 198,

02:26:26 your witness statement at paragraph 198, page 88, you refer to Robert Hastings uh, witness statement and his reporting on the John Charles de Mennez campaign. And you you said that as far as you were

02:26:37 And you you said that as far as you were aware, no UCOs were tasked to report on that campaign. Is that still your recollection? Now,

02:26:47 you said you don't recall there being any discussions about justice group reporting in general. I don't think that's what this is. I think this is about Okay. So, so yes, it is still my

02:26:59 Okay. So, so yes, it is still my position because I read this and I still read this as if you look at the very bottom line of the first paragraph, it said um that that

02:27:11 first paragraph, it said um that that he's going to provide advice to this was to use used to provide advice to Gold and Silver in order to ensure the policing arrangements of this and similar events are handled sensitively.

02:27:22 similar events are handled sensitively. This is about um this is about the left-wing and the their reaction to

02:27:33 the their reaction to Charles John Charles Demens's death. It's not about an infiltration into a justice group. It's about the reaction of the left wing and violent protest on

02:27:46 of the left wing and violent protest on the streets of London and how this intelligence is going to help us to handle that in in a way to keep the public safe and to ensure that the this is handled sensitively. So I think

02:27:58 is handled sensitively. So I think they're two different issues. Thank you. Um the authorization documentation states that in various places at pages 9, 42,57 and 72 that

02:28:10 places at pages 9, 42,57 and 72 that collateral intrusion um in relation to this campaign is an inevitability in the circumstances. Would you agree with that? Sorry, where is that? Where is that come

02:28:21 Sorry, where is that? Where is that come from?

02:28:22 from? Pages 942, 57 and 72. It's from the authorization documentation in the applications that you would have received to authorize this deployment

02:28:34 this deployment in relation to collateral intrusion. It stated it's an inevitability in the circumstances. Can I read that specifically, please? Page nine as an example.

02:28:48 Oh, 42. Yeah. Doesn't I don't think it matters. It's exactly the same um wording.

02:28:58 It's the second line of the paragraph entitled collateral intrusion.

02:29:24 collateral intrusion. Yes. And um I think they've taken steps to minimize that and not record it.

02:29:36 that and not record it. Um so I think they've recognized it and taken action to mitigate. Would you accept that um direct targeting of justice groups and um uh campaigns in

02:29:48 justice groups and um uh campaigns in relation to civil litigation against the Metropolitan Police Service were not merely collateral reporting but more directly reporting on the campaigns themselves? I don't see that here though.

02:30:01 I don't see that here though. Um would you accept that there's no justification for reporting on the campaigns themselves?

02:30:10 Well, in truth, would I? I I think it depends. I think it depends if you know if if you see that a campaign if if there's

02:30:21 see that a campaign if if there's intelligence coming forward that an a campaign was being hijacked and that campaign um was going to lead to serious public disorder or violence. Uh then,

02:30:32 public disorder or violence. Uh then, you know, I would have to consider that. Equally, you could say that about an MP, couldn't you? that that we'd never um we we'd never put surveillance on an MP.

02:30:43 we'd never put surveillance on an MP. Obviously, in normally that would be the case, but if an MP is committ committing serious and organized crime, you would have to think about that. So, I think that the circumstances I think in the

02:30:55 that the circumstances I think in the normal course of things, of course, you wouldn't do that. Of course, you would take steps to mitigate against it. But I don't think you know I can answer in all circumstances would you ever not because

02:31:08 circumstances would you ever not because because you have to take public security safe and and the safety of the public seriously. So in certain circumstances I would expect it to be a very live

02:31:21 expect it to be a very live conversation. I'd expect it to be thoroughly investigated by myself. I would definitely make a decision in uh in my decision log and I and I would be able to give you if that had ever come

02:31:32 able to give you if that had ever come across my desk then I would be able to give you more detail about that. I don't recollect that. If collateral intrusions described as inevitable, does that not amount to

02:31:44 inevitable, does that not amount to essentially the same thing as direct targeting? Isn't the impact the same? No, because you can if you recognize that there is potential for minimal

02:31:55 that there is potential for minimal collateral intrusion and you take that seriously and you put in um conditions to minimize that like no live monitoring

02:32:06 to minimize that like no live monitoring or recording or um uh uh other other things that may well be thought of then no I don't think it is. Thank you.

02:32:18 Thank you. Um,

02:32:19 Um, if we look please at page nine. Is this the same page or is this page 42?

02:32:29 Thank you. Um again an a similar um application uh by on this occasion HN53

02:32:40 uh by on this occasion HN53 to you to authorize this deployment um with the uh operational objectives and strategy set out particularly in the top four paragraphs there and in

02:32:52 top four paragraphs there and in particular at the first paragraph reference to um HN 104 providing extensive intelligence and indeed at the second paragraph um to

02:33:05 and indeed at the second paragraph um to refers to his placing providing high-grade intelligence and that the value of this intelligence to public order policing is significant and directly informs the deployment or non-deployment of resources by the MPS

02:33:18 non-deployment of resources by the MPS and other forces. Again, some relatively bold language quite high on assertion there. Would you agree? No, I I I think that's fact.

02:33:30 No, I I I think that's fact. And again, would you agree that it's relatively low on details, relatively low on specifics? I think it's a good summary. And if I wanted more detail, I would have asked

02:33:42 wanted more detail, I would have asked questions. And if I'd have asked questions that gave light to further information that I thought relevant, I would have recorded that in the decision log. And so your position is in relation

02:33:54 log. And so your position is in relation to this one is similarly to others we've looked at was that you considered what was in the application was sufficient for you to make an informed decision about the justification for the

02:34:05 decision about the justification for the deployment and its proportionality. I think

02:34:10 I think what was in the documentation together with the personal briefing and any questions I asked and um uh and notes I made thereof in my decision logs would have been sufficient or I wouldn't have

02:34:22 have been sufficient or I wouldn't have signed them. We that can be taken down. Thank you. We now know that um HN 104 Carlos Saraki cohabited with um a woman called Donna

02:34:35 cohabited with um a woman called Donna McClean between uh late 2002 and May 2004.

02:34:41 2004. Um if you had known that um would that have made a difference to your authorization of this deployment?

02:34:51 What? Because they were living in the same place? because they were cohabiting as a couple together. Oh, that's a different question. If if I'd have been told they were

02:35:02 If if I'd have been told they were cohabiting, I would assumed that that meant they were living in the same place. If I would have been told that they're cohabiting as a couple, that's a very different proposition. So, what would have been your reaction

02:35:13 So, what would have been your reaction in both of those two scenarios? So, if they'd been cohabiting and living in the same space, I you know, people do that. men and women live in the same um shared

02:35:26 women live in the same um shared building all the time. So, but if I'd been told that they were cohabiting as a couple

02:35:32 couple and he was reporting on her, that would be wrong and I would consider that a critical incident and I would deal with it.

02:35:39 it. Would you have withdrawn him from the field?

02:35:45 Probably. Yes. And in relation to if you had only been told they were cohabiting in the sense of living in the same building but not in a romantic relationship with each other,

02:35:56 relationship with each other, why would you have considered it justified in terms of the level of collateral intrusion that would have meant e even into Donna McClean's life, even if they weren't in a relationship

02:36:07 even if they weren't in a relationship together

02:36:10 because people people who are friends, people who are things in woman tend to share premises, don't they? But this is an undercover officer who's

02:36:21 But this is an undercover officer who's deceiving those he's he's with. And in the scenario that even if it's not a romantic relationship, it's a shared cohabitation, he's deceiving her still

02:36:33 cohabitation, he's deceiving her still at that time. Why does that collateral intrusion into her life justified? Because I didn't I didn't know he was deceiving her like that. But if you had if I had known that he was deceiving her

02:36:45 if I had known that he was deceiving her and having a sexual relationship with her, then that would have been a critical incident and I dealt with it. Um, standing back now, did you consider

02:36:56 Um, standing back now, did you consider whether there were inherent risks in long-term undercover deployments into activist groups in terms of um the level of collateral intrusion?

02:37:07 Yeah, I I think now standing back knowing what we know now about the sexual liaison um yes

02:37:20 um yes and I I think we should have done things differently. It should have been um considered more than it was at the time

02:37:31 considered more than it was at the time because you're putting an officer into a group for such a long time for four or five years that is going to lead to a lot of collateral intrusion, isn't it?

02:37:45 I think it's very difficult, isn't it? It's it's very difficult to um take out of your mind what you know now

02:37:57 of your mind what you know now but I didn't know that at the time um I was commander special branch. If I did know I would have taken action and believe me I would have taken action and everyone would have known that too. Um,

02:38:10 everyone would have known that too. Um, so

02:38:12 so if we look in general at SDS and the long-term deployment, I think we could have done other things to help mitigate against

02:38:25 to help mitigate against um

02:38:28 um against their welfare concerns, against their how their family have suffered and particularly of course how women have suffered

02:38:40 how women have suffered because of what they did. Um those women th those women need our apology. Um

02:38:51 apology. Um because they there's been an huge intrusion into their life and I'm sure that they were never the same again. So yes, of course. At the time, was the risk of sexual

02:39:04 At the time, was the risk of sexual relationships undercover considered at all or mitigated um for during the the the cheers authorization or review process? Did it ever come into your mind

02:39:16 process? Did it ever come into your mind at the time? No. Perhaps it should have done, but no, it didn't.

02:39:27 So, I'm conscious of the time. Is that [clears throat] a good moment for the lunch break? Certainly. If you've reached a natural pause, then we'll um break for lunch. Thank you, sir. Um we'll resume please um as soon before

02:39:41 Um we'll resume please um as soon before two as we reasonably can. Can I suggest um 3 minutes two? Thank you, sir.