Afternoon session of Day 27 (Tranche 3, Phase 3) continuing the evidence of Sir David Veness (HN144), former Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police with oversight of Special Branch and the SDS. Counsel to the Inquiry examines Veness's knowledge of the 2003-04 civil litigation brought by Peter Francis and HN123, the Gold Group's handling of that litigation, disclosures of SDS misconduct including sexual relationships, deceased children's identities and surveillance of the Stephen Lawrence campaign and elected politicians, failures of training and oversight, and the impact on women deceived by undercover officers. Veness repeatedly says he has no recollection of being told the detail, while conceding in general terms that the SDS's practices and the Met's handling of the litigation fell well short of what was required.
00:24:05 Good afternoon everybody. This afternoon's proceedings like this morning's are being livereamed after a 15minute delay. Those with mobile telephones may use them to report what they hear in the hearing room, but only
00:24:17 they hear in the hearing room, but only after 15 minutes have elapsed since the event that they're reporting. They may not be used for recording or photography. Mr. Bar, thank you, sir. Sir David, the point you were making before we broke for lunch
00:24:30 were making before we broke for lunch was that you hadn't seen the document signing off the decision to relocate uh former Sergeant Dyn.
00:24:43 uh former Sergeant Dyn. I haven't got that document for you, but I do have something I would draw your attention to. MPS-0011371
00:25:04 This is a prog a file note with a progress report on the 23rd of December 2002. If I could draw your attention to the top bullet point,
00:25:17 the top bullet point, Commander Roger Pierce briefed AXO at 14:30 today. Ray authority to reimburse costs of JD's relocation agreed in principle but not yet signed needs to be
00:25:29 principle but not yet signed needs to be kept updated on prospective costs. RP spoke to and we've redacted the name to inform him Ray the above. So it appears
00:25:40 inform him Ray the above. So it appears that Commander Pierce briefed you at half 2 on the 23rd of December 2002. Does that ring any bells? It doesn't, but I've got no doubt that took place.
00:25:52 but I've got no doubt that took place. Yeah. And the note isn't clear about whether you were briefed with or without any written documents. Can I can I take it at this removing time? You can't help us with that.
00:26:03 us with that. No, it it sounds as if the basis was an oral uh briefing supplemented by some extra details. Agreed in principle, but not yet signed.
00:26:14 Agreed in principle, but not yet signed. So that suggests that there would have been a signed document at some point. That's correct. At which you may or may not have been given
00:26:23 given further written material to consider. Correct.
00:26:28 Correct. I think that's as far as we can take that point. But if we can take that document down now, we're going to move to another topic. This is the litigation that was brought against the
00:26:39 that was brought against the commissioner by two uh SDS officers who were called by the court A and B were in fact Peter Francis and HN123.
00:26:53 fact Peter Francis and HN123. [snorts]
00:26:56 Can you recall that litigation? No, I can't. Oh, I should outline to you then that the basis of the claim brought by these two SDS officers was that the
00:27:07 by these two SDS officers was that the Metropolitan Police Service had breached its duty of care to those officers uh and occasioned them psychiatric injury
00:27:18 and occasioned them psychiatric injury as a result. Um the basis being the SDS had not looked after their mental health properly.
00:27:29 after their mental health properly. I want to take you first of all to Mr. Francis's witness statement made for the purposes of the litigation and I'm then
00:27:40 purposes of the litigation and I'm then going to take you to some managerial documents which refer to the statements. If we could have up please 726970
00:28:00 If we have the next page please, you will see that this is the witness statement of uh Peter Francis, officer
00:28:11 statement of uh Peter Francis, officer A, signed on the 18th of November, 2003.
00:28:17 2003. if you could hold that date in in mind. This witness statement contains disclosures about the SDS which cover
00:28:28 disclosures about the SDS which cover many topics. uh the existence of sensitive escort units, the location of SDS headquarters,
00:28:39 headquarters, uh the use of deceased children's identities, the commission of crime undercover, and um so forth. I'm not going to take you to every single
00:28:51 going to take you to every single disclosure, but I would like to take you to some of the more salient ones. If we go please to page 22
00:29:09 and if we look I'd like you to read 105 to 107 please. Yes.
00:30:06 Yes, thank you. So, assertions there of sexual activity under cover at least in part for the purposes of the job. If we could go now to page 26, please.
00:30:25 I'm going to invite you to read paragraph 128 when you get to the bottom of the page. If you ask for it to be uh turned over to read paragraph 129 as
00:30:36 turned over to read paragraph 129 as well, please
00:30:40 like me to read one to eight 128 and 129. One of my other tasks apart from the Y. Oh, sorry. Not to read it out. Read it to yourself. Oh, sorry. Thank you. I apologize.
00:31:13 Thank you. I read that. If we get Thank you. Go over the page.
00:31:27 Okay, thank you. So you see there that he is making assertions about gathering intelligence um about people supporting various justice campaigns
00:31:38 justice campaigns including um the Steven Lawrence campaign, isn't he? Yes.
00:31:44 Yes. And if we take this statement down now and could we have up please 726971. [snorts]
00:32:03 Thank you. This is officer B's uh witness statement in the same litigation. If we could have first of all page eight
00:32:18 Paragraph 22.
00:32:42 Thank you. So, this is a disclosure that Detective Sergeant Chitty had a girlfriend who was an activist uh when Detective Sergeant Chitty was deployed, isn't it?
00:32:57 Sergeant Chitty was deployed, isn't it? That's on the page. Yes. And if we go to page 12 please
00:33:11 to paragraph 37. Seven.
00:33:28 Thank you. And it appears that from the on the face of this, what is being asserted is Detective Sergeant Trevor Morris, another SDS undercover
00:33:41 Trevor Morris, another SDS undercover police officer, had a quote weary partner who we're calling be with whom he had been living. So an assertion
00:33:52 he had been living. So an assertion there of a romantic relationship, isn't it?
00:33:57 it? Yeah, that is the assertion. Yes.
00:34:02 We'll come back to all of this in a moment. Um, but first of all, I want to show you 749706.
00:34:13 We're moving now to records
00:34:18 records of the operation magma gold group which is on this occasion meeting on the 20th of January 2004.
00:34:32 It's the group that's dealing with the response to the litigation. [snorts]
00:34:37 [snorts] Uh
00:34:39 Uh I'll show you this page just to so you can orientate yourself. You are not listed as a person present. that if we go to page five,
00:34:57 paragraph 14, one of the decisions recorded in this document is that you are to be briefed on developments.
00:35:10 on developments. Commander Williams, Janet Williams, uh was a very able indeed officer uh who had recently been appointed uh to commander SB uh and I had complete
00:35:21 commander SB uh and I had complete confidence in her. So I have no doubt what it said there is true. Yeah, we will. There is in the next meeting note confirmation that she had uh briefed you. Can we go back to page
00:35:32 uh briefed you. Can we go back to page one?
00:35:41 And under the heading introduction, so Commander Williams outlined the overall objectives of the goal group were to protect the integrity of the
00:35:52 were to protect the integrity of the MPS, ensure the benefits of SDS as an intelligence gathering operation were not lost to the MPS.
00:36:03 MPS. Were you made aware that these were the overall objectives of the gold group responding to the litigation? Not that I can recall, but knowing Janet
00:36:14 Not that I can recall, but knowing Janet Williams, I would place a benign interpretation on her comments. What would you understand by the integrity of the MPS?
00:36:26 integrity of the MPS? the overall uh ambiencece of operations in the public interest by those concerned.
00:36:37 those concerned. As far as you are aware, were the claims made in the witness statements of officers A and B investigated at this stage? We saw that Mr. Francis's
00:36:50 stage? We saw that Mr. Francis's statement was dated November 2003. This is January 2004. No, I don't know.
00:37:01 No, I don't know. Cuz in the face of it, this litigation is being defended to protect the SDS as an intelligence gathering operation and
00:37:14 an intelligence gathering operation and there is no suggestion that the allegations of misconduct are being investigated. I can't comment on that.
00:37:26 If we look at the background synopsis section next, please.
00:37:37 I'll give you a moment to look at that.
00:37:52 Thank you. So it's clear from the background synopsis that the court was taking steps to protect the public
00:38:03 was taking steps to protect the public interest whilst allowing the litigation to proceed, wasn't it? As I understand it, yes. And that is exactly what you would expect a court to do, isn't it?
00:38:14 expect a court to do, isn't it? Yes.
00:38:16 Yes. Were you told about that? Not that I'm aware. This appears to be very detailed issues. Was it your understanding though that the proceedings were being conducted in
00:38:29 the proceedings were being conducted in a manner that was safe for the public interest?
00:38:32 interest? I presume so. Yes. Could we look at page three, please?
00:38:42 Paragraph four. This is about risk assessments.
00:38:52 I'll let you read it.
00:39:05 Thank you. Can you help us uh with what the potential impact on the wider MPS of the deployments of Morris and HN81
00:39:18 deployments of Morris and HN81 uh refers to? No, I can't because they appear to have led to a regrading as critical.
00:39:29 led to a regrading as critical. We saw from the witness statement what was said about Morris and 81. Well, implicitly about 81 reporting on
00:39:42 implicitly about 81 reporting on black justice campaigns and in Morris's case doing that and sexual relationship. Was it the potential impact on the wider
00:39:53 Was it the potential impact on the wider MPS of those re revelations coming out uh that was causing concern? I'm afraid I don't don't have sufficient
00:40:04 I'm afraid I don't don't have sufficient recollection to form any view. What else would it be uh in relation to these two officers in particular?
00:40:16 these two officers in particular? I'm not sure. And the
00:40:20 And the rest of that bullet point makes clear that the
00:40:25 that the safety of the officers is a separate report separate consideration to MPS vulnerability. What was your what is your understanding
00:40:37 What was your what is your understanding of what vulnerability MPS vulnerability is referring to? I can't recall what was meant by the those who authored those words
00:40:50 those who authored those words in the briefing that you received. Was anything said to the effect that it might be any of reporting on black justice campaigns, officers having sex
00:41:04 justice campaigns, officers having sex in their undercover identities, or using deceased children's identities? Afraid not. I I've got no recollection
00:41:16 on the basis of what I showed you from the witness statements and what I told you in summary. Uh they say are those
00:41:27 you in summary. Uh they say are those concerns that should have been brought to your attention.
00:41:34 I I would need to know uh more detail about to which extent these were linked uh and for example uh senior officers were aware of of those materials. Well,
00:41:49 were aware of of those materials. Well, on the face of it, this group is dealing with the litigation uh and uh the litigation involves witness statements which make serious
00:42:01 witness statements which make serious allegations. Assuming those witness statements had been read when you were briefed, would you be ex would you have expected
00:42:12 you be ex would you have expected uh the efficient Commander Williams to have communicated to you that allegations of this nature were being made.
00:42:22 made. The element that I'm missing from what what you're saying is that it's not clear to me that there is a certain read over from the contents of the witness
00:42:33 over from the contents of the witness statements to the notes that are being made at the gold group. Uh if we forget that little complication, there is litigation against the MPS in
00:42:45 there is litigation against the MPS in which two officers are making very serious allegations about the way in which the SDS has been conducting itself. Would you expect
00:42:56 conducting itself. Would you expect those to have been drawn to your attention? I I'm not, if I may, just to go back a second, uh I I cannot uh yet make the logical and certain deduction
00:43:09 make the logical and certain deduction that the contents of the witness statements were being aware may made aware to the gold group or they had read those statements. Well, let's assume they did. For the
00:43:21 Well, let's assume they did. For the purpose of my question, would you expect those concerns to have been raised with you
00:43:30 you if the the contents of those witness statements had made itself into the deliberations of the gold group and were known to its members, then there were
00:43:41 known to its members, then there were issues there which should have been brought to my attention.
00:43:51 And Commander Williams being the excellent officer that I think you were describing her as, you would have, even if you can't remember it now, you would
00:44:02 if you can't remember it now, you would have expected if she'd read the statements or knew about their content that she would have told you. If the word if means that she did uh and
00:44:13 If the word if means that she did uh and that she was aware, then I would have expected to be told. But I'm not uh convinced I'm afraid that there is a certain nexus between the witness statements and the gold group.
00:44:25 statements and the gold group. The next bullet point says the meeting discussed the possibility of A or B seeking alternative routes for disclosure and the potential for there having access to other material as a
00:44:37 having access to other material as a result of their SDS postings. Do you recall Commander Williams raising with you concerns
00:44:48 you concerns that A or B might make unauthorized disclosures? No recollection whatsoever.
00:45:00 And then if we look at the final bullet point, the meeting agreed that there is a need to ensure the current tasking process for SDS deployments are defensible and lawful and recordkeeping is fit for purpose. So it appears that
00:45:13 is fit for purpose. So it appears that the remedial action is to focus on the process for tasking going forward. No mention of any forensic investigation
00:45:26 No mention of any forensic investigation of the allegations. Not on this wording. No. And were you ever made aware of any intention forensically to investigate the allegations?
00:45:37 the allegations? No.
00:45:39 No. Could [snorts] we go to um decision six on this same page, please?
00:45:51 In fact, if we have six, seven, and eight all up together, please. So, this is a record of the decisions. detailed briefing notes to be completed on the deployments, contracts, tasking
00:46:03 deployments, contracts, tasking objectives, authorities, etc. in respect of Morris and HN81. So, there appears to be a particular focus on these two officers and what
00:46:14 focus on these two officers and what they had been doing in their deployments, doesn't there? Yes.
00:46:19 Yes. Can you recall whether that was drawn to your attention? Absolutely not. And I'd be very surprised if it did. Seven. Inquire is to be made to establish whether officers A or B are
00:46:30 establish whether officers A or B are planning disclosures outside of the statements already submitted. Up to this point, they'd acted entirely properly, hadn't they, seeking recourse to law?
00:46:41 hadn't they, seeking recourse to law? I I I don't know. Do you know? Well, you're not suggesting, are you, that um a police officer seeking recourse to law is in any way improper?
00:46:53 is in any way improper? No.
00:46:55 No. Did you were you aware of any reason to suspect that A or B was planning to make an unauthorized disclosure?
00:47:11 I'm sorry. Am I missing a question? Were you aware of any any ground for suspecting that either A or B was planning to make an
00:47:22 or B was planning to make an unauthorized disclosure? No, as I say, I I had no recollection of the sort of detail uh that you're quoting.
00:47:33 quoting. Yeah.
00:47:35 Yeah. In that case, please just note the next paragraph. for review to be undertaken of current MPSB mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection against support groups. That appears to be a reference
00:47:47 groups. That appears to be a reference back to the support groups referred to in the witness statement, doesn't it? I'm not sure. Can we go to page four on paragraph six,
00:47:58 Can we go to page four on paragraph six, please?
00:48:13 So we have seen that you at the end of this document that you're going to be briefed about developments but it is but it is clear isn't it that otherwise the
00:48:24 it is clear isn't it that otherwise the circle of people who know about this litigation is going to be kept very tight indeed isn't it? what it says. Yes.
00:48:33 Yes. And the practical effect of that is that very few people would have known about the allegations of misconduct and concerning practices that had been
00:48:44 concerning practices that had been raised.
00:48:45 raised. Assume that to be correct. Could we have 749712 please?
00:49:00 Now this is the next record
00:49:05 record of a
00:49:07 of a magma goal group meeting record of their third meeting on the 12th of February 2004.
00:49:18 2004. If we go first of all to page three in paragraph uh 14, this is where it confirms that Commander
00:49:30 this is where it confirms that Commander Williams had briefed you on the 20th of January, the day of the last meeting. Can I take it from your answers that you can no longer recall what your reaction
00:49:41 can no longer recall what your reaction to that briefing was? That's correct. I I can't recall. Did you ever see the witness statements of A or B? I had no recollection and I can't
00:49:54 I had no recollection and I can't imagine there will be a reason for it to be referred to me.
00:50:03 Were you kept informed of the progress of this litigation thereafter? Not that I can recall except in the most general of a headline terms.
00:50:22 We can
00:50:26 for the moment whether or not you you had been briefed in detail. Would you agree that somebody should have taken
00:50:39 that somebody should have taken immediate action to investigate the allegations being made by officers A and B?
00:50:48 B? Forgive me. This is my uh point of difficulty. I'm not aware uh of what knowledge there was and who by of the contents of the witness statements. It
00:51:00 contents of the witness statements. It sounds to me as if there are almost two distinct issues. One, the legal litigation, and B, the goal group. Well, let let me put it this way. The
00:51:12 let let me put it this way. The Metropolitan Police Service receives witness statements recounting a series of very serious
00:51:24 a series of very serious misconduct. Somebody should have ensured that it was investigated, shouldn't they? I'm not sure who was the recipient.
00:51:35 I'm not sure who was the recipient. Whereabouts within the organization if it was received?
00:51:42 We know that it was received by the Met and
00:51:49 we know that the gold group was dealing with it.
00:51:57 Do you disagree with the basic proposition that these allegations having been made, they ought to have been investigated in the theoretical that's correct. But I
00:52:10 in the theoretical that's correct. But I I I I forgive me for my repetition. Uh but I'm not making a link between the witness statements uh and somebody who is authorized to take action.
00:52:23 is authorized to take action. [clears throat] Should
00:52:27 somebody have made that link? I don't know. I've seen these very concerning allegations. I should pass them on to the people who are responsible for investigating this sort of thing. I think that is uh forgive me,
00:52:40 I think that is uh forgive me, supposition would be the wrong word, but it it is a leap between the statements uh and some actioning authority. Could
00:52:53 Could we go to section [snorts] one numbered paragraph one please? We go back to page one.
00:53:09 This is review of decisions actions from previous meeting. the continuing civil action and the potential impact of disclosure of the statements will be treated as a critical incident.
00:53:21 treated as a critical incident. Commander Williams will be gold. It's clear from that, isn't it? Uh that the statements were in the mind of the gold
00:53:33 statements were in the mind of the gold group and what they were concerned about was the further disclosure of their contents.
00:53:40 contents. That's what it says. I agree, but but I had no recollection of that. And so serious was the potential for a for disclosure of those statements being
00:53:52 for disclosure of those statements being taken that it was assessed to be critical.
00:53:57 critical. That's what it says. Yes. Can we go to numbered paragraph four?
00:54:06 compre comprehensive risk assessments to be completed on the impact if the statements became known to a wider audience.
00:54:15 audience. DI53 has completed interim risk assessments on the officers named and a further in respect of back office staff. No further activity can take place at
00:54:26 No further activity can take place at this time until further dissemination is authorized. [snorts] So risk assessments are being carried out, aren't they? That's what it says. Yes. If we go to page two, paragraph six,
00:54:45 detailed briefing notes to be completed on the deployment, contracts, tasking, objectives, authorities, etc. in respect of Morrison HN81. It's what we saw referred to in the last notes. Here it's
00:54:56 referred to in the last notes. Here it's saying a report has been submitted to Commander Williams by DIHN53. Can you recall if uh that fact and their
00:55:07 Can you recall if uh that fact and their contents was in any way communicated to you?
00:55:11 you? No, I've got no recollection. It may I I don't know with precision what took place at the time, but I've got absolutely no recollection. What was the purpose of Commander
00:55:22 What was the purpose of Commander Williams briefing you? In general terms, uh the the product of the gold group. And so would it have amounted in general terms to this claim
00:55:36 amounted in general terms to this claim has been brought, these allegations have been made. We are taking steps to protect the integrity of the MPS and the ongoing operations of of that unit.
00:55:49 ongoing operations of of that unit. In broad terms, that sounds reasonable.
00:55:54 Can we go to paragraph seven on this same page, please?
00:56:04 Inquir is to be made to establish whether officers A or B are planning disclosures outside the statements already submitted. The report submitted to Commander Williams advising no covert
00:56:17 to Commander Williams advising no covert action should be undertaken at this time. Were you aware that somebody had at least addressed their mind to the
00:56:29 least addressed their mind to the question whether to take covert action against A or B? No, I've got no recollection.
00:56:40 Are you able to help us with why A and B were being treated with such suspicion? With apologies. I I can't add anything.
00:56:52 With apologies. I I can't add anything. There's a flavor here that A and B are being treated as traitors for having the timmerity to exercise their legal rights.
00:57:03 rights. Would it be fair to say that the MPS was extremely
00:57:08 extremely defensive about its officers going to court?
00:57:13 court? I really can't give an intelligent question or answer to that question. [snorts]
00:57:19 [snorts] Can we go to paragraph 8, please?
00:57:26 We're picking up the recommendation from the last document. A review to be undertaken of current MPSB mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection against support groups.
00:57:38 against support groups. And a report has been submitted to Commander Williams. Uh, I appreciate uh what the answer is likely to be, but I must ask anyway. Can you recall being
00:57:49 must ask anyway. Can you recall being told anything about a report on the mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection against support groups? No, I'm afraid I can't.
00:58:01 No, I'm afraid I can't. I have no knowledge. This does suggest that the goal group was alive to concerns
00:58:12 to concerns that officers had been tasked against support groups, doesn't it? I I'm afraid I can't offer a a
00:58:23 I I'm afraid I can't offer a a probitative response. Can we go to page three, paragraph 11?
00:58:43 This appears to be further evidence of a high degree of suspicion about A and B, doesn't it? I understand that you made that
00:58:54 I understand that you made that interpretation. Yes. very defensive behavior by the MPS. That that is your interpretation. I I cannot assist whether that's true or
00:59:05 cannot assist whether that's true or false. [snorts] When you were contacted and informed about this matter by Commander Williams, did you endorse a very defensive strategy?
00:59:17 strategy? No, I I can't imagine that I gave uh any specific guidance about which strategy uh in terms of pose they should pursue. Uh Commander Williams was a very able
00:59:29 Uh Commander Williams was a very able officer and I was very confident that she will be pursuing an appropriate goal.
00:59:36 goal. Would you agree with the proposition that the contents of the witness statement contain material which falls into two categories? material about covert police operations that must in
00:59:49 covert police operations that must in the public interest be kept secret on the one hand and material about misconduct which ought not to be covered up
01:00:01 ought not to be covered up for the face that you you I agree your comment [snorts] and the allegations of wrongdoing if they had got into the public domain
01:00:12 if they had got into the public domain in 2003
01:00:14 in 2003 would have been very damaging for the Met, wouldn't they? On the face of it, yes. I should have said 2004, but I don't think that changes the answer.
01:00:25 think that changes the answer. Okay.
01:00:27 Okay. Uh especially the matters relating to spying on black justice support groups. Yes.
01:00:35 Yes. And the sexual misconduct. Yes.
01:00:39 Yes. And the use of deceased children's identities.
01:00:47 Yes. Now, all of those matters were already known about to some extent within MPS, weren't they?
01:00:58 weren't they? There are certainly suggestions uh that I've now been aware that there was a degree of knowledge. I I'm unaware of which to what extent that was in any way
01:01:10 which to what extent that was in any way known generally. Well, you were aware of the use of deceased children's identities be and you'd seen rep you knew that HN81 was deployed. You'd seen
01:01:21 knew that HN81 was deployed. You'd seen a report um based on his intelligence mentioning the Lawrenes and on the sex matters. We've explored several uh allegations. For example, the
01:01:33 several uh allegations. For example, the Chitty allegations, the Chitty deception was plainly well known within the SDS, wasn't it? What you say? I agree.
01:01:45 Nothing further appears to have been done internally to investigate this or to hold anyone responsible for that past misconduct. Was there any discussion at all of
01:01:56 Was there any discussion at all of whether that should happen? Not that I'm aware. No. I want to give you the opportunity to respond to the proposition that your response to this litigation
01:02:09 that your response to this litigation along with that of others was a cover up.
01:02:15 up. I would refute that completely. uh I'm not aware uh that I had detailed knowledge o of this litigation and a cover up which enabled the SDS to
01:02:27 and a cover up which enabled the SDS to continue for almost another four years with minimal challenge to the way it was operating. I I again would repeat uh my reserve
01:02:39 I I again would repeat uh my reserve that the the cover up is the wrong word. All I can reply is on my own knowledge and my own knowledge was that I was not close to the details of this litigation
01:02:50 close to the details of this litigation and the lack of any action to investigate the allegations of wrongdoing delayed justice in respect of past wrongs
01:03:02 wrongs um that were drawn to the MPS's attention by Francis and HN123. Without further detail of of what was the precise passage of information, I I
01:03:16 the precise passage of information, I I really can't comment on.
01:03:20 Can we take that down now, please? And could we have 749288, please?
01:03:33 This is an attendance note by the Directorate of Legal Services of the Met Metropolitan Police Service dated the 14th of September
01:03:44 14th of September 2004
01:03:46 2004 because it contains legal advice. It's very heavily redacted indeed to protect legal professional privilege. Can we go to page two, please?
01:04:00 And look, could you expand the text there please
01:04:18 HB that we understand to be a reference to John Dyn and HS a reference to Helen Steel.
01:04:27 Steel. It appears that at this meeting with lawyers, HN53, the detective inspector in the SDS, said that there had been, but that John Dyn had maintained its objectivity. Janet Williams, as we
01:04:40 objectivity. Janet Williams, as we understand that acronym to stand for, said that such a relationship would not have been dis disapproved of then, although it is
01:04:51 although it is now.
01:04:54 now. Were you told about this? I'm afraid that the legal documentation and legal discussion uh is even further
01:05:06 and legal discussion uh is even further from my knowledge uh of the actual litigation. I I can't imagine that I would have been aware of that. Well, this document appears to show that Commander Williams knew that Helen Steel
01:05:20 Commander Williams knew that Helen Steel and John Dyn had been in a sexual relationship, doesn't it? It on the face of it. But I would need to know what Janet Williams thought of
01:05:31 to know what Janet Williams thought of that comment. We'll be finding that out tomorrow when she gives evidence. Uh but my question at this stage is assuming we are right
01:05:42 at this stage is assuming we are right to understand that she knew, would you have expected her to pass up the chain of command to you the fact that John Dyn
01:05:53 of command to you the fact that John Dyn had been in a sexual relationship with Helen Steel? If it was a fact uh on the the bold facts that you are relating to me, I I would have expected to be told. I'm not
01:06:05 would have expected to be told. I'm not sure that that is the truth.
01:06:12 And what standard of proof would be required? By which I mean if there was even a strong a suspicion a reasonable suspicion that that had happened. Surely
01:06:24 suspicion that that had happened. Surely that would have been uh an important fact to communicate to you. a strong suspicion would fall into the category of that which would have been preferable
01:06:35 of that which would have been preferable for me to be informed. And here, whoever's written the note has noted it in unequivocal terms, haven't they?
01:06:43 they? Yes. But I can't comment about whether it's true.
01:06:57 Were you ever the subject or party to any discussion about whether or not sexual misconduct was still going on within the SDS
01:07:09 within the SDS at this point in time, namely 2004? Not that I'm aware.
01:07:19 On the face of this record and the disclosure of past misconduct, something should have been done to investigate, shouldn't it?
01:07:31 investigate, shouldn't it? If it's correct, as you are stating, then it would have been a platform for action.
01:07:37 action. Well, we do know that Helen Steel and John Dyn did have a sexual relationship. Yes. If that was known,
01:07:53 would that have been a startling revelation to you? It it would have been a complete surprise.
01:08:01 surprise. It's a reality that the SDS was regarded as an exceptional unit of exceptional value such that sexual relationships were overlooked and tolerated.
01:08:15 were overlooked and tolerated. It was regarded as we now know as an exceptional unit. Uh and as I mentioned earlier today uh it led uh to a certain specialization
01:08:26 specialization uh and immense security which we now know was inappropriate in the circumstances. Was the reality uh that uh for those in
01:08:37 Was the reality uh that uh for those in the chain of command including you the end justified the means? that that's the reverse of the case.
01:08:48 What other explanation is there for the complete lack of action uh in the face of these disclosures of misconduct?
01:08:59 I'm not uh able to follow your logic to where I can give a sensible answer. I I'm not aware that these
01:09:10 answer. I I'm not aware that these details were known by those who could take positive action. Can we take that down now, please? Can we have up MPS uh it's 50 it's an underscore MPS_5039
01:09:26 uh it's 50 it's an underscore MPS_5039 please. Tab B346. Uh page five.
01:09:42 This is um part of HN 58's evidence
01:09:53 evidence from a meeting he had with Operation Hearn officers. I would like could we have expanded please the section under the heading sexual relationships whilst
01:10:05 the heading sexual relationships whilst deployed.
01:10:11 I invite you to read that. You'll see when you get near the bottom that you are referred to. Um [snorts] once you've read it, I'll ask the question. Thank you very much.
01:10:43 I'm afraid I don't recognize the context in which this is been written. Well, he's been interviewed by officers from Operation Hearn. He's been asked about sexual relationships by undercover
01:10:56 about sexual relationships by undercover officers whilst deployed. You'll see in the second paragraph he's saying that he would not have been shocked if he'd been informed about such a relationship. And
01:11:07 informed about such a relationship. And if he did know about relationship, he would have been unlikely to have stopped it. And then he goes on to say two
01:11:19 And then he goes on to say two paragraphs below, he could not tell us about any written instructions, but he would have covered his own back by going up the chain of supervision.
01:11:31 up the chain of supervision. Colin Black said Vaness meaning Dave Vaness former AXO was quite realistic in these concerns and that he was more concerned around the cover.
01:11:45 concerned around the cover. The interpretation appears to be that you were sanguin about sexual relationships conducted by UCOs under
01:11:57 relationships conducted by UCOs under cover.
01:11:58 cover. That's the reverse of the case.
01:12:03 Did Colin Black ever disclose to you that he either knew or suspected that any sexual activity had occurred between an SDS Uco
01:12:15 activity had occurred between an SDS Uco and anyone else in their cover identity? No.
01:12:23 Can we take that down now, please? I want to move now in more general terms to the topic of training of SDSUs.
01:12:34 to the topic of training of SDSUs. What was your understanding of how they were trained? Mainly uh on the job uh and from officers who perfor performed those
01:12:45 officers who perfor performed those duties previously uh and other experience within the unit. We now know that's totally inappropriate and we should have applied uh the various
01:12:56 should have applied uh the various training developments that had occurred in the tri crime field. Um
01:13:03 Um can you help us with who you understood to be responsible for training SDS officers?
01:13:11 officers? I'm afraid I can't give you a name. I I assume that was within the unit. And who was responsible for oversight ensuring it was effective? Presumably the command chain of command
01:13:24 Presumably the command chain of command of SDS.
01:13:27 of SDS. Up to your level or below your level or above your level? I would have thought uh primarily within the unit itself. Uh I think that was up to chief inspector uh and more broadly
01:13:38 to chief inspector uh and more broadly uh within the overall command of special branch.
01:13:42 branch. Now you've referred to the training for evidential officers and we can all see that there may be some of the content that would have been um useful for
01:13:54 that would have been um useful for evidential deployments as well particularly about the legal context and legal obligations. But didn't it call for more than just
01:14:06 But didn't it call for more than just applying
01:14:08 applying evidential learning? It required a bespoke training course for intelligence gathering operations, didn't it?
01:14:19 didn't it? Of course, you're right. There were elements within the crime uh evidential chain that were applicable in the uh purely evidential ch uh training
01:14:30 purely evidential ch uh training requirement. But it was much more complicated than that. uh and there were a whole raft of issues which were relation to the structure uh of SDS undercover evidential operations which
01:14:43 undercover evidential operations which required their own bespoke arrangements and shouldn't that have been apparent at the time to those who were responsible
01:14:54 the time to those who were responsible for
01:14:56 for training the officers and those responsible for oversight. Yes. as we look back uh as I mentioned as early as my apology today that was an
01:15:07 as early as my apology today that was an obvious admission and it was an opportunity that we should have taken. Can we go now to 736907
01:15:26 page five please? This is a review uh by Richard Walton of the SDS and it's dated March 200
01:15:39 March 200 and four. If we could have page five, paragraph 7, please
01:15:53 give you a moment to read it all, but it's the second bullet point that I'm going to focus on. Yes.
01:16:00 Yes. That suggests that you occasionally saw Ripper authorities for the SDS. Can you recall ever doing so? No, I think the uh
01:16:12 recall ever doing so? No, I think the uh the normal process of uh of authorization by Ripper would be depending upon the level of authority or rank that was required to attend to. So
01:16:24 rank that was required to attend to. So there were some ripper or authorities uh which came to the assistant commissioner both uh from the crime uh and from the evident the non-evidential side. I think
01:16:36 evident the non-evidential side. I think from the STS side uh they would be extremely rare. Uh in fact I've got no recollection of them. Well that was what I was driving at is can you help us whether whether this is
01:16:48 can you help us whether whether this is factually correct or not. I I I think broadly uh the statement about raper authorizations is correct. Uh I think the or the AXO reference uh would
01:16:59 think the or the AXO reference uh would have been very very rare. Could we have page 91 please?
01:17:14 Try page nine then. I'm looking for paragraph 31.
01:17:22 Thank you. Paragraph 31 under the heading compliance with Ripper.
01:17:34 That suggests that um there was an inspection by the surveillance commissioners in June 2003 wide enough to encompass inspection of SDS uh
01:17:47 to encompass inspection of SDS uh paperwork. Did you have any involvement with that? I'm not aware. Uh I had read very regular contact with the surveillance commissioners and their office uh at
01:17:59 commissioners and their office uh at that time because we were all engaged in the evolution of Ripper. Uh I'm not sure uh to what extent the surveillance commissioners uh were able to uh achieve
01:18:12 commissioners uh were able to uh achieve a comprehensive review uh within Ripper. As we know uh there were deficiencies in what we would want now to be the position for RIPER authorities uh in a
01:18:23 position for RIPER authorities uh in a non-evidential context. It appears from the face of this uh document that the exercise was a paper exercise. Are you able to help us one
01:18:36 exercise. Are you able to help us one way or the other as to whether surveillance commissioner inspections in this era were paper only? I'm not sure. I I wouldn't perhaps use uh as
01:18:49 sure. I I wouldn't perhaps use uh as a term paper only. Uh but it clearly did not disclose the issues that we knew were problems. Indeed, and there were issues ongoing at this time. I appreciate um you're not a
01:19:02 this time. I appreciate um you're not a surveillance commissioner, but as a senior police officer, can you help us uh with anything that might explain why the surveillance commissioners didn't at
01:19:14 the surveillance commissioners didn't at this stage uh find any of the problems? I think it was by looking back uh I would perhaps understand that these were
01:19:26 would perhaps understand that these were early stages uh of the actual operations uh of uh Ripper. Uh you'll recall in our discussions earlier on that the code of practice I think was 2002
01:19:39 practice I think was 2002 uh and there were evolving uh operational uh considerations which were flowing from that. So I I would put this down to the fact that we were at early stages. I'm absolutely convinced that
01:19:51 stages. I'm absolutely convinced that the surveillance commissioners uh are providing an absolutely vital and independent legal perspective uh which is part of the solution uh to properly
01:20:03 is part of the solution uh to properly run evidence non-evidential running operations. Can we go now to 722623 please?
01:20:17 Page 13. This is a report by the team of operation Hearn.
01:20:29 operation Hearn. If we could go your tab B358. So if we could go to page 17 please
01:20:38 in paragraph 3.3 under the heading governance of the SDS
01:21:01 is Is this a reference to the annual report or to Ripper? Forgive me. It's not entirely what this is saying is between 1989 in 2000 and of course you were AXO for a
01:21:15 2000 and of course you were AXO for a lot of that time the annual authorization for the operation of the SDS became the responsibility of AXO. And what I would like to know is
01:21:27 And what I would like to know is is this report correct that you were responsible annually for authorizing the operation of the SDS? I I think it's got a bit mangled. Uh I I
01:21:40 I think it's got a bit mangled. Uh I I certainly was engaged uh in overall management uh and oversight o of the SB and including uh the SDS. But I I'm not
01:21:53 and including uh the SDS. But I I'm not aware that I had a specific authorization. Would that not have fallen uh to the home office? Well, this is a point at which I need to
01:22:04 Well, this is a point at which I need to to ask the questions rather than give the evidence. I apologize. [laughter] Can you recall
01:22:13 making a decision annually to authorize the SDS? No, that's not my recollection of how the history unfolded. As I understand [clears throat] it, this was
01:22:25 understand [clears throat] it, this was a home office authorized operation which received an annual report uh which followed up on that decision. So, uh, my own
01:22:36 that decision. So, uh, my own recollection would be that if there was a question of an annual authorization as opposed to day-to-day o oversight, it it would not have been
01:22:47 o oversight, it it would not have been within the Metropolitan Police, but I may be historically correct for which I apologize. Yeah. Do you have any actual recollection of the Home Office being approached for authorization during your
01:23:00 approached for authorization during your tenure?
01:23:02 tenure? I assume that was the process which included the annual report. Yeah. But I I I I I may be at fault. Well, the question is do you have any positive recollection of that happening?
01:23:14 positive recollection of that happening? No, I don't. I I can tell you uh so far as documents are concerned uh the documentary record shows only home office authorization annually up
01:23:27 home office authorization annually up into the 1980s and not in not extending into the 1990s or naughties. Okay.
01:23:33 Okay. Do you have any any experience to again say that? I I ap No, nothing to say again. Uh but again I I have no specific recollection.
01:23:45 again I I have no specific recollection. Apologies. So far as the annual reports are concerned, can you help us? Do you know whether they were being sent
01:23:58 Do you know whether they were being sent to the Home Office in the 1990s or not? I I think they were being sent every year of my term of office. Can you recall ever getting a response?
01:24:10 Can you recall ever getting a response? Not that I can recall.
01:24:17 We have not found any paper trail to suggest that happened. Can you help us with how they were sent? I I assume uh they were dispatched uh
01:24:30 I I assume uh they were dispatched uh from either my office or the head of SB uh to a department within the home office for their information.
01:24:43 We've got a number of annual reports to which I'm going to turn in a moment. We've got a paper trail which puts the 1996
01:24:52 1996 97 annual report on the commissioner's desk. Is it your recollection that he saw more than that or or was it unusual to put the annual report on the
01:25:05 to put the annual report on the commissioner's desk? I think it was unusual. Uh I I recall seeing those documents around the annual reports uh over the years. Uh I think
01:25:16 reports uh over the years. Uh I think this one was truly uh in a a rarity and perhaps had been asked uh for that specific action to be pursued.
01:25:29 The SDS annual report was an important part of the process, wasn't it? Yes, it was. But perhaps uh less attention uh should have been devote or
01:25:42 attention uh should have been devote or was being devoted uh to every paragraph uh which it would have been wiser to pursue more diligently. [snorts]
01:25:50 [snorts] Does it follow that the accuracy of the contents were important? Yes.
01:25:56 Yes. Were they sorry it my apologies it was a report to home office uh which was our police authority. So it was important that it would be correct. Were the contents
01:26:08 would be correct. Were the contents tested by you in any way or were they taken on trust? Taken on trust. Uh and I should have devoted more attention that knowing what I know now uh to reading every paragraph
01:26:20 I know now uh to reading every paragraph would care. Uh we have uh recovered completed annual reports up to and including 1996
01:26:31 reports up to and including 1996 1997.
01:26:33 1997. And we have a draft report for 9798. Are you able to help us with whether there were in fact annual reports,
01:26:44 there were in fact annual reports, completed annual reports after 9697? Yes. My recollection is this was uh an annual process.
01:26:59 [snorts]
01:27:02 I could take you to the reports that we've recovered uh to question you about what they showed on their face and the concerns
01:27:16 showed on their face and the concerns that I would suggest to you that they ought to have given rise to. But I'm understanding your answer to me to be that you accept that you ought to have read them more closely and if you had
01:27:30 read them more closely and if you had they would have rung some alarm bells. That's undoubtedly the case. Uh they were in many ways uh almost a routine bureaucratic uh exercise which was the
01:27:41 bureaucratic uh exercise which was the wrong mode. uh knowing what we know now we should have been greatly more probitative and intrusive uh into what was being written.
01:27:52 was being written. There are two levels at which one can look at this. one can look at what the reports themselves say and what I am testing now is I'm understanding that
01:28:04 testing now is I'm understanding that you accept that even on the face of what was in front of you, you should have been more inquisitive and that that should have set alarm bells ringing.
01:28:16 should have set alarm bells ringing. That's undoubtedly the case. I I agree that's a correct position. And then there the other way of looking at it is if you had known the full
01:28:27 at it is if you had known the full horror
01:28:29 horror not disclosed in the reports themselves but the full catalog of what was going wrong uh in the SDS. That was utterly appalling, wasn't it?
01:28:41 appalling, wasn't it? Well, there may not have been annual reports if we'd known uh the true horror because we would uh have been in a position to take action or should have taken action earlier.
01:28:54 Can we take that down now please? Uh I want to explore at a very high level of generality um some comparisons between the SDS and the MPIU.
01:29:08 Now, you sat on the MPIU steering group, didn't you? I did. Uh, and I cease that activity as I I recall from the documents I've seen
01:29:21 I I recall from the documents I've seen uh at the time of 911 uh when the Twin Towers and other bombs occurred uh in the eastern United States because that became uh absolutely uh my priority and
01:29:33 became uh absolutely uh my priority and obsession. Understanding that 911 was a gamecher and that must have been it and its seculi must have been your priority. You
01:29:45 seculi must have been your priority. You did know that the Miu special operations unit was deploying undercover police officers. I think I did. And that they were recruited nationally.
01:29:58 And that they were recruited nationally. They were NUTAC trained. They operated within the national framework for covert activity and they operated almost entirely in the reaper age. And you're
01:30:11 entirely in the reaper age. And you're accurately describing the position. [snorts]
01:30:14 [snorts] Uh in contrast, the SDS recruiting from within special branch training in house informally.
01:30:25 informally. It was isolated and its operations straddled
01:30:31 straddled pre-reaper and reaper times. Yes, there was a stark contrast uh between the quality of operations. I I put it more broadly than crime operations I include within that
01:30:44 operations I include within that umbrella uh NOIU. Uh but that clearly uh was an opportunity that should have been addressed to make the two regimes more comparable.
01:30:57 It would be fair though to observe that notwithstanding those quite profound differences, much the same things went wrong.
01:31:08 much the same things went wrong. So
01:31:10 So both units used in deceased children's identities in the MO MPI use case at least once and in the SDS case regularly
01:31:24 least once and in the SDS case regularly until 1994. There were deceitful sexual relationships causing serious harm to others in both units. There were
01:31:35 others in both units. There were miscarriages of justice in both units. Questionable justification in many cases and there's serious psychiatric harm to undercover police officers in both
01:31:48 undercover police officers in both units. Do you agree in broad terms that much the same went wrong in both units? Do not agree with the accurate what accuracy of what you've just said.
01:31:59 accuracy of what you've just said. And what I'd like to explore with you is why is it that two units so very different in the ways we've explored
01:32:10 different in the ways we've explored have the same things going wrong. In other words, the more formal training for the MPIU officers, all the support from the national
01:32:21 all the support from the national framework didn't stop the same things happening. Why was that? because uh it's not merely structure uh
01:32:32 because uh it's not merely structure uh and the authorities uh and the legal requirements uh it's a whole raft of issues uh of which I would put uh experienced uh and extremely disciplined
01:32:44 experienced uh and extremely disciplined staff uh at the heart of the requirement uh for a confident undercover operation. Would one way of describing it be there
01:32:55 Would one way of describing it be there are cultural problems? Yes. Or problems with moral compass. Yes.
01:33:04 Yes. How do you change that in a large organization?
01:33:10 It's a formidable challenge. Uh I think it begins uh with selection uh and the approval of the basic arrangements uh for the operation. But at the heart of
01:33:24 for the operation. But at the heart of this [clears throat] are quality people uh who are fully prepared and supported uh and by a whole raft uh of arrangements uh which make their compass straight
01:33:37 their compass straight and how do you assure yourself that that has happened and continues to happen by a whole range uh of combined issues.
01:33:48 by a whole range uh of combined issues. But when I gave the illustration this morning of the distinction between crime and non-crime, it it's all of those uh and it's all of the elements which make
01:33:59 and it's all of the elements which make up the component parts uh of a properly conducted undercover uh operation. So David, those are my questions for the
01:34:10 So David, those are my questions for the moment. We have a process, sir, if we may uh to adjourn uh for the rule 10 questions. Certainly. How long should we do that for? Um
01:34:21 do that for? Um I will of course send word if if we beat this, but I'm estimating 20 minutes. Yes. Very well. Rise for up to 20 minutes.
01:53:24 Sir David, can I first of all ask for a section of the transcript to be brought up from just before we broke. Page [snorts] 123, lines 17 to 19, please.
01:53:41 You'll need to see the context. It was where I was asking you about the M the Miu
01:53:48 Miu and the SDS and I've asked you do you agree in broad terms that much the same went wrong in both units and you say I do not agree with the accuracy of what
01:53:59 do not agree with the accuracy of what you just said. Did you mean to say I do agree?
01:54:03 agree? Yes. I apologize if I'm misled. The knot should not be there. Well, I'm grateful to those more eagle-eyed than me who spotted that. Uh can I now ask you go back to the question? We can
01:54:15 ask you go back to the question? We can take that down now. Can I go back to the question of relocating John Dyn and we we've heard evidence that in the result uh as might have been expected it cost a
01:54:28 uh as might have been expected it cost a great deal of money. Was there any process for authorizing expenditure on that scale? Um by which I
01:54:40 expenditure on that scale? Um by which I mean were you entitled to authorize that scale of expenditure or did you have to seek authority from above? I think it with looking back I think it
01:54:51 I think it with looking back I think it was probably that I needed some authority from elsewhere within the organization but that is a guess. Uh I I can't give an accurate uh answer. Can you recall whether you needed to to
01:55:04 you recall whether you needed to to inform or to seek the um permission of the home office for that level of expenditure for that purpose? That's a possibility. Uh but I I can't be accurate. Or the Metropolitan Police Authority
01:55:18 Or the Metropolitan Police Authority uh or the the or one of the financial authorities within the Met the receiver. Yes. Or his his his staff. Yes.
01:55:30 Yes. Or his his his staff. Yes. Was the Greater London Authority uh informed?
01:55:34 informed? I'm not aware. No, but I'm not that it wasn't either that informed.
01:55:42 informed. We've
01:55:44 We've heard evidence of of many things that went wrong in the SDS. One of them was reporting on elected officials um undertaking entirely lawful political
01:55:56 um undertaking entirely lawful political activity. Would you agree that that is a matter of constitutional importance that the police should not spy on politicians making political speeches?
01:56:07 making political speeches? It is a matter of constitutional importance and it shouldn't have happened.
01:56:13 happened. I want to ask now about two of the women who were deceived by SDS officers. The first is a woman we're calling Rosa who was deceived by Detective Constable
01:56:26 was deceived by Detective Constable Boiling. Uh she uh made determined efforts to find him after he withdrew from his deployment,
01:56:37 from his deployment, including teleoning the SDS office. Were you told anything about uh a woman trying to find
01:56:48 trying to find uh Detective Constable Boiling? No, I was not. And similarly, a woman we're calling Allison was deceived into a long-term
01:56:59 Allison was deceived into a long-term sexual relationship by Detective Constable Jenner, and she too tried to find him after he exfiltrated from his uh deployment.
01:57:12 from his uh deployment. and the SDS was aware that she was trying to do so. Were you told that Allison was trying to find Jenna?
01:57:23 find Jenna? No, I was not. And it's a matter of regret that any harm uh befall that befell those officers those those partners uh via those relationships.
01:57:37 So those are all my questions. Yes. Is there any re-examination? No. Thank you, sir. Um, thank you very much for attending. Your evidence is now complete. Um,
01:57:52 it's taken slightly less time than I think we both anticipated. Grateful to you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, sir.
01:58:01 Tomorrow we will resume at 11:00 in the morning. Um, as those who were here on Friday will may remember, that is because I have to attend a medical
01:58:12 because I have to attend a medical appointment of my wife's. I'm very grateful for your forbearance in the matter. Thank you.