Sir David Veness, Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations from 1994-2005, opens his evidence with an expanded apology, singling out the SDS's 'culture of exceptionalism and secrecy' and the missed opportunity to apply RIPA safeguards to SDS operations. Counsel takes him through documentary evidence on the Chitty case, deceased children's identities, SDS reporting on the Steven Lawrence campaign, the True Spies BBC documentary, and the Thompson and HN123 misconduct cases; Veness repeatedly cites poor recollection - which he attributes partly to a subsequent five-year UN posting - while conceding with hindsight that numerous risks and abuses should have been identified and acted on at the time.
00:08:57 Good morning everybody. Today's proceedings will be livereamed with the usual 15 minutes delay. Those with mobile telephones may use them to report what they hear in the hearing room, but
00:09:08 what they hear in the hearing room, but only after 15 minutes have elapsed since the event that they're reporting. They may not be used for recording or photography. Yes.
00:09:19 Good morning, sir. Can you hear me? Okay.
00:09:30 Okay. Yes, I can. Okay. Could you please hold the Bible up in your right hand and repeat after me? I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give
00:09:42 that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth. the whole truth. the whole truth and nothing but the truth. and nothing but the truth. Thank you,
00:09:53 Thank you, Mr. Bart.
00:09:54 Mr. Bart. Thank you, sir. Could you tell us your full name, please?
00:09:58 please? David Christopher Vanesse. And are the contents of your first witness statement for this inquiry dated the 28th of May, 2025, true and correct
00:10:11 the 28th of May, 2025, true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?
00:10:13 belief? Yes, they are. Are the contents of your second witness statement for this inquiry dated the 2nd of December, 2025 true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?
00:10:25 knowledge and belief? Yes.
00:10:26 Yes. I understand before we go any further that you would like to make an apology. Yes, if I may. Forgive me reading this. In my first
00:10:39 Forgive me reading this. In my first statement, paragraph 8, I echo my apologies made on behalf of the Metropolan Police Service to everyone who was deceived into relationships with
00:10:50 who was deceived into relationships with SDS undercover officers. I also note and agree the comments of the current commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, in his opening statement, tranch 2, phase one.
00:11:03 opening statement, tranch 2, phase one. [snorts]
00:11:04 [snorts] Excuse me. In my statement, I expressed my apologies to those who were affected by these actions. There are specific extra issues which I
00:11:15 There are specific extra issues which I would now add [clears throat] to this previous apology. The first is support the views expressed by Lord Condan last week. I particularly endorse that his
00:11:27 week. I particularly endorse that his expression of regret is all-encompassing and applies to everyone impacted by this harm. I also support the trenchant views of John Grieve also of last week.
00:11:41 of John Grieve also of last week. Further, there are two important aspects which are more directly applicable to my specific role between 1994 and 2005 as
00:11:53 specific role between 1994 and 2005 as assistant commissioner specialist operations. One of these is the significance of the regulation of investigatory powers act ripper.
00:12:05 powers act ripper. This was a very important development balancing public security and human rights. [clears throat and snorts] Ripper was very significantly introduced
00:12:17 Ripper was very significantly introduced the novel dimension of independent high level legal legal engagement. This was a transformative step which provided the opportunity to strengthen strategic
00:12:31 opportunity to strengthen strategic oversight. I regret this was not pursued more vigorously by me. The second important aspect is the missed opportunity to extend the raft of
00:12:42 opportunity to extend the raft of provisions of safeguards applicable to evidential crime undercover deployments to SDS non-evidential activities. These
00:12:53 to SDS non-evidential activities. These are extensive and included welfare training and a wider supervisory regime. One key danger of SDS was its culture of
00:13:05 One key danger of SDS was its culture of exceptionalism and secrecy. [clears throat] Thus there are two major opportunities more rigorous implementation of RIP RIPER and greater application of
00:13:17 RIPER and greater application of provisions which existed or were emerging for evidential UC operations. Together these would have reduced the risk in the culture and practices of
00:13:30 risk in the culture and practices of SDS.
00:13:32 SDS. The combined and collective impact of these two opportunities would have produced major contextual possibilities. These included fundamental revision
00:13:43 These included fundamental revision perhaps cancellation of X SDS activities. I very much regret that these opportunities were not taken of the time and I wish to add these important extra
00:13:55 and I wish to add these important extra dimensions to my previous apologies. Thank you very much. So David, I I also understand that you wish to say something at the outset
00:14:06 wish to say something at the outset about the state of your memory. Yes, this relates and I feel guilty in mentioning but it's had a significant subsequent impact. Uh this is relates to
00:14:19 subsequent impact. Uh this is relates to my role at the UN subsequent to serving AXO and the impact that has had on my recollection of events. Immediately following my departure from the
00:14:31 following my departure from the Metropolitan Police in early 2005, I moved to New York to assume responsibility for the newly created United Nations Department of Safety and
00:14:43 United Nations Department of Safety and Security. I retired from the Metropolitan Police on a Friday and convinced my US UN duties in New York the following Monday.
00:14:54 the following Monday. The UN was a global depart. The UN DSS was a global department with worldwide opportunities that was established and built up in dire crisis conditions. It
00:15:07 built up in dire crisis conditions. It was created following an alqaeda attack on the UN headquarters in Iraq. My tenure in this role combi com coincided with the war in Afghanistan and numerous
00:15:19 with the war in Afghanistan and numerous other dire events across the world requiring my direct attention. As a result, my complete focus was on the creation and development of this new UN
00:15:31 creation and development of this new UN department. This was highly paced and highly pressurized work that ex necessary executive extensive travel to dangerous conflict jones. This lasted
00:15:43 dangerous conflict jones. This lasted for almost 5 years. It has regrettably caused a significant gap in my memory before those UN years. Thank you.
00:15:54 before those UN years. Thank you. Uh another preliminary before we go any further just for the transcript. I understand that you have a member of the commissioner's legal team with you, Mr.
00:16:05 commissioner's legal team with you, Mr. Sabah, and your wife, Lady Vaness. That is correct. You tell us in your witness statement that between approximately 1980
00:16:17 that between approximately 1980 and 1984, you were a commander in charge of public order. That is right. Uh during that period presumably the Brixham riots were the
00:16:29 presumably the Brixham riots were the standout public disorder event. Yes.
00:16:34 Yes. Can you help us with the legacy of those riots so far as race relations and public order were concerned within the MPS?
00:16:47 MPS? they raise the temperature and focus of both those dimensions, racism uh and public order. Can you recall what were your other main
00:17:01 Can you recall what were your other main concerns about public order during those years? Public safety was the primary concern. Was there any particular threat to
00:17:13 Was there any particular threat to public safety? No, they were from a variety of sources. It was an era of very large demonstrations organized by CND.
00:17:27 demonstrations organized by CND. Uh would it be fair to characterize those as large uh but cooperative with police?
00:17:34 police? Yes.
00:17:37 Yes. Can you recall receiving briefings from A8 about public order matters? I think so. Yes. And were you aware uh that they had
00:17:50 And were you aware uh that they had input from special branch intelligence? I assume so. And were you aware at that stage that part of the special branch input into A8
00:18:04 part of the special branch input into A8 uh document came from SDS intelligence? Not that I'm aware.
00:18:12 Uh, I want to move now to Detective Sergeant Mike Chitty. So, I'm moving forward to
00:18:23 forward to June 1994. I'm going to show you uh go through a number of documents to help refresh your memory before most of my questions. Can
00:18:35 memory before most of my questions. Can we go first to 726956, please?
00:18:46 to page four please.
00:18:52 This is a document entitled discussion paper SDS targeting strategy and deployment in relation to the animal liberation front. This is part one the
00:19:04 liberation front. This is part one the Chitty case. If we could go now to page 28 and I can tell you that Detective
00:19:16 and I can tell you that Detective Sergeant Chitty served in the SDS in the 1980s.
00:19:22 1980s. He infiltrated animal rights activists. Uh he did uh engage in sexual activity
00:19:33 Uh he did uh engage in sexual activity with members of the public undercover. After
00:19:38 After his deployment, he returned to the activists uh he had socialized with during his deployment and resumed
00:19:50 with during his deployment and resumed social activities including a sexual relationship uh with them. Uh this all came to light uh in 1994
00:20:01 came to light uh in 1994 and is the subject of this paper. If we can pick it up at paragraph 4 at 3.5
00:20:14 at 3.5 uh and running through to 3.8. I'll give you a moment to look at 3.5 to 3.8.
00:20:43 Yes, thank you. Uh this document is written by the then detective inspector uh within the SDS DI Lambert. And you can see from those
00:20:54 Lambert. And you can see from those paragraphs that he is clearly recording Kitty's sexual activity undercover uh both during and after his deployment.
00:21:09 uh both during and after his deployment. If we can go to page 30 please in paragraph 3.12.
00:21:28 That paragraph records, amongst other things, that detective inspector Lambert took possession of a love letter uh from the
00:21:39 possession of a love letter uh from the woman we are calling Lizzy to Blake and Blake is Chitt's cover name. So the account appears to be corroborated uh by a document.
00:21:54 uh by a document. And if we go to page 39, please
00:22:10 to the top of page 39.
00:22:23 You'll see it's there recorded that there appears to be a possibility that he may still be mixing with those he met undercover and
00:22:36 mixing with those he met undercover and continuing uh a relationship in his cover name Blake.
00:22:46 Once you've digested that, I'll move to the next document. Yes, thank you. If we could have up 746137
00:22:58 going to take you now. This is a minute sheet and it's uh to tracking what happened to this report with the disclosures it contained.
00:23:09 disclosures it contained. Uh the first minute refers to the paper we've just been looking at DI Lambert's discussion paper
00:23:20 looking at DI Lambert's discussion paper and the DCI of the SDS at the time Keith Edmonson is uh promulgating it to the commanders of operations
00:23:31 commanders of operations and P through chief superintendent uh C E
00:23:39 uh C E goes up the chain of command and if we could go to page five please in minute seven
00:23:47 seven there's a debate about what to do with Chitty and in particular whether or not uh he should be disciplined the background is that he had been caught in
00:24:01 background is that he had been caught in a post SDS role um for financial irregularities is you will see here that the then DAC
00:24:14 you will see here that the then DAC John Howley on the 18th of May 1994
00:24:20 uh is um supporting advice which is advice to discipline Chitty uh please inform me of any significant developments or hints of any
00:24:35 or hints of any if we could once you've digested Ed that I'll take you to another document. Yes, thank you. 746 094 please. Tab B88 sir.
00:24:49 Tab B88 sir. Uh this is the next month 20th of June 1994. It's from the DAC security Mr. Howley to
00:25:02 It's from the DAC security Mr. Howley to you.
00:25:04 you. And at this stage you've been in post a small number of months and it's about DS Chitty
00:25:14 Chitty Special branch. Uh
00:25:20 I'll give you a moment to read that.
00:25:29 Thank you. Now, if you could go to page two,
00:25:38 uh, give you a moment to read that, but I'm particularly interested in the last two paragraphs.
00:25:59 Okay. And you will have noted there that there's reference to an appointment for the DAC to speak to you and his suggestion that you might want to speak
00:26:12 suggestion that you might want to speak to the commissioner about this. Also from this page you can see that the DAC is essentially saying that there's
00:26:23 DAC is essentially saying that there's nothing to be ashamed of uh in the SDS and the average member of the public would expect there to be long-term deep
00:26:34 would expect there to be long-term deep cover operations uh of the nature conducted by Chitty. Did you agree at the time that the SDS had nothing to
00:26:48 at the time that the SDS had nothing to be ashamed of and it was doing what the public might expect it to do? In very general terms, yes.
00:27:00 If we could go now to 746093,
00:27:06 this is 9 days later on the 29th of June 1994.
00:27:16 This is again a minute sheet and you can see that it's got a it's it's a minute on the first page and in a moment we'll go to the next page which has a draft briefing for the media but
00:27:30 has a draft briefing for the media but can it can I at this stage ask you to look at DAC how's in it.
00:27:45 Okay. Thank you. You'll see from that that it uh appears to confirm that you and DAC Howley had discussed DS
00:27:59 that you and DAC Howley had discussed DS Chitty's case. Can you help us with how fully DAC Howie briefed you about the Chitty case?
00:28:13 briefed you about the Chitty case? Well, I no reason to question what is written down in the minutes. Um, but I have no recollection of what you're showing me. Can you recall whether you saw Detective
00:28:26 Can you recall whether you saw Detective Inspector Lambert's discussion paper? No recollection at all.
00:28:35 Can you recall whether DAC Howley told you that Detective Sergeant Chitty had conducted sexual relationships in his undercover
00:28:46 undercover identity?
00:28:48 identity? Absolutely no recollection. But presumably that was an important part of uh the Chitty case, wasn't it? I'm not sure what the detail of the case
00:29:01 I'm not sure what the detail of the case is,
00:29:03 is, but if an undercover police officer has been sleeping with an activist that has been recorded in a discussion paper, would you have expected DAC
00:29:17 paper, would you have expected DAC Howley to tell you? If he knew himself, I might have expected him to do so. Yes. And if he'd read the discussion paper, he would have
00:29:28 read the discussion paper, he would have known, wouldn't he? Assuming he had.
00:29:33 Did he tell you that Detective Sergeant Chitty had returned to his cover identity and to his relationship with the woman we are calling Lizzy?
00:29:45 the woman we are calling Lizzy? I mean, just to make the point, I have no recollection of being informed of inappropriate relationships between uh undercover officers and activists at any
00:29:56 undercover officers and activists at any stage and I certainly don't I'm not assisted uh by this record of sheets. Perhaps I can put it to you this way.
00:30:07 Perhaps I can put it to you this way. Assuming DAC Howley had read the paper or otherwise knew, he should have told you, shouldn't he? Yes, but he was a very senior uh and
00:30:23 Yes, but he was a very senior uh and well-versed SB officer. I'm sure he would have acted properly had he known. A and we've seen the evidence of an
00:30:34 A and we've seen the evidence of an ongoing
00:30:36 ongoing risk that the relationship might have been continuing. Again, assuming he knew about it, he should have told you, shouldn't he? Yes. But I I would demure uh from the
00:30:51 Yes. But I I would demure uh from the assumption that DAC howley knew of this inappropriate relationship. Is there any possibility uh that you were told but didn't
00:31:03 uh that you were told but didn't remember because you did not think it very important? No, I I would have considered it important if I'd been told in terms at the time.
00:31:12 the time. Is there any possibility that DAC Howley knew but decided you did not need to know? I think there were a range of
00:31:23 know? I think there were a range of possibilities but it will be conjecture at this remove. From your knowledge of DAC Howley, how likely do you think it is that he knew and didn't tell you?
00:31:35 and didn't tell you? I wouldn't like to make any judgment at this.
00:31:40 this. [snorts]
00:31:40 [snorts] Did you speak to the commissioner about the Chitty case? I have no recollection.
00:31:49 [snorts] Just to be clear, at this time in the summer of 1994, shortly after you had become AXO, would you have considered a UCO having
00:32:03 would you have considered a UCO having sex with an activist undercover as being wrong?
00:32:08 wrong? Yes.
00:32:13 The minute refers to monitoring SDS activities and the potential for embarrassing disclosures.
00:32:24 disclosures. Are you able to help us with what was done to monitor the SDS for potentially embarrassing disclosures? No, I'm not.
00:32:39 A theme of the Chitty case was whether it was the effects of living undercover, immersed in the activist world for so
00:32:50 immersed in the activist world for so long that had caused Chitty to behave uh the way that he did. Was this case an opportunity
00:33:01 Was this case an opportunity to improve the psychological support provided to undercover police officers with the [clears throat] benefit of hindsight? Yes. But there is a more general point uh that long-term
00:33:13 general point uh that long-term deployments in the unregulated way in which they occurred uh with the distant supervision was a danger we should have recognized at the time and thereafter.
00:33:27 Why is it only with hindsight? Surely at the time it would have been clear that there was an undercover officer uh who had gone seriously off peace and there
00:33:41 had gone seriously off peace and there might be a need to improve psychological support
00:33:47 support because I'm reading the details that were known at the time. I had no specific knowledge of the points you raised.
00:33:58 Can we [snorts] take that down now and move on to a different topic? I'm moving now to the autumn of 1994. Could we have 52743, please?
00:34:12 This is tab B 101. Sir, if we could have page two.
00:34:18 page two. Uh this is an SDS uh memorandum. I'll give you a moment to read um the text on the page. [clears throat]
00:34:36 Yes, thank you. And you will see that it is relating the fact that the SDS had used deceased children's identities
00:34:49 children's identities uh in the past or elements of them and that there was going to be a new system. And if we go to page three, please.
00:35:08 I'll let you read both the paragraphs of text.
00:35:20 Thank you. The new system would avoid the need for the SDS undercover officers to use details of um real people
00:35:34 to use details of um real people and it was intended to get you to approve the new process.
00:35:44 process. Yes, I no recollection about whether that proceeded. We know that the SDS did change its practice at this juncture. Is
00:35:57 change its practice at this juncture. Is it therefore likely that you did sign it off?
00:36:01 off? It's possible, but I have no recollection. And would it follow that if you had been asked to sign it off as proposed, you
00:36:13 asked to sign it off as proposed, you would have been aware that the SDS had been using deceased children's identities but was changing course if that correspondence flowed. Yes.
00:36:27 if that correspondence flowed. Yes. Can you recall anything about what prompted the SDS to change methods? No.
00:36:38 Can you recall any concern about the fact the SDS had been using deceased children's
00:36:49 been using deceased children's identities? To the best of my knowledge, this was many years after that I became aware of the use of these identities.
00:36:59 I'm specifically asking whether you can recall having any concerns in 1994.
00:37:09 Can you recall whether you discussed this issue further up the chain of command?
00:37:19 It appears that the change of system occurred uh smoothly and it would therefore appear to follow that nobody had any concerns at this
00:37:33 that nobody had any concerns at this stage
00:37:34 stage about the morality or the legality of having used deceased children's identities in the past. Is that fair?
00:37:45 identities in the past. Is that fair? Yes. My recollection or knowledge of this practice it is many years later. Are you sure about that? Yes, I am.
00:37:56 Yes, I am. Could we have 527328, please?
00:38:04 Uh, thank you. I'm moving now to some documents uh about a visit uh that was arranged for you to go to the see the SDS
00:38:17 the see the SDS on Thursday the 15th of February 1996.
00:38:24 If we have page nine up first please.
00:38:37 I'm afraid I can't see that.
00:38:42 Thank you.
00:38:50 Well, my my first question is, can you recall whether or not this was your first visit? There's some suggestion in the papers that it wasn't. Can you actually recall going to see
00:39:02 Can you actually recall going to see them before this date? No.
00:39:06 No. If we have on page three, please
00:39:12 par. Thank you. If we could expand that,
00:39:22 give you a moment to scan it, but it's a six paragraph down about the the average length of operations that I'm going to be interested And
00:39:46 okay, thank you. Uh this uh is part of the the briefing pack. It would appear at this stage it was communicated to you that the average
00:39:59 was communicated to you that the average length of operational duty for a field officer was 4 years. Can you help us with whether you knew that before February 1996?
00:40:11 that before February 1996? I
00:40:11 I I can't help you, I'm afraid. Did you know that the SDS was involved in longterm undercover operations before the date? I think I must have done.
00:40:25 When you go and visit the SDS in 1996,
00:40:33 did you have any thoughts about the risks or the wisdom of such long-term intelligence gathering operations?
00:40:44 intelligence gathering operations? Not as much as I should have done. And clearly that is one of the issues uh that should have been addressed at a much earlier stage. I regret that I didn't.
00:40:53 didn't. Yeah. And there are a range of issues, aren't there? First [snorts] of all, officer welfare. Yes.
00:41:00 Yes. Um the dangers of not being able to corroborate the intelligence coming from the UCO.
00:41:09 the UCO. Yes.
00:41:10 Yes. um the risks arising from undercover officers having to appear in court or otherwise coming to the attention of the criminal justice
00:41:21 the attention of the criminal justice system.
00:41:22 system. Yes, indeed. Disclosure obligations in the event that there are prosecutions of activists. Yes.
00:41:30 Yes. Uh and um the considerable scope for those so inclined for misconduct. Yes. As I said in my apology, we needed
00:41:41 Yes. As I said in my apology, we needed to have an earlier regime which was using existing knowledge and procedures elsewhere applicable to these dangers that you just highlighted. If on
00:41:55 page two, just go down to the last section, you'll see that section entitled extreme left-wing anarchist anti-fascists.
00:42:07 There outlines are some of the targets for the SDS at the time. Did you already have an understanding of
00:42:19 Did you already have an understanding of the sort of targets that the SDS was infiltrating from the annual reports at this stage? I think that's correct.
00:42:32 If we go to page six,
00:42:44 this is a part of the briefing note dealing with individual SDS officers. If we could expand the top section on DC, Mark Jenner, please.
00:43:02 What did you know about the Hackne Community Defense Association at this time?
00:43:08 time? I can't recall I have any knowledge. Can you recall what you knew about the Colin Roach Center? I think I would have known in general terms at the time, but I have no
00:43:19 terms at the time, but I have no recollection today. The second part of this gist reads, "While maintaining an inside view of all public order events in the Hackne area,
00:43:31 public order events in the Hackne area, the officer has unique access to a range of anti- police campaigns in London." What did you make of
00:43:43 What did you make of knowing that an SDSU was reporting on anti- police campaigns in London?
00:43:54 in London? I don't think it caused a particular significance in my mind at the time. Do you think it should have done with the benefit of hindsight? Yes. Why only with the benefit of hindsight?
00:44:07 Why only with the benefit of hindsight? because we now know that there was inappropriate intrusion uh in groups of this nature but that has occurred in many years later.
00:44:19 many years later. Can you recall how far you inquired uh of the officers uh when you visited the unit?
00:44:28 unit? They were generalized uh visits uh which the intention was to encourage uh and to thank them for the general manner of which they conducted themselves. Uh it
00:44:40 which they conducted themselves. Uh it was not a probing assessment of individual details of an individual officer's activities because on its face without more
00:44:51 because on its face without more simply campaigning against the police is not a ground for deploying an undercover police officer. Is it? I think that's clear today. Uh I don't
00:45:02 I think that's clear today. Uh I don't think that I would make the judgment that I would be prompted by this brief reference many many years ago. Can we take this document uh down now? I
00:45:13 Can we take this document uh down now? I want to draw your attention next to the document 746143, please. We're moving to January 1997.
00:45:25 And uh this is Detective Superintendent Roger Pierce uh to you
00:45:34 uh to you drawing your attention to some SDS triumphs
00:45:42 triumphs uh in the runup to Christmas 1996. one involving uh ALF plans uh to uh
00:45:55 one involving uh ALF plans uh to uh poison some turkeys and the other refers to and a reclaim the streets plan to uh disrupt traffic on the M25
00:46:07 disrupt traffic on the M25 by stopping and placing banners on a tanker.
00:46:14 tanker. Can you help us with why Mr. Pierce would have reported these triumphs to you?
00:46:24 you? No, they are uh in his judgment good works and he is drawing that to my attention. I I would have expected it to go uh through a a longer chain of
00:46:35 go uh through a a longer chain of command.
00:46:37 command. How usual was it for units under your command to do this sort of thing?
00:46:45 in terms of disruption of the activist operations very rare. Yeah. I I meant more in terms of how of
00:46:56 Yeah. I I meant more in terms of how of how usual was it for units under your command to directly bring their triumphs to your attention? I don't think they were regular.
00:47:08 What was the threshold for doing so? I don't know that that the main motivation would that be the person who prompted the report. Um what these questions are driving at
00:47:21 Um what these questions are driving at is how good was the SDS's internal PR effort.
00:47:28 effort. I think with the again uh looking backwards uh there was some endeavor in this direction. Did you get the impression at the time that the SDS was seeking to impress you?
00:47:42 I think all the branches under my command uh would probably uh not be hesitating uh in bringing note to any regarded as good work.
00:47:53 regarded as good work. And what did you do about that? It was mainly for information.
00:48:01 Apart from praising work that deserved praise, did you develop any sort of cynicism or skepticism
00:48:13 cynicism or skepticism or or critical need to be more critical in your evaluation of what you were being told? Yes. With benefit of looking backwards, uh I would have valued more criticism on
00:48:27 uh I would have valued more criticism on my part.
00:48:28 my part. Could
00:48:30 Could we take that down now? Could we have 737231,
00:48:34 737231, please?
00:48:36 please? This is tab B144, sir. Uh, again, a minute from [snorts] Mr. Pierce to you this time through
00:48:47 Mr. Pierce to you this time through Commander Moss. I'll give you a moment to uh read the text. If we could have that expanded, please.
00:49:10 Thank you. If we could go over the page to page two.
00:49:18 And this is um your response uh
00:49:25 uh passing on your thanks for the SDS contribution to recent events. What had happened is that an officer who was
00:49:37 happened is that an officer who was a UCO in reclaim the streets had infiltrated the core organizing group and was able to provide
00:49:49 and was able to provide very detailed intelligence of RTS's plans for the demonstration that had taken place on the 12th of April.
00:50:01 taken place on the 12th of April. 1997
00:50:03 1997 and in particular a plan to occupy a semivacant building on Marshham Street uh a Department of the Environment
00:50:14 uh a Department of the Environment building. Can you recall anything about plans to police that event? Nothing.
00:50:25 Can we take that down now, please? I want to move now to the Steven Lawrence inquiry, please.
00:50:37 Mr. Quick. Bob Quick told the Steven Lawrence review team on the 1st of November 2013
00:50:49 on the 1st of November 2013 about a meeting in 1998, which he said was with the commissioner, possibly the deputy commissioner,
00:51:00 possibly the deputy commissioner, several assistant commissioners and DAC's
00:51:05 DAC's all discussing the public inquiry. He says that the mood of that meeting was that the inquiry was deemed to be
00:51:17 was that the inquiry was deemed to be going very badly for the Met, although he does recall a comment to the effect of we are bombroof on racism.
00:51:31 of we are bombroof on racism. Can you recall any such meeting? I regret that I'm not going to be helpful. Uh I was not attached or dealing uh directly with uh the
00:51:44 dealing uh directly with uh the McFersonen or the Steven Lawrence uh inquiry. Uh I was not I think amongst the group of senior officers who were engaged. My focus was distinct and was
00:51:57 engaged. My focus was distinct and was mainly with terrorism. Is it your evidence then that you were not at any of the meetings at which the Steven Lawrence inquiry was raised?
00:52:08 Steven Lawrence inquiry was raised? They we had regular meetings weekly with the commissioner for the regular details o of Metropolitan Police operations. So I imagine that it would have occurred at
00:52:19 I imagine that it would have occurred at that stage but not on the specific issue of having a meeting for addressing the Steven Lawrence inquiry. I think you in your witness statement
00:52:30 I think you in your witness statement make clear that the mood at the time was that the Steven Lawrence inquiry was a a very big and serious issue for the Metropolitan Police Service. That is undoubtedly correct. And presumably you were aware of that
00:52:42 And presumably you were aware of that from your presence at this the meetings that you've just described. Absolutely. [snorts]
00:52:48 [snorts] And can you help us then with the general mood at the start of the inquiry? Was there a feeling that there might be a vulnerability
00:53:01 might be a vulnerability so far as the quality of the investigation into Steven's murder was concerned, but that on issues of racism and corruption, the picture might be
00:53:12 and corruption, the picture might be better for the Met? I I'm not aware of that, Nor. What was your impression of the feeling within the Met as to where it stood on the
00:53:23 the Met as to where it stood on the three main issues? The quality of the investigation, racism, and corruption. That there was a lack uh of confidence uh that the service had proved had
00:53:36 uh that the service had proved had carried out its duties in the way that the public would have expected. Does that encompass all three issues or just the first? No, I think it's all across the board.
00:53:49 No, I think it's all across the board. Can [snorts] you recall whether or not there was a a change in the mood? For example,
00:53:56 example, would it be fair to describe the mood going down as the inquiry progress progressed? I think there was a greater sense of
00:54:07 I think there was a greater sense of pessimism. Yes. And was there a feeling that the inquiry was being conducted in a way that might be unfair to the Metropolitan Police
00:54:19 be unfair to the Metropolitan Police Service and some of those witnesses um who were appearing in front of it? I don't think I was close enough to form a judgment.
00:54:32 Can I move now to um a visit that you paid to the SDS in July 1998 for which we have a documentary record. Uh could we have 748092
00:54:45 record. Uh could we have 748092 please? Tab B166. [snorts]
00:54:50 [snorts] This is a briefing note for your visit that was due to take place on the 7th of July, 1998. If we could have page two up, please.
00:55:05 And if we um I'm interest I'll give you a moment to familiarize yourself with the page, but it's paragraph uh five that I'm going to ask you about.
00:55:22 Yes, I understand.
00:55:26 The feature of paragraph five is that it's
00:55:31 it's intelligence not on public order but on criminal activities of individuals or groups in support of animal rights and other extremists. So, criminal
00:55:43 other extremists. So, criminal intelligence. Did you discuss that criminal intelligence function with members of the SDS? I I can't recall that I picked up the
00:55:54 I can't recall that I picked up the distinction that you just mentioned. I certainly uh would not have discussed details of operations or their infiltration with the officers. It was very much a generalized event
00:56:08 very much a generalized event because in terms of the risks of running this sort of operation, the risks of long-term infiltration for public order purposes and the risks for criminal
00:56:20 purposes and the risks for criminal intelligence activities do in some respects differ, don't they? Yes, they do. And this is where you get concerns about disclosure in particular, don't you?
00:56:32 disclosure in particular, don't you? Yes, indeed that that's the whole regime that I've discussed uh or highlighted or sought to highlight the distinction between uh evidential short-term
00:56:43 between uh evidential short-term deployments and the longer term evidential uh non-evidential deployments. And if I'm understanding you correctly, your apology
00:56:54 your apology encompasses not doing more to identify and deal with those risks at the time. Correct. Yes. as a source of personal regret.
00:57:04 regret. Could we go to page seven, please?
00:57:11 And if we look at the section at the bottom about HN60.
00:57:20 Give you a moment to read that.
00:57:29 Thank you. So you're being informed that they've just deployed an officer into the Socialist Workers Party who is um attending events at which he
00:57:42 who is um attending events at which he will be being talked about Trosky's doctrine. By this stage 1998 the threat of subversion in this country was extremely low, wasn't it?
00:57:55 was extremely low, wasn't it? There was a change. Yes. and the security service were no longer actively investigating subversion, were they? Documents I've been reminded of over a
00:58:07 Documents I've been reminded of over a period uh there was a reduction uh in the security service attention to more monitoring activity. Yeah, [snorts] a watching brief I think they describe it as
00:58:18 they describe it as correct. Thank you sir. So there is no standalone justification on the grounds of counter subversion work to justify an infiltration of the
00:58:29 work to justify an infiltration of the SWP, is there? I I think I would need to know more about what the state of knowledge was at the time.
00:58:39 the time. And in terms of public order, we've seen evidence which suggests there was some concern that there might have been a renaissance in um disorder. Uh but very
00:58:53 renaissance in um disorder. Uh but very little evidence uh that the SWP was involved in any serious disorder at this time. I'm afraid I can't make any
00:59:04 this time. I'm afraid I can't make any useful comment. When you visited the SDS and learned that the SDS were infiltrating the SWP
00:59:16 that the SDS were infiltrating the SWP in 1998,
00:59:18 in 1998, did it ring any alarm bells for you? No, I I mean I can't recall reading that with the attention that it may have deserved or seemed to have deserved and
00:59:29 deserved or seemed to have deserved and I can't recall uh making any intrusive uh inquiries in relation to SDS operations. If you had
00:59:41 If you had subjected it to critical scrutiny at the time, it does at least beg questions, doesn't it, about the proportionality of infiltrating a political party such as the SWP with an undercover police
00:59:54 the SWP with an undercover police officer.
00:59:55 officer. Yes, this is an aspect of what I've discovered uh discover tried to convey uh that we should have taken more vigorous action uh in a highly intrusive
01:00:06 vigorous action uh in a highly intrusive way.
01:00:08 way. If we could go to page nine please now at the top of the page
01:00:15 and the pen picture for HN81.
01:00:24 I'll give you a moment to read that.
01:00:33 Thank you.
01:00:36 This visit uh takes place whilst the Steven Lawrence inquiries part one hearings
01:00:45 hearings were ongoing. And you're being told here that the SDS has an officer targeting local campaign
01:00:58 has an officer targeting local campaign groups in Brixton and that recently he has provided intelligence on the MFJ's effort to influence the Lawrence family during the
01:01:12 influence the Lawrence family during the public hearing. What was your reaction at the time to learning that? Uh, I'm not aware uh that I studied that
01:01:25 Uh, I'm not aware uh that I studied that with sufficient detail to form an intelligent conclusion. Were you aware at the time that there were concerns about the attempts of
01:01:38 were concerns about the attempts of far-left groups to influence the Lawrenes?
01:01:42 Lawrenes? No, I don't think so. I I was aware that there was concern about public order incidents and activity uh around the Steven Lawrence inquiry, but I can't
01:01:54 Steven Lawrence inquiry, but I can't recall any detail. Would you have understood there to be a desire to know whether or not these left-wing groups were getting any traction with the family?
01:02:07 traction with the family? I think it was rather more to my recollection whether there was traction that these groups were gaining influence uh in relation to the potential for public disorder.
01:02:19 public disorder. That sentence at the end, more recently, he has provided intelligence on the MFJ's efforts to influence the family during the public hearing. You are being
01:02:31 during the public hearing. You are being told that, aren't you? because the SDS is trumpeting to you that it has an officer who can do that. If that was the intention, uh I
01:02:43 If that was the intention, uh I understand, but I can't recall that I was clever enough to pick up that particular point during this brief visit.
01:02:52 visit. And that is something that you should have picked up on, isn't it? With the benefit. Yes. When you said with the benefit, did you mean with the benefit of hindsight?
01:03:03 mean with the benefit of hindsight? Correct.
01:03:05 Correct. Can I suggest to you that even without the benefit of hindsight, learning that the SDS had an officer infiltrating and a a left-wing group and
01:03:18 infiltrating and a a left-wing group and reporting on efforts to influence the Lawrence family during the public hearing was something that should have rung alarm bells.
01:03:30 rung alarm bells. I I think that you're uh giving an interpretation of those wordings uh which is more sinister than I read them at the time.
01:03:44 I think it follows from the lack of any action at the time that you weren't concerned by them at the time. But what I'm putting to you is at the time you
01:03:56 I'm putting to you is at the time you should have been concerned by this, shouldn't you? if I'd have been alert enough to read as cleverly as I should have done the wording within a brief visit document. Yes.
01:04:08 visit document. Yes. Can we look at the pen picture at the bottom?
01:04:16 This is DC Jenner. Uh you will see I'll give you a moment to read the summary.
01:04:35 Thank you very much. Again, this is as echoes of what I showed you in another document. This is the officer who's got unique access to a range of anti- police campaigns
01:04:49 range of anti- police campaigns in
01:04:50 in London. And again, can I take it that none of that rang alarm bells for you at the time?
01:05:00 the time? Regrettably, yes.
01:05:04 Could we have up please 728625,
01:05:14 page 12, please?
01:05:22 This is a file note made by Detective Inspector Lambert of the SDS. It's about a meeting which took place on the 14th of August 1998
01:05:35 of August 1998 at which DI Lambert acting detective inspector Walton and HN81 code name will wind Windmill Tilta
01:05:47 wind Windmill Tilta the UCO we've been just been looking at who was reporting um on matters touching the Lawrence family and the Lawrence inquiry.
01:06:00 We know that Detective Superintendent Colin Black knew about this meeting. Did he tell you anything about it? Not that I can recall. No. Did anybody
01:06:15 Not that I can recall. No. Did anybody at the time of the Lawrence inquiry tell you that an SDS undercover police officer had met somebody from either the
01:06:26 officer had met somebody from either the Steven Lawrence review team or the racial and violent crime task force? I can be reasonably confident uh that then this did not this did not come to
01:06:38 then this did not this did not come to my notice at all at the time. Could we have up please 748392?
01:06:55 This is a minute covering a report which we'll go in a moment. It's from detect. It's from detective superintendent Colin Black. Then the ops commander says the
01:07:08 Black. Then the ops commander says the note is marked secret and is for the attention of the named addresses only. Any further dissemination should be discussed with the detective superintendent C squad in SO2. If we go
01:07:19 superintendent C squad in SO2. If we go over the page, we see it's entitled the Steven Lawrence campaign associated organizations. It's dated the 10th of September 1998.
01:07:33 It's dated the 10th of September 1998. And if we could have the italics under the title expanded, please
01:07:40 you'll see it was produced for the commissioner DAC Grieve and Superintendent Thornton. The contents of the report
01:07:51 The contents of the report go through systematically various organizations which had involvement in the Steven Lawrence campaign starting with the families campaign and going through other groups
01:08:05 campaign and going through other groups and concluding with trade unions, the press and another Asian justice campaign on behalf of Ricky Real.
01:08:17 Ricky Real. I appreciate this was not addressed to you, but it's an important document and I wanted to know if you could assist the
01:08:29 I wanted to know if you could assist the inquiry in any way as to how a report about organizations associated with the Steven Lawrence campaign came to be
01:08:41 Steven Lawrence campaign came to be prepared for the commissioner, DAC Griev, and Superintendent Thornton. No, I've had the opportunity of seeing this document uh recently. Uh as I
01:08:55 this document uh recently. Uh as I understand it, it did not come to me. Uh and I'm afraid I can't assist you with your inquiry. If we could take that down now and have 722486
01:09:07 722486 up, please.
01:09:15 This is tab B175. Sir,
01:09:20 if we just go to page two to I'll show you what the document is. It's a correspondence file with correspondence between CO24 and Metropolitan Police
01:09:31 between CO24 and Metropolitan Police Special Branch in it. Could we go to page 116, please?
01:09:43 This is a minute sheet about a report. If we look at the first minute,
01:09:55 If we look at the first minute, if we have that expanded, HN58
01:10:00 HN58 is the DCI in charge of the SDS at the time.
01:10:05 time. He's writing to DCS Black
01:10:10 Black and it's about a request by Black of the detective inspector in the SDS HN53 for a summary of the state of play
01:10:21 HN53 for a summary of the state of play of left-wing involvement in the Steven Lawrence inquiry. The attached note has been compiled from a secret and reliable source which must be protected. A
01:10:33 source which must be protected. A similar intelligence report has been sent to C squad and you'll see it says in the bottom left SDS 22nd of December 98. If we could have if we could zoom
01:10:44 98. If we could have if we could zoom out and have the first two minutes.
01:10:55 See, this is a minute by detective superintendent Black to Commander Special Branch, which includes the phrase, "You may wish to show this to
01:11:06 phrase, "You may wish to show this to AXO.
01:11:07 AXO. Upon return, I shall arrange for Mr. Grieve to be briefed." And then the endorsement top right, scene, thanks, AXO 30th, the 12th.
01:11:19 AXO 30th, the 12th. Can I take it then that the note that this minute sheet covers is one that you would have seen. I certainly acknowledge that is my
01:11:31 I certainly acknowledge that is my writing uh and I saw or express my view seen. Thanks. Uh I don't know whether this was a a superficial read by me. Uh
01:11:42 this was a a superficial read by me. Uh certainly uh unlike the document which you've just shown me previously dated September uh I did not see that. I assumed that this was part of a uh
01:11:53 assumed that this was part of a uh correspondence channel uh between SB and CO2.
01:11:58 CO2. uh and I'm being shown as it were by background information and from the context of the first minute you would have known that what you were being shown was a report that had come
01:12:11 being shown was a report that had come from the SDS. I think that's correct. Could we have the next page 117 please? This is actually a pretty short uh
01:12:23 This is actually a pretty short uh document dated the 22nd of December. Could I ask that the text including the title is expanded?
01:12:36 I'll give you a moment to read that.
01:12:52 Thank you. It appears from this document that a sign significant importance is being attached
01:13:03 attached to the Lawrence's position visav a civil rights march because the suggestion is if the family
01:13:14 because the suggestion is if the family had called for a civil rights march up to a 100,000 people might have taken to the streets. Whereas from the second paragraph, it looks as if the movement
01:13:27 paragraph, it looks as if the movement for justice on their own will be well doing well to get a thousand people out on the streets. So two orders of magnitude
01:13:38 magnitude difference. Is it fair to say that this document shows the importance that was being attached to understanding the family's position?
01:13:51 the family's position? Yes, I can see explain. I certainly understand that interpretation. And the contents of the second paragraph
01:14:02 And the contents of the second paragraph show that the stance of other members of black and Asian justice campaigns are also being noted, aren't they?
01:14:15 also being noted, aren't they? Yes, indeed.
01:14:19 What did you make of this document when you read it? I can't recall what I made of it. Can I take it that it wouldn't have been
01:14:30 Can I take it that it wouldn't have been a critical reaction at the time? Well, on the reading of the minutes, this appears to be uh a note through me of a correspondence that I'd not seen
01:14:43 of a correspondence that I'd not seen before. uh and I uh am not in a position to take action upon it. But you're certainly not throwing your hands up in horror at what you've read,
01:14:54 hands up in horror at what you've read, are you? Not not that I can recall and with benefit of hindsight I should have reacted more vigorously because what this amounts to is you
01:15:05 because what this amounts to is you being informed uh that there you are seeing what the product of the SDS's undercover operation is aren't you and they're reporting on interalia the
01:15:18 they're reporting on interalia the Lawrenes. Yes, absolutely. And you would have known from your re then fairly recent visit to the SDS 5 months earlier that the UCO in question
01:15:31 months earlier that the UCO in question would have been HN81. If I'd have corrected connected those aspects of knowledge. Yes. Was any consideration given at the time
01:15:43 Was any consideration given at the time to whether the Steven Lawrence inquiry should be informed that there was an undercover police officer infiltrating the movement for justice and reporting
01:15:54 the movement for justice and reporting on the Lawrence family? I'm not aware of any discussion. There should have been, shouldn't there? With the benefit of what we know now.
01:16:06 With the benefit of what we know now. Yes. Even without the benefit of what we know now, should it not have been obvious to you as a very senior officer in the Metropolitan Police
01:16:17 officer in the Metropolitan Police Service that an undercover police officer
01:16:22 officer reporting on the Lawrence family was something that should be declared? I think if my knowledge had been in those stark terms, uh then yes, there
01:16:34 those stark terms, uh then yes, there should have been action. But that is what this document substantively conveys to you, doesn't it?
01:16:43 it? Yes, if I'd have absorbed and had the time to take those deductions.
01:16:53 And the SDS should not have been collecting and disseminating intelligence like this, should it? Unequivocally, no. And it should have been stopped at the time.
01:17:03 time. Yes.
01:17:06 Can you [snorts] help us with why this sort of intelligence was being collected at the time? I can't, I'm afraid. Was it a concern
01:17:19 I can't, I'm afraid. Was it a concern that the consequences of the complaints raised by the Lawren's and the underlying failures uh of the investigation into Steven's murder
01:17:32 investigation into Steven's murder uh were going to have for the Metropolitan Police Service. I think the whole impact uh of the Steam and Lawrence inquiry uh was bound to have great impact.
01:17:45 And concern about the impact on the Met's ability to police by consent. Yes.
01:17:54 Yes. And public order concerns. Yes.
01:18:01 In other words, the Steven Lawrence inquiry was of profound importance to the MPS.
01:18:08 the MPS. Yes.
01:18:09 Yes. And part and parcel of understanding what was going on was understanding the position that the Lawrenes were taking. Yes.
01:18:20 And who was supporting them or trying to support them? Yes.
01:18:27 Yes. and the potential for other black and Asian justice campaigns uh to add to the problems already faced by the Metropolitan Police Service in
01:18:39 by the Metropolitan Police Service in these regards. I think that's true. Yes.
01:18:44 Can we take that down now, please? There were um two HMIC inspections that we're aware of in the
01:18:57 inspections that we're aware of in the 1990s which cover included the SDS. One the inspection took place just before you
01:19:06 you assumed uh the position of AXO but I think reported in early 94 and the other was in January 1999.
01:19:17 Can we we can take the document down now.
01:19:22 now. Can you help us with what your understanding was of what those inspections had involved?
01:19:31 To the best of my recollection, uh the normal deep inspection process that was applied by her
01:19:42 process that was applied by her majesty's inspector of Constabbury. u regret uh that it did not highlight uh the issues uh that we now know to be the
01:19:53 the issues uh that we now know to be the problems.
01:19:54 problems. What do you mean by a deep inspection process?
01:19:59 process? A that they followed their own uh procedures uh which they had established over years uh and were a reputable uh
01:20:10 over years uh and were a reputable uh and highly professional investigative body. Had you ever been on the receiving end of an HMIC inspection? I think several. And in broad terms, in what depth did
01:20:22 And in broad terms, in what depth did they go into when you were inspected? I I I found them to be useful uh and probitative uh and a prompt for action because uh they raised issues that
01:20:33 because uh they raised issues that needed addressing. Did they concentrate on process and paperwork or did they go further than that? I I think they were useful in being broader.
01:20:45 being broader. As you have rightly pointed out, neither of the inspections that took place discovered the issues that we are investigating, sex discrimination, race
01:20:57 investigating, sex discrimination, race discrimination, miscarriages of justice, the use of deceased children's identities, poor welfare support, and questionable justification.
01:21:09 justification. a whole raft of issues not identified. Perhaps the easiest question I'm going to ask you all day. These reports gave
01:21:20 to ask you all day. These reports gave you false assurance, didn't they? I think that was the effect. Can you help us from the point of view of learning lessons? What could be done to give inspections
01:21:34 What could be done to give inspections like this greater chance of spotting the sorts of things that went wrong with the SDS?
01:21:43 SDS? Well, it's not an area that I am personally expert, but I'm certainly aware that the whole inspection process uh has evolved subsequently since this
01:21:54 uh has evolved subsequently since this period uh and does take uh a more intrusive uh and probing approach to its work.
01:22:04 Can we now have 36855 please?
01:22:12 please? This is a a letter dated the 1st of July 1999
01:22:19 1999 and it's about learning lessons after disorder in the city of London. And the event that's being referred to is the one that was known as J18.
01:22:31 one that was known as J18. um an event on the 18th of June 1999 at which there was considerable disorder in the city of London centered on but
01:22:42 in the city of London centered on but not limited to the life building. Give you a moment to look at at the first page. When you're ready, let
01:22:53 the first page. When you're ready, let the projectionist know and he'll take you to the second page.
01:23:11 I'm afraid I this is home office correspondence. Uh I I'm I'm not not picking up with accuracy what is being said I'm afraid.
01:23:22 said I'm afraid. Okay. If you go back, can you see at the bottom of that first page? The reason I'm showing it to you is because you are named at the bottom. Once you've absorbed that, I'll I'll give you some
01:23:33 absorbed that, I'll I'll give you some of the background.
01:23:42 Essentially, the home the home office is getting involved. They're asking questions along a theme of things have gone badly wrong. How can we learn lessons? And they're
01:23:56 How can we learn lessons? And they're getting the the Metropolitan Police and the Security Service to put their heads together.
01:24:07 What I'm interested in is this. The curiosity is before the J18 event, the SDS had
01:24:19 the SDS had a UCO
01:24:21 a UCO in
01:24:23 in reclaim the streets's core organizing group who reported in considerable detail
01:24:31 detail accurately on plans for the day and in fact was involved in the planning and execution. ution uh of um those plans.
01:24:46 It appears however that that intelligence was not acted upon either by the city of London police or the Metropolitan Police.
01:24:59 or the Metropolitan Police. And what I would like to know is do you have any recollection in the aftermath of the disorder of what was done about the fact that the
01:25:12 of what was done about the fact that the SDS had on this occasion provided highly pertinent intelligence that had not been utilized.
01:25:23 utilized. Forgive my confusion uh in not providing uh a probitative answer. Uh but I I've never seen this to my knowledge before. Uh and I am having difficulty in
01:25:36 Uh and I am having difficulty in recalling at all what occurred. You may not be able to help with the next question is can you remember being told before the J18 event that uh
01:25:49 told before the J18 event that uh special branch had a source and very timely accurate intelligence. I'm I'm sorry I'm confused by the letter uh and I'm afraid confused by your
01:26:01 uh and I'm afraid confused by your question.
01:26:02 question. Right. Well, I'll I'm not going to persevere. I'll move on to another topic. Can we have 748089, please?
01:26:18 Can we have page five? And we're moving on now to consider an undercover police officer HN 26.
01:26:29 officer HN 26. And this is you directing her to vacate her home address in July
01:26:41 in July 2000
01:26:42 2000 because there has been a potential compromise of her as an undercover police officer. I'll give you a moment to read that.
01:27:05 [snorts]
01:27:09 Thank you. Um
01:27:13 Um can do you have any independent recollection of this? Now regrettably I don't. uh I understand that in a small number of cases uh over
01:27:24 that in a small number of cases uh over a period of 11 years uh I made a number of vacation uh assistance orders uh but I can't recall I'm afraid
01:27:35 I can't recall I'm afraid uh it may not be necessary for you to have an independent recollection for the purposes of what I want to ask you. We now know that there is a great deal
01:27:48 We now know that there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that HN26 had by this time formed a sexual
01:27:59 had by this time formed a sexual relationship with an animal rights activist called Thomas Frampton and that HN26's
01:28:11 and that HN26's then husband knew do that.
01:28:19 And that HN26 and her husband were separating because HN26 was resigning from the Metropolitan
01:28:31 was resigning from the Metropolitan Police Service at the end of her undercover deployment in order to make a new life with Frampton.
01:28:43 that the result of your direction to vacate their home address had the practical effect of [snorts]
01:28:54 practical effect of [snorts] funding
01:28:57 funding HN26's
01:28:59 HN26's husband's
01:29:00 husband's move into smaller premises which he then occupied alone.
01:29:09 My question to you is, if you had known that
01:29:16 that when these papers were put in front of you, what difference would it have made? If I'd have had full knowledge, uh,
01:29:27 If I'd have had full knowledge, uh, including the the material that you've just referred to, uh, I think I would have pondered long and hard about the relocation decision. Would there still have been a concern to
01:29:41 Would there still have been a concern to ensure her safety if there was any risk from other activists? I assume yes. But would there have been a reticence to
01:29:53 But would there have been a reticence to fund a separation? Yes.
01:29:58 Yes. And might a solution have been to fund temporary rental accommodation whilst events were sorted out.
01:30:09 whilst events were sorted out. As you say, if if we had known facts which we didn't know at the time, uh it would undoubtedly have impacted on the decision made. And might knowing um those facts or at
01:30:23 And might knowing um those facts or at least evidence strongly suggesting them, there have been a disciplinary investigation. It's a possibility. Yes. When you say a possibility, what would
01:30:35 When you say a possibility, what would the considerations have been whether they amounted to uh defects or which were uh dealt with by the
01:30:46 which were uh dealt with by the disciplinary code? Would a consideration have been that disciplining an undercover police officer who was retiring from the Metropolitan Police
01:30:57 retiring from the Metropolitan Police Service and literally in bed uh with an activist
01:31:02 activist um have prompted any reticence to discipline her for fear of prompting indiscrete disclosures?
01:31:15 indiscrete disclosures? I really can't give an accurate opinion uh at this stage. Can we take that down now? Uh please
01:31:27 Can we take that down now? Uh please can we go to MPS-305746
01:31:34 tab B235. These are arrangements for a visit to the SDS on Thursday the 26th of April 20 and one.
01:31:48 20 and one. The significance of the date is this appears from the documents that we have found to be your first visit after Reaper.
01:32:03 Were you given any training on Reaper before it came into force? I had been involved both as DAC crime uh
01:32:14 I had been involved both as DAC crime uh in relation to uh evidential deployments uh with very considerable closeness uh with the evolution uh of the whole reaper process. I think the date you're
01:32:27 reaper process. I think the date you're showing me here is April of 2001. I think the codes of practice uh followed to my recollection some while later. But we were involved uh I certainly was
01:32:39 we were involved uh I certainly was involved uh with the judges uh who were involved the surveillance uh commissioners uh with evolving uh and being engaged both in the various
01:32:51 being engaged both in the various pre-run uh activities of Reaper uh and is as it evolved in implementation. You are quite right that the coming into force of reaper and the development of
01:33:03 force of reaper and the development of the codes of practice was actually a protracted process. The it's reaper has been enacted and am understanding then that by the time you visited the SDS in
01:33:15 that by the time you visited the SDS in April 2001, you would have had at least a working understanding of what was going on. I I knew certainly I I think I'm correct in pointing out uh that the
01:33:27 I'm correct in pointing out uh that the codes of practice uh had not yet uh been implemented uh in day-to-day working and so you you would have been aware in general terms of the
01:33:39 have been aware in general terms of the need for proportionality and so forth. Yeah, absolutely. There a whole range of issues. Uh as I say, Reaper was a true step change. uh notably if you're
01:33:50 step change. uh notably if you're engaged in it dayto-day with the involvement of high level legal expertise and the surveillance commissioners that changed the ball game uh and it was necessary uh to alter we
01:34:03 uh and it was necessary uh to alter we didn't do as much as we should have done in relation to SDS.
01:34:09 So if uh we now look at these visit arrangements, we see that the the gist says something
01:34:20 we see that the the gist says something of who you are going to meet. It's included HN60, HN3, HN77, HN81, and Carlo [snorts] Saraki.
01:34:32 and Carlo [snorts] Saraki. Um it says at the bottom that prior to the meeting you would be briefed on the areas of work. If we go to page two, please.
01:34:44 And under the extreme left wing at the top,
01:34:52 top, to provide intelligence on the activities of the extreme left wing, to report on public order events, to provide intelligence on community-based groups who pose a threat to public
01:35:03 groups who pose a threat to public order. I'll let you read the blurb underneath under the heading deployment.
01:35:16 Yes. Did this ring any alarm bells in the light of what you then knew about Ripper?
01:35:29 It should have done. Yes. uh I don't think I was reading this these words uh in the course of a short visit and the reading the the preparatory briefing
01:35:40 reading the the preparatory briefing note uh which picked up that issue in my mind which it should have done.
01:35:48 It it does talk at the end of that first paragraph about aims of injury and disorder but there is no real indication of gravity is there? No.
01:36:01 of gravity is there? No. And this inquiry has heard evidence that there may have been some to the effect there may have been some exaggeration of the level of threat and presumably if it
01:36:12 the level of threat and presumably if it had been pitched even lower than it is here that would be more of a reason to be concerned. Yes. As you highlight, the deeper issue
01:36:23 Yes. As you highlight, the deeper issue here is that there was an opportunity available to us uh to implement reaper with far greater rigorous application to SDS. We should have done that.
01:36:39 And if we could go to page three, please.
01:36:45 It may be in the light of your helpful answer just now that we can take this quite shortly. [snorts] But if you see the section on animal rights,
01:37:00 the same point applies, doesn't it? There should have been more rigorous application of reaper. That's correct. It it you mentioned the role of HMI uh in relation to its
01:37:11 role of HMI uh in relation to its product. uh I hesitate uh to make the observation, but the surveillance commissioners conducted uh activities in relation to RIPER implementation and
01:37:22 relation to RIPER implementation and sadly uh did not uncover what we now know to be the sad truth. So would that be an appropriate time to take the morning break? Certainly. [clears throat]
01:37:33 Certainly. [clears throat] We break now for 15 minutes to give you a a break and also the transcribers. Thank you, sir.
01:55:53 Thank you sir. Uh could we have up again please MPS-305746
01:56:03 just to remind you as context for the next theme I need to explore. Could we We're going back to the briefing for your visit in April 2001. If we
01:56:16 for your visit in April 2001. If we could have page two
01:56:22 and the second the paragraph at the bottom,
01:56:29 this is a reference to HN81's deployment.
01:56:37 Thank you. If we take that down and now go to UCPI 36
01:56:44 36 915, please.
01:56:50 This is a witness statement made by HN81 to Operation Hearn in 2015. If we could go to the second page,
01:57:01 If we could go to the second page, please.
01:57:07 And you can just make out on the right hand side of the page the photocopy of the holes made by the hole punch. If we
01:57:18 the holes made by the hole punch. If we could go to the text uh immediately below the top hole punch please.
01:57:27 please. Now what I'm directing to you you to sir David is the evidence that HN81 gave to Operation Hearn about your
01:57:39 gave to Operation Hearn about your visits.
01:57:41 visits. It says more importantly however I attended two meetings with AXO David Vanesse during my tour. Again, these took place at a safe house and were of a
01:57:52 took place at a safe house and were of a meet and greet nature, but nevertheless, he asked questions about the operations we were engaged in, and there was no suggestion of anything being kept from
01:58:03 suggestion of anything being kept from him. I met him once near the beginning of my tour, whilst I believe I was still in the back office, and once more near the end. My memory of the second meeting was of him having a general chat with
01:58:15 was of him having a general chat with everyone and then him seeing us in groups of two officers asking about our operations. I was left with a sense of appreciation for the work I was doing.
01:58:28 for the work I was doing. Do you have any reason to doubt the accuracy of that recollection? No. Uh the officer uh appears to have a more detailed recall uh of our
01:58:41 more detailed recall uh of our conversations as he recalls them than I do.
01:58:47 do. And we've seen how his deployment was summarized in the briefing for this visit. We've seen how you saw uh a short
01:59:01 visit. We've seen how you saw uh a short report from the SDS in December 19 98 based on his intelligence. We know that his intelligence
01:59:13 We know that his intelligence was incorporated in other reports, including those that I've shown you today that you did not see. He goes on essentially to make the point
01:59:26 He goes on essentially to make the point he wasn't a rogue officer. And that's a fair point, isn't it? He wasn't a rogue officer. He was
01:59:37 officer. He was doing what was expected of him in his role, wasn't he? It was an assigned role which he was performing. and he says I'm grateful that he noticed
01:59:51 and he says I'm grateful that he noticed that he felt appreciation from the visit because as you mentioned this was a meet and greet visit. Yeah. And at the time his work was being received very
02:00:04 his work was being received very positively, wasn't it? I I'm not able to go into that detail, but it would appear that his work was generally appreciated. Yes. Yeah. Uh, and can I take your answers as
02:00:15 Yeah. Uh, and can I take your answers as agreement to the proposition that he was not a rogue officer? No.
02:00:22 No. No, he wasn't. He was not a rogue officer. Thank you. Um, can we go next to 728625, please?
02:00:41 Uh page three, tab B242. Sir, this is a recommendation for commendation for HN81
02:00:52 for commendation for HN81 dated the 2nd of October 2001.
02:01:01 Do you know whether you saw this or not? I don't know at what grade the commendation is made. If if it was a AXO commendation then almost certainly I
02:01:12 commendation then almost certainly I would have seen it. Uh if it was for a commendation not at AXO level uh then I might not have seen it. In fact, I probably didn't see it. Can we go then to the second bullet
02:01:23 Can we go then to the second bullet point for which I think it doesn't matter whether or not you saw it.
02:01:38 It refers there to it says a copy of the home secretary's appreci home secretar's appreciation of the quality of the public order
02:01:49 the quality of the public order operation mounted in June 1998 communicated to AXO rests on DCHN81's file. Now, we have not found any such
02:02:03 file. Now, we have not found any such letter of appreciation on DC81's file. And my question to you is, can you remember whether the home secretary
02:02:15 remember whether the home secretary expressed appreciation of the quality of the public order operation mounted in June 1998? I'm afraid I can't.
02:02:27 I'm afraid I can't. Could we go now please to 741735?
02:02:33 This is tab B223 sir.
02:02:38 sir. We're moving now to the BBC television program True Spies. And this is a letter from [snorts] the BBC to you dated the 9th of January 2001
02:02:53 BBC to you dated the 9th of January 2001 during the preparatory phase for that television program. The first paragraph says, "It was good of you to find the time to see us when Peter Taylor and I
02:03:05 time to see us when Peter Taylor and I paid a brief visit to the commissioner before
02:03:11 before Christmas." Um
02:03:14 Um our understanding is by this stage Sir John Stevens is the commissioner. Can you help us with
02:03:25 you help us with Sir John Stevens's role in liaison with the BBC in relation to preparation of the True Spies program?
02:03:37 Spies program? I'm afraid in relation to true spies uh I have my recollection uh is as poor as it can be. Uh I absolutely there were ser senior involvement uh with the true
02:03:51 ser senior involvement uh with the true spies with Peter Taylor and his colleagues. [snorts]
02:03:55 [snorts] I also it thought that it included ACPO the terrorism allied matters uh count national council uh which had its own chairman. I I think there were various
02:04:08 chairman. I I think there were various bodies engaged. I I re I regret uh that I cannot unravel uh who did precisely what I was engaged. Uh but I can't recall what it was that I was engaged
02:04:20 recall what it was that I was engaged with. Now, it appears from that do from this document that you you'd had a meeting with the commissioner, Mr. Taylor, and one of his colleagues, and as the letter goes on, you'd offered
02:04:32 as the letter goes on, you'd offered help contacting former colleagues. Um, I may be pressing too far giving the state of your memory, but can you recall
02:04:43 of your memory, but can you recall whether this was a first meeting or whether there had been earlier meetings? I can't recall that precisely. it it does look to be at an early stage of the uh of the discussion.
02:04:56 uh of the discussion. And then if we go to the bottom paragraph on this page, please
02:05:03 after a list of essentially people they already know about, there is a request uh by the BBC for you to help them contact others. We know
02:05:17 to help them contact others. We know that subsequently a letter was sent out by Commander Pierce um seeking volunteers to assist with the program. Can you recall whether that was the
02:05:28 Can you recall whether that was the result of you asking him to do so or not?
02:05:32 not? Sadly, I can't. Is it likely that it arose from you asking him to do so? Certainly a possibility. Could we have 741801, please? That's B294, sir.
02:05:45 please? That's B294, sir. We're moving ahead from January to uh April 2000. This is 2000. April 2003. Uh so a couple of years later looking
02:05:57 Uh so a couple of years later looking back. Uh [snorts] this is from Commander Pierce. If we look at the second paragraph
02:06:10 here, a couple of years later, looking back, Commander Pierce is saying that there was a meeting in New Scotland Yard on the 15th of January. In other words,
02:06:21 on the 15th of January. In other words, after the letter we've just looked at, can you recall whether you were involved in further meetings or whether this is a mistaken date
02:06:33 or whether this is a mistaken date referring to the meeting that we've just read about? As I say, I can't unravel with precision as to who was involved in which dates.
02:06:44 as to who was involved in which dates. Uh I mean I have no reason to query uh if somebody has said that it occurred that it took place. If we could have 741738 now please. This is tab B236.
02:06:58 now please. This is tab B236. This is the letter from Commander Pierce. We're back now in 2001, the 30th of April 2001. uh to colleagues
02:07:10 uh to colleagues um
02:07:12 um uh inviting them to uh contact the BBC team if they wish. I know I've asked you and you can't remember whether you directly asked um
02:07:26 remember whether you directly asked um Commander Pierce to write such a letter, but can I take it uh that given what we've seen about your involvement that this would have been done with your either express or implied permission?
02:07:40 either express or implied permission? That's a a fair assumption. Uh
02:07:45 Uh we can take it can we from the fact that at this stage the Metropolitan Police Service is positively inviting
02:07:58 positively inviting uh people to cooperate with the BBC that
02:08:04 that you are unconcerned about making public the concept of infiltrating left-wing groups. I think that's generally correct.
02:08:17 I think that's generally correct. And was that because at the time it was considered wholly justified? I presume so. Well, the alternative would be that cooperating with the BBC was the lesser
02:08:30 cooperating with the BBC was the lesser of two evils. Um, and and better than not cooperating with them. Can you help us? Was it because it was thought this was good PR
02:08:41 because it was thought this was good PR for the Met or was it because your backs were up against the wall? I suspect I mean Peter Taylor had been involved uh with several uh initiatives
02:08:54 involved uh with several uh initiatives in relation to kindred subject matters. I assumed it was continuation uh of public information which was perhaps worthy in the public domain. not as a
02:09:07 worthy in the public domain. not as a reputation issue but as a story of public interest. A good news story. Yes. But but that was not perhaps the reason it was because it was an
02:09:19 reason it was because it was an interesting story. [snorts]
02:09:23 [snorts] Did you give consideration to the risk that might arise to former undercover police officers and current undercover police officers
02:09:34 police officers as [clears throat] a result of the BBC making public this story? A as we now know uh we should have paid attention uh to potentially negative aspects in a
02:09:47 to potentially negative aspects in a variety of forms and the impact of the true spies inquiry which clearly we didn't do at the time or put another way it should have been risk assess and it wasn't
02:09:58 risk assess and it wasn't well I I don't know whether there was or not but no the the effect was not necessarily anticipated. There were risk assessments afterwards, but we've not seen any prospective risk
02:10:10 but we've not seen any prospective risk assessments. Can we have up now 741 741774,
02:10:15 741774, please? That's tab B275.
02:10:20 Now, this is we move on to the fallout. Um, this is a letter from the director general of the security service to Mr.
02:10:33 general of the security service to Mr. hedges in his capacity of chairman of ACTO TAM. I'll give you a moment to look at it, but the the gist is uh she was not happy at all um that the security
02:10:46 not happy at all um that the security service had not been consulted.
02:10:54 Yes, that's a significant issue. That's a fair criticism, isn't it? Yes.
02:10:59 Yes. And uh perhaps to cut to the chase, on reflection, cooperating with the makers of True Spies was a mistake, wasn't it? I think that's probably uh too broad a
02:11:11 I think that's probably uh too broad a statement. It it clearly was inappropriate that the security service were able to feel that they not been consulted. Well, I may come back to that question a
02:11:23 Well, I may come back to that question a little bit later then. Can we take that uh down now please? I want to move uh to the question of Detective Sergeant
02:11:36 the question of Detective Sergeant Thompson.
02:11:39 Thompson. Detective Sergeant Thompson was caught having committed many acts of misconduct. He disobeyed an order not to travel to Indonesia.
02:11:51 Indonesia. He'd obtained an additional passport in his cover identity. He'd [snorts] obtained additional cover driving licenses
02:12:00 licenses in order to avoid the potent potential consequences of road traffic charges in his cover name. He was developing a second unauthorized cover identity in
02:12:14 second unauthorized cover identity in the name of a deceased child, including registering that identity as an elector. [snorts] There were at least strong suspicions that he had become involved
02:12:27 suspicions that he had become involved sexually with one or more women in his undercover identity, suspicions which were wellfounded. There were also suspicions about the propriety of his financial affairs
02:12:40 propriety of his financial affairs undercover. In other words, suspicions and evidence to back them up, suggesting serious professional misconduct and reasonably to suspect the commission of
02:12:52 reasonably to suspect the commission of multiple criminal offenses.
02:12:57 offenses. that was brought to the attention of Chief Superintendent Colin Black and he dealt with the matter informally by downgrading Thompson's security
02:13:11 by downgrading Thompson's security clearance to security cleared level for 2 years.
02:13:16 2 years. That was a step taken after the end of DS Thompson's deployment. Chief Superintendent Black's evidence to
02:13:28 Chief Superintendent Black's evidence to this inquiry is that you asked him to deal with Detective Sergeant Thompson.
02:13:41 Detective Sergeant Thompson. Is that true? I've seen documents uh particularly when I was asked to prepare my statement in
02:13:52 I was asked to prepare my statement in 2025
02:13:54 2025 in relation to the officer. Uh I cannot recall any of those uh and I cannot recall giving any instructions in relation uh to at any stage uh of the
02:14:05 relation uh to at any stage uh of the investigations.
02:14:10 Did Chief Superintendent Black in the role in the role and and the rank he held have authority to deal with Detective Sergeant Thompson
02:14:24 to deal with Detective Sergeant Thompson in that way? I think the actual determination of the case may well have rested uh at appropriately at a chief superintendent or acting commander level.
02:14:37 or acting commander level. Um, so just to explore that, was it properly within the gift of a chief superintendent to decide not to refer these episodes of
02:14:54 to decide not to refer these episodes of serious misconduct to the Department for Professional Standards or take any step that might result in prosecution? I I cannot be precise uh with at what
02:15:06 I I cannot be precise uh with at what level uh it was appropriate to make this determination. I think all of us would now reflect uh that there were other options uh apart from the decisions that
02:15:17 options uh apart from the decisions that were made. Were you told of the decision? I was not to my knowledge. Should the matter have been referred further up the chain of command before
02:15:30 further up the chain of command before deciding not formally to discipline? That certainly would have been an option.
02:15:37 option. When you say an option, was it a requirement? They are not precise uh as to what level in terms of rank uh the decision making could have been made. It sounds
02:15:49 could have been made. It sounds reasonable to me that it could have been made at the decision at chief superintendent.
02:15:56 Were there any guidelines for managers at Mr. Black's level as to what they had authority to do and what they needed to
02:16:07 authority to do and what they needed to communicate further up the chain of command?
02:16:10 command? I presume that may well have been the case and I apologize at this remove. I can't recall the precise details. Shouldn't
02:16:21 Thompson have been referred to the Department for Professional Standards? That certainly would have been an option available. In what circumstances can an officer
02:16:32 In what circumstances can an officer decide not to discipline someone when there is evidence of very serious misconduct? Well, there is a myriad of possibilities for them to consider uh in assume uh
02:16:47 for them to consider uh in assume uh that Colin Black had access to information on which he based his decision.
02:16:53 decision. You're painting a picture of the senior manager at his level having a broad discretion. I think that was my impression. Would
02:17:03 Would [snorts]
02:17:04 [snorts] protecting the operational security of the SDS be a good ground for not disciplining an Iran officer? A minor consideration.
02:17:16 Because the Department for Professional Standards is capable of disciplining someone without undermining the SDS, isn't it?
02:17:24 isn't it? I think that is true. Yes. And similarly, the court system is capable of prosecuting someone without harming the public interest. That's true.
02:17:38 Would you agree with hindsight with the proposition that um this should have been dealt with formally, not informally? With hindsight, that would have been, I
02:17:50 With hindsight, that would have been, I think, the preferred option. and at the time if it had come in front of you and on those facts as I've described them to you but with the additional fact
02:18:03 them to you but with the additional fact that the officer had as well as being thoroughly dishonest and behaving very badly indeed did have some mental health problems. Would you have decided it in
02:18:15 problems. Would you have decided it in the same way or differently? I can't be precise, but I hope that I would have taken a course of action uh that was more broadly in the public interest.
02:18:26 more broadly in the public interest. Are you very diplomatically saying you would have taken a different decision? I hope so.
02:18:36 As indeed we saw earlier happened when very senior managers got hold of the Chitty case and insisted that Chitty was disciplined. Yes.
02:18:50 Can we go now please to 749763? Sir, this is your tab B271.
02:19:05 Page two, please. This is a letter addressed to you dated the 8th of August 2002
02:19:14 2002 written by the partner of an anonymous undercover police officer HN123.
02:19:22 If you don't know who that is, you may wish to consult the cipher list. I think I know. I I'll give you a moment to refresh your memory from the from the bottom of the
02:19:35 memory from the from the bottom of the page and running over onto the top of the next.
02:19:49 Thank you. We've got the benefit of your second witness uh statement about this. Can I but I I I need to ask you
02:20:01 but I I I need to ask you directly. Did you see this letter? Not to my recollection. Assuming that you didn't see it, am I right to understand from your second
02:20:14 right to understand from your second witness statement that your staff would have given you a precy of its contents? Possibly. Yes. But whether it included this specific detail, I have no
02:20:25 this specific detail, I have no knowledge. And this document was generated in the course of a sickness appeals process. That is correct. I just would like to add uh that this was investigated uh
02:20:37 add uh that this was investigated uh very thoroughly uh in recent years uh and I provided a series uh of statements which I appended to my second statement witness statement uh which I hope uh
02:20:49 witness statement uh which I hope uh tries to form shed shed some light on what the possibilities were about whether I never saw this letter. Can you recall whether your staff
02:21:03 Can you recall whether your staff included mention of the misconduct alleged in this letter when briefing you?
02:21:11 you? No.
02:21:13 No. Should they have done so? I think there was a variety of uh responsibilities upon them. Uh I make no complaint in retrospect uh that it was
02:21:26 complaint in retrospect uh that it was not fully comprehensive. I don't know. I can't recall uh any details of the briefing note. Well, can I just explore that a bit? These are pretty arresting allegations,
02:21:39 These are pretty arresting allegations, aren't they? They are particularly as we now view them today. Being Well, they would have been at any time, wouldn't they? that there was certainly a cause for concern
02:21:53 being raised in correspondence with you in the capacity of a very senior member of the Metropolitan Police Service. That's correct. Surely
02:22:05 That's correct. Surely any responsible member of your staff should either have put these allegations in front of you or told you about them.
02:22:19 in front of you or told you about them. That would have been the ideal outcome. I I have no knowledge to contribute as to why that did not occur and I attribute no blame to stay to say that it it would be an
02:22:31 to stay to say that it it would be an ideal standard to raise allegations of serious sexual misconduct is understating it, isn't it? I I
02:22:43 is understating it, isn't it? I I understand the reticence of talking about people under your command, but the reality was these allegations should not simply have been ignored, should they?
02:22:55 been ignored, should they? You know, certainly uh ideally no. Well, it's not ideally at all. The bottom line is if a a police officer has
02:23:06 has allegations like this drawn to their boss's attention, they should pass them on, shouldn't they? I I think uh that is a a an
02:23:18 I I think uh that is a a an interpretation. Uh this was a process relating to sick peel payment uh in relation to the officer. I certainly should have regardless of the
02:23:31 certainly should have regardless of the questions you're specifically asking of this I incident uh I should have been more alerted uh to the broader welfare concerns uh which were being evidenced
02:23:43 concerns uh which were being evidenced in relation to undercover offices and I regret that.
02:23:53 And not asking you to name them. Do you know who was on your staff at the time?
02:24:00 time? No, I don't. Are you sure? I certainly can't recall.
02:24:09 If you had read this document or had it preede to you in the material passages, what would you have done? I hope I would
02:24:20 what would you have done? I hope I would have taken further action.
02:24:26 That of course is the right answer. What I would just like to be clear about is are you sure that in those days at that time that is in fact what you would have
02:24:38 time that is in fact what you would have done?
02:24:39 done? I hope so. I don't know with the benefit of looking backwards what action I would have taken. I hope I would have done the right thing. From that answer,
02:24:50 From that answer, I am taking it that you are not categoric and there is a possibility that these matters could have been drawn to your attention and you did nothing
02:25:02 to your attention and you did nothing about them. Is that fair? I I don't think that I saw the document. I have looked into that in some detail and I provided decent
02:25:14 I provided decent recent statements which I hope address this issue. Uh had I seen the the the do the the letter I hope I would have taken the proper action.
02:25:27 Putting aside the question of exactly who saw this letter and what was said about its contents within your office.
02:25:41 about its contents within your office. On any view, an undercover police officer's partner raises serious allegations of sexual misconduct
02:25:52 misconduct that go into your office and nothing is done about them. Is it
02:26:00 Is it and the the historical fact is yes, you're right. Doesn't that speak volumes about
02:26:11 speak volumes about attitudes to women in the MPS at the time?
02:26:18 time? I agree. It's an unwelcome indication. Whether that was true in this particular case, I I have no way of commenting because if the harm done by this sort of
02:26:31 because if the harm done by this sort of sexual deception had been appreciated, something would have been done by somebody, wouldn't it? I think that's true of a raft of issues
02:26:44 I think that's true of a raft of issues uh relating to misconduct within the SDS.
02:26:48 SDS. And I could make similar observations about attitudes to the children born of these relationships.
02:27:00 We have to pick it up for the transcript. I think you said yes then. I just want to be clear. Sorry, I I apologize for not being clear. I said yes. Did HN123's
02:27:11 Did HN123's partner ever say anything to you at any time
02:27:16 time about undercover police officers having girlfriends in their undercover identities? Not that I can recall. Might she might he have done or she?
02:27:27 Might she might he have done or she? I don't know.
02:27:33 or fathering a child or children with women that they had met in their undercover identities. Similarly, I have no recollection or any other sexual misconduct.
02:27:45 or any other sexual misconduct. No. Is let's say I'm in my own mind clear that I did not see this letter or receive indications by other means. Uh,
02:27:57 receive indications by other means. Uh, I Yes, I'm pitching my question wider because we know that you met HM123's partner in the course of the appeals process and I'm asking you now, did did
02:28:11 process and I'm asking you now, did did HM123's partner say anything to you about any of these matters? Not that I can recall. It was entirely appropriate uh that there should have been meetings uh between the officer and
02:28:23 been meetings uh between the officer and his partner and indeed uh other representatives for example of a staff association uh in order to progress the main issue uh of which we were meeting
02:28:34 main issue uh of which we were meeting which was continuation of pay. Did you tell HN123's partner that the SDS had been through a cowboy phase? a
02:28:45 SDS had been through a cowboy phase? a recollection or anything remotely like that. I don't think I would have used those phrase
02:28:53 phrase [snorts]
02:28:55 you will see that that phrase the the assertion in the letter is that you did do that. I want to give you an opportunity to deal with this
02:29:06 opportunity to deal with this proposition. Why would HN123's partner in assert in a letter to you that you had said something that you had not?
02:29:17 had said something that you had not? I don't know. Could we take it from the fact that it is included in this
02:29:28 is included in this 2002 document that it is more likely than not that you did say something to that effect? I have no information or recollection that would contribute to a
02:29:39 recollection that would contribute to a helpful answer to that. Did you uh say to HN123's partner that you were keeping a close eye on the SDS?
02:29:50 you were keeping a close eye on the SDS? I have no recollection. Were you keeping a close eye on the SDS at that time? We now know that I wasn't keeping as close an eye on the SDS as I should have
02:30:01 close an eye on the SDS as I should have done at the time. Did you say to HN123's partner that the SDS was now part of the modern world? No.
02:30:12 No. Did you consider at the time that the SDS was part of the modern world? What we know now, there were clearly defects that it was living in the past.
02:30:23 defects that it was living in the past. At the time, what was your state of mind?
02:30:30 I I can't recall uh whether I had a particular view. Did you say anything to HN123's
02:30:41 Did you say anything to HN123's partner to the effect that the SDS had better leadership than it had had? Not that I'm aware. No. Did you consider that it did? I I can't
02:30:53 Did you consider that it did? I I can't recall
02:30:58 whether from HN123's partner or anybody else. Did you ever hear anything to the effect that SDS officers were misconducting themselves sexually in their undercover identities?
02:31:11 their undercover identities? Of that I can be certain. I I did not know and I was not told of such illegitimate activities. How when your recollection is generally
02:31:23 How when your recollection is generally so poor can you be so sure of that? Because it would have prompted alarm bells uh and I hope would have led to resulting com actions.
02:31:36 Did anybody tell you that SDS undercover officers were in any way engaging in sexual activity in their undercover identities? Not to my knowledge. No.
02:31:47 Not to my knowledge. No. Is there likely to have been a reply to this letter?
02:31:53 I I can't assist. It was part of a process uh where there was a meeting held. I made a decision about pay presumably uh that they would
02:32:06 about pay presumably uh that they would have notified them what the decision and the outcome was. Would
02:32:13 Would it be fair to say that on any view HN123's
02:32:18 HN123's partner was clearly very distressed? Yes. And I I've expressed uh my opinion uh that I think the missed opportunity in not seeing this letter was not
02:32:29 in not seeing this letter was not addressing in more detail and in more proative way the whole issue o of welfare of undercover officers and indeed their partners.
02:32:41 indeed their partners. Can we take the document down now, please? And could we also have the feed down? Could you let me know when I can continue, please?