Continuation of Commander Janet Williams's (HN145) evidence as Commander of Special Branch (2002-2004), examining the MPS's handling of the 'Officers A and B' civil litigation (Peter Francis and HN123) via the 'Operation Magma' gold group, the commissioning of the Walton and Crane reviews of SDS practices, and the MPS's response to allegations that undercover officers had sexual relationships with activists, including Helen Steel's deceived relationship with John Dines and DI James Thompson's (HN16) vetting review. Williams repeatedly says she cannot recall reading key documents or discussing the allegations, while agreeing with hindsight that misconduct allegations 'ought to have been' investigated but insisting this was never the gold group's responsibility.
00:39:36 was all very much preme. Um, this had been going on so long. I think he was conversant with it whereas I really wasn't.
00:39:47 wasn't. Um,
00:39:48 Um, we can go back um on the live stream. Thank you. Um in relation to uh the document MPS0749288.
00:40:01 It's at tab B 101 of the bundle please.
00:40:08 This is an MPS Directorate of Legal Services attendance note dated the 14th of September 2004 and it records a meeting with you DIHN53
00:40:21 and it records a meeting with you DIHN53 and an MPS uh solicitor. Um it's heavily redacted because it concerns legally professionally privileged material. Um but if we can go um over the page
00:40:34 Um but if we can go um over the page please.
00:40:38 We see here in the unredacted section that someone whose name has been redacted asked whether there was a sexual relationship between HB who we
00:40:49 sexual relationship between HB who we understand to be Hawks Bay or Mr. and HS Helen Steel and it records HN53 said there was but that HB maintained
00:41:00 said there was but that HB maintained his objectivity. JWU Janet Williams said that such a relationship would not have been disproved of then although it is now. Um this is an attendance note written by
00:41:12 Um this is an attendance note written by an MPS solicitor. Um, would you accept first of all that a a lawyer from the MPS is likely to be trying to keep a full and accurate record of this meeting
00:41:23 full and accurate record of this meeting of of what was said by who? Yes.
00:41:27 Yes. And there would be no reason whatsoever for such a lawyer to record someone saying something in that meeting which they had not in fact said, would there?
00:41:39 I don't think I did say it. Well, what is the reason to think that this note recorded by an MPS uh Directorate of Legal Services lawyer who
00:41:52 Directorate of Legal Services lawyer who presumably is is faithfully trying to record accurately what's said at the meeting and by who? What is the basis for thinking that this note is inaccurate? It is a bit cuffgar-esque in in that,
00:42:05 It is a bit cuffgar-esque in in that, you know, there is it's completely redacted except for one one one remark I'm supposed to have made. There's no context for me. It's so
00:42:17 made. There's no context for me. It's so difficult. 20 odd years later, but I don't remember ever saying that. And I did not know there was a sexual relationship. Why he or she, I don't even remember remember the meeting. I
00:42:30 even remember remember the meeting. I don't even know if the meeting took place. [snorts] Um I can if you tell me it did and it was recorded by an MPS lawyer of of course it must have done but I honestly don't remember it and I I would have
00:42:43 don't remember it and I I would have remembered saying that and I didn't. Um how how can you be so sure um now given that you can't recall the meeting? Because I've never knew about the sexual
00:42:54 Because I've never knew about the sexual relationships. If I'd had known about the sexual relationships, I would have done something about it. Well, is that right? Is the reality that you were indeed told at that meeting, as
00:43:06 you were indeed told at that meeting, as this very clearly and boldly records, but it was not a significant piece of of information because sexual relationships were tacitly accepted to have happened
00:43:17 were tacitly accepted to have happened undercover. No.
00:43:20 No. Um,
00:43:26 and again, given the extreme lengths that Helen Steel was going to in order to find John Dyn, um, that would have made much more sense, wouldn't it? Having been told, as this records, that
00:43:39 Having been told, as this records, that there had been a sexual relationship between them. Yes.
00:43:46 But you still um maintain your evidence that positively today that you positively did not say this despite not recalling the meeting.
00:43:57 recalling the meeting. I do not recall saying this and more importantly I deny ever having had that knowledge.
00:44:07 Was your understanding at the time that sexual relationships wouldn't have been disapproved of in the past when this would have occurred in the late 80s and
00:44:18 would have occurred in the late 80s and early 90s, but that there was a disappribation at the time you were commander of special branch in this meeting.
00:44:25 meeting. Can you repeat that question? There's lots of
00:44:27 lots of was your understanding at the time you were commander of special branch yes
00:44:31 yes that this is this was true that essentially in the past relationships sexual relationships undercover hadn't been disproved of but that they were at
00:44:42 been disproved of but that they were at the time you were commander they were definitely disproved of at the time I was commander because I didn't even know they existed and if I did I'd have put stop to them but I I didn't
00:44:53 have put stop to them but I I didn't know that they had existed previously either
00:44:59 was your understanding that they had always been disprove disapproved of um in special branch. Well, it's quite certainly in um in the
00:45:13 Well, it's quite certainly in um in the the um
00:45:15 the um the code of conduct and the um um the manual for undercover officers in serious and organized crime. It's very
00:45:26 serious and organized crime. It's very explicit about that is prohibited. Maybe that was a naive assumption on my behalf because of the background I came from that it was explicit in the terms of
00:45:37 that it was explicit in the terms of reference of this group. But certainly I thought it was
00:45:44 um do you think now looking back um given that there does seem to have been knowledge of Helensteel and John Dyn's
00:45:55 knowledge of Helensteel and John Dyn's relationship within special branch and in particular within the SDS. Do you think um that relationship influenced the handling and resolution of operation muscat
00:46:06 muscat in terms of Mr. Dyn's relocation at great expense from New Zealand to Australia. I can't answer that question because I honestly don't know.
00:46:17 honestly don't know. Um, had you known, you say you you you didn't know, contrary to what this records, but if we take that evidence and assume that that um it's accurate,
00:46:30 and assume that that um it's accurate, had you known at the time of a relationship, a sexual relationship between Mr. Dines and Helen Steel. At the time you were dealing with Operation Muscat and the relocation of him from
00:46:41 Muscat and the relocation of him from New Zealand to Australia, would you have dealt with that operation differently?
00:46:52 I would have asked questions about how Miss Steel had been treated and what
00:47:04 you know if she Yeah. I mean, if if we knew as an organization that she had been mistreated sexually by him, which I regard it is a
00:47:15 him, which I regard it is a mistreatment, if he'd had an affair with her and she didn't know the true nature of that affair,
00:47:25 affair, then I would want to know how what are we doing to protect her? What are we doing
00:47:32 doing to make sure she was okay? What are we doing about her welfare? I don't know if I would have treated him any differently if I'd have thought that there was a serious physical threat against him and his family, but I would
00:47:45 against him and his family, but I would certainly have done some additional things for her. Yes. And in relation to the the assessment of that supposed physical threat against him and and to his family.
00:47:56 him and and to his family. Yes. Wouldn't a knowledge of the reason that Helen Steele was trying to find him was that because she'd been deceived into a sexual relationship with him and not because she was an angry activist um
00:48:08 not because she was an angry activist um who wanted to find him to confront him for that reason? That that would have affected the threat assessment, wouldn't it?
00:48:15 it? I certainly I didn't know. So, I didn't think that through. You may well be right.
00:48:20 right. Do you think that would have affected your thinking at the time had you known? I think a lot of different things would have gone through my mind if I'd have known.
00:48:29 known. Um, if you'd known, you would certainly have briefed Axo Vaness, wouldn't you? Yes.
00:48:38 Do you think his approach to the resolution of Operation Musket would have been influenced by that knowledge? Certainly hope so. I think so.
00:48:50 um you traveled to Australia um
00:48:56 um whilst HN53 was there facilitating John Dyn's relocation for a different reason. Yes. Um we understand but you were there at the same time and [clears throat] I think you met with HN53 at the time.
00:49:09 with HN53 at the time. What was the nature of those meetings? That can be taken down. Thank you. Yeah, this was it was all about cost really. um costs were rising in terms of um
00:49:21 um uh phone calls he was having to make be make back into branch and um discussions with lawyers back in the UK and there's only a certain you know above a certain
00:49:33 only a certain you know above a certain amount I think at that time certain amount of spend you had to get top cover for that um for the spend. So he
00:49:44 for that um for the spend. So he explained because in those days, you know, that phone calls cost a lot more than they do now. Um, and they were in peak time as well. So, uh, the costs were going up and up and they were they
00:49:55 were going up and up and they were they were really significant. So, he came to me through to authorize that spend, which I did. Was there any discussion of Helen Steel and what she was doing? I don't recall any.
00:50:06 I don't recall any. Um, did did you ever meet with John Dyn? No.
00:50:10 No. Um why not given your role in operation Muscat and that you were on the ground in Australia with HN53 albeit if I was pretty busy operationally actually
00:50:22 I was pretty busy operationally actually um in Australia um and um as far as I was concerned this was a historic case and we were just dealing with the financial and technical moves
00:50:35 with the financial and technical moves thereafter. I didn't regard it as a current case as it were. So, it wasn't one that I felt I should get involved with.
00:50:44 with. Thank you. Um I'd like to move on then please to another topic. Um operation magma.
00:50:52 magma. Uh this is the name of the operation given to the MPS response to the officers A and B litigation brought by um HN43 DC Peter Francis and HN123.
00:51:07 um HN43 DC Peter Francis and HN123. Um you say in your witness statement at paragraph 302 page 147 that you have no recollection of the litigation or of attending any meetings. Is that right?
00:51:18 attending any meetings. Is that right? I'll just find that if I may. Of course. Paragraph 30, page 147, paragraph 302.
00:51:41 100 page 147. Thank you.
00:51:47 Paragraph 302. Mine's different. Okay. Mine is different. Hang on. The ordinary page numbers at the bottom. It's page 145. Thank you very much, sir.
00:51:59 Thank you very much, sir. Yes. Sorry. The I'm using the epic reference, sir. You're right. I'll read that if I may.
00:52:45 Yes. So, you don't have any recollection of this litigation or of attending the gold group meetings today? I don't with I
00:52:56 group meetings today? I don't with I think this was probably something I would have definitely made a note of in my decision logs, but without those I can't recall, I'm afraid. Well, I can take you to your decision log in a moment, but um are you now
00:53:07 log in a moment, but um are you now aware that the basis of the claim was that the MPS had breached its duty of care to those two officers, occasioning them psychiatric harm, essentially that
00:53:18 them psychiatric harm, essentially that the SDS had not looked after their mental health? No, I didn't know that. I I I have lived abroad for about 10 years, so I've not really been following
00:53:29 years, so I've not really been following very much of the this this inquiry or what has happened. I'm afraid that can be taken down. Thank you. So, we we know that a gold group um was
00:53:41 we we know that a gold group um was convened. Um it was designated on the 16th of January 2004. Um we know from MPS0749707
00:53:53 um which are the minutes of the 16th of January meeting um that the gold group was convened and that you were uh present
00:54:03 present and you were designated gold in other words the lead of that group. Um what is the process um for starting
00:54:14 Um what is the process um for starting and ending a a gold group? Whose decision is it?
00:54:22 Um, there's probably a definition I can't remember now. Um, but a goal group essentially would be formulated to look
00:54:33 essentially would be formulated to look at an issue of deep concern. Um
00:54:38 Um and you would um you would have a variety of people um advise you in respect of um the incident
00:54:50 advise you in respect of um the incident or
00:54:52 or or whatever you were looking at. Um and those would usually include legal services. They would include sometimes HR, sometimes media. Um,
00:55:04 sometimes HR, sometimes media. Um, usually a senior officer would chair. Um,
00:55:08 Um, and it was to make sure that the issue was looked at in the round um to make sure it was properly investigated and
00:55:20 and uh all aspects of the um the incident were understood and acted upon as necessary. Thank you. So you said it would be
00:55:32 Thank you. So you said it would be usually in relation to a matter of deep concern. So it would have it would need to be a matter of high importance to warrant a gold group. Is that right? From memory. Yes.
00:55:44 From memory. Yes. Thank you. Um we know that you were designated as gold. You were the most senior officer um involved in this gold group and these meetings. Yes.
00:55:56 group and these meetings. Yes. Um and we know as you've said that the civil action and the potential impact of disclosure of witness statements was uh to be treated as a critical incident.
00:56:09 to be treated as a critical incident. Um and we can see that again from MPS0749711
00:56:15 page one at the bottom. It's tab 90 B92 of the bundle.
00:56:24 What was the significance of designating this litigation as a critical incident? Was it simply that the gold group followed or was there some other consequence that designating it a
00:56:35 consequence that designating it a critical incident had? As I said, there's there is some a document that defines what um when a gold group should be held. Um and I
00:56:46 gold group should be held. Um and I really am acting from 20 odd years memory and um having been working in a completely different jurisdiction for the last 10. I understand. Um
00:57:00 perhaps if we can look at MPS 0749708 please.
00:57:09 [laughter]
00:57:12 This is the decision log for Operation Magma. And as we can see from this front page, the gold group. Is this the type of document that you referred to before?
00:57:24 of document that you referred to before? Yeah, this is a decision log. It's not mine. It's a Sometimes decision logs were put in place for a specific incident. Um, and um,
00:57:36 incident. Um, and um, someone would be dedicated to um, completing that decision log. Um and then um
00:57:45 then um if necessary um the the decision log well usually actually the decision log was then given to the senior officer um to look at the decisions to check
00:57:57 um to look at the decisions to check that they were correct to check that the agreed actions were as he or she required them to be and then sign them off.
00:58:06 off. Thank you. And um this is a document you've only seen today. Yes. But we can have a look at it because you do feature in it. Um, page two, please.
00:58:20 So, we can see there an entry by it appears detective superintendent Renol, but your signature um as the um supervised review is at the bottom um on
00:58:34 supervised review is at the bottom um on the 16th of uh the 16th of January, 2004. Do you see that? I do.
00:58:41 I do. Um this um sets out the reasons for um the MPS concern in relation to the litigation under um the decision is at
00:58:53 litigation under um the decision is at the top and then the the reasons for concern are set out under in the box labeled reason and there are um three um set out there.
00:59:08 Maybe we can zoom in a little bit because it's a little tricky to read. Thank you. Thank you. Um, so there was a concern that the it
00:59:20 Um, so there was a concern that the it the the legal the disclosure of the these statements outside the legal process may one lead to physical threat to existing or former SDS officers from those they um formerly provided
00:59:32 those they um formerly provided intelligence upon, two, undermine confidence in the MPS within the public at large. and three undermine confidence in the MPS amongst former and existing
00:59:44 in the MPS amongst former and existing SDS officers. Do you see that? I do.
00:59:47 I do. Um, this litigation was clearly being regarded as extremely significant to the MPS as a whole, to special branch and to the SDS, wasn't it?
00:59:58 the SDS, wasn't it? I think so. Um, this was the first ever claim um, brought by SDS officers and this was a highly secretive unit. I
01:00:09 this was a highly secretive unit. I think so secret that you weren't aware of its particular existence before you were commander. Is that right? That's correct. um
01:00:18 um the litigation and in particular as is recorded here, it was felt the disclosure of the officers A and B witness statements um risked the operational security of the SDS and its
01:00:30 operational security of the SDS and its undercover officers, didn't it? That's what we were concerned about. And it risked public exposure of the unit and the groups that they were that
01:00:41 unit and the groups that they were that they were reporting on. That was a concern as well, wasn't it? Certainly of the unit and I'm not sure what the statement said now, but if if it contained any detail about um the
01:00:53 it contained any detail about um the groups they were put against, then yes, of course, that would be a concern. And clearly the the potential to undermine public confidence um in the MPS and the
01:01:04 public confidence um in the MPS and the confidence in the MPS of of existing and former SDS officers is expressly um recorded to be of concern in this document.
01:01:13 document. Yeah,
01:01:13 Yeah, that's right, isn't it? Um there were also weren't there complex official secret act considerations? Would you agree?
01:01:24 Would you agree? I can't recall now. You may be right. Um, you were leading this gold group designated as gold, the the the most senior officer.
01:01:36 senior officer. Um, do you really recall nothing at all about it?
01:01:44 Well, it's helpful to have the decision log, but I only got it this morning. If I'd have if I'd have had time if I'd have had the decision log when I was making my statement then I would have had real time to consider it and it
01:01:55 had real time to consider it and it might have joged my memory. So my answer to your question was because when I wrote my statement um I hadn't seen this and so I hadn't got that that jog and
01:02:09 and so I hadn't got that that jog and and it's very hard to try and remember things when you haven't got any prompts 20 odd years later. Understood. Has it now assisted your recollection of these meetings?
01:02:20 recollection of these meetings? It started I'm starting to remember a little bit about it now. Yes. And what do you recall? Um pretty much what's written there really.
01:02:29 really. Um I remember I was I I chaired the goal group. I remembered um that we were concerned about um about
01:02:41 about the impact of this on the organization and the impact of this on SDS officers in particular and current and past um investigations.
01:02:52 investigations. Um you were responsible for briefing AXO Vaness. Do you recall that? Is that written down? Yes. MPS0749712.
01:03:04 It's at tab B79 of the bundle. So it is a document you've seen before at page three. And that records that you briefed him on the 20th of January 2004.
01:03:16 him on the 20th of January 2004. Yes, I would expect to if it's something so serious then of course he's my boss. Of course I'm going to brief him on that.
01:03:25 that. Do you recall any contents of that briefing?
01:03:27 briefing? No.
01:03:29 No. Um, could we look at please MPS0749706?
01:03:35 This is a document you've seen before. It's at tab B64 of the bundle at page one. This is the minutes of the operation magma second gold group
01:03:48 operation magma second gold group meeting which um occurred on the 20th of January 2004. And again we can see that you were present along with other senior officers. DCI Dell from the SDS, DI HN53
01:04:02 officers. DCI Dell from the SDS, DI HN53 from the SDS and as you suspected a solicitor from the Department of Legal Services. Can you see that from the top? Yes.
01:04:12 Yes. Um, in the introduction it states, "Commander Williams outlined the overall objectives of the gold group were to protect the integrity of the MPS and
01:04:23 protect the integrity of the MPS and ensure the benefits of SDS as an intelligence gathering operation were not lost to the MPS. Is that right? That's what the minute says. And so far
01:04:34 That's what the minute says. And so far as you can recollect, does this help your recollection with what the priorities in terms of overall objectives were of this gold group in relation to this litigation?
01:04:46 relation to this litigation? Well, I for my from my perspective, the decision log is the better is the better document because that would be the document that um
01:04:57 document that um you know came up directly out of the meeting. It's contemporaneously recorded. So, and I I note that missing from that is the welfare of the SDS officers.
01:05:08 SDS officers. Yes. Um, what do you think is meant by protect the integrity of the MPS?
01:05:20 Now or then? Well, both. Yeah. Um,
01:05:26 well, I I think
01:05:35 [laughter] it it
01:05:39 it it I think for an organization to run
01:05:44 to run source units, undercover units, surveillance, those sort of covert tools
01:05:54 they need to the public needs to trust in them. And
01:06:03 um I think that if you're having people in a secret part of the organization,
01:06:14 making things that should not be public public,
01:06:19 public, that undermines public confidence in the integrity of the organization, in the secrecy of the organization, and the ability to keep secrets. secret
01:06:32 ability to keep secrets. secret and in the way that they manage their people.
01:06:37 people. Would you agree that it suggests that a primary focus of operation magma was essentially defensive? It was protecting the security and reputation of the SDS
01:06:49 the security and reputation of the SDS and not acting or investigating not acting upon or investigating the allegations or any revelations made in evidence of officers A and B.
01:07:04 I I don't think it was the role of the go group to do the investigation. Whose role was it?
01:07:14 whoever was given that investigation, but it wasn't the gold group who investigated. Was any part of the gold group's role to critically examine any claims being made
01:07:27 critically examine any claims being made within the witness evidence of officers A and B. In in other words, investigating revelations or allegations made within that evidence.
01:07:42 I don't think this I don't I mean I don't see from it's hard to recall but I don't see from the decision log that I thought it was the goal group's role and
01:07:55 thought it was the goal group's role and responsibility to investigate those claims. I can only assume that that was happening elsewhere that was happening in Metropol and police solicitors etc. But it wasn't I don't
01:08:07 solicitors etc. But it wasn't I don't see it from the terms of reference of the gold group that that's what I thought we were doing. Um there's no suggestion certainly from this document or the decision log that
01:08:18 this document or the decision log that allegations made by officers A and B of misconduct of UCOs whilst deployed undercover are being investigated. Is there do you recall any such investigation?
01:08:33 I don't recall at this stage, but I I say again
01:08:38 say again what I'd written down in the terms of reference of the goal group was what I thought we were doing in the goal group. And if if I didn't say we were investigating, we weren't investigating.
01:08:52 Um, were you aware though of whether there was any investigation into allegations of misconduct made within the witness statements disclosed to the
01:09:03 the witness statements disclosed to the gold group of officers A and B? I can't remember now, but I know it wasn't our responsibility to do so. That's not what I thought the gold group
01:09:16 That's not what I thought the gold group was doing. So, if I I don't I don't know. who else was doing the investigation, but I presume somebody else was.
01:09:27 but I presume somebody else was. Why did you presume that? Well, someone must have been doing it. Um the the second gold group meeting also instigated what would become the Walton review of the SDS um
01:09:39 Walton review of the SDS um recordkeeping. Um it's MPS0749706 at page two, action point 9.
01:10:08 Um your instruction to superintendent uh Renol um to DCI Walton to commence this were copied to the operation magma file
01:10:19 were copied to the operation magma file That's at MPS0526 836 and that's tab B77 of the bundles there.
01:10:46 So we can see that this is a memo from uh Superintendent Renol to DCI Richard Walton. It's copied to DCIDell of the SDS and it's copied to the operation
01:10:57 SDS and it's copied to the operation magma file and this is the review which you commissioned essentially um Andy Renold writes the memo following discussions with you in relation to a
01:11:09 discussions with you in relation to a review of existing arrangements of the recordkeeping system employed within special branch and the terms of reference are set out there. Um I think you do recall the Walton review. Does
01:11:20 you do recall the Walton review. Does that assist you to recall any further about the priorities of the gold group um in terms of the meetings you attended?
01:11:32 Two completely separate things in my mind really. I do remember the Walton review. I've had a lot of time to study those documents obviously when I was making my statement. Um
01:11:45 making my statement. Um I just repeat that the goal group was looking as you can see from the decision log I was very clear about what the goal group was doing.
01:11:57 group was doing. It's not special branch was not an operational investigative organization. It was an intelligence organization. Um, so
01:12:10 Um, so I'm
01:12:11 I'm I am making the assumption now that um someone else was looking at um the statements, the content of the statements, but it wasn't us. Um, in in
01:12:23 statements, but it wasn't us. Um, in in terms of this review, the Walton review, you say in your witness statement at paragraph 66, um, page 29, that you commissioned that review due to professional curiosity and a desire to
01:12:35 professional curiosity and a desire to increase your understanding of how the unit was operated and tasked. But looking at these documents, would you now agree that the Commission of the Walton Review appears to have been
01:12:46 Walton Review appears to have been directly connected to Operation Magma and not just a general desire on your part to understand the unit? Definitely not. What's the explanation then for the
01:12:59 What's the explanation then for the contents of this document? it coming out of um Operation Magma being copied to the file.
01:13:14 I didn't even know it was copied to the file. I mean,
01:13:20 I just have to reiterate in all honesty, I had a prof I I was responsible for modernizing
01:13:32 modernizing SO2
01:13:34 SO2 threat
01:13:36 threat and I needed to understand what was going on. So I needed to put that these things were things that I felt I needed some real knowledge of and so I put this
01:13:50 some real knowledge of and so I put this in place.
01:13:53 in place. Perhaps it had been copied to the file because
01:13:57 because that might assist in some way. But certainly
01:14:01 certainly I can guarantee you that Operation Magna had absolutely no place in me um commissioning this review. None at all. despite the the record in the the gold
01:14:14 despite the the record in the the gold group meeting minutes that I've took you to before this document that said that shows that the SDS recordkeeping review was an action point from a gold group meeting
01:14:27 but it was well we'd have to look at the dates exact dates of when I have you got the file what we need is the is the docket for the um this for me
01:14:39 docket for the um this for me commissioning the review. Um,
01:14:43 Um, sorry, I'm getting confused with the Let me let me be clear.
01:14:50 There was a docket for each of the reviews I put in place. I haven't been shown those dockets. I've just been shown portions of them. But the whole docket would show exactly on
01:15:03 the whole docket would show exactly on what date I made decisions and what was in my mind at the time. If we had those dockets in front of us, those dockets would show that this had nothing to do
01:15:14 would show that this had nothing to do with Operation Magna. It had it was, as I've said here, it was my professional curiosity, my responsibility, and my professionalism
01:15:26 responsibility, and my professionalism to make sure that these things were running properly. the one line in Operation Magna.
01:15:37 Maybe this com maybe this had already been commissioned. I think it probably had, but without those dates in front of me, I can't be sure. Well, we know that the date where that was recorded in relation to the gold
01:15:48 was recorded in relation to the gold group meeting was the 20th of January. We have this memo from Superintendent Andy Rintel, who sat on the gold group. Yeah. of the 6th of February commissioning this review following
01:15:59 commissioning this review following discussions with you. Okay.
01:16:01 Okay. That timeline suggests a correlation, doesn't it? Oh, I see. I see. Okay. So, so I understand why you've got the correlation now. Um because you've got similarity in dates and you've got the
01:16:12 similarity in dates and you've got the sim same person in both places. Okay. Andy Renol's job was reviewing and to and um process and systems and um all of
01:16:24 and um process and systems and um all of that all of that stuff. So it's not unusual for him to be on the go group doing the recordeping for me and also doing this. So that's a pure coincidence
01:16:35 doing this. So that's a pure coincidence in terms of the timing. Well, it's not a pure coincidence. it was he would have been as part of his his job and and that would be fine in in part of in in terms of the um the dates a lot was going on
01:16:50 of the um the dates a lot was going on and I was moving things very quickly. This is the finalized terms of reference that have gone um to Richard Walton that
01:17:02 that have gone um to Richard Walton that had come from Andy Rintel after having had discussions and some work done by me. Um so I don't know when the first draft of this was out or when I first
01:17:14 draft of this was out or when I first put these together. This is when the memorandum was sent to Richard Walton who's going to conduct the review. Um not when I put the terms of reference together. I can only reiterate Operation
01:17:26 together. I can only reiterate Operation Magna was not in my mind when I put these terms of reference together. Thank you. That can be taken down. Could we look please at MPS0749706.
01:17:37 It's tab B64 of the bundle.
01:17:43 Um page three, paragraph 4.
01:17:52 This concerned um risk assessments
01:17:58 and I'm interested in the top bullet point. The meeting considered the summary sheet circulated following discussion of the potential impact on the wider MPS of the
01:18:09 potential impact on the wider MPS of the deployments of Morris and HN81. These two officers were regraded as critical. Briefing reports are required to assess the MPS vulnerability. There
01:18:20 to assess the MPS vulnerability. There is also a need to ensure former SDS officers are not being exposed unnecessarily to the possibility of compromise. Um, can you help us with the potential impact on the wider S MPS of
01:18:32 potential impact on the wider S MPS of of Morris and HN81 leading to them being regraded as critical?
01:18:41 Because they were deep undercover officers and they were exposing the nature of those operations. Did it have to do with revelations in the officers A and B evidence um that
01:18:55 the officers A and B evidence um that they had been reporting on black justice campaigns? I don't think so. Did it have anything to do with the revelation that Mr. Morris had been in a
01:19:06 revelation that Mr. Morris had been in a sexual relationship whilst undercover? I didn't know he had. Um
01:19:13 Um it's clear um here that the safety of the officers is a separate consideration to MPS vulnerability. Um what did you understand vulnerability to mean?
01:19:26 understand vulnerability to mean? The officers vulnerability or the MPS vulnerability? The MPS vulnerability. um that it would be um
01:19:36 that these were these were undercover units and we were exposing them and we were exposing people who are potentially still in the field and that's not a way
01:19:47 still in the field and that's not a way for an organization to behave. They have a duty of care to their operations the and to the people who could be exposed. Could it also have
01:20:00 could be exposed. Could it also have been the effect that the revelation of sexual relationships undercover, the use of deceased children's identities, and the reporting on black justice campaigns um would have had if if it was made
01:20:12 um would have had if if it was made public?
01:20:13 public? I didn't know that at the time. Um do you know why Morris and HN81 were regraded as critical? What what does that mean exactly to your understanding?
01:20:27 that mean exactly to your understanding? I can't recall now. Um
01:20:36 um if we can look please at decision six on page three.
01:20:48 There was a particular focus, wasn't there, on the deployments of Mr. Morris and HN81
01:20:55 and HN81 and what they were doing within their deployments, wasn't there? Yes.
01:21:01 Yes. Themes from this. Yes.
01:21:04 Yes. Um we know that reports were um prepared on both of them. They're at MPS 0749702.
01:21:15 That's at tab B65 of the bundle. This is the paper prepared um in relation to operation magma on DI Trevor Morris's targeting strategy. And
01:21:28 Trevor Morris's targeting strategy. And in the introduction at the top there um it says this paper has been prepared in response to an action arising from a meeting of the operation magma gold group on Tuesday the 20th of January.
01:21:41 group on Tuesday the 20th of January. [snorts]
01:21:41 [snorts] The action uh stems from concern that the MPS may be vulnerable to revelations and comments made by officers A and B in their statements in connection with the above proceedings. In specific terms,
01:21:54 above proceedings. In specific terms, officer A raises the issue of what he describes as SDS targeting of black support groups and indicates that he felt a certain amount of unease in this targeting strategy. Um the exact same
01:22:08 targeting strategy. Um the exact same introductory paragraph appears in the report prepared on HN81's targeting strategy and we we don't need to go to it because it is exactly the same but
01:22:19 it because it is exactly the same but it's for reference it's MPS 0031685 and it's at tab B66 of the bundle. Sir, I'm really sorry, but I've only seen
01:22:31 I'm really sorry, but I've only seen these documents very briefly this morning and I haven't No, these were included in your um witness bundle.
01:22:41 Um that's my understanding because it's in it's in the index at tab B66 and um those those would have been the well um
01:22:52 those those would have been the well um maybe I'm wrong about that. If I am then I apologize but um these are reports that came out of the gold group that you were leading that had been commissioned into the targeting strategies of HN81
01:23:06 into the targeting strategies of HN81 and Mr. Morris. Yes. and clearly set out there um is that the the reason was concern arising from the evidence um of officers A and B
01:23:18 from the evidence um of officers A and B in particular officer A of SDS targeting of black support groups having um commissioned these reviews at least the gold group having commissioned the
01:23:29 gold group having commissioned the reviews that you were leading you would have seen them at the time wouldn't you
01:23:37 I may have done. And and so what is the explanation for that particular focus in relation to um
01:23:48 that particular focus in relation to um targeting of um who who wrote this? Sorry, who wrote this?
01:23:53 this? Um if we go to the last page, HN53.
01:23:59 HN53. Yes, it's DI HN53.
01:24:04 Sorry, not the last page, the second to last page. There we go.
01:24:09 DI HN53. So the the SDSDI under DCI Dell.
01:24:21 Okay.
01:24:29 Do you have any recollection of these two reports into the targeting strategies of these particular officers? at at the time.
01:24:42 Well, I can't remember if I knew it at the time or I knew it subsequently. Um, I knew I knew that there were some
01:24:53 Um, I knew I knew that there were some allegations about targeting of black groups.
01:25:01 To my honest recollection, I don't remember that happening on my watch.
01:25:10 And that is as much as I can help you with.
01:25:13 with. Um, you don't know if you would have taken any particular action in relation to these two reports.
01:25:36 So what doesn't this go back to 1999?
01:25:41 Yes. But it's they're being commissioned in relation to allegations made in the officer A and B litigation which the gold group was set up to deal
01:25:52 which the gold group was set up to deal with the MPS response to it and in response to those particular allegations in relation to the deployments of Mr. Morris and HN81. These two reports were commissioned by
01:26:03 These two reports were commissioned by the gold group. Okay. So
01:26:08 Okay. So this was historic. Before I got to special branch, this activity
01:26:14 activity had purportedly taken place. Yes. But being revealed to you as part of the gold group in relation to the officer amb litigation. And what I'm asking is whether you can
01:26:26 And what I'm asking is whether you can recall any action being taken as a result of those revelations about reporting on black justice campaign. wasn't part of my remit to to investigate activity that had taken
01:26:39 investigate activity that had taken place years before I took office. Well, could we look at one more document to to just see if that's right, please? Um, MPS0749
01:26:50 Um, MPS0749 712.
01:26:51 712. Um, it's a tab B79 of the bundle, sir. And this is the 12th of February, 2004, third gold group meeting. And these are the minutes. And again we can see that
01:27:03 the minutes. And again we can see that you were present. Um page two action point 8 please.
01:27:15 A review to be undertaken of current MPSB mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection against support groups. Action DCS Mitchell has submitted a
01:27:26 Action DCS Mitchell has submitted a report to Commander Williams. Complete. Um, do you recall receiving that report?
01:27:35 I don't, but it doesn't surprise me that I asked for a review of current MPS mechanisms for tasking
01:27:46 current MPS mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection because that of course was my remit and my responsibility. um the decision log um for Operation
01:27:57 um the decision log um for Operation Magma that we looked at before, MPS0749708
01:28:03 at page 10 recorded operation magma has raised issues about the targeting of previous SDS operations.
01:28:15 Do you have any further recollection of what issues it had raised other than what we've just been talking about?
01:28:39 I'm reading that as the things covered in their statements. Are you reading that as other things as well? Well, you you tell me. Well, I read I read it. Yeah. It's my
01:28:52 Well, I read I read it. Yeah. It's my reason I thought they were they there had been issues raised in their statements and I ensured that we'd look at current operations and
01:29:03 that we'd look at current operations and current targeting to ensure they were justified and necessary proportionate defensible and I've add added lawful
01:29:15 I've add added lawful um
01:29:15 um that's my
01:29:16 that's my that suggests there was a concern that some operations had not been justified, necessary, proportionate, defensible, and lawful, doesn't it?
01:29:27 defensible, and lawful, doesn't it? I don't think that's the case. I think it's just if that was the concern that was being investigated. Well, I I I think if something has come to your notice where
01:29:39 to your notice where it looks as if it wasn't proportionate or necessary or there is an allegation it wasn't proportionate and necessary and you are currently leading that unit.
01:29:50 and you are currently leading that unit. It's your responsibility as a leader to ensure that what is going on currently is justified and necessary, proportionate, defensible, and lawful. And that's what I've done. Um do you recall what um
01:30:04 Um do you recall what um uh Detective um Chief Inspector, sorry, Superintendent Mitchell's report concluded?
01:30:12 I don't. Do you recall if you took any particular action as a result of that report in relation to Well, I think um
01:30:26 perhap well have been subsumed into the um
01:30:32 um into the projects one, two, and three. Um
01:30:37 Um in which case, you know, I looked at all of those I looked at all of those re recommendations. I made a decision on all of those recommendations and I ensured they were acted upon. I can't
01:30:51 ensured they were acted upon. I can't now recall specific [laughter] anything anything specific about this action. Perhaps it was subsumed in those projects. I honestly don't know with
01:31:04 projects. I honestly don't know with this intervening time in terms of those projects um and the recommendations that you accepted and asked to be actioned. in other words asked for them to be implemented. What was the the process or the system for
01:31:15 was the the process or the system for ensuring they were indeed implemented? Okay, so uh so on the dockets themselves you've got um the terms of reference,
01:31:28 you've got um the terms of reference, time scales, etc. And then you would have all of the findings and then you would have the recommendations and who'd reviewed those recommendations and when. And you would look you would have what I
01:31:40 And you would look you would have what I had made a decision about in in respect of all of those recommendations each and each individual recommendation and who I'd referred it to. Um and then it would
01:31:51 I'd referred it to. Um and then it would show um the activity that I'd asked in respect of all of those. So um and and any followup that had asked for
01:32:02 and and any followup that had asked for in respect of those as well. So if I'd have asked for to be re viewed in six months, it would be on that docket. I see. Thank you. Um in terms of that can be taken down now. Thank you. Um in
01:32:13 can be taken down now. Thank you. Um in terms of uh the response uh in Operation MAGA to the litigation and in particular the concern about disclosures made um in the statements of
01:32:24 disclosures made um in the statements of officers A and B. as the lead on the critical incident, the lead of the gold group, you would have wanted to make sure you saw the contents of those witness statements, wouldn't you?
01:32:40 I think so, but I can't remember now. Um
01:32:44 Um perhaps um I can try to assist in in your memory. um MPS0749708
01:32:53 at page 18. This is the decision the operation magma decision log. Again the this entry is the 12th of February 2004.
01:33:06 the 12th of February 2004. I asked for these decision logs when I was making my statement and was told they were not available and I asked again eight days ago and I was told there were none. And then today suddenly
01:33:18 there were none. And then today suddenly these have turned up which is I don't think that's very fair in asking me to read digest and comment even before I've read it because there are so many
01:33:29 read it because there are so many documents here you're referring me to which I wish I'd had the opportunity to properly consider. Well I'm giving you the opportunity to comment upon them. If you if you can't recall or they don't assist then you
01:33:41 recall or they don't assist then you must just simply say so. Um I will and I can only apologize that the first time you've seen this particular one was today. Um this records exceptions being
01:33:52 today. Um this records exceptions being made for some of SDS management to the ban on disclosing the officer A and B witness statements outside of the gold group. So in other words, there had been
01:34:04 group. So in other words, there had been a prohibition on disclosing those witness statements outside of the goal group, but this decision um records that an exception is going to be made for certain members of SDS management and so
01:34:18 certain members of SDS management and so they will be allowed to see them. Isn't the inference from that then that the members of the gold group would have read them including you?
01:34:38 I don't know if they'd have read them, but it it there is an inference, you're correct, that the gold group would have had access to them. And as the lead of the gold group, um, effectively leading
01:34:50 the gold group, um, effectively leading the response to this critical incident, which included the disclosure of those statements, you inevitably would have wanted to familiarize yourself with the content of them, wouldn't you? I would have thought so.
01:35:01 I would have thought so. Um,
01:35:05 uh, parag MPS0749712,
01:35:10 please. It's tab B79 of the bundle.
01:35:18 Paragraph one at page one. So this is these are the minutes of the third uh gold group meeting on the 12th of February. And if you just look at paragraph one, it says the continuing
01:35:30 paragraph one, it says the continuing civil action and the potential impact of disclosure of the statements will be treated as a critical incident. Commander Williams will be gold and again action uh complete. um that
01:35:42 again action uh complete. um that suggests that the contents of the statements and their the impact of their disclosure um were clearly in the mind of the gold group including you. Would you agree?
01:35:54 group including you. Would you agree? It sounds like that. Yes. Thank you. Um that can be taken down. Thank you. Um, and the reason, part of
01:36:06 Thank you. Um, and the reason, part of the reason at least that you would have wanted to know what was in those statements would be to in order to uh inform the MPS response, wouldn't it? In
01:36:17 inform the MPS response, wouldn't it? In order to safeguard operational security of the SDS and the integrity of the MPS. Would you agree with that? Those were the terms of reference to the goal group. So yes,
01:36:29 goal group. So yes, and they also would have informed the response in order to safeguard um against losing the benefits of the SDS as an intelligence gathering operation.
01:36:41 as an intelligence gathering operation. Again, another stated objective of the goal group. Would you agree with that? Yes.
01:36:46 Yes. Um the circle of who was to know about um the litigation and the contents of those witness statements is being kept very tight, isn't it? Would you agree with that? Yes.
01:36:57 Yes. Um and a consequence of that is that the serious allegations of misconduct which are being made within them by officers A and B would have reached only a small
01:37:08 and B would have reached only a small circle comprising mainly the members of the gold group and certain members of the SDS. Would you agree with that? No. Whoever was investigating the offenses outline, if there were offenses
01:37:20 offenses outline, if there were offenses outlined in the statement, I can't remember what was in the statement now, but if there were offenses outlined in the statement, whoever was investigating that would have read it too, obviously, and their team.
01:37:31 and their team. Um, thank you. Um, we can come to certain of the the particular specifics of of the content of the statements in a moment, but would you agree as a general proposition that the witness statements
01:37:44 proposition that the witness statements contained two types of material? Firstly, material about covert police operations, both past and present, which needed to be kept secret. And secondly,
01:37:55 needed to be kept secret. And secondly, material about misconduct that ought not to be covered up.
01:38:04 Well, I let me answer it in two parts. Firstly, um material in in relation to misconduct.
01:38:16 misconduct. Um
01:38:20 I think that it depends on the circumstances, doesn't it? I mean misconduct proceedings if they impact on other third parties
01:38:32 if they impact on other third parties wouldn't necessarily be disclosed. So I don't know I don't think I can I don't think your I don't think the answer to your question is as simple as yes or no. It it depends
01:38:45 yes or no. It it depends is because there are usually other people involved in misconduct and you want to ensure that you know they are protected. Um so that
01:38:58 you know they are protected. Um so that would be and sorry what was your second part what was the second part of the question?
01:39:02 question? Well the the that there were two types of material material about covert police operations um past and present which needed to be kept secret. You'd agree that that type of material the MPS would
01:39:13 that that type of material the MPS would have wanted to ensure was kept secret? Yes, the NPS would want to ensure that was protected. And then the second material was the material about that that raised allegations of misconduct against
01:39:24 allegations of misconduct against undercover officers during their deployments. And I put to you that that shouldn't have been covered up. And you said it depended. Well, I I don't It depends. I'm not sure
01:39:39 Well, I I don't It depends. I'm not sure if it was covered up or not. Disclosure and cover up are completely different things, aren't they? Um, well, if no action was taken by the MPS in relation to those allegations of
01:39:50 in relation to those allegations of misconduct, that wouldn't have been appropriate, would it? It should have been investigated. If there are allegations of misconduct, then it should have been investigated. That's a DPS role,
01:40:02 That's a DPS role, director of public. Um that's a directorate of um in within the Metropolan Police investigates police officers misconduct.
01:40:14 investigates police officers misconduct. Um in officer A's statement for the civil claim, it's um MPS072 6970.
01:40:23 6970. It's at tab B57 of the bundle. And I just want to look at page 27, please.
01:40:38 and paragraph 129. I'll give you a moment to read that.
01:41:15 Yes. Um, do you recall reading that at the time?
01:41:31 I don't remember reading it, but I I do know that there were allegations, and I don't know where that's come from in my brain.
01:41:42 that's come from in my brain. 20 years later, it's very difficult to know.
01:41:45 know. Those are very serious allegations. They are very serious allegations that ought to have been fully investigated at the time.
01:42:00 This is what this officer is saying. And
01:42:09 yes, they should have been investigated. You're saying they weren't or you don't know?
01:42:18 know? It doesn't appear that they were from any of the documents we have. But it wouldn't be documents from special branch. It would be documents from an investigative body.
01:42:30 from an investigative body. And
01:42:32 And what's your view of what the likelihood of who that investigative body was or should have been? I think it would be DPS. Who would have told DPS?
01:42:45 Well, the lawyers were obviously Mr. Pon police lawyers knew about that, didn't they? So,
01:42:53 they? So, so the lawyers who attended the gold group meetings
01:42:59 in your view? Well, I I think you know this is Yeah, it wasn't us who investigated it.
01:43:10 Um, that can be taken down now. Thank you. And the reason why we didn't investigate it was because it wasn't in our terms of reference for the goal group to do that.
01:43:23 reference for the goal group to do that. Yes. Thank you. Um the officer A and B witness statements also reveal at least three different sexual relationships. Um in officer B's witness statement, uh he
01:43:34 in officer B's witness statement, uh he refers to Mike Chitty and Trevor Morris having girlfriends uh in their cover identities. It's MPS 0726971.
01:43:47 Um, it's page seven, please. Paragraph 22.
01:44:07 I'll give you a moment.
01:44:36 Yes, that's a clear allegation that detect Detective Sergeant Mike Chitty had whilst he was deployed undercover had a relationship with an activist
01:44:47 had a relationship with an activist um described as his weary girlfriend, isn't it?
01:44:54 It says that she's his girlfriend, but the the entitlement weary we know was used by the SDS to refer to activists who were reported on by
01:45:05 activists who were reported on by undercover officers. Yes, I've heard that before. Um, that sort of allegation should have been investigated, shouldn't it, at the time?
01:45:22 Are we talking about 1999 now? Are we talking about now? We're talking about when the disclosure these allegations are made in the witness statement of officer B HN123 at
01:45:34 witness statement of officer B HN123 at that time
01:45:35 that time that the MPS became aware of those allegations through disclosure of those witness statements in the litigation these allegations should have been investigated shouldn't they consideration should have been given to
01:45:47 consideration should have been given to them being investigated but not by special branch thank you and at page 12 paragraph 37 Seven. Again, Officer Bee's witness
01:45:58 Seven. Again, Officer Bee's witness statement detailing that Trevor Morris had a girlfriend whilst deployed undercover. Again, I'll just give you a moment to
01:46:11 Again, I'll just give you a moment to read it.
01:46:54 Yes, I've read that. Again, a similar allegation against um Mr. Morris. Again, should have been investigated or at least consideration of investigation been given at the time
01:47:07 of investigation been given at the time that this came to light from these statements.
01:47:13 I appreciate you saying not by you, but they should have been investigated. Not by the goal group because it wasn't in our remit, but yes, consideration should have been given to that. And just for completeness, officer A
01:47:25 And just for completeness, officer A then Peter Francis, he also stated he had engaged in a number of sexual affairs and that management knew he was behaving in this way and accepted that it was necessary in order for him to
01:47:36 it was necessary in order for him to credibly continue. Um, MPS0726970.
01:47:41 It's tab B57 of the bundle, please. It's page 22, paragraphs 105 to 107.
01:48:52 Yes. Again, similar um admissions this time by the officer himself of uh sexual affairs whilst undercover. Um, those
01:49:03 affairs whilst undercover. Um, those should have been investigated at the time, shouldn't they? I I think
01:49:11 I I think I think certainly um consideration should have been given to that.
01:49:18 that. Why was there no wider review of whether there were sexual relationships happening with undercover officers in the SDS at the time of these
01:49:29 the SDS at the time of these revelations? I don't know. Um
01:49:34 Um that can be taken down. Thank you. Um was this type of information um briefed by you to Axo Vaness? Do you remember? I don't I mean you're quite right that
01:49:47 I don't I mean you're quite right that it looks like from the um gold group that I did read those statements, but I honestly don't remember reading those statements and seeing that um that
01:49:58 statements and seeing that um that detail before. it. If you'd appreciated it at the time, would it have been the sort of thing you would have wanted to brief Axo Vaness about?
01:50:09 about? Yes.
01:50:13 Was there discussion that you can recall amongst other senior officers in the gold group about these type of revelations? No.
01:50:23 No. Was that because there was a tacit acceptance that they were permitted by managers and therefore not serious misconduct?
01:50:33 No, I I honestly don't remember reading that myself. And I I do I do absolutely understand why you think I should have read those statements and why it looks like I've read those statements, but I
01:50:45 like I've read those statements, but I honestly don't remember um reading reading that detail at all. and I can't explain why not. Uh, thank you. Um,
01:50:57 Uh, thank you. Um, MPS 0749763 please.
01:51:06 Um, this is a letter dated the 8th of August 2002. So some short time before you became commander of special branch. It's a letter from HN123.
01:51:19 It's a letter from HN123. So um officer be's um partner to Axo David Vanesse in which she makes various allegations
01:51:30 allegations um that there were sexual relationships undercover um that officers boasted about them and that management were aware of of such SDS management um and
01:51:41 aware of of such SDS management um and hire were aware of those at the time. [clears throat] Um, did Axo Vanesse make you aware of this letter or the contents of it when you were appointed commander
01:51:52 of it when you were appointed commander of special branch? No. [clears throat] Um,
01:51:56 Um, were you ever aware of the this letter or the contents of it at any time during your period of commander special branch? No.
01:52:08 Um, in particular, it refers to UCIO's boasting about fathering children undercover. If you had known about that allegation at the time, what what would you have done?
01:52:30 It's a very serious allegation. It would need investigating, wouldn't it?
01:52:37 it? Absolutely. Um what action would you have taken personally as commander of special branch to ensure that it was investigated? What what would you have
01:52:48 investigated? What what would you have done
01:52:50 done practically speaking?
01:52:59 I presume this is from his wife is this is from his wife. It's from his partner. Yeah.
01:53:07 Well, obviously I would want to understand the real detail about that and I'd want to understand whether it had ever been reported into the unit itself.
01:53:19 the unit itself. So, was this something that she and he discussed or was this something that the unit were more aware of? Um
01:53:29 because although she says the unit were aware of it, were they actually aware of it or was that just her husband saying so? I don't know the answer to that. So I'd want to I'd want to fully investigate
01:53:42 want to I'd want to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding it. But I don't think it but then my role I'm going into my detective hat here rather than my role at the time which
01:53:54 rather than my role at the time which was commander special branch. Um, if it had come to my notice at the time, I would have um briefed AXO and I would have asked
01:54:09 um briefed AXO and I would have asked that this be thoroughly investigated and that the officer we put some risk around the officer uh being removed from duties particularly in SDS.
01:54:21 particularly in SDS. While that happened, would you have considered that the MPS held a responsibility towards children born of relationships with other officers?
01:54:32 officers? And that would you have considered that there was a legal and moral duty to inform those children of the true identity of their biological fathers?
01:54:44 I I think that that would be something that would be considered along with the child's mother. I think her she has a role in that
01:54:56 I think her she has a role in that decision
01:54:58 decision together with the MPS. Yes.
01:55:02 Yes. Um, in at paragraph 66, page 29 of your witness statement, you refer to a long-held concern about the welfare of UCOs, and you've talked about the
01:55:13 UCOs, and you've talked about the reasons for that, and that you you did um hold such a a concern at the time. Um,
01:55:20 Um, in the course of Operation Magma, did you hold any concerns about the psychiatric impact on officers A and B of their long-term deployments in the context of these civil claims? They were
01:55:31 context of these civil claims? They were they were claiming psychiatric damage.
01:55:40 I can't remember now whether these officers were still serving for me. Were they still? No.
01:55:49 So, so really um I would be concerned about the current state of affairs and the current state of the welfare of officers that I was dealing with
01:56:02 officers that I was dealing with institute at the time and future officers making sure that the conditions were appropriate for them. Understood. Um the uh MPS0749708
01:56:13 at page nine please. This is the operation magma decision log again and I want to look at decision seven please.
01:56:24 It proposes to use all lawful means to establish whether A and B are planning public disclosure of operational um information and you've added a note I
01:56:36 information and you've added a note I think that's your handwriting at the bottom of the reason paragraph. This is particularly pertinent and maybe more readily facilitated once council has given advice on OSA official secret act
01:56:47 given advice on OSA official secret act breaches. Do you see that? Yes.
01:56:50 Yes. Um what exactly were you referring to that should be facilitated there in that note?
01:57:03 um to establish whether A or B are planning [snorts]
01:57:08 [snorts] was it that all lawful means to establish whether A and B are planning disclosure of operational information.
01:57:30 I don't know what more I can add to that comment. Really? Um, was covert surveillance of them being considered? I don't remember what was being
01:57:41 I don't remember what was being considered 20 20 odd years ago, I'm afraid.
01:57:44 afraid. Perhaps I can help with another document. MPS0749711
01:57:50 to tab B92 of the bundle at page two, please.
01:57:56 Um, detective superintendent um, Renol submitted to you a decision uh, regarding this decision. He advised you no covert action should be
01:58:07 you no covert action should be undertaken at this time to be kept under review.
01:58:15 Okay. Does that suggest that covert action against officers A and B was being contemplated?
01:58:27 I don't remember but the action was completed. So I obviously took his advice that no covert action should be undertaken at
01:58:39 covert action should be undertaken at this time. If not by covert action, how was the gold group intending to obtain information about what A and B were planning to do in terms of disclosure?
01:58:50 planning to do in terms of disclosure? I presume by asking them. Um, are you aware whether any covert action was ever undertaken against them?
01:59:01 I don't know. Would you have considered that covert action in these circumstances would be lawful and justified?
01:59:17 We're talking that their activity was in 99 and we're now talking of in 2004. So
01:59:29 So I think that would be very difficult to justify on the basis of the time lapse and that the activity was no longer current and
01:59:41 current and what was the necessity of doing that in order to to protect the public. Officers A and B appear to have been
01:59:52 Officers A and B appear to have been treated with a high degree of suspicion by the gold group and the MPS generally in the response to this litigation. Would you agree? Um, was there any basis to believe that
02:00:03 Um, was there any basis to believe that officers A and B were planning to make unauthorized disclosures about operational information? So far as you can recall, appreciate it's difficult. I can't remember.
02:00:15 I can't remember. Um, was there a general sense of betrayal within the SDS that these officers were bringing a civil claim against the MPS or or within special branch more generally?
02:00:27 branch more generally? I don't think it was so much the civil claim as the disclosure of the unit and the unit's activities and the fact that that put people
02:00:40 that put people who'd been previously engaged in the unit and currently engaged in the unit at risk.
02:00:46 at risk. Because there's certainly nothing improper, is there about former officers having recourse to the law to assert their rights?
02:00:57 their rights? Is there?
02:01:00 No. Um, and the court would have been seized of the
02:01:07 of the sensitive and secret nature of the unit and would have been managing the disclosure process in protecting the public interest, wouldn't it? I don't know,
02:01:19 I don't know, sir. Is that a convenient moment to take the afternoon break? Certainly. Um 10 or 15 minutes. 10 will do with it. Right. 10 minutes.
02:20:56 I know that giving evidence over a whole day is a tiring business and if you do ever need a break before we've finished this afternoon, just say so and there will be one.
02:21:07 will be one. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Um, Miss Williams, just before moving on from Operation Magna, I just have a few um supplementary questions um for you um arising out of your evidence
02:21:18 for you um arising out of your evidence before the break. Um you said a number of times that when um asked about um investigating the types of allegations including the sexual relationships um
02:21:30 including the sexual relationships um that were made in the officer A and B witness statements said a number of times that consideration should be given to investigating those sorts of sexual um allegations. And I just want to ask
02:21:41 um allegations. And I just want to ask you why only consideration? Um shouldn't they always have been investigated?
02:21:51 Well, I I think it's I think I think that you always have to test the validity validity of an allegation. And if you find it to be um a true
02:22:05 if you find it to be um a true allegation, then it will be invest. You scope, don't you? We always scope first and then we look at the parameters and then we decide whether we'll launch an
02:22:16 then we decide whether we'll launch an official investigation. But doesn't testing the validity of the allegation involve investigating semantics. I think uh what you're calling I I think the process that we
02:22:28 calling I I think the process that we would say is that we we test the validity of the allegation. If the allegation is um looked to be true and there is evidence to support it, then uh
02:22:40 there is evidence to support it, then uh or there is some evidence that's that that could be found to support it, then you would investigate. And in relation to Peter Francis, it was his own admission of sexual
02:22:51 his own admission of sexual relationships. That certainly should have been investigated, shouldn't it? Why on earth would he make something like that up? I don't know the answer to that question. Um what circumstances would
02:23:02 question. Um what circumstances would then have justified not investigating those sorts of allegations? Um
02:23:11 if the officer had said that actually this this statement wasn't true or
02:23:19 or um it turned it it turned out that they were
02:23:24 were mental health issues that um had in some way affected someone's recollection those type of things.
02:23:35 recollection those type of things. And in relation to commissioning such an investigation by the Department of Professional Standards, who do you say should have commissioned such an investigation?
02:23:53 You see, the problem is I'm having [laughter] is I I to reiterate, I've only seen the documents this morning, so I haven't had time to really read them and think about them. and I've responded
02:24:06 and think about them. and I've responded to you as best I can, but I honestly can't remember reading that detail. And I would remember that detail. So
02:24:18 the question in my mind is, did I ever read them? Did I ever see them? And I honestly can't remember. So to answer your question,
02:24:30 So to answer your question, how would it I I think it would we we need to know where those documents originated from,
02:24:39 how they how they came to be a gold group.
02:24:43 group. And the gold group obviously from the documents you've shown me had very limited terms of reference. it didn't have a full scope of an
02:24:54 it didn't have a full scope of an investigation in its reference. Before the break, you seem to suggest at one point that um the Department of Legal Services, the lawyer who attended
02:25:05 Legal Services, the lawyer who attended the gold group, would have had some responsibility in notifying the Department of Professional Standards as to those allegations in order for them to be investigated. But lawyers are only
02:25:18 to be investigated. But lawyers are only advisers, aren't they? Um, what's the basis for asserting that it was a lawyer's responsibility to report it to DPS and not your responsibility as I don't think it was an assertion on my
02:25:30 I don't think it was an assertion on my part. I think it was a speculation. Um, but I I'm struggling to remember because I can't remember how this how this goal group originated and where those
02:25:42 group originated and where those document where those documents came from in the first instance. If I knew that, then I would be able to say, "Okay, so they've originated there. They should have referred it on or um they actually
02:25:55 have referred it on or um they actually were investigating, but saw that there were broader considerations for the MPS and referred it to the Gold Group." I can't remember that. Now, um, don't all police officers have a a
02:26:10 um, don't all police officers have a a duty to report potential misconduct either up the chain of command or directly to the Department of Professional Standards when it comes to their own attention. Isn't doesn't that
02:26:21 their own attention. Isn't doesn't that arise from the police conduct regulations?
02:26:27 I I think if you know current of course if something was current then yes but this was old.
02:26:38 yes but this was old. Well, did did you think that you had any responsibility as the commander of special branch and the and the lead of this gold group that in hearing um or
02:26:49 this gold group that in hearing um or these um the contents of these witness statements bearing these allegations coming to your attention? What was your responsibility in terms of notifying
02:27:01 notifying DPS or ensuring that they had been notified so that consideration should could be given to investigation? Well, I come back to the point one, I don't know
02:27:12 come back to the point one, I don't know where the documents originated from and came to the gold group. I don't know where they came from. I don't know who they were given to originally and where and how they came to me. That's the
02:27:24 and how they came to me. That's the first thing. And I think I'd need to know that because it it could be that there was an investigation already running and I was asked to do the gold group as a part of that broader consideration. And [snorts] secondly, I
02:27:36 consideration. And [snorts] secondly, I can't remember reading those statements because
02:27:42 because and I absolutely hands up, you know, you you have led me to suggest that I should have read them. And from the very brief consideration of the
02:27:55 the very brief consideration of the documents I've been able to give, it looks as if I should have read them, but I don't remember reading them. And I don't remember reading those allegations because if I did I would
02:28:07 allegations because if I did I would have been horrified by those allegations and I don't and I would remember and I don't remember. Nowhere in the decision log or the meeting minutes that we've looked at today does it record that there is a DPS
02:28:21 today does it record that there is a DPS investigation. Um do you recall whether you were ever told that there was such an investigation into those allegations? No, because I don't remember the
02:28:32 No, because I don't remember the allegations. Um,
02:28:35 Um, in terms of of those records, do you consider it likely if there had been a DPS investigation already ongoing that it would be recorded there?
02:28:46 it would be recorded there? I don't know because I don't know where the documents originated from. I think if I'd have been given more time with the documents, I could help you further.
02:28:57 the documents, I could help you further. But I on the brief reading that I've had of them, I can't. Um [clears throat] I asked you about your consideration of the welfare of officers um A and B and you um
02:29:11 officers um A and B and you um gave some evidence that you would have been very concerned about the welfare of present UCOs that the the status quo that you were dealing with or indeed future UCOs coming into your command.
02:29:23 future UCOs coming into your command. Um, does that suggest something of a blind spot for the afterare of former SDS officers? I don't think that was my responsibility.
02:29:34 responsibility. Well, you're the commander of special branch.
02:29:36 branch. Yes. And those if those officers were no longer under my command, then I wouldn't have had that responsibility and I had a lot of other
02:29:47 and I had a lot of other responsibilities at the time. Thank you. I'd like to move on then to um HN16
02:29:56 um HN16 um DI James Thompson. Um you um certainly weren't briefed about the investigation into HN16 Jame James
02:30:07 the investigation into HN16 Jame James Thompson's conduct during his deployment of in the SDS the the relevant decisions had had all been taken prior to your tenure as commander. Um what I'd like to
02:30:18 tenure as commander. Um what I'd like to ask you is whether um in the handover that um Colin Black gave you if you were ever informed about his case um at that time.
02:30:29 time. No.
02:30:30 No. Um how certain are you of that?
02:30:35 I don't I don't recall there being any detail of that. I don't recall having been briefed on that. And I think um I
02:30:47 been briefed on that. And I think um I you know 2012 is a little bit closer than the time scale we're talking here. And when I did look at him in detail um that was all
02:30:58 look at him in detail um that was all new to me. So I can be confident in saying that I wasn't briefed about that. Thank you. So, as you've just referred to, your only involvement with him was in April um 2012 whilst you were serving
02:31:12 in April um 2012 whilst you were serving as a deputy assistant commissioner with responsibility for directing protection operations for the 2012 London Olympic Games. Is that right? Exactly. [snorts] And as part of that role, you reviewed
02:31:24 And as part of that role, you reviewed his security clearance. And at the time, he'd been serving in a protection unit for approximately 10 years. Um do you recall that? Yes.
02:31:35 Yes. Um you you say in your witness statement that you're now unable to recall exactly why his vetting came under review. Um do you think it was in relation to
02:31:46 Um do you think it was in relation to the revelation of historic um conduct or were there also current um conduct concerns? No, I I think it was more I have reflected on this and I I think it
02:31:58 have reflected on this and I I think it was more to do with the fact that um he was a protection officer and um you had um a lot of principles coming in from all over the world and it was important
02:32:09 all over the world and it was important that um you had absolute confidence in the lead protection officers for each of those principles coming in. And in the
02:32:20 those principles coming in. And in the same way that I I would I was ensuring um the integrity of all the vehicles that those uh personally um ensuring that the the integrity of all the vehicles that those principles were
02:32:32 vehicles that those principles were getting into. I also looked at um the officers who were um uh who were going to um who were going to lead those protection teams. And
02:32:47 to lead those protection teams. And I think there was I I think there was an allegation brought to my a more recent allegation brought to my attention and I think that triggered me looking at that more broadly.
02:32:58 more broadly. Thank you. Um if we look at MPS 0749720 then it's at tab B139 of the bundle at page one please.
02:33:12 you wrote a a letter to uh an MPS lawyer regarding HN16's um vetting status. And you attached
02:33:25 um vetting status. And you attached various documents uh to that letter and I'd like to look just at the bottom half of the page, please.
02:33:37 Does that set out the concerns that you had about HN16's vetting status?
02:34:02 It's the factual background. one might say
02:34:07 say of what had happened to HN16 and your concerns
02:34:17 were in relation to both a current uh issue and his historic conduct. Would that be fair?
02:34:33 Yes. And you were considering what options you had for taking action against HN16 regarding his vetting status. Is that right?
02:34:45 status. Is that right? Sorry, can you say that again? You you were considering what options you had for taking action against HN16 in relation to his vetting status. Is that right? Yes.
02:34:57 Yes. Um uh were you also considering possible disciplinary action for his historic conduct?
02:35:05 conduct? No.
02:35:06 No. Um in your view was the wrong decision made previously about how to deal with those allegations about his misconduct?
02:35:17 Well, I mean, I wasn't the person who made the decision at the time and I didn't understand the whole context and I uh may not have understood the case terribly well.
02:35:29 terribly well. But on the face of it, it looked to me to be quite serious and I think I would have acted differently. It shouldn't have been dealt with inhouse in special branch. In other
02:35:40 inhouse in special branch. In other words, there should have been um uh a full disciplinary uh investigation and pro proceedings external to special branch. In other words, with the
02:35:51 branch. In other words, with the department of professional standards. Was that your view? Um on the face of it, that's what it looked like to me. Yes. And there also should have been consideration to possible criminal
02:36:02 consideration to possible criminal proceedings. Was that your view at the time?
02:36:05 time? Um,
02:36:08 Um, that was my view. Um, I don't know if that was the case or not. I mean, I didn't understand it fully and I would have I didn't investigate it. Um, so I can't be sure.
02:36:22 investigate it. Um, so I can't be sure. Um, but um, it it it looked to to to me to be a criminal offense. And at that time, his vetting status should also have been removed.
02:36:37 I think if he'd have been under investigation or found guilty of a uh serious misconduct or vetting or or
02:36:48 uh serious misconduct or vetting or or criminal offense, then his vetting would of course been removed, be removed. Um, uh, paragraph 299 of your statement,
02:36:59 uh, paragraph 299 of your statement, it's at pages 144 to 145, you say you can't recall now, but believe you didn't remove his vetting status for reasons,
02:37:10 remove his vetting status for reasons, the reasons given on page three of the report. And if we just bring the report back up again, MPS0749721
02:37:19 [snorts] um at page three, it's at tab B 140 of the bundle.
02:37:28 Tor, have you taken the wrong one down? Page three.
02:37:35 It's the right one. We just need the right page. No, it's the wrong document on the screen. You want
02:37:43 You want 741
02:37:44 741 9721
02:37:50 page three. Thank you. And if we see the second paragraph there,
02:38:02 does that set out the reasons you think that at the time you were considering Mr. Thompson's vetting status. You didn't remove his status at that time.
02:38:20 Yes, I'd taken advice on that.
02:38:24 Legal advice.
02:38:29 I think I took the advice of the DPS on that.
02:38:36 And so this seems to be focused upon the historic nature of the allegations that he'd been imposed in SO1, so in protection for 10 years that he'd had
02:38:49 protection for 10 years that he'd had his vetting reviewed twice in that time. Um it that that those decisions were carried out by a number of senior officers backed by the commander of
02:39:01 officers backed by the commander of special branch who had that the relevant authority to make those decisions. Um and that the nature and background to the alleged misconduct would need to be shared at least in part with the
02:39:13 shared at least in part with the external body. Does that accord with your recollection now of your thinking?
02:39:26 Yes, the um the vetting authority was independent. Um um I should have probably put that in there. The the the vetting authority was
02:39:37 there. The the the vetting authority was independent. So in their independent view
02:39:41 view um
02:39:44 uh it wasn't it was his vetting was given to him and that was um endorsed by commod branch.
02:39:56 endorsed by commod branch. Um, so your decision was was not to revisit his vetting status, but instead to mitigate any potential risk by moving him from an operational role to a purely
02:40:07 him from an operational role to a purely administrative position within protection squad. Is that right? Yeah. When I was looking at this, I c I couldn't remember exactly what I did,
02:40:18 couldn't remember exactly what I did, but I think that's what I did because I my concern was
02:40:26 you we were in a time critical position because principles were going to arrive. Um there was not sufficient time for the
02:40:39 there was not sufficient time for the second investigation uh the current investigation into a different issue to be concluded. Um I was advised by the GPS that and the
02:40:53 Um I was advised by the GPS that and the vetting unit that um it was unlikely that his vetting would be removed because it'd been in place for 10 years
02:41:04 because it'd been in place for 10 years and uh there had been no concerns for those 10 years. Um, and yet I still had to make a decision because I had a principal arriving and I wasn't sure
02:41:19 principal arriving and I wasn't sure of the person that would carry firearms to protect him. And I felt that it was important to let the DPS current
02:41:31 important to let the DPS current investigation run, but also to protect the operation, the Olympic Games, and therefore
02:41:41 therefore that is that is what I think I did. Thank you. C could we look at MPS0719722,
02:41:50 please? It's at tab B42 of the bundle. This was a report uh by HN53 um on Mr. Thompson uh and as it says was
02:42:04 um on Mr. Thompson uh and as it says was entitled an overview and summary uh of inquiries
02:42:09 inquiries uh made in relation to him and and the the the misconduct uh the historic misconduct. Can we look please at page 10 paragraph 4.2.2 two.
02:42:29 I'll give you a moment to read it. Uh, it's actually the bit below that as well. [clears throat] [cough]
02:42:39 [cough] Thank you.
02:42:55 And can Sorry, I'll I'll you'll tell me when you're finished.
02:43:15 Yeah. And I just want to draw your attention in particular to the number of telephone calls, 301, to the woman that we're calling Ellie, who we now know um
02:43:27 we're calling Ellie, who we now know um HN16, Mr. Thompson, um had a sexual relationship with whilst undercover. Can we go over the page to page 11, please? At 4.2.3.
02:43:44 This is headed relationships.
02:43:50 Give you a moment to read it.
02:44:23 [cough]
02:44:26 [clears throat] Okay. And
02:44:27 Okay. And I don't remember seeing this before. Um, it's certainly material from from HN53. It was a report um on Thompson's conduct um which we understand you were
02:44:40 conduct um which we understand you were briefed on um as part of your consideration of his historic um conduct in relation to your review of his vetting status. Um but if you don't
02:44:51 vetting status. Um but if you don't recall it um then obviously you must say but uh at paragraph 4 uh 4.2.4 four on the same pl page, please. Page 11,
02:45:03 there's reference in the first line there to the obviously close association with Ellie, Wendy, and Sara being somewhat concerning in view of their close proximity to his real ex-wife and
02:45:14 close proximity to his real ex-wife and children in a particular area. Um, we now know that, um, as I said, Mi Mr. Thompson was in a sexual relationship with Ellie and also at um one time with
02:45:26 with Ellie and also at um one time with Sara whilst undercover. And if we can look finally then please at page 12, paragraph 4.3
02:45:35 and the summary of action required at the top.
02:45:39 the top. The question of what has been DS Thompson's relationship with Ellie, Wendy, and Sara is the top um bullet point there.
02:45:50 point there. I'm sorry. [clears throat] Was this included in my bundle? So far as I'm aware, yes.
02:45:58 Tab B42 of the bundle.
02:46:05 As far as I'm aware, yes, we can double check. [snorts] Um, what I'd like to ask you, um, please, is in
02:46:16 I'd like to ask you, um, please, is in relation to at the time you were dealing with Mr. Thompson's betting status. Um, the scandal in terms of sexual relationships undercover had hit the
02:46:27 relationships undercover had hit the press. Um, it was in the mainstream media. Did reading the paperwork on Mr. Thompson
02:46:35 Thompson read raise any alarm bells with you about the possibility of a sexual relationship um, undercover? I don't remember seeing this document.
02:46:47 I don't remember seeing this document. When was I shown this document by um whatever the nominal's called? HN53.
02:46:57 HN53. HM53.
02:46:59 HM53. Could you just confirm the date of the documentation? Um
02:47:04 Um yes, it's the 5th of July, 2002. That I was showing the document. That's the date of the document. I don't think I've ever seen this document.
02:47:19 It was in the rule. You were asked about it in your rule nine by this inquiry.
02:47:29 I was asked about his vetting status, but I don't recall ever seeing this. Was this one of the things that came today?
02:47:40 today? No, it was in your rule nine. I don't remember seeing this.
02:47:46 Um, so is your evidence that the material that you saw didn't raise any particular suspicion um of a sexual relationship by Mr. Thompson whilst
02:47:57 relationship by Mr. Thompson whilst undercover?
02:48:06 I mean, my primary concern then was the protection of the principles, but I don't remember seeing this at all. And I would have been concerned if I'd seen it. I don't recall seeing this.
02:48:20 seen it. I don't recall seeing this. Um,
02:48:22 Um, if you had seen it, let's assume for the purpose of my question that you did, the contents of it should have raised such a suspicion, shouldn't it? But I don't recall seeing it. So you're
02:48:35 But I don't recall seeing it. So you're asking me a hypothetical? Yes, I am. Assuming you did see it. It should have raised at least the suspicion of a sexual relationship, shouldn't it? So So am I obliged to answer
02:48:48 So So am I obliged to answer hypotheticals? Um,
02:48:52 Um, I think probably this issue has been pursued as far as need be. Yep. I can move on, sir. Thank you.
02:49:11 that can be taken down. Thank you. Um in relation to your um commissioning of the Walton review, please um
02:49:23 of the Walton review, please um you requested um DCI Richard Walton to conduct a review particularly focused upon the SDS. Is that right? Yes.
02:49:33 Yes. Um and it was um to review processes by which um records are maintained and reviewed within the SDS. um to include local policy and
02:49:45 um to include local policy and procedures particularly in relation to staff welfare, the mechanism for tasking field officers in relation to the MPS intelligence requirement, submission and handling of intelligence from field
02:49:56 handling of intelligence from field officers and compliance with RIPER. Does that accord with your recollection? Yes.
02:50:02 Yes. Can you refer me to the paragraph in my statement please? Um
02:50:07 Um yes I can. It's paragraph 52 page 23. Or we can bring up the document with the terms of reference if you prefer.
02:50:33 Sir, for your reference, the document is MPS0736907
02:50:38 tab B90.
02:50:42 Yes.
02:50:46 Um
02:50:52 the uh in relation to that document then please 0736907
02:51:03 at page 16 please. This is the conclusions of the Walton review and I just want to look at a
02:51:14 review and I just want to look at a couple of them please briefly. Conclusion 64
02:51:22 and I'll give you a moment to read that.
02:51:43 Yes. Was the concern being expressed there? Did you understand that to be that essentially S squad and the SDS itself
02:51:54 essentially S squad and the SDS itself were driving the targeting of particular areas and particular groups without being led by special branches strategic aims and objectives?
02:52:05 aims and objectives? No, it told me there wasn't a formal policy clarifying that.
02:52:13 Was there such a concern underlying the lack of policy? I wasn't made aware of that. I I took it at face value. That's what I was briefed.
02:52:24 briefed. Um in the sense that SDS operations may not accurately reflect special branches priorities.
02:52:35 No, it purely was that there was no formal policy written down clarifying its perfect purpose and strategic objectives. So, um, Richard was
02:52:47 objectives. So, um, Richard was suggesting that this be done and I agreed with that. Could we look at conclusion 66 then just a little bit further down the page and I'll give you a moment to read that one.
02:53:22 Did that conclusion reflect that concern that SDS operations may not reflect special branch's priorities at the time of this review?
02:53:33 of this review? Well, I I think as I've explained, special branch was a large organization and if you're talking about special branches main focus at the time I was
02:53:44 branches main focus at the time I was commander, it was it had definitely changed to international terrorism. Yes. But within that um overarching
02:53:55 Yes. But within that um overarching there there was still the need to look at specific other items for example protection you know um and extremism
02:54:06 protection you know um and extremism um and so SDS was rightly focused on extremism and threats to public order um as have been highlighted here. However,
02:54:19 as have been highlighted here. However, [clears throat] as Richard says, you know, there there may have been scope to look broader um on the basis that um the
02:54:30 look broader um on the basis that um the overarching um objectives of special branch also included international terrorism and was the scope for that to be included in SDS
02:54:42 the scope for that to be included in SDS um terms of reference and SDS's scope of work and and I think that that did need to be looked at and we did need to think about um you know is it time to change
02:54:55 about um you know is it time to change their their um targeting. Um the recommendations that relate to these uh particular conclusions are at recommendations six and seven on page 18
02:55:06 recommendations six and seven on page 18 please
02:55:14 just at the bottom six and seven. Yes. Do do those seem to relate to those particular conclusions that I've just taken you to?
02:55:35 Um I think the first one does recommendation six. Thank you. Um in relation to if we could just go back to page 16 please. Conclusion 69.
02:55:46 Conclusion 69. This is um in respect of Mr. Walton's review of compliance with Ripper that we touched upon briefly this morning in that he had found some minor errors uh
02:55:58 that he had found some minor errors uh relating to signatures and dates but um otherwise compliance with Ripper was good.
02:56:05 good. Um do you recall that? Yes. Was that a a reassuring conclusion um as a result of this review that the SDS was complying with its um
02:56:17 that the SDS was complying with its um ripper
02:56:19 ripper reassuring? It was reassuring, but I can assure you I was never complacent. Um DI Walton says that he was not given access to any UCO intelligence reports.
02:56:31 access to any UCO intelligence reports. Were you aware of that? No, I don't think so. Had you envisaged that he would have such access in conducting this review?
02:56:44 I can't remember what I thought at the time to be honest, but um I'd selected Richard Walton because he had been in special branch a couple of times briefly
02:56:56 special branch a couple of times briefly before and I thought that that well one that that he was vetted to the appropriate level and he was known within special branch and I thought that would facilitate the confidence to uh
02:57:10 would facilitate the confidence to uh include him in ISS issues uh that he thought relevant. C
02:57:16 C could could he have competently reviewed the submission and handling of intelligence from field officers and its compliance with RIPER without access to any intelligence reports?
02:57:31 I think that's a question for him. Well, what's your view? How how could he have done that without viewing any UCO intelligence reports?
02:57:44 intelligence reports? He presumably saw just the summaries. Is that what you're saying? Well, I'm asking if you think his review was fit for purpose and he could competently carry it out if he didn't
02:57:55 competently carry it out if he didn't review any UCO intelligence reports. What was your view as commander? I didn't I didn't know he hadn't reviewed the intelligence.
02:58:06 reviewed the intelligence. But would you have expected him to to do so in order to competently carry out this review? I thought he would be given access to STS intelligence.
02:58:19 STS intelligence. Thank you. uh in relation to the recommendations that he made in relation to this report, you have said that you um reviewed them, you accepted them and you um
02:58:32 you um gave instructions to detective superintendent Bernard, also known as Joe Connell. And we have the document MPS0527008
02:58:42 at tab B89 of the bundle. And that records that on the 17th of May 2004, you gave him instructions. Please see comments on Richard's report. Please
02:58:53 comments on Richard's report. Please lead on changes required. Do you remember that? That's my handwriting. So I wrote that.
02:59:04 So I wrote that. Um to to what extent are you aware of those changes being implemented? That would be on the docket as I previously explained. I can't rem I said
02:59:17 previously explained. I can't rem I said all of them should be. My understanding is that they were in progress. I can't now remember the status of that progress without reference to the docket
02:59:30 without reference to the docket and and would you have have followed up? Would you have wanted to keep a breast of
02:59:34 of Yes. I mean those dockets were in my possession on a weekly basis. And would you have briefed Axo Vanesse on the progress of implementation of those changes?
02:59:46 changes? I would have I I don't know. I think I would have definitely told him uh I would have briefed him about uh the terms of reference. I would have briefed
02:59:57 terms of reference. I would have briefed him about the recommendations and I would have told him that um I had endorsed all of those recommendations and that they were being
03:00:08 and that they were being um
03:00:10 um enacted,
03:00:12 enacted, he would trust me to get on with it as I would trust other people I'd be I I given the responsibility to to get on with it. Um, in relation to project
03:00:23 with it. Um, in relation to project three, uh, which occurred after the Walton review, um, we think we've dated the project 3 to be somewhere around September 2004. Is that your
03:00:35 September 2004. Is that your recollection? Can you help us with the date of project 3?
03:00:42 Sometime in 2004. Can't help me further. Um, project three was a review of intelligence acquisition across special branch um, units
03:00:53 across special branch um, units including the SDS with a particular focus on its tasking and role within the wider intelligence framework. Would you agree with that? Yes. Um
03:01:10 um Detective Superintendent Fuller uh at MPS0527094
03:01:17 at tab B 106 of the bundle at page nine.
03:01:26 [snorts] He recorded in relation to project three that potentially the SDS is the jewel in the MPSB's crown. It is an area where we could add value that no other agency
03:01:39 could add value that no other agency can.
03:01:41 can. [clears throat]
03:01:44 Do you see that in the middle of the page?
03:01:48 page? And if you want to see the previous page, we could go back. It's in relation to recommendation 23.
03:02:02 It's redacted, but um in terms of his view that the SDS was the jewel in the MPSB's crown, did you agree with that
03:02:13 MPSB's crown, did you agree with that view at the I
03:02:28 I I don't think it was the tool in the MP's crown, but I I think there's some context that has been um redacted before and after that
03:02:42 been um redacted before and after that would perhaps help with that comment. Thank you. Um what was the value to be added that no other agency could so far as you understood? The deep undercover
03:02:55 The deep undercover um
03:02:57 um operatives did give a lot of very valuable intelligence that in the past certainly had saved lives.
03:03:08 in the past certainly had saved lives. Um
03:03:09 Um at this time then is it fair to say that um despite the Walton review and um project three giving some recommendations for some changes or some
03:03:21 recommendations for some changes or some improvements, you were still of the general view that the SDS was serving a useful purpose. I did think the SDS served a useful purpose.
03:03:34 Um [snorts] can we move on then? That can be taken down. Thank you. Can we move on then please to the crane review? Um this was a a review you commissioned
03:03:46 Um this was a a review you commissioned into the systems and structures of the SDS um in December 2004. Um the the document is MPS0749483
03:04:05 uh tab B 112 sir. Um and this re review was um to look into the SDS deployments with regard to
03:04:16 into the SDS deployments with regard to RIPER and the human rights act to review the decision making uh process regarding the areas into which UCOs were deployed to review the training given to SDS UCOs
03:04:27 to review the training given to SDS UCOs and compare this to newac standards which were the standards in relation to undercover operatives in relation to criminal deployments and review the unit's operational security. Does that
03:04:39 unit's operational security. Does that accord with uh your recollection? Yes. [snorts] Um at page seven, please
03:04:49 um the key findings are set out um in particular the overall finding at the top of the page of the review was that the concept of the special duty section
03:05:00 the concept of the special duty section is excellent and should be continued as a key intelligence tool against both domestic and international extremism. [clears throat] Um, and then there was an acknowledgement that whilst the overall
03:05:11 acknowledgement that whilst the overall concept is excellent, there were areas where improvements could be made in common with other reviews. Did you agree with that overarching finding when you received this review?
03:05:23 I wasn't very impressed with this review full stop
03:05:28 full stop because I felt it it didn't give me what I needed. I felt it it had um extended beyond its terms of reference and
03:05:42 of reference and I felt that some of its recommendations were not well thought through. So I I didn't have the confidence in this review that I had in the other reviews
03:05:53 review that I had in the other reviews that I commissioned which is a shame because I commissioned this review from an indep someone who had a good reputation for understanding undercover work and
03:06:05 work and um was independent of special branch who had never been in special branch. So um I had high expectations of what would come my way. Um but in in terms of the overall finding
03:06:18 but in in terms of the overall finding that the concept of the SDS was excellent and should be continued as a key intelligence tool against both domestic and international stream as a general proposition. Did you agree with that?
03:06:28 that? I didn't think it was excellent. I thought I I thought there was room for improvement. And
03:06:41 that is why when um uh Commander No um where what was he then? Superintendent Fuller um
03:06:53 then? Superintendent Fuller um talked to the unit, really read these findings
03:07:00 findings and then came up with a set of recommendations that did make changes. I supported all of those. If I thought it was excellent, there had been no reason to
03:07:13 there had been no reason to accept any of that or to change it in any way.
03:07:17 any way. But other than the word excellent, did you agree that the SDS should continue as a valuable intelligence tool against extremism? Yes.
03:07:26 Yes. Um you've you've agreed that there was room for improvement and we'll come to um some of the recommendations in a moment, but um could you just explain you you've touched upon that you weren't
03:07:37 you you've touched upon that you weren't terribly impressed because the review didn't give you what you need. It didn't adequately address the terms of reference and you said that it also strayed beyond them. In what ways in particular did it do that?
03:07:50 particular did it do that? Um, I can't remember now um the specifics of um what I was disappointed with. I just remember it not reading well, it not meeting my
03:08:04 it not reading well, it not meeting my needs. It not it it wasn't um focused in on the terms of reference given uh and had strayed and and that I'm afraid that
03:08:15 had strayed and and that I'm afraid that is one of my key um gripes. You know, if I give terms of reference, I want people to stay within the terms of reference because that's what I want to know.
03:08:26 because that's what I want to know. Understood. Um we know that DIHN53 and um DCI Dell um the SDSDI and DCI were also very dissatisfied with this
03:08:40 were also very dissatisfied with this report and its recommendations. Um
03:08:45 Um HN53
03:08:46 HN53 recorded his views in a document prepared in advance of a meeting with you. It's at MPS0527478.
03:08:55 It's at tab B 113 of the bundle and it's paragraph 1.2 at page 10
03:09:15 and particularly the second sentence. In my 27 years of service in special branch, I have never read a police document which is so dishonest, inadequately researched, poorly written,
03:09:27 inadequately researched, poorly written, and self-seeking.
03:09:30 Um, DCI Michael Dell uh commented on the Crane Review report uh in similarly strongly worded terms. It's um page 21
03:09:43 strongly worded terms. It's um page 21 of the same document please at paragraph two
03:09:54 and he records um in the second paragraph there one week after receiving my copy I have no doubt that um SC's report is a shoddy and thoroughly
03:10:05 report is a shoddy and thoroughly dishonest piece of work these qualities are by no means original it follows the police research Search by number methodology of working backwards from your conclusion, fortified by the pious
03:10:16 your conclusion, fortified by the pious notion that you are in the vanguard of change and secure in the knowledge that this open and transparent outfit will not allow challenge of your premise, assumptions or conclusions until it feels like swapping your bunch of
03:10:28 feels like swapping your bunch of certainties for the latest fattish orthodoxy. Um, what was your reaction to HN53 and DCI Michael Dell's comments in this regard?
03:10:41 this regard? I had the highest regard for these two officers. Um, I really thought that they were
03:10:49 were intelligent and careful and precise. This language was obviously they were very very upset and very angry.
03:11:04 very very upset and very angry. Um,
03:11:06 Um, I wasn't upset and angry by the report, but they obviously felt it very personally. So, my reaction was, okay, that's how you feel. I I just I read that as
03:11:19 you feel. I I just I read that as feelings,
03:11:21 feelings, noise, feelings, and I thought, okay, I need someone to go in, calm the situation down, look at the terms of
03:11:34 situation down, look at the terms of reference I've been asked, talk to these people carefully, explain to them that we need to be ab we need to be absolutely on the top of our game, and make sure that this unit is
03:11:47 game, and make sure that this unit is run very efficiently and very effectively and is fit for purpose for the future. Let's get a s um recommendations from this work from their personal
03:11:58 from this work from their personal experience and from those terms of reference so that we could achieve those objectives. So you referred the review to uh
03:12:10 So you referred the review to uh detective superintendent Fuller to provide you with his views and those of SDS management as a result. calm and and you know I briefed him to let's calm it down, let's forget the noise and let's
03:12:23 down, let's forget the noise and let's actually get some work done here. And um so he Julie um looked at the report and the recommendations and he all all 22 of
03:12:34 the recommendations and he all all 22 of them and he um made comments in relation to those each of those 22 recommendations in his report um at page nine and it's uh MPS0527478
03:12:49 um at page nine.
03:12:57 Can I see this please?
03:13:18 and then over the page please.
03:13:29 So we can see from the introduction there that this is the report that Mr. Just blow it up for me, please. Prepared as a result of [snorts] um your
03:13:41 Prepared as a result of [snorts] um your request for Oh, no. Sorry, that's the wrong Where's his record, please? What's on uh
03:13:51 uh Apologies. Let me There we go.
03:13:56 Um so he he goes through um the particular recommendations. If we could look please at at page six. It's uh recommendation 10.
03:14:14 [laughter]
03:14:16 This was the recommendation from Mr. Crane that all requests for strategic tasking of the SDS should be submitted to the MPSB coordination and tasking group [snorts] for consideration against
03:14:29 group [snorts] for consideration against MPS priorities. Yeah.
03:14:31 Yeah. Um, and it recorded M Superintendent Fuller's view below. I'm in consultation with Detective Superintendent Walton regarding strategic tasking.
03:14:43 regarding strategic tasking. um
03:14:44 um effectively his response to this recommendation was well the CTG is not the appropriate body to do it but he essentially accepted the substance of DS crane's finding and
03:14:56 substance of DS crane's finding and recommendation that strategic tasking did indeed need to reflect special branches priorities would you agree okay I I think it's a confusion between tasking and targeting
03:15:09 tasking and targeting so
03:15:10 so targeting comes from the control strategy. That's a strategic decision. Tasking is um what those people whence in situ are asked to do.
03:15:34 But would you accept that whilst he thought that tasking, which is what this recommendation was about, um wasn't a matter for the CTG, he nevertheless accepted
03:15:45 accepted the recommendation.
03:15:48 Um all requests for strategic tasking should be submitted to MPS tasking group for consideration. Okay.
03:16:02 He records that a strategic view of futurist needs to inform in which area deployments take place and that wasn't the CTG wasn't the best vehicle.
03:16:12 vehicle. I just can I just read this? Sorry, I'm in consultant
03:16:27 there.
03:16:35 Yeah. Okay.
03:16:39 Okay. Okay. Sorry. Now I ask your question. Sorry. Well, do you accept that whilst the CTG in Detective Superintendent Fuller's um view wasn't the appropriate
03:16:50 Fuller's um view wasn't the appropriate body to do it, there was an acceptance of DS Crane's finding that strategic tasking needed to reflect special branches priorities?
03:17:05 I I don't okay I think I I come back to the targeting and tasking on the strategic targeting that [clears throat] should come from the control strategy
03:17:17 the control strategy and on then and then on the tasking I think he's suggesting that um the MPS sorry the um special branch as a whole
03:17:29 sorry the um special branch as a whole needed to have greater input to the tasking which I agree with. Yes. And whilst DS Crane had suggested that be done by the CTG and Detective
03:17:40 that be done by the CTG and Detective Superintendent Fuller didn't agree with that, he did agree with the premise that there needed to be special branch input into tasking. Yes.
03:17:48 Yes. Thank you. Um can we look at page seven, recommendation 12, please?
03:18:00 I'll give you a moment to read it, but it's clear that Detective Superintendent Fuller accepted DS Crane's recommendation in this regard, isn't it?
03:18:36 Yes. And you agreed with Detective Superintendent Fuller that this recommendation should be accepted? Yes.
03:18:44 Yes. Um, if we zoom back out again, please. Um,
03:18:50 Um, Detective Superintendent Fuller recommended in relation to recommendations 13 to 19 inclusive that all of those recommendations by DS Crane
03:19:01 all of those recommendations by DS Crane be accepted.
03:19:05 Sorry.
04:11:38 Thank you, sir. [clears throat] Um, M. Williams, you made two witness statements for the inquiry last year. That's correct, isn't it? That is correct. Um, and I think it says, I don't need to pull this up onto
04:11:50 says, I don't need to pull this up onto the screen, but in your first statement, you say your witness pack was 17 lever arch files of documents and you were asked 873
04:11:59 asked 873 questions. I was
04:12:01 I was sounds about right. Yes.
04:12:03 Yes. Um, there have been various points today where you haven't been sure if you've seen a particular document before either at the time or um when you made the statements last year's.
04:12:14 statements last year's. Yes. Um I mean given the the volume would you expect to have remembered each and every one of those documents now? Um no but I would have some of the
04:12:25 Um no but I would have some of the documents where I showed confusion. just I I think they were in the bundle from this morning and I think that they'd been available for a long time
04:12:36 they'd been available for a long time and I thought I think if I'd have had time to properly consider those and the context of those and really think it through I would have been more helpful to the inquiry. That was my point.
04:12:47 to the inquiry. That was my point. Thank you. That's also I'm afraid I have a question for you. Um two questions. When you started your work uh as
04:12:58 When you started your work uh as commander of special branch, you had no reason to think that there had been any significant misdeeds in the special demonstration squad, a small part of your responsibility to be. Is that
04:13:11 your responsibility to be. Is that correct?
04:13:11 correct? That's correct. And during your two years and one month as commander of special branch, I have the impression, and correct me if I'm
04:13:22 the impression, and correct me if I'm wrong, that your focus was on getting things done right then. Yes. To be honest, yes. I mean, it was an unprecedented time in our history.
04:13:36 an unprecedented time in our history. You know, we did have bombs going off in London. We had the Charles Charles de Menses. We had the G8 conference as well in Scotland. Um so and I had a huge
04:13:50 in Scotland. Um so and I had a huge modernization job to do. It wasn't that I was blinkered to what had happened in the past. It's just there are so many hours in the day and you look at what
04:14:01 hours in the day and you look at what you've been tasked to do and you know I knew
04:14:05 knew that it was important to get special branch in as best position as possible for the benefit of the Metropolitan Police and and the citizens of London
04:14:17 Police and and the citizens of London and not to lose some capability um because it it it wasn't sufficiently modernized. So I I felt a huge burden on me to do that and I tried to do it to the best of
04:14:29 that and I tried to do it to the best of my ability.
04:14:33 Thank you. Your evidence today is now complete.
04:14:37 complete. Thank you. Um I I can't speak about the distant future because um what we know is tranch 4, the investigation of the NPIU is not
04:14:48 4, the investigation of the NPIU is not going to be done by me. Okay, sir. [laughter] I'm sure you're relieved. Uh I'm under orders uh from my wife to um uh uh retire uh permanently um at a time
04:15:03 uh uh retire uh permanently um at a time when most people have been retired for um many years anyway. Good luck, sir. Thank you. I may need it [laughter] until tomorrow. Thank you, sir. 10:00.