Day 3 of evidential hearings features testimony from a witness who served as a back office sergeant in the Special Demonstration Squad from 1970-1974. The witness describes operational practices, management structure, training (or lack thereof), attitudes toward sexual relationships, arrests, and the use of deceased children's identities. Reveals significant details about intelligence dissemination, threat assessments, and the priority given to maintaining cover over court honesty.
00:11:30 all right please
00:11:48 welcome to day three of evidential hearings at the undercover policing inquiry
00:11:51 inquiry my name is neil fernandes and i am the hearings manager there is no fire alarm testing expected today so if the fire alarm goes off please follow the fire exit signs and make your way to the muster point which
00:12:03 make your way to the muster point which is the hard rock hotel great cumberland place
00:12:04 place on arrival at the muster point please make yourself known to a fire marshal who will be wearing a high visibility jacket and who will be keeping a register of all attendees the fire marshals will also be
00:12:17 the fire marshals will also be responsible for letting everyone know when it is safe to return in liaison with representatives from the thistle hotel
00:12:27 hotel i now hand over to the chairman sir john mitting to formally start today's proceedings chairman thank you
00:12:31 thank you those in the public area will know what i'm about to say um i apologize to you if you've heard it before
00:12:38 before but it's important that everybody there understands anyone who's brought a mobile device into the hearing room is perfectly free to use it to communicate silently with the outside world what they are seeing and hearing in the
00:12:53 they are seeing and hearing in the hearing room but only after 10 minutes have elapsed since the event that you
00:13:04 have elapsed since the event that you are describing and those devices may not be used to record or photograph what is going on here thank you ms campbell thank you sir this morning i'll be summarizing the evidence of hn 3095 william anthony ferna
00:13:15 3095 william anthony ferna william ferner known as bill ferner worked in the back office management of the sds as a detective constable from its formation in 1968 to late 1970
00:13:29 to late 1970 he has provided two witness statements to the inquiry the first
00:13:32 the first dated the 1st of october 2019 served to exhibit 15 photographs provided by bill ferner to the inquiry of former members of the sds
00:13:43 of former members of the sds these pictures were believed to have been taken at a christmas party held in november 1968 and bill ferner has assisted in identifying the people pictured
00:13:57 identifying the people pictured the second statement is dated the 18th of september 2020 and can be summarized as follows bill ferner joined the metropolitan police in 1964
00:14:09 police in 1964 moving to special branch at the start of 1968.
00:14:11 1968. he was part of the first group of officers brought on to assist the sds at its inception joining at the rank of detective constable
00:14:20 constable he states that he was told to report to conrad dixon who explained that the sds was to infiltrate left-wing organizations who were involved in the vietnam war protests and to obtain
00:14:32 vietnam war protests and to obtain information about their activities and intentions there was no selection process for the sds
00:14:39 sds nor was his involvement a matter of choice
00:14:40 choice quote
00:14:43 quote they told me i was a member of the team and that was it i accepted it as normal routine end quote
00:14:51 quote he also confirms that there was no training for the world
00:14:57 bill ferner's role was administrative working from the back office in scotland yard and dealing with the paperwork that came in
00:15:05 came in he describes his responsibilities as checking rent books checking and submitting officers diaries and ensuring that expenses were paid
00:15:16 that expenses were paid he states that he did not play any part in tasking or steering undercover officers
00:15:17 officers procuring
00:15:19 procuring procuring or administering the safe houses or obtaining cover documents accommodation or vehicles for the deployed officers
00:15:32 with regard to expenses ferner explains that he would check undercover officers diaries and ensure the accuracy of the sums before submitting them there was no set routine whereby
00:15:43 there was no set routine whereby officers had to submit diaries on a particular day but he recalls being given them weekly whether at the sds flat or if officers came to scotland yard
00:15:54 came to scotland yard he notes that the diary system was common throughout cid
00:16:02 bill ferner was based in scotland yard but would attend the safe house in west london for regular meetings he states that there was no set pattern as to when these meetings were to be held but quote if something cropped up that everyone
00:16:15 if something cropped up that everyone had to be involved in we met up at the flat
00:16:23 officers would hand in their reporting at these meetings and there would be general discussion about who would attend specific meetings and demonstrations based on the intelligence provided
00:16:29 provided the undercover officers would occasionally come to scotland yard on average ferner states that he would see the officers about once a week but this became less frequent towards
00:16:40 but this became less frequent towards the end of his time in the sds because the risks of being seen coming into the yard were considered greater as deployments were underway he states quote
00:16:51 he states quote i only interacted with the undercover officers insofar as they would hand me their diaries and we would talk i knew from their records and from talking to them the organizations and personalities they were involved with
00:17:04 personalities they were involved with but they never discussed with me in any detail what they were doing or who they met
00:17:13 bill ferner affirms in his witness statement that he was not involved in the filing up of filing or writing up intelligence reports from undercover officers
00:17:21 officers and states that it would have been hn1251 phil saunders who dealt with the paper intelligence to his knowledge
00:17:32 to his knowledge officers will provide both written and verbal reports during their regular regular safe house meetings which would be brought back to scotland yard
00:17:44 be brought back to scotland yard he believes the reports were written up before being passed on to conrad dixon who he presumes would pass them on to chief superintendent arthur cunningham and the assistant commissioner of crime
00:17:55 and the assistant commissioner of crime he is only able to speculate on whether reports were disseminated but states that he understood that the reports went as high as the home office
00:18:08 bill ferner recalls his direct line managers as being chief inspector conrad dixon the head of the sds and di phil saunders the second in command
00:18:16 command with d i r b wilson also holding a management position he states that all three joined organizations though ferner cannot remember what they were
00:18:27 remember what they were phil saunders spent the most time in the back office and contributed towards the administration of the sds alongside bill ferner and ds roy creamer
00:18:42 ferner describes the sds as quote hardly a rank conscious organization and confirms that he had a lot of personal interactions with conrad dixon
00:18:54 personal interactions with conrad dixon his closest working colleagues were d.i saunders and dias creamer as they were all posted in the office together
00:19:03 bill furner states that he had done no undercover policing or used a cover identity prior to joining the sds although his role was administrative there were occasions where he did attend meetings or demonstrations and reported back
00:19:14 back he states that he attended very few activists meetings but can remember attending several large demonstrations for example at trafalgar square and at twickenham
00:19:27 twickenham these would be occasions where he was told to attend he states that he did not use a cover name and only attended as a member of the audience to take notes or to mingle with the crowd at a demonstration
00:19:39 with the crowd at a demonstration he would wear quote a scruffy coat but would not otherwise change his appearance he did not join any organizations
00:19:54 bill furner states that a major part of his job was reading information from the security service it was his responsibility to go through information provided by the security service on groups of common interest between them and the sds
00:20:07 between them and the sds and extract relevant details and file them
00:20:13 them despite this he states that he had no direct contact or dealings with the security service while on the sds he believes that the security service would have made requests for intelligence but did not deal with that personally
00:20:27 ferner recalls that officers would have spent time preparing for their deployments but he did not know what they would do or how long they would have had spent preparing
00:20:38 would have had spent preparing he knew they were being briefed and told what to look out for before being sent out of the main office to join a group he did not know beforehand which groups were to be
00:20:49 were to be infiltrated as it was not a topic that was discussed openly he cannot comment as to whether officers spend time in the back office following their withdrawals
00:21:03 their withdrawals bill furner states that he was not aware of any unhappy working relationships between members of the sds and considered it a well-run squad to his knowledge
00:21:14 to his knowledge none of his contemporaries provoked or encouraged a third party to commit a criminal offence engaged in sexual activity whilst in their cover identity were arrested tried or convicted in their cover identity
00:21:26 their cover identity were involved in incidents of public order or violence reported on any legally privileged information or reported on the activities of elected politicians
00:21:40 politicians he recalls one instance where a member of the sds may have been involved in committing a criminal offense but the matter did not go to court and the officer was not charged with any offence
00:21:52 when asked about what the sds achieved for policing bill ferner notes that the squad was able to provide uniformed police with
00:22:05 able to provide uniformed police with threat assessments or other forecasts in relation to the likely numbers or moods of those attending upcoming public events
00:22:09 events he states that the undercover deployments quote meant that we had the people under constant observation excuse me quote meant that we had the people under observation and different organizations completely and utterly tapped
00:22:24 completely and utterly tapped they did not make a move that we did not know about end quote
00:22:34 he recalls one particular incident where it was discovered that a group intended to chain themselves to the rugby posts at twickenham and the uniform police were forewarned to turn up with bolt cutters which avoided any significant disruption
00:22:48 with regards to senior management bill ferner remembers one time where the assistant chief commissioner of crime visited the sds before the 1968 october demonstration and spoke to undercover officers about the work being done
00:23:00 the work being done on this occasion ferner recalls driving the assistant chief commission commissioner to and from the sds safehouse for the meeting he also recalls that conrad dixon did
00:23:14 he also recalls that conrad dixon did have an interview with jim callahan the then home secretary at least once
00:23:25 bill ferner left the metropolitan police in september 1970 to take up a job at the ministry of defense the sds was his final posting so that concludes the summary of the statements of bill ferner
00:23:37 bill ferner the documents related to that officer will be published on the inquiries website today along with documents for four other individuals
00:23:55 documents for four other individuals they are hn 325 conrad dixon who was the head of the sds from july 1968 to july 1969
00:24:04 pn1748 ryby wilson who was detective inspector of the sds from july 1968 to may 1970
00:24:15 hn1251 phil saunders who was detective inspector and second in command of the sds from july 1968
00:24:26 in command of the sds from july 1968 and head of the sds between november 1969 and august 1971 and finally for hn 474 wilf knight who was involved in the documentary true spies thank you sir yes and
00:24:39 and all of these um four individuals have died and so all we have of theirs is their documents i believe that's correct yes thank you now we are now going to hear from a live witness are we not and we will need 10
00:24:52 witness are we not and we will need 10 minutes i think to get everything set up to permit that to happen
00:46:51 all right please
00:47:08 i understand that you wish to be sworn i do yes listen mr flanders
00:47:21 i swear by almighty god i swear by almighty god that the evidence i shall give the evidence i shall give will be the truth will be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth and nothing but the truth thank you
00:47:32 thank you thank you
00:47:33 thank you mr warner
00:47:49 uh mr smith um i think it's right that you gave the inquiry a witness statement already uh dated the second of december 2020. and can i ask you firstly please to confirm that witness statement is true to the best of your knowledge and belief it is indeed yes now mr smith um you have told us that you were
00:48:03 you were a back office sergeant uh within the sds from
00:48:04 from about october 1970 to october 1974 is that right yes
00:48:12 yes um the first topic i'd like to ask you about please is training
00:48:16 training and the first aspect of that is the training that you personally were given um
00:48:22 um when you joined the sds you told us in your statement that not very much specific to the sds was given to you
00:48:34 to you um and that to some extent it was your special branch training was relevant to that role was that right that is correct we'll come on to special branch training in just a moment but just
00:48:46 in just a moment but just in terms of when you started on the sds are you um able to recall whether you get were given an induction of any kind
00:48:58 obviously i would have been told about the structure of the squad and who was on it and what we did and what i was being expected to do essentially i was told to process
00:49:14 process the information that was being brought and put it into a format which was then go back into the system but uh as a having been in special branch then for eight years i was well versed in the reports and the
00:49:28 i was well versed in the reports and the things that we did and the nature of the reports that were coming through from the officers was no different in practice to what other officers would be doing when they were doing things overtly with day day-date time and place and
00:49:41 day day-date time and place and that was it you know so that wasn't difficult in any shape or form um so is it is it fair to say that the most the guidance you would have given would have been on practical things
00:49:55 been on practical things the guidance was well who was out on the squad and what they were doing but no actual i i didn't need any guidance as as i saw it was i perceived it on
00:50:03 on dealing with the paperwork um i knew where it had to go instinctively because i'd been in as i say in the branch for eight years at that stage
00:50:15 branch for eight years at that stage it wasn't as if i was a rookie sort of coming in totally blind right um we'll come on to that aspect in
00:50:26 right um we'll come on to that aspect in in just a moment um is it likely that um phil saunders was the person that introduced you yes he was the one who in fact approached me to join i see and in terms of um
00:50:37 and in terms of um your position on the squad um is it right that it's
00:50:39 it's any other guidance or training you were you were given was on the job as issues arose yes i mean one of the good things was was that there was the chief inspector of the inspector myself
00:50:54 inspector of the inspector myself and a dc or someone who was in the point of going into the squad or coming off the squad we're in the office and we're all in the same office together it wasn't if we were separated into a couple of offices so if you had a
00:51:06 couple of offices so if you had a problem or you had a question you would you just simply could ask them and say look
00:51:09 look what about this what about that i mean so it was
00:51:11 so it was it was very easy in that respect and is that something you did while you were on the sds yeah i would have done it yes i don't specifically remember an instance of saying what about this or what about that but
00:51:26 what about that but logic and common sense dictates i would have done that i see um can i ask you please um just a bit more generally about your special branch training now you told us you i think joined special
00:51:37 you told us you i think joined special branch about eight years or so before uh moving on to the sds um presumably you would have been given uh some training when you joined special branch
00:51:42 branch yes uh again it's sort of all linked into really when one starts as a pc you learn this as i call day date time and take place type of writing reports
00:51:54 place type of writing reports and i when i started i started on the naturalization section where basically you were interviewing people for who wanted to become british and who were in the main
00:52:07 were in the main people from poland hungary that sort of neck of the woods and
00:52:18 and the people around you in the office gave you advice and said look and they told you the format of the report and the things you needed to cover and then
00:52:19 and then i suppose to some extent it was experience in trial and error i mean uh but you you did these reports um that was it and then i did that for a year or so and then i went on to
00:52:33 so and then i went on to main street that's pretty well if i can just um ask you a little bit more specifically when you actually joined special branch do you remember an overall training course being given to you no you just joined a squad no no
00:52:44 you no you just joined a squad no no just join the squad and then someone would have given me some sort of briefing at probably a chief inspector level as to what was expected of me um
00:52:56 um when you joined special branch do you remember either on the squad or more generally um do you remember any training being given to you on the legal limits of police powers no not no but it was the most common sense was that was the
00:53:12 the most common sense was that was the the best thing that i could say that you know you followed junior what was illegal and what wasn't illegal um
00:53:14 um did you have any training perhaps on that topic when you joined the police as a as a constable something like that that would have been i suppose but i say
00:53:26 that would have been i suppose but i say like what 60 years ago i appreciate it i have to remember a long time i went to detective training school as a d whilst i was in the special branch and obviously that would have covered aspects of that at that time and that was a i think it's about a three-month course or so
00:53:39 course or so so you would have presumably been aware of things like limits on the police powers to enter and search property things like that search warrants and things like that um
00:53:50 um and now when you were on the sds was any consideration and conversation about those legal limits applied to the sds's work do you remember well i could remember
00:53:58 remember vividly that the thing that was hammered home was not to act as a provocateur for the officers yes um
00:54:08 um i think probably it may help to sort of explain that one of the the nature of the job was to be on demonstrations and obviously get information which would help us to police things much better but
00:54:21 to police things much better but the trouble is if you're going out on demonstrations with the best will in the world there's going to be a small risk that you may get arrested for obstruction for example because you're
00:54:32 obstruction for example because you're with everyone else because if you didn't go out on the demonstrations then what was the point of being undercover anyway yes and so it was part and parcel albeit a small risk but once in a blue moon
00:54:46 a small risk but once in a blue moon someone might find themselves arrested for obstruction but that was that was about the limit of things we i understand that we'll come on to that in a bit more detail in the moment i just before we do wanted to ask you whether
00:54:57 ask you whether specifically the the police's powers to to enter property um whether that was thought about on that i can't remember that being mentioned okay um and um equally um there were of course police
00:55:09 equally um there were of course police disciplinary regulations that applied to all police officers at the time weren't there and i think you mentioned them in your your statement as a large tome yes well yeah it's very large it was very very good um and presumably you were aware that things
00:55:23 presumably you were aware that things like discreditable conduct were covered in yeah it was all it was straightforward i don't think there was anything
00:55:33 anything complicated about it and you were aware presumably that things like that would have applied to um sds officers activities yes yes they had to use their common sense in terms of what was possible and what and if they had a problem then they would one would expect them to
00:55:47 them to tell their supervising officers now do you ever recall having conversations with with any of the deployed officers about things like um discreditable conduct or anything like that or did you just expect them to
00:56:02 that or did you just expect them to use their training no think i didn't have direct conversations with them about that was very much the domain of the chief inspector and the inspector but obviously that the ladder was in the
00:56:16 but obviously that the ladder was in the office with me who could quite often was one he was about to go out into the field
00:56:17 field then i would have shown him the reports that were coming in so he gets a feel of it all so there was an
00:56:28 gets a feel of it all so there was an element of talk about that yes but not necessarily about not about specifics how they should behave on this point mr smith um was legal advice ever available to you when you were on the sds
00:56:39 were on the sds i suppose it was available i never had an occasion to take advantage of it um thank you i'd like to move on to the the training that officers were given um and you've you've mentioned a little about it before
00:56:52 about it before um uh and you you've told us in your statement that really adjoined provocateur was was quite an important part
00:56:58 part um and um
00:57:05 um and um was this uh training that or guidance if i put it that way that you would have given to
00:57:07 given to new recruits to the sds i might have mentioned it but i wouldn't have i would have just mentioned it rather than being the one to actually give them that advice if you follow me
00:57:18 advice if you follow me uh there's a difference between sort of saying well you know just just a casual comment as it were but the actual advice was given by the two of the inspector and the chief
00:57:30 two of the inspector and the chief inspector so is it fair to say you would have taken your lead from the deep detective inspector yeah yeah it was common knowledge that that was the the um the main thing is that basically they we wanted them to be a fly on the wall not
00:57:43 fly on the wall not to be taking a leading part in things and why
00:57:44 and why was it such a concern this aspect of them taking a leading role why was it because obviously that would have been improper i mean because then you
00:57:55 improper i mean because then you if people suddenly start getting arrested and police officers were in fact the ones that instigated the problem then that would create all sorts of complications and would have been you know illegal and um
00:58:07 you know illegal and um wrong just pure and simple um can i ask you to look at a document please and it will come up on the screen in front of you you don't need to do anything it's it's mps 0727104
00:58:41 um this this is a document mr smith which was issued by the home office on on this very topic um just uh uh 18 months or so before you joined the sds yes is this a document that you were familiar with
00:58:52 familiar with no
00:58:55 no i haven't seen it before i see
00:58:59 i see um and can you scroll down can we scroll down to the bottom of the first page please thank you
00:59:05 and really the the guidance is as you will see
00:59:06 see by number three a no member of a police force or police informant should council incite or procure the commission of a crime yes
00:59:16 crime yes and is that in in a nutshell yes what you were
00:59:17 you were aware of
00:59:20 aware of thank you that that can come down now please
00:59:21 please um
00:59:24 um just before we move on you you've mentioned police officers inc encouraging crime being being a real concern
00:59:29 concern um
00:59:30 um what about police officers becoming involved in criminal acts and was that a
00:59:41 involved in criminal acts and was that a concern too uh not at that stage i think the nature of the demonstrations in those early days was mainly i think it's when things like animal rights came in where it's a much more
00:59:52 rights came in where it's a much more anarchistic dare i say set up but in the formal setups of the organizations that were there in that period 1774 then you had the leadership of the organization which was defined and therefore the rank and file
01:00:05 defined and therefore the rank and file would dare i said turn up on the meeting on a wednesday or thursday and be told that this weekend we've got a three line on a demonstration or we're going to do this or we're going to do that we want as many to support this as
01:00:16 we want as many to support this as possible and of course it was that giving of that information was then put into the system which enabled our ultimately uniform colleagues to be
01:00:28 ultimately uniform colleagues to be better placed to deal with and cope with the situation
01:00:37 the other aspect of guidance that you mentioned within your statement is that officers shouldn't
01:00:43 shouldn't get too involved with individuals in the groups that they were deployed on you you mentioned that in your statement um i just wanted to explore what was the thinking you're thinking behind and that guidance well i think the trouble is is
01:01:00 guidance well i think the trouble is is it the more you become involved and the more close you become to someone then that there's a greater risk of you letting slip something or being lulled into a false sense of
01:01:12 being lulled into a false sense of security and saying something which could lead to your dare i set your exposure
01:01:18 exposure uh as as a police officer so is it fair to say it's risk of compromise yes and um it's a balance you have to obviously
01:01:30 it's a balance you have to obviously join in be a part of things but you have to be disciplined in how far things go because as i say the deeper the relationship becomes uh then the more difficult it becomes was any um concern behind this in terms of officers
01:01:42 behind this in terms of officers developing close relationships with the people they were reporting on i don't remember it specifically being called in that sense i mean it was just
01:01:54 it was just at that stage i mean i wasn't aware of dare i say the things that emerged later that aspect wasn't i wasn't aware of at all it was never mentioned but um it was just common sense you didn't get too deeply involved as
01:02:06 didn't get too deeply involved as friends i'm talking friendship with people you know yes you'd have a mate and be fine but you
01:02:12 but you the nature of the work was that you didn't want to divulge too much about yourself but had to have sufficient to be credible and you didn't ask questions
01:02:27 and you didn't ask questions and the point the beauty was that if you weren't asking questions of people they weren't answered questions of you because it's a natural thing if people are open with you you will be open with them and it's a vice versa
01:02:39 as you've mentioned it you also mentioned in your statement that you you considered that it was obvious that this guidance would have extended to intimate relationships oh yeah by implication i mean common sense well that that's my
01:02:57 mean common sense well that that's my question really what was this implied or or was it ever expressly said never expressed no i never heard problem
01:03:04 problem being mentioned about that aspect of of the job of that undergraduate work in fact
01:03:08 fact casting my mind back i think it's true to say i mean i'd later on that it would have changed but in those days the numbers of women though i say who were involved in extremist activity
01:03:19 extremist activity was
01:03:20 was very small there weren't there were women involved in the women's liberation thing and that was almost exclusively if
01:03:36 thing and that was almost exclusively if not exclusively women but the numbers of women involved in demonstrations or were much less in those days i suppose
01:03:38 i suppose i don't know why but that was just a fact of life
01:03:47 the fact that the implication that this guidance would have also included intimate relationships is that something you thought at the time or something didn't occur to me about that it was simply
01:03:58 simply just you know you've got to be careful um
01:03:59 um that was
01:04:02 that was it's a bit like telling a police officer not to commit crime or not to assault people or whatever it is a common sense thing that you it
01:04:09 it it's a risk obviously to themselves and indeed to the the whole existence of the of the squad
01:04:17 squad do you think it's fair to say that management on the sds when you were involved in it were aware that there must have been very close personal
01:04:33 must have been very close personal relationships not necessarily sexual but certainly close personal relationships um being formed between the ucos and those they were reporting on it's possible i mean i i it was inevitable that something along those lines would have happened but the idea was to keep that thing to a minimum i would say
01:04:44 would say um but i wasn't i wasn't involved in that side of the conversation with the individuals in the way that
01:04:51 way that the inspector and the chief inspector was all i was got was getting peripheral bits i was interested in the information that the lads were providing to me so i could then process it put into the
01:05:02 could then process it put into the system well we we will come on to that surely just before we do um the guidance both on agile provocateur and not getting too involved and with those in
01:05:16 getting too involved and with those in the groups would that have been given to everyone that came through yes i'm sure it was yes um
01:05:21 um was there any training or guidance rather
01:05:26 rather given to new ucos on how to perhaps limit
01:05:27 limit their um involvement in other people's i'm not aware particularly of that no no i mean
01:05:33 i mean i think there's more the conversations would have been more at a sort of common sense level rather than training per se you know as they've had a chat about what they've got to do what they
01:05:45 about what they've got to do what they shouldn't do and of course the officers most of them would have been in special branch for three or four years beforehand so a lot of the sort of awareness of these things would have already been
01:05:59 these things would have already been assimilated by them so it wasn't as if you were sort of teaching young rookies off the off the street as it were what to do and how to do it i see positions of responsibility and a number of the officers
01:06:12 of the officers certainly um after you were involved in the unit obtained positions of responsibility within the groups that they were reporting on was there any concern that you recall
01:06:29 was there any concern that you recall amongst the management of the unit about officers doing that no i can't remember anyone having positions of responsibility to be honest um as i said i think when the organizations were more clearly defined and had a
01:06:41 were more clearly defined and had a structure it was fine the problem arose i suspect was when you're getting into what i call the more anarchistic setups where
01:06:52 where you were everybody was an individual and a law unto themselves in a sense and so that made dare i say the job of getting the intelligence more difficult but i i don't i don't remember anyone being secretary or chairman or
01:07:04 secretary or chairman or whatever of any group no can we take it from that then that there was no guidance given to the officers about i don't know
01:07:16 about i don't know i don't know i can't say it was or there wasn't but um because i said i wasn't involved in that side of things thank you um the back office which you
01:07:27 thank you um the back office which you have already mentioned uh you've told us that uh new ucos would tend to spend four to six weeks in the office and meet um some of the deployed officers as well and read their reports
01:07:36 reports was this the method that the sds was using when you joined in 1970 it was yes yes the the um it was only after about two or three
01:07:52 it was only after about two or three years that we started to get a permanent dc from elsewhere within the branch who hadn't been out in the field or wasn't
01:08:03 hadn't been out in the field or wasn't about to go in the field doing that role that happened about 1973 i suppose uh but i i dated i'm not too sure i understand um you've mentioned in your statement that the purpose really of this was to learn about targets yeah and methodology yeah now if i can deal with targets first
01:08:16 i can deal with targets first uh what sort of thing were they they taught about targets can you remember well by targets i mean what sort of organizations were were there i mean that was decided really by the chief
01:08:31 that was decided really by the chief inspector in the inspector on advice dare i say it from the rest of the branch
01:08:32 branch um or
01:08:33 um or because
01:08:35 because these things are aren't static i mean you had certain organizations which were common pretty well throughout but others sort of came and went a bit and so what you did was you adjusted
01:08:48 you did was you adjusted don't say our coverage of these things accordingly and yeah it was that was the way it was it was
01:08:57 it was something that just naturally evolved what was this um process supervised by you so for the process of learning about targets no no that was just
01:09:09 targets no no that was just wasn't supervised by me i was aware of obviously
01:09:10 obviously who the targets were uh um i suppose the better way i can describe it is that
01:09:21 describe it is that when i was a chief inspector i was aware of
01:09:30 of right-wing elements and the need perhaps for the sds to cover that because they hadn't posed a problem before but i
01:09:32 but i said look i think there's an argument and i put up an argument and ultimately that's what happens so what happens is that when events happen and
01:09:42 and organizations come to the fore then you say hey
01:09:44 say hey should we be covering these and is it appropriate we cover these for the sds and then that paper will get put up through to two superintendent or commander level and they would then obviously
01:09:54 obviously sorry go across to the um to the squad and say uh yes uh we'll this is what we do or what or not well
01:10:10 this is what we do or what or not well they would do it obviously just focusing on on what new officers would have been told about targets at this point um do you remember what sort of thing they might have been told about the groups that
01:10:14 that those above you or perhaps you wanted them to target yeah i think it's true to say that having been in special branch most of them said three or four is they
01:10:27 most of them said three or four is they would have had a fair idea themselves of the organizations were talking about um and they would have been told the organization which dare i say they were being earmarked for because what you had was like a rolling program as one man went off of an organization
01:10:43 one man went off of an organization someone else would be coming in as it were or they may overlap for a short time
01:10:45 time so and then of course the money was coming off could give them very valuable information and probably the most valuable information about that organization and of course in the interim the lad
01:10:58 and of course in the interim the lad would see the reports that were coming in from that source to assist him in what what would needed to be done but it wasn't complicated stuff i mean basically it was just saying well what
01:11:10 basically it was just saying well what we wanted to do was to find out what was the strength of the organization what were they planning to do and when were they planning to do it um and that was fairly straightforward it wasn't
01:11:20 wasn't some sort of rocket science thing though i say it was straightforward and they were well used to reporting that sort of thing
01:11:25 thing previously so it wasn't a great steep learning curve the best thing was the advice that they were getting from the chief inspector inspector about what to do how to do it and from dara
01:11:39 what to do how to do it and from dara said their colleagues on the squad who told them daryl said the ring craft well coming on to that um the other aspect that you mentioned in your statement is methodology now i don't want you to go into any
01:11:54 now i don't want you to go into any detail please um but but can we take it from that that you're talking about tradecraft yes yes yeah yeah about how to sustain their undercover identities what to do what not to do more precisely um
01:12:05 precisely um you mentioned also seeing uh viewing reporting from those that perhaps they were following into the field or or were there already otherwise um
01:12:16 um were the new officers being encouraged to follow the patterns in reporting sort of things that you've mentioned that might be interested in them of their predecessors yeah so they would they would do that naturally as i said it
01:12:29 would do that naturally as i said it followed on from the old what i call the day-date time and placing you simply said this is what it's about this is what happened this is who said that as a summary you did get absolute chapter and verse obviously on things but what it did was gave a picture of
01:12:45 did was gave a picture of the organization at that time thank you um can we move on please to to special branch and where the sds sat within
01:12:57 branch and where the sds sat within special branch i'd like you to look at a document please um it's mps 07
01:12:59 07 37401
01:13:10 and if we just you can see that this is thank you a document entitled the evaluation of special branch
01:13:23 special branch and at the bottom of the page it's dated july 1973 so while you were within the sds
01:13:26 sds and if we could scroll to the second page please thank you and we can see that the the first uh top half of the page is what what's it is
01:13:39 half of the page is what what's it is suggested to be the current structure of i think c squad within special branch yes and uh we can see that um the special demonstration squad sits underneath a chief inspector who in turn sits underneath a
01:13:52 who in turn sits underneath a superintendent and chief superintendent um
01:13:56 um is that your recollection around sort of summer of 1973 of how the sds sat within special branch yeah so one of the misconceptions i wish the first site i was thinking for
01:14:08 the first site i was thinking for inspectors it didn't make sense but then i realized in
01:14:16 in one of the lads in the field was in fact an inspector which was unusual but he was we
01:14:19 was we we don't need to um hear anything okay um let's just focus on where um the the squad uh the sds sat within special branch um we we know that
01:14:30 that um the sds became part of c squad in perhaps late 1972 or 1973. does that accord with your recollection i can't remember that to be honest no i see um
01:14:44 remember that to be honest no i see um and it later um became part of s squad um in about the summer of 1974. and but this uh document seems to be suggesting a proposal whilst it was
01:14:58 suggesting a proposal whilst it was within c squad to change the sds and to sit underneath a superintendent if you look towards the bottom half of the um diagram yes you can see that the proposal is that the sds moves to report into a superintendent
01:15:12 into a superintendent rather than a chief inspector do you recall that ever to my recollection the time i was there it was always a chief inspector i see um
01:15:27 um the other question i wanted to ask you about this document is um on the very far left of both of uh the proposal and the current structure you can see a what it says sec service
01:15:42 sec service inspector can you see that yes um which um we assume may be security service inspector we're not sure um are you able to help us with um who what sorry what role that person did
01:15:54 what sorry what role that person did it doesn't doesn't ring a bell with me at all i must confess no um
01:15:56 um i assume that the aid to cid chief inspectorate might have been on the bomb squad or something like that but um no i can't i don't know
01:16:08 no thank you um now as i mentioned in 1974 um the sds moved from c squad to s squad
01:16:19 the sds moved from c squad to s squad can you recall that happening no i don't know um
01:16:21 know um the
01:16:27 the reason i ask is is there is a suggestion within the annual the sds annual report for that year um that
01:16:32 um that this allowed for greater cooperation within the squads um but presumably you can't help us whether that was right or not no no i think i think it was logical for it to be under c squad only because
01:16:43 c squad only because well primarily because 80 percent of the product went to c-squad
01:16:51 c-squad it was of their interest so i mean that sort of was logical in that sense
01:16:59 um thank you this document can come down now um
01:17:00 now um more generally and how much control if i can put it that way was there over the sds by special branch when you were in the unit
01:17:10 unit i think it's true to say that the primary control and the major control was that chief inspector and inspector
01:17:22 was that chief inspector and inspector level because of the nature of the work uh you had to rely upon those two very heavily because senior officers couldn't be going to see these people all the time or hardly at all for security reasons
01:17:35 for security reasons so there was great emphasis i think put upon the selection of the people to do that to do that role because it was so important
01:17:44 important because you had to rely upon those two to do the supervision in parallel with that however it was true to say that being 12 people together there was dare i say it a mutual
01:17:56 dare i say it a mutual support system there by accident almost it wasn't necessarily by design but the fact there were 12 of them there was a great sense of camaraderie amongst them which then definitely was beneficial to
01:18:07 which then definitely was beneficial to the squad and if someone felt there was a problem with one of the lads he would undoubtedly have said it to that in vector and the chief inspector if they weren't aware of it
01:18:19 weren't aware of it um would you include yourself within that
01:18:23 that to a degree yes but i uh if if the inspector and the chief inspector weren't around then you know it would fall to me i mean in fact it did on one occasion
01:18:30 occasion we will come on
01:18:39 you may or may not be able to help us with this but if a problem had arisen and the chief inspector or inspector were aware do you know whether a problem might be escalated to those superior to them
01:18:52 superior to them uh well no in the first instance they would come to me because i was the the one person in the office who would then have natural access i could then go along and see you know the the appropriate chief superintendent commander whatever and
01:19:07 superintendent commander whatever and and praise him instantly of what what the problem was um
01:19:10 um knowledge of the sds that's the next topic i'd like to ask you about please
01:19:21 topic i'd like to ask you about please you told us within your statement that knowledge of the hairys as they were known was was very high within specialists it was yes um and you said that you knew that they before you joined i should say you knew that they were providing intelligence on public order
01:19:32 public order does it follow from that that you knew or suspected which type of groups they were reporting on uh i would have had a fair idea because it was unavoidable when you one knew
01:19:49 it was unavoidable when you one knew that the people who were demonstrating because we were covering those demonstrations overtly anyway um prior to the sds then the threat assessments which were so generously
01:20:01 generously valuably assisted by the sds but prior to that then it was the lads on the ordinary scores that were doing preparing those uh assessments so that they were well aware of those organizations by nature by by the very nature of
01:20:12 by nature by by the very nature of things would you have been aware for instance that most of the groups being reported on were left-wing groups the vast majority yes yes and you would have been aware of that before yes yes
01:20:23 been aware of that before yes yes um and can you assist us perhaps with with why um when you joined certainly and there was such a focus
01:20:36 and there was such a focus well the vast majority of the people who were demonstrating were left-wing as i said i alluded to the right way um
01:20:42 um the national front at that time time was really quite small i mean it got a bit of a profile but it was very small and the but the right wing the left wing were the ones who were demonstrating what had happened was in 68 throughout europe there'd been this
01:20:53 this upsurge in extreme left-wing uh demonstrating and everything and we weren't immune from it
01:21:07 weren't immune from it and that's what happened and it started with you know with the vietnam solidarity campaign which was essentially a left-wing extreme left-wing organization and so that was where the emphasis was because these were the people who were demonstrating um
01:21:21 um after you left the unit and returned to special branch did you get the impression that the state of knowledge amongst special branch officers of the sds had changed at all was it still pretty commonly known about oh it was commonly known
01:21:35 known about oh it was commonly known about yeah oh yes there's no question about that and uh it'd be fair to say that the the sds the existence of the sds
01:21:46 existence of the sds though perhaps not specifics was a pretty open secret within special branches yes yes thank you
01:21:49 thank you um
01:21:50 um turning to the sds itself um you've told us in your your statement and in fact today that that its primary
01:22:02 and in fact today that that its primary purpose was as you understood it to gain intelligence on public order and demonstrations you joined in 19 in 1970 which was about two years or so after
01:22:14 after it had been set up maybe a little longer when you joined the sdf did you understand it to be a permanent unit yes well it was subject to annual review i knew that um but it was a
01:22:28 i knew that um but it was a well-established unit by then yeah so i always hope well this will obviously go on as long as well as long as it remained a secret dare i say while you were there did you ever
01:22:39 while you were there did you ever consider that there was a chance it might not
01:22:48 might not continue was it was its existence in jeopardy from those on high can you not put those on high because um i think it was true to say that because those on high had been consulted do all about it or and the home office knew about it i mean the commissioner himself had
01:22:59 i mean the commissioner himself had actually visited on one occasion so it wasn't a question of nobody could ever say that so i think and also to the relationship dare i say with our
01:23:10 relationship dare i say with our uniform colleagues in a8 which may be a different
01:23:11 different number now um was very very good and in no small part it's because we were able to give them
01:23:23 to give them very good threat assessments on what was happening in respect of demonstrations so i think that the the
01:23:26 the benefits of the squad were well known and there wasn't the danger to the squad was
01:23:35 was if it became known outside uh
01:23:36 uh and obviously that would make its uh continuous existence much more difficult and problematic can we take it from that that you don't recall any conversations happening about
01:23:49 recall any conversations happening about the sds being curtailed its existence no no no
01:23:52 no no there was an annual report and
01:23:57 and we'd have been surprised dare i say if we'd have been refused because it was becoming a regular thing but things hadn't changed and nothing had happened to cause us to think otherwise now you you mentioned that the vietnam solidarity campaign and the october
01:24:11 solidarity campaign and the october demonstrations in 1968 being the the start of the sds we know that certainly those uh um deployments didn't involve particularly long-term infiltrations of groups
01:24:28 long-term infiltrations of groups um but by the time you had joined the unit about two years later these longer-term deployments had begun are you able to help us why with why things changed well i think the problem in
01:24:37 in initially was that um there was to be there'd been a demonstration in the spring of 68 which was
01:24:45 was quite nasty and almost involved in an invasion of the us embassy which would have been disastrous and there was a another one scheduled for the autumn the october
01:25:00 for the autumn the october and it was realized that we needed to get far better intelligence and so obviously as a short-term thing well what we're going to do is infiltrate the vsc or people who associated with that and that led on think naturally to a
01:25:15 and that led on think naturally to a slightly wider coverage of the groups and
01:25:19 and by definition by the end of 68 nobody had been in the group more than six months but it then naturally followed on that slowly but surely the sort of tenure of people in groups is just naturally developed because
01:25:33 is just naturally developed because there was no rush after that point there would have been a rush initially to get people in because time was pressing six months time you're going to get this major demonstration and i suspect the decision to form the squad was a month
01:25:44 decision to form the squad was a month or so down the line but as things went on then obviously you have more time and you can then do things and people weren't rushed into organizations at all it would take a month two three months
01:25:59 it would take a month two three months whatever even longer to get established in a group and that was a very gentle process because that was less risk to the individual and indeed to the organization
01:26:10 organization and so that what you had was a rolling program of people joining these organizations um
01:26:17 um and at any one time 10 or 11 would be fully active and one or two would be sort of in the process of coming in perhaps so is it fair to say you suspect that it one thing led to the other naturally yes it did yes it was it was it was obviously proven to be very
01:26:32 it was obviously proven to be very effective and if something's proven to be effective you don't say well let's get rid of it
01:26:43 can we move on please um to an essay that you wrote in 1979 yes um and we'll bring it up on the screen just so it's mps-074744
01:26:53 page two to start with thank you
01:27:01 this um this is an essay which you've told us you wrote for a training course you did
01:27:07 you did um in 1979 yes um and it reviews the um the public order scene if i can put it that way and police and policing of it um in the 1970s um firstly what can you remember what
01:27:20 um firstly what can you remember what training course you would have prepared this it was uh brahms hill course inspectors brahms um
01:27:24 um firstly um the context how much of a concern were the demonstrations which took place in the 1970s to special branch
01:27:35 1970s to special branch well they were concerned because obviously there was a potential for a public disorder and there was disorder from time to time and uh one of the primary roles of
01:27:46 and uh one of the primary roles of police places protection of public you know preservation of public order and so it was perfectly natural for us to be
01:27:54 to be concerned with that and how best can we get information on that um can we look please um at a small section of it it's page five please um the bottom of the page
01:28:12 um now i'm going to read a small section out
01:28:13 out where you deal with um police intelligence on demonstrations at the bottom of the page it is a truism that full and prior knowledge of extremist plans for demonstrations
01:28:27 demonstrations is the cornerstone for police success in planning for demonstrations fortunately our liberal democratic system which positively encourages demonstrations is
01:28:39 positively encourages demonstrations is ultimately our best weapon for obtaining intelligence only rarely do the extremists formulate their plans in total secrecy and normally albeit grudgingly they will
01:28:50 normally albeit grudgingly they will supply to the police the broad outline of their intentions additionally the need to enlist support for any event necessitates publicity usually by leaflets advertisements in sympathetic publications and publicity
01:29:07 sympathetic publications and publicity in the newspaper of the organising group in more authoritarian countries where the underground system is by necessity more widespread it is possible to raise significant support in secret but in this country other than for small
01:29:20 this country other than for small sit-ins or pickets it is virtually impossible to do so uh
01:29:24 uh is
01:29:27 is what you've written there your your view now
01:29:30 now i think to some extent what i was trying to do was to dare i say i realized that i couldn't talk about the sds and i didn't want to talk about the ds so i dare i say dan played
01:29:43 say dan played that aspect i i because i thought well look um it'd be a very easy i could quite easily talk about things which would imply that we had the sds i didn't want to do that but i had to somehow in dealing with that subject i have to get
01:29:59 dealing with that subject i have to get around that problem dare i say if you're going to talk about demonstrations so so um
01:30:05 so so um but the reality is it was the very small ones that were the very secret ones which was the tricky ones in some respects but what what the great thing about the sds was that you were able to because you had the extra intelligence you then had a better
01:30:17 you then had a better grasp of the feel and the strength of the organizations so that if for example you
01:30:26 you prior to 1968 you would turn around and say on the threat assessment well they'll probably be pm one thousand and two thousand people and whatever and the the possibility of violence exists sort of
01:30:37 violence exists sort of all rather general stuff with the existence of the sdsu would say look intelligent suggests we will have 1250
01:30:48 intelligent suggests we will have 1250 on this demonstration there was a small risk of
01:30:52 risk of disorder but it's not that not that high but you could be far more precise in that and what it meant
01:31:00 meant and as our uniform colleagues became far more trusting do i say and were aware that our threat assessments were on the button
01:31:09 button then they could deploy their people far more accurately and indeed not have a lot of wastage of police because they didn't need colossal reserves
01:31:23 didn't need colossal reserves and the beauty is what reserves they did have could have would be dispositioned in the right place so we were both saving money and indeed making a more efficient uh and it was making 10 15 20 difference or whatever it is it so the whole thing was cost effective and effective what would
01:31:35 effective and effective what would public order control to us we will we will come on to assessments um and it it is only right to say that you do go on later in the next paragraph to talk about special branch sources which we will come to
01:31:51 will come to um but just before we do um i understand what you say that you couldn't mention the sds in this um but what i'm interested to explore is if this much information is available freely as you mentioned there um
01:32:06 um why was the sds a necessity in your view it just sharpened it up that much more that was all i mean you could get a fair when you were well experienced you could get a fair amount of information but what we did find and i think it is true to say is that whereas
01:32:22 to say is that whereas a lot of organizations were compliant or you know helpful to police and report what they were going to do a lot of these extreme organizations they were coming didn't weren't as compliant
01:32:33 compliant um uh
01:32:35 um uh so we we needed to be able to get the information and be more precise you could come up with a a reasonable assessment but what we wanted to do because these assessments these
01:32:49 because these assessments these demonstrations weren't a sort of well without one here and one they were a constant
01:32:53 constant drain on police resources so it was important that we uh uh
01:32:57 uh uh cover those efficiently as possible can i just read a little bit more surely then i'll ask you a question or two about it um the next paragraph the more
01:33:08 about it um the next paragraph the more precise plans of extremists are normally supplied by special branch who employ rather more discreet and sophisticated means of obtaining information occasionally special branch obtains information from highly sensitive
01:33:20 information from highly sensitive sources disclosure of which would involve considerable risk to informants or seriously jeopardize future operations um was that a slightly more oblique
01:33:33 was that a slightly more oblique reference to that yes i used the word informants as a yes because that is people's traditional perception of how things work i mean you can get information from
01:33:45 information from three or four different main sources and that would have all dare i said was considered back in 68 and um we came up with the system that we did but informants
01:33:57 informants is is is a way of getting information you know but informants is a broad phrase which is capable of other interpretations and
01:34:09 is capable of other interpretations and are you able to help us with what other sources of intelligence were available to special branch at that time uh there were a few people who were informed but not many i think the trouble with informants is that they are some are excellent but the loyalty of
01:34:25 some are excellent but the loyalty of of all of them isn't guaranteed and of course the trouble is is that uh if their loyalty is and the reliability isn't guaranteed they also pose a risk to uh the operation as well by definition because that's
01:34:38 that's you want people you can trust when you do
01:34:41 do especially to get continuity on this sort of thing um
01:34:44 um the sds was um would you agree the sds was a relatively significant departure from traditional additional records it was it was a step
01:34:55 additional records it was it was a step further there's no doubt about that and it it was the vietnam solidarity campaign that initiated that if that's the right word and um the the longer deployments that
01:35:11 and um the the longer deployments that we've mentioned um necessarily involved a more significant intrusion into people's lives didn't they uh
01:35:17 uh yes i said yes i think one of the things i would say in perhaps you're coming on to this is that the role of the ses did widen slightly with daryl i said some of the ira campaign and all that sort of thing
01:35:29 campaign and all that sort of thing the the the question i i really wanted to ask you is is given that these uh things came along with the sds's methods
01:35:36 methods um and the importance that you've mentioned in the previous paragraph of the liberal democratic system um was there any consideration that you can recall when you were on the sds of
01:35:47 recall when you were on the sds of whether the ends justified the means uh i think we almost approached it from the other way around in the sense but i know what you're saying but
01:36:00 know what you're saying but what we felt was that by having the sds is that in fact demonstrations were more peaceable things were weren't allowed to get out of control
01:36:12 of control and so it was almost a win-win situation the the extremists would get their publicity through the media the people are being demonstrated against weren't having a problem the police weren't
01:36:23 having a problem the police weren't having a problem the disorder which was uh was less and so in a way that was the whole purpose of it all was it wasn't a question of like typical police
01:36:35 question of like typical police undercover work where the idea is to get three or four gangsters up before the old bayley as it were it was the idea was to do
01:36:45 do precisely the opposite not to bring be arresting people left right and center but to maintain public tranquility which by definition meant there would be fewer arrests so it wasn't a question of saying well get their plans and then we can arrest them all it was quite the reverse i see um
01:36:58 all it was quite the reverse i see um there's just one more uh little passage i'd like to ask you about in this essay then we'll move on um just continuing from where we stopped for example it may be known that the international marxist
01:37:12 be known that the international marxist group plans to hold a six-man sit-in at an embassy and knowledge of this is confined to a few trusted supporters clearly if police are found to be
01:37:23 clearly if police are found to be waiting for the would-be participants it would pose a very serious it would pose very serious problems for the source similarly if the sit-in is allowed to continue it might prove to be embarrassing politically a solution is to acquaint uniform officers of the
01:37:34 to acquaint uniform officers of the problem and to arrange for sufficient officers to be in the vicinity so that they can respond
01:37:44 mr smith was was things demonstrations that were embarrassing politically at something that the sds were concerned with stopping
01:37:55 stopping yes in the sense that obviously whilst dare i say we would expect home office the foreign office or british institutions to have a thick skin about these things obviously if there were demonstrations outside
01:38:06 there were demonstrations outside foreign embassies and all that we are now getting into more ticklish territory you have to be a bit more careful but the problem was as as i highlighted was that if if police are waiting for
01:38:19 was that if if police are waiting for them when they turn up then obviously there's a problem um but at the same time if police aren't aware of it and they turn up 15 minutes later with blue lights and there's a danger things can go pear-shaped to use
01:38:32 danger things can go pear-shaped to use a phrase so the ideal thing was for them to turn up gently five minutes later and um with a bit of that minimize the risk of of of of a problem the prob the demonstrators will get their publicity
01:38:46 demonstrators will get their publicity because they will probably have tipped off the press beforehand so they got some nice photographs and everyone was happy
01:38:51 happy just in terms of what you remember being of interest when you're on the sds would a small sit-in be the sort of thing that would have um animated you or those above you no they weren't
01:39:06 you or those above you no they weren't particularly it depends upon the type i mean there would have been occasions i think when it was so small and so in a sense insignificant and we wouldn't have told anybody we said look no this one we just let drift because it's
01:39:17 it's it's it's not that relevant it's it's it's outside you know the front door the home office or whatever it is and they're used to it anyway and there's only going to be a few half a dozen they're not going to cause obstruction
01:39:29 they're not going to cause obstruction if they're on the pavement so what let's be common sense about this it then poses less risk to to our source you know thank you if we could take that document down now and move on to tasking
01:39:51 you told us that before you joined the the the sds you'd been involved in c-squad so left-wing and public order issues and you understood the area that the sgs operated in um
01:40:00 um can we take it from that that the groups when you got to the sds were very similar if not identical to the ones that were of
01:40:09 yes and interest i would have known the main because having been in special branch i would have been aware of those groups generally anyway without being on c squad in fact i've done protection duty prior to that for
01:40:25 duty prior to that for two and a half years but um but even then you still were aware of these things because you needed to be um
01:40:26 um is it fair to say that the main difference really between the sds and special branch more
01:40:38 the sds and special branch more generally was the method being used to obtain the intelligence rather than autonomous absolutely yes um
01:40:40 um you
01:40:41 you you told us in your statement that you weren't specifically involved in tasking ucos targeting the mat at groups um are you able to help us with where
01:40:52 are you able to help us with where these targets the groups would have come from within special branch
01:41:00 so as i indicated that when i was involved in the right-wing section as the chief inspector then i initiated coverage of that for a variety of reasons and so
01:41:11 and so one imagines that most of the the targeting
01:41:13 targeting request is the right word i suppose would have come from from c squad which was the primary area i mean irish elements were also covered as well and
01:41:24 elements were also covered as well and that would have come from another squad i see
01:41:25 i see um
01:41:28 um we will come on to a8 in a moment because um you've given us evidence in your statement that that a lot of c squad's work was being done um in turn for them
01:41:40 work was being done um in turn for them but but just um to focus in on something you've told us in your statement you told us that you recall that people from special branch would come into the sds office when you were there and say that they
01:41:52 when you were there and say that they were interested in a particular person and that you'd note down that request and
01:41:56 and given that the sds is interest as you've told us was public order what type of information um was being sought in these requests
01:42:07 sought in these requests it's simply identity identification of the individual um
01:42:13 we would have records on the primary people within these organizations and also in parallel with that
01:42:28 and also in parallel with that the security services were interested as well obviously for obvious reasons um and
01:42:31 and so a chap would do be doing a report simply to sort of check
01:42:33 check an up-to-date thing on this person and say look is he still active what is he up to
01:42:38 up to um
01:42:39 um if a lad was in that particular orchestra organization it made sense for them to come to us and say look can you help with this or not he wouldn't ask
01:42:51 help with this or not he wouldn't ask any questions about this but there's a very good chance that the
01:42:55 that the the man in the field would be able to say yes i know him he's he's still active no he doesn't appear on him or whatever and give him some pieces of information uh about him how would that assist the sds in their
01:43:07 how would that assist the sds in their public order riemann didn't assess the sds it's just the sds were able then to assist the branch and its overall picture of the indeed the security
01:43:18 picture of the indeed the security service so it was really a sort of secondary purpose but they were in the right position to give the information so why not um how roughly i don't expect you to be able to remember specific numbers but
01:43:33 able to remember specific numbers but roughly how frequently would requests like this happen a couple of times a week perhaps and what sort of level of officer in terms of rank would be making these requests would it be someone said the inquiry it would be
01:43:48 the inquiry it would be inspector sergeant or constable dc you know just the one who was doing that particular inquiry and you would uh would you simply pass these on to the relevant people or would you send that yes i mean there would be the file would be put in the back as we called it with
01:44:03 be put in the back as we called it with a probably a slip-on saying can you help fred blocks on this one at all and they know instinctively what they're saying and they'd see the file and in fact it was if the file went out to the officer at the safe flat then he could then read it and say yeah
01:44:15 he could then read it and say yeah that's he could see what had changed or hadn't changed in terms of what the individual was about photographs of potential targets
01:44:27 of potential targets how frequently do you remember those being given to ucos in the field i don't particularly recall that i i know there was fairly significant well it was significant coverage of
01:44:38 it was significant coverage of demonstrations by people but i can't remember
01:44:42 remember photographers i suppose it would have happened but that's not something i particularly remember
01:44:50 remember can you help us with how photographs of people in the uco's groups might have assisted them um
01:44:57 um so the uco is great yes so you've told us in your statement that occasionally you would take photographs down in the bag i think you mentioned to the to the officers in the safe flat and what i'm interested in is to to
01:45:08 and what i'm interested in is to to understand how this assisted with uh what it was was it was just part and parcel of the whole
01:45:20 parcel of the whole overall package is that because we had a photographic department that would photograph demonstrations so they'd have a whole album of these things and obviously would be quite nice
01:45:33 would be quite nice to to a they could look at that those photographs and say well that's fred that's harry that's joe or whatever and we may or may not have a photograph of that person on file so you were then able to put a photograph on file of that individual it just
01:45:47 individual it just broadened your knowledge about that individual i see
01:45:49 i see um the security service you mentioned um can we look at a document please um it's ucpi
01:45:56 ucpi at five zeros three zero zero six six
01:46:03 that's tab sixer
01:46:13 and it's page uh thank you it's page two i'm interested in please thank you these are our minutes of a meeting which was held between the security service um and a number of your superior
01:46:24 um and a number of your superior officers and you i think in fact you you took these minutes and
01:46:28 and the paragraph two in terms of the purpose of the meeting explains that the object of the meeting as outlined by commander rogers roger that's matt rodger was uh to examine special branch and box 500 coverage
01:46:50 and box 500 coverage of extreme left-wing groups in london and to establish where such coverage overlapped and where it should be increased
01:46:54 increased do you recall mr smith um whether such meetings
01:46:58 meetings ever led to a change in offices targeting or a change in where new officers might be targeted i don't recall whether there
01:47:09 targeted i don't recall whether there was any change but all i can say is that that would have been a natural process if you're both say looking at the same field it made sense that you have some sort of awareness or coordination between you and they might say to us for example i
01:47:23 and they might say to us for example i mean i'm not talking hypothetically now or we're a bit thin on this ground or we'd say we're a bit thumb on that and they saw we've got that cover duplication wasn't a problem it was when you had no cover duplication
01:47:36 it was when you had no cover duplication in fact turned of 2d into 3d if you know what i mean so it was just a question of a courtesy thing that would have happened i imagine for right not all the time but fairly regularly to make sure that our
01:47:51 regularly to make sure that our targeting was appropriate and indeed uh
01:47:52 uh coordinated well that brings me to my next question is how frequently do you recall meetings like this happening i i don't particularly recall it but but my definition is i would have thought every
01:48:06 definition is i would have thought every two or three years or so not it wouldn't have been a sort of every five minutes job two or three years did you just do it i think so yes it wouldn't have been because the the nature of these organizations and the nature of the scene changing wasn't that rapid
01:48:25 things sort of just drifted in it's like animal rights i mean it didn't in this period animal rights wasn't featuring but by the end of the 70s it was and then over a period of time it eventually disappointed disappeared and reduced really because animal rights achieved a
01:48:38 really because animal rights achieved a lot of the things they wanted to achieve um a question just about about the administration of of this meeting and perhaps others what were we can see that minutes were taken of this meeting that that you um took
01:48:52 that you um took were meeting minutes such as this always taken and kept um by the sds i was yeah i don't remember having that many meetings i mean this meeting obviously took place
01:49:04 this meeting obviously took place but beyond that no i don't i don't recall and there would have been there was the annual report which covered the whole thing which in a sense gave
01:49:16 gave the the the people above the commander and the dac or whatever uh uh a summary of what was going on and so they wrote with everything and up to
01:49:31 they wrote with everything and up to date but no i think this was this is the only agency that we would have been dealing with i can't think of any other agency that would have required such you know we needed such meetings i see and um can we take it from that that internal meetings within the sds not involving outside agencies wouldn't
01:49:43 involving outside agencies wouldn't necessarily be minuted in your memory if it was something important it would have been minuted i'm sure but not um [Music]
01:49:51 [Music] not necessarily i mean it would be
01:49:57 discussed trying to think of the whole thing run itself in many respects i mean the organization didn't change that much and the product was coming through and there wasn't uh we didn't have chief superintendents knocking on the
01:50:11 chief superintendents knocking on the door saying will you do this will you do that will you do the other we knew what we had to do we were covering the organizations and that was it it was the sort of the thing would say run itself but in many ways it did to be honest
01:50:29 but in many ways it did to be honest do you recall any element of socializing with mi5 and before or after these meetings
01:50:31 meetings thank you
01:50:32 thank you can we look please uh on page three a paragraph seven of this document
01:50:47 thank you i just want to read it out and it may be that you may or may not be able to assist us with this young liberals and redacted were other
01:50:59 young liberals and redacted were other fields express uh fields currently being examined by the s i think it's os it's a reference to sds for their potential mi5 expressed interest and offered any assistance from his uh department um the young liberals um was a group i i
01:51:14 um the young liberals um was a group i i wanted to ask you about do you recall if this group's initial targeting was encouraged by the security service or or
01:51:20 or or um
01:51:25 um as this document seems to suggest that they were being informed after it had happened
01:51:30 happened i don't remember the exact timing of it all i can remember with the young liberals was that they were very much the younger liberals per se wasn't of interest but there was elements within it were involved in
01:51:45 it were involved in anti-apartheid movement and all that sort of thing also too the young liberals
01:51:52 liberals whilst they weren't anything like as extreme dare i say as the top skips they were
01:51:53 they were an ideal stepping stone for someone to have a bit of street cred to them move on to it sort of like joining cnd and having cnd on your cv and then joining because you
01:52:04 because you you couldn't in a sense it was you're suddenly someone who's not interested in politics suddenly you want to join ing whereas if you have a bit of street cred and awareness and you've
01:52:16 street cred and awareness and you've been in some other organization and so it's a much better stepping stone to do that so in part young liberals would have served that purpose but also there was this element within the young liberals that were engaged in the
01:52:29 liberals that were engaged in the anti-part-time move and some quite interesting demonstrations on that front um you've mentioned in your your statement and we we know that an officer who we we know as hn298
01:52:43 who we we know as hn298 and you can refresh your memory of who that is
01:52:58 um can i ask you mr smith just to put the folder on the sides table you have please thank you
01:53:08 yes
01:53:14 that officer um was deployed for some time into the young liberals yeah and and you told us in your statement that you
01:53:23 you you recall that uh he may have used that to move on to other groups thereafter yeah
01:53:29 yeah and i think we know that um he he later went on to anarchist groups and irish support groups and later the workers revolutionary party is that the sort of movement uh that you are describing yes exactly yes um finally on this mr smith was there
01:53:45 um finally on this mr smith was there any concern that you can recall within the sds
01:53:46 the sds um about
01:53:53 um about a police officer reporting on the youth wing of a mainstream political party no i think it was because we were interested in that one element the element of the anti-apartheid movement it wasn't the general there was no interest whatsoever in in the young liberals per
01:54:08 whatsoever in in the young liberals per se it was just that there was an element of them that were involved in that it was a transient thing i think later on i mean
01:54:14 mean the young liberals didn't weren't so involved with it and so therefore we never went back to them as a to my knowledge well i can't speak authoritatively but my
01:54:28 my what knowledge i have that was the one time when we looked at that um
01:54:34 um can we take this document down please and replace it with another document mps
01:54:42 that's page two and that's tab ten of your bundles sir
01:55:00 this mr smith is a i think it's called a minute sheet which
01:55:02 which shows a
01:55:07 shows a various comments on a report which was produced on the img
01:55:11 img and by an officer can we scroll down to the second half of the page please thank you and uh you'll see minute two um comments
01:55:25 um comments by i think that's matt rodger commander who says you will wish to peruse detective constable hm 338's report which i regret regard as quite magnificent
01:55:36 magnificent both in relation to content and presentation for such a junior officer it will certainly be eagerly grasped by the security service and doubtless keep their trotskyist desk well-occupied for months ahead
01:55:48 months ahead at one time you will recall img was a headache to police in regards to present preservation of public order invariably they were in the vanguard of any
01:56:00 they were in the vanguard of any demonstration which bordered on violence and disorder at present they certainly do not pose any real threat in this area and the future of the party as an active revolutionary
01:56:16 the party as an active revolutionary body will depend to quite a considerable extent upon whether the differences existing within the leadership are resolved
01:56:23 resolved and that is a comment made in june 1973 when when you were within the sds um
01:56:29 um that would you agree that comment tends to suggest at least um that the report in question was of more use to the security service than it was to special branch yes they were talking about the
01:56:41 they were talking about the there's a thing called tendencies within uh img
01:56:43 uh img and there were two or three or four of these sentences and basically they were vying for power within img and they were producing
01:56:59 producing quite long documents about their subtle variations of tropschism or interpretation there are and so
01:57:00 and so and that was part and parcel of the power struggle that was taken apart within img now all the politics didn't particularly bother sb but obviously we
01:57:11 particularly bother sb but obviously we passed it on to the security because it was right
01:57:14 was right you know in this uh up their alley as it were that was what they wanted um this report which i don't need to take you to came at the towards the end of the officer officer's concern
01:57:25 of the officer officer's concern deployment about three years or so do you recall and whether officers deployments were perhaps extended um to
01:57:39 deployments were perhaps extended um to serve purposes uh that benefited the mi5 i don't think that mi5
01:57:44 mi5 to my knowledge didn't have any import in terms of how long that officer would be deployed they were aware of their deployment because we were sending them copies of
01:57:55 because we were sending them copies of the report but that was entirely down to the the officer that concerned the length of a officer's deployment was very much he was the lead in that um
01:58:04 um typically they were out for which you know for two three years or whatever but um no it was the officer himself determined that
01:58:15 determined that in your view do you consider that mi5 influenced sds tasking targeting influence is the wrong word uh if they provided information that was
01:58:28 if they provided information that was valuable to us in targeting yes but to influence to say that they said we would like you to do this or no we we made our own judgment
01:58:40 no we we made our own judgment uh we might help them obviously but no i think primarily we were just in public order
01:58:41 order um it was obviously of interest or mutual benefit to know what we were doing or how we were doing it but that that was the extent of it or no
01:58:52 no thank you so it might not be an appropriate time for yes and we will have a break of a quarter an hour and then resume thank you
02:17:02 all rise please
02:17:18 yes thank you mr smith um can we turn please to processing of the reporting and how it left the sds and put it that way um you told us that your primary duty was
02:17:34 you told us that your primary duty was to process the handwritten reports which came to you um from from officers via the di or the dci um other than handwritten reports were there any other methods used in the sds for passing intelligence on uh sometimes by telephone of course if
02:17:48 uh sometimes by telephone of course if there was something that came through at the last moment then obviously the the passing of a written report wasn't practicable so but that was
02:18:01 wasn't practicable so but that was not it was infrequent i think to say that
02:18:02 that um
02:18:02 um when you process these reports are we right to understand you didn't play a role in sanitizing them no i i think no mainly it was just
02:18:13 no i i think no mainly it was just putting them into the format tidying them up as it were getting them typed up by the typing board which is right next door to us uh
02:18:22 uh no i can't think of nothing comes to mind in that respect you didn't play any role in analyzing
02:18:35 you didn't play any role in analyzing what was in them the content well i was aware of what was in them obviously um and then you i'd be aware that what needed to be expedited dare i say or it was routine um that was self-evident uh and
02:18:44 uh and so obviously i i acted accordingly as to what what the information was um
02:18:52 um the sort of more detailed analysis rather than if i the the the role that you played would that happen further up the chain within special branch as you understood it
02:19:03 as you understood it well mainly the information just put the information into the system and then this system the information would then go on to file or
02:19:09 or be something that would contribute towards obviously a threat assessment or whatever
02:19:13 whatever uh
02:19:14 uh the information itself was just like another little brick in the wall i mean we're just adding to to the wall of our intelligence um the the batches of reports that came to you
02:19:31 the batches of reports that came to you 15 to 20 or so how roughly speaking how long would it take you to go through a sheath of documents like that and certainly depends upon the size of the document itself and then someone would just
02:19:37 just record one hour 20 minutes i suppose if that and then another one you know might take a little longer but there wasn't it wasn't a great deal of time no um you've told us that once they'd come back from the typing pool they were
02:19:51 back from the typing pool they were signed by the chief inspector generally speaking
02:19:55 speaking and then went to the relevant chief inspector and special branch who would take action as necessary yes they would then benefit it further yes and
02:20:05 and my question first question is is how did you know which chief inspector to sell it to yourself because you know i knew which organization was covered by which squad
02:20:13 squad they're all just literally down the corridor from me one way or the other and um i just walk them straight down them and give them a batch usually and say
02:20:26 say won't tell them what they knew who i was so they knew exactly what the reports were
02:20:27 were what sort of action would you have imagined the receiving chief inspector to to take on the intelligence a lot of it would have been put onto just the either the individual's file
02:20:43 either the individual's file or the group file as necessary and in the case of uh
02:20:46 uh stuff relating to specific demonstrations would have been sent to or brought to the attention of the officers who were going to be involved in that demonstration the
02:20:58 involved in that demonstration the somewhat demanding compiling the the threat assessment for example okay and so they could incorporate that yes and the the decision about how to send this on is that the sort of thing that would tend to be included on a minute
02:21:11 would tend to be included on a minute sheet like the one we saw exactly yeah so they would say so-and-so disease so and so to do whatever i see and it would
02:21:18 um a8
02:21:22 a8 you've told us in your your statement that you
02:21:27 that you you possibly remember um passing intelligence directly to a8 a dozen or so times a year
02:21:30 a year and that you would somewhat sanitize a report in order to protect its source if you if you sent it this way
02:21:40 this way are we right to understand that that's because the intelligence was leaving special branch and going into the police you had to be obviously more careful you didn't want to do anything that would
02:21:53 didn't want to do anything that would remotely run the risk of identifying the nature of the saw well not the the identity of the source but nevertheless you wanted to get that information across i mean
02:22:03 i'll just give a hypothetical example if you knew that something was going to happen that 20 people were going to be a certain place at one o'clock and they were going to be processed protesting about a certain thing you make it you may make the numbers
02:22:17 you make it you may make the numbers less precise you may make the time less precise
02:22:21 precise but the broad thrust of what you were saying was there so that they were able to sort of uh the
02:22:28 uh the colleagues were able to keep an eye on things and be in attendance fairly at the appropriate time how did you know to do this were you instructed to do this sense really you knew that you could you could
02:22:46 could you could a i knew that a8 obviously needed to be told very quickly so we'd do that um and
02:22:50 um and you just just intuitively do you say well look uh you knew what would obviously pose a risk to the officer i mean it usually would be obviously in the form of a telephone message not
02:23:02 the form of a telephone message not a full formal sb report where you've got names and details which um would help in identifying where it came from and everything else um you you mentioned in your statement that
02:23:14 that and i don't want you pleased to mention any names on this stage that a special branch liaison officer was instituted at some point um is it right to say that the job of
02:23:28 um is it right to say that the job of sanitizing was effectively taken out of your hands and put into theirs no no i don't think so um i think it was probably what
02:23:37 what the sb liaison officer was doing in a sense was
02:23:40 sense was helping
02:23:46 helping a8 to sort of understand exactly what it is we were saying because he would know and also to help make sure that they protected our information and that they were briefed accordingly i mean what we didn't want was
02:23:57 what we didn't want was a uniform inspector coming up to a demonstrator and saying oh you're late or whatever well it did happen on a few occasions but obviously
02:24:08 occasions but obviously we could reduce that to zero as near to zero as possible was to our advantage i mean what we wanted and so he would have helped in making sure that
02:24:20 sure that our interests were were served within a8 albeit that i think that the vast majority of the a8 people were aware of that anyway but we needed a belt and braces approach because
02:24:31 braces approach because of the nature of the work we
02:24:31 we know and you you've given evidence that
02:24:43 know and you you've given evidence that in your statement that c-squad prepared threat assessments for 4a8 didn't they um are these were these sometimes referred to as pre-demonstration assessments that you recall was that a term you really just it would obviously the first line would say this is a threat assessment regarding a demonstration of what
02:24:54 demonstration of what was going to take place on salsa but they were just called threat assessments as i recall and it may have changed later but i see well it it it may be that what we're thinking of came slightly after you you left the sds and
02:25:12 slightly after you you left the sds and the inquiry has also seen a document an internal document from special branch saying that in around 1976 so i bear in mind that this is a couple of years after you left that
02:25:28 that c-squad were preparing between six and 700 threat assessments a year for a8 that's more than 10 a week do you think that sort of figure is
02:25:39 do you think that sort of figure is accurate to your collection well all i can remember was that demonstration activity was pretty constant um
02:25:42 um there wasn't a weekend barely a weekend it didn't pass off without a fairly significant demonstration plus a horde of these smaller ones taking place it was the nature of the political scene at that time
02:25:53 the political scene at that time so a a number like that perhaps in your time within the sds might not be wildly exactly it would be that something along the lord i wouldn't surprise me
02:26:07 the lord i wouldn't surprise me and from your or your recollection again please no no details um do you recall whether other special branch squads would and sometimes feed into these assessments uh if it was the relevant organization yes
02:26:17 yes um
02:26:18 um and presumably sds intelligence would you expect that to feed into these assessments oh yes that was woven into it just naturally i mean
02:26:30 mean as i said the officers who were preparing the assessments would have been able to do the basic framework of that assessment would have that
02:26:42 that literally written down ready as a draft but what the sds were doing were padding out the juicy bits as it were and giving us more precision on terms of the numbers and the likelihood of violence and any little action which was going to be
02:26:56 action which was going to be different to the main the main plot as it were you're marching from let's say marble arch down to uh trafalgar square if there was some target on way that they were particularly interested in
02:27:09 they were particularly interested in they were going to have a little sit down or a diversion to it then that would be woven into the into the report
02:27:14 report and presumably um would you have expected that there would be some degree of sanitization of sds intelligence for the time it ended up yes yes there was a
02:27:28 there was a a natural level of protection and common sense used about that you didn't give them chapter and verse but you give them sufficient such that they can make an intelligent uh understanding of what was going on i see and moving on to
02:27:44 see and moving on to post demonstration after demonstration reports
02:27:45 reports um
02:27:48 um was this done internally within the sds or was that a function of c squad as a function of c squad but what the sds did was to contribute to that in terms of the people who had attended
02:28:02 the people who had attended from the various organizations and
02:28:03 and any other little relevant bits and pieces which might add to the sort of the picture of or the report of the demonstration but primarily it was
02:28:14 demonstration but primarily it was the names of the people who've taken part in the demonstration and when you say sds uh the sds would contribute is that um by virtue of written reports or would they meet in person with people
02:28:27 would they meet in person with people from the scene so what would happen was that
02:28:28 that generally speaking on this was on all the major demonstrations i would be in the office i'd go out on the demonstration see the demonstration come back just before the end go back to the office
02:28:43 the office they would then phone in that that lads had been out on the demonstration with their idents as we call it i would compile a list of those idents with the organizations that were responsible they were part of and that would then be given
02:28:56 given and it would be part of an appendix attached to the report um
02:29:09 um by c squad and i mean c squad would have had a few idents himself anyway and we would have been adding to that substantially actually um
02:29:10 um do you ever recall for a formal debriefing of uco's officers after they had been on demonstrations again no no specifics please that's not not particularly no um
02:29:22 not particularly no um i think that on the monday morning if there'd been a big big demonstration and on the monday afternoon and it's quite possible that the dci and the di would have had they'd have a group chat about
02:29:36 have had they'd have a group chat about it naturally and say well that went off or what but there was most of the demonstrations i have to say passed off reasonably well i mean a few arrests here and there but nothing nothing along the lines if you'd had
02:29:47 nothing along the lines if you'd had something along the lines of the vfc demonstration there was a coffins demonstration of vaguely remember in about 1980 which was rather rather difficult to put it mildly um well just a few others but just focusing on when you were within the sd
02:30:04 focusing on when you were within the sd card within the ssd i can't recall there would have been but i can't remember um there was a demonstration which um didn't go off without a um a problem towards the end of your involvement in the sds at red lion square um in which a
02:30:18 um in which a demonstrator called kevin gately was killed
02:30:19 killed um now
02:30:27 um now do you recall whether the sds would have uh produced a post-demonstration report in the method in the way that you have suggested after that redline square rings a bell and that's about as far as i can remember to be honest um well if you can't go into more details
02:30:38 details thank you um moving on to the volume more generally of reporting that came out of the sds during your time and now it's maybe a very difficult
02:30:53 and now it's maybe a very difficult question to answer are you able to help us with how many reports roughly speaking per year or per month would be coming out of the unit when you were processing them um
02:31:02 um i suppose
02:31:07 in the course of a week that would have been
02:31:08 been 50 or so
02:31:11 50 or so difficult to say i mean everybody would have been producing three or four reports a week or perhaps more or less at least um
02:31:24 at least um a dozen officers yeah i suppose 50-ish but i'm
02:31:25 but i'm again like it's a bit of a guess to be honest that i i won't ask you any more about it in that case um are you able to say of
02:31:36 of a proportion of this how much of that material went to the security service when you were uh i would have said somewhere around about 75 to 80 we didn't send them the irish stuff because
02:31:49 because national responsibility was for us in those days uh and
02:31:52 uh and like so that would involve the couple of organizations that that's fine mr smith um if that's your recollection
02:32:03 recollection um finally um this on this topic feedback
02:32:12 feedback you've told us earlier today that um you knew that your intelligence effectively was of assistance um
02:32:17 um but you you mentioned in your statement that you didn't receive any feedback either from a8 or security service how is it that you knew that your intelligence was helping oh because of the dare i said
02:32:28 dare i said the contact that we did have the security service we didn't get any feedback from and that i'm aware they didn't say it wasn't any but with a8 certainly uh
02:32:43 but with a8 certainly uh i mean what would happen on a major demonstration is a special branch officer would probably be in the control center anyway on the day where they're masterminding the demonstration uh and
02:32:52 uh and the relationship i can remember we used there used to be a security committee
02:32:59 committee which was held at chief inspector superintendent chieftain dental level with the commander of a8 in the 80s and i went to those as the superintendent if we could just focus on when you were
02:33:12 we could just focus on when you were within the sds with the scsts well i no it was just common knowledge that the relationship was great and it was fine i can't
02:33:21 can't be specific about it okay um management if i can um the inquiry just generally the inquiry has heard evidence from some of the officers who came just before you or or in fact
02:33:32 came just before you or or in fact overlapped with you that there was generally speaking a loose system of of uh a management within the sds it wasn't particularly hierarchical um as as some other parts of special branch
02:33:46 other parts of special branch would you agree with that yes i mean there was just the chief inspector around the inspector that was it and as i said a great part of the support mechanism was in fact their colleagues yeah so that in a sense was
02:34:01 colleagues yeah so that in a sense was was unusual i mean obviously colleagues supported one one another elsewhere in special bunch but in this thing because of dare i say the ring craft
02:34:13 the ring craft that was vital to them then that support and indeed the fact that they were both in their same unique environment was they knew what they were talking about when they they were talking to each other you told us in your statement that you
02:34:28 you told us in your statement that you didn't have a formal pastoral role with the ucos but you consider yourself a colleague of them oh yes and that you you did help out ad hoc with management when when required indeed
02:34:37 indeed we'll come on to an example of that in a moment um one of the officers you uh that was on the unit when you were there um described you as
02:34:47 as an officer that we know as hn294s number two in command now can i just ask you to have a quick look at who hn294 is please
02:34:58 hn294 is please if you could keep the folder where it is thank you
02:35:05 yes um and and one of the the ucos you managed described you as his number two do you think that that's an accurate assessment of what your role was well i was the next in the chain i mean
02:35:18 well i was the next in the chain i mean there was only four of us in the office there was the dci the di me and then um the the dc so it was it was a small structure um
02:35:33 um jeffrey craft who who came after you um has told the inquiry in his witness statement that um in his view the dss in the back office were part of the management team yes yes um
02:35:47 team yes yes um and certainly your successor in the back office has said something similar so would you agree that you considered yourself part of the wider management team yes i mean i was aware of what was going on and i could
02:35:59 aware of what was going on and i could contribute obviously if just we were all in the same office so it was natural we spoke and there was no sort of know your place type of thing that we were all part of the same team so it was a natural
02:36:08 a natural natural event you know that we chatted to each other about it and even the dc would you know everybody's have a bit of input you know wisdom isn't unique to the ranks um
02:36:21 um part of that interaction would have happened at that safe house yes and you've told us that you you visited about once a month and sometimes a few more times a year on on top of that when required
02:36:39 required um the the purpose being that to take the bag down as you've mentioned um but also
02:36:43 but also i think you said to socialize with the officers
02:36:45 officers now
02:36:46 now is this
02:36:49 is this this happened on a monthly basis roughly speaking
02:36:57 speaking and this socializing would it be a drink a meal something like that a meal and then followed by some drinks it was
02:37:02 it was the chief inspector described as a vino veritas section this session it it enabled them to relax because they weren't able to do that otherwise uh as they would have done back it in in the mainline special branch
02:37:21 mainline special branch uh and um if they had something you know with a few drinks if they had a problem people tend to be dare i say a little more
02:37:22 more bold well i think on that point you you've told us that on occasion these occasions officers would sometimes speak their minds yes exactly tell you what was going on
02:37:36 was going on and discuss problems any problems they might be having do you recall whether this again no specifics please but did this sort of thing happen often
02:37:47 thing happen often i think it was just as part and parcel of yes of what happened it was the nature of it um because i could remember the chief inspector saying something to the effect that
02:37:55 that this is unique situation we have to be more
02:37:58 more tolerant and understand why it is that this is so because this is the only place they can let off steam and i think it was a very valuable valve for that to happen
02:38:08 happen and would that include uh
02:38:12 uh what was going on in their deployments or their lives outside of the sds or both uh
02:38:21 both uh i think that probably what was happening in their lives outside sgs was probably more between themselves although obviously one knew
02:38:27 one knew some of these offers i knew a few a few of these officers from before so therefore you knew to some extent their personal circumstance because it was a there was a sort of
02:38:38 because it was a there was a sort of family sense dare i said about special branch as a whole but primarily if there was discussion or anything that was interesting is probably the wrong word but
02:38:49 but this was an opportunity for they had a problem to say and they would they weren't they weren't shy but that's what we wanted and and that would include would it things going on in their deployments problems issues again i would not specifically
02:39:02 would not specifically if if if they if they wanted to there was someone there they would not necessarily to me or but someone someone else would probably know about it and if you
02:39:13 and if you had become aware of a particular issue that you had been told um socializing that you thought your superiors needed to be aware of would you pass it on questions yes um
02:39:26 um jeffrey kraft has also told us in his statement um that he doesn't consider that any police officers were more carefully monitored
02:39:37 officers were more carefully monitored than the sds the deployed officer would you agree with that yes yes and
02:39:38 and in practice was the socializing at the safe house after the safe house that in action that was an integral part of it all yes
02:39:52 that was an integral part of it all yes it was part of that process i mean what you had was a chief inspector and an inspector
02:39:55 inspector pretty well full time looking after these these guys whereas you know uh as a dc on the squad you may not have quite that same closeness i
02:40:06 not have quite that same closeness i mean obviously there was a closeness but it was just the nature of the work made it so
02:40:10 it so um i'd like to ask you about a couple of specific examples of things that happened while you were within the sds
02:40:22 happened while you were within the sds um the first is um the withdrawal of an officer that we know was hn 68 so if you'd like to have a look at the book
02:40:28 yes now we we know that this officer was deployed in the irish field while you were within the sds and you've told us in your statement
02:40:41 and you've told us in your statement that you recall that he was detained by the police at some point and we suspect probably in around 1974. and this all happened while your superior officers were away yes um so
02:40:53 superior officers were away yes um so do we understand it then that you were effectively holding the fault well they were absent and
02:40:59 and you were
02:41:03 you were told about this and you had to take some action
02:41:04 action in response to it was the fact that you were being presented with this issue a surprise to you or were you expecting to have to deal with any
02:41:15 expecting to have to deal with any problems that arose yes it was just natural i mean i've been there i've been in
02:41:21 in special rights then for what
02:41:26 what 14 13 14 years so i wasn't a rookie um and i knew the squad well and so when this problem presented itself
02:41:31 itself i knew it was urgent and i took it i thought well i think we need to do this went and saw i think the appropriate chief superintendent
02:41:47 chief superintendent we then went and saw the commander and we all agreed and that very day the officer was withdrawn um
02:41:50 um if your superiors had been there that day when the issue had arisen do you think you would have been involved in it or not
02:41:56 or not i may have been aware of it but they would have dealt with it and i'm confident they'd have dealt with in exactly the same way and um can you recall whether they were when they did return they were content
02:42:07 when they did return they were content with how the issue had yes i never had a moment of
02:42:10 moment of criticism the only person who complained was the individual himself but 10 years later he said it was the best thing that ever happened to him but that's another story i see
02:42:21 story i see another issue i'd like to ask you about is
02:42:30 is the withdrawal of three officers which took place at the beginning of 1973. and if we could bring up a document please
02:42:31 please mps
02:42:33 mps 0728975
02:42:39 um and it's page five please
02:42:47 now the the top of this i should explain mr smith is uh the annual report um for 1973 from the sds and paragraph 18 reads the unfortunate appearance in the
02:43:04 the unfortunate appearance in the extremist field of a and the gist says a member of the public necessitated the immediate withdrawal of two women detective constables the loss of knowledge and expertise when a long-serving officer is permanently withdrawn is serious but unavoidable if the stringent demands of security and
02:43:15 the stringent demands of security and the officer's best interests are to be served
02:43:20 served now um mr smith we know that that is a reference
02:43:21 reference to an occasion when three officers in fact were withdrawn and i'll give you the numbers if you'd like to refresh your memory it's hn348
02:43:36 yes hn 45
02:43:47 yes and uh the third is a name i can tell you it's jill mosdell yes now um
02:43:56 now um i i'd like you um please to answer my next next question just yes or no um
02:43:57 um given that you
02:44:02 you were involved in the sds at this time were you aware of those three
02:44:13 were you aware of those three individuals being withdrawn from the field i might have been but i don't i don't i can't recall it um
02:44:15 um is it the sort of thing generally speaking that you would like have been likely to have been aware of at the time i would have thought so yes um so um can i take it from that that
02:44:33 um so um can i take it from that that you can't help us with the circumstances no the only thing i can say is that two of the individuals well we're in the same organization yes well thank you um
02:44:41 um do
02:44:44 do can i also take it then that you can't help us with any visits which may have occurred from very senior officers
02:44:56 very senior officers to one of the people concerned um to discuss what had happened no okay thank you
02:44:57 thank you now
02:44:59 now the sds
02:45:01 the sds you have told us in your statement uh left a safe house one of the safe houses that was used um around
02:45:14 um around 18 months or so after you joined the unit
02:45:18 unit due to a security concern now 18 months or so would would take us to around the middle of 1972 roughly speaking
02:45:34 and we know that these officers were withdrawn at the beginning of 1973 so a few months thereafter and we've also um heard from you in your statement and there is some evidence that at around this time early 1973 or so the sds
02:45:46 the sds uh procured a second safe house now again a yes or no answer please are you able to help us with whether
02:46:02 whether these three officers being withdrawn led to a change in the practice regarding safe houses
02:46:12 do you generally speaking remember your views being sought about officers being withdrawn from the field and no specifics please no no no
02:46:24 um you mentioned a little earlier that you attended demonstrations as part of your job in the back office was this
02:46:33 was this uh for the purposes of intelligence gathering or was this just to keep an eye on the officers who were there it wasn't necessarily
02:46:44 it wasn't necessarily intelligent gathering it was simply if you were
02:46:47 you were you saw the demonstration that the ladder involved then you could get a better understanding of what was happening and what they were saying
02:46:53 saying it was uh
02:46:58 it was uh just just it would put it into 3d as i would say
02:47:04 recruitment of offices one of your uh successes in the management structure of the sds angus macintosh recalls that back office sergeants would
02:47:15 would play a role in recruitment making recommendations particularly was that something you ever did no no
02:47:26 no no would you ever um be asked for your opinion on someone uh no specifics please but whether they were i can't remember that happening no i mean i probably would have contributed to it but i can't remember being asked
02:47:38 being asked and we know that two officers were recruited to the scs just as you were leaving the unit
02:47:52 the unit one is called rick clark was called rick clark and the other is hn 300 if you'd like to just have a look
02:48:02 yes thank you
02:48:06 thank you the the inquiry has heard evidence that uh both of these persons in different slightly different respects had reputations within special branch um
02:48:15 um one for womanizing was that a a reputation that you were aware of when they joined at that time no did you come to learn about it afterwards
02:48:28 afterwards oh 10 15 years later yes if someone had been uh
02:48:32 uh recruited to the back office with such a
02:48:44 recruited to the back office with such a reputation would you have done something about it yes i would have said it i don't think it's advisable do you have a view now or
02:48:45 or then when you're in the sds about what sort of people were or were not suitable for undercover work yes i think
02:48:59 if you needed volunteers for a start i think because then obviously the person was willing to to to
02:49:04 to to to if you ask your junior officers to do something then he may feel he's being coerced and avoided that but yes because
02:49:15 because you do the officers you knew those that were
02:49:18 were better than others i mean when that one had a view of most officers yes i think so you i would have i would have certainly said that certain types of individual weren't suitable for it
02:49:30 suitable for it uh we did those with a sort of a balanced
02:49:31 balanced calm
02:49:32 calm disposition
02:49:40 um undercover identities please you've told us that you don't know how undercover officers um created their identities when you were that was something that was dealt with by the individual sorry that that
02:49:56 with by the individual sorry that that just i'll just ask a question about it um
02:49:57 um at the time that you joined the sds the evidence that the inquiry has received suggests that undercover officers made up names um that they used
02:50:10 um that they used um however by the time you left the unit october 1974 um they were officers were obtaining details of deceased
02:50:24 obtaining details of deceased children normally from somerset's house to
02:50:25 to support their undercover identities given your role in the back office that you've told us about and your role as colleagues to these people
02:50:42 as colleagues to these people can you help us with what led to this change no i can't i don't remember enough
02:50:47 is it right all i could say was i think
02:50:53 i think in hindi spoken speaking to just one officer
02:50:54 officer many years later he said that his problem had been he hadn't got a proper identity and that led to a problem so i suspect that he had a problem and that was part of
02:51:09 he had a problem and that was part of the reason why he had to leave and that may have been part of the trigger process to go from a more secure system but you don't know that you don't recall that at the time so can we take it from that you don't
02:51:23 so can we take it from that you don't recall any discussions with officers no no that was all dealt with at
02:51:26 at within the individual and the chief inspector and the inspector you weren't included with the conversation with the chief inspector or the inspector yeah they would give them advice on what to do and i think that that would all happened
02:51:37 that would all happened by that obviously happened and the only people who would have been involved with those
02:51:47 those two and the individual themselves do you think looking back that it's uh likely or possible that the decision to change the policy if i can call it that would have been taken at the chief inspector level or higher within special branch
02:52:01 higher within special branch i don't know it was possible i i don't know i don't know um
02:52:04 um were you aware um at the time of of a criminal case involving a person who had used a deceased
02:52:15 a person who had used a deceased person's identity influencing this decision
02:52:17 decision were you aware of um the day of the jackal yes coming out yes are you aware and the film they're after are you aware of that influencing the decision to change the policy
02:52:29 decision to change the policy was of this period of time i can't be sure but i i i do remember the day of the jack and that system being sort of muted it's a question of which came first the chicken or the egg and i can't remember that
02:52:42 and i can't remember that i'd like to ask you about a specific officer um hn 200 please if i could ask you to have a look
02:52:59 yes hn 200 has told the inquiry um that he was told by someone in the back office to go to somerset house
02:53:10 to go to somerset house and in fact that person went with him to show him what to do now we we suspect that hn 200 joined the sds in around april 1974.
02:53:21 the sds in around april 1974. yeah so when you would have still been the later ones as i recall yeah um can you help us whether that person was you or not i can't at all no um can i
02:53:31 um can i ask you whether you recall hn200 mentioning to you or within your earshot that he was upset at the prospect of using a deceased child's identity i can't remember anything of that
02:53:50 more generally can i ask you please what what your attitude was to finding out that
02:53:51 that undercover officers had used the identities of deceased children well i must confess i didn't think of a of a better system
02:54:04 didn't think of a of a better system that was the problem is you could if you made it up and falsified it then the trouble is that the people who were if they had occasion to check on you would quickly establish that um it was false whereas at least
02:54:19 it was false whereas at least if you had someone who had existed at least they had a chance of being successful so i think it was a sort of the lesser of two evils dare i say
02:54:29 the next topic please um is sexual relationships you've told us that they were in your statement that they were wrong and foolish would have posed a risk to undercover officers in the squad
02:54:40 undercover officers in the squad and you uh mentioned the effects that they would have had on the other party yes um is that still your view oh yes yes yes
02:54:48 yes yes was that your view when you were within the sds well to be honest at that time i hadn't nobody spoke about that as being a potential problem it was only in hindsight
02:55:03 problem it was only in hindsight back what 2013 or so that i became aware of that but um
02:55:05 um it obviously was a risk you know um within your statement you you um suggest that there may be um a distinction in your mind between
02:55:19 distinction in your mind between a one night stand and between a longer term relationship do you consider that one night stands between officers and those they're reporting on our let would be less problematic well there's degrees of
02:55:32 problematic well there's degrees of culpability or whatever we call it but i mean obviously they were both wrong some were more wrong than others it's as simple as that um but i frankly i think
02:55:50 frankly i think criticism would be a you know level that whatever you did in that respect i mean it was wrong we'll start in terms of what the
02:55:53 what the manager's
02:55:56 manager's response to finding out if this had happened would be you suggest that um a one night stand would give rise to serious consideration of of the
02:56:09 serious consideration of of the deployment being terminated and that longer term relationships would certainly result in a termination of the deployment the question that flows from that is is it possible conceivable in your mind that an officer who had had a one-night
02:56:24 that an officer who had had a one-night stand and who his managers had found out about it
02:56:33 about it would have been allowed to continue on his deployment there would have to be wholly exceptional circumstances for that to happen i i can't it's difficult to think if someone was just on the point of getting some very very important information possibly and that it was of a terrorist nature or something perhaps but it's
02:56:47 nature or something perhaps but it's difficult to think of anything but you you can we take it from that that you would consider the the starting point for finding out that any sexual contact had happened between an officer and someone they were reporting on would have been that they were withdrawn
02:56:59 were withdrawn i think so yes i'm pretty certain that would have been the case yes and i would have supported that view yes um
02:57:09 um the inquiry has heard some evidence that shortly after you left the sds um there was what's been referred to as banter within the safe house amongst officers and some managers
02:57:22 officers and some managers about sexual activity between officers and those they were reporting on and was this something you ever heard when you were in the same house never heard anything remotely about that sort of thing
02:57:34 were officers when you were on the sds ever questioned directly about whether they were having sexual contact with those they were talking about you don't know anything about that at all no no
02:57:47 anything about that at all no no do you consider with hindsight that they maybe should have been i would have thought it was common sense for them not to do it without having to be told um as i said we had these sessions monthly
02:57:58 monthly when people you know vino veritas and even in those sessions i never heard it mentioned
02:58:12 mentioned do you think it's possible that um those above you within the chain of command the chief inspector and inspector um
02:58:13 um might have turned a blind eye to things like this happening when you were on the streets well if they turned a blind they never discussed it in the office that's what you know
02:58:23 you know you know so and since we were in that same office for
02:58:30 for great lumps of time you know a great deal of the time then it would have been odd if it wasn't mentioned if that had raised its head in some way is it the sort of thing you would have expected to have i would have thought they would have said something yeah so
02:58:43 said something yeah so i mean obviously you don't tell everybody absolutely everything simply because it that's the way of life you know but i don't think they would have sat on that information it would have
02:59:01 sat on that information it would have been in part of general chat if that had happened i would imagine um final topic please arrests of officers you you've told us that um today that the risks of arrest came up when officers were on demonstrations um
02:59:13 um and i think you said in your statement that uco's undercover officers knew not to get involved with crime and the document we saw earlier
02:59:26 the document we saw earlier how much of a concern was it amongst you and the other managers about your officers being arrested and possibly even ending up before courts i think
02:59:35 i think in
02:59:36 in practice it was a question of experience the numbers of officers there was always the risk because of obstruction but the numbers of officers that were arrested was
02:59:48 arrested was probably less than the fingers of one hand or no more than the fingers on one hand in in a period of
02:59:54 period of what four years that i was there um and bearing in mind the number of demonstrations they went on and everything else that was
03:00:08 that was statistically it's almost inevitable that one or two would have been but
03:00:09 but provided that was just obstruction and they were part of a a large if they had been arrested for
03:00:20 large if they had been arrested for obstruction on their own that might have been a different issue how come you've been arrested nobody else has but if they're part of a group of 20 that were just swooped up because they chose to sit across a road or something
03:00:34 that was part and parcel of the risks of doing the job you couldn't do the job dare i say without taking that risk um courts
03:00:40 um courts how
03:00:41 how much thought if any was given to officers appearing before courts in their undercover identity i think it was dealt with on an individual basis
03:00:53 dealt with on an individual basis obviously what happened but if they were just arrested for i could only success thinking
03:00:54 thinking one particular incident and on that occasion the idea was that just plead guilty and leave it at that type of thing um
03:01:05 um when these issues arise and we will look at an example in a moment um was the security of the sds as an operation a concern amongst the management oh yes i mean obviously you were
03:01:15 you were it was the potential existed for daryl i said a police a uniformed police officer or someone else to recognize the man
03:01:24 man uh you know as a police officer i mean it's a minimal risk but it still existed and therefore you have to be alert to that
03:01:34 that possibility because things would then have to happen in a hurry would you would you perhaps suggest that the security of the sds was considered a paramount concern when officers were arrested oh yeah i mean obviously you
03:01:51 arrested oh yeah i mean obviously you you have to be you have to be very much aware of that i mean the the
03:01:52 the the individual and and and the whole unit thing were potentially if things just fell wrong could
03:02:03 could create a tremendous problem which caused the collapse of everything would would that
03:02:07 that potentially be put above the
03:02:10 the danger of a of an officer misleading a court
03:02:15 well it's on the same level i would have i can't see that this officer wouldn't i hope but misleading the court by having a false identity i can see what you're saying yes um i think that wasn't it
03:02:29 i think that wasn't it to that end that was inevitable i mean if if the office if the first time an officer is arrested for obstruction he has to put his hands up and say i'm
03:02:40 has to put his hands up and say i'm sorry and so what the squad was or just banned straight away because it how could it continue because you it it's a balance and i think that's the way it was can we look an example an example of
03:02:51 can we look an example an example of that please um it's in relation to hm298 who you can have a look at and while you're looking um please can we bring up document mps two
03:02:58 two six seven eight two
03:03:07 that's a tab eight of your bundle yeah uh sorry the document itself rather than the open ground schedule the document is omps-0526782
03:03:36 uh it's the
03:03:44 it's not the open ground schedule but the document itself
03:04:48 thank you um and it's page 13 we'd like to look at please
03:04:58 this is a report which you prepared i think of a first appearance at a magistrate's court in relation to the officer we know as uh
03:05:09 we know as uh hn298 uh who use the cover name michael peter scott that we can see it within that page
03:05:10 that page um
03:05:12 um do you um
03:05:14 do you um you authored this document i think um were you asked to attend the magistrates court by your senior officers i would
03:05:25 court by your senior officers i would have been yes um can you recall whether they were particularly concerned about hn298's
03:05:27 hn298's arrest i think it was just a standard procedure that obviously if these can appear in court and someone needed to be there in case something happened at the court which the officer himself wouldn't be in
03:05:41 which the officer himself wouldn't be in a position to report immediately back so i was there to see that daryl said if the wheel came off that uh we we were you could have we wouldn't do it instantly
03:05:53 instantly um do you remember whether you spoke to hn298 before you attended the court or can you he may well have been aware that i was going there but i don't recall speaking to him though
03:06:04 speaking to him though and was there also an aspect of you being there for moral support uh that would have been incidental but the primary reason
03:06:15 the primary reason was to find out what happened at court and to be there on the day but moral support would have been a sort of a bonus dare i say uh
03:06:24 uh hn 298 um appeared in the real name of another person yes um what was the fact that he was appearing in a court in another person's name a concern as you can recall
03:06:35 name a concern as you can recall to the managers of the no i can't remember i've been talking about i think obviously
03:06:42 obviously it was just a hope that the whole thing would you know he'd pay his fine and that would be the end of it full stop hopefully without any other complications
03:06:51 we can likely infer from at least the court appearance that you attended and there were later ones that i i don't think you were at that
03:07:02 were at that hn298 uh answered the charge in his assumed name yes and that it is therefore likely that he
03:07:14 and that it is therefore likely that he was in fact misleading a court as to who he really was would would you have seen it that way at the time no i didn't no uh
03:07:17 uh with hindsight do you agree that that is problematic yes i suppose it is but as i said that was the problem with with the nature of the squad if if
03:07:28 if if if
03:07:29 if if that was it was inevitable that occasionally an officer would be arrested for obstruction and therefore if if that was going to happen and we were going to put our hands up
03:07:43 and we were going to put our hands up straight away then the squad wouldn't exist
03:07:47 exist it was a quit as a balance of uh
03:07:49 uh as i say it was the better for the greater good as it were
03:07:53 were um by far
03:07:55 um by far i wasn't as if there's a question of degrees i mean there's a difference between someone driving 34 miles an hour on a 30 mile
03:08:06 driving 34 miles an hour on a 30 mile limit and killing someone going at 150 miles an hour it's that sort of comparison that i suppose i'm making but technically i i agree you're saying it's it's misleading the court i don't i
03:08:18 it's misleading the court i don't i don't deny that obviously i want one can't
03:08:19 can't can i ask you to just look at us another section of this document it's page eight please
03:08:34 um and this is a report that was written by hn294 who was your superior if you want to look at the list and to remind yourself who that person is please do
03:08:46 yes and he uh wrote this the decision on which i should be obliged and i think that's a a decision for those superior to him
03:08:55 to him for your guidance is whether dc hn298 should continue his attempts to learn more of them to do this he will probably have to apply as they are doing for legal aid and attend meetings with all
03:09:15 legal aid and attend meetings with all those arrested to discuss tactics whilst i'm reasonably confident that dc hn298 could with assistance carry this off there is of course the potential of embarrassment to the police if his true identity should ever be disclosed alternatively he could disappear from
03:09:28 alternatively he could disappear from the political scene both are technically possible but if the latter decision is reached we would lose intelligence coverage of what in the past has been a troublesome area of the public order field
03:09:45 the public order field would you say that sums up the attitude of those within the sds at the time to instance like this well first i can't remember this particular aspect um just let me quickly read this together i'm sorry
03:10:04 yes i think it's broadly true yes um
03:10:08 um really this what this is suggesting is that the primary concern of hn 294 was um for hn 298 the officer to maintain his cover and secondly and to avoid any embarrassment uh to the
03:10:23 to avoid any embarrassment uh to the police that that appears to be what's being suggested do you agree yes i think i think the choice of the word embarrassment is probably
03:10:31 probably i may have used a different word or a different phraseology but um you didn't write this so i didn't i'm not asking you to
03:10:38 you to answer for it um finally this would you agree that certainly in this small extract there doesn't appear to be much thought given um to whether uh hn298 was being
03:10:54 um to whether uh hn298 was being completely honest with the court when he appeared there wasn't no no no not in the that's absolutely thank you um do you recall whether there was any change in guidance or instruction after the
03:11:05 instruction after the uh prosecution of hn298 no i don't and
03:11:06 and finally this would you agree that it's fair to say that arrests were considered an occupational hazard really of being yes i think i've explained that before it was
03:11:20 it was statistically it was going to happen in many ways it was remarkable it happened as few times as it did thank you uh mr smith now there are two small
03:11:30 small matters i've been asked just to clarify with you and your evidence earlier um and then you'll be pleased to know that's likely to be it from me anyway um you've mentioned that there were files that were sometimes taken down to the officers yes
03:11:44 officers yes in the safe house by you would these be registry files group files or both
03:11:51 to my knowledge they were all individual files
03:11:52 files so those would be registry files yeah well register yeah yeah they would have a reference on them and they would be files but they're fast for the individual rather than an organization or but they're all the files were
03:12:08 or but they're all the files were registry files or sp registry files yes um and would they be files that were requested by the officers or would you sort of proactively provide them for possibly relevant people the officer who was dealing with the inquiry into that
03:12:19 dealing with the inquiry into that individual which was on the squad that person on the squad would bring the file to me and then i'd put the file in the back
03:12:28 back probably with a note to the relevant officer in the field to say can you assist and you don't either say yes or no
03:12:33 no um that was it thank you and finally this you you i asked you questions now a little while ago this morning about the guidance that you gave officers
03:12:48 the guidance that you gave officers about not getting too involved with individuals within the groups um
03:12:50 um where in your mind did this come from did it come from your superiors or was this um simply as you saw it uh sort of part
03:13:02 part there was lots of little things that you didn't ask questions you didn't get it you know it is part and parcel see the less you volunteer about yourself the less chance they can ask questions and if you ask questions you draw
03:13:15 and if you ask questions you draw attention to yourself so it's a sort of reciprocal thing which led to improves your own protection as it were but would you would you have understood that from those around you or from your students
03:13:26 from your students i mean one of the nice things about being a policeman is on the phone the very first day you you're given advice a bit like the very first day i walked out on the man said
03:13:38 on the man said if you're going to a pub don't go in on your own way to the blue van lights of the blue van come down the road and then go into the pub it's it's that sort of thing you get constantly within the police and you build up your knowledge
03:13:49 police and you build up your knowledge and your experience and it's an active one of the great things about the police officers that's a continuing process and by then you knew instinctively
03:14:04 by then you knew instinctively what to do or what not to do mr smith thank you very much those are any questions i have for you mr smith because um your evidence has taken a little longer than we'd timed sorry would it
03:14:17 than we'd timed sorry would it inconvenience you if you were to come back here at ten to two you know you'd be content to do that of course i can't thank you very much i'm going to have to improvise here we're going to have our um
03:14:24 um there may be further questions obviously which are fed through our system it takes we allow 20 minutes for it for a variety of reasons um i i'm going to allow that to happen over the lunch break and we will start again at 10 to
03:14:40 break and we will start again at 10 to 2. we are going to hear from mr creamer we hope at two or generate very soon after two
03:14:41 after two until ten two
03:15:49 you