Detective Chief Inspector Trevor Butler testifies about his time managing the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) from 1979-1982. His testimony reveals a striking lack of legal and ethical oversight, with repeated admissions of never considering human rights, discrimination, or the harm to deceived activists. Butler admits he trusted married officers not to have sexual relationships, despite no guidance being given, and denies knowledge of several sexual misconduct cases that occurred under his watch.
00:03:44 all rise
00:04:02 welcome to day seven of the evidential hearings at the undercover policing inquiry
00:04:04 inquiry my name is nell toza there is no fire alarm testing today if a fire alarm does go off please follow the fire exits and make your way
00:04:17 follow the fire exits and make your way to the muster point located at the hard rock hotel great cumberland place on arrival please make yourself known to a fire marshal who will be wearing a high visibility
00:04:28 who will be wearing a high visibility jacket and will be keeping a register of all attendees the fire marshals will also be responsible for informing everyone of when it is safe to return to the hotel
00:04:40 when it is safe to return to the hotel in liaison with the representatives from thistle hotel i now hand over to the chairman sir john mitting to formally start today's proceedings chairman thank you
00:04:53 you now and for the last time this session
00:04:58 session may i say what i usually say to those in the public gallery you may use any handheld electronic device for the purpose of communicating silently what you have seen and heard in the hearing room but only after 10
00:05:14 the hearing room but only after 10 minutes have elapsed since the event that you are describing you may not use your device for recording or photographing our proceedings there is a formal note on the desk in front of you which
00:05:29 on the desk in front of you which sets out the terms of what i have summarized fully ms campbell thank you sir
00:05:41 thank you sir this morning i will in fact be reading out uh three summaries of uh evidence from managers who will not be giving oral evidence they are
00:05:50 they are hn2152 richard scully hn 350 paul croydon
00:05:51 croydon and hn 308 christopher skay i'll begin with the summary for richard scully
00:06:10 hn2152 richard scully was a back office detective sergeant posted to the sds from approximately late 1977 to mid 1979.
00:06:12 1979. he provided a witness statement to the inquiry dated the 29th of september 2020 which may be summarized as follows
00:06:23 which may be summarized as follows richard scully joined the metropolitan police service in 1964 and moved to special branch in 1968 as a constable prior to joining the sds he served on b and c squads
00:06:37 and c squads he cannot recall the exact dates of his time with the sds but the inquiry believes he joined the unit in late 1977.
00:06:48 richard scully had not done any undercover policing prior to joining the sds
00:06:51 sds though he did attend demonstrations and meetings while in special branch he did not know what the sds did prior to his joining and he was not provided with any training he states that joining the sds was not a
00:07:04 he states that joining the sds was not a question of choice he did as he was told
00:07:10 scully fulfilled an administrative role and describes himself as the quote processing point for undercover officers reporting
00:07:21 reporting he recalls intelligence coming into the office typed and on scraps of paper to be written up he would check names and reports for any associated special branch file numbers and add them where needed he states that he would alter the report where necessary for example to fix typos or
00:07:37 necessary for example to fix typos or factual inaccuracies or to correct the english
00:07:41 english information might also be rearranged into a different order he would not have been provided with things like photographs from the sds officers
00:07:49 officers those would rather come from the branch photographic unit and could be shown to an officer to confirm the identity of a particular person to his knowledge individual sources
00:08:04 to his knowledge individual sources would not be identified which was in line with ordinary special branch practice
00:08:06 practice however the information number would be qualified with an s to indicate s squad scully states that he did not filter the information his job was to present the factual
00:08:20 his job was to present the factual position and it was for someone else to interpret its significance
00:08:26 reports would be typed then forwarded on where required or put into files he notes it would not be for him to determine which reports were forwarded reports would be sent from s squad to
00:08:38 reports would be sent from s squad to the operational squads in the branch and it would be the chief superintendent excuse me the chief superintendent of those recipient squads who would determine what action if any should be taken
00:08:50 scully does not believe that he signed or marked up any reports but rather it would be signed by the superintendent or chief inspector before it left the office
00:09:00 office he did not have any involvement with the report after its onwards transmission
00:09:09 richard scully was aware that reports would also be forwarded to the security service
00:09:15 service however that decision would be made at a more seen by a more senior officer than himself
00:09:22 himself he describes the security service as quote the main beneficiary of sds reporting
00:09:23 reporting and confirms that a lot of the information requests received by the sds came from the security service elsewhere in his statement he states that the security service were the great
00:09:36 that the security service were the great beneficiaries of the undercover approach other than the uniform branch he notes that the sds did get thanks from the security service for particular reports
00:09:46 reports scully states that he had no direct involvement with the security service while in the sds
00:09:55 scully describes the filing system in place for special branch and notes that files would be made for individuals and for organizations the file number would reflect what politics were an issue
00:10:09 he believes that files had review dates on them and they would be sent to governors for regular assessment to decide what to do with them richard scully states that he had no involvement in directing or targeting
00:10:23 involvement in directing or targeting ucos but he believes uh that would be down to the superintendent he was likewise not involved in the procurement or administration of safe houses cover accommodation or vehicles cover documents or overtime claims
00:10:37 cover documents or overtime claims he was not involved in drafting the annual reports
00:10:44 richard scully operated from scotland yard but recalls attend attending regular safe house meetings he mentions that it was considered important for the ucos to meet up and quote let off steam he says quote often there would also be a meal
00:10:57 often there would also be a meal and they would tell us what they thought of us
00:10:59 of us he believes there may have been discussions about deployments at these meetings
00:11:05 meetings but they would have not been addressed to him
00:11:10 to him overall scully states that he personally had little interaction with the undercover officers he knows that there would have been one-on-one meetings available between management and the ucos if needed he notes quote
00:11:21 he notes quote the supervising guys were very very conscious of emotional well-being and all the problems that the undercover officers were exposed to this was front and center of what the supervisors were doing
00:11:38 scully was not aware of any unhappy working relationships between members of the sds
00:11:42 to his knowledge none of his contemporaries provoked or encouraged a third party to commit a criminal offence engaged in sexual activity whilst in their cover identity
00:11:53 their cover identity were arrested tried or convicted in their cover identity were involved in incidents of public disorder or violence or reported on any legally privileged information he cannot say whether any of his contemporaries reported on the
00:12:04 contemporaries reported on the activities of elected politicians he believes it was branch policy not to report on politicians
00:12:15 richard scully states that he was unaware of any training for new undercover officers but notes that they had quote quite a lot of lead-up time before going into the field he states that ucos quote were carefully assessed to see if they were suitable
00:12:31 assessed to see if they were suitable for the role and then had considerable reading in time before going into the field
00:12:32 field they knew what they were up against and could leave at that point if they wanted it was very carefully thought out
00:12:43 richard scully remembers david mcnee visiting the sds when he was a new commissioner of the metropolitan police stating quote i think it was assumed he should see the sds because it was so sensitive that it could cause him grief
00:13:02 he remembers jeffrey kraft guiding him through the squad's operations in the sds office and mcnee questioning everyone on their role scully believes mcnee also visited the undercover officers in the sds flat though he was not personally present at that visit
00:13:19 exceptionally richard scully ran an informant alongside his work in the sds he explains that he had started with this informant while posted to c-squad while dealing with anarchist matters and ended up maintaining the contact throughout his time in the sds
00:13:33 throughout his time in the sds he states that it was quite difficult to keep it up as it took a lot of extra time and the area of interest covered by the informant did not coincide with his sds work
00:13:44 sds work his experience with the informant did give him prior understanding of how special branch squads provided eight uniform branch with forecasts for public events
00:13:58 scully reflects in his witness statement on the benefits of undercover policing as compared to relying on informants he states that while informants were quote generally fine the only way to find out exactly what was being planned was with undercover policing
00:14:10 policing he also notes that in matters where urgent reporting was required quote the odd informant was not enough undercover policing allowed efforts to be concentrated where needed
00:14:21 be concentrated where needed he does note however that he quote was a bit surprised we were allowed to do this with undercover policing but we had official backing
00:14:33 official backing richard scully reported directly to dci mike ferguson while in the sds but notes that he ultimately did not have much to do with ferguson as he operated out in the field
00:14:45 operated out in the field scully states that he and ferguson quote did not click and he felt that ferguson interfered in the running of his informant this led to tensions that later escalated over an unfavorable annual report
00:14:57 report scully states quote i remember i had a very poor annual report from mike ferguson because of my
00:15:08 report from mike ferguson because of my personal problems with him such that it was very unfair and i did have a work with word with derrick neal out of desperation to explain the work i was doing
00:15:13 was doing i asked for evidence he asked for evidence and i put in a quantity of information i think i overheard him taking mike ferguson to task over this even though i was not asking for that
00:15:28 even though i was not asking for that scully states that he enjoyed his work on the sds but that the incident with dci ferguson quote tipped him into leaving the squad the inquiry believes he left the sds in mid-1979
00:15:46 when asked what he believes the sds achieved for the benefit of policing richard scully says that quote undercover officers identified real troublemakers people who were potentially dangerous to the state to put it in a grand way and who were promoting violence
00:15:58 promoting violence and who excuse me who are promoting violent and dangerous behavior in the streets to the danger of ordinary citizens
00:16:06 citizens we were able to contain the worst aspects of what could affect the public and protect them
00:16:19 after his time on the sds scully was posted to ports as he says he wished to get out of the general atmosphere of special branch he returned for a time to be squad after this on the invitation of ray wilson and later ended up in another posting on s squad unrelated to the sds
00:16:31 squad unrelated to the sds he states that he did not have any involvement with sds intelligence after his departure from the unit richard scully retired from the metropolitan police service in 1994.
00:16:49 so i'll now move on to the summary of the statement of hn paul croydon
00:17:00 detective sergeant paul croydon was posted to the sds from the 30th of july 1979 to august 1981. he provided a witness statement to the inquiry dated the 20th of october 2020.
00:17:10 2020. it may be summarized as follows
00:17:15 paul corden joined the metropolitan police service in 1966. and moved to special branch in late 1969 among his special branch postings prior to joining the sds
00:17:26 to joining the sds he served two excuse me he served two stints on special branch c squad dealing with general inquiries
00:17:42 paul croydon first became aware of the sds from hn 45 cover named david robertson
00:17:45 robertson who had been deployed as an undercover officer
00:17:46 officer and who he knew socially croydon recalls being told that the squad was referred to as the harrys and that they did undercover work but nothing more
00:17:58 but nothing more paul croydon was approached in the late 1970s by d.i angus mcintosh who inquired whether he would be interested in joining the sds macintosh had been cordoned sergeant in
00:18:15 macintosh had been cordoned sergeant in naturalization and crowden describes it as having been a quote good working relationship they also knew each other socially croydon states that he was not informed of the purpose of the unit prior to
00:18:29 of the purpose of the unit prior to joining but was told that the role was administrative and primarily involved collating and arranging reporting he accepted the position and began with the sds in july 1979
00:18:42 paul croydon recalls on his first day meeting d.i mcintosh and dci ferguson who explained the purpose and history of the unit
00:18:48 the unit there was no formal training but there was a handover period of three to four weeks with ds dick scully whom croydon replaced in the back office
00:18:59 replaced in the back office he does not recall being shown any training materials and says that he trained on the job he remembers that the sds office was initially based in new scotland yard
00:19:10 initially based in new scotland yard when he joined but moved to a secure unit in vincent square several months into his posting
00:19:22 paul croydon states that his primary role in the sds was to process reports from the undercover officers he would be given handwritten reports following the regular meetings in the safe house and it would be his
00:19:33 safe house and it would be his responsibility to read each report and make corrections if needed the corrections would be stylistic such as fixing spelling and grammatical mistakes
00:19:42 mistakes information would only be removed from a report if it was repetitive he notes that there was a high standard of reporting in special branch and officers could have their reports
00:19:54 officers could have their reports heavily modified quote almost to the point of pedentry croydon cannot recall ever amalgamating reports from more than one officer though notes that the ucos may have
00:20:06 though notes that the ucos may have liaised with each other to produce a joint report if more than one had attended a large event
00:20:12 in addition to stylistic changes paul croydon would add special branch and security service file reference numbers to the reports this was done by telephoning special branch records to determine which
00:20:25 branch records to determine which individuals had open files mentions or no trace
00:20:31 no trace he states that he had no direct contact or dealing with the security service during his time on the sds croydon notes the use of a technique learned from ds scully to occasionally include the cover name of a uco within the reports
00:20:45 the reports he explains that the reason was to obscure the uco's identity to the security service in case they also had an informant in the group
00:21:00 once all amendments were complete a modified report would be handed to an office typist to produce a duplicate before being passed to the dci the dci would be responsible for disseminating the intelligence to the relevant section of special branch paul croydon recalls that the
00:21:14 paul croydon recalls that the superintendents on s squad david palmer hall and kenneth pride at the time took receipt of the resp of the reports if the report concerned public order a copy would also be sent to the a8
00:21:26 copy would also be sent to the a8 uniform division via special branch liaison one copy of the report would be sent to scotland yard and the second stored in a secure room in the sds offices at vincent square
00:21:47 paul croydon confirms that most sds intelligence was written down either as a report or put into a report after a phone call urgent calls would also have been passed on to the relevant squad by telephone he suspects that a large proportion of public order matters were passed on orally in this way
00:22:02 orally in this way croydon notes that the special branch surveillance and photographic units shared offices with the sds in vincent square
00:22:18 square he recalls that an album of photographs would sometimes be taken to safe house meetings following a demonstration to allow the ucos to identify relevant individuals those photos might then be appended to a report
00:22:29 paul croydon states that he did not play any part in tasking procurement of cover documents procurement of uh excuse me procurement or administration of accommodation or vehicles
00:22:39 vehicles processing overtime claims or drafting of annual reports
00:22:46 croydon states that he did occasionally receive the daily welfare calls from the deployed officers they would be required to ring the office by 11 am he confirms that this was equally an opportunity to pick up on any new
00:23:00 opportunity to pick up on any new information or get clarification on a particular report if needed paul croydon states that the majority of his interaction with the ucos was by telephone
00:23:10 telephone as he would only occasionally visit the safe houses he would sometimes play sports or have lunch with the ucos but usually the purpose of his attendance at the safe houses would be
00:23:22 attendance at the safe houses would be to clear up ambiguous text in a report or conduct a welfare visit the dci and di would be the ones to attend the safe house meetings regularly he was not aware of any unhappy working
00:23:44 he was not aware of any unhappy working relationships between members of the sds paul croydon served with dci's ferguson and moss and dies macintosh hn68 and butler
00:23:45 butler croydon suggests that there was a high level of supervision and control by the dci ndis over the undercover officers and the administrative staff
00:23:58 and the administrative staff he notes that he was always supervised by them and confirms that they were responsible for tasking the undercover officers
00:24:04 officers he also suggests that uco's received feedback on their reporting from the dci and dis at meetings in the safe houses croydon states that he himself did not
00:24:18 croydon states that he himself did not give any any feedback aside from asking certain officers to improve their handwriting paul croydon traveled over a weekend on two occasions to provide cover for uco's attending demonstrations outside of london
00:24:29 london he spent two days in scotland for a protest against the torness nuclear power station attended by hn155 cover named phil cooper and traveled to liverpool to assist
00:24:40 and traveled to liverpool to assist officers in the 1981 swp right to work march both times he was accompanied by di trevor butler
00:24:52 di trevor butler croydon recalls that they took an office car
00:24:55 car and kept in contact with the ucos through the use of pagers
00:25:05 paul croydon recalls undercover officers spending time in the back office prior to their deployments he states that it would be between three to six months where their primary role would be creating their legends they would also assist with administrative tasks in the office
00:25:20 administrative tasks in the office no ucos spent time in the back office following their withdrawal to his knowledge none of his contemporaries provoked or encouraged a third party to commit a criminal offence engaged in sexual activity whilst in their cover identity
00:25:34 their cover identity were arrested tried or convicted in their cover identity were involved in incidents of public disorder or violence or reported on any legally privileged information or elected politicians
00:25:45 elected politicians he states that he believes his contemporaries achieved a great deal for policing gathering intelligence which was instrumental for the effective and proper policing of demonstrations
00:26:00 proper policing of demonstrations he also believes that the sds was of assistance to the security service stating quote i do not think that it would be possible for the security service to obtain the same depth and quality of intelligence by using any other method
00:26:15 by using any other method paul croydon left the sds in august 1981 he states that he was asked to stay by dci butler but he felt he did not want to be tied to a predominantly administrative job he was succeeded in his role by hn 45.
00:26:30 he was succeeded in his role by hn 45. after leaving the sds croydon undertook positions including on c squad and later b squad
00:26:36 b squad he cannot recall coming across intelligence emanating from the sds in these roles though accepts that it is feasible that he did paul croydon retired from the mps in
00:26:52 paul croydon retired from the mps in 1989 at the rank of detective sergeant he concludes his statement with the following comment quote i have no more evidence to give other than to say that during my time with the sds it was a highly professional unit
00:27:04 sds it was a highly professional unit that acted in a proficient skilled and upstanding manner sadly the unit has subsequently been besmirched by the poor behavior of a few officers
00:27:12 officers end quote
00:27:18 finally sir i have the summary for hn 308 christopher scay
00:27:34 christopher scale served on the sds as an administrative detective sergeant from approximately mid 1978 to early 1982. he has provided two witness statements
00:27:45 he has provided two witness statements to the inquiry the first dated the 15th of december 2020 and the second dated the 8th of december 2021. they may be summarized as follows
00:27:58 christopher skaye joined the metropolitan police service as a cadet in 1958 becoming a full constable in 1960.
00:28:01 1960. he recalls being on duty as a uniformed officer during the 1968 grosvenor square demonstration and witnessing what he
00:28:15 demonstration and witnessing what he describes as quote large-scale disorder he ended up applying to join special branch that year sk worked for various squads including that which dealt with irish extremism where he was promoted to detective sergeant
00:28:28 christopher scay is unable to recall the exact dates of his posting in the sds but the inquiry believes that he joined around mid-1978
00:28:38 he recalls that he may have been asked to join by d.i angus mcintosh he states that he did not receive any formal training for the job but recalls speaking to ds dick walker who had
00:28:49 speaking to ds dick walker who had filled the role before him as a form of handover
00:28:54 handover skay recalls first becoming aware of the sds around a year before he joined however he notes that the need to know culture of special branch meant that it was not something readily discussed
00:29:10 christopher skaye describes his position as a purely administrative back office role
00:29:13 role he lists his primary responsibilities as the processing of expense claims and liaising with the transport department over the procurement and disposal of suitable vehicles for the undercover officers
00:29:28 officers he assisted in procuring a car for the sds office and would liaise with officers and the mps transport department to ensure that uco cars were inspected and met police standards he did not have a role in registering the vehicles in the cover names of the
00:29:48 the vehicles in the cover names of the undercover officers and understood that this was something they did themselves skade did help compile transport cost and expenditure for the unit and is identifiable in the 1980 and 1981 sds annual reports signing off the transport expenses
00:30:04 christopher scay was also involved in sourcing and looking after the sds safe houses
00:30:07 houses one of which was replaced during his time in the role he was not involved in the procurement of cover accommodation for the officers as this was done by the ucos themselves
00:30:24 sca states that he was involved in a limited way with the welfare of the ucos he states that his role during the regular safe house meetings would be to check if the ucos needed anything he would also collect receipts for
00:30:35 he would also collect receipts for officers expense claims and pay out the previous week's expenses scade does not recall seeing any welfare issues at the time and believes officers would have known to let management know if there were problems
00:30:51 if there were problems indeed he recalls morale being generally high and agrees with similar comments made in the 1980 sds annual report
00:30:59 christopher scale states that he was unaware of any ucos committing a criminal offence or acting as an agile profile caterer engaging in sexual activity while undercover identity
00:31:11 undercover identity being arrested or convicted in their cover identity being involved in public disorder or criminal activity reporting legally privileged information or reporting on elected politicians or trade unions
00:31:25 trade unions when asked by the inquiry about specific officers
00:31:28 officers sca asserts that he was unaware of any concerns regarding hn cover named phil cooper performance any potential compromises relating to hn126 cover name paul gray
00:31:44 hn126 cover name paul gray or the incident that arose with hn 80 cover name colin clark that required his family to relocate he likewise was unaware of any
00:31:55 he likewise was unaware of any suggestion that hn 106 barry tompkins or hn 21
00:31:59 hn 21 had sexual activity in their undercover identity
00:32:01 identity he states that if he did know of any sexual activity he would have told more senior officers as there was a risk of compromise and it would have been in breach of the police regulations
00:32:19 states that he did not know that hn21 developed significant medical issues as a result of his time in the sds and says that if he had known he would have encouraged him to speak to more senior officers and seek medical assistance
00:32:30 assistance sca was not aware of an allegation that hn 67 cover named alan bond had fathered a child in his undercover identity
00:32:41 a child in his undercover identity but notes that this officer was not deployed when sca was in the sds
00:32:47 christopher scale states that he was aware that the majority of officers deployed when he was part of the sds adopted the identities of deceased children
00:32:55 children he notes quote as far as i'm aware this practice was in place when i joined i did not at any stage question it or ask who it was who had begun this practice
00:33:12 practice he confirms that he had no role in authorizing the use of deceased children's identities quote
00:33:18 quote with hindsight i can see that it may be distressing for surviving relatives if told
00:33:20 told but then the expectation was that they would not be told at the time i must admit that i didn't give much thought to this
00:33:33 christopher scale confirms that thought was given by management to protect officers whose deployments required them to travel outside of london
00:33:45 london if an undercover officer was required to travel outside of the mps district for an event where there was a risk of arrest or to their safety back office staff would liaise with the local police force at their destination sk states that quote often two of the sds back office staff
00:33:58 often two of the sds back office staff would go to that area to liaise with the constabulary concerned to ensure that if the uco happened to be arrested we would be able to deal with the local police immediately
00:34:16 immediately sca himself recalls going to edinburgh twice in relation to events concerned with the tornest power station and liverpool once he confirms that no incidents arose on these trips that required intervention
00:34:27 christopher scay would also assist the other administrative staff in the back office including ds richard scully and diaz paul croydon in processing intelligence reports though this was not his primary responsibility
00:34:40 his primary responsibility he recalls receiving intelligence from ucos at the twice weekly safehouse meetings and by phone though he does not recall how much would have been passed on orally
00:34:48 on orally to his memory all information that came into the sds would end up being written down
00:34:54 down he recalls that the notes would be tidied up without changing their meaning before being sent to the typing pool christopher sca states that he would
00:35:06 christopher sca states that he would have taken calls while in the sds office providing intelligence updates or conveying information too urgent to write down he recalls having to contact the duty inspector of special branch occasionally to pass on urgent intelligence
00:35:20 to pass on urgent intelligence sca states that he played no part in tasking instructing or steering ucos to collect any particular intelligence he likewise did not decide where intelligence was to be disseminated
00:35:31 intelligence was to be disseminated he confirms that decisions on ultimate dissemination were done by the customer of the information for example special branch the home office a8 or the security service
00:35:48 security service states that he did not have any direct contact with the secret the security service
00:35:49 service but recalls that they would ask for information on certain groups or persons he believes that they would have been in touch with officers of superintendent rank or above it was his impression that the security
00:36:03 it was his impression that the security service had a good working relationship with special branch
00:36:09 he confirms that intelligence reports would have been held in special branch records he did not believe that the sds had its own records room when asked about gathering of personal
00:36:21 when asked about gathering of personal information by undercover officers sca states that quote it was gathered because it ensured that in the future should there be any problems with the groups then the authorities would be
00:36:32 groups then the authorities would be aware of the identities and associations of persons involved if demonstrations fragmented this could cause real issues and knowing who was associated with the broader groups was important
00:36:45 important it also meant that people would be able to be identified accurately government and police departments had a vetting process for which association with certain groups may have been an important consideration
00:36:59 he notes that the sds was quote a conduit for information in terms of senior oversight christopher scay states that he believes the deputy assistant commissioner came to visit the sds once or twice a year
00:37:14 sds once or twice a year and specifically recalls colin hewitt visiting once he also remembers the assistant commissioner gilbert kelland visiting once he does not believe that any
00:37:26 once he does not believe that any external regulatory body visited the sds during his time there
00:37:32 after leaving the sds sca served for several months as the special branch liaison officer with the a8 uniformed public order unit his role was to get information from
00:37:46 his role was to get information from special branch and to report orally to a8 on potentially problematic public order events he believes that the majority of this intelligence must have come from the sds
00:37:59 he notes that the liaison officer was not the only means of communicating between branches he states quote there were other communications and decisions taking place at other levels
00:38:11 decisions taking place at other levels and on other channels and my role was to assist at a more administrative day-to-day level i would put questions and requests to special branch on behalf of a8 and pass back the responses i would receive and i would receive information from
00:38:25 and i would receive information from special branch unprompted and feed this to a8
00:38:33 christopher scay confirms that he did have some direct contact with the sds in this post
00:38:36 this post he states that a8 would not have made report requests directly of the sds considering the covert nature of the squad
00:38:42 squad rather requests were made generally of special branch but as liaison officer he would have known when a particular answer needed to be sought from the s squad or from the sds
00:38:55 squad or from the sds he does recall sanitizing information received from special branch to protect its source he also remembers pulling different pieces of information together into a single document for use by a8
00:39:10 single document for use by a8 though he notes that this is a feature of special branch work more generally and accepts he might be thinking of work he did in another post
00:39:24 he did in another post after leaving this position sk served in the anti-terrorism branch and then the unit concerned with the extreme left wing until his retirement christopher scace served in the mps for 30 years before retiring at the rank of detective inspector in 1990
00:39:38 detective inspector in 1990 so that concludes the summaries the documents related to all of these managers will be published on the inquiry website today along with documents for two further deceased managers they are hn 608
00:39:51 are hn 608 kenneth pride who was detective chief inspector in charge of the sds between november 1977 to early 1978
00:40:09 november 1977 to early 1978 and hn 135 michael ferguson who was head of the sds between january 1978 and february 1980 thank you sir thank you we will break for 10 minutes to enable uh the hearing room to be set up for our last
00:40:24 for our last and only witness today trevor butler
01:01:38 all rise please
01:01:51 mr butler i understand you wish to affirm
01:01:55 affirm thank you sir yes and the words will be read out too by mr fernandez
01:02:01 thank you please repeat after me i do solemnly i do solemnly sincerely and truly sincerely and truly declare and affirm declare and affirm that the evidence i shall give that the evidence
01:02:18 evidence i shall give that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you chairman thank you
01:02:27 thank you sir mr butler could you start please with your full name trevor charles butler you've provided us with a witness statement dated the 21st of january 2021
01:02:44 statement dated the 21st of january 2021 signed on the 17th of march 2021 are the contents of that witness statement true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief they are could i start please uh with a little bit about your training you tell us you were trained at peel house
01:02:55 house hendon
01:02:56 hendon and had a cid course in 1969 and went to brams hill in 1978 is that right that's right
01:03:08 right that's right and would you in the course of at least some of that training have been trained on police powers of entry search and seizure
01:03:23 i can't recall that it would be logical that i would have done yes
01:03:27 yes and did you understand that a police officer
01:03:31 officer doesn't have an automatic right of entry to private premises yes
01:03:34 yes and did you understand that a police officer doesn't have an automatic right to confidential information
01:03:50 on consideration yes you qualified your answer with on consideration what was your understanding at the time i'd never given it any thought to be honest
01:03:59 honest were you given any training about
01:04:00 about how these basic legal uh principles applied to the work of undercover police officers no
01:04:10 no did you give that any thought no
01:04:17 did you consider that they applied to your work as the manager of an undercover police unit
01:04:29 could you refresh me what are we talking about now about a police officer's powers of
01:04:30 powers of entry
01:04:31 entry and
01:04:32 and seizure of confidential information no i can't say that i gave that any consideration um
01:04:41 um i appreciate this next question is something of a long shot mr butler did anyone train you on the european convention of human rights uh in the 1960s and 1970s
01:04:53 1960s and 1970s no
01:04:56 no you've already told us in your witness statement that you didn't have any training on the discrimination act did you give any consideration to discrimination whilst you were serving in the sds
01:05:14 no
01:05:22 you were presumably trained about the police discipline regulations yes
01:05:23 yes and for example that sexual misconduct uh was an offence contrary to police discipline yes was that something that you thought
01:05:36 was that something that you thought applied to the work of undercover police officers
01:05:38 officers why not
01:05:46 because the officers i worked with on the sds were
01:05:48 were experienced
01:05:54 trustworthy men
01:05:56 men um
01:05:59 um who i had no concerns about i think that's slightly different to the question i was asking did you think that if they
01:06:04 if they did
01:06:06 did commit an act of sexual misconduct whilst on duty undercover they were subject to police disciplinary
01:06:17 subject to police disciplinary regulations or not yes of course uh were you familiar with the pelian principle sir robert peale's principles of policing
01:06:28 shall i shall i try from the look you've given me if you remind me shall i shall i try you with a couple the first is we familiar with the principle that the ability of the police to
01:06:42 that the ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions of course
01:06:44 course did you give any consideration to whether or not the public would approve of what the sds was doing
01:07:00 with hindsight i would have thought the public would have been hugely grateful for the work that the undercover officers did and in
01:07:08 and in in without going into any details
01:07:14 because because the the officers were there
01:07:20 to help
01:07:25 protect the tranquility and safety of the public
01:07:31 the next principle i want to put to you is police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law
01:07:42 observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public yes
01:07:43 yes did you give maintaining the respect of the public any consideration in relation to the way in which the sds was operating
01:08:01 i didn't give it particular consideration but overall
01:08:05 overall um
01:08:06 um it was the standard by which we we served in the metropolitan police that we are a force that
01:08:17 a force that placed by consent which is a shorthand form of
01:08:19 form of the pill objectives
01:08:27 and were you familiar with the principle that a police officer is essentially a member of the public devoting his or her uh
01:08:36 uh full working time to upholding law and order certainly and that's unless a statute provided so you have no special legal rights or powers only those granted to a constable
01:08:52 only those granted to a constable can i ask you now a little bit about the training you got when you joined special branch i realized that you joined special branch a long time before
01:09:05 before 1979 but the only syllabus that we have been able to find for special branch training is dated 1979.
01:09:13 1979. so what i'm going to do is have some of it called up for you to look at and then the question i'm going to ask you is whether that was broadly similar to the training that you had
01:09:27 to the training that you had so if we could have up please ucpi 5 zeros 34702
01:09:50 and if we could go go to the next page please
01:09:54 please you see in the first week there was
01:09:58 there was a lot of training on the role of special branch special branch structure the role of the security service the police security service liaison
01:10:12 police security service liaison and an introduction to the threat of subversion and the role of the desk officer i am paraphrasing were those the sorts of things that you were trained on
01:10:25 as far as i can recall there was no formal training similar to that which is being displayed it was very much learning on the job
01:10:40 learning on the job i see well if i if i that may cut short the need to to go through the rest of the document but uh can i ask you this then where did you get your understanding of what subversion was from
01:10:58 i can't say that i ever
01:11:06 did gain that understanding other than from my own experience and common sense i don't think i was ever trained as to exactly what subversion is or was
01:11:20 was there a received understanding a received wisdom within special branch about which groups were subversive in which groups were not subversive i believe sir and was there
01:11:33 and was there any influence from the security service about what was and what was not
01:11:38 subversive not at a junior level no
01:11:46 now can i move we can take that document down now
01:11:48 down now can i move to c squad
01:11:52 c squad at you spent 10 months on c squad in around september 1971
01:12:05 1971 and then some more time as a detective inspector on c squad between approximately july 1978 and september 1979 is that right yes
01:12:16 when you were working for c squad what roles did you have on c squad
01:12:27 when i first joined c-squad it would have been
01:12:33 dealing with inquiries which were issued to officers
01:12:43 occasionally attending meetings and doing general special branch work
01:12:48 did you do any work on the industrial desk at any point i did not did you ever prepare threat assessments for a8 i did not
01:13:07 did you do any work which involved you using any intelligence that had come from the sds not that i was aware of no did you make any requests for intelligence from the sds no
01:13:20 intelligence from the sds no what was your level of awareness of the existence
01:13:22 existence of the sds before you joined the unit quite slight i knew of its existence but
01:13:31 but very little more than that
01:13:37 in 1971
01:13:42 when you were working for
01:13:46 for c squad running into 72 is it right that the main
01:13:47 the main concerns from a public order point of view were those that followed from the in position of internment
01:13:59 in position of internment and from events on bloody sunday i can't recall
01:14:05 uh moving to when you were in sea squad in early 1979 can you recall the demonstration at which blair peach was fatally injured
01:14:23 no i can't can you recall uh whether there was any interest expressed within sea squad or aft of sea squad relating
01:14:36 relating to the friends of blair peach campaign no i can't recall that
01:14:49 uh you spent some time on b squad in the mid-1970s between we think june 1975 and june 1977
01:14:51 june 1977 is that right yes
01:14:54 yes and that was in the aftermath of the terrorist outrages at birmingham and guildford wasn't it yes how significant were irish uh related
01:15:06 how significant were irish uh related matters to special branch at this time
01:15:16 i believe at that time special branch still had
01:15:18 still had the main responsibility
01:15:24 for tackling
01:15:26 tackling republican terrorism before the security service took that role
01:15:32 role and so
01:15:33 and so it would have been quite significant
01:15:39 can you answer the next questions with a yes or a no please did you knowingly work with any
01:15:50 did you knowingly work with any intelligence which emanated from the sds no
01:15:56 are you able to this you don't have to answer with a yes or no are you able to help us with whether or not
01:16:02 not um
01:16:07 um the infiltration by the sds of the troops out movement was of any assistance to b squad
01:16:17 my knowledge of the activities of the sds at that stage were almost non-existent so i wouldn't have been aware of their dealings with the troops out movement
01:16:30 the troops out movement i'm going to move now to your time in the sds we understand from your witness statement that you joined around september 1979 yes sir
01:16:40 yes sir and
01:16:43 and that you took command when
01:16:47 when barry moss was promoted yes
01:16:51 yes we think that barry moss was promoted on or around the 5th of january 1981. does that sound about the time you took over command
01:17:03 over command probably i can't remember you
01:17:04 you held that role in an acting rank until you were substantively promoted in july 1981 is that right yes and then you were replaced by detective
01:17:19 and then you were replaced by detective chief inspector short in around january 1982 yes
01:17:26 can i ask you first about your arrival at the unit did you receive a handover
01:17:42 i don't remember exactly but i'm fairly certain that i spent a certain amount of time with angus macintosh
01:17:52 and uh what would your time with angus mcintosh have been sufficient to cover
01:17:53 cover who the undercover officers were who were serving with the unit at that time yes
01:18:05 yes um did it cover what was expected of you in terms of your duties yes
01:18:08 um were you told anything of past problems with an officer being presented with his death certificate
01:18:20 certificate no
01:18:24 no at that stage or at any other time no
01:18:34 did mr mcintosh when you joined the unit tell you anything about one of the officers marrying an activist no
01:18:45 did you hear any rumors that an officer's cover had been compromised because he got involved with members of the opposite sex no
01:19:02 were you given any briefing about the legality of what the sds did
01:19:09 no were you
01:19:13 were you given any guidance about the sds's ethics
01:19:19 no
01:19:27 were you told in broad terms what intelligence was being gathered why and for whom
01:19:36 in broad terms yes and in broad terms what was the answer
01:19:46 that their primary purpose was to obtain intelligence concerning forthcoming demonstrations this would be passed
01:19:57 this would be passed to the office at scotland yard and disseminated to i8 and others who needed the information did the handover cover the relationship between the sds and the security service
01:20:11 not that i recall
01:20:18 did it cover the relationship with c squad in
01:20:21 squad in any more detail than you've just mentioned no b squad
01:20:35 was it explained to you that the undercover police officers use deceased children's identities in part at least to found their cover identities not at that stage no
01:20:43 did it cover target selection
01:20:57 target selection as far as i was aware at that stage was very much
01:21:01 very much to try to
01:21:05 to try to offer complete coverage and was
01:21:06 and was usually done on a geographic basis
01:21:19 is that because at the time there were a lot of people infiltrating the socialist workers party in different parts of london
01:21:20 london that was the main reason yes
01:21:25 were you given any instruction or guidance to review existing deployments
01:21:40 the 1979 annual report
01:21:51 contains a passage which says that covert policing was being subjected to increasingly close and critical scrutiny can you recall what that increasingly close and critical scrutiny was
01:22:04 i can't
01:22:10 at around the time you joined the sds and were serving in it the inquiry has seen documents which show that the home office
01:22:26 home office was expressing some concerns about the relationship between special branch and the security service were you aware of any such concerns no i wouldn't were you aware of any debate about the role
01:22:39 debate about the role of special branch visa v the security service no
01:22:45 can i move now to how
01:22:49 how undercover officers were recruited into the sds
01:23:09 it's right isn't it that almost all of the undercover officers were married weren't they they were and was one advantage of selecting officers who were married that it reduced the risk of them becoming involved sexually with activists or other members of the public and another reason was it helped to
01:23:24 and another reason was it helped to anchor them in reality when they weren't operating undercover i believe so
01:23:31 can you recall whether you recruited the officer we know as hn150
01:23:53 no
01:24:04 can i move now to the question of uh cover identities could you answer this question yes or no were you aware of
01:24:13 of any previous compromise of an sds undercover police officer no
01:24:28 can you help us with whether officers identified a suitable deceased child alone or with assistance
01:24:39 i believe it was alone were they given any guidance about how to do it
01:24:42 to do it not by me
01:24:45 not by me where would they have got instruction as to what to do
01:24:57 a recruit to the sds would spend some time possibly months in the back office
01:25:02 office preparing himself for eventual work undercover he would talk to staff there he would also meet
01:25:11 also meet serving undercover officers and speak to them
01:25:12 them and that was where where he would gain this information did you take any steps to check or test
01:25:28 did you take any steps to check or test how robust cover identities were before your offices deployed i didn't know
01:25:34 do you know whether anybody else did not to my knowledge i'm going to quote from the 1980s sds annual report which includes a passage
01:25:44 passage supervisory staff place great emphasis on the need to ensure that an officer's cover
01:25:54 cover is as secure as possible before he enters
01:25:56 enters the field
01:26:03 how was that great emphasis placed if you didn't check their cover identities before they deployed
01:26:20 i repeat that i didn't check them i can't recall whether other members of the office did
01:26:24 or perhaps they were checked by
01:26:32 using one of the undercover officers or somebody who had previously served as an undercover officer
01:26:39 is it right that great emphasis was placed on
01:26:43 placed on uh ensuring that the cover identity was as secure as possible
01:26:52 well in light of my answer just now i i can't agree that um that was the case um
01:27:05 um did you re did you have a view as to how important using a deceased child's identity was
01:27:17 when i became aware of the fact that this system was in operation
01:27:18 operation i thought that it was acceptable and an efficient way of establishing the new identity did you think it was important
01:27:36 if there was no other way to achieve that end then it was important
01:27:37 important did you
01:27:41 did you consider whether there was another way no
01:27:51 i'm getting the impression you simply picked up the existing practice and ran with it is that fair it is fair but at that time i wasn't critical of the process
01:28:04 critical of the process you know whether or not the regional crime squad used this method i have no idea
01:28:11 did you give any consideration to the utility of using the tactic by which i mean what additional protection it brought
01:28:27 it was an accepted practice which seemed to work well and i
01:28:29 and i at the time found no fault with
01:28:39 did you consider the risks that a family might find out that a police officer was using the name of their deceased child at that time no i didn't consider that
01:28:49 looking back now do you think it was a necessary practice
01:28:59 i think it probably was a necessary practice um
01:29:02 um i didn't realize at the time that
01:29:05 that families of the deceased children
01:29:08 children would learn of the system and be distressed by it
01:29:12 and why do you think it was necessary
01:29:21 i didn't have any alternative suggestions for obtaining
01:29:28 obtaining their identity their birth certificate passport whatever
01:29:39 do you think now that it was an appropriate tactic to use i do
01:29:43 i do notwithstanding the distress of some of the families who found out that is now with hindsight at the time i thought it was the correct process i'm asking you now about your position
01:30:00 position your reflections my reflection now is that a lot could have been improved to provide their identity cover i think
01:30:08 i think they were put in a very difficult position
01:30:14 position to establish that cover and they should have had far greater support from the home office and senior police officers to make the whole process
01:30:27 to make the whole process more secure and easier for them to adopt we've had some evidence from the very very early days of the sds of two officers being issued with british visitors passports in the days before deceased children's identities were used
01:30:40 were used was it really necessary to use this practice
01:30:45 practice i wasn't aware of the bvps and
01:30:57 if somebody had suggested an alternative system then i perhaps would have agreed and
01:30:59 and implemented it but nothing was suggested and as i was saying it worked well at the time
01:31:12 on the subject of the training of undercover police officers was there a black folder in the office containing advice and guidance for undercover officers
01:31:24 for undercover officers i wasn't aware of it i've become aware since but i never saw it and wasn't aware at the time well we've had to be fair to you mr butler mixed
01:31:38 to be fair to you mr butler mixed evidence about whether there was such a a folder do you have any independent recollection as to whether or not there was such a folder i don't know
01:31:57 targeting um in other words which groups or which geographical areas offices were allocated to
01:32:09 allocated to can i start at a high level there were some places that
01:32:13 that sds officers seem simply not to have gone
01:32:18 gone one example of that is the irish republican army i understand from your witness statement that there was never any question of the sds deploying into the ira is that right that's right
01:32:32 into the ira is that right that's right and was that a decision that you had to take or one that had already been taken one that had been taken are you able to help us with who had taken that decision and when
01:32:51 no i imagine it had been taken some time beforehand because there was no talk of any officers having been involved recently in irish matters
01:33:14 we also know that in this era no sds officers were deliberately infiltrated into the far right did you give any consideration to
01:33:23 to any
01:33:26 any officers who joined whilst you were managing the sds deploying into the far right no why was that
01:33:43 that consideration would have been made by officers senior to me
01:33:53 they would have indicated to me that was what was being considered and asked for me to implement
01:33:58 the action
01:34:03 i certainly didn't give it any consideration
01:34:08 i'm getting the sense that you might have had an understanding that this was
01:34:19 have had an understanding that this was just a field into which the sds did not go at that time correct is that fair that's fair where had you got that understanding from
01:34:23 from day-to-day practice that uh
01:34:32 matters of the far-right were very rarely even discussed other than in terms of the confrontation between the left and the right
01:34:42 since as we've heard confrontations between the left and the right were a significant source of public disorder in the time that we're talking about
01:34:58 why was it are you able to help as to why it was that only the far left was infiltrated by the sds i can't help you i'm afraid
01:35:15 there were some officers who seem to have been given a very considerable discretion as to
01:35:18 as to which groups to target and simply given a geographical area into which to go is that right
01:35:30 yes and there were other officers who seem to have been given some clear guidance to go into a specific field i'm thinking here for example of hn 65
01:35:57 who infiltrated the camp nuclear
01:35:58 nuclear disarmament can you assist us as to how the decision to direct hn 65 to do that came about
01:36:18 no i can't recall i i believe
01:36:20 i believe that officer joined at about the time i was leaving it may even have been that his his his target was
01:36:34 his his target was asked of him after i'd left i don't recall
01:36:39 recall it was a time at which cnd was getting bigger and there were more demonstrations than they'd been for some time in that field isn't it yes
01:36:46 yes can you recall whether there was any sense within special branch that this was a
01:36:55 was a an area of growing significance to special branch
01:37:03 if i recall the concern was that extremist groups on the left
01:37:16 would infiltrate and use the cnd
01:37:22 the cnd rather than the problem arising from core members of the cnd can you recall whether there was any interest emanating from the home office
01:37:38 can you recall whether there was any interest emanating from any other part of government no i can't
01:37:48 we were of course still in the midst of the cold war in those days and you've mentioned in your witness statement to the impact and influence that had
01:38:01 influence that had would it be fair to say that the concerns about the warsaw pact and the ussr in particular were primarily in relation
01:38:13 in relation to those groups who shared their particular form of far-left ideology yes cpgb
01:38:25 yes cpgb and that would it be right to say that for example the trotskyist groups we're getting no support from the ussr
01:38:35 i don't know
01:38:49 do you know whether or not maoist groups were getting assistance from china in the late 1970s i don't know um
01:38:56 um it may be testing your memory too much say so if it is but mao died in 1976 and the chinese form of communism moved on were you
01:39:04 were you informed about that or instructed or told what difference that might make no
01:39:20 can i move now to anti-racist groups
01:39:22 groups one of the officers who was deployed whilst you were managing the sds was the officer we know as hn 106.
01:39:48 yes and he ended up spending quite a lot of his time with the east london workers against racism group didn't he yes
01:39:58 could we just have a look at well before i do that perhaps i should ask you
01:40:04 ask you were you involved in hn106s tasking or not
01:40:22 i must have been due to the uh the time that he served but i i don't actually recall tasking him with that group
01:40:25 group but you were certainly aware that he was doing that weren't you yes can you help us with why he was doing that
01:40:36 i can't recall whether
01:40:43 that group was his target or whether geographically he was in that area and became involved with them i can't recall
01:40:57 but either way you were content for him to report on that group yes and why was that
01:41:11 i can't remember i can only think that they offered a public order threat
01:41:18 all right well let's have a look at some of the documents could we go first of all
01:41:23 all to the document which is at ucpi five zeroes one five
01:41:27 one five five four zero
01:41:32 this is a tab 26 of your bundle
01:41:48 after this isn't very easy to read if we could be blown up a little bit please we're going to start at paragraph 2. this is a report dated the 18th of august
01:41:53 august 1981 which we understand came from hn 106.
01:41:58 106. uh paragraph two reads on monday the 10th of august 1981 between 7 30 and 10 p.m at ross wilde hall
01:42:09 at ross wilde hall churchill london e-17 a public meeting was held by the winston rose action campaign to discuss the death of winston rose in police custody and the action required to force the
01:42:25 and the action required to force the authorities to hold a public inquiry into the circumstances approximately 100 persons attended slightly more than half of whom were black
01:42:37 black if we could go down now to paragraph four please
01:42:43 going to read from the
01:42:45 from the middle
01:42:46 middle of the
01:42:48 of the page
01:42:56 page gitzmore an extremely articulate speaker concentrated much of his speech on a marxist view of social and capital relations in britain
01:43:09 britain concluding that the only way for racism to be eliminated was to overthrow capitalism itself
01:43:15 itself he intimated throughout his speech that he considered it the responsibility of the black section of the population to carry out the attack on capitalism not mentioning the role that white
01:43:30 not mentioning the role that white workers should play in this activity at any time if we could go over the page to paragraph eight
01:43:42 uh says fran
01:43:43 says fran eden
01:43:48 eden of east london workers against racism when she spoke launched into a tirade against the police
01:43:58 police and their racist attitudes and the racist scum in the labour party elwha she stated did not call for the reform of the police but for their destruction
01:44:14 but for their destruction this speech was very well received by the audience eden also expressed the support of elwha for rioters who had attacked the police during recent disturbances
01:44:27 during recent disturbances if we could go down to the next paragraph
01:44:34 the mood of the meeting could be described as angry black separatists present who advocated revenge attacks upon the police whilst not gaining outright support
01:44:50 whilst not gaining outright support did provoke an amount of quiet sympathy from some
01:44:52 from some of
01:44:53 of the audience
01:45:03 could we go now to page five of this file
01:45:18 and that is the front page of the flyer that was attached to this report
01:45:23 report illustrating that it was a meeting
01:45:28 meeting about calling for a public inquiry
01:45:36 i'm going to ask you two broad lines of questions about this first of all from your point of view was there any policing value in reporting on a meeting such as this
01:45:56 i think there were elements in that report
01:46:02 of the speeches made which were of great interest to police the call for the destruction of the police force
01:46:17 sounds to me a call for violence and public disorder which is the reason the sds was established
01:46:29 second matter is this this document is dated not very long after the brixton riots isn't it yes
01:46:45 yes uh the atmosphere was febrile to say the least wasn't it yes
01:46:54 there was a great deal of anger wasn't there amongst the black community yes
01:47:01 do you think that in that atmosphere having an undercover police officer report
01:47:09 report upon
01:47:10 upon a meeting such as this risked doing more harm than good
01:47:27 i think that really depends on what happened to the report when it was received how it was disseminated and whether any action uh ensued
01:47:31 uh ensued the report in itself i can't think was anything but helpful it wasn't the risk that if an undercover officer was discovered doing this
01:47:44 doing this that would be just the type of catalyst that might put people back on the streets
01:47:49 i think that could probably be said of every report that an undercover officer submitted
01:48:00 do you think that this sort of reporting in these circumstances would secure as sir robert peel wanted public approval
01:48:11 yes why
01:48:19 the group of people at the meeting
01:48:25 quite rightly as you said
01:48:36 were annoyed and contributed to this febrile atmosphere but there'd be many members of the public who would be very concerned that such a meeting was going on
01:48:45 going on and such sentiments were being expressed so i think it was wholly justified and a fine report
01:48:59 we've seen a certain amount of evidence to the effect that the sds was trying to monitor
01:49:11 how far left groups were interacting with the black community is that fair no i wasn't aware of that is that what hn 106 was doing
01:49:24 is that what hn 106 was doing infiltrating the east london workers against racism to see how they were interacting with the black community
01:49:35 that may have been a spin-off i'm sure he was there to establish the risk they posed in terms of violence and demonstrations they being
01:49:51 they being the members of the group he infiltrated thank you could we take that document down please could we have up now ucpi5016611
01:50:12 now this is from 16th of april 1981 so this is in the immediate aftermath of the brixton riots we again think that this came from hm 106. this one is signed at the bottom by you
01:50:24 by you it says the following information has been received from a reliable source as a result of the violent disturbances in brixton over the weekend of the 11th
01:50:43 brixton over the weekend of the 11th 12th of april 1981 the rct has brought forward plans to former south london workers against racism branch at present the level of activity is apparently restricted to attempting to arrange defense facilities for those arrested
01:50:56 defense facilities for those arrested and to encourage defendants to employ the rct's legal representatives rct influence amongst the brixton black
01:51:07 rct influence amongst the brixton black population is acknowledged to be minimal and it is thought that an attempt to increase influence will be made through contact with local community
01:51:19 community leaders the events in south london are unlikely to affect the commitment of east london workers against racism in
01:51:30 east london workers against racism in east london and in particular brick lane although support for particular occasions is always available
01:51:35 available now the aspect of this report i want to ask you about mr butler is the reporting about legal assistance
01:51:46 about legal assistance and encouragement to use particular legal representatives did you have any concerns about reporting
01:51:53 reporting that sort of information no did you have any instructions about reporting that sort of information i didn't know
01:52:07 i didn't know and that sort of information in particular isn't relevant to public order is it specifically it isn't specifically but it does indicate
01:52:24 it does indicate that present the level of activity is apparently restricted it gives
01:52:30 it gives an insight to the fact that the rc
01:52:31 the rc the rct
01:52:33 the rct were not calling
01:52:38 for direct street action they were more concerned with the subject of that paragraph
01:52:49 if we could take that down now and have up ucpi-5015302
01:53:00 the third and final document i want to take to take you to from the aftermath of the brixton riots
01:53:11 brixton riots this is a report dated the 30th of april again it's our understanding that it comes from hn
01:53:15 hn 106
01:53:22 and you sign it we can go to the signature if you want to see it it's at page 3 at the bottom
01:53:33 if we go back to the top please to page one at paragraph two we see
01:53:46 we see it reads on friday the 24th of april 1981 between 7 30 p.m and 9 30 p.m at stoke newington town hall stoke newington church street n16 the east london workers against racism held a public election meeting
01:54:01 held a public election meeting with the events at brixton two weeks before still a major talking point the opportunity was taken to use the meeting to illustrate the similarities between events in northern ireland
01:54:12 northern ireland and those at brixton approximately 50 people attended and then the rest of the report is about the meeting
01:54:30 report is about the meeting was there any concern on your part about having an undercover police officer
01:54:34 officer reporting upon the electoral activity
01:54:36 activity of an anti-racist group weeks after the brixton riots
01:54:48 i think the undercover officers
01:55:01 who infiltrated groups thought it was their responsibility to report as fully as they could on those groups some of the activity might suggest
01:55:16 forthcoming demonstrations others might be just general background um
01:55:24 and the officers of course haven't submitted this report left it for others um to analyze and disseminate as they felt fit
01:55:31 felt fit well we may come to that later i mean you've made very clear in your witness statement your officers weren't inhibited in any way as to what to report were they correct were you given any guidance as as to
01:55:49 were you given any guidance as as to whether there may be sensitive areas that ought to be avoided no
01:55:58 at the time you plainly didn't think this needed avoiding is that fair yes what's your view now
01:56:07 now today please
01:56:11 i think i hold the same view that
01:56:24 if a group has been assessed as being of interest
01:56:26 interest then as much as possible should be reported on that group some of it
01:56:37 some of it might appear to be irrelevant um
01:56:39 um but
01:56:41 but the officer
01:56:47 is not able to make that judgment at the time
01:56:54 and that my attitude was always it's far better to report too much than too little
01:56:59 now can we take that down
01:57:01 that down having said this was the last document it's the last document from 106. there is there is another document from hn 356 that i'd like to show you please
01:57:46 yes could we have up ucpi five zeros 15 441 please
01:58:04 that could be just blown up a little bit we think this is a report from hn 356. it's dated the 30th of june 1981. uh
01:58:05 uh hn 356
01:58:09 hn 356 it is our understanding was deployed in southeast london initially and for much of his time but we see in this report paragraph two on thursday the 25th of june 1981
01:58:26 on thursday the 25th of june 1981 at 8 15 p.m at the tate library ephra road sw2
01:58:28 road sw2 the new brixton branch of the socialist workers party held its inaugural meeting nine persons were present then at three the meeting was chaired by
01:58:46 then at three the meeting was chaired by privacy who commenced the proceedings by calling for the election of branch officers
01:58:53 officers after much argument the under mentioned were elected to the following posts and of relevance to us is branch treasurer william biggs and that was hn 356's cover name so it appears
01:59:13 name so it appears uh that in the wake of the brixton riots the swp is setting up a new branch in brixton and hn 356 is moving
01:59:20 is moving from
01:59:27 from southeast london to south west london to follow that development is that
01:59:35 is that right i don't recall it appears so from the document in front of me and would it have been because there was interest in monitoring
01:59:46 because there was interest in monitoring what the swp were doing in a flash point i can't remember presumably so would that be a convenient moment to take the break certainly and we'll have a quarter of an
01:59:58 certainly and we'll have a quarter of an hour break now and that you i hope we'll be able to resume your evidence then
02:15:26 all right please
02:15:41 mr butler um you have explained in your witness statement that you got the occasional request from senior managers for specific information about events
02:15:52 events but otherwise you say the sds was left to get on with things and you also say that you were left very much alone
02:16:04 that you were left very much alone did that apply not just generally but also to
02:16:07 also to the question of where you targeted your officers
02:16:19 i can't recall exactly how they were targeted i think it was guidance from senior officers and as i say it was generally to ensure as complete coverage geographically as possible
02:16:39 did you consider it any part of your duty to consider whether there were alternative ways of obtaining the same intelligence or weighing the degree of intrusion into the lives of the activists with the benefit
02:16:47 benefit to be gained for policing purposes i never gave that any consideration no did you
02:16:57 did you review any of the deployments formally or otherwise
02:17:05 i don't recall i think they seem to satisfy
02:17:08 satisfy the criteria that was required
02:17:19 was required can i ask you now to answer the next question with a yes or a no did you terminate any
02:17:23 any deployments on the grounds that you didn't think they were worth while no
02:17:30 no again yes no did you alter the course of the deployment of any of your officers
02:17:42 deployment of any of your officers because you thought what they were doing was not worthwhile no
02:17:52 coming back to those specific requests from intelligence from senior managers was your intelligence going from the sds to s squad or from the sds to c squad
02:18:08 to escort now are you sure about that because we've had conflicting evidence on that issue
02:18:21 my understanding that it all went to s squad
02:18:24 s squad and it was for them to decide its onward path
02:18:30 and were the specific requests coming from s squad or from other squads or both
02:18:37 i think from escort
02:18:47 you say you think how sure are you fairly sure i can't recall any other
02:18:48 any other way of receiving requests
02:18:59 was there any change in the nature of the requests you were getting after the 1979 general election
02:19:06 i can't recall that was there any change in the nature of the requests that you were getting after the 1981
02:19:12 the 1981 election
02:19:16 election as leader of the glc of ken livingston again i can't recall any change
02:19:27 i'd like to move now to a completely different topic and that is your relationship with the security service and it's right to say isn't it that you met them on a number of occasions whilst working for the sds
02:19:45 i've looked at some reports from the security service and i accept that i did but i'm afraid my memory is is failing me on those meetings right we'll look at a few documents the first one i want to show you in fact
02:19:58 first one i want to show you in fact predates your time in the sds could we have ucpi
02:20:04 have ucpi five zeros three zero zero four nine please
02:20:14 and this is a 1973 document it's from 13th of november 1973
02:20:17 1973 at paragraph two it says the security service defined their primary targets for agent operations as the socialist labor league which of
02:20:30 as the socialist labor league which of course became the workers revolutionary party
02:20:36 party international socialists which i'm sure you know became the socialist workers party and the img the ideal would be a permanent well-placed employee in each headquarters
02:20:49 in each headquarters not necessarily too high up in the organization secondary targets were we've had to redact those but the security service requirements in these two cases was virtually only for membership details
02:21:02 membership details was it
02:21:03 was it at your understanding in the late 1970s that the security service was still very keen for the sds to have someone at
02:21:16 keen for the sds to have someone at headquarters level in the socialist workers party
02:21:22 i don't recall that group no
02:21:26 no okay if we could take that down please can we look at some of the documents in your era first of all the documents
02:21:38 your era first of all the documents which is at tab three of your bundle ucpi
02:21:43 ucpi five zeros two eight eight one zero
02:22:00 now this is um about a meeting which occurred on the 2nd of october 1979
02:22:02 1979 starts by saying the head of the sds paid a routine visit to csh which we understand to be the security services premises
02:22:11 premises on the 2nd of october 1979. this was an opportunity to say farewell to di angus mcintosh and to meet his
02:22:26 to di angus mcintosh and to meet his successor trevor butler after lunch at the waterloo dispatch in adams row we returned to csh for discussions
02:22:37 so it appears that you were introduced to the sds almost straight away doesn't it it does appear so um a feature of the documents we're going to look at is there was very often an opportunity for a bite to eat and a
02:22:50 an opportunity for a bite to eat and a drink either before or after the meeting with the security service do you remember that no i don't can you recall what sort of things you discussed with them
02:23:01 you discussed with them in the margins of your meetings no i'm afraid i can't
02:23:06 this document goes on to include a specific request at 2a about
02:23:17 about training
02:23:18 training and then if we go over
02:23:21 over to page two please
02:23:27 um
02:23:34 there's some some discussion of photographs and then future coverage and at little e picking up from near the bottom i said that if possible we would be interested in reports on one or two specific resolutions such as
02:23:46 or two specific resolutions such as those dealing with flame women's voice and the organization of the party this is in connection with the forthcoming swp national conference
02:24:05 swp national conference i asked if reports provided on the new communist party and the workers party indicated that the squad had sources close to the group ferguson confirmed that these reports were unlikely to continue now coming back to those specific requests about flame
02:24:19 flame women's voice and the organization of the swp
02:24:25 the swp was it typical of the security service to make specific requests like this
02:24:31 i'm afraid i can't recall
02:24:35 and if we go to g
02:24:45 this is about the officer we know as hn 354 i can tell you his real name it's vince harvey it was confirmed that vince harvey is being withdrawn a replacement will eventually be provided albeit in a
02:24:58 eventually be provided albeit in a different geographical area was it the norm to keep the security service informed about when officers started and ended their deployments i don't think
02:25:14 i don't think so what's the basis for saying that i just can't recall it i see
02:25:25 in paragraph three it says in general conversation we touched on the problems of agents being involved in actions of varying degrees of illegality ferguson remarked that certainly for the more trivial offences this was no real
02:25:37 more trivial offences this was no real hindrance to their operations since they were often able to insulate their sources
02:25:41 sources even though this sometimes meant not prosecuting other offenders can you recall whether you had any discussions with ferguson
02:25:50 ferguson about this sort of matter
02:25:54 matter i don't recall yes no please can you recall any instance in which a prosecution was dropped in order to protect
02:26:05 dropped in order to protect an undercover police officer
02:26:09 over the page
02:26:23 paragraph four head sds re-emphasize the value of these regular meetings and we agreed to get together again in the second week of november
02:26:33 november can you give us an impression about how grateful the security service was for the relationship you had with them no i can't
02:26:38 can we take that down and go now please to tab five ucpi29198
02:26:55 uh now this is a document which records that somebody from the security service called on dci ferguson on the sixth of november 1979 and gave him briefs
02:27:08 of november 1979 and gave him briefs prepared by security services f7 branch in relation to a number of things including the swp national conference and the debrief of the sds source in
02:27:21 and the debrief of the sds source in walthamstow we know that that source was vince
02:27:22 vince harvey
02:27:24 harvey so if we
02:27:28 so if we go over the page now and have a look at those
02:27:35 this loose minute contained very detailed
02:27:36 detailed questions
02:27:38 questions about the swp so for example if you look at one a under general points
02:27:51 under general points it says delegates it is understood that local branches will send one delegate
02:28:02 local branches will send one delegate for 30 members we are learning the names of a number of these but a full list if available would be welcome
02:28:03 welcome and if we go down to 2a it says would we would be particularly glad of early comments on the following topics
02:28:18 topics industrial situation and policies what is the swp's assessment of their intervention in recent strikes and then we've had to summarize the next passage is a broad range of fourth coming strikes
02:28:33 fourth coming strikes and the questions go on if we go over the page
02:28:44 at f1 we see questions about the anti-nazi league about the women's voice and about flame
02:28:50 is it your recollection that the security service were interested in really pretty granular details
02:28:57 details i have no recollection do you have any recollection of
02:29:03 of meeting with them discussing matters at this sort of level of detail and trying to service their requests i do not
02:29:22 can you recall whether or not security the sds provided intelligence to the security service trying to fulfill their requests
02:29:34 if that was the case i assume it would have been done through s squad office well we've got a lot of meeting notes and if you don't remember there may not be much point in me putting them all to
02:29:49 be much point in me putting them all to you but there are quite a lot of them at which you are recorded as having been present
02:29:55 present are you telling me that you simply can't remember any of these now that is the fact i see
02:30:08 can i now move to the question of subversion
02:30:13 uh you've told us already that you can't recall
02:30:15 recall any tuition on this subject can i just put a couple of documents to you in case they jog your memory can we have a ucpi 60s 4459
02:30:41 now this is a this is a covering letter to a circular dated 1970 to all chief constables which covers the terms of reference for special branches relationship with the security service and if we go over the page
02:30:58 you will see it deals with the responsibility of special branch and the function of special branch visa v the security service and if we look on page two
02:31:13 at paragraph 3d
02:31:23 you see it says in consultation with the security service to collect process and record information about subversive or potentially subversive organizations and individuals
02:31:34 individuals do you recall seeing these terms of reference
02:31:36 reference i don't know do you recall being familiar uh with the task of
02:31:44 of uh
02:31:51 uh collecting processing and recording information about subversive or potentially subversive organizations for the security service no
02:31:58 if we go to page four paragraph three
02:32:08 there is a definition of subversion it says it is important that special branches should have a clear idea of what constitutes persons and organizations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the state
02:32:19 of the state broadly speaking these are any organization or individual whose purpose is the undermining or overthrow
02:32:30 or overthrow of the established democratic order
02:32:35 order can you now recall being presented with this definition no i can't recall um does it accord with your understanding of what a subversive group was yes i think so
02:32:50 was yes i think so can you recall that um definition ever changing
02:32:52 changing no
02:32:58 no could we have uh plea if we take that down could we have up ucpi six zeros four five four five
02:33:12 now this is a another circular from the security service to chief constables about subversive activities in industrial disputes can it essentially makes the point that there is a distinction between militant industrial action
02:33:25 industrial action and action designed to use industry to overthrow the state
02:33:33 the state can you recall being made aware of that distinction no do you think that you may have been and simply can't remember it or are you saying that it didn't happen
02:33:48 i can't remember it it may not have happened
02:33:58 if we go to the bottom of page two paragraph four please um
02:34:07 this has a slightly different definition of subversion it says subversion is defined as activities threatening the safety or well-being of the state
02:34:18 the safety or well-being of the state and intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political industrial or violent means slightly different to the last definition i read out to you can you recall
02:34:29 recall being instructed about this definition no
02:34:32 no is that again is it something that might have happened it might have happened
02:34:41 could we take that down please
02:34:44 could we have up ucpi 5034698
02:35:05 now this is a document entitled subversive activities in schools dated the 16th of december 1975 and if we go over the page to paragraph 2 again it's a circular to chief constables paragraph two says we do not ask you to
02:35:16 paragraph two says we do not ask you to make inquiries in schools on our behalf but we would welcome any help you could give us on the basis
02:35:36 give us on the basis of information which comes your way from the local papers or from members of the public or by recourse to other sources outside schools which you can use without risk of embarrassment can you recall being given any guidance at all
02:35:45 at all about subversion in schools i wasn't no can you recall feeling any sensitivity about that issue i don't think the
02:35:56 the position arose we know that some sds officers notably hn126
02:36:18 did make reports which referred to children particularly in the context of the group school kids against the nazis
02:36:31 can you recall that group i don't recall the group no can you recall
02:36:48 whether there was any concern that extremist groups on both left and right were seeking to influence school children
02:36:56 i don't recall there was any particular concern now
02:37:09 uh can we take that down please in your witness statement you deal at one point with what you thought the most important things that the sds did were top of your list was public order
02:37:24 was public order and news then went on to say the second most important contribution was the provision of information to update
02:37:31 update files
02:37:33 files can you help us with what sds intelligence on mpsb files was used for
02:37:53 the file npsb files were just a collection of reports each one would have been dealt with individually and
02:38:07 the file would be maintained either
02:38:14 about a group or association or an individual
02:38:23 any new report coming into the branch would be placed on the appropriate file sometimes a general file sometimes a personal file
02:38:38 that doesn't quite answer my question what i'm driving at is if you think that this was the second most important thing that the sds did what i'm trying to find out is why it was so important
02:38:52 was so important what was it that this information could be used for that made it an important contribution
02:39:04 well the importance might have been immediate if the report referred to
02:39:13 to an individual or a group which was
02:39:15 which was under
02:39:20 under active review it would have been immediate importance if not
02:39:22 if not it could have relevance and importance in the future and is that an importance perhaps for
02:39:34 perhaps for informing reports about public order
02:39:38 presumably
02:39:43 do you know i don't know i can't recall all the different reports that were submitted and filed
02:39:47 and filed i'm asking in general terms do you think sds reporting for example contributed to the ability to vet people
02:40:04 quite possibly do you think that sds reporting contributed to
02:40:11 special branches understanding of activist groups yes
02:40:22 you use the phrase latent value of information more than once in your witness statement what did you mean by that
02:40:31 information which might appear to have no immediate interest but which could possibly be relevant at a future date
02:40:52 now to point in your witness statement uh when you're explaining why you thought it was important to have comprehensive intelligence coverage you say
02:41:05 you say providing that those individuals were not unlawfully discriminated against because of this what were you meaning by that
02:41:19 i don't know i'd have to look at the whole
02:41:20 whole week
02:41:23 week yeah sure we can get that up it's mps-0747658
02:41:34 at page 37
02:41:47 that so if we it's paragraph one two nine i want if you want to see the context if we go back one page it reads having considered the reports above a close reading shows that each of them contains relevant and useful
02:41:59 them contains relevant and useful information even though parts may seem unacceptable in today's context the difficulty is that you either have state-controlled organizations that keep a record of
02:42:10 organizations that keep a record of potential extremists and activists or you do not when something untoward happens there will be some who will most likely criticize the state if it does not
02:42:19 not react quickly enough and in a targeted fashion to investigate the perpetrators and bring them to justice that is much more difficult to do from a standing start i do not believe that individuals
02:42:34 start i do not believe that individuals finding their names on a special branch or security service file is too high a price to pay for comprehensive intelligence coverage providing that those individuals were not
02:42:48 not unlawfully discriminated against because of this
02:43:05 not quite sure what i meant by it
02:43:29 were you perhaps referring to the risk that information might improperly have been leaked to employers who would blacklist
02:43:43 employees i can't really think of any other
02:43:55 unlawful discrimination arising from retaining this intelligence so i think that's probably what i was thinking about
02:43:56 about and why was that on your mind
02:44:02 i think when i made this statement i was
02:44:07 probably
02:44:11 justifying
02:44:17 the reporting on and maintaining records about members of the public which i thought
02:44:28 which i thought was acceptable as i said there providing as a result they don't lose their job or are blacklisted which then unless there are exceptional circumstances becomes unacceptable
02:44:43 was it a known risk at the time you were serving in special branch
02:44:52 branch that information might get out and lead to people losing their jobs not at all
02:45:04 can i take it then so far as you are aware nothing was done to stop it
02:45:10 to stop what on the unlawful disclosure of information leading to people losing their jobs
02:45:19 well i'm convinced that special branch records were properly maintained and there was no leakage i added that
02:45:30 i added that at the end of that paragraph as a caveat actually
02:45:35 actually thank you could we take that down please well could we look at the document tab 23 of your bundle sir ucpi5015469
02:45:52 this is a report dated the 10th of july 1981
02:45:53 1981 said submitted hit from a reliable source and then we have redacted to protect people's privacy or all the names but if we just look
02:46:13 or all the names but if we just look down the right hand column you can see in relation to some of them is the annotation n stroke t
02:46:18 stroke t is that
02:46:20 is that for no trace it is and so we can take it that some of the names that have ended up on file are people
02:46:32 file are people from this address book who were unknown to special branch at the time
02:46:46 it depends how the report was handled by escort or if it was c-squad as the recipient
02:46:48 recipient quite often no traces
02:46:55 no traces would not be recorded and in fact uis unidentified would also fail to be recorded
02:47:04 yes i mean this one we can go over the page there are more nts there and then over to the last page
02:47:15 and we see your signature at the bottom and another n t
02:47:23 n t it appears on this occasion that the document was filed we've got it from a security service file it was filed with the no trace names all left included was that normal
02:47:46 i'm not sure i i think it probably was the fact that there were no traits at that stage didn't preclude them from becoming people of interest so it may well
02:48:00 well have been retained on a general file yes thank you can we take that down
02:48:09 i want to ask you now about how well you got to know the undercover officers under your command you've explained in your witness statement that you met them periodically on a one-to-one basis often
02:48:21 on a one-to-one basis often playing squash as i understand it and for a bite to eat is that right yes and then you met them usually twice weekly in either the south or west safe house yes
02:48:31 house yes and you would have talked to them at that stage about their deployments and their well-being yes
02:48:41 over time how well did you get to know these officers of them very well others not quite so well but reasonably well all of them enough that they were telling you what they were doing
02:48:53 they were doing in their deployments and you knew a little bit about their well-being and their home lives would that be a fair generality it would be yes
02:49:04 be yes can i ask you a little bit about the environment and the unit was all male wasn't it at that time yes and was it would you describe it as a male environment
02:49:15 male environment yes
02:49:17 yes banter yes jokes yes
02:49:27 jokes yes some of them of a sexual nature i can't remember but probably um
02:49:31 it was any ever any joking to the effect uh that officers might have been the subject of sexual advances by female activists no
02:49:42 no you sure about that
02:49:48 if it was said as a joke it was certain something that i've forgotten by now but was there any ever joking to the effect that an officer
02:50:00 effect that an officer had had some sexual contact with an activist
02:50:02 activist certainly not no
02:50:06 was there any serious discussion about the problem of what to do if a female member of a group
02:50:19 of a group or a female member of the public became amorous
02:50:25 amorous with an undercover police officer that wasn't discussed now are you sure not by me
02:50:35 did you consider whether there was a risk that there may be sexual activity no did you consider that they may be tempted
02:50:44 tempted to participate in sexual activity i might have considered that that was a possibility but i trusted all of them who i knew quite well not to be so involved
02:51:00 not to be so involved i mean they were pretending to be single men weren't they yes and they were
02:51:13 yes and they were infiltrating groups many of which were sexually quite liberal yes and
02:51:14 and they might have thought might they that getting together with an activist might keep them safer and enhance their cover i don't think so why not
02:51:37 because the selection process as you alluded to much earlier ensured that they were married men with a stable background who
02:51:49 who i trusted not to get involved sexually outside of their marriage
02:51:56 if it was based on trust can you help us did you ever give them a reminder no
02:52:08 no did you ever suggest to them ways that they might reduce the risk of a sexual contact no
02:52:17 do you think looking back that it would have been a good idea to do that
02:52:22 i'm sure it would
02:52:28 can i ask you now about some specific officers
02:52:31 officers first of all some officers who served before your time and i want to know whether you heard anything about them did you
02:52:40 did you hear
02:52:45 hear anything at all about richard clarke in a sexual connection
02:52:56 did you hear anything at all in terms of asexual including a romantic connection about the officer we know as hn 300.
02:53:13 no
02:53:21 we have evidence that hn 300 formed a
02:53:22 formed a lasting relationship with an activist and in fact went on to marry her
02:53:35 whether was there any talk in the office any gossip about who hn 300 was marrying no
02:53:49 can i now ask you to look at a section of somebody else's witness statement this is a witness statement of hn106
02:54:03 and it's at mps-074
02:54:27 and if we could go to page 43 please
02:54:33 and start at paragraph 132.
02:54:40 the only reason i can think of for the security service file though relates to another incident connected with a woman called privacy i knew privacy is she was privacy's wife or partner
02:54:51 privacy's wife or partner i cannot remember if they were married or what her surname was she was not an activist herself during my deployment privacy and privacy split up
02:55:02 split up a few months after this i bumped into privacy while i was selling papers on brick lane she invited me to come around for a drink and i met up with her
02:55:16 drink and i met up with her neither of us were interested in a romantic relationship i was happily married with two small children and privacy was still was very much still in love with privacy who had left her for another woman in
02:55:33 who had left her for another woman in fact i think the reason she wanted to spend time with me was to hear what privacy had been up to i went for a drink with privacy on a couple of occasions and also went around to her house if i had had something to drink and
02:55:46 if i had had something to drink and could not drive home i would sometimes stay over at privacy's home i would sleep in one of her children's rooms and they would share with her i remember there was a hamster in the child's room which would keep me awake
02:56:02 child's room which would keep me awake at night running around in its wheel i do not think that i stayed over more than five or so times and if we could
02:56:09 could scroll down please i became quite close with privacy and even though it was an entirely platonic relationship some activists
02:56:22 platonic relationship some activists started to refer to privacy as barry's girlfriend barry tompkins was this officer's cover name
02:56:27 name i do not think that they said this in front of privacy i did not correct them as it was actually helpful for my cover for people to think i had a girlfriend
02:56:38 for people to think i had a girlfriend as i otherwise face questions about why a young man seemingly had no interest in women and if we could go over the page please
02:56:52 over the page please one day trevor butler asked to speak with me
02:56:55 with me he told me that a telephone call had been intercepted during which there had been discussion of where items from ireland could safely be stored
02:57:04 be stored it was discussed that the only place deemed not to be under surveillance was barry's girlfriend's place
02:57:15 barry's girlfriend's place i think trevor said something along the lines of
02:57:19 lines of you're not going to get as into trouble are you
02:57:22 are you and i simply said no it's nothing like that
02:57:29 that i did not feel the need to say much more as there was not anything untoward to explain
02:57:32 explain trevor never actually mentioned privacy's name but i have always assumed that this must have referred to privacy my relationship with privacy was never anything more than friends
02:57:46 anything more than friends but i was very sad when i had to just disappear from her life
02:57:51 life first question can you recall hn 106
02:57:58 hn 106 ever
02:57:58 ever speaking of the woman concerned
02:58:09 speaking of the woman concerned no can you recall speaking with hn 106 as described by him in his witness statement no
02:58:20 do you accept that his recollection is likely to be correct no why not
02:58:25 why not it didn't happen
02:58:30 why are you so sure that it didn't happen as opposed to being just something that you cannot now remember 40 years later
02:58:42 i can't answer that question i just know that didn't happen
02:58:53 why are you being so categoric he wasn't explaining he wasn't confessing any wrongdoing on his account
02:59:03 i just cannot recall any
02:59:11 knowledge that i had of an intercepted phone call and
02:59:17 and i wasn't aware that he had this girlfriend so i'm fairly satisfied that he's either confused me with another officer from the office
02:59:29 from the office or i don't know the answer if
02:59:34 hn 106 had
02:59:39 had explained to you what he sets out in his witness statement what would you have done
02:59:54 i don't know it's uh my
02:59:58 my outlook was probably different than it is now
03:00:00 is now um
03:00:09 i think we'd have had to have a fairly long discussion about whether or not
03:00:11 not the position was sustainable uh could you help us with what your outlook was then no i can't remember
03:00:23 no i can't remember when you just you've just said that your outlook was different it may have been different i can't recall now um
03:00:32 i think i would have
03:00:38 insisted that he ended such a relationship then i might have been more tolerant
03:00:47 and why would you have been more tolerant back in the day purely because i've become older and more disagreeable
03:00:55 where attitudes different in those days
03:01:00 i'm sure mine was jeff
03:01:14 how big a deal in those days would you have regarded an undercover police officer forming a platonic friendship with a woman
03:01:22 i wouldn't have been concerned providing it didn't look as if it could become a problem for the officer or the sds it is one of the things that leaps from the page of this statement
03:01:35 the page of this statement that there might in fact have been more going on
03:01:37 going on certainly
03:01:38 certainly and
03:01:40 and back in the day
03:01:43 would you have investigated
03:01:50 establish whether or not you were being told the whole story
03:01:56 that's a hypothetical question it didn't happen
03:02:00 happen i would have investigated very thoroughly
03:02:12 would you have put out a warning to other officers to be careful about the friendships that they were forming
03:02:24 in the event that this had happened yes i probably would
03:02:31 in the event that you had discovered an officer having a sexual relationship with a woman
03:02:43 woman do you think it would have led to disciplinary proceedings or not
03:02:49 i don't think that would be a question for me i think
03:02:53 i think i would have ensured the offers removal from the sds but as to any
03:03:04 but as to any disciplinary action thereafter i don't know
03:03:07 know you're telling me it's above your pay grade indeed
03:03:15 might there have been difficulties with formally
03:03:19 formally disciplining a police officer who had been under cover because of the rights that that officer would have under the police disciplinary procedures
03:03:30 procedures i'm sure it would have been a very difficult decision to take yes can we take that document down please and can we have up utpi five zeros two seven four four six
03:03:48 now this is another note made by the security service it comes from their liaison file with the sds
03:04:00 the sds it's dated just after your time it relates to a visit to the sds on the 29th of june 1980
03:04:12 i'm showing you it because of what it says at paragraph five
03:04:19 five it says i stressed to david short our continued interest in blank and asked that hn 106 should pass on anything that suggested a continuing
03:04:35 anything that suggested a continuing contact between we've had to redact it information on this subject may be bedeviled
03:04:37 bedeviled by the fact that hn106 has probably bedded blank and been warned off by
03:04:47 by his
03:04:48 his bosses
03:04:53 bosses can you help us with whether you know anything at all
03:05:04 anything at all about the circumstances in which hn 106 appears to have been warned off by bosses who thought he had
03:05:09 he had probably
03:05:10 probably bedded
03:05:11 bedded a person
03:05:13 a person no
03:05:17 might you have been concerned
03:05:27 and pass this on to mr short is there any possibility that that happened no
03:05:31 can we take that down please
03:05:37 can we have your witness statement back up again that's
03:05:44 mps-0747658 can we have page 26 please
03:05:52 paragraph 98
03:06:00 now this reads from the passage provided to me it seems as though he was quite close to the lady and this is referring to 106. i know that he was married with young children at the time and i believe i would have reminded him about his
03:06:16 i would have reminded him about his obligations to them and to the job in fairly strong terms if i had even the slightest suspicion that he had or was tempted to stray
03:06:29 or was tempted to stray i would certainly have checked with him that his wife knew where he was on the evenings when he stayed over it is possible that hm 106 has mixed me up with one of the other managers
03:06:44 up with one of the other managers now what i want to ask you about this passage
03:06:45 passage is that you are clearly thinking about hn 106 says marriage
03:06:52 marriage and his wife and children that's correct isn't it yes and you are plainly thinking about the risk
03:07:03 risk which uh such conduct might
03:07:04 might present to the sds and the metropolitan police yes is that right
03:07:13 right but what you don't mention is
03:07:15 is the woman
03:07:17 the woman uh with whom hn 106 had
03:07:28 had formed this on his account entirely platonic but plainly quite close friendship was that deliberate
03:07:40 as i was unaware that this officer had formed this platonic or otherwise relationship it's a hypothetical question and so now i
03:07:52 and so now i gave the
03:08:00 gave the the other party no consideration at all if this had happened uh
03:08:02 uh would you have given the other party any consideration
03:08:15 i don't know possibly i might have
03:08:21 tried to establish a reasonable way for the officer to disentangle himself i don't know i can't really comment
03:08:35 what was the attitude in the day was it that the activists were just wearies
03:08:48 and what are they so you don't don't recognize the term just activists was that the the attitude that they were the other side
03:09:04 to a certain extent they
03:09:07 they they were individuals and some
03:09:08 and some were
03:09:11 were potentially more of a threat uh than others but yes they were basically
03:09:20 basically the people we were
03:09:25 trying to uh gain
03:09:26 gain information about did you give any consideration that the harm that might be done to a woman who was deceived sexually by an undercover police officer no
03:09:47 can we take that down now please can i ask you now about vince harvey
03:09:50 harvey can you recall whether you ever met vince harvey uh as he was about to leave the sds
03:09:57 the sds i don't think so can you ever recall whether you met him for one of your one-two-ones over a game of squash and a bite to eat
03:10:14 i don't recall working with vince harvey i'm not sure whether our times did overlap
03:10:15 overlap as far as we can tell it's he's coming out of the field about the time you're starting
03:10:27 starting what i'm interested in is is i'm going to show you a postcard ucpi5034819
03:10:41 now this is a postcard which vince harvey sent to
03:10:44 to his group
03:10:51 his group uh after he had withdrawn as part of covering his exfiltration
03:10:58 can you recall this tactic being used
03:11:03 no i can't
03:11:10 can do you know
03:11:19 who decided to use this tactic i have no idea
03:11:22 idea if we could take that down please
03:11:29 the officer we know as hn 21.
03:11:44 how well did you know hn 21 reasonably well
03:11:50 hn 21 has told us that he did have sex
03:11:56 have sex with a woman twice
03:12:04 twice in his undercover identity and that it happened after
03:12:09 after a friendship had developed between them over a period of time
03:12:19 did hn 21 in any of his conversations with you
03:12:23 with you give you the impression he was getting close to anybody no he
03:12:30 didn't how surprised are you
03:12:42 by hn 21's evidence that he did have sex with a woman twice when he was undercover i'm surprised
03:12:49 do you think with hindsight
03:12:56 that you might have been able to put him off doing so if you had asked more questions or put across the line more strongly that this sort of thing was off limits
03:13:09 was off limits possibly
03:13:15 hn126 please
03:13:31 uh did he
03:13:33 did he tell you at any stage uh that he was getting on very well with a member of the opposite sex no
03:13:45 no or express any concerns that he might be coming
03:13:46 coming close to somebody no
03:13:52 so would now be a good time to break for lunch certainly and we'll resume it too
03:14:37 you