Former Commander Operations Dennis Gunn (HN143) gives evidence about his role overseeing the SDS from 1988-1991. The hearing focuses extensively on the Stefan Scott affair, secrecy considerations that prevented disciplinary action, and knowledge of deceitful sexual relationships by undercover officers.
00:08:40 Good morning everybody. Um we begin the second day of evidence in this part of tr 3. Uh those with recording devices uh may uh use them to tell the outside
00:08:53 may uh use them to tell the outside world what they have heard in the uh proceedings after 10 minutes have elapsed but they may not use them to record or to photograph. May the witness be sworn please.
00:09:08 Please repeat after me. I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth and nothing but the truth
00:09:24 and nothing but the truth please sit down Mr. G um if at any stage during the evidence that you're giving you need uh to rise for a moment do not hesitate to say so I will rise immediately thank you sir yes
00:09:37 yes thank you sir um Mr. Um, thank you for coming to give evidence today. Um, as
00:09:51 coming to give evidence today. Um, as the chair has said, do please ask for a break if you need one. Um, we will aim to break in any event at around 11:15 this morning. Um, as I know you're aware,
00:09:52 aware, there is um a list of ciphers um in front of you on a sheet. Um, some people um officers and civilians in this inquiry have anonymity. If you um are
00:10:07 inquiry have anonymity. If you um are concerned about revealing a name, please do just refer to that cipher list in front of you. Um you also have a copy of your witness statement in in hard copy
00:10:19 your witness statement in in hard copy in front of you, but it will be brought up on the screen if you're to be asked about any particular part of it. I don't seem to have a list of ciphers here.
00:10:36 They'll bring it over to you if you if you need it, I'm told. Thank you. Uh Mr. Gun, you've provided a witness statement to the inquiry dated the 31st of October, 2024, sir. It's at MPS0749634
00:10:56 tab one of your bundle. Um Mr. Gun, is that statement true? accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief? Yes, it is. But I think it might be helpful to the inquiry to say how I
00:11:08 helpful to the inquiry to say how I approach making that statement which I found uh um quite a difficult task bearing in mind that um I made the statement a year ago. It was about events some 30 or 40 years ago. Uh
00:11:19 about events some 30 or 40 years ago. Uh and as you know the inquiry asked me 221 questions of which uh I tried my best to answer each one and there was documentation reams of documentation to
00:11:32 documentation reams of documentation to check and I approached it in three ways.
00:11:44 check and I approached it in three ways. The first looking at the questions those questions that I recognize and could remember and answer honestly and truthfully uh without referral necessarily to the documents. There was a second uh uh tranch of uh questions that I did not immediately
00:11:58 questions that I did not immediately recognize from uh my own memory but uh in looking at the documents and referring to the documents I was able to jog my memory and answered as truthfully as I could uh with that. And then sadly there's a third category and this is a
00:12:12 there's a third category and this is a category that's troubled me. There are some of those questions I just cannot answer. I do not recall some of the uh incidents, the events and the persons
00:12:25 incidents, the events and the persons and even checking the documentation and there was mass of it. I still couldn't answer honestly the question. So I put that before the inquiry now because uh I have no doubt you're going to ask me a number of questions later that I possibly can't answer.
00:12:39 possibly can't answer. Thank you for that. Yes, that's understood. Um, in relation to the making of that statement, did you speak
00:12:51 making of that statement, did you speak to any other Metropolitan Police Service officer or former police officer who is a witness in this inquiry about your evidence?
00:12:57 evidence? No, not at all. And if I could just explain, I was a coordinator of a group of former senior Metropolitan Police special branch officers. That group, of which there were 15 of us when we started, sadly there's only seven left. uh that group was formed and I
00:13:08 uh that group was formed and I coordinated it to help this inquiry with factual information of the background to the SDS. Under no circumstances
00:13:20 the SDS. Under no circumstances did we collude in any way, shape or form on the evidence presented or would be presented by potential witnesses. And I remember and recall having a conversation with the first solicitor to this inquiry peers I think um about
00:13:37 this inquiry peers I think um about those matters and made it absolutely clear that whatever we discussed in terms of former colleagues it was not about the evidence it was about process facts and help
00:13:53 facts and help I'm grateful um have you spoken to Mr. Peter Felen um about the contents of your witness statement in its preparation? No, I keep in contact with Peter Phelm because we're close colleagues and friends. Uh but under no
00:14:04 colleagues and friends. Uh but under no circumstances uh would either of us talk about the evidence and we were absolutely sacrianked in making that distinction when we uh spoke to one another. We are friends and former colleagues, but under no circumstances did I include in any way talking about
00:14:17 did I include in any way talking about the evidence that either he or I give. Thank you. I just want to ask you about one particular aspect of your witness
00:14:28 one particular aspect of your witness statement. Um it's on the topic um of knowledge of deceitful sexual relationships by undercover police officers in their cover identity. You and Mr. Felen were asked a number of
00:14:39 and Mr. Felen were asked a number of questions um about that and I should note um for the inquiry's part that those questions were identically worded to both of you. um you answered those questions at page 51 at paragraphs 131
00:15:07 questions at page 51 at paragraphs 131 to 133 of your witness statement and he did so um sir for your note at page 49 paragraphs 144 to 146 of his witness statement. Uh it's at tab 13 of the supplemental bundles MPS0749627.
00:15:15 um those three paragraphs in each of your statements are very similarly worded. Indeed, the middle one of each is identical save for one word. Given what you've said um just now to the
00:15:26 what you've said um just now to the inquiry, can you explain how that came about?
00:15:31 about? Yes. Well, I'm not surprised that there's a similar answer to the same question, but I refute entirely any suggestion that myself or Peter Feland colluded with that answer. If it's come out uh uh looking similar, that's
00:15:42 out uh uh looking similar, that's because the question was the same.
00:15:53 because the question was the same. Thank you. Um Mr. Gun, your witness statement is given in the name of Ben Gun, but your full name is um Dennis George Gun. Is that correct? That's correct. I'm commonly known as Ben. Uh the only person that calls me Dennis is my mother and she's been dead 25 years.
00:16:06 25 years. Yes. Um but I do sign official documents DG gun as you will see from a number of my statements but I'm colloally known as Ben.
00:16:17 Ben. I'm very grateful. Um you served as commander operations in the Metropolitan Police um special branch from January 1988 until November 1991. Is that right? um your career prior to becoming um commander operations. You tell us in
00:16:34 commander operations. You tell us in your witness statement that immediately beforehand you were um detective chief superintendent in charge of our squad which dealt with policy matters. Um what type of policy matters um in in brief
00:16:52 type of policy matters um in in brief terms? Well, general uh issues affecting special branch and the metropolitan police in respect of policy uh communication uh statutory powers uh etc etc. It was very much the policy hub of of special branch at the time. Uh and I I can't
00:17:03 branch at the time. Uh and I I can't remember how long I had there. I had a year and a bit I think. You say that you were posted to Area 6 as a uniform chief superintendent between 1986 and the end of 1987. So immediately prior to
00:17:16 of 1987. So immediately prior to becoming commander of I didn't get that. You you say that you were posted to Area 6. Yes.
00:17:22 6. Yes. As a uniform chief superintendent between 1986 and the end of 1987. So immediately before becoming commander operations.
00:17:36 operations. um in the early 1980s. Um were you also a detective chief superintendent?
00:17:50 I must have been. Um as um commander operations, you tell us at paragraph 6B of your witness statement, you were operationally responsible for the special demonstrations squad or what we know as the SDS. Is that right? That was one of my duties. Yes. I think it's worth pointing out that as commander ops, I had a range of
00:18:08 that as commander ops, I had a range of duties covering the operational effects of all of the special branch work, not just the SDS. Yes, absolutely. Um, you say that uh detective chief superintendent s squad was responsible for the SDS and reported
00:18:23 was responsible for the SDS and reported to you and during your tenure those were um four different people. Uh, HN84 Raymond Parker, HN 103 David Smith, HN115 Anthony Wait, and HN593
00:18:34 HN115 Anthony Wait, and HN593 Robert Potter. Is that right? Um, the SDS moved to C Squad in the second half of uh 1988. Do you recall that?
00:18:48 that? Yes, I I I recall vaguely that. um it did and and obviously the paperwork substantiates that and the rationale behind that I think is because the the main product of SDS work at that time
00:19:03 main product of SDS work at that time was going to feed into C squad which was extreme leftwing activity. Uh and so it seemed logical to put the logistical command uh and operations of SDS under C squad rather than S squad grateful
00:19:22 grateful but I think it moved back subsequently. Yes. Um, you succeeded uh HN587 Mr. Peter Felen uh in your role as commander ops and preceded HN294 Donald Buchanan um as commander operations. Um is that right?
00:19:30 right? Yes, that's correct. And Mr. Felen um was promoted uh to immediately above you as DAXO security.
00:19:41 immediately above you as DAXO security. Correct. Um so deputy assistant commissioner specialist operations security which I'm going to for reasons of brevity refer to as DAXOS. I'm grateful you say um you were responsible to him and throughout uh
00:20:00 responsible to him and throughout uh throughout this time and you met daily uh with him together with commander administration Don Buchanan and commander anti-terrorist branch George Churchill Coleman. Is that right?
00:20:15 Churchill Coleman. Is that right? Correct. We used to meet every morning at 10:00 to discuss matters affecting each of the squads in special branch plus the anti-terrorist branch. Yes. Would all of those senior officers have known about the SDS as a unit at that time? Well, they would at that time. Yes. But uh it's worth bearing in mind as I'm
00:20:26 uh it's worth bearing in mind as I'm sure you know that the secrecy of the SDS and the need to know most special branch officers did not appreciate the full uh uh remit of or the existence of
00:20:41 full uh uh remit of or the existence of the SDS uh until uh they reached command rank.
00:20:42 rank. Yes, thank you. Um, Peter Felen as Daxo s at that time and who had previously been commander operations would certainly have known
00:21:00 operations would certainly have known about the SDS and its deployments upon his handover to you as commander operations. Would you agree? Yes.
00:21:04 Yes. Um, what sort of thing, if you can recall, did he um pass over to you in terms of the knowledge of what the SDS were doing at that time? Well, bearing
00:21:17 were doing at that time? Well, bearing in mind we'd worked closely in adjacent offices for uh years before it. I had known Peter Phelin for some 30 years before and so we'd merged our careers in terms of experience over that time.
00:21:32 terms of experience over that time. There wasn't a great deed for a specific briefing moving from commander ops to DAC or backwards in respect of Peter Felin and I. We knew one another well. We knew the jobs. We knew the remit of
00:21:46 We knew the jobs. We knew the remit of those jobs and we knew how far uh uh we needed to cooperate or deal with it individually. But specifically about his knowledge at that time in handing over to you as
00:21:57 that time in handing over to you as commander ops and becoming your um line manager effectively as DAXO about the SDS and its operations. What was the sort of information you received?
00:22:04 received? We were next door. uh if there was any concerns uh we would speak at any time. Um but obviously there were some issues uh that um would be delicate in respect
00:22:18 uh that um would be delicate in respect of the sensitivity of escort and I have no doubt although I can't recall specifically I have no doubt that Peter Feland briefed me on that and if he didn't I would probably have asked
00:22:31 didn't I would probably have asked but you don't recall specifics now. Um, would officers above Daxo have also known about the SDS?
00:39:17 Do you think you were aware of um allegations of criminality against um Mr. Scott or would you have been if there were such allegations? I should have been if there were any allegations live at that time. But I
00:39:29 allegations live at that time. But I again I can't help you because my memory doesn't cover this this particular case and and it's troubled me.
00:39:40 and and it's troubled me. No. Um there was um reference um in these minutes to uh an an adverse AQR on on DC Stefan Scott um which had been served upon him and that that was part of the reasoning clearly for his removal from SDS duties. Do you think that an
00:39:54 from SDS duties. Do you think that an awareness of criminality in addition to that adverse appraisal could have been a reason you wrote untrue next to a comment in a letter from the force consultant psychiatrist to the chief
00:40:15 consultant psychiatrist to the chief medical officer that Stefan's gut was taken out of his role entirely as a result of an adverse AQR with no reference to criminality. I can't help you with the detail. Well, I mean, what you've just said seems logical,
00:40:32 logical, but I can't answer something that I just cannot remember. and and I wish I could, but it's obvious from these minutes and the documents that I read and have reread uh that I was uh closely involved in the Scott case and and uh as I say the the the decisions taken at the time, although
00:40:46 decisions taken at the time, although this is hypothetical now, I don't think I would have made any different. Grateful. Um were issues of potential possible criminality to be dealt with? um as a separate matter to uh
00:41:01 um as a separate matter to uh disciplinary or welfare issues at this time in general. They would be part of the whole in respect of deciding how to deal with the
00:41:12 respect of deciding how to deal with the Scott case I assume. Um they wouldn't be compartmentalized because they could involve both disciplinary if they involved both criminal and disciplinary matters they would be part of the
00:41:25 matters they would be part of the totality of the decision-making process. Was there at this time generally a prioritization of secrecy, the secrecy of the SDS and its operational security that you've referred to already in your evidence over potential disciplinary or criminal
00:41:38 over potential disciplinary or criminal investigation of a UCO's criminality or misconduct? Well, Miss S, as I mentioned in an earlier uh answer, there was an
00:41:54 in an earlier uh answer, there was an overriding concern that the secrecy of the SDS and the classification of the work of the SDS should be kept to an absolute close need to know. And yes, it would have been a consideration in
00:42:06 would have been a consideration in making judgments on whether or not uh a discipline or a criminal uh uh case would follow a particular incident. But again, I I can't go into the I can't explain the detail of what decisions
00:42:20 explain the detail of what decisions were made in respect of discipline or criminal. But as I say, looking at the paperwork and reading the minutes, I think I made the right judgment.
00:42:36 I think I made the right judgment. Um, was there a concern in um the Metropolitan Police special branch that if the underlying details of the Scut affair became public that there was a risk that the SDS could have been closed down?
00:42:49 down? Well, it just wasn't Scut uh any detail uh in respect of the work of the SDS. And I can't emphasize highly enough, it was a top secret unit operating in a a statutory vacuum at the behest of the
00:43:00 statutory vacuum at the behest of the government home office. And as far as the branch were concerned, any handling
00:43:13 the branch were concerned, any handling of SDS, information, intelligence, etc. had to be at the highest and most discreet level uh because of the embarrassment that it could have been caused to the home office and to
00:43:25 caused to the home office and to government if the work and understanding of the SDS had been made public at that time.
00:43:27 time. was um secrecy uh and the secrecy of of operations and the operational security of operations of the SDS um a decisive factor or a significant factor in
00:43:40 factor or a significant factor in I don't say it was a deciding factor but it would be a significant factor in any consideration on what action to take in respect of an individual or a set of circumstances because it affected both
00:43:53 circumstances because it affected both the judgment of the chief superintendent of esquad and ultimately my judgment when it comes to dealing with matters that were referred to me would have taken into account the need for the
00:44:10 taken into account the need for the utmost security of this operation and I can't emphasize that enough. Was there any and that wasn't our doing that was the government and home office wish.
00:44:25 government and home office wish. Yes. Was there any concern at the time that a culture developed within the SDS and indeed potentially wider in um special branch of covering up criminality or bad behavior by UCOs? No.
00:44:34 No. But isn't that the necessary consequence of the level of secrecy to which you've referred? what is a product of having to uh take into account a range of circumstances one of which maybe not the overriding uh uh and final judgment is
00:44:51 overriding uh uh and final judgment is the secrecy of the operation uh but uh I don't think in any sense was I aware that there was a culture of secrecy to avoid doing things or admitting things
00:45:02 avoid doing things or admitting things it was this culture of secrecy about the very existence of the work of the SDS and If but if criminality or misconduct on behalf of UCOs's became public that secrecy would be in jeopardy and
00:45:16 secrecy would be in jeopardy and therefore the unit itself it existence could be
00:45:19 could be obviously and that that was part of the decision-making process that I and others had to make when it came to the the delicate area of UCOs's committing criminal offenses and we had to take
00:45:37 criminal offenses and we had to take into account not just the circumstances of the case the overriding need of the interests of justice, but also the overriding need of government and the
00:45:52 overriding need of government and the home office that whatever action we took should not jeopardize the publicity of SDS activities and I can't emphasize that enough. Yes, thank you. Um just returning then to Scott. Um
00:46:05 to Scott. Um having approved his removal from the SDS at that early stage. Um you acknowledge um in this document uh pages one and two. We must of course pay more attention to his post SDS counseling and any supervision stroke
00:46:27 counseling and any supervision stroke welfare matters that may arise. You also approved his transfer to B squad. Um that do you accept that from the documents? I accept it from the documents but I cannot recall that process.
00:46:41 cannot recall that process. No. Um you write a minute to Daxo Peter Felen on the 16th of May 1988 where you write um it's at uh page four minute five. Uh, nevertheless, we do have a potential welfare problem and I will closely monitor that and his rehabilitation to normal duties. And you
00:46:54 rehabilitation to normal duties. And you continued, however, in my interview with him, he did disclose that he was totally shattered by these events and would be gone from the force by Christmas. From
00:47:06 gone from the force by Christmas. From my own judgment of his present demeanor, I have also recommended to PT17 that he be removed from the list of authorized firearms officers. um was that a precautionary
00:47:17 um was that a precautionary um course of action um in that you didn't want him able to use a firearm when there was a concern about his mental health?
00:47:29 mental health? Well, obviously we were taking into account the risk the individual posed to himself and to the organization in respect of the activities or alleged
00:47:41 respect of the activities or alleged activities that were under consideration at the time. And as I say, reading that minute,
00:47:42 minute, I saw Scott in my office. I can't remember it. I don't remember at all. And that troubles me because I ought to
00:47:56 And that troubles me because I ought to remember a meeting I had and I ought to remember the direct and detailed process, decision-making process that I was involved in, which I stand by in the minutes, but I'm troubled I can't
00:48:07 minutes, but I'm troubled I can't remember it. Yes, we understand, Mr. Gunn, and we're very grateful for your efforts. Just so that you're reassured there's no criticism in relation to a lack of memory. If you don't remember,
00:48:18 lack of memory. If you don't remember, you don't remember. I'm just trying to establish the sort of course of events from from the documents and ask you a
00:48:35 from from the documents and ask you a few supplementary questions um to see if you can assist further. Um in a further minute to commander of PT4 and to Daxo security from you dated the same date the 16th of May. You made them aware of your concerns saying during my interview with Detective Constable Scott I was
00:48:46 with Detective Constable Scott I was concerned that he might be suffering from depression result depression resultant from his AQR. and you gave them various asurances um regarding his welfare stating you would closely
00:48:58 welfare stating you would closely monitor that and his rehabilitation to normal duties and that you counseledled him on both professional and domestic issues and offered both medical and welfare assistance. He rejected both
00:49:10 welfare assistance. He rejected both offers but I will consider to monitor these matters. Do you have um any sense of now of how you were going to monitor those welfare issues in relation to him?
00:49:24 those welfare issues in relation to him? I stand by the judgment that it would be uh prudent to let Scott go on an ill health pension and the circumstances led me to to that conclusion rather than
00:49:36 me to to that conclusion rather than follow a disciplinary case. As far as the welfare issues are concerned, I think we need to remember we're talking about 30 40 years ago where welfare considerations both in the police
00:49:48 considerations both in the police generally and indeed in special branch were not as sophisticated as they are today.
00:49:51 today. We didn't know in those days the potential psychological damage that this work was doing to these officers. Maybe we should have done but we didn't. And the medics will tell you and I can tell
00:50:10 the medics will tell you and I can tell you personally having had my own medical blip earlier this year and the benefit of counseling in respect of that how much or how little was known in the 70s and 80s about those matters and would we have dealt with it differently? I sus
00:50:24 have dealt with it differently? I sus suggest we wouldn't have dealt with it differently but we would have been forewarned about it that we weren't at the time.
00:50:36 the time. Thank you. Um on the 12th of June 1988, um Mr. Scott went absent without leave. As you've um referred to, he went missing. On being informed that he'd been located, um you directed officers
00:50:47 been located, um you directed officers to escort him to the Metropolitan Police um nursing home and you spoke with the doctors requesting that he remain in the medical center pending a full examination uh by a doctor and Dr. farewell the force psychiatrist
00:50:59 force psychiatrist and um you informed them of your concerns um that he may be suffering from depression. Um we get that from the documents. You then updated um Daxos
00:51:12 documents. You then updated um Daxos Felen writing because of the very real possibility of compromising his position in his covert role and possibly other es squad activities I did not feel it
00:51:23 squad activities I did not feel it prudent indeed practical to launch into a discipline investigation at that time and you say as you are aware it is my
00:51:34 and you say as you are aware it is my firm view that DC Scott's case should be pursued on a welfare medical basis unless and until we have good reason to institute discipline inquiries. As such, we must now await the outcome of medical stroke psychiatric examination of him
00:51:47 stroke psychiatric examination of him before taking any further action. And sir, for your note, um it's page seven, minute 8, paragraph three of this same document. Um
00:51:58 document. Um what was the thinking then behind dealing with um Stefan Scott on a welfare medical basis rather than investigating potential disciplinary offenses?
00:52:13 offenses? Well, I think as I've already explained in some detail, there was an overriding need to protect the security, sensitivity, and classification of the special demonstration squad's activities. It would have been a feature
00:52:27 activities. It would have been a feature and a very strong feature in my decision as indeed was shown by the minutes. And by you asking further questions on Scott is troubling me even more because I ought to remember Scott was in my office
00:52:45 ought to remember Scott was in my office allegedly. I was instrumental in the man being uh pensioned out on an ill health rather than a discipline. They are crucial decisions that I would have had to have made and did make for the reasons I mentioned earlier that I felt it was best for Scott and it was best
00:52:58 it was best for Scott and it was best for the Metropolitan Police and I have to say it was best for the Home Office in Government that he should be allowed to retire in a dignified uh and quiet
00:53:11 to retire in a dignified uh and quiet way rather than the paraphernalia of a discipline case which would have attracted huge publicity. And was the publicity the overriding factor? I mean, is is a disciplinary investigation
00:53:23 is is a disciplinary investigation mutually exclusive from medical ill health?
00:53:25 health? I don't say it was overriding, Miss Hukot. What I do say is it was powerful. I see. And are the two processes mutually exclusive, disciplinary
00:53:38 mutually exclusive, disciplinary investigation and medical ill health retirement? Or could both have been explored?
00:53:44 explored? Sorry, I didn't quite I'm having trouble with my hearing aids. I'm afraid I'm missing some of what you say. I'll try and speak up. Um I was asking whether the two approaches, disciplinary investigation Yes. and medical ill health retirement are mutually
00:53:58 health retirement are mutually exclusive. Couldn't you consider doing both?
00:54:03 both? Well, it could, but if that was the case, it wouldn't have solved the problem of the publicity that I was trying to avoid. Yes, so uh yes uh uh as a
00:54:15 so uh yes uh uh as a a consideration of the the uh the whole of the circumstances both discipline and disciplinary issues and I think you see from the minutes it it was uh detailed right up to DAC level
00:54:36 it was uh detailed right up to DAC level and beyond in respect of uh the activity and it was agreed that it was best for all concern for Scott to go on an ill health and I Okay. Uh I'm I'm taking that from the judgment of the minute which I wouldn't have changed. Thank you. Um you met with the
00:54:51 Thank you. Um you met with the consulting physician, we understand from the documents. So I understand. Um would that have been usual in such circumstances? I'm not sure whether it would have been usual, but it would have been a
00:55:03 usual, but it would have been a consideration that was important because if Scott was a legend, psychological damage, then I was in no position to judge his psychology. As I've mentioned earlier, having had some depression myself, I now know the effects that it
00:55:19 myself, I now know the effects that it can have. Uh, and I might have been in a better position to judge it. But in those days, we didn't. But we were concerned about the welfare of officers. It just wasn't so sophisticated in terms of its response as it is today.
00:55:33 of its response as it is today. Yes. What was the purpose though of of you as commander operations um meeting a a consultant physician um in circumstances such as these? Well, the purpose was to understand and get
00:55:51 the purpose was to understand and get medical specialists advice as to whether what Scott was alleging that and indeed we had identified he was having some psychological problems was so uh it was part of the decision-making process. If you have got medical evidence that overrides
00:56:03 overrides some disciplinary action maybe uh particularly minor disciplinary action if you have overriding medical evidence
00:56:20 if you have overriding medical evidence adding to the issues I referred earlier about secrecy then it would possibly tick the scale but I again I don't recall seeing uh the medical officer and I I'm not sure whether I was supposed to have met the psychiatrist. as well. I think I was from the minutes. Um, and I think
00:56:34 from the minutes. Um, and I think justifying the fact that this was my minute. Uh, I think I've even annotated something in the in in in the uh paragraph. So, I don't deny any of the action that was taken. I just can't
00:56:46 action that was taken. I just can't remember it. Would there have been a a possibility of um persuasion or pressure brought to bear by the Metropolitan um
00:56:57 brought to bear by the Metropolitan um police special branch of the doctors to go down that medical welfare route, that medical ill health retirement? Well, I it's hypothetical because I can't remember it, but under no circumstances
00:57:09 remember it, but under no circumstances would I have put pressure on the medical experts in respect of their advice as to the true medical condition of uh of the the officer. Uh that would be wholly
00:57:20 the officer. Uh that would be wholly improper. And why would we call upon them if uh uh if it wasn't a genuine desire to find out the specialist advice?
00:57:31 advice? Um thank you. you uh referred in a later report to uh DAX uh Felen, it's at page 8, minute
00:57:42 DAX uh Felen, it's at page 8, minute nine of the same document at tab 53 to the previous SDS case earlier this year
00:57:53 the previous SDS case earlier this year where the officer was granted a medical retirement with a 30% injury award following diagnosis that he was suffering a personality disorder arising from an alter ego problem. Um that is a closed officer. um HN155.
00:58:11 closed officer. um HN155. Um it happened earlier uh you dealt with that case earlier in the year in February 1988. Do you have any recollection of that particular case? I I I understand the comment in the minute and that seems perfectly
00:58:25 minute and that seems perfectly reasonable but I don't recall it. Okay. And without Well, if you let me continue. Yeah. if you let me continue. Um, HN155, as I've said, is a closed officer, so
00:58:42 as I've said, is a closed officer, so please don't say his name, but do you now sitting here today know who I'm talking about?
00:58:50 Sorry. Uh, do you know who HN155 is?
00:58:51 is? No. Could we provide him with the
00:58:59 without revealing his name? Can you take a look at who HN155 is?
00:59:32 Sorry, did you say HN15? Uh, no. 155.
00:59:48 Oh, yes. Yes. Do you rec without Yes, I do. You know who it is? Yes.
00:59:57 Yes. Um, does that help refresh your memory as to your involvement in that officer's disciplinary case or not? His relevance to the Scott case I can't say but I mean uh I I do recall
01:00:11 I do recall that particular officer and the circumstances of an ill health case that he was involved in but I can't remember the detail. Yes, thank you. um
01:00:24 Yes, thank you. um at um going back to MPS0740892
01:00:35 at page 8 minute nine um you reported that you had stressed that we were we were concerned lest alter ego should become an easy excuse for any SDS officer to put forward
01:00:50 for any SDS officer to put forward whenever he experienced a professional or domestic problem adding that such grounds should not become an easy option.
01:00:52 option. what the inquiry understands um here is meant by alter ego is is his role as an undercover officer. Is that your understanding?
01:01:07 understanding? Yes. And and it's obviously an issue uh bearing in mind again we're talking 30 40 years ago. We didn't understand entirely the effects psychologically or
01:01:18 entirely the effects psychologically or otherwise that this operation had on not just the officers but the so-called victims. uh and I uh understand that the medical requirements at that stage in
01:01:33 medical requirements at that stage in terms of welfare were not sophisticated as I said but we would come to a conclusion based upon the information that was available to us as to whether it was an appropriate decision and I
01:01:48 it was an appropriate decision and I think in that particular officer's case we did come to the conclusion that a medical
01:01:53 medical retirement was was Right. But we also had to take into account the wider picture that there was the possibility of people ducking out from a responsibility either medical or discipline by claiming uh damage
01:02:05 discipline by claiming uh damage medically from their operation and and I understand that but we didn't then.
01:02:17 I understand that but we didn't then. Is that what you think you meant by easy excuse and easy option? That was the concern at the time. I might have used the phrase easy option. uh uh slightly facitiously I sus suspect um but it would have been an
01:02:33 suspect um but it would have been an easier option for the officer uh but I don't for one minute alleged that against that particular officer. Thank you. Um here there's reference to um uh a domestic problem uh
01:02:48 domestic problem uh being a reason why this alter ego um defense might apply. Can you help us with what sort of domestic problem uh might a defense of alter ego apply? Well, these officers that were undercover or operating under extreme
01:03:01 undercover or operating under extreme stress, we never really understood at that stage, and we should have done, I suppose, but we didn't, the extreme stress that these officers were under. And it wasn't just them. They were living a lie. They were living a
01:03:17 living a lie. They were living a different world to their home life with their family. and we didn't fully understand that, I'm quite sure. Um, that's a matter of regret, but it's a fact of life 30, 40 years ago, I'm afraid. I
01:03:31 afraid. I Is that um is there a possibility that that reference was an illusion to um undercover officers having deceitful sexual relationships in their cover ident?
01:03:43 ident? I'm sorry, I didn't get that. Is the reference there to a domestic problem alluding to the risk of undercover police officers having deceitful sexual relationships?
01:03:55 deceitful sexual relationships? Well, obviously there's obviously a risk uh that any extrammarital sexual relationships of the undercover officers would affect their marriage. uh and taking into account the interests of the of the family was part of the process,
01:04:09 of the family was part of the process, but it probably didn't obviously didn't work because it wasn't good. But that that reference there to um an alter ego defense being an easy excuse
01:04:21 alter ego defense being an easy excuse for an SDS officer to put forward when he experienced a domestic problem. Is that an acknowledgement of the risk of um UCOs having deceitful sexual relationships in their undercover identity?
01:04:35 identity? I don't think it's an acknowledgement. I think it's an accepted risk. Thank you. Um going back to the chronology then on the same day you informed um Dax Felen
01:04:46 the same day you informed um Dax Felen that you had spoken with the consultant psychiatrist and um in relation to Mr. gut and had emphasized our side of the case. And that's at page eight of the same document, minute 10. Sir, um
01:05:04 same document, minute 10. Sir, um what did you mean by um emphasizing our side of the case to the consultant psychiatrist? Well, I would imagine uh I can't call precisely at this stage, but I would imagine it would about the sensitivity of the work that the officer was doing. I mean quite clearly uh the force
01:05:22 I mean quite clearly uh the force medical officer needed to be aware uh of some of the detail if not all the detail. I'm not sure whether the psychiatrist who was a stranger bought in to it. I don't think he was a force psychiatrist who didn't have such a
01:05:35 psychiatrist who didn't have such a thing in those days. Um I don't think he would probably have been aware but the sensitivities of explaining uh the background to the work the officers were doing which I say again was unique. We
01:05:48 doing which I say again was unique. We hadn't done this before. We were on the rim and the outside of the law on many occasions and these issues had to be based upon judgment taken in good faith at the time and 40 30 years later trying to rewrite history andor reassess the
01:06:04 to rewrite history andor reassess the circumstances that we were under then I think is not particularly fair. Yes. Thank you. Um you recorded um in your minute I reiterated to the doctor our concern in this case both about the
01:06:21 our concern in this case both about the sensitivity of the issue which you've um repeatedly referred to and the need to protect our continuing operations. I also mentioned our concern about the alter ego problem. Dr. farewell in
01:06:32 alter ego problem. Dr. farewell in response expressed concern about uh DC Scott's apparent mental and medical condition and advised that he should not be seen by any police officer until so advised. That's page 9, minute 10, sir.
01:06:47 advised. That's page 9, minute 10, sir. Um despite that, you obtained uh Daxo S. Felen's approval to visit uh Scott to retrieve some confidential documents. Um the inquiry understands that the concern about the documents um he held was that
01:06:58 about the documents um he held was that they related to his covert role and that um their return was necessary to prevent compromise of DC Scut's role SDS
01:07:13 compromise of DC Scut's role SDS operations generally and to protect the safety of colleagues still engaged on operations. Is that right? I think that's entirely sensible. Um you recorded that Dr. the farewell had agreed to HN 337 visiting Mr. Scott
01:07:27 had agreed to HN 337 visiting Mr. Scott for the particular purpose of retrieving the documents and that he would call Mr. Scott first. Um we we see that from uh the the documents following the
01:07:39 the the documents following the successful retrieval of the documents. You issued instructions that there be no contact with Mr. Scott and any unexpected contact to be reported to you immediately. That's page 10 and minute
01:07:51 immediately. That's page 10 and minute 11 of the same document. Um, presumably the reason for that instruction was that once the documents had been retrieved,
01:08:05 once the documents had been retrieved, um, you were concerned as Dr. Farewell was about his mental health and his welfare.
01:08:06 welfare. Well, yes, that goes back to the point I made earlier. I'm not sure that Dr. Farewell was aware of of the nature and indeed Dr. Bach would would not have been aware of the specific details of
01:08:17 been aware of the specific details of the operation, but he would be aware of the high classification, the top secret sensitivity of the operation, and that was a matter for Dr. Bot to take into account when he did his medical thing.
01:08:33 account when he did his medical thing. Yeah, thank you. Um, as a result of a report um, received, I don't think we need to bring it up on screen, but it's MPS0740937.
01:08:51 It's a tab 60 of your bundle. Sir, um you visited North Yorkshire uh police to establish what records they held on Mr. Scott. Um we see that from uh the documents and uh pages 10 and 11 minute 12 of 0740892.
01:09:07 Um the concern about um the uh North Yorkshire Police's records was that um Mr. Scott may have revealed to or indeed did reveal to them uh details about his SDS duties. Is that right?
01:09:26 For me, the the travel to North Yorkshire is one of the most troubling parts.
01:09:28 parts. If I saw, and I can't remember, but I must have seen somebody at ACPO level, a chief conipal or assistant chief conipal, I must have been driven all the
01:09:40 conipal, I must have been driven all the way to North Yorkshire and back. For me, not now to be able to remember any of that mystifies me and troubles me. But whatever
01:09:50 whatever happened, it would have been for the specific purpose of maintaining the security of the SDS in respect of the reputation of the Metropolitan Police
01:10:05 reputation of the Metropolitan Police and the need to know. And we if we had information around
01:10:08 around Scut activities in North Yorkshire or elsewhere, then we would need to verify
01:10:19 elsewhere, then we would need to verify and or try and minimize the damage that could potentially have been caused on that. But as I say, you don't remember it? I can't remember. Um, you would have wanted the records they held to be destroyed. And I think we see from the paperwork that they
01:10:30 we see from the paperwork that they agreed to do that. Does that sound um like the purpose one of the purposes of of attending? Well, I don't recall, but I don't see why I would want wanted the paperwork
01:10:41 why I would want wanted the paperwork destroyed. It doesn't seem to follow. Uh it was a matter of record. Uh we weren't trying to hide anything. Um but again, I I if I said that, I can't recall why.
01:10:56 I if I said that, I can't recall why. and you wanted um their assurance that they wouldn't disseminate any thing they'd been told further presumably. Well, obviously um you uh later addressed the course of action to be taken against Mr. Scott um
01:11:12 action to be taken against Mr. Scott um writing um it is unfortunate that Scott not only broke his cover but also reprehensively gave details of the nature of his SDS work to unauthorized persons. I fear that little will be achieved in pursuing any disciplinary
01:11:24 achieved in pursuing any disciplinary action against Scott. Indeed, we have more to lose. Suitable damage limitation has been taken in respect of North Yorkshire Police Force. And I feel this particular facet of the Scut Saga must
01:11:39 particular facet of the Scut Saga must rest there. And that's page 11, minute 12 of the same document. Sir, um, why did you consider there was little to be achieved by pursuing disciplinary
01:11:50 achieved by pursuing disciplinary action? I stand by the judgment I made in respect of the sensitivity and security needs of the work that Scott was involved in and the potential for that matter becoming public with the huge
01:12:02 huge danger and difficulty it would created both politically and policewise for us and government.
01:12:13 and government. And is that what you think you meant by we have more to lose? Possibly. Yeah.
01:12:24 Possibly. Yeah. Um, and the we in that sentence, is that the police, the government, or both? Both.
01:12:31 Both. Um, was part of what was to be lost a good reputation of the Metropolitan Police special branch? I'm sorry, say again. Was part of what could potentially be lost by pursuing disciplinary action
01:12:45 lost by pursuing disciplinary action against Mr. got the good reputation of Metropolitan Police special branch in the eyes of the public. Well, it would have been an issue. Yes. And uh it was taken I mean again I'm struggling to
01:12:58 struggling to to recall uh which I can't the detail and by looking at these documents I could only judge what I did then and comment upon uh what I feel uh was the reason for making that judgment. There
01:13:14 reason for making that judgment. There was also uh looking at these minutes and I don't know whether I'm able to say this but there was also quite a strong involvement of the security service in this issue.
01:13:28 this issue. Yes, I'll come to that um a little later if if if I may. Um and I'll ask you some questions on that in a moment. Thank you. Um just finishing off this um document. Um, as you've repeatedly, um, referred to, part of what could be lost, as
01:13:39 to, part of what could be lost, as referred to in this document, is the secrecy of the SDS. Yes.
01:13:42 Yes. Um,
01:13:47 Um, if it became public, um, that an SDS UCO had had gone off the rails in in this way, um, would the continued existence of the SDS also be in jeopardy? Of course. Um you've referred to um the
01:14:03 Um you've referred to um the and if I may add to that yes
01:14:06 yes the efficiency and effectiveness of the SDS at the time in terms of the information it was providing the intelligence it was providing was crucial to the home office to the government to the security service at the time so it wouldn't just been a
01:14:18 the time so it wouldn't just been a question of the SDS folding that vital
01:14:29 question of the SDS folding that vital intelligence that we were asked to gain which we did over the years would have gone. Where is the vacuum that would have filled that? And I think we're viewing some of that today with the mismatch between intelligence and public order problems. Yes, Bessie. Thank you. Um,
01:14:44 Yes, Bessie. Thank you. Um, in your statement at paragraph 79F, you say the security service was possibly more concerned about revelations by DC Scut than even we were. Can you elaborate on that for us, please?
01:14:56 elaborate on that for us, please? Well, yes, I can. uh in respect of the generality of security service uh involvement in SDS matters. I mean I can't specifically say their invol I've
01:15:09 can't specifically say their invol I've read the minutes about the their concern their serious concern about SCUP but I can't recall the detail. The security service knew exactly what we were doing in the SDS. They lived off the product. They enjoyed the product. They even
01:15:24 They enjoyed the product. They even targeted and helped targeting. So it's important that the security services were part of the equation when it came to decision-making process on all matters dealing with SDS that might
01:15:35 matters dealing with SDS that might affect the security service work. And it's no good saying I was upstairs collecting fairs at the time. They were involved in most of the work uh of the SDS
01:15:46 most of the work uh of the SDS particularly in the early days when we were ste we were dealing with subversion extremism
01:15:51 extremism left which is uh was the security service province and uh I think I have to say having listened to each of the
01:16:02 to say having listened to each of the tranches every bit of evidence that's been delivered to this inquiry so far I don't see much from the security service in terms of supporting or justifying
01:16:14 in terms of supporting or justifying what we did in those days and I think that is a matter of concern. Thank you. Um did the um collective concerns that you've um uh repeatedly
01:16:25 concerns that you've um uh repeatedly referred to amongst both the MPS and the security service. the desire to keep the SDS a secret, their operations uh a secret, effectively prohibit
01:16:36 secret, effectively prohibit um disciplinary action or criminal prosecution of uh an undercover police officer in the didn't prohibit the action, I would suspect, and again, I'm going back to the minutes. It didn't prohibit because
01:16:50 the minutes. It didn't prohibit because it would have been a police operational decision as to whether or not a disciplinary action was started and progressed. What it did do was influence andor be
01:17:01 What it did do was influence andor be part of the judgment as to which action was best to take. And I can only assume looking at the minutes and the details that I don't recall, it was judged at
01:17:17 that I don't recall, it was judged at that time with the full agreement of the security service that a disciplinary route would not have been a wise or prudent way of dealing with this matter in respect of the downside that would have come from the publicity that would
01:17:31 have come from the publicity that would inev inevitably have followed. And as I say, I although I still can't remember the details of the case, I I I would stand by that today given the same set of circumstances. Was there any um recognition or
01:17:43 Was there any um recognition or consideration that such influence that secrecy and security of operations had over other factors was a rather
01:17:56 over other factors was a rather dangerous precedent to set amongst um the SDS and and what action to take against UCOs. the the special branch had many experienced
01:18:07 many experienced and uh diligent officers at all levels. Although you could be surprised thinking it from some of the details that have been presented in this inquiry but
01:18:20 been presented in this inquiry but the experience of the special branch officers particularly the managers in conjunction with the home office in conjunction with the security service there was a common agreement and I can't
01:18:40 there was a common agreement and I can't emphasize this enough there was a common agreement that the secrecy and confidentiality and knowledge of the work of the SDS should be kept to an absolute need to
01:18:54 should be kept to an absolute need to know and that need to know I don't think has fully been uh explained yet to this inquiry.
01:18:59 inquiry. Thank you. Um sir, I'm conscious of the time. Would that be a convenient moment to break?
01:19:04 to break? So we'll um break for 15 minutes and resume.
01:19:05 resume. Thank you very much.
01:19:09 All right guys.
01:34:15 I'll pause a moment. There we go.
01:34:28 Mr. Gun, um I'll continue just finishing off the chronology in relation to the Scutair, if I may, appreciating, as you've already said, your lack of recollection. Um so there had been early medical advice that prohibited contact with Mr. Scott, as we dealt with just
01:34:42 with Mr. Scott, as we dealt with just before the break. Um following um your approach to the chief medical officer and the force psychiatrist, they agreed that the pressing operational need to assess potential damage limitation
01:34:56 assess potential damage limitation factors overrode the medical concern for Scott. That's um sir that same document 0740892
01:35:05 0740892 at page 12 minute 13. Um you you've referred a number of times to the competing um factors of secrecy, operational security, safety of the undercover officers and the factors of of Mr. Scut's welfare. Um
01:35:20 of Mr. Scut's welfare. Um is that an example of the pressing operational need um overriding temporarily Mr. Scut's welfare in order to um assure yourself that there was indeed damage limitation? Well, it's
01:35:32 indeed damage limitation? Well, it's part of the consideration in the round. Yes.
01:35:35 Yes. Thank you. Um, so you instructed officers to visit um, Mr. Scott to gain his confidence and ascertain whether he had made any further unauthorized disclosures. Um, the purpose of the
01:35:47 disclosures. Um, the purpose of the visit was recorded as being to establish his current demeanor and whether or not he may have disclosed similar details to any other un other unauthorized source.
01:35:59 any other un other unauthorized source. Um when the visit was refused um Dax OS Felen ordered an unannounced approach. Um that's is at page 13 of that document at minute 15. Um there's no need to put it on screen. Um prior to that planned
01:36:12 it on screen. Um prior to that planned visit, you'd received a copy of a letter from um the consultant psychiatrist um to Dr. Bot, the chief medical officer. And that letter raised serious concerns
01:36:23 And that letter raised serious concerns about um Stefan Scott's mental state and advised against police contact. What do you consider your reaction was likely to have been to that letter at that time? Between a rock and a hard place, I would think. Uh I had to make a judgment.
01:36:35 think. Uh I had to make a judgment. Well, sorry, I'm saying I had to make a judgment. I did make a judgment. I just can't recall it. Yes. But we would have taken I would have taken into account the sensitivity
01:36:50 have taken into account the sensitivity is issues, the medical issues including the psychiatric issues and weighing it all up. I would had to have made a decision. Sometimes you have to make decisions that don't always turn out correct. Uh and certainly 30 or 40 years
01:37:02 correct. Uh and certainly 30 or 40 years later may look a little bit thin, but at the time that I made that decision according to the minute and I say again, I wouldn't have changed it.
01:37:16 I wouldn't have changed it. So you briefed the officers to proceed with the visit. Um that uh visit went ahead. Um you also disagreed with several um of Mr. Scott's claims in the
01:37:28 several um of Mr. Scott's claims in the letter, particularly an allegation that his commander had hinted at an affair. Do you do you take that to be a reference to you? Well, I suppose it must be, but I don't recall it. No. Um
01:37:43 No. Um you said you had arranged um to see Dr. bot and Dr. Farewell to set the record straight. Um, was that essentially to persuade them that some of what Mr. Scott was telling them was untrue so far as you and special branch were concerned?
01:37:54 concerned? No, Miss Simra, as I said before, there was no element of persuasion in respect of the medical opinion. The medics, Dr. Bot and the psychiatrist are experts in what they do. They would not welcome
01:38:06 what they do. They would not welcome intrusion andor uh emphasis on their decision. It's their decision alone. I say again, it's part of the whole jigsaw that I would considered in terms of
01:38:21 that I would considered in terms of coming to the final judgment as to what was best for Mr. Scott. And actually looking at the minutes there, you could say in the end it was equal about
01:38:33 say in the end it was equal about concern for Mr. scut and the reputation of the Metropolitan Police both would have suffered or could have suffered if a different course of action had been taken.
01:38:46 taken. By this stage, do you think you had resolved, at least in your own opinion, that the right course of action was indeed to medically retire Mr. Scott on the grounds of ill health? Well, I must have done. Yes, because that's what happened. Um,
01:38:57 Um, you forwarded uh the letter to Daxo Felen and confirmed that officers had been briefed to attempt contact with Scott and you noted and recorded that Dr. Bot was happy with our actions to
01:39:14 Dr. Bot was happy with our actions to date. That was in the context of those particular circumstances, wasn't it? That setting the record straight. I assume so. I assume so. Yeah.
01:39:27 I assume so. I assume so. Yeah. Balancing those competing factors. Um, following that visit, uh, you wrote in a minute to Daxo Slen, uh, I'm now confident that adequate damage limitation measures have been taken to protect SDS activities and I'm hopeful
01:39:42 protect SDS activities and I'm hopeful that that aspect of the scutair has been resolved. And that's page 14, minute 17 of that same document. Sir, um, you suggested to Daxo S. feeling that Commander P um was made aware and he may want to update um AXO the assistant commissioner.
01:39:53 commissioner. Um at that stage um notwithstanding further advice from Dr. Bot that there should be no visits
01:40:04 Dr. Bot that there should be no visits to Mr. Scott, that's page 15, minute 18. Um you upon being informed of the proposed immediate medical discharge on ill health grounds proposed that Mr. Scott be seen once more to assess his current demeanor.
01:40:18 current demeanor. Why was it necessary at that stage given that decision had been made apparently from the documents to assess his current demeanor?
01:40:26 demeanor? Well, I assume because there was ongoing concern about whether Mr. Scott was going to uh agree with the action that I
01:40:40 going to uh agree with the action that I had recommended. Um I I I don't know the detail behind that, but obviously these things are are just not open and shut. these things have continuum and the issues of Scott would have reverberated after he'd been dealt with. So it was of interest to know uh if we could how Mr.
01:40:59 interest to know uh if we could how Mr. Scott might approach such matters and uh that was presumably the reason for keeping uh in touch or making an assessment of his demeanor. And so would you say that there was still in your view a pressing operational reason to see him at that stage?
01:41:12 see him at that stage? Well, I don't know how many times I've got to say it, but it would have been an operational consideration that was pretty high in our consideration of the whole matter, but it wouldn't
01:41:26 whole matter, but it wouldn't necessarily have been the single well, it wasn't necessarily the single and sole reason. And that's even in circumstances where you state in the minute, minute 19 at page 16, that you were confident his medical retirement would bring matters to a close.
01:41:42 would bring matters to a close. Well, I was at the time, I assume, otherwise I wouldn't have written it. Um,
01:41:45 Um, in relation to um liaison with the security services over this, we touched upon it um before the break. Um there's
01:41:59 upon it um before the break. Um there's a security service meeting with the SDS um where they've noted between DCI Martin Gray and HN 109 a closed officer. Um that's at UCPI
01:42:10 Um that's at UCPI uh 30663
01:42:15 uh 30663 at page three and that's tab 72 of your bundle sir. Um and it's it reads home office. The SDS consider this to be an internal matter only. They may decide to
01:42:27 internal matter only. They may decide to allude to it in their 1988 annual report to the home office, but were very exercised at the idea of the problem being brought to the immediate attention
01:42:39 being brought to the immediate attention of the home office. DCI Malcolm Mloud of C squad strongly supports them in this line and F4 redacted in conversation assured them that we had no intention of saying anything to the home office. in the interest of good F4 SDS relations,
01:42:52 the interest of good F4 SDS relations, they should not be pushed on the point as they are extremely sensitive about it. They will obviously reconsider if the case starts to explode on them. Um, you were asked about that in your witness statement and at 79F
01:43:05 witness statement and at 79F referring to that meeting, you say it's clear the security service was possibly more concerned about revelations by DC Scut than even we were. Um its officer's comment also fails to understand the
01:43:19 comment also fails to understand the nature of the relationship between the MPS and the home office which was properly constrained to policy and funding both generally and specifically in terms of the SDS. DC Scut's removal
01:43:32 in terms of the SDS. DC Scut's removal from the SDS and the subsequent welfare concerns were operational and administrative matters that were wholly and solely the concern of the MPS. But wasn't the real concern about
01:43:45 But wasn't the real concern about informing the Home Office that the Home Office was extremely concerned, as you've said a number of times, to keep
01:43:58 you've said a number of times, to keep SDS operations secret and their funding of them a secret from the public and that this may have revealed um those facts. Well, that may well be a consideration. As as I've said before, it emphasizes the sensitivity in home office circles. not just home office circles, the
01:44:15 not just home office circles, the security service as well about the whole need for secrecy on these operations. Um I'm not aware other than from the minute uh that the security service were clearly as much if not more concerned than we were uh according to the minute.
01:44:35 than we were uh according to the minute. And as I say, I I I don't recall it, but I I stand by it if it's uh written down there. And I think it underlines again what I tried to say earlier that the security service were head and shoulders and above dealing with these matters in respect of keeping the secrecy of this
01:44:47 respect of keeping the secrecy of this operation sacrosan. And we in addition to the security service would take into account the position of the home office
01:44:59 account the position of the home office and government in making those judgments and that I believe is a clear implication of those minutes. Um there was a risk um as we've
01:45:11 Um there was a risk um as we've discussed um earlier this morning that if the full details of the Scutter became known to the Home Office, there was a risk that they may have decided that the SDS couldn't continue as a unit. Is that right?
01:45:25 unit. Is that right? No, that's your judgment and I don't agree with it. Uh it would have been an issue. Uh and as I've said, Home Office was very sensitive about the activities of the SDS and how we controlled the need to know. But I don't think it uh
01:45:38 need to know. But I don't think it uh automatically assumes that your version is that uh it would have changed the SDS um approval by the Home Office. They
01:45:51 um approval by the Home Office. They they funded or part funded part funded the SDS for 25 years. They knew that these were very sensitive, difficult operational matters. So the line between operations
01:46:04 matters. So the line between operations and policy in respect of the police, the security service and the home office was a thin one but it was very important and we had to take into account
01:46:16 we had to take into account sensitivities of each of those players if I could put it that way in respect of any action that was taken uh by the SDS. The scutter as it appears from the
01:46:33 The scutter as it appears from the documents was clearly significant at the time. Don't you consider that the home office should have been told um about the development of of what was happening with Mr. Scott? Well, hindsight's a valuable thing. Maybe you could. I my judgment at the time was not uh and that was an
01:46:46 time was not uh and that was an operational decision for the police. I don't think you should run away with the idea that the home office were uh automatically excluded from every piece
01:47:01 automatically excluded from every piece of information on the SDS. They weren't. Uh there were some operational matters that may have been alluded to. they would had to have been alluded to in respect to the part funding the home
01:47:12 respect to the part funding the home office gave but I don't think that adds up to the fact that uh the home office would have changed their mind just because there was a another bucket coming their way in respect of Scott where you knew in in special branch at the time that the secrecy of SDS
01:47:23 the time that the secrecy of SDS operations and um its operational security was of primary concern to the
01:47:35 security was of primary concern to the home office didn't something such as the scutter affair which threatened that need to be notified to them. Yes, I can take that uh alternative view and I don't say that I was absolutely right. I had to make a judgment. I was between a rock and a hard place and I
01:47:48 between a rock and a hard place and I made that judgment and as the minutes show I explained it. Um would you make a different judgment now with the benefit of hindsight in relation to telling the home?
01:48:00 relation to telling the home? I think that's entirely hypothetical. All I can say is given the same set of circumstances uh I wouldn't have changed the decision I made at the time although I don't recall it. Thank you. Um during the scutter you instructed um
01:48:21 during the scutter you instructed um DCIC docker to conduct a review of the SDS um focusing upon viability recruitment deployment strategy and postfield supervision. I take it from what you've said this morning. You have no
01:48:33 said this morning. You have no particular recollection of that. Or do you? Well, that's exactly my point. Uh, in terms of memory, I should have remembered that. I mean, that was a
01:48:46 remembered that. I mean, that was a perfectly proper and legitimate response that I did to uh Mr. Docker in respect of reviewing the work of the SDS in respect of the scutter fair. It was time we reviewed its viability, the need for
01:49:00 we reviewed its viability, the need for it, how we trained our officers, how the welfare aspects were dealt with. And I think all my minute there, and as I say, I don't recall making it, but I wouldn't have made it any different today um covered those areas of proper
01:49:14 covered those areas of proper supervision of the SDS by the management of special branch. Yes. And I don't think any uh any other interpretation is viable. Yes. Thank you. And sir, for your note, it's it's MPS0731676,
01:49:39 page 1, minute 1A, tab 61 of your bundle for um the request for the review. The recommendations of that review by DCI docker are at MPS072
01:49:51 docker are at MPS072 6998 at page seven and that's tab 39 of your bundle. Sir, I just want to go to some of those recommendations and ask you about them. Mr. Gun, um you have addressed those recommendations um in
01:50:04 addressed those recommendations um in some detail and you you have said that you supported um DCI Dockers's recommendations. Um, one of them concerned um the background of a UCO and you and it said this. Whenever possible, only
01:50:16 it said this. Whenever possible, only married officers with a stable family background should be selected for SDS duties, although there should not be a total bar on the recruitment of single officers who may be deemed especially
01:50:37 officers who may be deemed especially suitable. And you emphasize that only in wholly exceptional cases should single officers be considered and then only after prior discussion with the candidate squad chief superintendent and commander ops. Um I take it you don't have a particular recollection of that recommendation.
01:50:52 recommendation. I don't have a recollection but it's one that I would have made uh uh again given the circumstances.
01:50:58 the circumstances. Yes. And I'll I'll I'm going to come to that particular recommendation a little later if I may, but just dealing with the others. You also approved the recommendation of the convening of a case conference chaired by commander operations P and chief superintendent C at which the SDS candidate selections
01:51:13 at which the SDS candidate selections would be confirmed having regard to an oral presentation by the SDS DCI. Um, you also approved the recommendation for psychiatric testing of SDS
01:51:28 for psychiatric testing of SDS candidates at the recruitment stage and of former UCOs as part of the post SDS supervision procedure. Is that right? Yes. Doesn't that strike you as a sensible reaction to uh an affair that
01:51:40 sensible reaction to uh an affair that Scott had created uh for the SDS? I was trying to oversee the reaction and correction of anything lessons we needed to know at the time and that seemed to me in terms of
01:51:51 and that seemed to me in terms of looking through those minutes uh of recommendations that they seemed to be valid.
01:51:58 valid. Thank you. um you noted um at page five of of MPS0726998
01:52:13 uh minute four it's tab 39 again sir that the real problem as you say lay in the necessarily long range of supervision given to field officers and that some tightening was desirable. Um what was the concern about the
01:52:25 what was the concern about the necessarily long reigns of supervision so far as um well I think just as the min says the the the essence of the undercover work that these officers were doing was
01:52:46 that these officers were doing was entirely different as I tried to explain earlier to the normal undercover work which was short-lived focused uh specifically requiring uh getting evidence to prefer charges The SDS operation was entirely different. Well, not entirely different. It was built upon the same, and this is a point that's not
01:53:07 and this is a point that's not necessarily been, I think, understood by the inquiry. Undercover policing is all about deception, deceit, intrigue. I'm sorry, but that's the reality of what undercover policing is. When you have officers dealing with that, there is a sensitivity that they should understand
01:53:23 sensitivity that they should understand the problems that they're going to face, which we tried in terms of uh management. But the SDS officers uh who
01:53:36 management. But the SDS officers uh who were undercover were out on their own in the field sometimes in dangerous circumstances and
01:53:40 and their command was back to the office. I thought at the time, was there some way
01:53:52 thought at the time, was there some way we could put a a a management level or a supervision level to shorten the lines of communication between the poor SD the undercover officers out there on their
01:54:05 undercover officers out there on their own in dangerous circumstances and the back office uh in respect of supervision. And as I say, I don't I again don't remember making this minute, but I'm rather saddened that I can't remember it
01:54:17 rather saddened that I can't remember it because I think I would have said that's exactly the response I would have expected from supervisors of the SDS. And in terms of what you meant by tightening up supervision, uh in
01:54:32 tightening up supervision, uh in practice, is that what you what you've just alluded to a closer link between the back office and the UCO?
01:54:47 the back office and the UCO? Yes. and and for not just the welfare of the officer but also for overseeing some of the behaviors. I mean these officers were out on their own uh and sadly some transgressed um in your it's a matter of a matter of huge regret but it happened. If there had been a closer supervision on the from the
01:55:05 closer supervision on the from the office to the field, it is possible we could have obiated the need for the distress that that caused. Was there a need to also have closer vision from senior officers at your level and just below or you just talking about the SDS itself?
01:55:19 about the SDS itself? No, it's it goes up the chain. But what I've said earlier, you can't well I don't know maybe you can one shouldn't expect the head of the organization the
01:55:31 expect the head of the organization the commander ops when for the very reasons I explained earlier the plethora of activity responsibility and work that he has to had to deal with you can't expect you to know every minuti and detail of the operational uh
01:55:50 minuti and detail of the operational uh activities of SDS officers we relied on the near supervisors the back office, the chief inspector and the superintendent and chief superintendent to provide that information to me. Sadly, it didn't happen on a couple of
01:56:01 Sadly, it didn't happen on a couple of occasions and that's a matter of regret. But the idea in that minute of closer supervision was to to shorten the line of command between those in a difficult position and those in the office.
01:56:16 and those in the office. Thank you. Uh, in your inquiry witness statement at paragraph 33, you acknowledged that the intended level of senior oversight never materialized and you attributed that to not a disregard but to a looser attitude towards
01:56:32 but to a looser attitude towards supervision at that time. Um, looser attitude to supervision by who?
01:56:41 Well, by the chain of command in SDS, I assume
01:56:44 assume and and higher up as well in special branch.
01:56:44 branch. And higher up. Yes. Um and and what did you mean by looser attitude?
01:56:50 attitude? By what?
01:56:51 By what? By looser attitude.
01:57:02 Well, I I can't recall precisely what I meant by it at that stage, but it would presumably have been didn't take into consideration quite as seriously as it should have done.
01:57:19 should have done. Um because wasn't one important reason for the review and the recommendations to address a lack of or an inadequate um level of supervision of UCOs. Yes. So you were expecting those recommendations to be carried forward. Yes.
01:57:28 Yes. Um
01:57:34 Um uh DCI Docker concluded in his review that officers of the special demonstration squad are in a prime position to be able to report on any threat from London's principal subversive groups and it is therefore essential that the SDS be allowed to
01:57:46 essential that the SDS be allowed to continue its role as hitherto. Um, you accepted that conclusion at the time, so presumably you agreed with it. I did.
01:57:57 I did. Um, and you certainly didn't give any further instruction to explore the closing down of the SDS at that stage. So far as we know, certainly not. There were no circumstances that I thought would
01:58:12 circumstances that I thought would justify closing it down. And it wouldn't have just been a decision of special branch to close it down. It would have involved
01:58:21 involved right up to the commissioner. It would have involved the home office and it would have involved the security service.
01:58:23 service. Yes. Thank you. Um in 1988 there was a briefing from the security service outlining a reduction in the
01:58:34 service outlining a reduction in the threat from subversion. Do you recall that? Now
01:58:40 that? Now is this a Harris definition? You were following the Harris definition. Yes. and and the yes I I do recall uh the change uh of definition of subversion and I think the security service took the view that if
01:58:58 security service took the view that if subversion in its new definition was the case then they would back out or not be so interested in my words uh in um public order issues. I think special branch command of which I was part took
01:59:10 branch command of which I was part took a slightly wider view or more pragmatic view can I say of public order uh and we did not accept or at least I didn't accept that certain elements of the
01:59:26 accept that certain elements of the activity that caused public order wasn't described as subversion and I believe that has been justified since in a recommendation that uh Paul, the government security adviser is suggesting there should be a law against
01:59:38 suggesting there should be a law against subversion. So, it's still current today and it's still a matter that was burning into our souls at the time that we were taking on without necessarily the
01:59:50 taking on without necessarily the support or encouragement of the security service on public order matters and that created uh a schism between the two.
02:00:05 created uh a schism between the two. I see. Thank you. Um I' I'd like to leave the scutter now and move to some different topics. Thank you. Um the first one is um Debenhams and the um uh prosecution against Clark and
02:00:16 um uh prosecution against Clark and Shepherd in relation to the incendiary devices um planted at Debenhams. Um you deal with this at um paragraph 148 of
02:00:29 deal with this at um paragraph 148 of your statement. You were asked questions um in your rule nine by the inquiry about that. It's page 58 sir of um Mr. Gun statement and you say that um Metropolitan Police special branch had no involvement in the prosecution um
02:00:50 no involvement in the prosecution um regarding Debenhams of Clark and Shepard to your recollection. Is that right? I believe that to be so it was the operational responsibility the anti-terrorist branch and you personally as commander
02:01:01 and you personally as commander operations didn't play any role that you can recall in the prosecution itself correct
02:01:10 correct um or in any disclosure decisions at the time in relation to the trial. Is that right? Um, should there have been greater involvement by you or uh personally as commander ops or special branch generally given the known
02:01:25 branch generally given the known involvement of Bob Lambert in the runup to um that and in and in the um prosecution itself in respect of the circumstances surrounding that uh issue. Yes, hindsight would say there should have
02:01:36 hindsight would say there should have been closer involvement. I can't say on the morning meetings that we had which included uh Commander Church of Coleman of the anti-terrorist squad. I can't say he didn't actually refer to it. I can't
02:01:47 he didn't actually refer to it. I can't remember but it would seem logical that he would refer to it as a strategic issue but not as an operational issue. Um but obviously with the benefit of hindsight and what's been discovered
02:02:09 hindsight and what's been discovered since a closer SB uh not involvement in the prosecution because there's a se separation lie there but a closer involvement in the events uh or knowledge of the events would probably have been prudent. Thank you. Um, moving on then,
02:02:24 uh, I want to ask you about the use of deceased children's identities by undercover police officers. Um, uh, in your inquiry witness statement, you
02:02:35 your inquiry witness statement, you describe the use of deceased children's identities as a wellestablished p practice when you became commander operations. That's paragraph 84 of your statement. Is that right?
02:02:51 statement. Is that right? Yes. Um, what was your understanding at the time of the legal basis for using such a practice? This whole subject troubles me greatly, but it's worth bearing in mind and pointing out to the inquiry. We didn't
02:03:04 pointing out to the inquiry. We didn't invent this tactic. It was used as early as the first part of the 1900s by the military. I understand it was used by Czech spies in respect of uh uh spying charges that were profered here later.
02:03:24 charges that were profered here later. It found uh popular uh in uh four sites novel
02:03:26 novel and when special branch
02:03:38 and when special branch used or took up the thing it was before my time but a judgment would have been made on the sensitivities of that action. Clearly it is difficult to justify
02:03:49 Clearly it is difficult to justify morally. It is very difficult to justify the fact that if and this is where I want to emphasize if the information had got out it would have caused much
02:04:02 got out it would have caused much distress to the families as indeed it has and that's a matter of personal regret because some of the content of the hearings we've had from those that uh
02:04:13 uh experienced it were heart-rending and that's a great burden. However, in respect of the use and continued use of it, first of all, it was necessary
02:04:28 of it, first of all, it was necessary because we needed secure legends for our undercover officers. I believe two or three had been compromised from purely fictitious uh legends and that at the time a
02:04:42 uh legends and that at the time a judgment was taken that that was for the interest and safety of the officer that was the right decision. Again that is a matter of judgment. Again at the time you got to bear in mind this was 40
02:04:53 you got to bear in mind this was 40 years ago. There were no computerized issues that we can do now. uh we were
02:05:07 issues that we can do now. uh we were operating in in a sterile uh atmosphere as far as false documentation goes. So the judgment taken, I'm pretty sure and my judgment when I took over as commander ops is
02:05:21 took over as commander ops is as damaging as this might be and indeed it has been extremely damaging then uh it was necessary operationally to adopt that process and was that and and if I could just say
02:05:37 and and if I could just say we did not believe with top secret well sorry the secret nature of the uh uh work and the tactic we did not believe that would ever get into the public domain it didn't get into the public
02:05:49 domain it didn't get into the public domain from the SDS or the police and I'll leave their judgment as to how it got into the public domain for others to make but it was that that caused the
02:06:00 make but it was that that caused the stress hurt and unhappiness of the poor families not our particular specific use of the tactic. Although obviously the
02:06:17 of the tactic. Although obviously the use exacerbated the problem, but it was a very difficult and a very stressful time for officers and commander and senior officers. And with the benefit of hindsight, we'd never use it again. We
02:06:28 hindsight, we'd never use it again. We wouldn't need to use it again. Uh and I personally apologize to the families that were involved in that because there were some heartbreing cases. Thank you. Um, but can we just
02:06:40 cases. Thank you. Um, but can we just look at on becoming commander operations and your knowledge of the the use of this tactic? What did you understand to
02:06:51 this tactic? What did you understand to be because you've referred to undercover operations, undercover officers having to act within the law? What did you understand to be the legal basis or the lawful authority for the use of this particular tactic? Well, there was no legal basis for it as I understood and indeed there was no legal basis for a
02:07:03 indeed there was no legal basis for a lot of the work we were doing. If you remember, and I say again, 1968 and 40 years on, we had no statutory backing for what we were doing until REIPA uh
02:07:23 for what we were doing until REIPA uh regulation investigatory powers act in 2000. We had no uh authority, legal authority to have covert human intelligence sources until that act. We were operating in a statutory vacuum. We had very little statutory backing for
02:07:39 had very little statutory backing for what we did. It was fly by the seat of your pants and make judgments on difficult political operational decisions in everything we did. And I think in 40 years of activity I think we
02:07:56 think in 40 years of activity I think we did that we achieved and this is another thing that I don't think this inquiry has fully covered the importance of the work and the
02:08:07 the importance of the work and the results that were achieved by our brave officers
02:08:12 officers who didn't go off peace who didn't engage in sexual relations. And that's regrettable and should never have happened. Well, where did we hear where have we heard about all the excellent undercover operational work
02:08:29 excellent undercover operational work that took place for 40 years? Where have we heard that in this inquiry? I accept entirely that much of it is secret and will probably held in camera, but that will never reach the public domain. What the public have heard and will hear is
02:08:41 the public have heard and will hear is the mistakes, the cockups, the faults, the damages of the people that did wrong. And that's wrong. And I take full responsibility as commander ops for whatever happened on my watch.
02:08:58 whatever happened on my watch. Um, you accept in your inquiry witness statement, as I've said, that you were aware of, um, this practice at the time. Um that is contrary to the officer's note of your discussion with the operation hear investigator
02:09:14 operation hear investigator um of your interview um on the 8th of April 2013 and it's also contrary to what you said in your signed operation hear witness statement signed on the
02:09:26 hear witness statement signed on the 15th of May 2013 and um for everyone's note it's MPS0723255
02:09:33 page four it's a tab two of your bundle Sir, um
02:09:35 Sir, um what was the reason for a denial of knowledge of the use of this practice um in that statement and to that investigation?
02:09:46 investigation? I'm glad you mentioned Operation Hearn because it's a matter that's been troubling me and other officers involved in this inquiry quite considerably. Could I just put into context
02:10:01 Could I just put into context the details given in operation herd to the officers that interviewed us were purely and simply explained to us as details for the background knowledge of SDS because the people doing the inquiry uh under the chief constable uh in
02:10:19 uh under the chief constable uh in respect of Hearn had no idea of any of this uh history. That's what we were asked about. We were never told that that information which we weren't allowed to consult documents. We had no we were doing it from memory and we made mistakes as
02:10:38 from memory and we made mistakes as indeed I made a mistake and I wanted to change the statement as I said the fact is when those statements and notes and some of them have been declared as public documents to this inquiry and have
02:10:54 documents to this inquiry and have reached the public domain or notes of uh interviews in operation that were never ever signed by the officer who made them. That is wrong and I don't believe it should have happened and I query whether the operational hear statements
02:11:07 whether the operational hear statements and information should be quoted within this inquiry many years later with the inference that what you told Operation Hearn when you weren't uh allowed to do
02:11:23 Hearn when you weren't uh allowed to do any review of documents etc etc and what you told under caution well not under caution but you told in your witness
02:11:34 caution but you told in your witness statement for this inquiry differed It's not surprising and I think any I would say drawing a conclusion for any of those officers that made different opinions to their rule nine statements to this inquiry against what they said
02:11:46 to this inquiry against what they said in operation hear should be treated with the utmost caution because it was for a different purpose and a different reason. But this is a statement to a a police investigation which statement you signed and signed with a statement of
02:11:57 signed and signed with a statement of truth which says I am not aware that the identities of dead children were used in creating the false identities and do not believe that to be so. That is you a
02:12:10 believe that to be so. That is you a fact about your knowledge of a practice which you now say is is incorrect because in your inquiry witness state can I finish in your inquiry witness statement you accept that you did know.
02:12:28 statement you accept that you did know. How would access to documents have affected your knowledge of whether you knew something or didn't at the time? What I was trying to explain in that part of the statement was to the best of my knowledge as commander ops I never signed off an application for a birth
02:12:46 signed off an application for a birth certificate of a dead child and I can't recall I ever did and I don't believe there's any documentation uh documentation that says I did. So my my my
02:12:56 my comment about I don't believe that it happened was about I don't believe I answered any queries about it or indeed approved any applications. The way that was put down in the first statement is
02:13:14 was put down in the first statement is incorrect and I tried to uh change it in my other statement and if that didn't come out completely as I've just explained then I'm sorry. So it's it's um a product of loose language in the operation hear statement. Yes.
02:13:24 Yes. Um
02:13:29 Um did you find out about this practice only upon becoming commander operations in special branch or did you know about it before?
02:13:40 It's difficult to say. I'm not sure. It's logical. I might have known about it before but I can't be certain. But I certainly
02:13:50 certainly can say it was not common knowledge within the branch. Thank you. Um you accept that as um commander operations you could have put an end to
02:14:01 an end to because it hadn't leaked out to the public domain and caused any problems. It seemed to be the most suitable method
02:14:20 It seemed to be the most suitable method to provide a full and supportable legend to undercover officers. If the issue of the legality andor the propriety of it had been raised then I would have obviously
02:14:24 obviously taken inquiries but it wasn't uh and in my judgment at the time because it wasn't it wasn't a burning issue but it obviously with hindsight and it having been exposed by this inquiry uh the
02:14:36 been exposed by this inquiry uh the tactic being exposed um it would have been better if I'd have had closer uh look at those matters. Thank you. Um
02:14:51 Thank you. Um did did you give um any consideration at the time to the moral and ethical implications of the MPS using such a practice? you I asked because you refer to its use by um Vaklav Yeleneck um the
02:15:04 to its use by um Vaklav Yeleneck um the communist um spy from Czechoslovakia and you you've relied today again on that it
02:15:17 you you've relied today again on that it it wasn't a practice invented by the MPS but were you aware of that case the Vaklav Yellow case at the time?
02:15:29 Vaklav Yellow case at the time? Yes. Um, did the fact that a spy in communist Czechoslovakia employed such a practice not give you pause for thought as to its moral and ethical implications? As I've tried to explain, Mr. Cot, um, it was morally wrong. We shouldn't necessarily have used that
02:15:42 We shouldn't necessarily have used that tactic in terms of the distress and hurt that it's caused. And I accept that entirely. All I can say is in terms of the torid period we were in in the 70s and 80s and some of the 90s
02:15:57 and 80s and some of the 90s the security and safety of our officers undercover was of great importance. I believe before my time two or three officers I'd said have been compromised and a
02:16:09 said have been compromised and a judgment was taken to use this tactic given time again given the knowledge that it did get out when every one of us thought it would never get out and it shouldn't have got out then the judgment
02:16:22 shouldn't have got out then the judgment was probably at least supportable if not totally um in incontrovertible so yes he shouldn't have happened.
02:16:35 so yes he shouldn't have happened. And you say uh as you've said today um at paragraph 87 of your statement that none of us imagined that the use of the tactic would ever be revealed. But your knowledge of the Vaklav Yeleneck case,
02:16:47 knowledge of the Vaklav Yeleneck case, did that not give you pause for thought that it had been revealed there? Um was any consideration given to the possibility of revelation of this um
02:17:04 possibility of revelation of this um tactic by activists or otherwise? Sorry, I don't think there was a read across from the spying case to the use for children's uh families. I don't think so. I I can't say. I can't remember.
02:17:15 say. I can't remember. Was the the possibility that suspicious activists could unmask a UCO and in the process discover and reveal this tactic
02:17:26 process discover and reveal this tactic ever considered at the time? Yes, there was a constant concern obviously uh and that matter was continually considered uh as to whether or not the um tactic should remain. I
02:17:44 or not the um tactic should remain. I don't again recall the day-to-day issues of that, but as an overriding principle and policy, I'm sure that was part of our consideration. And was there a view that because of the ethical and im unethical and immoral nature of this tactic that a
02:18:01 and immoral nature of this tactic that a consideration that well the MPS would do everything in its power to keep it secret?
02:18:02 secret? Yes.
02:18:06 Um
02:18:15 was any consideration um given to the impact upon the family member in the Vaklav Yelin case in terms of the immense uh distress caused by um the
02:18:34 immense uh distress caused by um the revelation of of that um tactic? Um what consideration was given to the impact upon families? I can't comment upon individual cases because I do not remember the detail. All I can say, as I already said, it was
02:18:43 it was a matter of great concern that the distress and hurt to the families of the use of this tactic uh resulted. it. If we could have done without it, we
02:19:05 it. If we could have done without it, we would. At the time, we considered it was an appropriate, proportionate, and necessary means of protecting our undercover offices. We did take into account, I'm absolutely certain, and I was at the time, troubled, if this ever got out, it was
02:19:21 troubled, if this ever got out, it was going to be extremely embarrassing, not just for the police, but for the Home Office and the government. But it didn't get out. Uh now that's not justification I understand for using it. But it is a consideration in terms of
02:19:33 But it is a consideration in terms of context and proportionality of the risk that we faced and how we dealt with that risk. uh and I said and I apologize again to the families those heart-breing
02:19:53 again to the families those heart-breing statements they've given to this inquiry I can't uh uh excuse in terms of uh causing them that trouble. Um I just want to ask you about a reference in the uh annual report of
02:20:05 reference in the uh annual report of 1990 to 1991 dated the 4th of February 91. Um it's MPS0728958.
02:20:14 It's tab 38 of your bundle, sir. Um, it records that the provision of cover backgrounds was becoming more difficult with public records becoming computerized and then there's a reduction. Um, you received those
02:20:28 reduction. Um, you received those reports as commander ops at the time. Yes. Um did um was that an opportunity to look at um
02:20:40 was that an opportunity to look at um the necessity for this practice and the appropriateness of it? Yeah. What? Sorry. What was the date of this uh annual report? Uh it was the 4th of February 1991. 91.
02:20:55 91. Yes. It would have been an opportunity. Uh but as I said earlier, uh there was 101 things I was dealing with at the time. Irish terrorism uh international terrorism lockabe
02:21:09 terrorism lockabe uh extreme leftwing extreme right-wing uh and not all of the minutiai of the details of those issues would have struck me as being something that should have acted upon with hindsight you're right it should have done
02:21:28 right it should have done thank you um as commander operations did you do you know whether the home office was aware of the Metropolitan Police's use of this tactic at the time. I don't personally recall on my watch the Home Office ever been involved.
02:21:39 the Home Office ever been involved. Whether they were initially or after it was used, I can't say. Um if they I if at the time you had been aware they were aware of the practice, would that have provided um reassurance
02:21:56 would that have provided um reassurance that the practice was authorized outside of um the Metropolitan Police special branch in government? Well, it's a matter of judgment. I I all I can say is it would have the support of the home office on something like that would have helped
02:22:08 that would have helped clarify the judgment of the officers that took that decision. Um I can't I can't say whether or not home office saying go ahead with it or were
02:22:20 saying go ahead with it or were specifically asked about it. I I don't believe they were. I find it practically in terms of the duration of this uh
02:22:33 in terms of the duration of this uh undercover operation from 1968 through to 2008.
02:22:44 I can't honestly think that at some stage in the longevity of this inquir of this uh activity the home office wouldn't have been aware of it but I can't say. Um, and what about in relation to those senior Metropolitan
02:22:55 relation to those senior Metropolitan Police officers above you? Um, you've accepted that you were aware of its use at the time. Do you know or are you do you have cause to believe whether those above you also knew?
02:23:16 above you also knew? Well, I think my answer to the previous question is exactly the same for that. I I don't know. Uh I find it difficult to believe that they didn't particularly assistant commissioner specialist operations because he was overall in charge of all the matters that we were dealing with STS. Whether or not the
02:23:27 dealing with STS. Whether or not the commissioner or others higher up know I don't know. Okay. Thank you very much. Um I'd like to move on to a different topic now. Please
02:23:39 one second.
02:23:51 Thank you. Um, and you've been asked about this in um, your witness statement. Um, and that's the subject of, um, knowledge of sexual relationships, um, deceitful sexual
02:24:02 relationships, um, deceitful sexual relationships by undercover officers in their cover identity. Um, you say at paragraph 120 of your witness statement that when you took over as commander operations, you weren't aware that any
02:24:17 operations, you weren't aware that any UCO had engaged in sexual activity with members of the public in their cover identity. Is that right? That is correct. Um, when were you first aware of any such allegation? That's difficult to say because the
02:24:28 That's difficult to say because the assumption that's been used in this inquiry time and time again is that we must have known about it as senior officers. So we either acquiesced to it, positively supported it, or even
02:24:45 positively supported it, or even directed it. That is not true. As far as I'm concerned on my watch, between 88 and 91,
02:24:51 and 91, I can honestly say I did not know that officers were engaged in sexual activity. I can say that of the nine or 10 officers to which that is alleged in my watch,
02:25:03 my watch, that shouldn't have happened. It was wrong. And if I'd have known, it would have been hopefully stopped. And when I
02:25:17 have been hopefully stopped. And when I say hopefully because the circumstances of each one of those may be different and would need certain undercurrent of uh of examination but it was wrong. It shouldn't have happened. Uh and uh I apologize
02:25:28 Uh and uh I apologize again as everyone else seems to apologize but I do it sincerely in respect of uh sexual activity. But in terms of context and proportionality,
02:25:42 terms of context and proportionality, again I go back to what I said earlier, nine or 10 people uh allegedly transgress in my period. What about all the dozens of other good brave intelligence gathering undercover
02:25:53 intelligence gathering undercover officers who didn't go off beast who didn't go on a journey of their own and commit sexual offenses? When have we heard about those? All I'm saying, Mr.
02:26:12 heard about those? All I'm saying, Mr. something Simco is there is some balance that's not been drawn upon this and I want to put the context of balance without in any way justifying the activity because it shouldn't have happened and indeed when one of my chief superintendants
02:26:27 when one of my chief superintendants were alleged to have known about it he should have told me yes we'll come to that in a moment if if I may um
02:26:32 I may um this parag raph of your witness statement refers to an allegation made either by or on behalf of Stefan Scott. I'm sorry to have to return to him as I know your you what you've said about
02:26:43 know your you what you've said about your recollection there, but from the papers it seems you were made aware um of an allegation that he had made um
02:26:58 of an allegation that he had made um that an undercover officer had engaged in sexual activity whilst undercover. Um, if we can look at MPS uh 0740892 at page 19 and 20, please. And it's tab 53 of your bundles, sir. This is a
02:27:16 53 of your bundles, sir. This is a minute dated the 25th of November, 1988. And it shows that that allegation um was investigated uh by DCI Martin
02:27:29 um was investigated uh by DCI Martin Gray and DI HN 109, a closed officer. Those were SDS managers um at the time. Is that what you would have expected to have been the initial
02:27:40 have expected to have been the initial MPS response to such an allegation? The SDS management investigating their own UCOs. Any information that came back to the back office, the officers were
02:27:55 the back office, the officers were engaging in this sort of behavior should have been brought to the attention of the supervisory officers at very least and certainly the supervisory officers
02:28:09 and certainly the supervisory officers should have brought uh the matter to my knowledge. It is self-evident that that behavior jeopardize the security and classification secret of that operation. The dangers that those
02:28:20 operation. The dangers that those officers expose themselves to by that behavior was paramount in terms of uh
02:28:32 behavior was paramount in terms of uh the whole um exercise being revealed. And uh uh you don't need police discipline regulations to know that unauthorized sexual activity in the job
02:28:45 unauthorized sexual activity in the job when we were dealing with uh uh targets is wrong, not right. They knew that. They must have known that. But each one had circumstances which uh may or may
02:28:59 had circumstances which uh may or may not have put a different uh shape to it. I'm not saying that. I'm not suggesting that it justified the behavior at all, but it should have come to the knowledge of Commander Ops.
02:29:12 of Commander Ops. Yes, thank you. Um just in relation to that invest initial investigation by DCI um Gray and DIHN 109,
02:29:17 109, do you see it as problematic that officers from within the SDS themselves are the initial investigation in particular circumstances where Stefan Scut was likely to be disbelieved by
02:29:30 Scut was likely to be disbelieved by them given the circum his particular circumstances that we've been through at length this morning in relation to the Scut affair. I understand your point, but what was
02:29:41 I understand your point, but what was the alternative? To bring in an outsider to deal with matters that were highly secret uh when in the first instance it was to establish whether or not there
02:29:52 was to establish whether or not there was good cause uh uh for the allegation whether it was true or not. So the initial inquiries quite properly in my mind would have been conducted inhouse by uh the managers in SDS. Once the
02:30:05 by uh the managers in SDS. Once the information initially was achieved and then there were queries about whether or not it should be uh a follow a
02:30:18 not it should be uh a follow a discipline route or the uh uh ill health route or others uh we dealt with before uh and I I can't say um well I don't I I don't recall as I say
02:30:30 well I don't I I don't recall as I say Scott I don't recall anybody coming to me with information uh uh of of that nature in respect of Um, it appears it did make its way to you though as we see from this minute and you directed further investigation
02:30:41 and you directed further investigation by David Smith and and that you wish to be kept informed. Um, David Smith was at the time one of your detective chief superintendent. Is that right? Correct.
02:30:51 Correct. Um,
02:30:56 Um, he was in fact I think in charge of the SDS at that time as a chief superintendent. Yes.
02:31:02 Yes. Yeah. Um, and you say in your witness statement that you're not aware of how the investigation concluded. Um, you should have been made aware at least um in terms of this direction to be kept informed, shouldn't you? Obviously.
02:31:24 Obviously. Um, you infer because um the file was quote put away that the UCO must have been um exonerated. Is that right? I can't
02:31:27 I can't I can't comment on that. I don't know. Um because isn't another uh possibility was that it was the investigation wasn't taken any further because of the
02:31:42 taken any further because of the paramount of s of keeping SDS operation secret?
02:31:45 secret? That was a possibility. That would have been a consideration. Yes. But that wouldn't have been taken at that level. That should have been taken at commander level.
02:31:53 level. Yes. and you don't recall it coming back to you.
02:32:01 to you. Um had it come back to you um what would have been your attitude to such allegations at the time? Well, I would have considered the whole circumstances
02:32:14 circumstances of the initial uh investigation. I would have taken the views of the managers of SDS including the chief superintendent in charge. I would have looked at the circumstances and come to a decision on what was the best course of action. I can't say now and as I say I I don't
02:32:27 can't say now and as I say I I don't remember these but that would have been the logical course of action following an initial investigation inhouse passed to senior officers for judgment uh inhouse and then that should have
02:32:42 uh inhouse and then that should have come to me and I would have then made a judgment uh taking into account the wider issues involved including reputation security and all the other matters
02:32:54 matters um in relation to your interview with Operation Hearn about this topic. Um, and the officer taking notes of your interview noted this um, appreciates that if a person brackets SDS was vulnerable, he may have to but would not be authorized. And in your Hearn's
02:33:07 be authorized. And in your Hearn's statement, you say, "I am conscious of the extreme pressures on the undercover officers, and it may well be that to maintain their deep cover, some officers may have engaged in sexual activity. I
02:33:22 may have engaged in sexual activity. I would not have condoned it." And that's um MPS0723255
02:33:29 at page five. um that rather reads as though you understand and almost sympathize with how a UCO could enter into a deceitful sexual relationship. Was that your view at the time?
02:33:42 Was that your view at the time? No, that's your interpretation. I don't believe that I did sympathize. It was wrong. As I've said, uh it shouldn't have happened. Uh, and I've said before and I say again, I am seriously concerned about the inclusion of
02:33:57 concerned about the inclusion of Operation Hearn information into this inquiry.
02:34:01 inquiry. Um, I'm sure the chair has that has noted that. Um, you do though seem to acknowledge that there was um an obvious risk of it happening there.
02:34:14 happening there. Well, clearly there was a risk. uh uh um it was a risk that with all the other risks had to be taken into account and judged uh in risk analysis but yes clearly there was a risk.
02:34:27 clearly there was a risk. Um and you say there I would not have condoned it. Um what does that mean in
02:34:38 condoned it. Um what does that mean in practice in terms of of action that you would have taken had you become aware? Um would the officer have been disciplined? Well, again, I go back to the circumstances. There would have had to
02:34:51 circumstances. There would have had to have been uh an inquiry into the issue. Uh referred from initial investigation upwards to me. Uh the likelihood, most likelihood is the officer would have been removed from his role as undercover because the risk of that
02:35:05 undercover because the risk of that officer continued if the allegation was true. and and again that would depend upon the veracity of the inquiries made into the allegation that officer was in huge risk of discovery as indeed the
02:35:20 huge risk of discovery as indeed the security of the whole operation was. So yes uh it's difficult to give circumstances now which are hypothetical 30 or 40 years ago but top of my
02:35:34 30 or 40 years ago but top of my knowledge if that had been so would have been removed the officer from his post fourth with Um, we know now um that during your tenure as commander ops, several underco under undercover officers engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with
02:35:49 inappropriate sexual behavior with members of the public. Uh, we know that HN87 engaged in inappropriate inappropriate sexual contact conduct during his deployment. We know that um HN10 Robert Lambert and HN5 John Dyn
02:36:07 HN10 Robert Lambert and HN5 John Dyn formed long-term inappropriate sexual relationships while deployed. You're aware of those officers now. Um you say you weren't aware of them at the time.
02:36:15 the time. Not of their sexual activity. No. No.
02:36:22 No. Um in your inquiry statement, you say that you don't regard these incidents as a failure of oversight by senior managers. That's at paragraph 133. Um why not?
02:36:37 Well, it depends upon the degree of oversight that uh one assumes to these matters. Um with the benefit of hindsight, it should have been more seriously uh viewed. But again, I come
02:36:48 seriously uh viewed. But again, I come back to the fact that the concentration again is on the miscreants who've uh misbehaved etc etc. In terms of context and balance, all I can say is it is regrettable, seriously regrettable that
02:37:01 regrettable, seriously regrettable that these officers went off pie and engaged in that behavior. But there are so many others that did not. And I cannot emphasize that enough in terms of
02:37:15 emphasize that enough in terms of balance, proportionality, and context. Um, we know now that Bob Lambert
02:37:32 Um, we know now that Bob Lambert disclosed his relationship to Tony Wait. Um, at the time, uh, Tony White took no action. Um, isn't that a failure of oversight by a senior manager? Certainly. Um, and you accept that he should have taken action. I didn't know about that. I should have known about it. And it is a grave concern that uh if I had have known
02:37:48 concern that uh if I had have known about it and done something about it, which I would have done, some of the angst and anxiety and distress as a result of their activity could have been limited.
02:37:54 limited. Yes. Um
02:38:05 that's one occasion which we know and you're aware of that a a disclosure was made to a more senior manager. um you seem to rely upon that as um an exception of a of failure in a manager taking action they should have taken.
02:38:18 taking action they should have taken. How can you be confident that that was indeed an exception and not the rule? Well, I can't be confident certainly as events have turned out, but at the time my judgment and I stand by the judgment
02:38:34 my judgment and I stand by the judgment is that the chief superintendent was in charge of the squad in terms of its uh behavior, welfare officers uh activities, etc., etc. And he should have bought that information to my knowledge. It was a failure of management that he didn't. Um but that
02:38:49 management that he didn't. Um but that doesn't again that doesn't assume that just because that not just because but the one incident that we should have known about should we have known about all the others well we didn't and the
02:39:02 all the others well we didn't and the fact is as I tried to explain earlier these officers engaging in this untoward activity must have known that what they were doing was wrong. Why would they want the governors to know about it? Why
02:39:16 want the governors to know about it? Why would they talk about it? Why would they disclose those matters? I mean, I know in the cold light of day here, it seems impossible that we didn't have some
02:39:29 impossible that we didn't have some knowledge of it. Well, I can tell you in the in the period that I was in charge, I had no knowledge of that sexual activity. And I find that distressing and almost unbelievable, particularly in respect of Lambert, but it happened. Um,
02:39:54 respect of Lambert, but it happened. Um, in your statement, um, at paragraphs 131 to 133, you you place some reliance on the officers, um, skills in subtifuge and their awareness of um, potential consequences of discovery of those sexual, inappropriate, deceitful sexual relationships. Um,
02:40:06 relationships. Um, aren't their skills in subtifuge one important factor in the reason why managers should have been very concerned to oversee these types of deployments very closely?
02:40:20 very closely? Yes. Well, I've already said the whole essence of undercover work is based upon deceit,
02:40:21 deceit, uh, subtifuge, confusion. And it's quite clear that officers who had the skills and the ability to do that sort of work don't grow on trees.
02:40:39 that sort of work don't grow on trees. But it's also quite clear that they all knew that they had to stay within the boundaries of the law. But I've also explained the boundaries of the law as far as SDS was concerned and the first 30 years of its operations were very sketchy.
02:40:58 sketchy. And you don't need a law to say officers on duty should engage in un uh wanted sexual uh behavior. But you've accepted that there was an obvious risk that it could happen. And wasn't there also uh a huge potential risk of harm?
02:41:14 risk of harm? Yes. If you put a man and woman together in the circumstances that these officers were actually acting under, it was clearly a risk. These officers were
02:41:25 clearly a risk. These officers were going to squats, sleeping on mattresses, rooms full of individuals. The context of exactly what happened has not been properly discovered by this inquiry. As far as I'm concerned, the circumstance,
02:41:36 far as I'm concerned, the circumstance, we put those officers in that position. We must take the responsibility for that. Not because they misbehaved. They should not have misbehaved. But we put
02:41:48 should not have misbehaved. But we put them there and they behaved in the vast majority of cases properly with integrity with honesty and not a little
02:41:59 integrity with honesty and not a little bravery. And I don't think that has been understood. But I do not excuse for one minute the behavior of those officers that did transgress sexually. In your statement, you say that you consider such behavior would fall within the
02:42:13 such behavior would fall within the definition of discreditable conduct. Um, doesn't that rather understate the seriousness of both the behavior and the impact upon the deceived women? Yes, it does. But let's go to context again, Mr. Simkin. I'm uh Mr.
02:42:32 again, Mr. Simkin. I'm uh Mr. I am trying to illustrate the boundaries within which managers and officers work within the SDS were very close to the limits of the
02:42:43 were very close to the limits of the law. Indeed, there wasn't a law uh for covert human intelligence up until 2001.
02:42:44 2001. So we would we were judging on situations, risks and analysis of 30 40 years ago. The world was a totally
02:42:59 years ago. The world was a totally different place. The morality, the law, uh the environment, everything was so different in those days. And I only mention that because the judgment of those officers has to be taken into consideration under the circumstances
02:43:15 consideration under the circumstances that they were faced at the time, not in the cold light of day of this tribunal. But you would still accept as I think you have done today that they would have known at the time that it was wrong. Yes.
02:43:26 Yes. Um I said I would return to one of the recommendations from DCI um Docker's review as a result of um of of the SDS as a result of the Scutter. Um and we
02:43:37 as a result of the Scutter. Um and we went to the the condition that you uh agreed should be imposed limiting the deployment of single officers to
02:43:50 deployment of single officers to exceptional cases and you you said um in response to DCI docker's uh recommendation and it's MPS 0726998 at page five and that's tab 39 of your bundle sir but I have emphasized that
02:44:08 bundle sir but I have emphasized that only in wholly exceptional cases should single officers be considered and then only after prior discussion with the candidates squad chief superintendent and commander ops. Um
02:44:17 Um the rationale and the purpose of that condition goes to um mitigating the risk of undercover police officers entering into deceitful sexual relationships,
02:44:32 into deceitful sexual relationships, doesn't it? Um and so that was again acknowledged as a risk that needed mitigating at the time of this review. Correct.
02:44:39 Correct. Um
02:44:40 Um in your inquiry statement you say that the the rationale behind um that such a condition was you say you likely shared
02:44:52 condition was you say you likely shared Eric Docker's view that a stable family background was an important anchor for undercover officers. Um, was that also part of the consideration?
02:45:08 Excuse me. Um
02:45:21 you say at the time um that concerns about inappropriate sexual activity were not foremost in your mind at the time but you've accepted just now that it that was a consideration in relation to this particular condition. It was a consideration but when you have incidents like locker also on your desk
02:45:35 incidents like locker also on your desk at the same time it may not have been a priority.
02:45:36 priority. I regret that. Uh obviously uh um I wished I'd have paid greater attention to it, but I did have a few other things on my plate at the time.
02:45:50 on my plate at the time. Yes, understood. Um and the the particular mischief um here was in relation to single um UCOs because that's what the condition refers to that there should be a stable family background and it um it should only be
02:46:02 background and it um it should only be in wholly exceptional cases that single officers be considered. But wasn't there an acknowledgement at the time that even those in a stable relationship such as
02:46:16 those in a stable relationship such as marriage, there was nevertheless um such a risk?
02:46:19 a risk? Well, it it was considered. It must have been considered, but we got it wrong.
02:46:26 Um,
02:46:32 other than this recommendation, did you take any other action to look at mitigating that risk at the time? I can't recall. Um, no, I can't recall.
02:46:44 no, I can't recall. It was pretty comprehensive uh judgment and recommendation. Um, and I would have wanted to have been satisfied that those
02:46:55 wanted to have been satisfied that those recommendations were carried out. But in terms of how I followed up with any other additional stuff, I can't say. Um, in terms of other ways to mitigate risk, um, at paragraph 132 of your
02:47:15 risk, um, at paragraph 132 of your statement, you say that you don't know what additional training would have prevented these relationships. And greater supervision strikes me as problematic because to be wholly effective, it would have required undercover supervision of the UCO. Um were those the only ways um you
02:47:28 were those the only ways um you considered to mitigate such a risk or were there other considerations? They were they were part of the bigger picture and as as I've said um before in respect of oversight to have limited or shortened the lines
02:47:41 to have limited or shortened the lines of command communication between the UCO
02:47:58 of command communication between the UCO and the office was part and parcel of uh dealing with that potential risk. Um, I I I'm not sure I can't remember uh whether or not that worked.
02:48:10 uh whether or not that worked. Um, thinking about it now, looking back, is there anything else that you consider could have mitigated such a risk at the time?
02:48:12 time? Well, I don't claim uh 100% uh hindsight. Uh and obviously there would be other considerations uh that possibly could have been taken.
02:48:23 uh that possibly could have been taken. But I'd say again, we were dealing with a situation 30 40 years ago uh with very little uh support uh in respect to
02:48:43 little uh support uh in respect to statutory or political uh intrusion in that. And I've got a feeling that uh
02:48:46 uh should I have covered more? Possibly. I don't know. Um in your witness statement to
02:48:59 Um in your witness statement to Operation Hearn, you um mentioned there that you signed um diaries on a weekly basis and that all the accounts and expenses of UCOs were strictly controlled. Um what was the purpose of signing diaries? Do you recall now? Sorry. The purpose what
02:49:13 Sorry. The purpose what of signing diaries in in your operation hear statement you said that you signed diaries on a weekly basis and all accounts and expenses were strictly controlled. It's at page five. That was part of the general operational supervision in special branch. That was
02:49:24 supervision in special branch. That was not unique to SDS. Every Friday officers
02:49:35 not unique to SDS. Every Friday officers would submit their diaries with a record of their behavior and activities of the previous week including expenses. uh they would be signed off at chief superintendent level usually but the SDS was signed off at my level because of the sensitivity involved and was that this the case with your predecessor as well? Yes.
02:49:47 Yes. Um,
02:49:49 Um, could further interrogation of administrative paperwork have been one way to um look at uh mitigation of risk and discovery of deceitful sexual
02:50:00 and discovery of deceitful sexual relationships given how intertwined UCOs's became into um some women's lives
02:50:13 UCOs's became into um some women's lives cohabiting um living together for years. Um would that have been it's possible a source of supervision? It is possible. There are a number of scenarios one could raise now. Would you have done it then? Could you have done it? Why didn't you do it? Etc., etc. I accept that. Um, but I come back to the
02:50:36 accept that. Um, but I come back to the point we had to certainly Commander Ops had to operate on on policy and operational issues in terms of priorities. And as I keep saying, Commander Ops had a wide range of responsibility and accountability. and some of the matters
02:50:47 accountability. and some of the matters you're raising in the cold light of day here which which are important and I don't decry that but actually they may pale into insignificance slightly when you got a locker bee
02:51:01 you got a locker bee um you specifically refer to the relationship between um John Dyn and Helen Steel and at paragraph 125 of your statement you say you weren't aware of that at the time. Yeah.
02:51:18 that at the time. Yeah. And you um you point out that her name and telephone number on a budget vehicle rental document was far from con conclusive proof of such a relationship. But shouldn't paperwork of that nature
02:51:30 But shouldn't paperwork of that nature have aroused suspicion prompted further inquiries? Possibly.
02:51:38 Possibly. Um were you aware of um Operation Muscat at the time? Um,
02:51:42 Um, help me.
02:51:47 help me. Of course. Um, this was an operation which arose as a result of Helen Steel's attempts to track John Dyn down after he had withdrawn from his Whose operation was this?
02:52:01 Whose operation was this? Um, it was a an SDS and um MPSB special branch um operation. And what's the date of this? Um, I can bring it up. It's MPS0706718.
02:52:14 I've got a feeling this is after I'd gone to Cambridge. I I I knew about the Dian's case and it was on my watch, but the aftermath of the Dian's case in terms of Helen Still tracing him was
02:52:31 terms of Helen Still tracing him was after I'd left the branch, I think. I I can't be sure, but I don't recall operation what was it? Muskrat. Muscat.
02:52:33 Muscat. Muscat. I don't recall it. No. Um,
02:52:36 No. Um, as I said, the context of that was was Helen Steel's um efforts to track John Dyn down after he had withdrawn from the field. Had you known about that at the time if you had been in uh position as
02:52:53 time if you had been in uh position as commander operations at that time? Would something like that have aroused suspicions? Yes.
02:52:59 Yes. And and at that stage um what action would you have taken to act upon those suspicions? Well, I've done exactly the same as previously explained. I would ask for an initial inquiry by in-house officers in
02:53:15 initial inquiry by in-house officers in respect of uh what the issues were, the circumstances, then decide uh whether or not it needed further investigation, help or whatever. Uh the Dyn's case was a particularly
02:53:26 Uh the Dyn's case was a particularly difficult case. uh and uh I don't know whether you want to ask me about uh that but if you're not going to um I won't trouble you but it was a difficult case.
02:53:45 trouble you but it was a difficult case. Um I I will come to later on um the um arrests um by of of John Dyn. Yes, it's it's on my list. Okay.
02:53:49 Okay. Um so we'll maybe um leave leave that there then and move on. Sarah, I'm I'm conscious of the time. I'd be moving on to another topic. Is now a convenient time to break for lunch just a touch early
02:54:00 early or would you like me to continue? Yeah, I if you're going to go on to another topic, would you rather have the break now? Yes. Fine.
02:54:10 Fine. Then can you help me with one question before we rise? Yes. Um I refer to an answer and I hope I've understood it correctly that um when you were dealing with the scutter Yes.
02:54:27 Yes. you said that there were crucial decisions that you had to make. I'm well aware that you can't now remember the detail of it, but you said that um you had to decide what was best for Scott, what was best for the MPS, what was best for the home office, what was
02:54:48 was best for the home office, what was best for the government. And you said it was detailed up to the deputy assistant commissioner level and beyond. Yes.
02:54:53 Yes. And beyond to whom? Well, I don't know because I can't remember the the specific detail, but in terms of uh chain of command, it would have gone from DAC special branch to the assistant commissioner specialist operations
02:55:05 operations uh if the uh assistant commissioner of specialist operations thought it worthy uh and there was significant uh
02:55:18 uh and there was significant uh potential jeopardy here for all those you've mentioned, sir. um that uh could have been referred up to the deputy commissioner or more likely straight to the commissioner
02:55:31 likely straight to the commissioner because it was so sensitive. Uh, and I can't say because regretfully I can't remember uh uh sadly all the time that's been spent on Scott. I feel really
02:55:45 been spent on Scott. I feel really uh troubled. Um not not because of the time that's been spent on it, but because I can't remember, but it would have gone I think in those circumstances to the commissioner level and if it didn't it would be pretty
02:55:57 and if it didn't it would be pretty senior under him. Sir Peter Imbert, commissioner at the time. Ah well I would have thought almost certainly it would have gone to Sepita because he was a former special branch officer. He would have been trusted and
02:56:14 officer. He would have been trusted and understood the security of the operation of the SDS. Sorry I hadn't realized that. Yeah. Thank you very much. Um can we resume at um 5 to 2? Yes.