Continuation of Dennis Gunn's testimony covering arrests of undercover officers, use of deceased children's identities, targeting of social justice campaigns and racial justice groups, police monitoring groups, and the McDonald's libel case. Gunn defends decisions around UCO arrests and maintains that social justice campaigns were not directly targeted, only extremists who attached themselves to those campaigns.
00:24:21 Those with electronic devices know what I'm about to say. uh you may not use them for recording or for photography, but you may use them to speak to the
00:24:32 but you may use them to speak to the outside world about what you've heard in the hearing room 10 minutes after it's elapsed.
00:24:39 elapsed. Thank you, sir. Um Mr. Gun, before we move to another topic, I just want to ask you a couple of questions I neglected to um in relation to um the use of dece deceased children's
00:24:51 use of dece deceased children's identities, please. Um you mentioned in your um evidence this morning that you were aware at the time you were commander operations that there had been two or perhaps three undercover police officers who had used fictional
00:25:03 officers who had used fictional identities that weren't from deceased children's um identities and who had been compromised. Um without telling me what their names were in case those
00:25:16 what their names were in case those officers are closed officers. Um do you remember who those um officers were? Uh no. Uh I remember the circumstances but I do not recall the names of the
00:25:34 but I do not recall the names of the individuals or their uh um ciphers. Uh but I am aware that there was it was outside of my period as commander ops but I am aware it was part of the rationale for the uh use of birth
00:25:46 rationale for the uh use of birth certificates that officers had been compromised in the past. Were you aware of an officer um HN56 who used a fictitious identity during your period
00:26:01 fictitious identity during your period of time as commander operations that was not a
00:26:04 not a Could I see who HN56 is, please? Yes, of course.
00:26:30 No, I I don't recall the name. Okay. Um,
00:26:32 Okay. Um, one last question um on on this particular topic. Um, I had asked you some questions about um Tony Wait um being aware of a disclosure from Bob
00:26:43 being aware of a disclosure from Bob Lambert about his um relationship whilst he was an undercover officer and um that he hadn't reported it. In fact, his evidence to this inquiry was that he
00:26:54 evidence to this inquiry was that he reported it um above him to Mr. Tucker.
00:27:06 reported it um above him to Mr. Tucker. um that would have been the appropriate thing to do um in the circumstances to report it up his chain of command. Is that right, Mr. Tucker? Did you say I believe so? Yes. Pardon?
00:27:20 Pardon? I believe so. Yes. That was Mr. I don't recall we had a a chief inspector uh or superintendent Tucker in uh in the branch, but I don't recall him being associated with the SDS and I
00:27:33 being associated with the SDS and I certainly don't recall the circumstances you just relayed about Tony White telling him. Okay, I'm very grateful. Thank you. Um right, we we will move on to um another
00:27:46 right, we we will move on to um another topic, please. um which is uh arrests of um undercover officers um during their deployments um during the time you were uh commander operations. Um just generally speaking um at the time were
00:28:01 generally speaking um at the time were you aware of the home office circular uh number 35 of 1986 which was the consolidated circular to the police on crime and kindred matters? Yes. Um sir for your note it's MPS0727412
00:28:24 at page two tab 83 of your bundle. Um paragraph 1.92 of that um home office guidance
00:28:26 guidance provides that the police must never commit themselves to a course which whether to protect an informant or otherwise will constrain them to mislead a court in any subsequent proceedings.
00:28:40 a court in any subsequent proceedings. If his use in the way envisaged will or is likely to result in it being impossible to protect him without subsequently misleading the court, that must be regarded as a decisive reason for his not being used or not being
00:28:54 for his not being used or not being protected. Were you aware of that at the time?
00:28:55 time? And it further provides um the prosecution should be informed of the fact and of the part that the informant took in the commission of the
00:29:06 informant took in the commission of the offense. Were you aware of that as well? And as far as you understood or you were concerned um during your time as commander operations, did you consider
00:29:19 commander operations, did you consider that those directions that that guidance applied to the SDS? Yes, but it was guidance. And if you're going to ask me of spec Well, carry on.
00:29:40 going to ask me of spec Well, carry on. Um no, do do comment if you wish to. I I I was only going to say that as far as the two occasions, I think it was two occasions on my watch where uh it occurred an officer was caught. Uh one was drink drive and the other one was John Dyn which I can
00:29:54 the other one was John Dyn which I can say I think I am aware of those two. Uh I dealt with both of those cases in the full consideration of the guidance in the full consideration of
00:30:08 guidance in the full consideration of the interests of justice and also in the consideration of the circumstances surrounding the incidents and I don't know whether you're going to ask me specifically about uh the drunk drive but if you are
00:30:26 drive but if you are yes perhaps we can perhaps we can come to that in a in a moment. I am going to ask you about that and about John Dyn and um but you'll obviously have an opportunity to say which whatever you like at that time. Can I just um look at um what you say in your statement at
00:30:39 um what you say in your statement at paragraph 23 please which is where you set out your understanding that the starting point was that UCOs were to avoid involvement in criminality and that anything beyond that required
00:30:50 that anything beyond that required consideration and authorization by managers. Um did that starting point apply irrespective of the field into which the UCO deployed?
00:31:01 which the UCO deployed? I'm sorry I don't understand that qu. Could you could you repeat that? Sorry. Yes, of course. Does that starting point that UCOs were to avoid involvement in
00:31:12 that UCOs were to avoid involvement in criminality apply across every field of deployment in in
00:31:20 deployment in in Well, it was a part consideration in respect of the circumstances involved in each incident. I had to make a judgment as commander ops as to whether or not the guidance was followed to the letter or whether the guidance was followed to the spirit.
00:31:33 the spirit. On occasions I found myself between a rock and a hard place. John Dimes was a classic example of the rock and a hard place. Not so the previous uh drunk dive. But we I took
00:31:51 previous uh drunk dive. But we I took the action I took in the best interests of one justice, two the reputation and safety of the officer, three the reputation of the Metropolitan Police. And I had to make a judgment. Yes.
00:31:59 Yes. Because
00:32:06 Because unlike now where the covert human intelligence source criminal offenses act of couple of years ago when it is recognized that for national security reasons that there is a a possibility that undercover officers may have to
00:32:19 that undercover officers may have to commit criminal offenses in the course of their undercover duties. We never had that. that came in I think in 2023 or
00:32:32 that. that came in I think in 2023 or maybe four. We never had that. But I had to do and take the spirit of the recognition that sometimes you're on the edge of the law and I was on the edge of the law but made that
00:32:46 on the edge of the law but made that decision in the full cognizance of the guidance my judgment against the circumstances at the time. Okay. We'll come to those individual cases in in a moment. But were you aware of an acknowledgement within the SDS itself that um those targeting
00:33:01 itself that um those targeting particularly animal rights groups would inevitably need to participate in criminal activity? Um had you been would you have taken any particular action in relation to that or would it still have been the same balancing exercise
00:33:12 balancing exercise cognizant of the guidance exercise? I mean we in terms of uh priorities we were having more trouble from animal rights extremists at that
00:33:25 from animal rights extremists at that time than most others. So it would have been up the chain of priority in terms of dealing with matters but in terms of the principle of dealing with it staying within the spirit of the guidance andor
00:33:40 within the spirit of the guidance andor the criminal law uh it would be another part of the consideration. Um, do you recall discussions you had with the security service to the effect that any undercover operations against
00:33:54 that any undercover operations against animal rights extremist targets would be bound to involve the commission of acts of criminality in order to gain acceptance amongst the groups of hardened activists? I don't recall that conversation, but I don't deny it took place. is highly likely because the activities of the
00:34:09 likely because the activities of the animal extremists were very much uh in terms of greater threat than just billosting etc. the smaller uh less significant criminal offenses. They inter uh included up to placing
00:34:23 inter uh included up to placing firebombs and again I come back to the fact this was for 30 40 years ago. 30 years ago certainly not too many people remember the febrial atmosphere there was in this country at that time
00:34:34 was in this country at that time concerning animal extremism and the threat and risks that this country faced from those elements at the time. They
00:34:49 from those elements at the time. They were extraordinary circumstances and we had to use extraordinary measures to deal with them and animal extremism in respect of potential for criminal offenses would have been top of the list.
00:35:05 list. And was that a an acknowledged risk that the those directions in that home office circular wouldn't be followed necessarily in those cases? Well, I I'm not sure whether it's acknowledged or what. I what I'm saying is
00:35:17 what. I what I'm saying is I did not ride roughshot over that guidance, ignore it or just assume that uh SDS is special treatment. What I did was take into account the principles of
00:35:31 was take into account the principles of the decision and the guidance, match it against the principles of the circumstances and come to a judgment. Yes. And as sometimes it's a rock and a hard place.
00:35:43 hard place. Yes. Um at at paragraph 137 of your statement, you say that you believed that the SDS had a process in place to assess involvement of UCOs in criminality and that this appeared to work. Um was your what was your
00:35:57 work. Um was your what was your understanding of the process that the SDS had in place? I I'm not sure I quite understand the question. We're getting into territory here which I think is restricted in
00:36:11 here which I think is restricted in respect of how I dealt with John Dian's uh which was uh which was pertinent to other considerations. I I'm I need guidance as
00:36:22 considerations. I I'm I need guidance as to whether or not I open that up because I think I understand it was redacted from my statement. Well, let's not go underneath a redaction, but perhaps if I can ask you to look at paragraph 138 of your statement.
00:36:34 your statement. You say
00:36:36 You say there that UCOs would inform the SDS if they were arrested. Once the DCI and DI were aware of this, they could monitor progress through the criminal justice system. A written report was prepared
00:36:53 system. A written report was prepared for the squad chief and I expected to be made aware. Is that the sort of process you were referring to? Yes. I'm sorry I slightly misled you on that previous answer that was to deal with a specific incident. Uh not at all.
00:37:04 not at all. I stand by what I've said in par 138. That is the right process that we would have gone well right that is the process we went through and I support it.
00:37:15 we went through and I support it. And and you maintain that that was an appropriate process even looking back today.
00:37:25 today. I do. Um that process doesn't address though, does it? Anything specific about the potential for misleading the court um during any type of prosecution involving a UCO or the activist they were deployed
00:37:36 were deployed in black and white words, but it's implicit that uh the home office guidance
00:37:38 guidance applied to everybody. And was a rec was there a recognition of the potential for miscarriages of justice?
00:37:52 Um I'm not I'm not happy with the description of miscarriage of justice in the respect of this sort of incident. As I've said, we were faced with circumstances that we
00:38:08 were faced with circumstances that we had to deal with according to the law as it stood at that time. And I emphasize at that time and the circumstances of the offense. And I go back to what I said earlier
00:38:20 And I go back to what I said earlier this morning about the need for security of the operation in respect of the government, the home office and others. Um you say in your you confirm in your
00:38:31 Um you say in your you confirm in your inquiry statement that and you've said today that you would expect to be informed uh if an undercover officer was arrested whether in their cover or real
00:38:42 arrested whether in their cover or real identity and we'll come to some specific cases in a moment but would you also be expect to be informed of a UCO's involvement in criminal activity where
00:38:54 involvement in criminal activity where it didn't lead to the arrest of the UCO but nevertheless occurred probably
00:38:59 probably um and why probably it would depend upon the circumstances. I mean there's gradations of uh activity uh culpability um and responsibility and it would depend uh and the circumstances
00:39:15 depend uh and the circumstances which I would be expected to know um how I dealt with it. And were there circumstances where a c an uco would be involved in criminal activity that you
00:39:29 involved in criminal activity that you um would uh expect not to be informed? Um
00:39:35 Um no I if there was any indication of potential criminal offenses arrests affecting the individual undercover officer I would as commander ops would expect to be informed. And what if the
00:39:46 expect to be informed. And what if the criminal activity in which the UCO was involved or was peripheral to led to the arrest of others but not the UCO? Would you expect to be informed in those circumstances? Yes.
00:39:58 Yes. And
00:40:02 And you would clearly expect to be informed of any charges or prosecution um where the UCO was involved in the activity leading to the arrests in relation to those charges and prosecution.
00:40:14 prosecution. Um, what about if a UCO appeared as a defense witness in court? Would you be expected? Would you expect to be informed of that? Sorry. Of what offenses?
00:40:27 Sorry. Of what offenses? If if a UCO appeared as a defense witness.
00:40:28 witness. Yes.
00:40:30 Yes. Would you expect to be informed of that? Yes.
00:40:33 Yes. Um,
00:40:41 in your witness statement, you say that minor offenses such as bill posting, and you've confirmed again that circumstances may be that uh committing minor criminality would be acceptable if it was operationally necessary. You say
00:40:56 it was operationally necessary. You say that at paragraph 139 of your statement. Um, what sort of circumstances would make it operationally necessary?
00:41:13 Well, I think it's self-explanatory in what I've said in par 139. We obviously uh would take into account the seriousness or otherwise of the offense and post that against the circumstances posed at that time. Sometimes bill
00:41:28 posed at that time. Sometimes bill posting involved violence and unruly behavior which would add to the consideration as to which way to jump in terms of uh court appearance or not. Other times a mere bill posting and
00:41:44 Other times a mere bill posting and scadaddle uh by the individual uh uh if arrested for something like that that would be then a matter of judgment that was a lesser seriousness than if there was violence.
00:42:01 was violence. And so and you you confirm in paragraph 140 that um more serious offenses committed by a UCO would not be acceptable. Um, and what sort of offenses would you have classed at the time as more serious? Something involving violence,
00:42:18 offenses that involved public safety, injury to others, serious criminal damage. I mean there's a list uh that I
00:42:30 damage. I mean there's a list uh that I can't really go through now where uh the circumstances of the offense is pertinent to the decision on whether or not to follow the strict guidance of the home office or the spirit of the
00:42:42 home office or the spirit of the guidance of the home office and uh I would have said where there is human injury, serious damage to property andor threat to life obviously. Mhm.
00:42:56 threat to life obviously. Mhm. But there's a range of other uh offenses. I mean, some of the animal liberation people that were going to harass
00:43:03 harass people in Huntington when I was chief constable, Huntington Life Sciences, for
00:43:15 constable, Huntington Life Sciences, for instance, the directors of that firm was subject to the most enormous uh threats uh from animal rights demonstrators. In itself,
00:43:24 itself, there was no particular serious criminal offense, but the accumulation of that activity adds up to the consideration as to whether or not we would charge or
00:43:35 to whether or not we would charge or not. So, it's impossible today just to give a a cart blanch on uh on what offenses do and what offenses don't come in the range of my uh decision process. Um in your witness statement you reject
00:43:49 Um in your witness statement you reject any suggestion of a culture of turning a blind eye. Absolutely. And you say that any decision not to take action that is against a UCO had had to be made by an officer of appropriate appropriate rank and
00:44:01 appropriate appropriate rank and properly recorded. Is that right? Absolutely. And I think the action I took in both the cases I referred to earlier demonstrates only too well that
00:44:14 earlier demonstrates only too well that there was no culture of turning a blind eye there. There was obvious action needed to be taken and I took it. Um, yes, we'll come to those in a moment. You mentioned,
00:44:25 moment. You mentioned, excuse me, um, you mentioned appropriate rank. Um, are you referring there to your rank and above if there was criminal offenses involved? Yes.
00:44:38 Yes. Um, and and um, what type of action? Um, you say that any decision not to take action had to be made by an officer appropriate tank. What type of action are you referring to there? Where
00:44:49 Where going back to the points I've labored this morning uh where the danger of exposure of the work of the SDS and the
00:45:03 exposure of the work of the SDS and the individual or a threat to the safety of the individual was relevant to the to the decision-making process. I would take that into account and I no doubt we'll come on to it in a minute. I'll explain why in one of the cases.
00:45:17 explain why in one of the cases. Yes. Um so in your inquiry witness statement you confirmed that it was SDS policy for UCOs to give their cover details when they were arrested. It was acceptable for a UCO to give a false name um along with members of their
00:45:31 name um along with members of their group to maintain their cover. And you explained that in relation to SDS
00:45:42 explained that in relation to SDS operations, you as commander operations retained the discretion over what to disclose to whom and when. Is that right?
00:45:47 right? Um was that standard practice as commander of operations um throughout your time, throughout your tenure? Well, I was commander operations for the four years that it applied when I was commander operations. And did your pred predecessor do the same?
00:46:04 same? Sorry. Did your predecessor do the same? I would have followed Peter Felen's uh activities. Yes. And did that equally apply to criminality where the UCO was involved but not arrested? Yes.
00:46:16 Yes. Um
00:46:20 Um well depending on the layer of the criminality alleged. Yes.
00:46:22 Yes. But most mostly if there was criminal behavior the threat of uh charges, arrest etc. of the officer uh which would implicitly endanger the SDS in
00:46:34 would implicitly endanger the SDS in terms of uh exposure to an open court then yes the commander opts would have to make the decision
00:46:46 to make the decision and you state that while operational security was very important the interest of justice and the seriousness of the offense would have also been significant factors that's at paragraph 143 of your
00:46:59 factors that's at paragraph 143 of your statement um was it appropriate the that the interests of justice were merely a significant factor. Isn't aren't the interests of justice a decisive factor in what action should be taken? Well, this is where we come back to decisions
00:47:20 this is where we come back to decisions at the same at the time weighing up the pros and cons of the incident against the guidance that we are granted and indeed recognized by the state subsequently under the new act of uh CHI's criminal behavior. There are circumstances
00:47:32 circumstances where it's a fact of life undercover officers may get caught up in the criminality and or public order issues of their colleagues. And
00:47:46 of their colleagues. And I tried to explain earlier that undercover policing its very essence is deceit, deception, and subtifuge.
00:47:57 and subtifuge. It's unsurprising that those undercover officers give the name which would be deceitful to the criminal justice system but which for their compatriots and
00:48:08 but which for their compatriots and co-extremists was essential because they're hardly likely to turn around on PC blogs.
00:48:20 PC blogs. Yeah. Um let's look at um two arrests of John Dyn then. Yes. Um, on the 6th of December 1988, John Dyn was arrested during a protest involving inspection of
00:48:31 during a protest involving inspection of livestock transport. He provided a false name and subsequently appeared in court under his alias. Um, you were briefed and kept informed of that throughout to the document references MPS0526792.
00:48:46 It's tab 99 of your bundle, sir. And you also informed Daxo Selen um of his arrest. And was that um reporting to
00:48:59 arrest. And was that um reporting to Daxo Eselen necessary because he'd in been arrested and charged with other activists who who intended to plead not guilty to the offenses? Yeah, I don't I don't recall this particular incident. I I've refreshed it was one of those in category two of my
00:49:13 was one of those in category two of my decision-making process. I didn't recall the circumstances of this particular arrest of John Dyn. I'm referring to another one which you no doubt come on with. Yes, I'll come to
00:49:24 with. Yes, I'll come to but I stand by the statement uh uh the written uh circumstances and decision
00:49:41 written uh circumstances and decision uh because it took into account what I as commander ops had to do which was weigh up those issues pro and con a person an undercover officer being arrested, charged, possible imprisonment, possible expo or definite exposure from
00:49:53 possible expo or definite exposure from an open court to the work of the SDS. So I I agree with the minute but I don't recall the her until I read the minute I didn't recall the Heraford arrest.
00:50:05 didn't recall the Heraford arrest. Um in your inquiry statement you say you would have intervened had the matter proceeded to a contested trial. What in fact happened was in the absence of any direction from you. you considered that
00:50:19 direction from you. you considered that a bind over and fine in his case, which was what the court did um in his cover name was justifiable and proportionate. Yes, I think the circumstances of that and the offer of a bind over or whatever
00:50:32 and the offer of a bind over or whatever would have matched the circumstances and seriousness or potential seriousness of what the person was charged with, which wasn't in my mind serious criminality in respect of the nature and activity surrounding that incident.
00:50:44 surrounding that incident. um you acknowledged that um the SDS
00:50:54 um you acknowledged that um the SDS managers did not declare any interest or intervene with the courts or the Crown Prosecution Service and that it was a matter of good fortune that the prosecution um offered no evidence. So the fact that John Dyn was a a UCO wasn't revealed to the prosecution or
00:51:07 wasn't revealed to the prosecution or the court in that particular instance. Is that right? Well, it seemed to solve itself uh by the circumstances, but the rationale behind that is borne out by my action of a subsequent arrest
00:51:22 out by my action of a subsequent arrest of John Dyn where for different reasons I took a different uh view taking into account all the circumstances of the uh incident.
00:51:33 circumstances of the uh incident. Um and did you discuss that with other senior officers th this case? Well, I think it's almost inevitable. I would have discussed it with Peter Fel. He was the next he was in the next room. Uh this was a serious matter. Prejudice potential uh potentially to the
00:51:52 potential uh potentially to the reputation of the of the police and to the exposure importantly again and I keep coming back to it of the SDS. Was any consideration given to the consequences of non-disclosure of the fact that he was a UCO to the court to
00:52:06 fact that he was a UCO to the court to the other arrests? I'd like to think at the time I took that into account. I can't recall now whether I specifically did, but I certainly would have uh hopefully uh taken into account the
00:52:18 hopefully uh taken into account the considerations of the law as well as the considerations of the guidance. Um because the guidance would have directed that his identity should be disclosed. Um
00:52:35 disclosed. Um yeah but there's no no guidance in my submission can cover every eventuality of the sort of situation we were in extraordinary situation dealing with extraordinary threats to the country. No guidance from the home office or
00:52:48 guidance from the home office or anywhere else can cover every aspect of that. No,
00:52:54 that. No, we have to deal with the circumstances we're faced with at the time. And sometimes in the heat of battle, decisions are made that you might change later. On this occasion, I wouldn't have changed it.
00:53:06 changed it. So you you didn't at the time and you don't now consider that the lack of disclosure to the court was problematic in the circumstances of the incident? No. Um
00:53:17 No. Um the greater good greater risk of uh disclosure in that case to me didn't match the activity alleged
00:53:31 didn't match the activity alleged and you didn't consider um it problematic um that there was the that potential there was a misleading of the court in
00:53:43 there was a misleading of the court in that case. Well, of course I did because in a previous case, the drunk drive, I took action which recognized exactly that.
00:53:48 that. Um, but in this case, your view was that that misleading of the court, which I think you accept it, it was misleading the court not to have informed them of his involvement as a UCO.
00:54:02 his involvement as a UCO. Um, that was balanced against other considerations which you've you've told us about at length and that was the decision you made. Yeah.
00:54:04 Yeah. um
00:54:13 um was the effect on those others who were um standing trial in that had been in very close proximity to him in in relation to this activity all of in relation to which all of them had been arrested. What consideration was given
00:54:28 arrested. What consideration was given to them and their proceedings? Well, as I'd said, I don't recall this specific case, so I have to rely upon the documents that I was shown and being shown now. And I can only say uh that the action taken in my mind was
00:54:41 the action taken in my mind was commensurate with the uh circumstances of that particular incident, but I don't recall specifically now uh the detail of
00:54:53 recall specifically now uh the detail of that case. Would consideration have been given to the effect on the other defendants who were intending to plead
00:55:05 defendants who were intending to plead not guilty of the fact that John Dyn in his undercover identity had accepted a bind over and a fine where the court didn't know he was a I repeat I don't recall the circumstance to the case but I would have hoped and I think certainly yes consideration would
00:55:19 think certainly yes consideration would have been given to all of the aspects of the prosecution of a case where an undercover officer was involved. And you say you considered the home office guidance. Do you accept it wasn't followed at least to the letter in this case?
00:55:28 case? Well, I accept that. Um, you also agreed to allow John Dyn to acceed
00:55:36 acceed by a chief superintendent from West Mercia Police following an official complaint made by the activists. Um sir for your note it's MPS0526792
00:55:53 page four at minute six. Um in your inquiry statement you state that the only the only viable option for
00:56:04 that the only the only viable option for John Dyn to maintain his cover was to go along to that interview. Were other options considered? I I don't recall that case. I'm sorry Mrs. Simcott. I do not recall the detail of that case. I can only rely upon the
00:56:18 of that case. I can only rely upon the circumstances described in the minutes taken. Um I don't demir from the decisions taken at the time. Uh but I don't recall the specific incidents of that case. Um, in relation to
00:56:31 that case. Um, in relation to there being no other viable option for him to maintain his cover, allowing him to go to that interview, wasn't there an option to bring the chief superintendent from West Meria Police into the
00:56:42 from West Meria Police into the confidence that he was a UCO and that
00:56:53 confidence that he was a UCO and that was the the context of him um appearing with those activists in that incident? that was an option. But again, that would have to be part of the consideration of the risk of exposing the work of the SDS through the behavior
00:57:04 the work of the SDS through the behavior of John Dyn on that particular occasion. And
00:57:06 And it's it's a it's a reasonable assumption that uh somebody should ask uh the chief superintendent to attend, but at the time I suppose the the decision was
00:57:20 time I suppose the the decision was taken in the best possible interest that that was too risky. I don't know. I can't remember again. Okay. Um let's move on then to um the second arrest which was on the 31st of March 1990. Uh John Dyn was arrested at a pole tax demonstration for being
00:57:39 a pole tax demonstration for being involved in assaults on uniformed police officers. And he was charged in his cover name of Wayne Kadugen. Yes.
00:57:44 Yes. With threatening violent disorder contrary to section four of the public order act 1986. Yes. Would you class um that sort of level of charge as a serious offense? Yes.
00:58:00 Yes. Um you um with the approval of Daxo Selen instructed him to effectively skip bail to not attend court on the 10th of April 1990 when he was due to appear uh
00:58:11 April 1990 when he was due to appear uh despite um his earlier stated intention to attend and plead to the offense. Right.
00:58:18 Right. Let me give you the context and a proportional response to that question. John Dyn was likely if convicted to suffer imprisonment for that offense.
00:58:35 suffer imprisonment for that offense. As far as uh the offense was concerned, it was it was obviously serious. We were going to prejudice possibly the interests of justice whichever course of action we took. If John Dyn had been allowed to go to court in his cover name that's misleading the
00:58:52 in his cover name that's misleading the court. If John Dyn skipped bail that's m that's misleading the court. But the lesser of those two evils given into account all of the issues we had to consider. And I keep coming back to the
00:59:04 consider. And I keep coming back to the range of issues that we had to consider in these circumstances. The lesser of those two evils in my judgment was he skipped bail. Um so there was an implicit
00:59:17 interference with justice on that occasion, but not as implicit as putting him before the court and going through a whole trial with duff details. I'm sorry. I I I still stand by given the
00:59:30 sorry. I I I still stand by given the circumstances we were under and I keep mentioning a rock and a hard place. Sometimes you have to make decisions which in the cold light of today may not appear justified. Well, so be it.
00:59:47 appear justified. Well, so be it. Um you also facilitated cancellation of the outstanding warrants against him uh through detective chief inspector uh sorry detective chief superintendent Ram. Um and again was the reasoning
00:59:58 Ram. Um and again was the reasoning behind that decision and instruction the best balance between those competing factors that you were talking about? Now on this spe uh specific point I need guidance because the rationale of what I
01:00:11 guidance because the rationale of what I did following the decision for John D to skip bail
01:00:12 skip bail restricted as redacted. But the incident
01:00:23 But the incident or the circumstances that I described in that redacted part of my statement deal exactly with how I could substantiate the reasoning behind my action. Yes. Thank you. And I don't want to transgress the redaction by saying
01:00:41 transgress the redaction by saying anything further, but I am satisfied as far as I can be that that action mitigated
01:00:43 mitigated the decision for John Dyn to skip bail. And would um officers in in the line of command above you, including Daxo S. Felen, have been aware of
01:00:55 Felen, have been aware of Sorry, I I missed that. Would officers in the line of command above you, including Mr. Felen have been aware of those that that rationale and those decisions at the time.
01:01:07 those decisions at the time. Mr. Felen certainly would have been because this was a case that taxed us severely. It's not these cases are not dealt with as routine. they're dealt with on the basis again
01:01:26 they're dealt with on the basis again coming back to the point what is the SDS doing what's the purpose of it and what are the risks attached to each of its actions at any time including the actions of the undercover officers um you stated that you would personally supervise the necessary action to
01:01:40 supervise the necessary action to protect John Dyn from legal legal repercussions that cancel that's exactly what I did in respect of the redact Ed issue. Got it. Um
01:01:54 uh in your inquiry witness statement, you confirm you discussed your approach with um DAC Manol and say that it was an appropriate and principled approach to an intractable problem. Yes.
01:02:06 Yes. Um what principle without again revealing anything under the redaction at the moment to what principle were you referring there? Well, the principle was the greater evil would for John Dyn to
01:02:17 the greater evil would for John Dyn to have appeared before the court. So, the principle was accepting and acknowledging that whatever decision we took on that was going to in some sense uh transgress uh and almost alter the
01:02:34 uh transgress uh and almost alter the not alter but go against the home office guidance. Again, we had to make a decision. In decision making as commander ops, there are a number of times when we are on the boundaries of
01:02:46 times when we are on the boundaries of the law, particularly dealing with SDS activity, and we did it with honesty, commitment, and integrity. And if I got it wrong, I got it wrong. But I don't
01:02:57 it wrong, I got it wrong. But I don't think on this occasion I did. Um, was the intractable problem that you were referring to there, the arrest of and um of John Dyn and his charge with a
01:03:13 of John Dyn and his charge with a serious criminal offense in his um cover identity? Yes. Um, wasn't there an option to reveal to the court, the the
01:03:26 option to reveal to the court, the the prosecution and indeed the investigating police team the fact that he was a UCO? there was an option and there is a consideration and if it had been normal undercover policing uh in respect of usual crime as opposed to this
01:03:38 usual crime as opposed to this extraordinary version of undercover policing that we had that's what happens. You normally inform the court uh and the court makes a decision as to whether or not it progresses and the
01:03:50 whether or not it progresses and the prosecuting authority makes the decision as to whether they pull the case. In essence, what I was doing was shortcircuiting that and pulled the
01:04:01 shortcircuiting that and pulled the case. Now, I accept in the strict letter of the law that doesn't uh that shouldn't apply. Yes. And you would accept, I'm sure, today that it's again doesn't follow the home office guidance and it does mislead that.
01:04:11 that. Yes.
01:04:22 Yes. Um should um well, was any and should any consideration have been given to the subject of a disciplinary investigation of John Dyn in relation to this incident?
01:04:42 I'm not sure it wasn't actually. Uh I I can't remember exactly the after effects of John Dyn's disappearing. Uh no, I I mean given those circumstances now today, yes, that would have been part of the decision-making process. Uh but it's difficult to
01:04:56 difficult to acquies and or direct an officer not to attend court and bail and
01:23:37 HN4's covered driving license was formally endorsed. Uh but his real license was not. Um although his real license was confiscated from him by you.
01:23:54 license was confiscated from him by you. Um, isn't the fact that his real license didn't accurately reflect his true driving record problematic? Yes.
01:23:56 Yes. Um, but again, that was just something to weigh in the balance. Part of the consideration. Yes. The fact that he didn't have his license for a year was in fact carrying out the punishment, but I agree his his own
01:24:13 punishment, but I agree his his own license didn't get endorsed. Um there was a disciplinary investigation and subsequent disciplinary action was discussed by you in a minute to Daxos Felen and you stated that uh there is always a residual risk that if HN4 was to lose his job that he might turn
01:24:26 to lose his job that he might turn against us with all the associated dangers that entails and you propose making proper representations to AXO on
01:24:38 making proper representations to AXO on his behalf. Um subsequent to that Peter Felen persuaded uh John Howley and the assistant commissioner that no disciplinary charge needed to be preferred. Is that your understanding?
01:24:55 understanding? Yes, I think it involved the very senior officers not just within the branch but outside of the branch and management services I think. uh and there was a lot of heart reddy over that as to whether or not what action should we take.
01:25:07 or not what action should we take. And that's an example of the prioritization of operational security and secrecy over disciplining this type of behavior. Yes.
01:25:23 Yes. And again, you accept that that's problematic, but it was the decision that was taken at the time. Yes.
01:25:26 Yes. Um you say in your inquiry statement just finally on this that you considered your actions to be principled and a pragmatic example of handling this
01:25:39 pragmatic example of handling this particular offense um where the officer wasn't arrested with others and you don't consider that the court was misled in this uh instance. Um do you still consider that to be your view that it was principled and pragmatic?
01:25:52 was principled and pragmatic? We're still talking about HN4. Yes.
01:25:52 Yes. Yes, I do. the the danger of uh it that particular case
01:25:59 case being uh becoming public in respect of uh the undercover officer was in my mind the one of the principal reasons uh that
01:26:13 the one of the principal reasons uh that we took the decision but it wasn't taken lightly.
01:26:18 lightly. Thank you. Um I'd like to move on then please to um the targeting of the particular fields and deployments in your era as commander ops. Um the types
01:26:33 your era as commander ops. Um the types of groups and um fields of activism that were targeted during your tenure as commander ops are set out in each of the annual reports for the period of time when you were in that post. And you've um already told the inquiry that you
01:26:49 um already told the inquiry that you would have seen those annual reports um at the time. Is that right? Yes.
01:26:58 Yes. So you would have been aware of the the general fields of deployment and the the names of the groups that were being targeted at the time. Correct.
01:26:59 Correct. Um in respect of um justification um there would have been um reasons that the MPS as an organization thought a
01:27:11 the MPS as an organization thought a particular uh field and a particular group was justified in being targeted but there would also have been influence from the security service. Is that right?
01:27:21 right? Absolutely right. Um you say you weren't routinely in receipt of SDS reporting. Do you mean by that the intelligence reports themselves? Correct.
01:27:38 Correct. Um you say that if there was anything inappropriate about it, you would expect that to have been dealt with at um detective chief superintendent level at the very high highest. Is that right? Yes.
01:27:52 Yes. Um you you were though as you've accepted aware of the groups and the general fields of broadly Yes. targeting from the annual reports. Uh, I take it um that you didn't consider there to be anything
01:28:05 consider there to be anything unjustified or inappropriate about the targeting of the groups listed there. No. And I didn't consider uh that it was necessary for commander ops to be involved in that layer of decision making unless there was contest and
01:28:18 making unless there was contest and concern about the particular target in which case uh that would be referred to me.
01:28:29 me. Thank you. Um, I've just been asked to pause, sir, so that you can read the restriction order, please.
01:28:45 There must be no disclosure or publication made of information stated uh today between 245 and 36 seconds and 245 and 45 seconds. Thank you, sir.
01:28:58 seconds. Thank you, sir. If you had thought at the time that targeting of a particular group wasn't justified, what action would you have taken as commander operations?
01:29:13 taken as commander operations? Well, I would have sought advice and information to justify why the decision was taken. As I say, at my level, the details of each target were not
01:29:25 the details of each target were not necessarily known to me, but the chief superintendent and his team on escad experience special branch officers and they would be the ones that make the decision on targeting as you say with
01:29:37 decision on targeting as you say with the cooperation, understanding and uh direction in some cases. No, direction is too strong a word. um advice of the
01:29:49 is too strong a word. um advice of the security service uh on the targets. Um and
01:29:51 and I would only be consulted or only I would be consulted if there was a real concern about whether or not such targeting was appropriate. And I take it
01:30:03 targeting was appropriate. And I take it that to your recollection at least there was never um anything raised with you by those underneath you at detective chief superintendent level that that such
01:30:15 superintendent level that that such influence that the security service were having over targeting was problematic or inappropriate. Yeah. Not that I could recall.
01:30:27 Yeah. Not that I could recall. Um what was your experience of the home office's influence over the SDS and targeting of groups and individuals in particular? Well, the home office would be party to the general national inter
01:30:42 the general national inter intelligence picture from the national security committee. Home office were members of that special branch uh security service military. So the overall threat to the country specifically uh would be party of home office role coming down a level to uh uh
01:31:00 office role coming down a level to uh uh specific targeting of extremism in other words political extremism etc etc. Uh the home office would not necessarily have a role in operational matters of
01:31:12 have a role in operational matters of that nature at all. Um but if there was concern
01:31:14 concern politically about activity that was threatening the state then of course home office would have
01:31:27 then of course home office would have had the opportunity to put that uh to the police but it doesn't mean necessarily that they decided the targets. It just means their advice uh
01:31:40 targets. It just means their advice uh was such that um well they didn't recite the targets at all. their advice was taken into account. And was the there a degree of deference but um by Metropolitan Police special branch to um that sort of influence from?
01:31:59 from? No, I don't I don't accept that at all. Um in your uh witness statement to Operation Hearn at page seven, it's tab two of the bundle MPS0723255.
01:32:08 You said that the home office and prime minister were aware of the SDS and were very conscious of the difficult and stressful work undertaken. Um, how did you come to that understanding that they were aware of the SDS in particular?
01:32:24 were aware of the SDS in particular? On the 9th of June 1988, or was it the 6th of June, I can't remember, but it was June 1988, Margaret Thatcher was discussing with her
01:32:32 her principal private secretary, Robin Butler, about the threat posed to this country by animal extremists. Margaret Thatcher was glowing in her
01:32:53 Margaret Thatcher was glowing in her praise as to how the police were dealing with the threat by animal extremists. Margaret Thatcher then offered a suggestion to Robin Butler had the police considered undercover operations.
01:33:07 police considered undercover operations. Happily we were able to tell uh the home office who were also involved in the tripartite chat that we've been doing it for 25 years and uh actually thank you
01:33:20 for 25 years and uh actually thank you very much for your support. That is why at prime minister level, at government level, they knew and you didn't have to be at prime minister level because the threat to the street, to the uh fur
01:33:34 threat to the street, to the uh fur trade, to the calf trade, all sorts of things
01:33:39 things uh was indicative of the need for some form of intelligence to combat the threat. and the prime minister and
01:33:50 threat. and the prime minister and indeed the home office were keen to try to use undercover deployments. Yes. To penetrate
01:33:51 penetrate I I read Margaret Thatcher's enthusiastic praise as being a tick in the right box.
01:34:05 Thank you. um
01:34:19 uh in looking at um again the the memorandum written by DCI docker uh in relation to his review of the SDS following the scutter which we know you saw at the time. Um it uh indicates that final decisions regarding targeting
01:34:34 final decisions regarding targeting rested with the chief superintendent of es squad um in consultation with the commander operations. Yes, namely you. Correct.
01:34:48 Correct. Um and uh HN115 Detective Chief Superintendent Tony Wait also recalls that he thinks you would have been consulted and effectively authorized decisions on targeting That's not unfair.
01:35:02 unfair. Um, your in your inquiry witness statement though, you say that as far as you can recall, you were rarely, if ever, required to intervene regarding SDS targeting decisions. Um, by intervene, do you mean um make those
01:35:16 intervene, do you mean um make those targeting decisions in and authorize them in the first place or do you mean interfere or intervene if there was something wrong? I would intervene if my judgment uh uh wanted to be satisfied that the targeting was
01:35:34 be satisfied that the targeting was correct. Uh but I had confidence in my senior officers that they would make that judgment. Uh I can't can't recall ever querying the justification uh behind a target a potential target for I it's it's quite
01:35:50 potential target for I it's it's quite possible it happened but I can't recall it.
01:35:51 it. um oughten you to have been more involved than it seems you recollect being in targeting decisions and the justification for targeting particular
01:36:12 justification for targeting particular groups given what that review um by Mr. Docker said and given uh Tony Weight's uh recollection that you were more involved in authorizing targeting decisions. Well, I I can't recall, but if they say that, I have no reason to oppose it. But it was certainly not as a matter of cause and a matter of practice. It would been exceptional.
01:36:30 practice. It would been exceptional. Um you you say um that you agree uh that the factors set out in the SDS annual report for 1989 to 90 and the reference is MPS0730905
01:36:46 at paragraph 8 page seven. It's tab 37 of the bundle uh were the most pertinent when it came to targeting decisions and those were the degree of involvement and control of public order activity exercised by a political organization in its widest sense its past general
01:36:59 its widest sense its past general behavior at public order events um and the coverage already given to it by the SDS and other special branch sources. Is that right?
01:37:11 that right? Yes. I I I mean the issue of public order and SDS targeting of issues affecting public order is uh important. Um
01:37:26 Um the as I've mentioned before the febrile atmosphere in the country in the 70s well certainly after the Vietnam riots 70s and 80s was quite intense. public
01:37:37 70s and 80s was quite intense. public order was a major problem and it went on till the 1990s uh after um it was suggested the SDS should have been shut down. Uh the welling uh public order problems
01:37:52 welling uh public order problems justified in my mind entirely the fact that we needed to have extraordinary measures to deal with extraordinary problems and that's what happened. It
01:38:03 problems and that's what happened. It also applies to areas where we have been criticized and in fact were criticized in the opening remarks of the commissioner's uh council that social justice campaign should not have been uh targeted. I agree in principle they
01:38:14 targeted. I agree in principle they shouldn't have been targeted and they weren't targeted. It was the extremist groups and agitators around those
01:38:26 those justice campaigns that were targeted and there is a misunderstanding that we targeted the justice campaign itself. We did not.
01:38:38 itself. We did not. Um you also refer to the covering letter accompanying the 1984 home office guidelines on the work of special branch. Um the reference is UCPI4584
01:38:54 branch. Um the reference is UCPI4584 paragraph five and it's at tab 31 sir of your bundle. Um senior officers must exercise strict control over the selection of targets for investigation when the current activities of an organization are legitimate and peaceful.
01:39:05 peaceful. And that paragraph relates to assistance to the security service and particularly about collecting information about subversive or potentially subversive
01:39:17 subversive or potentially subversive organizations or individuals. And you say that the context for this was clearly mainstream inquiries rather than undercover intelligence operations. That's paragraph 102 of your statement.
01:39:32 That's paragraph 102 of your statement. How did you come to that understanding? Well, I think it's fair to assume that in the developing uh operational concerns we had in terms of gathering intelligence. And don't forget, it was James Callahan, the home secretary in
01:39:44 James Callahan, the home secretary in 1968 that demanded the commissioner got his act together in intelligence gathering. We weren't doing this for our own benefit. We were doing it on behalf of the safety and security of the state. So when we have uh a an organization
01:39:57 So when we have uh a an organization that is potentially a threat to public order and there's a plethora of reasons why that may be not necessarily at the time but the buildup p to subversion as
01:40:10 time but the buildup p to subversion as it was and indeed subversion who it may be today and as I mentioned Jonathan Hall's advice that there should be uh a statutory provision for subversion I think that's a recognition by the uh
01:40:24 think that's a recognition by the uh intelligence coord coordinator Jonathan Hall that the threat from subversion today is not dissimilar to the threat from subversion when we were facing it in the 70s and 80s. So what appeared on
01:40:38 in the 70s and 80s. So what appeared on the face of of targeting may not always have been the complete rationale for gathering intelligence on that group. But specifically with this um this
01:40:50 But specifically with this um this requirement applying in the context only of of mainstream inquiries and not undercover operations, why shouldn't this requirement apply to undercover intelligence operations and the SDS?
01:41:08 intelligence operations and the SDS? I'm not sure whether Home Office fully understood at that time exactly the operations of the SDS undercover policing. And I have to say the terms of reference for this inquiry
01:41:22 reference for this inquiry are talk about undercover policing in the general where is basically it's about the specific of the SDS and the NPIU and all I would say in respect of uh those matters is
01:41:41 uh those matters is we targeted what we felt was necessary. the SDS was a complete new range of activity and I don't think that has been completely and fully understood and it ma it's not for me to say it may not
01:41:52 ma it's not for me to say it may not have been understood at the time the home office made those guidelines the extraordinary activity that the SDS was involved in. I don't think that was fully understood
01:42:05 fully understood but the guidelines themselves don't expressly exclude undercover intelligence operations on their face do they?
01:42:14 they? Yes. Um, and indeed, paragraph six of that letter says, "Special branch investigations into subversive activities in particularly sensitive fields, for example, in educational establishments, in trade unions, in industry, and among racial minorities,
01:42:28 industry, and among racial minorities, must be conducted with particular care so as to avoid any suggestion that special branches are investigating matters involving the legitimate
01:42:39 matters involving the legitimate expression of views." Now, that applies to SDS undercover deployments, doesn't it? They were um and there were deployments by the SDS into some of those particularly sensitive fields, weren't there? Yes.
01:42:55 Yes. Um if we look at paragraph 8, it says it is not the function of the of the four special branch to investigate individuals and groups merely because their policies are unpalatable or because they are highly critical of the
01:43:07 because they are highly critical of the police or because they want to transform the present system of police accountability. Um, isn't there the need for senior officers to exercise control and
01:43:20 officers to exercise control and oversight of the selection of targets all the more pressing in sensitive undercover inter
01:43:28 um because and I agree with paragraph 8 sentiments entirely.
01:43:40 entirely. Thank you. Um because there's a risk of interference with lawful activity, isn't there? In those circumstances, was that risk recognized at the time? Yes, it could do. Um, and there was um a a risk of interference with civic civil and political liberties, weren't there?
01:43:54 political liberties, weren't there? Well, sometimes there's a thin line uh drawn between uh protest legal and protest illegal and public order problems. And it's not always possible to delineate exactly where the line is. But yeah, I I agree with the sentiment.
01:44:09 But yeah, I I agree with the sentiment. And there's also in those circumstances a particular risk of collateral intrusion, isn't there? You that's what you were alluding to a moment ago. and collateral uh damage was a a real issue for us because uh
01:44:26 was a a real issue for us because uh there's no doubt the nature of the SDS activities increase the pos sorry increase the possibility of uh collateral uh damage
01:44:38 collateral uh damage and that what kind of consideration was given to that collateral damage or collateral intrusion by you and senior officers at the time in relation It would be considered by the squad and
01:44:50 It would be considered by the squad and again if it was considered necessary it would be referred to commander ops. And how was a UCO to determine what was collateral but was nonetheless of
01:45:02 collateral but was nonetheless of potential intelligence interest? What what guidance were they given about where that line is drawn? this again and it's been a recurring theme in this inquiry so far uh doesn't entirely
01:45:17 inquiry so far uh doesn't entirely understand uh intelligence gathering as it was in those days uh
01:45:25 uh what appears to be as it's been remarked many times on SDS reporting why do you need to report that what's to do with the color of our eyes what's this that each scrap of intelligence and in sorry information needs needs to be brought together, assessed, collected.
01:45:42 together, assessed, collected. All intelligence is information, but all information is not intelligence. and the process for dealing with intelligence in gathering scraps of information that go together and form a
01:45:56 information that go together and form a jigsaw of a a puzzle that comes together maybe much later than the apparent information that's been offered is something which I think has not been understood as an assumption that
01:46:08 understood as an assumption that intelligence gathering only involves and should have only involved pure intelligence. Well, it's not. It's about information that is converted to intelligence by an assessment made by
01:46:21 intelligence by an assessment made by others and that's the back office. The officers and and the squad they had their experience in special branch to go
01:46:32 their experience in special branch to go on but they did not make the decision as to whether the information they were reporting was intelligence or information that need to be assessed. I want to just ask you briefly about um the police accountability report. um
01:46:43 the police accountability report. um that was uh on political extremism and the campaign for police accountability within the MPD special branch of January 1983.
01:46:53 1983. The reference is MPS0748355.
01:47:01 It's at tab 85 of your bundle. Sir, um upon coming becoming commander of operations in 1988, were you aware of this report at the time? I must have been, but I I can't say now. Yes, I must have been. Um
01:47:14 Yes, I must have been. Um at page five, paragraph um 1.1, there are concerns reported there that the extreme left wing were attempting to
01:47:25 the extreme left wing were attempting to secure ultimate control over the MPS and the advancement of known extremists. Do you recognize the concern set out there? Yes, I do. It's an example of where politics
01:47:36 politics uh becomes merged with extremist activity. There is no right of police to interfere with genuine political activity as said in the previous
01:47:50 activity as said in the previous paragraph. But where that genuine activity crosses the border that political activity into disorder,
01:48:02 political activity into disorder, disarray and subversion as it was in those days, then the police have a responsibility to deal with those matters. And just because at that time there was a considerable amount of activity against the police
01:48:20 activity against the police and there was a desire by the left-wing extremists for police control either through police committees or local councils. It's not surprising that some disorder arose out of that activity. And where that disorder arose, we needed
01:48:39 where that disorder arose, we needed intelligence to cover police activity on it. And that's exactly what we did. And were you familiar with the unofficial accountability uh groups, independent bodies whose sole function would be to watch and report upon the work of the MPS
01:48:51 MPS and that uh they were of interest to special branch because of the nature of them wanting to watch and report. I think I understood the question and if I did yes.
01:49:09 I did yes. Okay. Um, did thinking of that kind set out in the report there influence um, UCO deployments in the SDS or their reporting at the time you were commander of operations so far as you understood? Yes.
01:49:18 Yes. Um, and was there um
01:49:32 Um, and was there um was there interest in certain groups um and fields simply because those groups were known to be notoriously anti- police such as the No, as I've tried to explain, Mr. Simco, it wasn't about anti police feeling. I mean, we're used to that. We've had
01:49:44 mean, we're used to that. We've had generations of that. uh the police are the whipping boy for a lot of uh activity. We take that as part of the part of the course. That's not what this was about. It's where public order, disorder, and other activities
01:50:09 disorder, and other activities threatening the safety and well-being of the state were bought in for political means. Then we had a duty to gather intelligence on that to inform our uniform colleagues and others in combating it. Were you aware of action taken by the S
01:50:23 Were you aware of action taken by the S any action taken by the SDS in terms of targeting police accountability groups in order to give central support to district commanders to counter the efforts of those police monitoring groups during your I I can't recall that. No. Um, what assistance were you aware that
01:50:39 what assistance were you aware that special branch provided to counter the efforts of police monitoring groups during your time?
01:50:48 Well, I can assume uh and I know from my period as a chief superintendent in Rice Flip that there were community groups uh assembled in each county and burough area which dealt with all sorts of matters um including the role of the
01:51:00 matters um including the role of the police. So at that level there was uh and chief superintendent on divisions there was a level of supervision uh and involvement in uh uh police matters
01:51:15 involvement in uh uh police matters going up to the national level that's when it comes into A8 public order andor special branch then we would be involved or the SDS would have been involved
01:51:27 or the SDS would have been involved where there was intelligence or a need for intelligence on the threat to public order, not because somebody was objecting and criticizing the police.
01:51:43 objecting and criticizing the police. Um, were you aware of the establishment of a support unit within A7 to collect and disseminate within the force information relating to the activities of those involved in the police monitoring group? And if and so you didn't have any involvement with them.
01:52:03 So would you um characterize intelligence gathering and reporting on police monitoring or police accountability groups as a matter of collateral intrusion or were they specifically targeted?
01:52:14 specifically targeted? No, it would be a core responsibility if it justified the action and justifying the action means they were a threat to public order. And it was that threat to public order
01:52:29 And it was that threat to public order which justified targeting, not the fact that they were anti- police. Potentially. Yes. What do you mean potentially? Well, yes. Um were you aware at the time of a
01:52:40 Um were you aware at the time of a concern by the home office about the expansion of um Metropolitan Police special branches remitt with regards to the police monitoring groups along the lines of intruding upon those um where
01:52:57 lines of intruding upon those um where they were merely trying to hold police accountable. special branch. The Metropolitan Police special branch uh from my existence in it from 1965 were well aware of the need to keep within the rules of the game as far as special
01:53:09 the rules of the game as far as special branches were concerned the home office guidance. I don't remember specifically any changes to that. But there were at least two other instructions I think
01:53:22 least two other instructions I think from the home office on the role of the special branch and we concurred with those. We applied complied with them. Was um were you aware whether this police accountability report was updated during your time as commander operations
01:53:41 by the police or by the home office? Either
01:53:44 Either I think the home office updated it. Yes. I think there was a there was an inspection if I I wasn't in London then. I was in Cambridge here but I believe there was an inspection carried out by our majesty's inspector of Castabbury
01:54:03 our majesty's inspector of Castabbury into special branches and as a result of that there would have been no doubt recommendations and corrections or updating.
01:54:05 updating. Um were you were the security service um during your time as commander operations interested in the activities of the police monitoring groups or not?
01:54:17 monitoring groups or not? Not that I was aware of.
01:54:28 Were you aware of their decision in March 1988 that they weren't interested in receiving intelligence on police accountability groups from NPSB as such groups were cons were were not considered to be subversive?
01:54:43 Well, uh I I've tried to explain that in previous answers. Um they may not have been overtly subversive in the definition strictly as it should. Which is why the security service stood back from public order problems, but a more pragmatic view of these issues by
01:54:55 pragmatic view of these issues by special branch and by our uniform colleagues indicated there was still a need to go for intelligence on areas
01:55:11 need to go for intelligence on areas which are were a threat to public order. And if that included police punishing groups, uh policy police monitoring monitoring groups, so be it.
01:55:22 monitoring groups, so be it. Um and so it was that threat to public order that fulfilled a proper policing purpose of any targeting of those groups.
01:55:26 groups. Well, public order at one end, subversion at the other. Thank you. Um sir, I'm conscious of the time. I still have some more questions, but it may be time for a break.
01:55:43 but it may be time for a break. Well, let let's ask those who are most affected. But Mr. Gum, would you like a break now? Not particularly. How about our short handwriters? Okay, at the moment, okay, how much long have you can you go on for without a break? 15 minutes.
01:55:56 15 minutes. Yes, that's that's fine. Thank you. I'll carry on. I just wanted to make sure that those who might need a break had one if they wanted one. Um I want to move on to um uh social justice and
01:56:09 move on to um uh social justice and defense campaigns which you've mentioned yes
01:56:19 yes briefly beforehand. Um you say at um paragraph uh 116 page 47 of your inquiry witness statement in relation to these type of campaigns that a targeting decision had to fulfill either the policing requirement of preserving the Queen's peace or supporting the security service in its counter subversion task as you referred to a moment ago in
01:56:35 as you referred to a moment ago in relation to police monitoring groups. Um what safeguards were there to ensure then that particular care was taken by a special branch that's by that they
01:56:50 special branch that's by that they weren't investigating and reporting on the legitimate expression of views as opposed to um fulfilling a proper policing purpose. Well, I re reiterate what I've said about social justice campaigns. We did not target social justice campaigns. Whatever has come out in evidence to
01:57:03 Whatever has come out in evidence to this inquiry so far, the policy from special branch was not to target the social justice campaign itself. What we
01:57:15 social justice campaign itself. What we experienced were, and anybody that lived through the 70s and 80s will remember, the disorder created by extremist groups and individuals that latched on to
01:57:27 and individuals that latched on to justice campaigns to further their own political or extremist cause was significant. So it's those people we
01:57:40 significant. So it's those people we targeted and it's those people that were the subject of SDS activity, not the social justice campaign itself. But what what consideration was given then to safeguarding against collateral intrusion into those social justice um and defense campaigns? Well,
01:57:57 and defense campaigns? Well, the operational directions and the nouse of the individuals that were uh undertaking this word at work understood that there were boundaries that they had to stay within. Um sometimes they may
01:58:09 to stay within. Um sometimes they may have strayed outside. Obviously they did from some of the uh details presented to this inquiry, but they understood their role and it was as far as possible
01:58:24 role and it was as far as possible dealing with extremism, subversion and those issues, not social justice. Um what about racial justice campaigns or
01:58:35 or Well, the same. So, what was the Metropolitan Police's attitude towards those type of of campaigns when you were commander operations? That they weren't targeted specifically in so far as they were reported on. It
01:58:51 in so far as they were reported on. It was collateral intrusion due to a risk of of extremists taking over or influencing those campaigns. I can only speak for my period when it was my watch between 88 and 91. Uh I do not recall any specific
01:59:02 Uh I do not recall any specific targeting of uh racial groups per se, but there may well have been and there obviously were intrusions into intelligence gathering of those areas
01:59:17 intelligence gathering of those areas where there was a threat to public order by extremist activity and that was not necessarily involving the racial organization itself. It was
01:59:32 the racial organization itself. It was the fringe groups and individuals that latched on to those organization to those campaigns. And during your time as commander operations, how um what was your awareness of the nature and extent of
01:59:45 awareness of the nature and extent of racial or racist violence in London at the time?
01:59:49 the time? Well, I sadly I think racial violence existed uh from way back. Um you've only got to look at the record of Brixton and etc etc. uh racial violence was endemic within society. Uh as far as we were
02:00:02 within society. Uh as far as we were concerned, we were tasked as special branch to provide intelligence to our uniform colleagues, to the security service, to others to deal with
02:00:13 service, to others to deal with extremism in whatever form it reared. And if it was racial issues, then it was against those uh that we targeted. And w
02:00:25 against those uh that we targeted. And w were you did you have an awareness of um criticisms by ethnic minority communities, police minor police monitoring groups and justice campaigns of an inadequate response by the MPS to
02:00:37 of an inadequate response by the MPS to racist violence? Were you aware of that during your time as I don't think you should not been aware of it sitting where I was seen as commander OS. And what steps did you take to um address those concerns and concern? I
02:00:48 address those concerns and concern? I would reiterate with command with the chief superintendent and the teams to dis uh um
02:01:00 dis uh um to tell the troops when they were being uh at meetings advised on the areas where they go and importantly areas where they don't go. So there were
02:01:11 where they don't go. So there were personal briefings from uh the team in the back office to the frontline officers and they would then use their own initiative as to when that may have happened or not and
02:01:24 and I think you've given your view on this but just so I check that my understanding is correct you would say that a high incidence of racially motivated crime was understood to
02:01:38 motivated crime was understood to represent a particular public order risk um during the time you were commander operations. Um, and that that um was likely to make policing more difficult and potentially more dangerous both for our uniform colleagues. Yes.
02:01:56 both for our uniform colleagues. Yes. And so it was in um clearly everyone's interest to um address Yes.
02:02:00 Yes. those concerns. And I think the Welling demonstration in ' 91 illustrated that amply because that was there was a racial influence from the anti uh uh racist league in there and the bookshop where there was mayhem, absolute mayhem.
02:02:15 where there was mayhem, absolute mayhem. In relation to the NPS, the Metropolitan Police Service as an organization itself, I want to ask you just a few
02:02:26 itself, I want to ask you just a few questions about racism in that context. Um, in relation to the MPS as an organization and your tenure as commander of operations, what was your experience of racism within the organization itself and its officers?
02:02:37 organization itself and its officers? Special branch or the Metropolitan Police?
02:02:40 Police? Um, both primarily special branch, but but both.
02:02:43 but both. I joined the Metropolitan Police in 1963.
02:02:45 1963. I joined special branch in 1965. In all my career in special branch andor before at uh uniform and indeed as chief superintendent rice liib um I was
02:03:01 superintendent rice liib um I was obviously conscious that it was a threat that the police needed to deal with sensitively properly but firmly but I never saw any overt racial activity within special branch or in the
02:03:13 within special branch or in the surrounds that I was working with at rice lip or whatever That's not to say there wasn't some because clearly there was. But I didn't witness it. I didn't see it. And uh I would have been
02:03:31 see it. And uh I would have been appalled if uh that had motivated our actions.
02:03:32 actions. Um I think you knew HN593 um Detective Chief Superintendent Bob Potter during your time. Um, does the same comment apply to him that you
02:03:45 same comment apply to him that you didn't witness or hear about any racist behavior or comments by him? Well, let me put that in context. Bob Potter was seriously ill. I saved him from jumping in front of a
02:03:59 I saved him from jumping in front of a tube at St. James's Park as part of his illness. What he did, his behavior was unacceptable. Totally unacceptable. And he knew it and we knew it. But the man was ill and ultimately was
02:04:21 was ill and ultimately was put to a secure hospital and died of his uh problems. And I will not accept Bob Potter being used as a thrust to demonstrate that there was uh racial activity in special branch just because one man who was seriously unwell
02:04:34 one man who was seriously unwell did what he did which was an outrageous behavior if I remember it rightly. I understand. Um, did you know HN86 who's a closed officer and a DI in the SDS? Did you know? Sorry. H
02:04:47 Sorry. H 86. If you don't know who that is, we can give you the cipher list
02:04:54 again. So, please don't use his name.
02:05:10 Yes, I did. No. Were you ever did you ever witness or were you ever aware of any racist behavior by him? No. Uh and to put that in context, I believe he was at the end of my period
02:05:27 believe he was at the end of my period of commander ops. I can't be absolutely sure. I don't recall having much to do with that person. Okay. Obviously, I have listened to the evidence presented to this inquiry. Um, I'm surprised.
02:05:41 I'm surprised. Uh, I'm saddened by the current impass. Uh, but having said that, I don't personally see any, uh, activity, racial activity or discrimination by that person.
02:05:56 person. Thank you. Were you ever aware of family liaison officers assigned to bereaveved families of the victims of racist violence reporting on them and their justice campaigns? No.
02:06:09 No. Um or that their reports were shared with the SDS and special branch? No.
02:06:15 No. Um what would you have done if you'd become aware of such reporting at the time?
02:06:21 Well, I would have made a judgment on the uh veracity of the comment whether or not it affected our role as special branch and dealt with it accordingly. I mean, I I it's hypothetical now uh to
02:06:33 mean, I I it's hypothetical now uh to say something that happened 20, 30, 40 years ago. What would I have done about it? I don't know. Would would such a practice have been justifiable and if so, on what basis? No.
02:06:47 Um, thank you.
02:07:00 I want to ask you very briefly about elected politicians and reporting upon some of them during your time.
02:07:10 some of them during your time. Um, what was your understanding briefly as to the nature and extent of targeting of elected politicians during the time you were commander operations? It was the same with uh the man on the street. Elected politicians have a right and duty to represent their uh um
02:07:21 duty to represent their uh um constituents and express their own opinion. And some of those opinions, as you well know, in the 70s and 80s in particular, were pretty extreme by some members of parliament and by local
02:07:33 members of parliament and by local authority chips. So be it. That wasn't our role. what we did become involved in and it was possibly
02:07:45 and it was possibly uh collateral damage as you described it, information or intelligence that came to the SDS that a particular member of parliament or whatever was involved in something that came within the
02:07:56 in something that came within the definition of either public order problems, subversion or something untoward. Then where the safety or security of the state may have been threatened, whatever the person's status
02:08:11 threatened, whatever the person's status as an elected representative, they still had a responsibility to comply with the law. And the police had a responsibility to report where there was potential threat to the law. And some of the comments made by some of those people at
02:08:26 comments made by some of those people at that time, as you well know, were on the borderline of stirring uh uh unrest. Were you aware at the time between 1988 and 91 of intelligence reports on Mr. Ken Livingston while he was an MP?
02:08:43 Ken Livingston while he was an MP? Well, I knew about Ken Livingstone. Yes. And I know his politics, but I wasn't aware of any un uh uh um wrongful uh intrusion in his uh activities. No. Were you you weren't aware of intelligence
02:08:56 you you weren't aware of intelligence reports by the SDS on him attending and speaking at various when was this? Um in primarily in uh 1988 but through that period.
02:09:10 that period. No, I I No, I was new to special branch uh commander then. Uh but that's not an excuse. No, I didn't know. I I I mean it's not impossible that I would have been made aware of that because of who he was. Uh but he did expouse some uh extreme views at times, didn't he?
02:09:25 extreme views at times, didn't he? And so would you have regarded reporting upon him as justified at the time? Only if it threatened public order or was subversive. And I keep repeating. We did not and should not have
02:09:42 We did not and should not have interfered with the genuine political activity of members of parliament or elected members of councils. was reporting on left-wing politicians influenced by the security service at the time so far as you're aware.
02:09:53 the time so far as you're aware. Not from my point of view, but you better ask them that. Um, and were you aware whether the home office um prime minister or anyone else in government was aware of such
02:10:05 in government was aware of such reporting of of the type on um for example?
02:10:10 example? I wasn't I wasn't aware of any intrusion in that uh level of activity. No. Thank you. Um, I want to move on to your uh knowledge and awareness during
02:10:27 your uh knowledge and awareness during your time as commander of operations of the case which um came to be known as Mcllyel the court case. Yes.
02:10:35 Yes. Um but so I'm again I'm conscious of the time. This is my last topic. Um but uh if
02:10:38 if let let's finish it and then we'll break for 15 minutes so that any rule 10 questions can be put to you and uh we we can then resume. Yes. Thank you sir. If Mr. Gunn is happy with that I'm happy to proceed that way.
02:10:57 with that I'm happy to proceed that way. Um so uh during your tenure as commander of operations um what contact was there so far as you were aware between Metropolitan Police special branch and companies who might be affected by activists activities including animal
02:11:10 activists activities including animal rights activists. What sort of channels of liaison was there between companies and the police? The Mcnal case was interesting uh from the point of view it was um it was at the start of uh of of my no it was at the end of my tenure as
02:11:26 my no it was at the end of my tenure as commander ops I think where the activity uh increased and the civil case and I spent one evening last week after Dave Morris's uh evidence reviewing the whole of the Mcn McNable
02:11:41 reviewing the whole of the Mcn McNable process through the courts here appeal courts, uh, House of, uh, Lords or whatever it was, and the human rights court, and I take my hat off to Helen Steel and, uh, Dave Morris for their
02:11:54 Steel and, uh, Dave Morris for their tenacity because it took nine years to solve that case. I can't say and I didn't see anywhere in a whole evening going through that there was any mention of me as commander ops or of special
02:12:10 of me as commander ops or of special branch per se in terms of SDS in respect of that particular uh incident but I can't say it didn't occur. All I can say is I don't recall it. Um, did you have any knowledge or awareness at the time
02:12:25 any knowledge or awareness at the time of a relationship between Metropolitan Police special branch officers and McDonald private investigators in 199? No, I didn't have any knowledge of specific uh arrangements. But let me say this.
02:12:41 this. It was good practice for police in possession of intelligence about threats to industry, commerce, and whatever to share that information with those potentially affected
02:12:54 those potentially affected presumably wider than just McDonald's. AB
02:12:55 AB Oh, absolutely. McDonald's was uh just one of of a number of organization. I mean, I recall uh the Oxford Street Trade Association where there was firebombs being put
02:13:07 where there was firebombs being put around in uh Oxford Street. It was good practice to inform the industry and the shops that there was a threat and I stand by that. It was good security practice. It was not, as possibly
02:13:21 practice. It was not, as possibly inferred by Dave Morris, uh that this was a commercial arrangement. Certainly not. It was good practice in respect of security of those organizations
02:13:35 security of those organizations uh and preventing harm, damage and injury.
02:13:41 injury. Did you know that SDS reporting was being passed to McDonald's at the time? I didn't.
02:13:52 I didn't. Um did you know that McDonald's had activists including John Dyn but who they knew was a UCO um followed by private investigators? I didn't have knowledge of that. No. Um,
02:13:58 Um, in terms of the authorization of a relationship between special branch and um private investigators from McDonald's, who who would have
02:14:10 McDonald's, who who would have authorized um that relationship and that liaison?
02:14:19 liaison? Well, it would have been at a higher level uh than the back office. It would probably been at chief superintendent level of the squad. Not at your level. Sorry.
02:14:22 Sorry. Not at your level. Not necessarily. No. Uh, it might have been referred to me if there was contention. Uh,
02:14:34 contention. Uh, liable might have been referred to me because of the ongoing legal process which took nine years or 10 years to resolve, but I don't personally recall
02:14:48 resolve, but I don't personally recall any involvement with McLibel personally. And were you aware of or did you yourself authorize McDonald's private investigators to be told that UCOs were infiltrating London Greenpeace? No.
02:14:58 No. Um,
02:15:03 Um, we know that did happen. Um, how could that have happened without your knowledge at Commander Operations? Well, I don't know because I didn't know it happened.
02:15:14 it happened. Um, in relation to the McLibel case itself,
02:15:16 itself, um, in relation to the writer, uh, by McDonald's on the activists, um, were you aware of, um, them prior to their service?
02:15:30 service? No, I I I mean, I I got what Dave Morris said the other day and was waving a bit of paper in the air like uh, Chamberlain as as if it was damning evidence of something. I'm not sure what that was all about. And certainly as I reiterated
02:15:41 all about. And certainly as I reiterated and do reiterate the fact that we leazed commercial with commercial organizations
02:15:52 commercial with commercial organizations was not per se a commercial decision. It was a security decision. It had commercial implications. Of course it did.
02:15:59 did. Why were there security implications to the McLibel defamation trial though? Well, I I wasn't aware of that.
02:16:13 Well, I I wasn't aware of that. Okay. Um the MPS made sure that um John Dyn was not included on the writ um of defamation served by McDonald's on activists including Helen Steel in September of 1990. Were you aware of that at the time?
02:16:32 that at the time? Um did you have any involvement in in No, I didn't. And as I said earlier, I only really got uh concerned with the Mc Liel trail after hearing Dave Morris the other day. Uh um my personal memory of the details of the Mc Liel incident, that's the leaflet
02:16:45 Liel incident, that's the leaflet and the alleged activity afterwards and then going on for another nine 10 years in the civil case. I I did not recall.
02:16:58 in the civil case. I I did not recall. Okay. Um, do you recall ever seeing intelligence reports from John Dyn concerning the service of of the RIS? No.
02:17:04 No. Um,
02:17:12 uh, Detective Chief Superintendent Wait, um, has said that, uh, John Dyn's name, he couldn't have been emitted from the RIT without a commander's authorization. Do
02:17:24 without a commander's authorization. Do you have any particular comment on that evidence?
02:17:25 evidence? Well, I don't I don't know. I mean, I would have considered the circumstances at the time. It is possible it should have been uh uh seen by Commander Ops, but it
02:17:39 uh uh seen by Commander Ops, but it certainly wasn't seen by me as far as I'm aware.
02:17:53 Um, what consideration was given, so far as you're aware, to John Dyn's risk of compromise on being excluded from Sorry, say again. What consideration are you aware of being given to John Dyne's risk of compromise on being excluded from the RIT? In other words, that not being
02:18:09 RIT? In other words, that not being included on the RIT with other activists despite his involvement at the time, would have been suspicious to those fellow activists? I don't recall that decision.
02:18:19 decision. I don't resolve myself uh relieve myself of the responsibility if it happened, but I don't recall it. But it would have been part of the circumstances in the round. Again, taking you back to the many answers I've given so far today in
02:18:37 many answers I've given so far today in terms of the security of the operation, the interests of justice, the need to protect both the reputation of the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office
02:18:48 Metropolitan Police and the Home Office and government and they would have been part of the decision-making process involving that particular issue of Dines, but I do not recall it. Do you recall any awareness of his involvement after service of the Ritz in that he helped activists respond to them?
02:18:58 them? No.
02:18:59 No. Um,
02:19:04 Um, so you wouldn't be aware of any guidance given to him about what he should do about that? I was probably in Cambridge here by then. Was any guidance given to him so
02:19:19 then. Was any guidance given to him so far as you are aware concerning um legal professional privilege implications of his reporting on a defamation case in which his fellow activists were? I can't answer that question. You I wasn't involved in that so I don't know the answer but I would be surprising to me if there wasn't an
02:19:33 surprising to me if there wasn't an involvement and advice given to him by uh a senior officer within the squad. Thank you. Um I just have um two very short questions on another topic and
02:19:46 short questions on another topic and it's the topic of true spies and then I'm finished sir with my questions. Um are you aware or do you have any knowledge of who was the first person from the MPS to make contact with the
02:19:59 from the MPS to make contact with the BBC in relation to that program? And if you're concerned about revealing a name for privacy reasons, if you know if you have a name in mind, you could write it down.
02:20:11 down. I remember the case well. I've waited 25 years to have an explanation of what went on on the True Spies, which was grossly distorted because of the lack of actually what happened as opposed to
02:20:24 actually what happened as opposed to what people thought happened. I've lost a few friends in the past because they
02:20:35 a few friends in the past because they considered my decision was wrong. It may well be with the benefit of hindsight, but I stand by it because the greater evil would have been not to have cooperated with the program. I got lambasted because insisting all along as if I'd done this uh inquiry today about
02:20:50 if I'd done this uh inquiry today about the sacrosan nature of the secret nature of the um SDS and that here you are on
02:21:02 of the um SDS and that here you are on television talking about it. Yes, I have no doubt you probably want to ask me about that. The reason was I was approached, can I mention the name of the journal, the the senior journalist? Yes.
02:21:11 Yes. I was approached by Peter Taylor, a respected Panorama uh reporter who I'd worked with in the special branch previously on Irish terrorism.
02:21:24 Irish terrorism. Peter had never let me down and I trusted him. What Peter described to me as chief constible of Cambridge cheer and chairman of ACPO terrorist committee made my jaw drop. I was terrified of
02:21:39 made my jaw drop. I was terrified of what he was telling me and it was clear he had been well briefed by somebody connected with the SDS either past or present. Clear some of the information that he was passed to me not just the fact that they were known as the
02:21:50 fact that they were known as the hairies. Everybody, I think probably knew that by that time. But some of the information of the contacts, the informants, if that had been published, would have
02:22:08 if that had been published, would have done lasting damage, not just to us, but to the government, to the security services, and to us. And I can't emphasize that strongly enough because it was part of my decision-making process.
02:22:18 process. We either cooperated with Peter Taylor to minimize the damage or we stood back and let Peter Taylor and his program do
02:22:33 and let Peter Taylor and his program do utmost damage possible to the situation that he was describing in True Spies. I came to the conclusion that and again the rock and a hard place I'm afraid I
02:22:51 the rock and a hard place I'm afraid I had to make a decision on what to do. I spoke. Can I mention the uh assistant commissioner specialist operations? Yes.
02:22:53 Yes. David Vanesse? Yes, you can. I contacted Can I mention the commissioner, John Stevens? Yes.
02:23:03 Yes. I contacted both of those and discussed the case in detail. In fact, I think I actually came down to London to see John Stevens.
02:23:11 Stevens. We I went through it in detail as I'm telling you that if we didn't cooperate with that program, all hell would break loose. Not just the
02:23:28 all hell would break loose. Not just the end of SDS, but could could have brought down the government. It was that serious.
02:23:30 serious. My judgment, and I stand by it, was we should limit the damage by cooperating with Peter Taylor. And I go back to what I said earlier. I trusted Peter Taylor.
02:23:41 I said earlier. I trusted Peter Taylor. He was obviously insisting on editorial control and I understood that. So I knew we couldn't influence the program unduly.
02:23:56 unduly. But we did influence the program and we did manage to take out of that program the very damaging
02:24:07 the very damaging matters that would have been involved if we hadn't uh would have been spoken if we hadn't been involved. Now, having said all of that, it was again a judgment we had to make.
02:24:20 judgment we had to make. We know that there was a meeting over lunch between the BBC and Roger Pierce and Colin Black of the Metropolitan Police. Um, were you aware of that meeting at the time? I I my role as act poam was not to interfere with uh the metropolitan police activities and although I would have
02:24:32 activities and although I would have been party from the terrorist committee so was the home office because they were members of the terrorist committee and
02:24:48 members of the terrorist committee and so were the security services although I would have been party to that I do not recall um Roger Pierce or Colin Black Colin Black
02:25:00 Colin Black Colin Black's meeting and I don't recall but I believe Roger Pierce sent a note round to former SDS officers warning them that this was they might be approached. Roger got crucified by others not fully understanding what
02:25:12 by others not fully understanding what that was all about. But having said that I wasn't aware of that. Uh Peter Taylor asked me if I would contact former members of the SDS to see whether or not they would cooperate with the program
02:25:23 they would cooperate with the program and I said absolutely not and I didn't. Do you know? But there were two two members on that program that went off pie. One was a special branch officer and that's sad
02:25:35 special branch officer and that's sad that he went off pie and one I believe was a West Midlands officer and they said things off script that were potentially damaging and of course increase the criticism of that
02:25:46 course increase the criticism of that program and the true story behind True Spies has never been published. My original question was, do you know who first made contact from
02:25:57 first made contact from well probably sorry from the Met from the Met to BBC? No. The first person to be approached was probably me when Peter Taylor contacted me and Cambridge chair and
02:26:08 contacted me and Cambridge chair and explained what he proposed to do to my horror.
02:26:11 horror. Thank you. Thank you sir. Those are all my questions.
02:26:25 my questions. Well, now we will break for 15 minutes. Um can I express the um hope please that Mr. Khan can be finished by 4:30 which is the time that I think he has been promised.
02:26:30 promised. Yes, we will make every effort sir. All
02:44:36 Yes. Thank you, sir. Um Mr. Gun, we're nearly finished.
02:44:43 finished. Um I just have a few more questions um as a result of um the rule 10 process. uh and uh they're on a a variety of different topics, but I shouldn't detain you very long. Okay.
02:44:59 Okay. Um firstly then, in relation to uh the Mclli court case, the defamation case, um did you know um Sid Nicholson or Terry Carol at all? No. Did Sorry. Did I know Did you know Sid Nicholson? No.
02:45:12 Did you know Sid Nicholson? No. Or Terry Carol? I read from the papers that they are former police officers who work for McDonald, but I didn't know them either. I wasn't aware of their position uh as former police officers or whatever. Didn't know them. And you didn't have um any involvement with them in the McLar? Definitely not.
02:45:24 Definitely not. um in relation to um the Debenhams um
02:45:38 um in relation to um the Debenhams um case um you were aware at the time of Bob Lambert's involvement in um that that case that court case. Yes.
02:45:46 Yes. Um you said that um you weren't involved in disclosure decisions. No.
02:45:58 No. um or um those decisions in in the court case, the prosecution um of uh uh Clark and Shepherd. Is that still right? You've also given evidence though primarily in relation to um John Dyn but in general as well that um it was your decision um what who to and when to
02:46:14 decision um what who to and when to disclose information to the courts about an undercover police officer's involvement in the arrests of people and you were aware of Bob Lambert's involvement in this particular uh
02:46:27 involvement in this particular uh prosecution. I was I was aware that he was uh
02:46:32 was uh monitoring the extremist activity of animal extremists. Yes. But in particular in relation to that Debenham's incident the
02:46:44 Debenham's incident the in I'm aware from reading the paper. I can't say at the time that I was totally uh can remember it now but I'm aware from the paperwork of his close involvement in those matters. Yes. So why
02:46:54 So why intelligence gathering? I hasten to add. So why weren't you given your acceptance today in relation to the general position and in relation to the dyn
02:47:07 position and in relation to the dyn cases? Um why wasn't it you making those decisions about disclosure within those prosecutions? Why weren't you more involved as commander operations? Because there's a demarcation line between intelligence and evidence. Intelligence is the role of the special branch. Evidence was the role of the
02:47:19 branch. Evidence was the role of the anti-terrorist branch. And there is a corridor of air between the two so that intelligence can be protected and the propriety of the evidence given in a
02:47:33 propriety of the evidence given in a criminal trial is not uh uh jeopardized by uh intelligence issues.
02:47:46 by uh intelligence issues. I see. Thank you. Um you mentioned um relatively briefly but in passing in relation to animal rights extremist activity during your time as chief constable of Cambridge police that you were aware um of targeting of um Stac
02:48:07 Huntington um animal cruelty. Um, were you aware that SDS officers were targeting them at the time? I wasn't aware at the time because I was in Cambridge here, but I would have been amazed if they weren't because we had
02:48:18 amazed if they weren't because we had enormous problems in Cambridge here with the Huntington Life Sciences uh premises, enormous uh uh public order, potential serious damage and threatening
02:48:30 potential serious damage and threatening the community as I mentioned earlier. So yes, I was aware uh of the activities and I assumed that there would be SDS involvement in the intelligence gathering area of that those events.
02:48:47 gathering area of that those events. I see. Thank you. Um in relation to the um disciplinary case of HN155 and if you wish to remind yourself of who that is, the cipher list will be provided to you. It was
02:49:03 provided to you. It was the officer who was disciplined and was ill health retired um before the Scott case.
02:49:03 case. Sorry, I
02:49:07 Sorry, I Yes, I do. I number 155.
02:49:16 Here we are. Yes, you and don't mention his name, but you you're aware of that case. Um, HN 155 wrote a letter directly to the commissioner at the time by way of
02:49:28 commissioner at the time by way of complaint about his treatment in his disciplinary case in which by his own admission he was very close um to members of the social socialist workers party and on close
02:49:45 socialist workers party and on close terms with some MPs in the left wing. Um that letter um as I said goes directly to the commissioner and you were made aware of it in a minute at the time. You then wrote to Daxo uh Peter Felen. Um
02:49:58 then wrote to Daxo uh Peter Felen. Um saying he may raise this if he remains unhappy with the home secretary. um why would there be a concern about um HN155 or indeed any UCO um raising um a
02:50:13 HN155 or indeed any UCO um raising um a concern about a disciplinary matter with the home secretary? I don't think it was specifically about the individual. It was about the circumstances of the incident. In other
02:50:28 circumstances of the incident. In other words, any publicity of the 155 case and that would have happened in a disciplinary inquiry would have been public. If that became public then the whole uh issue of the role of the SDS would have been exposed. So it wasn't I
02:50:43 would have been exposed. So it wasn't I think specifically about the individual. It was about the circumstances that the Home Office would need to have known if there was a reputational issue coming
02:50:54 there was a reputational issue coming their way. And there would have been a reputational issue as I've explained. Thank you. Um uh Mr. Buchanan who succeeded you as commander operations um gave uh an interview with uh Operation Hearn in
02:51:09 interview with uh Operation Hearn in common uh with yourself. um he referred um in that interview uh and to his
02:51:20 um in that interview uh and to his statement to um briefings um being given to the home office on the SDS. Do you recall that during your time as commander of operations? I was party to a briefing. Can I mention he's dead? A senior home office official.
02:51:34 Could you write them down? Write it down. Would you write it down to start with and then we'll uh
02:51:48 It's in my statement. If it's in your statement, then yes, you can.
02:51:52 can. Yeah, it's in my statement. Um,
02:51:55 Um, I
02:51:56 I was party to a conversation uh at the home office with John Chilcott,
02:52:03 Chilcott, who was a senior home office. We briefed I I can't remember the exact timing. I think it was
02:52:17 timing. I think it was late on uh before just before I went to Cambridge here, there was an issue of park funding. I'm sure that conversation involved uh updating
02:52:30 updating uh John Chilcott on the activities. And although I can't specifically remember it, I'd be surprised if we didn't
02:52:42 it, I'd be surprised if we didn't mention at that time 155 case if it was considered to be of reputational importance, which it was. So were to to your recollection briefings to the home office about SDS activities issue related rather than routine and regular?
02:52:57 I'm just trying to think how many times I went to the home office and it can't be more than two or three. Uh but I do specifically remember the meeting with John Chilc. Uh and I think I went with Peter Felen as well, two of us. Um
02:53:13 Peter Felen as well, two of us. Um because the SDS was an operational police unit and because it was part but because it was part funded by the home office, there was a home office interest. Yes. And I have to say also, as I've said repeatedly today,
02:53:28 said repeatedly today, the sensitivity of the work of the SDS was considerable. Yes. Thank you. Political damage that could have been done by exposure of the work was ever present.
02:53:42 present. Um Mr. Buchanan's uh Operation Hearn interviewer noted um in his interview
02:53:55 interviewer noted um in his interview with him that Mr. Buchanan had said that he both he and you um stood up to the home office and were therefore not popular with them. I noticed that and I have to say again and I repeat I have grave concerns about
02:54:11 and I repeat I have grave concerns about the use of notes not even signed and the statement of an officer which appeared in the public domain through this inquiry I think is outrageous. Do you have any comment on the accuracy? I have no comment at all. Um
02:54:29 if um separate topic, if you had become aware of a particular um deceitful sexual relationship between an undercover officer um and uh a member of the public um during your time as
02:54:46 the public um during your time as commander of operations, would you have taken any steps to inform the woman in that relationship of the the fact of that that person was a UCO. That's a difficult question. Uh it would be a hypothetical answer at best. I can't
02:55:06 I can't think that that would have been what we'd have done. Uh but it depends or would have depended on the circumstances. It would have depend on the extent of the relationship, the seriousness of the relationship, whether there was child,
02:55:17 whether there was child, whether any children were involved. Yes, of course. Uh and there's a I don't wish to minimize the uh uh the behavior of those officers that uh went off peace. But um
02:55:36 there is there's a difference between a sexual encounter which happens when men and women get together in the circumstances that we put our offices in and a long-term affair.
02:55:47 affair. Both of them shouldn't happen because they were wrong. But they did. Um, and I think as far as the circumstances of informing the women, I watched the ITV
02:56:04 informing the women, I watched the ITV program of uh three of the women and was it tugged the heartstrings because clearly those women were hurt by the uh
02:56:17 clearly those women were hurt by the uh uh arrangements. Um, but they did appear to be a longerstanding relationship. They weren't just casual sexual relationships and they certainly weren't from the information I know I've got uh
02:56:29 from the information I know I've got uh directed or intended to seduce the woman into giving target evidence. Um are you aware of the commission commissioner's position currently that um the women should have been told if
02:56:43 um the women should have been told if there had been any discovery of such? I was going to raise this matter at the end of this uh uh questioning, but as you've raised it, I'll mention it now. The commissioner's statement at the end
02:57:03 The commissioner's statement at the end uh of last Monday, I thought was sad and unnecessary and not in any sense denigrating his rightful way of apologizing to all and Sunundry. that was right and I join his apology in
02:57:15 was right and I join his apology in that. What the commissioner didn't say, and this is grievous in respect of the truth of the other side to this story,
02:57:26 truth of the other side to this story, the other part of the story, all those officers that put their lives on the line for the in the interest of the state has not been discovered. And for the commissioner to say that the SDS was a dysfunctional unit
02:57:42 a dysfunctional unit cart blanch for 40 years when we know the home office funded it for 25. We know the security services and the home office were complicit in most of what
02:57:53 office were complicit in most of what they did. I think this is an appalling stretch of the truth and I fear that that damning statement that it was a uh dysfunctional unit. It's grossly unfair
02:58:06 dysfunctional unit. It's grossly unfair and there are a lot of people that have contacted me from the undercover officers who feel grievously hurt that their reputations have been produced and bismerched by sadly a commissioner
02:58:19 bismerched by sadly a commissioner giving half a story. I know Mark Roelly. He's a very fair and reasonable man. But he didn't sadly
02:58:33 he didn't sadly use the whole or inform the whole story. He threw us all under the bus for the sake of eight or nine miscreants. That's unfair.
02:58:47 unfair. Thank you. Um separate topic. Um, do you recall reading any paperwork reporting on what was known as the Lucasade incident in November 1991 that was mentioned in the true spies document?
02:59:01 mentioned in the true spies document? Sorry, I didn't catch that. Say again. Do you recall reading any paperwork about reporting on what was known as the Lucas Aid incident in 1991? Um, thank you. Um last
02:59:13 Um, thank you. Um last um few questions on the subject of the Wayne Kadugan uh last few questions I have for you Mr. Gunnar on the subject of the Wayne Kadugan John Dyne's false identity.
02:59:29 identity. Um were you aware at the time that that identity was based on a deceased child's identity?
02:59:31 identity? Uh,
02:59:33 Uh, not directly, but I would probably have assumed it was because of because of the timing of Dime's involvement.
02:59:44 timing of Dime's involvement. Thank you. Um, when uh John Dyn was arrested, his driving license in that name was um seized and um seized and and kept during his time in custody and recorded um on his custody record. Um,
03:00:02 recorded um on his custody record. Um, do you agree that having had a driving license in in a second unauthorized false identity demonstrated a degree of planning and anticipation of use of that identity? And it wasn't just a
03:00:15 identity? And it wasn't just a spur-ofthe- moment giving of a name upon his arrest. Well, I I agree with what you said. Uh, tactics used by undercover officers, particularly in those far-off days, uh, did vary. It was wrong. Uh uh um but I
03:00:32 did vary. It was wrong. Uh uh um but I keep coming back to the fact the essence of undercover policing is deceit, deception and subtifuge and the tactics that go with that in terms of operational
03:00:43 operational at the coldface police activity necessarily mean that some tactics
03:00:55 necessarily mean that some tactics aren't quite as comfortable in the cold light of this room. And I have to say also when judging those matters, we didn't get it all right, but we neither got it all wrong.
03:01:07 got it all wrong. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Those are all my questions. Thank you. Any re-examination, Mr. Sanders?
03:01:19 Hopefully that that's worked, sir. Um only to ask Mr. Gun if there was anything else he he wanted to cover or add. um before completing his evidence.
03:01:34 completing his evidence. No, I think I think I've had a fair say. I don't think there's anything more that can add uh any gravitas to what I've said.
03:01:39 said. Thank you. Thank you for spending the whole of what has been quite a long day giving evidence. I hope it has done you no harm. Uh your evidence has certainly been informative, instructive, and interesting.
03:01:50 interesting. Thank you very much. Uh we are going to adjourn now until Thursday when we will start at 9:00 in
03:02:05 Thursday when we will start at 9:00 in the morning to accommodate two witnesses uh so we can finish them comfortably in the time available. Thank you sir. All right.