HN10 "Bob Robinson" Robert Lambert - Animal Rights Deployment and Sexual Relationships

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00:37:30 you

00:38:00 I swear by almighty god that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

00:38:10 Thank you.

00:38:13 Thank you, sir.

00:38:17 Could you tell us your full name, please?

00:38:22 Robert Lambert.

00:38:24 You've provided a witness statement to the inquiry dated the 9th of May 2022.

00:38:32 Are the contents of that witness statement true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

00:38:39 Yes, they are.

00:38:41 I'd like to start, please, with your service in C Squad of Special Branch immediately before you joined the SDS.

00:38:54 You told Operation Hearn that you had some knowledge of the SDS through that service.

00:39:03 Did you know that Roger Pearce was being deployed, amongst other things, into the 121 Bookshop, Railton Road, Brixton?

00:39:16 No, I didn't know that at the time that I was working on C Squad.

00:39:23 Was reporting from the SDS about the 121 Railton Road Bookshop crossing your desk?

00:39:34 I can't immediately recall.

00:39:40 It's certainly possible, but at that time I wouldn't have had knowledge where the intelligence had come from.

00:39:54 Did you know that the Revolutionary Communist Party had been infiltrated by the SDS?

00:40:04 Not at that time.

00:40:06 Did you know that the Revolutionary Communist Group had been infiltrated by the SDS?

00:40:15 Not while I was working on C Squad.

00:40:18 Did you ever see the SDS bagman bringing material over from the SDS back office to C Squad?

00:40:29 I probably did. I can't recall it now, but it's far from certain that I would have known what his role was with the SDS.

00:40:52 What is your recollection now of your awareness then of the SDS?

00:41:00 Very limited. Very hard to say precisely.

00:41:20 The only clarity I think that emerged was when I was approached to join the SDS.

00:41:32 I have to say now to try and distinguish between what I learnt perhaps months after my deployment on C Squad.

00:41:48 It's very hard to distinguish that from what I knew two months previously, but that's my broad recollection.

00:42:02 What was C Squad's interest in the campaign for nuclear disarmament when you were working on C Squad?

00:42:12 When I was working on C Squad as a junior detective constable, I had no real grasp of the rationale for special branch monitoring CND.

00:42:36 Did you have any knowledge that it was happening?

00:42:42 I'm sure I would have done, but I can't recall it now.

00:42:48 Did you know where the demand for that intelligence was coming from?

00:42:54 Not while I was on C Squad. Probably not.

00:43:00 And later?

00:43:02 Later, yes.

00:43:04 Where was the demand coming from?

00:43:08 The demand was coming from special branch and from the security services.

00:43:20 Are you able to help us with whether or not it was also coming from any further up the chain, for example the Home Office or the Cabinet Office?

00:43:33 I can't recall now, no.

00:43:39 What was C Squad's interest in Hackney and Stoke-Newington as an area of interest?

00:43:49 I don't think that C Squad had a particular geographical interest.

00:44:03 I don't think I can recall, but I do recall that certain areas of London would feature more regularly in public order situations than others.

00:44:27 What was C Squad's interest in campaigns against the police, people like Hackney Police Monitoring Group and so forth?

00:44:39 I don't think at that time I would have been able to formulate a clear answer in terms of the C Squad strategy.

00:44:55 Later?

00:44:57 Later, yes.

00:44:59 And what was the interest when you did become aware of it?

00:45:03 I think that it would be not based on the geography, but based on the groups that were being monitored by C Squad.

00:45:26 Sorry, could you explain the connection with police monitoring groups?

00:45:30 What about the police monitoring groups such as Hackney Police Monitoring Group?

00:45:34 The interest would be whether groups that were being monitored, whether they had a connection to that local campaign.

00:46:00 And what was the concern if they did?

00:46:04 I'm sorry?

00:46:06 What was the concern if the groups that were being monitored did have a connection with a local police monitoring group?

00:46:16 I don't think I could answer that without...

00:46:26 I don't think I could answer it as I was as a detective constable on C Squad.

00:46:34 Later?

00:46:36 Later, when I worked on the SDS, I would have gathered a clearer understanding.

00:46:48 What would that understanding have been?

00:46:50 That the groups that the SDS was infiltrating were of interest to Special Branch.

00:47:06 Let me test it this way.

00:47:10 Was there a concern that racial justice groups were being influenced by far left groups which were of interest to Special Branch?

00:47:24 That would be true, yes.

00:47:28 And what was the concern?

00:47:30 I'm not sure that I can immediately recall what that concern was beyond the general concern of public order.

00:47:46 Was the concern that the far left groups would stir up trouble which might either result in public order or the growth of subversive thoughts?

00:48:02 Certainly, yes, certainly the former and potentially the latter as well.

01:15:10 Why couldn't those groups be left to deal?

01:15:40 I think that the experience within the SDS,

01:15:46 this particular officer

01:15:51 explaining to me at the time

01:15:53 and I would have had a full understanding

01:15:55 at the time of what

01:15:57 the importance was.

01:16:03 I'm pretty sure now that it

01:16:07 it revolved around

01:16:10 the perceived difficulty of

01:16:15 the officer's

01:16:19 false identity, assumed identity

01:16:23 being discovered if the

01:16:27 death was, did you say

01:16:29 six to eight years?

01:16:31 You told her eight to ten.

01:16:33 Eight to ten years.

01:16:35 So that would be

01:16:37 I think that would be the

01:16:40 reason.

01:16:44 Did you establish whether

01:16:46 or not Mark Robinson's

01:16:48 parents were still alive?

01:16:52 I didn't, to the best of my recollection.

01:16:55 Did somebody else do that on your behalf?

01:16:58 Not that I can recall.

01:17:02 You told Hearn that you wanted to have

01:17:04 a general understanding of the

01:17:07 area in which Mark Robinson

01:17:10 lived.

01:17:11 How did you get that understanding?

01:17:18 I can't recall precisely now.

01:17:22 I think I had

01:17:25 a reasonable knowledge of

01:17:27 that area

01:17:29 from my

01:17:32 police experience.

01:17:34 Did I go

01:17:37 to that area?

01:17:39 Not that I can recall.

01:17:43 Did Special Branch make any checks

01:17:45 of any other kind on the family?

01:17:50 I don't think they did.

01:17:56 You said to

01:17:58 Operation Hearn that whilst you

01:18:00 were building your legend, management

01:18:02 probably also came in

01:18:04 to, you know, offer advice

01:18:06 and general thoughts

01:18:08 about this business of creating

01:18:10 the identity.

01:18:12 Is that what they did?

01:18:16 Yes, it is.

01:18:19 And how regular was your contact

01:18:21 with your managers

01:18:23 on this subject?

01:18:26 To the best of my recollection,

01:18:28 it was ongoing.

01:18:32 How many times?

01:18:35 I can't be sure.

01:18:39 Your immediate managers

01:18:41 within the SDS on your account

01:18:43 knew all about

01:18:45 this technique.

01:18:47 What is your knowledge of how

01:18:49 far up the chain of command

01:18:51 knowledge of the use

01:18:53 of this technique

01:18:55 went?

01:18:58 I can't say now with

01:19:00 complete certainty, but the

01:19:02 impression I'm left with that

01:19:04 it certainly

01:19:06 would have gone up to the

01:19:08 senior

01:19:10 officer on

01:19:12 Esquad.

01:19:17 Do you have any knowledge as to whether

01:19:19 or not knowledge extended

01:19:21 to the Home Office?

01:19:25 I can't say for certain

01:19:27 today, no.

01:19:30 Did you ever know

01:19:32 the answer to that question?

01:19:34 I may have had a

01:19:36 better idea

01:19:38 had I been asked

01:19:40 at the time or

01:19:44 or even

01:19:46 in the subsequent

01:19:48 period when I was a manager.

01:19:50 Was there any direct contact

01:19:52 between the SDS

01:19:54 and the Home Office

01:19:56 whilst you were serving

01:19:58 as an undercover officer?

01:20:00 Not that I can recall.

01:20:02 Was there any direct contact

01:20:04 between the SDS

01:20:06 and the Home Office whilst you were managing

01:20:08 within the unit?

01:20:10 Yes, there was

01:20:12 contact.

01:20:14 Was it on that subject or not?

01:20:16 Not that I can recall.

01:20:21 You told Channel 4

01:20:23 News

01:20:25 that the practice was well

01:20:27 known at the highest

01:20:29 level of the Home Office.

01:20:33 What was the basis for making

01:20:35 that assertion to the national

01:20:37 media?

01:20:39 I would have to say

01:20:41 today that it

01:20:43 was not

01:20:45 soundly founded.

01:20:47 It was a general

01:20:49 recollection

01:20:51 but one that

01:20:53 on reflection

01:20:55 and having

01:20:57 looked or tried to

01:20:59 look back as clearly as possible

01:21:01 I wouldn't

01:21:03 wish to

01:21:05 stand by it.

01:21:07 An exaggeration?

01:21:11 Yes.

01:21:13 Made

01:21:15 to national media?

01:21:17 Yes.

01:21:19 Did you have any choice

01:21:21 as to whether

01:21:23 or not to use

01:21:25 a deceased child's identity?

01:21:27 I'm sorry, could you...

01:21:29 Did you have any choice as to whether

01:21:31 or not to use

01:21:33 a deceased child's identity?

01:21:35 No.

01:21:37 Did you give any thought

01:21:39 to asking?

01:21:41 Not that I can recall.

01:21:43 Was there any debate

01:21:45 at all about alternative methods

01:21:47 whilst you were legend

01:21:49 building?

01:21:51 Not while I

01:21:53 was legend building.

01:21:55 I want to

01:21:57 move now to what you

01:21:59 knew about

01:22:01 the undercover officers

01:22:03 who were deployed

01:22:05 whilst you were in the back

01:22:07 office.

01:22:09 Can I take it that from

01:22:11 your attendance

01:22:13 at the safe house

01:22:15 you knew how many

01:22:17 undercover officers were serving

01:22:19 in the unit?

01:22:21 Yes.

01:22:23 And you knew which fields

01:22:25 they were operating in?

01:22:27 Yes.

01:22:29 And you knew their cover

01:22:31 names?

01:22:33 That wouldn't

01:22:35 have been

01:22:37 quite so clear

01:22:39 but I certainly

01:22:41 would have

01:22:43 been

01:22:45 aware of

01:22:47 those names at the time.

01:22:49 And you

01:22:51 knew at least something

01:22:53 about the issues

01:22:55 that they were facing in the course

01:22:57 of their various deployments?

01:22:59 Yes.

01:23:01 To what extent?

01:23:03 I don't want you to go into any details at the moment

01:23:05 but to what extent did you know

01:23:07 about the issues?

01:23:09 Did you get the impression that you were being told

01:23:11 everything?

01:23:13 Most things?

01:23:15 And what was the

01:23:17 reason for your

01:23:19 curated selection?

01:23:21 Inevitably

01:23:23 for I would say

01:23:25 of necessity.

01:23:27 It was a

01:23:29 sample.

01:23:31 I can't say

01:23:33 more definitely

01:23:35 than that.

01:23:37 You were in the back office for a long time

01:23:39 weren't you?

01:23:41 Well everyone was

01:23:43 nine months.

01:23:45 Can I take it that you would therefore

01:23:47 have had experience

01:23:49 of officers dealing with a considerable

01:23:51 variety of issues?

01:23:53 Yes.

01:23:55 Did you discuss with

01:23:57 Mike Chitty

01:23:59 before you deployed

01:24:01 what you should

01:24:03 expect deploying into the

01:24:05 animal rights field?

01:24:07 Yes.

01:24:09 I would have had discussions

01:24:11 with Mike Chitty.

01:24:13 And what did he tell you

01:24:15 to prepare you

01:24:17 to deploy into

01:24:19 the animal rights field?

01:24:21 I can't recall

01:24:23 today

01:24:25 what he told me.

01:24:31 I can't

01:24:33 say

01:24:35 what topics were covered with him.

01:24:37 Did he

01:24:39 say anything

01:24:41 about a woman

01:24:43 who we are calling Lizzie?

01:24:47 I'm pretty sure

01:24:49 that he didn't.

01:24:51 When you say you are pretty sure

01:24:53 that he didn't

01:24:55 did he say anything at all

01:24:57 about any sexual relationship

01:24:59 with any woman?

01:25:01 Not

01:25:03 while I was

01:25:05 in that back office role

01:25:07 to the best of my recollection.

01:25:11 Did there come a time later on

01:25:13 when he did?

01:25:19 Yes, there was a time later on.

01:25:21 When was that?

01:25:25 I can't put

01:25:27 a date on it.

01:25:29 But can you

01:25:31 if you can't put a precise date on it

01:25:34 on the date of the

01:25:35 purpose

01:25:37 which year it was?

01:25:39 No, I can't.

01:25:41 Was it within your

01:25:43 time as a undercover police officer?

01:25:45 Within the SDS?

01:25:47 Within your time as a manager?

01:25:49 Or in between the two?

01:25:51 I can't recall.

01:25:55 What did he tell you?

01:25:59 Well, I learnt

01:26:01 from him

01:26:03 that he had had

01:26:05 a sexual relationship

01:26:07 and certainly

01:26:11 by the time I was

01:26:13 employed in a management role

01:26:17 that became

01:26:19 an issue that I dealt with.

01:26:21 So I had a very clear

01:26:25 understanding of it then.

01:26:27 Is there anything

01:26:29 about the circumstances

01:26:31 in which he made that disclosure

01:26:33 to you

01:26:35 that helps you

01:26:37 to locate it in time

01:26:39 at all?

01:26:41 A first

01:26:43 disclosure?

01:26:45 No.

01:26:49 Was that sort of

01:26:51 disclosure then not something

01:26:53 that would stick in your mind?

01:26:57 I think not.

01:27:03 Did Mr Chitty say anything

01:27:05 about

01:27:07 sexual relationships

01:27:09 in general

01:27:11 or the risk of them

01:27:13 when you were talking to him?

01:27:15 When I was talking to him

01:27:17 prior to my deployment

01:27:19 or during my deployment?

01:27:21 Shall we start with prior to?

01:27:23 Prior to.

01:27:25 Not that I can recall.

01:27:27 I think not.

01:27:29 During?

01:27:31 Not that I can recall.

01:27:33 Might he have done?

01:27:37 It's possible but I

01:27:39 honestly can't recall.

01:27:45 In terms of the

01:27:47 issues

01:27:49 that you came across

01:27:51 other officers

01:27:53 and the managers dealing with

01:27:55 before you deployed,

01:27:59 no names at the moment please,

01:28:01 did you come across any

01:28:03 who were having to appear in court?

01:28:13 Could you just help

01:28:15 me again with the time?

01:28:19 Between joining the SDS in the autumn

01:28:21 of 1983

01:28:23 and deploying in June

01:28:25 1984,

01:28:29 as the officer

01:28:31 waiting to deploy,

01:28:33 did you come across any

01:28:35 instances of officers,

01:28:37 undercover officers

01:28:39 having to appear

01:28:41 in court?

01:28:43 I may have done

01:28:45 but I can't recall now.

01:28:47 Can you recall what

01:28:49 the managerial attitude

01:28:51 was to officers

01:28:53 appearing in court

01:28:55 in their undercover identities?

01:28:59 Yes, generally

01:29:01 what I learnt

01:29:03 whether it was

01:29:05 back office or whether it was

01:29:07 during deployment but

01:29:09 I learnt that it was

01:29:13 to be avoided

01:29:15 if at all possible

01:29:17 but that depending

01:29:19 on the

01:29:21 the officers target

01:29:23 group,

01:29:25 it would be

01:29:27 a likelihood

01:29:29 and that if it did

01:29:31 arise that

01:29:33 management would

01:29:35 support the officer

01:29:37 involved.

01:29:41 Did you come across

01:29:43 any cases of officers

01:29:45 participating in crime?

01:29:49 Not that I can recall.

01:29:51 What was the managerial

01:29:53 attitude to that?

01:29:57 That

01:29:59 it

01:30:01 could only be

01:30:05 countenanced where

01:30:07 it arose

01:30:11 in

01:30:13 circumstances that

01:30:15 the officer

01:30:17 had no control over.

01:30:23 Any crime at all?

01:30:25 I think it would

01:30:27 be a case by case

01:30:29 judgement.

01:30:31 Public order situations

01:30:33 would be

01:30:35 one situation

01:30:37 the most common situation

01:30:39 I think where

01:30:41 an arrest

01:30:43 would arise

01:30:45 or crime

01:30:47 might arise.

01:30:49 Fly posting, things like that,

01:30:51 were they permitted?

01:30:53 I think it

01:30:55 would have been a case by case

01:30:57 judgement would have been permitted

01:30:59 but discouraged.

01:31:01 Was there any kind of threshold?

01:31:05 I'm sure there was.

01:31:07 I can't think immediately

01:31:09 of where that threshold

01:31:11 sat.

01:31:13 Which side of that threshold would arson sit?

01:31:15 That would sit

01:31:17 outside of it.

01:31:21 Sexual activity

01:31:23 in undercover identities.

01:31:25 Whilst you were in

01:31:27 the back office, were there

01:31:29 any specific instances

01:31:31 of officers

01:31:33 having an issue

01:31:35 involving sexual activity

01:31:37 in their undercover identity

01:31:39 with a member of the public?

01:31:41 While I was in

01:31:43 the back office.

01:31:45 Not that I can recall.

01:31:47 In answering my question,

01:31:49 are you sticking to

01:31:51 what was said formally?

01:31:53 Or are you including off the record

01:31:55 conversations?

01:31:59 Well, I'm certainly

01:32:01 sticking to what I

01:32:03 recall

01:32:05 from

01:32:07 learning from management.

01:32:13 I'd like to expand my question

01:32:15 then please. Were there any off the record

01:32:17 conversations

01:32:19 about specific officers being

01:32:21 involved in such

01:32:23 sexual activity whilst

01:32:25 you were in the back office?

01:32:27 No, not that I can recall.

01:32:31 You describe

01:32:33 being the bag man.

01:32:37 And that task involved

01:32:39 you moving documents between

01:32:41 the SDS back office

01:32:43 and the office where

01:32:45 senior managers were

01:32:47 accommodated.

01:32:49 I'd like to ask you,

01:32:51 when you were speaking

01:32:53 to senior officers

01:32:55 in the course of those

01:32:57 duties, did any of them

01:32:59 ever speak to you

01:33:01 about the work of the SDS?

01:33:05 I honestly

01:33:07 can't recall if they did.

01:33:09 Well, let's

01:33:11 have a document up. It's the one at

01:33:13 722-566

01:33:15 File 1

01:33:17 A-2-2.

01:33:31 Page 17, please.

01:33:43 Bottom of the page,

01:33:45 this is one of your Herne

01:33:47 transcripts,

01:33:49 Mr Lambert. Yes.

01:33:51 If I could let you have a look

01:33:53 please at that bottom paragraph.

01:34:01 And when you're ready, we'll go over the page.

01:34:05 Yes, ready.

01:34:25 And when you're ready, we'll go over the page.

01:34:27 Yes, ready.

01:34:31 Having refreshed your memory as to what you told

01:34:35 Operation Herne in 2013

01:34:39 about the sort of conversations you were having

01:34:41 with chief superintendents,

01:34:43 does that help jog your memory?

01:34:49 Yes, I think to some extent, yes.

01:34:51 I would

01:34:53 accept that

01:34:59 I would accept that and

01:35:07 I can't really recall it

01:35:09 today, but I, yeah,

01:35:11 I'm happy to accept that.

01:35:13 The sort of views that they were

01:35:15 expressing about where officers

01:35:17 should be deployed,

01:35:19 Do you recall any views

01:35:21 being expressed about deployments

01:35:23 into CND?

01:35:27 I don't, no. I think

01:35:31 I would have thought

01:35:33 it would only be my deployment

01:35:35 that would be

01:35:37 the issue.

01:35:39 that would be the issue.

01:35:41 But I don't have a clear recollection.

01:35:47 Can you recall at all what was said

01:35:49 about your deployment then?

01:35:53 No, I can't.

01:35:55 Did they ever talk about

01:35:57 sexual activity between

01:35:59 undercover police officers and members

01:36:01 of the public?

01:36:03 I'm pretty sure

01:36:05 they didn't.

01:36:07 Why do you say that?

01:36:09 I think

01:36:13 I would probably

01:36:15 recall that.

01:36:19 And why would it

01:36:21 be memorable?

01:36:27 I think to hear

01:36:29 hear that

01:36:31 from a senior officer

01:36:33 would be

01:36:35 likely to stick

01:36:37 in my mind.

01:36:39 Why?

01:36:49 I can't

01:36:51 add to that, I'm afraid.

01:36:55 Is it because

01:36:57 that is not something you would expect

01:36:59 them to acknowledge?

01:37:01 Yes, I would

01:37:03 have thought, yes, I would

01:37:05 I would think that would be the case,

01:37:07 yeah.

01:37:09 Do you know whether any of

01:37:11 the senior officers you spoke

01:37:13 to either knew or suspected

01:37:15 that there was sexual

01:37:17 activity between SDS

01:37:19 undercover police officers

01:37:21 and members of the public?

01:37:25 At the time

01:37:27 I wouldn't have

01:37:29 been able to

01:37:31 answer that.

01:37:33 And

01:37:35 I can't today

01:37:39 really

01:37:41 say with any certainty.

01:37:45 Did you, in the course of your

01:37:47 duties as bagman, talk to

01:37:49 C Squad desk officers?

01:37:53 I would have

01:37:55 spoken to them

01:37:57 in the course of

01:38:01 doing my

01:38:03 job as bagman.

01:38:05 Yes.

01:38:07 Did they communicate to you

01:38:09 their intelligence

01:38:11 requirements for

01:38:13 the SDS to execute?

01:38:15 No, only I think

01:38:17 in a

01:38:19 perhaps in a

01:38:21 administrative way

01:38:23 if

01:38:25 a desk officer was making

01:38:27 a specific request

01:38:29 to

01:38:31 a field officer

01:38:35 or to

01:38:37 the SDS

01:38:39 I might have been told

01:38:41 to

01:38:43 make sure

01:38:45 that it was passed on

01:38:47 but nothing above

01:38:49 or beyond my

01:38:51 administrative role.

01:38:55 I want to move now to the subject

01:38:57 of report writing.

01:38:59 You were involved in the

01:39:01 production of SDS intelligence

01:39:03 reports in the back office weren't you?

01:39:05 Yes.

01:39:07 And you also read the reporting of

01:39:09 the officers who were deployed?

01:39:11 Yes.

01:39:13 Were

01:39:15 reports that came

01:39:17 in from undercover

01:39:19 police officers always

01:39:21 written up and filed?

01:39:27 Always?

01:39:29 No, not always.

01:39:31 In what circumstances would they not be?

01:39:39 If the report

01:39:41 was in some way

01:39:43 superfluous,

01:39:45 a duplicate,

01:39:47 in other words,

01:39:49 if more than one officer

01:39:51 had reported on the same

01:39:53 event,

01:39:55 many, many

01:39:57 different reasons

01:39:59 perhaps, but

01:40:01 generally

01:40:03 those

01:40:05 reports would have been

01:40:07 would have resulted

01:40:09 in a published

01:40:11 intelligence report.

01:40:13 Putting to one side

01:40:15 reports that were going to be amalgamated

01:40:17 as the product of multiple

01:40:19 officers.

01:40:21 How common was it for a report

01:40:23 to be discarded?

01:40:27 Not routine, I can't

01:40:29 recall any more than that.

01:40:33 When you deployed

01:40:35 how did you submit your intelligence?

01:40:39 In the way

01:40:41 that I had learnt

01:40:43 was the

01:40:45 practice to

01:40:47 submit either

01:40:49 a handwritten

01:40:51 or a typed report

01:40:53 at a

01:40:55 Monday or Thursday

01:40:57 meeting.

01:41:01 That was it, really.

01:41:03 Apart from

01:41:05 what might be described as

01:41:07 topping and tailing

01:41:09 and inserting

01:41:11 file references,

01:41:15 would it be normal for there to be

01:41:17 any change to the

01:41:19 text of the intelligence

01:41:21 submitted by

01:41:23 an SDS officer

01:41:25 when the report was written up?

01:41:29 I think it would be a kind of

01:41:31 I think it would be a case by case

01:41:33 judgment.

01:41:35 Certainly

01:41:55 there was no certainty

01:41:59 from a field officer's

01:42:01 point of view.

01:42:03 No certainty that the

01:42:05 report would

01:42:07 remain as it

01:42:09 had been submitted.

01:42:11 When you were writing up

01:42:13 officers' reports, how often did you

01:42:15 change their texts?

01:42:17 Are you now moving on

01:42:19 to my management role?

01:42:21 No, in the back office.

01:42:23 Well, the back office role was purely

01:42:25 purely

01:42:27 clerical in the sense of

01:42:29 adding

01:42:33 file references.

01:42:35 No more than that.

01:42:37 The actual

01:42:39 Did you, were you

01:42:41 aware as to whether your managers at the time

01:42:43 were editing reports?

01:42:45 Well, indeed. That was

01:42:47 the routine practice.

01:42:49 And when you were a detective inspector

01:42:51 in the SDS, did you alter

01:42:53 the text of

01:42:55 the substance of what was

01:42:57 being reported?

01:42:59 Well, it may

01:43:01 have, not the

01:43:03 substance, but

01:43:05 I only, I can't

01:43:07 recall now

01:43:09 an instance

01:43:11 of

01:43:15 editing, but

01:43:19 And is the reason for that

01:43:21 that you would

01:43:23 be in no position

01:43:25 to alter the substance

01:43:27 because it is the reporting officer

01:43:29 who knows

01:43:31 what happened?

01:43:33 I don't think that

01:43:35 quite covers all the

01:43:37 all the scenarios

01:43:39 that might have been at play,

01:43:41 but

01:43:43 What other scenarios?

01:43:45 I can't

01:43:47 call to mind

01:43:49 at the moment, no.

01:43:53 Targeting.

01:43:59 Your ultimate target,

01:44:01 if I've understood it correctly, was the

01:44:03 Animal Liberation Front.

01:44:05 Yes.

01:44:09 And if you'd been able

01:44:11 to get to them the Animal Rights

01:44:13 Militia.

01:44:15 Yes.

01:44:19 How did your managers

01:44:21 explain to you

01:44:23 the importance

01:44:25 of your target?

01:44:31 I think they referenced

01:44:33 it to

01:44:35 events

01:44:37 at the time.

01:44:41 The series of

01:44:47 serious

01:44:49 attacks

01:44:51 carried out

01:44:53 by

01:44:55 the Animal Liberation Front

01:44:57 and other

01:44:59 animal rights

01:45:01 extremist groups.

01:45:07 Do they give you any advice

01:45:09 about the method

01:45:11 or strategy

01:45:13 that you should adopt?

01:45:19 Yes, I was advised to

01:45:23 begin by

01:45:25 joining

01:45:27 local

01:45:29 animal rights

01:45:31 groups and

01:45:33 in addition

01:45:35 a group

01:45:37 London Greenpeace.

01:45:41 Did they explain why you should use that method?

01:45:45 With a view

01:45:47 they explained that this was

01:45:51 potentially the best way

01:45:53 to

01:45:55 gain

01:45:57 access to

01:45:59 the Animal Liberation Front.

01:46:03 Did they explain to you

01:46:05 what their

01:46:07 requirements were? In other words,

01:46:09 what you were expected

01:46:11 to do?

01:46:13 What they wanted from the deployment?

01:46:17 Yes, I think they wanted

01:46:19 intelligence

01:46:21 on the

01:46:25 activities

01:46:27 of the

01:46:29 Animal Liberation Front

01:46:31 both

01:46:33 pre-emptive intelligence

01:46:35 and

01:46:39 intelligence about

01:46:41 individual

01:46:43 members, about

01:46:45 what was a network.

01:46:47 I think rather than

01:46:49 a hierarchical

01:46:51 organisation, I think they

01:46:53 wanted an understanding

01:46:55 of how exactly

01:46:57 the Animal

01:46:59 Liberation Front worked.

01:47:03 Am I right to understand from your answer

01:47:05 that it was a, your

01:47:07 remit was purely

01:47:09 intelligence?

01:47:11 Yes.

01:47:15 And if I've understood your Herne interviews

01:47:17 correctly, you went about

01:47:19 preparing to deploy by

01:47:21 researching

01:47:23 animal rights activists

01:47:25 who were known to special branch

01:47:27 by looking at their files.

01:47:29 Yes.

01:47:35 Was there a discussion

01:47:37 with your managers of the challenges

01:47:39 that you might face

01:47:41 infiltrating

01:47:43 animal rights groups with a view

01:47:45 to discovering

01:47:47 more about the ALF?

01:47:51 Yes, I think

01:47:53 there was

01:47:55 a recognition of

01:47:59 potential

01:48:01 risk

01:48:03 to my

01:48:05 safety, my family's

01:48:07 safety, and

01:48:09 equally

01:48:11 a potential risk to the

01:48:15 operational security

01:48:17 of the

01:48:19 SDS. If

01:48:21 my

01:48:23 true identity

01:48:25 became known

01:48:27 to them, to

01:48:29 that target

01:48:31 group.

01:48:33 How important was the operational

01:48:35 security of the SDS to

01:48:37 your managers?

01:48:39 It was of

01:48:41 prime importance.

01:48:45 Sorry, carry on.

01:48:47 Well, purely,

01:48:49 I think it's two issues

01:48:51 coming together here. I think

01:48:53 that operational security

01:48:55 and an individual

01:48:57 field officer's safety

01:48:59 and the safety of their family

01:49:03 were interdependent. If

01:49:05 an individual field officer's

01:49:07 identity

01:49:09 became known

01:49:11 to a target group,

01:49:13 then there

01:49:15 was understood at the

01:49:17 time to be a potential

01:49:19 knock-on to the

01:49:21 safety

01:49:23 of

01:49:25 other officers.

01:49:27 What risks

01:49:29 to your safety

01:49:31 were expressed

01:49:33 to you?

01:49:35 A big part, sorry?

01:49:37 What risks to your safety

01:49:39 were expressed to you?

01:49:41 What views? What risks?

01:49:43 Risks.

01:49:47 Well,

01:49:49 a risk of

01:49:51 serious harm, injury,

01:49:53 because

01:49:55 the groups that were

01:49:57 prepared

01:49:59 to carry

01:50:01 out incendiary device

01:50:03 attacks at the homes

01:50:05 of

01:50:07 scientists,

01:50:09 such as

01:50:11 Dr Brian Meldrum,

01:50:13 Professor Colin

01:50:15 Blakemore,

01:50:17 that the same risks would apply

01:50:19 to

01:50:23 a field officer who was

01:50:25 identified.

01:50:27 Are you talking here about

01:50:29 the ALF or the ARM?

01:50:31 I'm talking about both groups.

01:50:33 I think one of the things

01:50:35 that I did discover

01:50:37 was that there was no real,

01:50:39 there was not the clear

01:50:41 distinction in membership

01:50:43 between the ALF

01:50:45 and the

01:50:47 animal rights militia

01:50:49 as was intended.

01:50:51 The ALF

01:50:53 was not the

01:50:55 clear distinction

01:50:57 between the ALF

01:50:59 and the animal rights militia

01:51:01 as was intended.

01:51:03 I can say more on that,

01:51:05 but I won't unless you want me to.

01:51:07 Without uttering the name,

01:51:09 was anyone

01:51:11 that you mixed with

01:51:13 during your deployment

01:51:15 to your definite knowledge

01:51:17 involved in actions

01:51:19 claimed under both banners?

01:51:25 I would have

01:51:27 been able to answer that

01:51:29 pretty,

01:51:31 at least I would have been able to answer

01:51:33 that with a degree

01:51:35 of knowledge

01:51:39 at the time,

01:51:41 but today I

01:51:43 can't, no.

01:51:51 Accommodation,

01:51:53 squatting

01:51:55 were invitations to squat

01:51:57 amongst the challenges

01:51:59 that were discussed between you

01:52:01 and your managers before you deployed?

01:52:03 If not before,

01:52:05 certainly

01:52:07 during my deployment.

01:52:11 And what

01:52:13 was their view?

01:52:15 That it

01:52:17 was not really,

01:52:19 it wasn't viable.

01:52:21 It was

01:52:23 to be avoided.

01:52:31 Why?

01:52:33 I think

01:52:37 because it would have,

01:52:39 it would entail

01:52:45 it would increase, I think,

01:52:47 increase the risk of

01:52:49 not being able

01:52:51 to maintain

01:52:53 what was

01:52:55 recommended.

01:52:57 It was recommended that

01:52:59 a field officer should always

01:53:01 be able to

01:53:03 readily

01:53:05 return

01:53:07 to home life

01:53:09 and

01:53:13 to be

01:53:15 living in a squat.

01:53:17 Of course,

01:53:19 you know,

01:53:21 there were no doubt

01:53:23 you can't say that

01:53:25 every squat was the same,

01:53:27 but certainly

01:53:29 there would have been a

01:53:31 risk of

01:53:35 different kinds in

01:53:37 different squats.

01:53:41 Was a risk of

01:53:43 sexual activity between

01:53:45 an undercover police officer and a member

01:53:47 of the public ever expressed

01:53:49 to be one of those risks?

01:53:53 Not that I can recall.

01:53:57 But if

01:53:59 one mixes

01:54:01 very closely

01:54:03 with people in a squat,

01:54:05 there would be an

01:54:07 increased chance of sexual activity,

01:54:09 wouldn't there?

01:54:11 Well, it's potential. I can see

01:54:13 that, but

01:54:15 again, it would have to be

01:54:17 a case-by-case judgment,

01:54:19 I'm sure.

01:54:21 But if I'm understanding

01:54:23 your evidence correctly,

01:54:25 it was not a matter

01:54:27 that bothered your managers?

01:54:29 Oh, no.

01:54:31 I'm not saying that.

01:54:39 No, I'm not.

01:54:41 I don't think

01:54:43 I said that.

01:54:45 Well, if that wasn't one of the risks

01:54:47 that was discussed,

01:54:51 presumably we

01:54:53 can infer that it wasn't a risk

01:54:55 that they were concerned about.

01:54:57 Well, I don't

01:54:59 think so, at least not from what

01:55:01 I can recall.

01:55:05 Given that

01:55:07 I

01:55:09 didn't

01:55:11 live

01:55:13 my cover

01:55:15 role,

01:55:17 my four and a half

01:55:19 years in the field,

01:55:21 I didn't live

01:55:23 in a squat.

01:55:25 I certainly visited many

01:55:27 squats,

01:55:29 so that's...

01:55:31 I think you're drifting a little

01:55:33 bit away from the question. My question

01:55:35 is directed at what

01:55:37 your managers said to you

01:55:39 and their attitude. Yes, and on that, I

01:55:41 just can't recall.

01:55:43 You've described,

01:55:45 again to Operation

01:55:47 Hearn, that there was a difference

01:55:51 in your deployment compared

01:55:53 to those of your predecessors

01:55:55 because you were deploying

01:55:57 into the...

01:55:59 with the ALF

01:56:01 as a target. You've said

01:56:03 that one standing

01:56:05 within the group

01:56:07 would be based on what

01:56:09 you did

01:56:11 and not what

01:56:13 you knew.

01:56:15 Is that right?

01:56:17 I think...

01:56:19 Well, yes, I think

01:56:23 I can... Yeah, I can

01:56:25 understand that, yeah.

01:56:27 And what did you mean by that?

01:56:31 Well, in

01:56:33 summary, I

01:56:35 meant that

01:56:37 in a...

01:56:39 in another type of

01:56:41 target group,

01:56:43 the important consideration

01:56:45 would be

01:56:49 a grasp of

01:56:53 the

01:56:55 organisation's

01:56:59 political creed.

01:57:01 I think

01:57:03 in the

01:57:05 animal rights movement generally

01:57:07 and the

01:57:09 animal liberation front

01:57:11 in particular, I think

01:57:13 it was much more

01:57:15 about

01:57:17 what you did,

01:57:21 for the cause, and that

01:57:23 what you did or what you

01:57:25 might do would cover

01:57:27 a lot of things from

01:57:31 going on demonstrations

01:57:33 through to

01:57:39 well, through to all

01:57:41 of the

01:57:43 actions

01:57:45 that are out there

01:57:47 on the streets

01:57:49 as opposed to

01:57:51 being more,

01:57:53 perhaps more theoretical.

01:57:57 In other words, you needed to be a

01:57:59 doer. Yes.

01:58:01 And if your

01:58:03 ultimate destination was the

01:58:05 ALF, you needed to do

01:58:07 enough to

01:58:09 be invited in. Yes.

01:58:15 Did that thinking

01:58:17 occur to you and your

01:58:19 managers before you deployed?

01:58:21 Well, I

01:58:23 I'm sure it did.

01:58:25 Yes, I'm sure

01:58:27 it would have done. What advice were you

01:58:29 given?

01:58:31 Well,

01:58:37 I think certainly

01:58:41 to be reassured,

01:58:43 this is to say, managers would have

01:58:45 wanted me when I was deployed,

01:58:47 they wanted me to be

01:58:49 reassured that I would have

01:58:51 their support

01:58:53 when I was out there

01:58:55 doing.

01:58:57 And that

01:58:59 you know, that was the case.

01:59:01 Did they discuss

01:59:03 with you specifically

01:59:05 what you could and could

01:59:07 not do?

01:59:11 Not that I can recall

01:59:13 now.

01:59:15 No.

01:59:17 How did you

01:59:19 propose to

01:59:21 deal with that challenge?

01:59:25 Well,

01:59:27 I dealt with it in a

01:59:31 number of ways,

01:59:33 which I've

01:59:35 covered

01:59:37 in my statement.

01:59:39 There's many

01:59:41 many strands

01:59:43 to it, but I don't know whether

01:59:45 you want me

01:59:47 to...

01:59:49 I would like your recollection now,

01:59:51 please, about what you were

01:59:53 planning to do

01:59:55 in order to demonstrate

01:59:57 that you were a doer.

02:00:01 Well, I can't

02:00:03 give you an answer to that.

02:00:05 What I was planning

02:00:07 either, you know,

02:00:09 prior to deployment

02:00:11 or at deployment.

02:00:15 I can't really

02:00:17 say now.

02:00:19 Is that because you were going to see how it went?

02:00:21 Well, yes,

02:00:23 there would be, certainly

02:00:25 be an element of that.

02:00:27 Yes.

02:00:29 Can we now look at

02:00:31 an article that was published

02:00:33 by Spinwatch?

02:00:35 It's volume 3, sir,

02:00:37 tab B,

02:00:39 Roman numeral 1, 34,

02:00:41 37, 416

02:00:43 for the projector.

02:00:51 This is an article

02:00:53 dated the 24th of October 2011.

02:00:55 My understanding of it is,

02:00:57 is Spinwatch is

02:00:59 publishing your reply

02:01:01 to something they've

02:01:03 previously published. Is that correct?

02:01:05 Yes.

02:01:07 If we look at the second

02:01:09 paragraph on the first page,

02:01:11 please, you say,

02:01:13 as I explain

02:01:15 in The Guardian, in the

02:01:17 article, you say,

02:01:19 as I explain in The Guardian,

02:01:21 in the 1980s, I was deployed

02:01:23 as an undercover

02:01:25 Met Special Branch officer

02:01:27 to identify and

02:01:29 prosecute members

02:01:31 of the Animal Liberation Front

02:01:33 who were then engaged

02:01:35 in incendiary device and

02:01:37 explosive device campaigns

02:01:39 against targets

02:01:41 in the vivisection,

02:01:43 meat, and

02:01:45 fur trades.

02:01:47 Now, the words I'm particularly interested

02:01:49 in are to identify

02:01:51 and

02:01:53 prosecute.

02:01:55 You have told us

02:01:57 today that your

02:01:59 deployment was

02:02:01 evidential only.

02:02:03 No, intelligence only.

02:02:05 Sorry, you correct me. Intelligence only.

02:02:07 Yes, yes.

02:02:09 Well, if you were going to

02:02:11 prosecute someone,

02:02:13 you would conduct

02:02:15 an evidential deployment,

02:02:17 wouldn't you? Yes.

02:02:19 Is it right,

02:02:21 first of all, then, that this

02:02:23 statement is inaccurate?

02:02:25 Yes.

02:02:29 Was there any discussion

02:02:31 with your managers

02:02:33 at the time

02:02:35 as to whether or not your

02:02:37 deployment should be

02:02:39 evidential?

02:02:41 No.

02:02:43 Did that thought cross

02:02:45 your mind? No.

02:02:47 Was it hoped that

02:02:49 ALF activists

02:02:51 would be convicted

02:02:53 of crimes as a result

02:02:55 of your intelligence?

02:02:59 I can't say now.

02:03:01 I honestly,

02:03:03 there's certainly a strong

02:03:05 likelihood that

02:03:09 at my deployment

02:03:11 that that

02:03:13 wasn't anticipated.

02:03:17 It wasn't anticipated?

02:03:19 Well, certainly

02:03:21 it was never anticipated

02:03:23 that my role

02:03:25 would go beyond an intelligence

02:03:27 gathering role. That is 100%

02:03:29 clear.

02:03:31 But

02:03:33 that there was,

02:03:35 you know, I don't think I

02:03:37 was put under any

02:03:39 particular pressure,

02:03:41 or I don't recall an

02:03:43 expectation

02:03:47 that prosecutions

02:03:51 were expected

02:03:53 to arise.

02:03:57 I think it was

02:03:59 very much

02:04:01 SDS

02:04:03 intelligence gathering,

02:04:05 but recognising

02:04:07 that this was a

02:04:09 different

02:04:11 context.

02:04:15 I may come back to this question

02:04:17 in a few days time, but I'd like

02:04:19 your view now, please.

02:04:23 Would it have been better if in fact

02:04:25 your deployment

02:04:27 had been conducted as

02:04:29 a long-term

02:04:31 evidential deployment?

02:04:33 Well,

02:04:35 I can see now

02:04:37 that there might

02:04:39 well have been some

02:04:41 benefits

02:04:43 in that, but

02:04:45 I couldn't

02:04:47 offer

02:04:49 a quick

02:04:53 answer

02:04:55 today,

02:04:57 really. There'd

02:04:59 be a lot of pros and cons

02:05:01 involved, I think.

02:05:03 What would

02:05:05 those pros and cons be?

02:05:11 Well, one

02:05:13 con would be

02:05:15 that the,

02:05:19 to the best of my knowledge,

02:05:23 the SDS

02:05:27 operations

02:05:29 was the best

02:05:33 operation for,

02:05:37 if not the only police

02:05:39 operation for

02:05:41 gaining

02:05:43 the kind of intelligence

02:05:47 that myself

02:05:49 and other SDS

02:05:51 officers were involved

02:05:53 in. So that would be

02:05:55 one reason for thinking

02:05:57 that

02:05:59 a different, an

02:06:01 entirely different unit

02:06:03 might,

02:06:05 that was following

02:06:07 an evidential route,

02:06:09 you know,

02:06:11 might have problems. I mean, there is

02:06:13 a lot more I could say

02:06:15 about this, because when I was in a management

02:06:17 role,

02:06:19 you know, these,

02:06:21 these issues did

02:06:23 were discussed.

02:06:25 Well, it is an obvious

02:06:27 pro that in the

02:06:29 event of a prosecution,

02:06:31 the involvement of a UCO

02:06:33 would be disclosed,

02:06:35 and if there were any

02:06:37 factual disputes about the role

02:06:39 of the UCO, they could be dealt with

02:06:41 at trial. Indeed.

02:06:43 Yes, I understand that. And

02:06:45 a con would

02:06:47 be that

02:06:49 if the SDS

02:06:51 did it, then

02:06:53 that would bring to an end,

02:06:55 or threaten to bring an end

02:06:57 to the SDS

02:06:59 operation.

02:07:01 Yes.

02:07:03 And the SDS operation

02:07:05 was regarded as extremely valuable,

02:07:07 wasn't it? Yes.

02:07:09 Can I move now

02:07:11 to pre-deployment advice

02:07:13 on drugs?

02:07:15 What advice

02:07:17 were you given, if any,

02:07:19 about control substances

02:07:21 and using them whilst

02:07:23 deployed?

02:07:25 My

02:07:27 general recollection is that

02:07:31 drugs were to be

02:07:33 avoided,

02:07:35 but

02:07:39 if

02:07:41 social situations

02:07:43 arose

02:07:45 with drug taking,

02:07:47 to perhaps

02:07:51 to come up with

02:07:53 a reason for not

02:07:55 indulging, or

02:07:57 just,

02:07:59 you know, pretending to

02:08:01 be involved.

02:08:03 Were you told

02:08:05 in terms not to do it?

02:08:09 Not that I recall,

02:08:11 no.

02:08:13 Were you warned that it was

02:08:15 prevalent

02:08:17 in the groups

02:08:19 that you were going to

02:08:21 infiltrate?

02:08:23 I don't

02:08:25 know, not that I can recall.

02:08:27 Who gave

02:08:29 you the advice? No names,

02:08:31 please.

02:08:33 Who gave me the advice?

02:08:35 The advice to try and avoid

02:08:37 it, but if in a social situation.

02:08:41 I can't recall now,

02:08:43 I'm sorry.

02:08:45 Did you take

02:08:47 control substances as an undercover

02:08:49 police officer? No, I didn't.

02:08:51 Did you

02:08:53 feign smoking

02:08:55 cannabis?

02:08:57 Yes, I think

02:08:59 I probably did.

02:09:01 How often?

02:09:07 I can't recall.

02:09:09 And to what extent

02:09:11 did you feign it?

02:09:17 I can't

02:09:19 recall.

02:09:23 Can you give us some indication

02:09:25 please, if you can't remember

02:09:27 precisely, approximately

02:09:29 frequently,

02:09:31 very frequently, not very often,

02:09:33 please give us an indication.

02:09:37 Not very often.

02:09:39 In what sort of circumstances?

02:09:41 In a

02:09:43 social

02:09:45 setting.

02:09:49 So would now be a convenient time

02:09:51 to take the afternoon break.

02:09:53 Certainly. We have a 15-minute

02:09:55 break to enable the

02:09:57 transcribers to rest,

02:09:59 and you, for that matter.

02:10:01 Could I ask, please, those at the back

02:10:03 of the hearing room, quiet, please,

02:10:05 could I ask you at the back

02:10:07 of the hearing room, not

02:10:09 to make noises when evidence

02:10:11 is being given. It is very important

02:10:13 that the witness can give evidence

02:10:15 in peace and quiet, and that I can hear

02:10:17 it in peace and quiet.

02:10:19 To disturb it makes my life

02:10:21 and the witness's life more difficult.

02:10:23 Thank you.

02:10:25 All rise.

02:28:37 Thank you.

03:31:11 .