Keith Edmondson (HN216), DCI in charge of the Special Demonstration Squad from April 1994 to July 1997, gives evidence on SDS management, tradecraft and oversight in the years before and during his tenure. He is questioned closely on his predecessors' handling of intrusive intelligence-gathering, the absence of any written rule against undercover sexual relationships, and his knowledge of officers' covert relationships with women in the groups they infiltrated.
00:57:33 I'm not too sure where Ollie is.
00:57:37 Uh Peter Francis's uh witness statement, it's at UCPI
00:57:44 at 3612.
00:57:51 page 154, please
00:57:56 at paragraph 989. He previously uh referred to this earlier in his statement as a a a sexual indiscretion, saying that you had not passed the back office posting due to a
00:58:10 passed the back office posting due to a rumor about a sexual indiscretion. And here at paragraph 989,
00:58:17 he says that I was aware that during his back office tour in preparation for deployment into the field, he had been caught having sex in circumstances which meant he ultimately did not deploy.
00:58:28 meant he ultimately did not deploy. Um in terms of uh
00:58:34 uh that
00:58:35 that uh you've obviously given your account as to what happened during your back office deployment, but he goes on to say that when you were the DCI of the SDS,
00:58:47 that when you were the DCI of the SDS, you made a comment to the UCOs about all this shagging going on and yet I wasn't allowed to go out because I had sex with one person. As to that, what do you say
00:58:59 one person. As to that, what do you say as to whether you did make those comments or something along those lines to the UCOs under your management? Let me first touch on the fact that he
00:59:10 Let me first touch on the fact that he says that I was caught having sex in circumstances which meant I could not ultimately be deployed.
00:59:20 deployed. But Mr. Edmonson, if if you prefer, we are going to have a private session on that later on this afternoon. if you want to go. But this is an open session. This this is open. So I'm I'd rather Well, I would like
00:59:33 So I'm I'd rather Well, I would like just to to answer at least that one point.
00:59:36 point. Of of course. Yes. Of course you may.
00:59:42 Absolutely. There was no s never been a suggestion other than by Peter Francis that I was called having sex in circumstances that
00:59:54 called having sex in circumstances that he's describing. Utterly untrue. And had they been true, my vetting would have lapsed straight away. This is this is an
01:00:05 lapsed straight away. This is this is an utter fabrication. And I I wish that to be stated clearly or I state it clearly. Now going on to that uh latter part,
01:00:16 that uh latter part, people who know me know the sort of person that I am and there is no way that I would ever have uttered those words. I find it appalling that he's
01:00:28 words. I find it appalling that he's even allowed to say such things. Of course, it's his statement, but he's he's a fantalist. I'm sorry. I I really do not
01:00:38 do not I just cannot abide the fact that he's allowed to say such things. That is not me and I would never have said those
01:00:49 me and I would never have said those things.
01:00:50 things. Were you aware at all that there may have been a rumor, whether correct or not, as to why you didn't deploy back in 1980?
01:01:02 1980? As far as as far as I knew, people realized that I'd been seen going to lunch with somebody. I know of no other rumors.
01:01:16 Mr. Redmanson, you recognize why it's important to explore this issue uh given that
01:01:23 that effectively somebody that was prevented from deploying into the field as the UCO was then later put in charge of a small policing unit where there were officers
01:01:36 policing unit where there were officers some of whom were having sex in their undercover uh identities. And it's that engaging in inappropriate sexual relationships and duty that then becomes
01:01:50 relationships and duty that then becomes a a serious issue about judgment and that is why this has become an issue in relation to your management. Do you do you recognize that? I I can understand
01:02:02 you recognize that? I I can understand that the way that I've seen the inquiry being undertaken and I do understand that
01:02:09 that there are considerations about people having sex while under undercover. I I do accept that and it would be a serious matter of
01:02:20 and it would be a serious matter of judgment for a for a manager to be able to manage those officers and if there was something in their background that made uh them have inappropriate sexual
01:02:32 made uh them have inappropriate sexual liaison. I'm not saying that's true at all. But the allegation is there. That would be something that would have to be taken into consideration when putting you in that position as manager.
01:02:44 putting you in that position as manager. Do you accept that? If that had been the case, I can understand you raising it in that way. But I reiterate, I never had the sex in
01:02:56 But I reiterate, I never had the sex in the way that he is describing it at all. And certainly the use of that language is not me. Were you capable of recognizing that your officers behavior
01:03:08 recognizing that your officers behavior fell way below what was expected of them as police officers when you were a manager?
01:03:14 manager? No.
01:03:17 No. Let me rephrase that. Were you a person given your ethical judgment that could recognize poor behavior in other officers?
01:03:30 officers? If if they if there had been such poor behavior and it had come to my notice or I had suspected it, then I can understand you asking it in that way. But
01:03:41 But were you recognizing that
01:03:45 that uh officers behaviors where they're engaging in sexual relationships undercover was wrong? I'd have been capable of recognizing
01:03:56 I'd have been capable of recognizing that. Yes. Were you capable of recognizing that that sort of behavior amounted to abuse of innocent members of the public?
01:04:07 of innocent members of the public? I until this inquiry, I've never thought about it in that way as abuse. Do you accept the commissioner's
01:04:18 Do you accept the commissioner's position that sexual relationships undercover, that some of your officers conducted were abusive, deceitful, manipulative, and wrong?
01:04:30 manipulative, and wrong? In the way that the commissioner has described it, then I will accept his statement.
01:04:37 Knowing what you do know now about the behaviors of the officers that you were managing in the 1990s, do you recognize it and accept that it was abusive behavior?
01:04:52 I have to say I don't I don't recognize it as being abusive. I'm sorry. That's I don't recognize that terminology. I would say yes, it's wrong.
01:05:08 But I think what what I'm trying to to put myself back into into thinking about this is that we asked a lot of our officers to go into
01:05:20 asked a lot of our officers to go into deep undercover and that meant leading undercover lives that were normal for for ordinary people. And therefore I
01:05:32 for ordinary people. And therefore I think we've probably put them into a position that made it difficult for some of them
01:05:41 of them some of them to avoid some sort of close
01:05:48 close liaison. I will one officer and I I can his HN1 once said to me one of the the worst things he'd had to
01:06:00 one of the the worst things he'd had to deal with was the fact that he
01:06:06 he had become great friends with people and that he felt that he was betraying friendships and I think that's what a lot of officers probably felt. They were
01:06:17 officers probably felt. They were getting very close to people who had causes
01:06:22 causes that were understandable. And to get close to them, they had to form relationships, friendships. And that's the way I've always thought
01:06:33 And that's the way I've always thought about this in respect to managing the officers.
01:06:40 officers. And when you say you expected them to play their role, have a normal life in their undercover role, was sex a part of the normal life of a
01:06:52 was sex a part of the normal life of a young 32
01:06:55 young 32 year old, uh, sorry, early 30s, late 20s, some of them pretending to be early 20s.
01:07:03 20s. Sex would be a normal part of their undercover persona, wouldn't it? I'm not saying sex would have been part of it, but certainly I'm saying that they were put in very difficult
01:07:15 they were put in very difficult positions and getting and were getting close to people. Personal relationships, chemistry between people does come into this. But I think what you're also
01:07:27 this. But I think what you're also asking of me is were were those relationships condoned? And that's certainly not the case.
01:07:39 In terms of the close relationships, the chemistry between people, it had to be recognized realistically, didn't it? That
01:07:50 didn't it? That these young, predominantly young men in the groups that they were infiltrating would be seen
01:08:01 would be seen by their group as uh normal. if they were engaging in sexual relationships. Again, I can only say that that's what a
01:08:13 Again, I can only say that that's what a lot of officers had difficulty with in trying to maintain their undercover in such circumstances. But it [snorts] doesn't mean to say that they were engaging in sexual activity.
01:08:26 engaging in sexual activity. Is it highly likely that that would be a part of their undercover persona? Not their persona. No, I wouldn't say that it was [cough]
01:08:38 [cough] I'm trying to understand what you were thinking as a manager at the time in terms of you're asking them to live the life of this undercover I uh uh person
01:08:49 life of this undercover I uh uh person um live a normal life. You're putting them into a situation where they are forming very close friendships. Those friendships develop, don't they? Particularly over the times
01:09:00 Particularly over the times that they're being deployed for They're not deployed for a short period of time. They're deployed for years.
01:09:08 Is it to be expected that there will be a real really high chance of sex becoming a part of that deployment?
01:09:23 Having looked and listened to some of the things that have been said, it's clear that some officers were put into that invidious position and perhaps felt that they had to engage in some form of
01:09:36 that they had to engage in some form of activity, but it it's not something I I believe that they were wanting to do in any way.
01:09:44 any way. Did you recognize that at the time? You'll have to forgive me. is a long time ago now. I I' I'd rather think about it and
01:09:56 I' I'd rather think about it and hopefully help you in some way in the way that
01:10:00 way that the way that our managing system worked and and the way in which we would on a very regular basis. I mean it is
01:10:11 on a very regular basis. I mean it is very regular. Every day we these officers would be spoken to by somebody mostly the sergeants when they phoned in and every day we would be discussing
01:10:22 and every day we would be discussing them literally every day we would say how is so and so any thoughts about that any anything that's different and I would have hoped at that point that we
01:10:35 would have hoped at that point that we might have picked up on any issues that might be affecting them in that way any reporting that might have come to us from different quarters but I don't recognize that there there was that
01:10:47 recognize that there there was that reporting so I yes officers were put into a a very difficult position and yes we were asking them to do a lot
01:10:58 and yes we were asking them to do a lot in relation to working closely with organizations and infiltrating them so friendships were formed did I think that they would be sexual
01:11:09 did I think that they would be sexual relationships I don't believe at the time when I was a manager that I did. Do you recognize that
01:11:20 Do you recognize that you should have recognized that that was a likelihood?
01:11:27 In hindsight, I in hindsight I perhaps somehow should have tried to find out. But all I'm going back to what I said
01:11:38 going back to what I said we took we took great care over the way that we talked about and thought about each officer and the work that they were doing and the effects on them.
01:11:52 doing and the effects on them. So in hindsight now you might say I should have given thought to them having had sexual relationships. I didn't at the time.
01:12:05 I didn't at the time. Is your evidence that you should have at the time?
01:12:12 With hindsight, should you have given thought to the chance of them for those friendships forming into sexual relationships [clears throat]
01:12:23 [clears throat] in hindsight?
01:12:30 Um, Mr. Revenson, I want to have a look at what those relationships were in a little bit more detail later on, but first I just want to go back to the chronology
01:12:42 chronology of
01:12:43 of where you were prior to coming into the SDS as a manager. So, as I understand it, that once you left the SDS back office in July 1980, having spent those
01:12:56 office in July 1980, having spent those four months in the back office, you then transferred back into B squad and protection duties. Then you had that year in Hamstead where you were a relief inspector and then you
01:13:09 you were a relief inspector and then you went back to special branch and you spent time in B squad, S squad, and briefly in C squad. Um,
01:13:20 Um, you say that while you were in B squad, you recall one particular instant where you were in receipt of SDS int intelligence that suggested that some
01:13:33 intelligence that suggested that some members of the troops out movement were to disrupt a high-profile event on horse guards road by running into the marching parade and that was on the eve of the uh
01:13:44 parade and that was on the eve of the uh trooping of the color. And with that intel, you and a few B squad colleagues went into the crowd in plain clothes and you pointed out one of the men, a senior member of Tom. Do you
01:13:57 the men, a senior member of Tom. Do you recall that incident? And as a result, you say that that event went off without disruption. And you use that as an example of valuable SCS
01:14:08 that as an example of valuable SCS reporting from your perspective as a customer in B squad. Do you recall that? I do. This was you've you've mentioned it's the evening of beating uh of of trooping the color.
01:14:20 of beating uh of of trooping the color. I think it's a a specific ceremony called beating retreat and it takes place on horse guard parade and the intelligence that I was given was that
01:14:34 intelligence that I was given was that certain members of the troops out movement were prepared to disrupt that ceremony
01:14:42 ceremony by jumping the barriers
01:14:46 onto horse guards and disrupting the the actual event. I at that time was on what was called the troops out movement and in LA Irish Republic Irish
01:14:59 movement and in LA Irish Republic Irish National Liberation Army desk and therefore I I identified I knew the people involved in troops out movement and with that intelligence I went with
01:15:12 and with that intelligence I went with colleagues into the crowd and I I identified a particular senior member of top or leading member of Tom and and pointed him out. And all I can
01:15:26 and and pointed him out. And all I can tell you then is that that person, as far as I'm aware, was restrained and therefore that event didn't that disruption didn't take place.
01:15:37 disruption didn't take place. Okay. So, so that that that man that you identified, he was arrested. I'm sorry. I I can't answer that. I just know that that
01:15:49 know that that the event the the disruption did not take place. Had he had he been in the process of disrupting or had he taken any action at that stage? As far as as far as I'm aware
01:16:00 As far as as far as I'm aware by pointing him out, the uniform officers who were involved probably just approached him and pulled him away from the the barriers. As far as I'm aware, I
01:16:13 the the barriers. As far as I'm aware, I can't help you anymore in relation to what happened after I'd identified him. And you you can't recall the name of the SDS officer who provided the information
01:16:27 is a it's at paragraph 21 of your witness statement, but I don't think you can recall who the source of that intelligence was. Whoever was No, I'm sorry.
01:16:38 Whoever was No, I'm sorry. And you can't recall the date of that intelligence. Is that right? Um,
01:16:43 Um, and how can you be sure that that was valuable intelligence that prevented a disruption?
01:16:53 Well, I think an event like beating the retreat, which as far as I know is televised, but irrespective of that, it's quite a major ceremonial event, and I know that identifying him
01:17:06 and I know that identifying him prevented that disruption taking place. And I think I think the importance of that is clear. And how did you know the SDS intel was
01:17:19 And how did you know the SDS intel was accurate that they were intending to disrupt?
01:17:27 Well, the I'm just thinking here that the officer who would have told me that or it would have come from the officer. I somehow think it was the officer himself, which is unusual, but I got a
01:17:40 himself, which is unusual, but I got a feeling it was the officer. And he would have been he would have been part of the the the
01:17:48 the the infiltration of that that activity.
01:17:54 Um, in 1989, you had a police service and good conduct medal presented to you. Is that right? That's correct. And in 1990, you were promoted to DCI.
01:18:08 And in 1990, you were promoted to DCI. From November 1990, you took charge of the Irish research unit. Is that right? That's correct. In your witness statement, you can't recall exactly what you did between
01:18:21 recall exactly what you did between that uh the Irish research unit and joining the SDS as a manager in April 1994
01:18:29 1994 if you had another role. And I'm just wanting to refer you to a few documents to try and assist you with that. Sorry. Could I just help? Well, perhaps just come in there.
01:18:40 just come in there. I I was thinking about this only because something was put to me. It's it seems that I was certainly in the Irish research unit as a DCI,
01:18:53 in the Irish research unit as a DCI, but I think a document might indicate that I was on C squad for a short period.
01:19:00 period. Um, prior to then going to SDS, the inquiry understands that in September 92, C squad merged with E squad, forming CE squad. Do you recall
01:19:13 squad, forming CE squad. Do you recall that happening? I do know. I don't recall that. I've seen something now that says CE, but I'm assuming that's what that means. And we understand that CE squad housed
01:19:24 And we understand that CE squad housed the SDS until it moved to S squad in 1995. So during the period that we're talking about between your time in the Irish research unit and joining the SDS
01:19:35 Irish research unit and joining the SDS as a manager, CE squad existed. Do you remember being part of CE squad at that time after the Irish research unit?
01:19:47 time after the Irish research unit? only might only as a result I think of this of a document you might be showing me later where it sees it it's talked about me look being referred
01:19:59 about me look being referred having had a document referred to to me and and I'm thinking that I could only have been on CE if that's what it was then but I do not
01:20:10 if that's what it was then but I do not actually recall in any way the chronology of from C to PE and and on to S for SDS. Okay.
01:20:21 Okay. Absolutely not at all. It appears that in at least 1993 to 1994, you were receiving intel from the SDS, particularly in relation to
01:20:33 the SDS, particularly in relation to hunt sabbing and animal rights reports. So, if I can take you to one of those reports, MPS 0730 975. If it's behind tab B44 sir this is
01:20:47 975. If it's behind tab B44 sir this is a report 6th of February 1993 Siri union foxhounds meet [snorts] and it appears from this note at the
01:20:58 and it appears from this note at the beginning that you are cited on it DCI Edmonson to see and if we scroll down onto the actual nature of the report
01:21:13 we can see that This has been sent by HN86 who is the DCI of the SDS at the time.
01:21:25 This sort of report on the organization Hunts Doctors Association would that be something that you would have been in receipt of around this time?
01:21:40 Well, if I was on C squad at the time, and I I don't remember it, but I I can see from what you're I have in front of me that it looked as though I was copied in
01:21:52 in I was I the DCI on C squad. If if you can say chronologically that's where I was, then fine. Uh another report B46
01:22:03 Uh another report B46 MPS07395.
01:22:06 MPS07395. May I stop you again? begun, but looking at that minute sheet, I I see it says copy given to Arie and I recognize I believe that's my
01:22:18 and I recognize I believe that's my writing.
01:22:19 writing. Okay.
01:22:20 Okay. If that helps in any way. So would information come from the SDS into CE squad and you'd post it on to Arie?
01:22:29 Arie? From what I can remember? Yes.
01:22:34 There's a number of these sorts of reports on this type of organization, these sorts of demos during that period. Um, another one
01:22:45 Um, another one uh for example B48 MPS073 0987.
01:23:02 Do you see again it's been sent to you this time by the
01:23:09 um chief super uh well it would have been H67 who was the DI in um the SDS at the time and if we scroll down
01:23:25 we can see that again it's to do with the organization H essay Okay.
01:23:32 And it's about a turnout demo. Is there any way you can make this larger?
01:23:38 larger? Yes, of course. I'm having difficulty. Yeah, can make it larger possibly. Um the um
01:23:49 Um the um the text on page two. Yes, please. Thank you.
01:24:07 Do you recall receiving information about demonstrations and protests of about this size in relation to hunt saboturs and animal
01:24:18 in relation to hunt saboturs and animal rights activists? as the DCI on the squad responsible for this and I would have been in receipt of these of many such reports.
01:24:30 Can I ask you about uh MPS 0739425
01:24:37 behind tab B-54?
01:24:50 You can see your name here again on the minute sheet
01:24:59 and the actual uh report itself. If we can expand the
01:25:10 the detail on that
01:25:20 We can see it's about a protest,
01:25:29 relatively small scale protest. Is that fair? I think the number was 25 people. If we can increase the numbers at the top of the page, numbers present 25.
01:25:42 numbers present 25. isolated instant two arrests and it's the organization here is the London Boots Action Group.
01:25:52 Does that jog your memory to the types of information you were receiving from the SDS at the time?
01:25:59 I see that it doesn't jog my memory that I actually remember the report, but it it indicates the type of information that would have
01:26:10 the type of information that would have been received. from SDS.
01:26:14 from SDS. Um, a further report on the London Boots Action Group is MPS0745818
01:26:23 at page two. This wasn't in the pack that was provided to you. Um, but it's a further report of a meeting of the 11th of January 1994.
01:26:37 And we can see in paragraph two
01:26:47 talks about the reduction of boots pickets
01:26:52 pickets to that held in Camden each Sunday. So there's been a reduction in the type of activity in relation to boots. Paragraph three
01:27:05 talks about potentially actions being taken outside the addresses of the homes of directors of Selfridges.
01:27:17 of Selfridges. And this is because they would have been selling fur coats, but that the addresses were probably out of date.
01:27:31 and that the chairman of Selfridges, we can see at the bottom of that paragraph, no longer lived at the address.
01:27:41 Do you see that? Do you recall any of this happening or being referred to you? No.
01:27:47 No. Um,
01:27:49 Um, on page one of this document, we can see the minute sheet and again for DCI Edmonson to see, but
01:28:01 and again for DCI Edmonson to see, but the note after that reads that the security officer for the Sears group, Selfridges, is aware of the threat as is Boots PLC.
01:28:14 I don't think that's your handwriting, is it?
01:28:16 is it? Well, having looked at what I've just showed you earlier that they're two different types of handwriting, aren't they?
01:28:22 they? Yeah. Were you aware that this information was being relayed to the uh office for the Sears Group, Selfridges, and Boots PLC? Was that part of the
01:28:35 and Boots PLC? Was that part of the dissemination of the intelligence at that time?
01:28:41 That certainly wouldn't be something I that I would be aware of uh that I would be sending, but I can see that there would have been
01:28:54 but I can see that there would have been some connection between the security people involved in Sears
01:29:02 and the police service in some way. Other than that, I I I can't help you in that respect, but it seems to me clear
01:29:13 that respect, but it seems to me clear that some the police should have been involved in some way to help protect um the the people who may have been targeted and that's
01:29:25 targeted and that's and similarly boots plc as well. So, we've got the security it says that but forgive me Sears or Boots I don't know the difference.
01:29:36 difference. And
01:29:38 And but your role in relation to that communication with those private companies, you're saying you weren't the person to send it off. No,
01:29:48 No, you you didn't communicate that, but you were aware of that being communicated. Is that right? No, I'm not I'm not aware that it was communicated. I can see that there's a reason why the police service now
01:29:59 reason why the police service now whoever received who else received that I don't know but I can see that the police service has a responsibility for the care of other people including um
01:30:11 the care of other people including um the the managers or directors of certain companies. There must have been some mechanism set up outside of special branch perhaps in relation to this. The only other people
01:30:24 relation to this. The only other people that I am ever aware of who have some form of security responsibility would be the security service itself. That's generally from my recollection we're
01:30:37 generally from my recollection we're talking of things like list X firms that the service would have um been responsible for keeping a um oversee overseeing
01:30:49 overseeing but also
01:30:51 but also I believe the service also provided some form of security advice to certain companies but that's from the back of my mind I
01:31:02 but that's from the back of my mind I can that's that's all I can help you in that respect. You say list X firms. What what firms were they? I that's why they're called list X. I
01:31:13 I that's why they're called list X. I don't know. So So you were aware that information from the SDS was being passed up to special branch one of the desks and
01:31:25 special branch one of the desks and being then passed on to to those particular firms. No, I'm not saying I was aware. I'm saying I could understand if that were the case.
01:31:34 the case. I I from sitting in my in my role as a DCI on CE squad as it was, I don't I don't recall there being that liaison
01:31:47 don't recall there being that liaison while I was there with these groups. I don't know whose writing that is or or in what connection that was written. And in terms I can understand it. That's what I'm saying to you. I can see how you're saying there's a value that the police
01:31:59 saying there's a value that the police add to those companies in terms of their managing their own security. Yes. And that sort of thing. In terms of um list X,
01:32:08 X, where would that be held or managed by the security service? By the security service. So that went out to the security service. If if if there was such a
01:32:20 If if if there was such a forgive me, this is nothing to do with list X.
01:32:23 list X. Okay.
01:32:24 Okay. Nothing at all. No, but you're saying that's a sim similar sort of exercise. The security service did does I believe probably still has that type of responsibility
01:32:39 and this sort of information that was being picked up from the SDS. Is that the sort of information that you on CE squad or when you were a manager
01:32:51 on CE squad or when you were a manager in SDS would say right uh we understand security service ought to know about this as well because of what they manage in terms of the listex companies
01:33:02 in terms of the listex companies would you send that to security service for that purpose I don't know that we sent it direct to security service we would have probably sent it to whichever squad was wanting
01:33:14 sent it to whichever squad was wanting to see it and that they the squad would then have have sent it on. Interestingly enough, obviously I was on the squad that I've just referred to. I don't recall having sent that information to
01:33:27 recall having sent that information to um
01:33:29 um that type of information to anybody outside of the police service. In terms of information about trade unionists and trade union action, would
01:33:42 unionists and trade union action, would that also go to the security service or would that information come through the SDS to the squad and information be sent
01:33:54 SDS to the squad and information be sent then to
01:33:56 then to either private company or an organization or a a group that would have an interest in those union activities? Are you able to assist us with that? It can I can only say that
01:34:08 with that? It can I can only say that the any information like that would have would have been copied to the security service if that's what they had sought
01:34:20 service if that's what they had sought or would have just been kept by the squad receiving it to see to see whether it had any um interest in relation to
01:34:32 it had any um interest in relation to activity on the streets. Other than that, no.
01:34:36 that, no. What about the organizations or the even government departments that it might affect? I'm thinking kind of transport
01:34:47 thinking kind of transport um uh organizations or departments or there's a a a trade union activity that is rep reported on under your management
01:35:00 is rep reported on under your management in relation to I think it's Suk Burough Council.
01:35:04 Council. uh uh workers dispute, an industrial dispute there in Soduk. What Southern Council
01:35:14 Council would information come into the SDS through the undercover officers, go to a desk and Suk Burough Council, for instance, be told about the activities
01:35:25 instance, be told about the activities or the intentions of trade unionists. Certainly not direct from SDS. it would have gone to whichever squad was responsible and I I know of no
01:35:38 and I I know of no even in my time elsewhere I know of no connection like that to any organization I can see that the police might have had
01:35:49 I can see that the police might have had some
01:35:51 some the police per se might have had some but I certainly not from an SDS or special branch perspective
01:36:05 So in terms of trade union activities, what if uh somebody was coming uh into the limelight, a particular trade unionist who was organizing
01:36:17 unionist who was organizing um and leading a an industrial dispute. Would details on that person obviously would be put on a a file in special branch? I imagine. But what
01:36:29 special branch? I imagine. But what happens to that information? Would that information be disseminated out to the groups that were involved in that dispute? When I say groups, I
01:36:40 in that dispute? When I say groups, I mean the the um object of the the activity. I would say definitely not.
01:36:55 Why was that so different then? because you've said that seers group for um Debenham's boots plc will get information so that they can manage their own security.
01:37:06 Um I didn't say I didn't say I would have sent it. I said there may have been some mechanism within the police service to lies with Seer's group.
01:37:18 lies with Seer's group. Yeah. uh in terms of of of a council I think SDS concern was one thing only [clears throat] and that was to provide intelligence about activity that might
01:37:30 intelligence about activity that might affect public order. Now if a trade unionist was going to ferment disorder on the streets that would have been something that perhaps
01:37:42 something that perhaps the branch dealing with public order would have wanted to know. But that's that's it.
01:38:11 sticking with London Boots action group for a moment. So this is information that you were receiving still as we understand uh your position was in CE
01:38:22 understand uh your position was in CE squad on the desk B55 please. It's MPS0746507.
01:38:40 We can see that it's been copied to you at bullet point two. The details of this report
01:38:51 The details of this report are quite personal in relation to um an individual. So page two, please.
01:39:03 You can see that it's uh somebody that's involved in London Boots Action Group and other groups. And then on page three,
01:39:15 can we expand that top part? It's it's it details living arrangements, relationships,
01:39:29 [cough and clears throat]
01:39:31 and a history of abuse. Do you see that? I do.
01:39:38 What were your thoughts on receiving reports like this and the appropriateness of this sort of information being put into an SDS report?
01:39:53 I can only go back for my training when I first joined the branch and the amount of we would we would have what they called comprehensive reports I think it was and officers
01:40:05 reports I think it was and officers would be expected to provide a comprehensive update on an individual and anything affecting that individual in any way would have been put into a
01:40:16 in any way would have been put into a special branch report and that's how we were trained That's so this this to me if I received that I'd say yes. Okay.
01:40:27 if I received that I'd say yes. Okay. That's that's a a comprehensive overview of that particular person and it would have it would have just met what I would have thought would have been the the way in which we dealt way in which we
01:40:39 in which we dealt way in which we reported on comprehensive reporting. Thank you. It can be taken down now please. What was what was the purpose of that?
01:40:49 that? I go back to what I've just said. This is this is how we were trained as special branch officers when we first joined. Comprehensive meant comprehensive as much as we could identify and
01:41:00 identify and why how would that information then be used?
01:41:03 used? Do you know in that respect? I doubt very little of that would have been used. It would have just been part of this comprehensive branch system of reporting. Did you ever query why such
01:41:14 reporting. Did you ever query why such personal information was being reported on and held on file in relation to individuals? No, I didn't. So, you didn't have a sense of why it
01:41:25 So, you didn't have a sense of why it was being reported. You just knew that it should be reported. I knew that if the if this is from an an undercover officer, um I can't remember
01:41:37 undercover officer, um I can't remember now. Was it from an undercover officer? Yep. Then again the undercover officer just report everything that they see and hear about particular
01:41:49 they see and hear about particular individuals. That's part of how special branch reporting was conducted. So did you have any training at all in terms of uh privacy in terms of
01:42:00 terms of uh privacy in terms of proportionality as to what should be reported about people or activities? Not when I joined in about 7172. No, there was no such training. Go back to what I said. Comprehensive report means
01:42:13 what I said. Comprehensive report means a comprehensive understanding of an individual. Um B56 please. MPS0739633.
01:42:31 This is a report from the 21st of May 1993.
01:42:36 1993. You can see that you're copied on minute sheet
01:42:41 sheet page two,
01:42:43 page two, paragraph
01:42:44 paragraph two, please. These are personal documents
01:42:48 documents belonging to EAB, the cipher that the inquiry has supplied.
01:42:56 [snorts] And on page three,
01:43:01 three, we can see their library card, driving license. Page four, please. This is an address book with names and phone numbers.
01:43:13 phone numbers. And if we scroll through to page eight, we can see that a lot of information
01:43:21 terms of name, phone number,
01:43:30 names and phone numbers listed there. And it looks like research is then done in relation to each of these people that's listed in the back of the address book.
01:43:41 book. You see annotated where the persons are known
01:43:50 and we can see about halfway down Andy Andy Davyy. Do you recognize that as being HN2
01:43:57 being HN2 and Andrew Coohl's? Oh, right. Okay. In fact, I wouldn't have recognized that from that, but Okay,
01:44:05 Okay, I recognize the name now you've said it.
01:44:10 Page nine, please.
01:44:17 This starts then to become a diary in terms of events. Page 10
01:44:26 is the handwritten note recording bank details.
01:44:30 details. Page 11, please. Sorry. A handwritten note regarding what?
01:44:34 what? Bank details. Jotted down bank details. Okay.
01:44:37 Okay. Page 11 is the banking book.
01:44:42 Um why would all this information be copied
01:44:47 copied to you? What what would what would you be doing with this sort of information coming from the SDS? Right. Forgive me. Would you go back to the first the first minute sheet because I could I note my name's there
01:44:59 I could I note my name's there and there's some annotation and could you enlarge it please? Yes.
01:45:07 So we can see this is about a year before you join the SDS as manager. It's been sent by HN67 who was the DI in the SDS at that time and it's all this
01:45:19 SDS at that time and it's all this information has been sent to different people.
01:45:26 I'll go back then I will say this is I go this is normal special branch reporting. That's the first thing. And then I do note it says here um I've seen
01:45:40 then I do note it says here um I've seen it. I looked as though I might have sent it on to someone else. I don't know. But to see and then arranged for research that's what we would have done. All those names would have been researched
01:45:51 those names would have been researched against special branch records I think if that's what is the researches meant to be referring to there. Uh contained in the correspondence and as if deemed
01:46:05 in the correspondence and as if deemed appropriate. Well, it would only be appropriate if we could identify some some of the names from our records.
01:46:15 records. And what about the lawfulness of an undercover officer obtaining these documents? Either presumably they'd have been into the home of somebody and look through their personal belongings or
01:46:26 through their personal belongings or been into the the bag of somebody and taken out these personal documents and and copied them. What was what was the lawful basis for doing things like that?
01:46:40 Um, do you know I I do I cannot answer that question. I do not know what the lawful basis was. Did you ever turn your mind to what the lawful basis might be?
01:46:51 lawful basis might be? Certainly not at the time. I It was never a part of a discussion amongst people in special branch. At the time, no. I can't say that it was [clears throat]
01:47:02 [clears throat] um and certainly not a part of training. No.
01:47:08 No. Um in terms of policy documents copied to you before you joined the SDS's manager, can I have up please tab B45 MPS073
01:47:20 MPS073 0597?
01:47:29 We can see this is a a note
01:47:38 an interim report about changes to performance measurement measures uh management arrangements and potential for development arising from a meeting with uh DAC howley
01:47:52 with uh DAC howley the week before. So this is a a rep a report from the 19th of January 1993.
01:48:02 Uh if we shrink that back down please, we can see that this note was sent by DAC security John Howley to ACSO
01:48:14 DAC security John Howley to ACSO William Taylor. Was William Taylor at the time.
01:48:20 And scrolling on to page two, we can see this is an SDS uh report. It's it's authored by HN86
01:48:33 dated the 15th of January 1993.
01:48:38 And the contents are performance indicators, training, policy guidelines regarding participation in crime. Bullet point four is redacted out and
01:48:50 Bullet point four is redacted out and SDS deployment beyond the MET Metropolitan Police District.
01:49:01 Does this show that the top brass within the Met were discussing all these key elements of the SDS?
01:49:12 elements of the SDS? The SDS wasn't a unit that just operated in secret by itself. the chain of command were very much involved in these five areas of SDS business
01:49:25 five areas of SDS business I would say yes and was that you you understood that to be right did you when you were a manager of the SDS that people like the DAC howley were very much involved in um the
01:49:39 howley were very much involved in um the setup of the SDS and Mr. heard he was very much involved in that respect. Um I I did have
01:49:50 in that respect. Um I I did have access direct to him should I need to. What about ACSO?
01:49:58 Were they a little bit further removed or were they all due respect I don't I know of Mr. His name is but I I I have no I didn't have that connection
01:50:09 have that connection in relation to that. I had other connections but not that. Um training on page 11 please.
01:50:27 You see here, this is all about um uh the ACSO believe there may be scope for training inputs to incoming field officers from SO 10.
01:50:40 Now this training that was delivered to SO10, was that the the undercover crime department special branch? Yes,
01:50:51 Yes, we can see at paragraph 2.2 too. It says the strength of the SDS is variable according to targeting priorities and a considerable time is spent in the grooming of potential field officers who have to pass a stringent selection
01:51:03 have to pass a stringent selection procedure presided over by commander of operations. At that time, commander of operations was Donald Buchanan. Do you do you remember Mr. Buchanan?
01:51:15 remember Mr. Buchanan? I remember Mr. McCannan. I don't know if I What date is this? Sorry, this is a 1993 document, but it remained to be Donald Buchanan during the time that you were manager of the SDS as
01:51:26 that you were manager of the SDS as well.
01:51:27 well. Okay, thank you. Do you remember uh Commander Buchanan having involvement in um potential field officers uh being
01:51:39 potential field officers uh being recruited to the SDS?
01:51:46 He excuse me he or other commanders would have had probably the final approval. Yes. Because I think I have
01:51:57 approval. Yes. Because I think I have seen other documents which indicate that from the bottom up we would have pulled together a number of potential recruits had done some work
01:52:08 potential recruits had done some work around that. We'd have pulled together um a case for a particular officer to be go through the selection process which was
01:52:20 was not a true not going in front of a board but going through a type of selection process and and I believe there was a final um then presentation to the commander to
01:52:33 presentation to the commander to indicate what we had found and how we the potential for a particular recruit. It's described here as the grooming of potential field officers. Was this essentially a tap on the shoulder?
01:52:45 essentially a tap on the shoulder? You'll be a sort of the sort of person we'd like in the SDS. And then they went through a a bit of a an assessment process.
01:53:00 It's a very blunt way of putting it, but in in in respect um SDS would always have been on the lookout for potential recruits
01:53:12 recruits and we had what at the time I thought was a very good mentoring system and uh a system of re of referring back to former
01:53:22 former SDS officers who perhaps would have just quietly in the background been looking to see whether certain officers had potential
01:53:31 potential and that was was that quite a small pool of officers that Forgive me I can't remember it was only officers within special branch is that fair yes sorry y um and what sort of attributes would
01:53:44 um and what sort of attributes would make somebody stand out as a potential SDS officer
01:53:55 it it is odd actually thinking back now because they the there was a variety of individuals that came each with them almost unique personality that there would there would have been
01:54:06 that there would there would have been something in their personality that would have perhaps identified them as being possibly of value to SDS but they would have had to have
01:54:18 would have had to have shown their integrity loyalty
01:54:23 loyalty to the branch loyalty to the police service was loyalty the predom dominant factor that would attract
01:54:34 that would attract somebody to the SDS or attract the SDS to a potential recruit. It was their sense of loyalty, loyalty and integrity as well and how they performed on their on their general
01:54:45 they performed on their on their general duties.
01:54:48 duties. Uh, paragraph 2.3 on this page looks at the type of training or tuition that would be provided for people
01:55:09 that sort of setup. Would that be the same as it was in your day as well? You continued that process under your management. I would agree with that.
01:55:20 Um, page 12, please, paragraph 2.4. four. I'll give you a moment to read that.
01:55:46 Do you see that the the emphasis is placed on self-development? Um w was there quite a lot of responsibility placed on the new recruit
01:55:57 responsibility placed on the new recruit to develop their own undercover identity and and to they had responsibility for their own deployment. There wasn't a lot of interference or oversight once they
01:56:08 of interference or oversight once they were deployed. Is that right? No, I don't I disagree with that. I think looking and just reading this um certainly self-development means that
01:56:20 certainly self-development means that they have to provide and satisfied with the legend that they're living that that would have been supported by um the DI in charge of the unit at the
01:56:33 um the DI in charge of the unit at the time. Uh in my case it would have been Bob Lambert um thoroughly experienced officer who would have understood all ramifications
01:56:44 would have understood all ramifications of developing a good and secure legend. Uh and as it says here I I'm sure we followed this through with a mentor
01:56:55 followed this through with a mentor former field officer was involved in talking to them. It was always to do with supporting them and how they developed their legend
01:57:06 and how they developed their legend which they had to live. So they had to be they had to be really confident in what they were producing that it would provide them with the security they needed. But there were all
01:57:17 security they needed. But there were all there were all these other officers around them I believed giving support. In terms of the training, it was largely would you say by osmosis from the field
01:57:28 would you say by osmosis from the field officers onto the new recruits? Yes, there is no I don't know what I say is there was no formal training as one
01:57:39 is there was no formal training as one would now think perhaps if if we look at paragraph 2.5 there was some consideration back then in 1993
01:57:48 in 1993 of SO10 training being used
01:57:56 and if we can expand the next part of the page page.
01:58:04 So there was contact between special branch
01:58:08 branch SO12
01:58:09 SO12 with SO10 crime undercover operations to see if there could be some cross fertilization of training. It was found that um the
01:58:23 It was found that um the SO10 training was too different from what the needs of the SO12 special branch was. Is that fair to say? Do you recall anything about that?
01:58:35 recall anything about that? Careful what I'm saying here. May I just refer to Yes, of course.
01:58:49 Yeah. Um, HN86 from what I recall, he he was the one who instigated the the contact with SO10.
01:59:02 the the contact with SO10. And my discussions with him at the time subsequently were that while we had every respect for what SO10 was doing and the way that it operated,
01:59:15 and the way that it operated, the two systems were quite different. And therefore, we had to be careful that we could we shouldn't do everything that SO10 seemingly did. And that's what
01:59:28 SO10 seemingly did. And that's what that's what 86 was telling me. And I I read from this and I do accept it was different. I I also visited subsequently I believe SO10
01:59:39 I believe SO10 to discuss with them such things and came away with the same view. So, so as a result, was the training within the SDS kept fairly internal and each
01:59:52 SDS kept fairly internal and each officer learned from the previous officers
01:59:55 officers generally? And and and could you see any danger in that in that there wasn't any new ideas coming into the office and any bad behaviors would simply be uh passed on
02:00:06 behaviors would simply be uh passed on from one officer to another officer without being checked?
02:00:16 I I don't know about you might say bad practice but I don't know I I think there were enough there were enough officers
02:00:28 officers who
02:00:29 who even on the field or in the field who would have understood what the recruit was was being told and would have said no that's that's not the best way to deal with it.
02:00:42 deal with it. Can I have a look at page 14 please in relation to participation in crime
02:00:50 paragraph 3.1 again the ACSO having oversight of this says that there should be more in the way of written policy and practice notes especially in
02:01:02 policy and practice notes especially in respect of participation in criminal activity
02:01:06 activity and the action further down please was to develop some guidelines. I want to come on to those because they're set out at page 18 of this
02:01:19 they're set out at page 18 of this document which we'll finish just before the break. Um
02:01:25 page 16 please.
02:01:34 It says paragraph 3.8 that arrests up until these days have been relatively few, but the risks of arrest
02:01:47 few, but the risks of arrest will be increasing given the groups that have been in infiltrated.
02:01:54 Did you accept that when you came in as a manager these groups that were being infiltrated anti-fascist action a action or activity
02:02:05 anti-fascist action a action or activity anarchism and animal rights were a real risk of arrest and participation in crime? Is that what your understanding was?
02:02:17 your understanding was? I certainly began to understand that that there was more of an opportunity for them to be involved and that involvement might take them into the criminal area
02:02:28 criminal area and page 17 please paragraph 3.10. Sorry, could I just sorry
02:02:32 sorry for just for a moment talk them into the criminal area, but always in the back of our minds was that they were not there per se to provide
02:02:44 per se to provide the type of intelligence that an SO10 officer would do, i.e. standing in court and giving evidence. Ours was much of a longer term basis. It took it would have taken an officer a long time to get that close
02:02:57 officer a long time to get that close and I think it would have been We'd have lost the value of that officer if purely because he had he or she had to stand in in the witness box. She
02:03:08 to stand in in the witness box. She would have so it was more intelligence based rather than evidential gathering and intelligence then intelligence then can be used by other um areas of the
02:03:21 can be used by other um areas of the police to develop the criminal evidence. much as much as I learned and I'm going back to my B squad days. Much of I learned about how the RU used to work.
02:03:35 learned about how the RU used to work. They had their own intelligence side but then moved it over to the the crime side to develop the arrests. I just want to finish on this document
02:03:47 I just want to finish on this document before we go to a break. Um so paragraph 3.10 on page 17 please. It says that here that no fully committed SDS officer has ever given
02:03:58 committed SDS officer has ever given evidence in court proceedings. And was that your sense that when you took over management of the SDS, nobody had actually given evidence in court proceedings before or did you have a different understanding? No, I I can I see that written. I can I
02:04:14 No, I I can I see that written. I can I don't think I can differ on that. um will come to people being arrested under your watch and given evidence in in court. But did you have a sense then when you were managing those events that
02:04:25 when you were managing those events that this was something new? You were entering new territory.
02:04:32 You know, thinking back, I just think I would probably think it was a difficult territory. I I don't know about new territory. Looking at those guidelines very briefly, page 18, please.
02:04:45 briefly, page 18, please. Is the written SDS guidelines on participation in crime? Is that something that you and your officers would have been very familiar with in the SDS?
02:04:56 with in the SDS? Could you enlarge it for me again, please?
02:04:58 please? Of course. Um, yeah. Thank you.
02:05:16 We don't necessarily have to read the whole of it. Just at the moment it addresses things like um a Jean provocator. Yeah, I was just going to say one thing that was certainly picked up
02:05:27 one thing that was certainly picked up by me almost just prior to joining and what when I first sat in in the the DCI's chair that one that one small
02:05:38 DCI's chair that one that one small sentence is is quite significant. No SDS officer will counsel inside or procure the commission of a crime. That's
02:05:48 That's and that was something that was hammered home to the officers uh in the SDS. I would say yes. What about um on page 19 little E?
02:06:00 What about um on page 19 little E? So paragraph E. At no time will an SDS officer commit himself or herself to a course to mislead a court. And this could include appearing on behalf of a defendant as a
02:06:13 appearing on behalf of a defendant as a witness. Was that something that was readily understood by you and the UCAs in the SDS?
02:06:23 I don't know about readily understood actually.
02:06:26 actually. Did you train your officers in relation to that or advise them in relation to that?
02:06:34 that? Do you know I do not recall specifically raising that with them, but I I'm sure that at some stage that that would have been a discussion.
02:06:45 been a discussion. Did did you take steps to ensure the officers had this document and read it and abided by it? Well, that the that document in or
02:06:57 Well, that the that document in or similar document in particular in relation to a profit or which contained that was definitely there and available to to anybody when you say to all officers.
02:07:08 to all officers. When you say available, what steps did you take if any to make sure that they read it, they understood it and they complied with it? they would when they were when they were in the back office they would have had to have read it and
02:07:21 they would have had to have read it and that that would have been I'm sure would have been a discussion I don't recall those discussions but would have been a discussion with by them with them either by u in my case it would have been Bob
02:07:34 by u in my case it would have been Bob Lambert
02:07:36 Lambert and indeed anybody within the office who because it was a it was a team effort in relation to this. Yes. Okay. I was the DCI, but we
02:07:47 this. Yes. Okay. I was the DCI, but we had a very good team of officers in that in the I say manager, but in the back office role. Thank you, sir. I note the time I've run over slightly from half past 11, but now
02:08:00 over slightly from half past 11, but now is perhaps good time to break. Certainly. Uh we'll um break for 15 minutes.
02:08:06 minutes. All right.
02:27:09 Please could we have up on screen MPS0737236
02:27:15 behind tab B67. This is a November 1993 SDS memorandum in relation to SDS or ANIE rules of engagement. So again, this
02:27:27 ANIE rules of engagement. So again, this is a few months before you became a manager of the SDS.
02:27:39 And if we can go uh paragraph
02:27:43 paragraph first paragraph, please to enlarge it. It's effectively um an attempt to protect undercover sources
02:27:54 sources and not disclose intelligence in criminal cases by recording information differently. And that's following a recent Crown Court ruling. Do you recall
02:28:06 recent Crown Court ruling. Do you recall where a crown court ruling uh meant that information had to be disclosed to the defendants? And this is an attempt by the SDS to try and prevent intelligence being disclosed during criminal
02:28:17 being disclosed during criminal proceedings. Do you recall anything about that? No, I don't.
02:28:25 Uh do you recall any change in how information was disclosed during criminal cases? No, I don't. Okay.
02:28:37 No, I don't. Okay. Page two, paragraph 7.
02:28:51 We can see that the the note was actually written by H&86 who was the DCI of the SDS at the time.
02:29:04 And it says that you have been consulted. In what capacity would you have been consulted in relation to this um change in approach to recording
02:29:19 this um change in approach to recording of intelligence and and by and I I appreciate that um we haven't been through this paragraph by paragraph but essentially what is set out in this
02:29:30 essentially what is set out in this document is that um the the names of sources of intelligence would be kept very separately to the intelligence and the names of those that are being spied on would also
02:29:43 those that are being spied on would also be uh redacted or separated out in some point in some way so that information on the defendants wouldn't have to be disclosed. C can you tell us why you would be
02:29:56 C can you tell us why you would be consulted in relation to that and and what you might have said in relation to that?
02:30:01 that? Okay, firstly I I have no recollection whatsoever of this report or you know, the report. Um, if I was consulted, which obviously I must have been, it
02:30:13 which obviously I must have been, it probably was because I was a DCI on CE squad, but I I just don't remember this whatsoever.
02:30:24 What was your understanding of how intelligence was recorded? You've already mentioned the difference between an intelligence uh gathering exercise which the SDS was uh primarily concerned
02:30:37 which the SDS was uh primarily concerned with and that being different from an evidential gathering uh exercise which SO10 was more uh concerned with.
02:30:48 more uh concerned with. Can you help us with how information was stored and how that might be disclosed in criminal proceedings from when you were a manager?
02:31:00 were a manager? I'm afraid I can't. Okay.
02:31:02 Okay. Oh, I'm sorry.
02:31:08 You say in your witness statement at paragraph 117 that even before joining the SDS, you always understood it to be about prevention of serious public disorder.
02:31:20 prevention of serious public disorder. And you qualify that in sub paragraph A in relation to the prevention or control in conjunction with other parts of the MPS. I can bring that up on screen for
02:31:31 MPS. I can bring that up on screen for you.
02:31:31 you. Sorry. Uh MPS0749544.
02:31:36 It's behind tab A1
02:31:40 page 74
02:31:44 paragraph 117.
02:31:48 What did you mean by serious public disorder? And by that I mean was the you know in terms of numbers level of disruption.
02:32:07 Does 35 people outside Grovener House Hotel vifily viciferously protesting the horse and hounds ball qualify for that sort of thing? the type of information
02:32:18 sort of thing? the type of information you were getting reports on in terms of the animal rights activity. Would that constitute in your mind serious public disorder?
02:32:29 serious public disorder? Unfortunately, it probably would have been in my mind that that could have been serious. It it's all grades of of disorder, but I can I can see how such a a gathering
02:32:43 can I can see how such a a gathering could eventually become serious.
02:32:49 And in terms of the level of disruption, would events like that um you say that would create a
02:33:00 um you say that would create a significant level of disruption that required reporting?
02:33:08 Sorry, where are you? Could I just see what you're looking at or in terms of the animal rights reports that you you had been receiving during your time in uh CE squad prior to
02:33:21 your time in uh CE squad prior to becoming a manager in the SDS? That was your understanding of serious public disorder was it that that did constitute serious public disorder in your view?
02:33:35 As I said, a gathering of 35 could end up being serious depending on the outcome and their intention.
02:33:47 Right up to a full scale riot, not with them, but as as we have seen. I'm sorry, I'm trying to trying to be helpful. Yeah.
02:33:56 Yeah. I don't quite see what what what you were trying to get from me. Um, in terms of what's set out here in your in your witness statement, paragraph 117, the
02:34:07 witness statement, paragraph 117, the prevention and detection of crime, uh, sub paragraph B, [clears throat] in terms of the prevention of crime,
02:34:19 was disruption of political groups a part of the objective of the SDS in terms of infiltrating a group and trying
02:34:30 terms of infiltrating a group and trying to disrupt it to prevent it from being able to act uh in protest. I don't know that SDS per se would have been able to disrupt a particular crime, but the the
02:34:45 disrupt a particular crime, but the the evidence or sorry, the intelligence that was being provided by an SDS officer could have been used by other parts of the police service to disrupt
02:34:57 the police service to disrupt uh activity. Was was there any sense that once a UCO infiltrated a group that was almost the death nail for a group and that they
02:35:09 death nail for a group and that they would try and disrupt the personal relationships amongst those within the group?
02:35:13 group? No, I don't I don't recognize that you became an SDS manager. You were the DCI from the 4th April 1994 to July
02:35:25 DCI from the 4th April 1994 to July 1997. So just over three years. That's right, isn't it? Um, you say you can't recall how or why you were selected to be the DCI.
02:35:37 you were selected to be the DCI. Was
02:35:38 Was there a relationship between um you and Superintendent Robert Potter? You've set out in your witness statement that you were a close family friend of his and at the time he
02:35:52 family friend of his and at the time he was the uh chief superintendent above the SDS. Was he involved in your recruitment at all?
02:36:02 Let me just touch on this. Um, I would like to think I was recruited because I had wide experience
02:36:13 had wide experience in very sensitive areas of of SP as a manager, very sensitive areas of man of of SP.
02:36:24 And I would like to think that my my career and what had been seen about my career had had given
02:36:35 my career had had given senior officers the the opportunity of deciding that I would would fit what they wanted as an SDS manager. That's the first thing.
02:36:46 the first thing. As regards to it to being Mr. Potter. I do not recall him being involved in in the recruitment. I I don't recall it.
02:36:58 the recruitment. I I don't recall it. But I will say here quite openly, [clears throat] Bob. Bob Bob Potter was a very good and close family friend of mine,
02:37:09 mine, but I still do not think that has anything whatsoever to do with my recruitment onto SDS. Would he have helped advise you as to whether to take
02:37:20 helped advise you as to whether to take the position or given you some advice about the SDS and what it involved, given you information about it? Would you have discussed the position with him and what the SDS was all about?
02:37:31 with him and what the SDS was all about? I don't recall doing that. Um, when you say senior officers would have
02:37:38 have uh been involved in your recruitment, are we talking about commander ops uh Mr. Buchanan or DAC for security John Howley would he have been again I can't answer that question in
02:37:50 again I can't answer that question in terms when I said officers would have been responsible for recruiting there was something you sickly called horse training which I know that the uh inquires heard about but in fact it was
02:38:03 inquires heard about but in fact it was at a time when at any time within the the branch when when an officer was to be moved to another unit. There would have been
02:38:14 another unit. There would have been senior officers from the squads, I imagine, together with the uh the various commanders because I believe there was more than one and indeed Mr. Holy possibly would have had some say.
02:38:29 Holy possibly would have had some say. Uh we've heard evidence from HN88 that there were two ways to succeed in special branch and that was through rugby or freemasonry. Do you accept that?
02:38:41 Do you accept that? Who is this fellow? HN88. Um,
02:38:50 maybe on your cipher list.
02:39:01 Well, that right. But I'm going to say that's not who I I've seen a statement by somebody else who made that who has said that.
02:39:13 who made that who has said that. Okay.
02:39:13 Okay. And that was not as far as I know it was not 88. It was somebody else but I don't know if you want me to say who I think it was.
02:39:24 want me to say who I think it was. It's really just the sentiment and whether you agree with that. Is that something? Most certainly do not. Um,
02:39:33 no. I don't agree with that. Were you a rugby player and had connections through rugby? I I was a rugby player. But did that not have any uh influence
02:39:45 But did that not have any uh influence over your recruitment to the SDS? To SDS? I would say absolutely none. No. It might have helped in the branch, but not not in not in SDS. How well did you
02:39:59 not not in not in SDS. How well did you know DCI HN86 before you took over? He was the DCI before.
02:40:05 before. Oh, sorry. Yep. Our paths had crossed. We
02:40:13 I knew of him. Um and Bob Lambert again our paths would have crossed and I knew of him. But you
02:40:22 But you I don't remember working with him. I don't quite remember working with 86 although forgive me I might have done uh you you became quite close with Bob
02:40:33 uh you you became quite close with Bob Lambert though once you joined the SDS he was already the DI there when you joined as uh DCI is that right
02:40:42 right I would like to think that I did come close to to Bob as I hope I came close to all my colleagues within the now I know they don't refer to themselves as managers but the officers
02:40:55 managers but the officers We I'll refer to them as a back office for the moment. Um or the office. I I hope that I came very close with all of them uh
02:41:08 them uh in a in a professional way. At paragraph 27 of your witness statement, you say that you brought management skills to the SDS and Bob Lambert was respected by the UCO, so
02:41:19 Lambert was respected by the UCO, so having him as my deputy was advantageous. How did you divide labor between you and Bob Lambert? Was there such a division?
02:41:31 Was there such a division? Well, firstly, I was
02:41:36 the word would be, but I I was it isn't the word gifted, but I was lucky enough to have officers of huge experience
02:41:49 to have officers of huge experience within the back office. That's the first thing I'd like to say. I held them in high regard. I knew of them and having worked with them I knew I knew the type of people they were. So they were an
02:42:01 of people they were. So they were an excellent
02:42:02 excellent group of I think DCI DI and two DS's at the time. You've mentioned John Webb an amazing man really very intellectual
02:42:13 amazing man really very intellectual very clever very experienced and somebody I held in high regard. Can I mention the other one? Yes, I think so. Yeah.
02:42:28 Uh, yes, you can. Okay. Bob Bob Mintosh been hugely respected. I'd worked with him in the Irish research unit as well.
02:42:39 Irish research unit as well. Enormous amount of time for him as well. Um, and Bob Lambert, my goodness, his experience as an SDS officer was invaluable to me.
02:42:50 officer was invaluable to me. He was somebody that I could turn to for in relation to how operations should should be conducted, how officers should be supported. I had a I really did feel
02:43:04 be supported. I had a I really did feel that Bob was very good. Now you asked me about the division of labor. I will just put it this way. I was the boss if of this war team, but I had a great team
02:43:16 this war team, but I had a great team around me. And eventually we we came to the decisions together but I would have as a DCI and therefore would have made the uh the additional
02:43:28 the uh the additional uh you know the final decision. When you say Bob's experience was of great uh advantage to you,
02:43:40 great uh advantage to you, in your witness statement, you say that you didn't actually know much about his experience at all as a UCO in the SDS. You didn't know about the groups he infiltrated. You didn't know about his
02:43:52 infiltrated. You didn't know about his relationships with people. You didn't [clears throat] know that he had fathered a child. if you didn't know about the ins and outs of his deployment, how was that supposed to be
02:44:03 deployment, how was that supposed to be of use to you? But I knew I knew that Bob had been an undercover officer. I knew that um I was told that he'd been extremely successful. He was held in high regard
02:44:16 successful. He was held in high regard because of the work that he'd conducted on SDS. I felt that was somebody I could turn to. That's how I was putting it to you.
02:44:25 you. Is it right that although he's held in high regard and people uh respected him for what he had done as a UCO, he actually didn't provide much
02:44:38 a UCO, he actually didn't provide much information about his experiences and didn't
02:44:43 didn't uh use his own experiences in terms of training up others. He wasn't open about his activities in in his undercover deployment. Is that
02:44:54 in his undercover deployment. Is that right to say? That's not how I That's not how I recall this relationship and how I recall him working. I I've always
02:45:05 recall him working. I I've always assumed
02:45:06 assumed that Bob gave of his experience when talking to to newer people joining the unit. And I think in in relation to the
02:45:18 unit. And I think in in relation to the weekly meetings, Bob Bob would have been able to to provide some support or understanding to each of the officers that he spoke to if not necessarily my
02:45:29 that he spoke to if not necessarily my presence.
02:45:33 Is it your evidence though that he didn't disclose the fact that he was in a sexual relationship with Helen Dy? Sorry, in a sexual relationship with Jackie.
02:45:45 Jackie. The first I ever heard that Bob had been involved in any form of activity like that was probably long after I left the
02:45:56 that was probably long after I left the police service. And something I,
02:46:01 this is dragging it into my mind, but something that either appeared on television or in the media because I think he was photographed um leaving a a meeting where he'd been
02:46:15 um leaving a a meeting where he'd been confronted by some activists and accused of wrongdoing. And I think they followed him down the street. That's the very first I ever heard of that.
02:46:26 first I ever heard of that. Um you say that Bob brought the operational experience and understanding to the office and you brought management skills, people management.
02:46:37 skills, people management. Was was Bob Lambert very much more involved with the UCOs and he managed them and you were more of a an administrator manager in the background.
02:46:51 That's not how I thought this was working, but I thinking about it now, it could well be that he had the more of the
02:47:03 well be that he had the more of the hands-on operational day-to-day activity. I I I think you are aware of this. Bob and I shared an office. So, we would be we would discuss
02:47:16 office. So, we would be we would discuss any issues that arose that arose. We we talked I've mentioned it before. We we talked on a daily basis about officers and how they were progressing, what
02:47:28 and how they were progressing, what support they needed. Do you did you get the sense that he set the tone with the undercover officers? Did he did his influence have much more
02:47:40 Did he did his influence have much more of an impact in that and consequently his role was that unduly inflated because of his previous role as the UCO?
02:47:51 because of his previous role as the UCO? That's not how I saw it at the time. I will say that I've heard a number of officers and I think I've seen some writing that people held him such high regard. So it could
02:48:03 held him such high regard. So it could well be that subconsciously that that was happening. But that's not how I I was working what I was working to.
02:48:13 Um, did you feel that you weren't really in a position to discipline UCOs because you hadn't got that previous UCO experience yourself?
02:48:26 experience yourself? No, that that certainly is not the case. If if somebody had needed disciplining, I would have I would have taken up responsibility as I as I did in other aspects of of my
02:48:40 as I as I did in other aspects of of my police career in my own way of doing things.
02:48:45 things. [snorts] In terms of who was actually managing the officers, we've heard DS uh Web say that he didn't really consider himself as being a manager, but he was
02:48:56 himself as being a manager, but he was more of an intelligence processor. Who was it that really had to manage and oversee
02:49:05 oversee the officers during the course of their deployment?
02:49:11 I'm I'm going to go back to what I said. Certainly the DCI and the DI were the the top two in terms of what you're
02:49:22 the top two in terms of what you're referring to, but I always thought of and you're right, John, and John is right. His his role was predominantly as the intelligence manager, but having it was a it was a a team
02:49:35 but having it was a it was a a team effort. That's how I viewed it. A team effort with everybody bringing something something different perhaps to the table for discussion. So yes,
02:49:47 for discussion. So yes, there may have been somebody with a bit more of a
02:49:51 more of a a responsibility for one area or or in another. But I I could I just get this I go back to how I felt at the
02:50:03 this I go back to how I felt at the time. And this was a team effort with regard to managing and I say managing the the staff who were the undercover officers. We we didn't see them day in
02:50:14 officers. We we didn't see them day in and day out. We didn't see them operating. We didn't visit I've even been asked by somebody at some stage, did you go and inspect the officer's premises to know that they existed? I
02:50:27 premises to know that they existed? I mean [snorts] some some of those I those ideas are ludicrous. We're talking about officers who were trusted, who had built their legends,
02:50:38 trusted, who had built their legends, who had gone out and were then operating in the fields that they had been op asked to infiltrate.
02:50:49 op asked to infiltrate. When you say it's ludicrous to have a sense of, you know, where they're operating, the location, the premises they're living in, was what what was your sense of your duty to ensure that
02:51:02 your sense of your duty to ensure that your officers were turning up turning up for work as required and carrying out the job in the manner that they ought to. What level of oversight was there?
02:51:14 to. What level of oversight was there? When when I referred to somebody because it was at some stage throughout this long long process, somebody has said to me, "Oh, um, shouldn't shouldn't you
02:51:26 me, "Oh, um, shouldn't shouldn't you have gone shouldn't managers have gone just to check on the premises?" As police officers years ago, if we wanted to go and live somewhere, a senior officer or a sergeant or somebody would
02:51:39 officer or a sergeant or somebody would have gone to the actual address, checked it over to see that it was suitable for a police officer to live in. And I think that's what somebody was actually saying to me. Did you go and check the premises? I thought, well, I could I
02:51:52 premises? I thought, well, I could I could go and look and see if it was a squat or something like a squat or a a studio flat. I that's what I was referring to him in relation to checking
02:52:03 referring to him in relation to checking on premises. We knew everywhere that they lived. We we thought we did. We we would have had I
02:52:16 records of where they lived. We we would have have we we might even at some stage have gone around the area to understand what the area was they were living in.
02:52:28 what the area was they were living in. We might even have driven past where they were living. We might have done. I don't recall doing that. Do you see what I'm trying to say? We we
02:52:39 Do you see what I'm trying to say? We we had a full understanding of what each officer was doing or trying to do. But we we weren't there like we weren't there as uniformed officers saying, "Oh, knock on the door. Oh, does
02:52:51 saying, "Oh, knock on the door. Oh, does so and so live here?" We're just checking up on him. No, of course not. There would have been different ways to check, wouldn't there, to monitor the UCOs in the field? And
02:53:02 to monitor the UCOs in the field? And would one of those options have been to look at the police national computer, for instance, to see who was living in a premises if they were going to move in there as their cover accommodation? I think that would I think that was
02:53:13 I think that would I think that was done.
02:53:14 done. That was done. I my understanding is on building the legend and we go back to what we talked about before on building the legend that that the legend was built by them largely because they had
02:53:27 built by them largely because they had to live it but there were other people supporting them who perhaps would have done exactly what you're saying. They would have perhaps done cla checks being the local recorders of of incidents. So,
02:53:39 the local recorders of of incidents. So, we would have known that street A was liable to be um broken into too often or or street street B was an area that um
02:53:52 or street street B was an area that um suffered from criminal damage. Yes, we would have done things like that and you would know who was living above or below. For instance, if somebody was going to take a first floor flat,
02:54:04 going to take a first floor flat, [clears throat] would you have done checks on that? I think do you know I don't recall that being done I but I can't imagine why it would not have been done if we if it
02:54:16 would not have been done if we if it were possible. Yeah.
02:54:17 Yeah. Um and in terms of that being done when a an officer first deploys would that have been done during the course of their deployment over the next few years if there was a change in their
02:54:29 few years if there was a change in their circumstances?
02:54:33 You don't what I what I'm suggesting is would that that wouldn't have just been done once when they did their legend and then off they go for the next four or five years or so
02:54:44 five years or so and no further monitoring or checks being done on them. I would like to think that we did support them in that way if they moved somewhere. I I cannot tell you that I picked up the
02:54:56 I I cannot tell you that I picked up the phone and did that type of inquiry, but I I would like to think that we did give that support in that respect. You say you wouldn't have done that inquiry. Who would have done that inquiry? One of one of the one of the officers
02:55:10 One of one of the one of the officers like like John perhaps or Bob or the new officer in the back office or indeed after a while I believe we had some civilian colleagues who would have been asked to do some checks.
02:55:23 asked to do some checks. I think what I'm trying to offer you is that we would have we would have done our utmost to ensure that where they were wanting to live
02:55:34 were wanting to live would have not caused them any operational difficulties and and part of that you would have known who was living there if they were to be living with anybody else.
02:55:45 to be living with anybody else. One would hope so. Yes.
02:55:52 Um, in terms of training for you as a manager, did you receive a handover from HN86?
02:55:58 HN86? I did.
02:55:59 I did. Um, did he tell you about the trade craft manual? Yeah. Yes. Yes. And was that something that you read? Yes. I think we've referred to it as
02:56:11 Yes. I think we've referred to it as well. It's a I think what sticks in my mind is a provocator. Okay.
02:56:15 Okay. That's the one thing that really does stick in my mind. So that there was a a whole binder full of uh uh information that was available to officers that were coming in as new recruits to be able to
02:56:28 coming in as new recruits to be able to train themselves up effectively on what to expect and how to behave. Is that is that right? Is that fair? It was certainly I I can visualize this.
02:56:40 I I can visualize this. It wasn't very neat, but I can visualize this binder that officers were were offered what they should read and as part of their induction. And
02:56:55 I I I look I looked upon it as part of forgive me here not many people understand what I mean but general orders police officers there's a thick binder and uh it was we all had to study
02:57:08 binder and uh it was we all had to study it verbatim almost for our exams but one of the the things about general orders was that somebody said it's a book full of of
02:57:19 somebody said it's a book full of of mistakes that we've learned from and I think in some respects the trade craft manual was was a a build a buildup of
02:57:31 manual was was a a build a buildup of knowledge over the years of officers who had completed their tours of duty. So
02:57:39 So not everybody would have done that but that's how I've that's how I recall the trade craft manual. So a lessons learned sort of approach. Yes. A and did you find that useful for
02:57:52 Yes. A and did you find that useful for you when you first joined the SDS to to read and to gen up on the sorts of experiences that your officers would be confronted with in the field?
02:58:05 confronted with in the field? I'm going to say I I must have I must have found it useful, but do you know I I just don't remember it. I don't remember reading it. I must have done.
02:58:16 remember reading it. I must have done. There's no doubting that. [snorts]
02:58:19 [snorts] What was your view of the adequacy of that as a training material for your offices? Did you feel like you needed to supplement it with something more
02:58:32 supplement it with something more orderly and legally based?
02:58:35 based? No, I won't say that that was the case. That training training was I think you've mentioned it on the job osmosis. It was a matter of um
02:58:47 It was a matter of um the processes that we had in place to do with mentoring, speaking to former officers to learn from their experiences. That that was the for one
02:59:00 experiences. That that was the for one of a better term training. There was no there was no formal training, no classroom work that could be done or was
02:59:11 classroom work that could be done or was there. I I believe SO10 did have something similar. I I can't remember but I think that was the training that we looked at that um it was decided that wouldn't apply to so
02:59:23 wouldn't apply to so well SDS because it was very different deployment. Yeah. So there wasn't that formal structure in place in terms of training and I think in your witness statement you say you know the officers while
02:59:34 you say you know the officers while they're in the back office would get chance to speak to other officers field officers and once they've deployed they might come across a situation and they would ask other field officers they
02:59:45 would ask other field officers they might ask a manager and ultimately they will make up their own mind as to what to do about it. Is that a fair assessment? It it it is a relatively fair assessment. I
02:59:56 it it is a relatively fair assessment. I go back to what I said. There was the the mentor system that um 86 had introduced I believe. Um it may have been introduced before but there was a
03:00:07 been introduced before but there was a mentoring system. There was the I I refer to it once before not here but elsewhere as a the family of SDS. So there a group of officers who had that
03:00:18 there a group of officers who had that background who could talk to officers about their experiences. Um because I should imagine many experiences were were different. They might have they
03:00:30 were different. They might have they might have been joining the same organization but would you couldn't a different context different context would arise. Thank you for that. Um in some cases though there would be a
03:00:43 Um in some cases though there would be a correct answer wouldn't there? for instance, uh non-reporting of legally privileged uh uh uh material. There is a right and wrong answer to
03:00:54 There is a right and wrong answer to some of these scenarios, isn't there?
03:01:01 I can see that there is now. Was that not recognized? I forgive me. No, it is a long time ago and I don't I don't recall that
03:01:12 and I don't I don't recall that specifically.
03:01:17 You've mentioned a provocator. Don't be an aon provocator. That was something that there's there's a right and a wrong answer, isn't there? And and for your officers, they they were told about that. And that was as I said much earlier, that's the one
03:01:30 as I said much earlier, that's the one that one sentence, it's it's there and that document which Axo had seen. Um, in terms of the range of other boundaries that there should be on such
03:01:42 boundaries that there should be on such an invasive policing uh method. None of those other boundaries were put in place. None of those other boundaries were reinforced and emphasized to your
03:01:56 were reinforced and emphasized to your officers though. No, not in their intelligence gathering role. M
03:02:02 role. M the no sex in relation to uh uh uh targets and uh members of the public in their undercover identities. That wasn't
03:02:14 their undercover identities. That wasn't emphasized, was it? To the the officers. No, it wasn't. But forgive me here. You're right. I I it would be wrong of me to say that we ever said don't have
03:02:25 me to say that we ever said don't have sex. But we would never have endorsed it. I think that's the the difference. And I've heard people say I believe that they were told it was okay. That was
03:02:36 they were told it was okay. That was certainly I know of no officer that was told having sex was was permitted and certainly the people I worked with in the office as far as I including Bob
03:02:50 the office as far as I including Bob would ever have said it's okay to have sex. I think that's quite important
03:02:57 in terms of that explicit no to sex. There's lots of other ways in which it can be impliedly looked over blinded.
03:03:10 looked over blinded. Was that the actual practice? So that it was a don't ask don't tell policy that was in place. Let me say quite emphatically that is
03:03:21 Let me say quite emphatically that is not the case. No blind eye was turned by me had I learned that there would have somebody was having sex. I could So that requires the premise that somebody came to you and explicitly told
03:03:34 somebody came to you and explicitly told you that they were having sex undercover. Say [laughter] that again. Sorry. That's that's based on the premise, is it? That somebody would have to come to you and explicitly tell you that they were having sex in their undercover
03:03:46 were having sex in their undercover identity
03:03:47 identity to me. But I I go back to what I'd said in terms of in terms of the office and the daily contact. I would have hoped that had any of the
03:03:59 I would have hoped that had any of the officers
03:04:00 officers I say below me but any officers part of the team had started to believe that there was some sexual relationship. I I would like to think that I had been told
03:04:12 would like to think that I had been told and I can tell you now I never learned of a sexual of any sexual activity by any of my co undercover officer
03:04:23 any of my co undercover officer colleagues until after I'd left the police service and indeed it came out uh in some of the ways that it has.
03:04:34 in some of the ways that it has. Why? Why was that prohibition on sex not put in writing? Why was there no policy in relation to that? I can't answer that. And I'm I I
03:04:48 that? I can't answer that. And I'm I I will say in a way I'm sorry that perhaps that wasn't in writing. But I'm also going to say this as well. We can say to people you cannot do something.
03:05:01 people you cannot do something. But if they found themselves in a position even with the chemistry between two people, if they then found that that chemistry was too strong, that they wanted to get
03:05:12 was too strong, that they wanted to get a closer
03:05:14 a closer sexual relationship being told that they can't have it would not have stopped them. I No, but it would have made it very clear, wouldn't it, that that was wrong
03:05:25 clear, wouldn't it, that that was wrong behavior. It shouldn't happen and that they would be disciplined for that. I I I I do agree with that. And that wasn't in place, was it, at the time?
03:05:33 time? No, it wasn't. And that's a a a significant mission on the part of management. Would you agree with that? I do agree with that. Yes.
03:05:46 So, I can I I do agree utterly with what you're saying there, but I I I go back to what I'd said earlier today. We put our
03:05:58 I'd said earlier today. We put our officers in such strange positions that many had not many in the police service would not have encountered. It's you know we were asking an enormous amount of them to
03:06:11 asking an enormous amount of them to almost live double lives. And you're right in strict theory management terms yes make write a document and say you will not have sex and you
03:06:22 will not have sex and you [clears throat] can be disciplined if you do. We could we didn't and I but I'm just saying I don't know that that would have stopped everybody having had that close relationship.
03:06:34 close relationship. Recognizing that difficult situation that you put your officers in is all the more reason, isn't it, to have very clear guidance, very clear support
03:06:45 clear guidance, very clear support available to the officers to help them avoid these situations to ensure that they don't uh behave in that way.
03:06:59 There are two things there. Yes, we should always have been giving support, but I I I don't know what we could more we could say even now to an officer to
03:07:12 we could say even now to an officer to to stop them doing something like that. Um and once we once we'd found out if we had found out I think now and I
03:07:23 if we had found out I think now and I listen this is this is hindsight may I say this is now me thinking oh okay I've read this I understood this was happening now what would I have done
03:07:36 was happening now what would I have done if somebody had come to me and said oh I found myself having a sexual relationship with somebody and we'd had that discipline side of things. Yes, they would have had
03:07:47 side of things. Yes, they would have had to because of the discipline rule, they would have had to have been taken off the field, out of the field, but it would not have happened that day. We still had to make certain that although
03:08:00 still had to make certain that although they'd had that relationship that for two reasons. one importantly the relationship that he they entered into was it fleeting because some sometimes
03:08:13 was it fleeting because some sometimes there are these fleeting relationships was it more was it deeper that we would have we'd have had a responsibility then and I'm learning this now because of what we've we've discovered but I'm
03:08:27 what we've we've discovered but I'm thinking what could I have done so fleeting okay that's that's you've got to be moved If it's if it's developed into quite a strong relationship, we're not going to
03:08:39 strong relationship, we're not going to be able to move them straight away. It's like any of the exfiltration that we tried. People just did not turn up on one day and then leave SDS field. They
03:08:50 one day and then leave SDS field. They took some sometimes a number of months to leave and we'd have had to give that as well. So, you're right. We could have had that rule and yes, they would have been brought off, but they would still
03:09:02 been brought off, but they would still have had to been brought off carefully both for the relationship they' developed and for the sake of the the integrity of the unit.
03:09:14 integrity of the unit. Um, your responsibility to the officer and to the members of the public didn't arise once a sexual relationship had been entered into. Your your
03:09:25 been entered into. Your your responsibility arose before that officer was deployed, didn't it? You had a responsibility before sending that officer into into their groups to protect members of the
03:09:38 their groups to protect members of the public
03:09:40 public from any misconduct. And you've suggested, well, there's not much we could do. Doesn't that doesn't that indicate a lack of imagination in
03:09:52 that indicate a lack of imagination in terms of what could be done to prevent sexual relationships occurring
03:09:59 and to assist I'm thinking one of the most basic things could have been to build something into their legends to say they're not interested in a sexual relationship. Very very basic steps
03:10:10 relationship. Very very basic steps could have been taken, couldn't they? That was discussed in some cases that I do know. There were there were people were
03:10:18 were um I'm sure I could read something somewhere where somebody had been told um you know just say you're not interested in sex or you mentioned it
03:10:29 interested in sex or you mentioned it yourself I've had a bad experience of got a sexual disease or something. Yes, there are various there could be ways but
03:10:38 but and emphasizing to not only the officer but their families just how important it was that this was a risk to make them aware of it so that they could prepare
03:10:49 aware of it so that they could prepare themselves for it. Yeah, I can see what you're saying. Are you saying that that would I don't I don't believe that I ever in talking to any of my
03:11:01 talking to any of my colleagues wives I ever discussed extrammarital relationships. No,
03:11:09 No, you you didn't. But should that have been the case? Could that have happened as another form of protection against this behavior?
03:11:26 It could have been raised. That's all I can say. It could have been raised. Do you accept that there's a a number of different steps and measures that could have been put into place to prevent
03:11:37 have been put into place to prevent sexual relationships occurring undercover?
03:11:49 And you know, I'm trying to think of what you've been saying about sort of start at the grassroots and saying, "Yep, no,
03:11:59 "Yep, no, no, no, no sex undercover and all the way through." I mean, yes, in hindsight, I probably would have would have acted differently, but I still don't quite
03:12:10 differently, but I still don't quite know how I would have done it. I'm honest.
03:12:14 honest. of
03:12:17 of in your tenure. There were nine open officers that were aware of um eight of whom had sexual relationships or alleged sexual relationships undercover. We had
03:12:29 sexual relationships undercover. We had uh Andy Cole's alleged relationship with Jessica um alleged uh harassment of Claire Hildruff and others say that he was quite leerous.
03:12:42 was quite leerous. Trevor Morris, HN78, had a relationship with Women Recalling B and Jenny. HN1, known as Matt Raina, had an alleged
03:12:53 known as Matt Raina, had an alleged relationship with Liz Fuller. HN43, Peter Francis had uh he says various one night stands. Uh HN26,
03:13:04 Uh HN26, Christine uh uh Green had a relationship with Thomas Frampton. HN15 Mark Jenner had a relationship with a woman we're calling Allison for five years. Jim
03:13:17 calling Allison for five years. Jim Boiling HN14 uh had a relationship with Monica for about six months and went on to have relationships thereafter with uh Ruth for about 18 months and then Rosa um for
03:13:31 for about 18 months and then Rosa um for a significant period and had two children.
03:13:35 children. uh HM16 James Straven. He had a a friendship with Wendy uh during your tenure and went on to have relationships with Sarah and Ellie that continued for
03:13:47 with Sarah and Ellie that continued for a significant period post his uh deployment. H and 81 were not aware of him having a sexual relationship undercover, but that is a significant amount, would you
03:14:00 is a significant amount, would you agree, of sexual relationships undercover that you must have known about?
03:14:07 about? They I think some of those that you've recounted
03:14:12 recounted they might have been with me as their DCI
03:14:17 DCI but but I believe one or two their activities started after I left. But I'm going to go and say this quite emphatically. I was never given any
03:14:29 emphatically. I was never given any indication from anywhere that one of the officers was having a sexual uh uh relationship.
03:14:40 Um have you listened to or read the accounts of the women who have given their evidence to this inquiry?
03:14:51 their evidence to this inquiry? I I've listened to one or two and I might have read one at all. And have you listened to or read the accounts of your officers that have
03:15:03 accounts of your officers that have given evidence to this inquiry and about the sexual relationships that they've had that they were engaging in under your management? Are you aware of their evidence?
03:15:16 Are you aware of their evidence? Not all of them. I can't remember which ones.
03:15:20 ones. Um
03:15:30 the sense that officers deploying into uh their target groups would be inundated with uh sexual offers
03:15:44 would be inundated with uh sexual offers and trying to bat off sexual advances. is not something that has come across in the accounts that we've heard of from the women who have uh uh
03:15:57 the women who have uh uh uh been involved in relationships with these uh officers. That's not how these relationships have evolved. It has according to them and
03:16:09 evolved. It has according to them and according to the some of the officers it's either evolved mutually or in many respects it's been because of the officers pursuing sexual relationships
03:16:21 officers pursuing sexual relationships with them. The officers have been in some uh respects quite predatory in in their approaches to women.
03:16:32 approaches to women. Do you recognize that that was a a real risk of you putting officers out into groups often involving uh you know young activists.
03:16:46 Some of these women have been very vulnerable and very young. For instance, um Jessica was only 19 when she met Andy Cole. She thought he was 24. He was actually 32. and she'd just moved out of
03:16:58 actually 32. and she'd just moved out of home and had had moved to London and joined a a group of uh other animal rights supporters. These are sometimes vulnerable women,
03:17:10 These are sometimes vulnerable women, all of whom were very naive to the invasive practice of the SDS undercover operations. None
03:17:21 of the SDS undercover operations. None of them knew that they had to protect themselves from officers such as your officers that were being deployed into their their groups. Do you do you accept that that these are women who have been
03:17:34 that that these are women who have been uh subject to something that they never knew existed and could not protect themselves from? I I do take issue with the terminology
03:17:46 I I do take issue with the terminology of invasive activity by undercover officers. I don't recognize that. And on each account, I can only now
03:17:59 on each account, I can only now go back
03:18:01 go back in a hindsight, having read or seen some of it, and and [snorts] reiterate to you, I had no
03:18:11 no information, no knowledge whatsoever that officers were undertaking any activity with with in sexual activity with other
03:18:22 with other none.
03:18:25 I And I go back to how if if it was known then I wasn't told and I go back to how I thought our
03:18:37 and I go back to how I thought our system was working through the mentor system, through the office system, through the weekly meetings. No one ever in my
03:18:48 No one ever in my presence referred to having had sexual relationships. No one whatsoever. Given some of the evidence that we've heard about the officers taking steps
03:19:00 heard about the officers taking steps themselves to pursue a sexual relationship, had they been told that that was prohibited, is there a good chance that they would not have taken those steps, thereby
03:19:11 not have taken those steps, thereby preventing the relationships from happening? Forgive me. I can't answer that question in the positive. I just cannot. I could I could have told them they that they must not have sexual
03:19:23 they that they must not have sexual relations. I did not tell them. But even telling them I don't know that that we've had this discussion. I don't know that that would have stopped people had
03:19:34 that that would have stopped people had they really wanted to pursue or indeed had suddenly found being so close to somebody that their relationship evolved into a very caring one. For all I know,
03:19:45 into a very caring one. For all I know, you say that you don't recognize the word invasive in terms of the deployment. Have I I think you were s suggesting that every
03:19:56 I think you were s suggesting that every SDS officer was a was a sexual predator. That's what I think you were. That's how I interpreted what you've just said to me. No, some some of the officers from the evidence that we've
03:20:07 officers from the evidence that we've heard, some of your officers were quite predatory according to the the accounts that we've heard in in in their pursuit of sexual relationships with some of the women. Do you accept that?
03:20:21 women. Do you accept that? I knew nothing about it. If you were telling me that that's what happened from the perspective of of the the women concerned and the officers who have
03:20:32 concerned and the officers who have admitted it, then I accept what you're saying. But I that's not how they were put into how or why they were put in to any field.
03:20:44 why they were put in to any field. But the whole uh nature of undercover policing and infiltrating target groups, that's an invasive policing tactic, isn't it? In that respect, yes. And in terms of the relationships that
03:20:57 And in terms of the relationships that some of the officers had, it was way beyond
03:21:03 beyond any
03:21:04 any uh policing tactic that one could have imagined before hearing uh about the the events of this inquiry is is uh
03:21:16 events of this inquiry is is uh exploring. For instance, Allison, the woman we know as Allison, had an undercover officer sleeping in her bed for about four to five years.
03:21:27 for about four to five years. That's extremely invasive, isn't it? Absolutely. And forgive me, I have to reiterate to you. Yes, that's extremely invasive, but I knew nothing about it
03:21:43 in terms of protecting the women from this invasive uh tactic. They couldn't protect themselves because they didn't know anything about that
03:21:55 they didn't know anything about that policing uh those policing operations. But you had the responsibility, didn't you, to pro protect those members of the public from officers engaging in in
03:22:07 public from officers engaging in in sexual relationships. That's on the management of the SDS, isn't it? To take steps to protect the women from this sort of activity.
03:22:20 But that's presupposing that we knew that officers would engage in that activity. There was there was they were never never told not to have any sexual
03:22:31 never never told not to have any sexual relationships but they were but may I say but they were never ever encouraged that they should have sexual relationships. Now that that is absolutely
03:22:43 Now that that is absolutely we would never have said that to anybody. Whatever anybody else has said no one would have been permitted to have had a sexual relationship with anybody.
03:22:54 had a sexual relationship with anybody. Is it fair to say that it didn't require you to know the sex was happening in order to be able to put measures in place to prevent it from happening? In
03:23:05 place to prevent it from happening? In the same way that it didn't require you to know that uh an officer was acting as an aon provocator in order for there to be measures in place and a policy in place to prevent
03:23:17 place and a policy in place to prevent that from happening. Do you see what I'm saying? It does. It didn't require you to know that an officer was having sex before you did anything about it. Your duty was to put
03:23:29 anything about it. Your duty was to put in place measures to prevent it from happening, even if you thought it might never happen. There was there was something written about Azon Provocator.
03:23:40 about Azon Provocator. There was nothing written that I can recall about having sex while you were undercover. Even even that sort of sect that was just fleeting and definitely absolutely
03:23:53 just fleeting and definitely absolutely definitely not in any way to be used to gain
03:24:00 gain officially to be used to gain access to um colle to intelligence. What do you mean by officially? Well,
03:24:12 What do you mean by officially? Well, what I'm saying is nobody that I'm aware of would ever have said it's quite all right to have sex with somebody if you're going to get closer to them to get the intelligence that we
03:24:23 to them to get the intelligence that we want. That would never have happened. That's what I mean by official. But what what is missing and you've you've highlighted it and I've agreed is
03:24:34 you've highlighted it and I've agreed is that there there was a line that said hon provocator but there was no line to say not to have sex and I accept that
03:24:47 in terms of there being a line. Shouldn't there have been a whole part of the training on this very very serious uh part of a deployment? This is
03:24:58 serious uh part of a deployment? This is a big issue, isn't it? And one of the key issues that has really um uh seized the the uh the the the
03:25:09 um uh seized the the uh the the the undercover officers and has caused a lot of uh pain and heartache uh for a lot of people.
03:25:18 people. The ripple effect of this is is is huge, isn't it?
03:25:22 isn't it? It's not about having one line in a policy document. It's about having a whole policy on it, a whole training session on it, reiterating it, making a
03:25:33 session on it, reiterating it, making a massive part of the SDS management uh uh requirement to prevent these relationships and behavior from happening.
03:25:45 and behavior from happening. I can only say yes. Now, in hindsight, what I don't quite know how the training would have taken place, but there certainly would have been No, I I can see why you're saying there should have
03:25:57 see why you're saying there should have been something, not just a line as well. Of course, not a line.
03:26:04 Um Baron Condan in his witness statement, uh it's at paragraph 17 of his witness statement. I don't need to bring it up, but the quote is bad behavior is human
03:26:16 but the quote is bad behavior is human weakness plus opportunity. Uh because officers would have had opportunity, strong clear guidance on ethical matters was essential.
03:26:28 ethical matters was essential. Do you agree with that sentiment that Baron Condon has set out in his witness statement? Yes, I do.
03:26:40 Do you accept that the the young officers that you had under your direction
03:26:48 direction being put into uh groups to socialize, to make uh relationships with the people there?
03:26:57 there? um in situations that in social groups it often involved alcohol, sometimes drugs,
03:27:08 the thought that they could behave with immunity and impunity was irresistible, wasn't it, to to some of the young men that you were in charge
03:27:25 I I have to say I I don't I don't see it in the way that you're saying. I I I'd like to think that they after all they were they were police officers. They
03:27:36 were they were police officers. They were prof they were in a profession which which really should have integrity. So
03:27:44 So yes, these things have happened and shouldn't have happened, but I'm I'm I'm struggling here to see how best we could go about having
03:27:56 go about having had those training sessions as you as you put it.
03:28:04 um in terms let me let people tell me I shouldn't keep talking at times but I'm just going to say when you talk about um training um if what what you're thinking
03:28:18 training um if what what you're thinking I I'm trying to work out how we could have uh a formal training session but yes in hindsight I can now see that we should have had that we could have had
03:28:30 should have had that we could have had the opportunity to sit down with officers before they go out and go through a number of the scenarios they might have faced. Now, I think we did that largely, but I'm I'm accepting that
03:28:44 that largely, but I'm I'm accepting that we we did not touch on the the opportunity for sexual activity. I I'm I'm accepting that. was one of the scenarios that was used. A scenario
03:28:57 scenarios that was used. A scenario where an activist was taken taken home, driven home and um offered the officer to come in for a cup of coffee and things became a little bit close. Was is
03:29:10 things became a little bit close. Was is that one of the scenarios that you're talking about? I don't remember that that but I I I have subsequently as a result of this inquiry I've read something along those lines.
03:29:22 lines. That's all I can say on that. And so was it contemplated that that might be a scenario that an officer would face of the way I've read that then that's obviously something that somebody had
03:29:34 obviously something that somebody had given thought to and then in in their discussion and going back to what I've just said. I know I could I should stop talking sometimes. I I keep saying but
03:29:46 talking sometimes. I I keep saying but had we had that type of training then we could have had that that um u discussion with them introducing that area. I I I
03:29:57 with them introducing that area. I I I do accept that. But but you didn't contemplate it during no your management time. In terms of the tradecraftraft manual, this is at 0527597
03:30:12 at page 27.
03:30:29 Paragraph 5.6 Six is entitled sexual liaison. So there is something written. Okay,
03:30:36 Okay, this is in the tradecraft manual and we understand that this part was written by H&2 Andy Kohl's. So it does address the issue of romantic
03:30:47 So it does address the issue of romantic entanglements as set out here. And while it is not my place to moralize at the end of paragraph uh 56 5.6.1, 6.1. One should try to avoid the
03:30:59 6.1. One should try to avoid the opposite se opposite sex for as long as possible.
03:31:17 [snorts]
03:31:23 Um, it's recognized there that this subject is the cause of much soulsearching and concern. Were you aware that officers under your management were having conversations
03:31:34 management were having conversations about sex undercover? No.
03:31:39 No. That this did engage a lot of their uh uh concerns. Certainly not. Not not at the time. No.
03:31:51 Certainly not. Not not at the time. No. No. And I've learned all about this as a result of this inquiry.
03:32:01 It does say here that in the past emotional ties to the opposition have happened and caused all sorts of difficulties including divorce, deception, and disciplinary charges. Were you aware of those things that had
03:32:14 Were you aware of those things that had happened in the past? No.
03:32:18 No. No.
03:32:19 No. When you read this, I had had you read I'm just trying to think. Yeah. That would that would that have been something that you would have wanted to find out more about?
03:32:33 If I'd seen if and when I saw that then yes, I perhaps should have taken but more cognizant of it. And I I'm told
03:32:45 but more cognizant of it. And I I'm told that it was intro, if I'm right, this was Andy
03:32:49 was Andy Cole's
03:32:50 Cole's Cole's writing something and therefore that would offered to put into the accompany the trade craft.
03:33:01 into the accompany the trade craft. But when I was first shown it um some years ago perhaps now, I I believe it was the first time I'd actually seen it. And that's odd thing
03:33:13 actually seen it. And that's odd thing to say but that was my recollection at the time but so that's the first thing is other thing is yes they I I was unaware of
03:33:25 unaware of divorce deception and discipline but although I believe there was one officer way way back but I'm I'm I'm getting confused over
03:33:36 but I'm I'm I'm getting confused over this so I'm going to careful what how I interpret what you're I'm reading and what you're asking of me. Hi. Just just before we break for lunch, um
03:33:47 Just just before we break for lunch, um I just want to draw your attention to 5.6.3.
03:33:54 Can we have the whole paragraph up, please?
03:34:05 and over the page.
03:34:17 Do you see it's trying to say that you while you may try to avoid any sexual encounter, there may come a time when you your lack of interest may become suspicious. I do see that. Um, and it talks about introducing an
03:34:29 and it talks about introducing an appropriate male or female from your own relations. Uh, or ask the back office if they can help with an operative. Both options fraught with difficulty. You have to
03:34:41 fraught with difficulty. You have to make your own mind up about how to proceed. It's putting the burden on the UCO themselves, isn't it? It is.
03:34:50 It is. Um, if you have no other option but to become involved with a weary, you should try to have fleeting disastrous relationships with individuals who are not important to your source of information. And one cannot be involved
03:35:03 information. And one cannot be involved with a weary in a relationship for any period of time without risking serious consequences. It's talking about it's in the plural as well, isn't it? about having relationships, fleeting, disastrous relationships with
03:35:15 disastrous relationships with individuals. Um, that
03:35:20 that is something that suggests sex undercover is something that you can try and avoid, but it may come to the point where you have to have a few of these relationships.
03:35:32 relationships. Do you accept that that's what it's inferring? Well, if that if he's referring to sexual relationships, then I can see that.
03:35:41 that. I there are relation there are other relationships and you can fall out with people and perhaps calls I think this is under the head in sexual relation sexual relation uh liaison
03:35:59 and I I can I say I saw this when it was presented to me I don't I don't recall it but had I that that would have caused me some concern reading it in that way.
03:36:11 me some concern reading it in that way. Okay.
03:36:12 Okay. Um I could honestly say that. Okay. Thank you. So that may be a time to break for lunch. Yeah.
03:36:29 We'll resume at two.