Opening Statements - Systemic Failures and Accountability

Full transcript

00:00:48 Miss Heaven.

00:00:58 No. Miss Heaven, I can't hear you at the moment.

00:01:07 moment. There we are. Can you hear me now, sir? I can now. Yes. All is in order. Good. Excellent. Thank you. This is the opening statement made on behalf of the cooperating group of nonp police non-stakeful participants who have

00:01:19 non-stakeful participants who have expressed a view about tranch 3 phase 1 who I will refer to as the group. This supplements the statements that have been made directly on behalf of non-state individuals and groups by their instructed lawyers and the group's written opening statement. Over the last three days, this inquiry

00:01:32 Over the last three days, this inquiry has stood harrowing accounts detailing the impact that SDS undercover operations had and continues to have on non-state core participants, many of whom were simply seeking to exercise

00:01:45 whom were simply seeking to exercise their democratic rights. The inquiry has also heard more admissions from the Metropolitan Police Service, MPS, on behalf of the commissioner in respect of what is described as quote the serious

00:02:04 what is described as quote the serious wrongdoing by some undercover officers and serious mismanagement by SDS and Metropolitan Police special branch managers.

00:02:06 managers. It is of note and welcomed that unlike inranche 2, the MPS now accepts that as an organization it failed not in

00:02:18 an organization it failed not in hindsight but by the standards that should have prevailed at the time. The group also welcomes the acceptance from the MPS that their reliance on the policy to neither confirm nor deny NCND

00:02:32 policy to neither confirm nor deny NCND was wrong as it prioritized secrecy over openness and cander. However, it must not be forgotten that reliance on NCND has historically informed how the NPS

00:02:44 has historically informed how the NPS has approached this inquiry, including in NPS submissions in 2016 on the correct legal approach to the making of restriction orders by this inquiry.

00:02:57 restriction orders by this inquiry. The opening statement made by Mr. Imran Khan King's Council on behalf of the Blacklist support group core participants sets out in more detail how the MPS's reliance on NCND frustrated

00:03:08 the MPS's reliance on NCND frustrated their search for the truth in respect of blacklisting. This is just one example of the impact of NPS reliance on NCND. Despite the admissions that have been made, the group questions whether the

00:03:29 made, the group questions whether the MPS has in fact gone far enough in this inquiry. The opening statement for the MPS in Tanch 3 rightly accepts that quote reporting on family justice campaigns, including about the Lawrenes, was known to senior officers in the Metropolitan Police Special Branch and the MPS.

00:03:44 the MPS. However, it remains notably silent when it comes to identifying who at the

00:03:56 it comes to identifying who at the highest operational and political levels was demanding and directing and lawful SDS intelligence gathering. The group asks why there are no admissions and indeed no apology from the MPS for the direct involvement of their own former

00:04:11 direct involvement of their own former commissioners and deputy commissioners in what was an obviously unlawful and racially discriminatory system of policing. If the MPS want to demonstrate a full commitment to cander, transparency, and frankness in this inquiry, then they

00:04:24 frankness in this inquiry, then they must publicly explain the role played in STS targeting by those at the highest levels within the MPS. They must also directly address the concerns raised by some non-p police state participants

00:04:41 some non-p police state participants that SDS targeting arose in part because of political pressure being applied by the home office. Over the years, the senior leadership of the MPS have sought to deny any connection with and

00:04:54 to deny any connection with and knowledge of SDS targeting. In 2013, in his interview with Mark Ellison, S. Paul Condon claimed not to know about the STS, stating, quote, I do not remember any piece of paper or briefing

00:05:10 remember any piece of paper or briefing or any meeting where I thought, ah, that is the special demonstration squad. However, it is now clear from the material before the inquiry in triage 3 that it is simply unsustainable for Saul Condom to maintain a position of blind ignorance in respect of the SDS.

00:05:23 ignorance in respect of the SDS. The evidence plainly shows that Sepul Condon met with SDS undercover officers

00:05:35 Condon met with SDS undercover officers to briefly discuss their operations when he visited the SDS safe house to thank them following the welling demonstration. As also identified in council to the inquiry's opening statement on Monday, entries from the minute sheet accompanying the 1996 to 1997

00:05:50 accompanying the 1996 to 1997 SDS annual report show that support Condom and the then assistant commissioner of special operations, Sir David Vanesse, saw the report and lavished high praise on the SDS.

00:06:03 lavished high praise on the SDS. Of note, this is the same annual report that referred to the SDS's long-term operations, including inter leftwing groups and quote community-based pressure groups.

00:06:16 pressure groups. However, the evidence in TR 3 goes even further and suggests that the senior leadership of the NPS were also customers for SDS intelligence. As the inquiry also knows, HN81 cover name Dave David Hagen told Operation

00:06:31 name Dave David Hagen told Operation Hearn that he quote was informed at the height of the McFersonson inquiry that my reporting was going straight to Sir Paul Condon's desk each morning via DS

00:06:42 Paul Condon's desk each morning via DS Steve Beiels. DS Tidley passed on to me from DS Steve Beals. Congratulations from the commissioner for your excellent reporting.

00:06:53 reporting. We can see that HN81 Hagen's reporting was clearly of interest to senior MPS officers as his 1998 to 1999 annual performance review stated that quote uh stated that he quote collated and

00:07:06 stated that he quote collated and disseminated a series of reports which ensured that the commissioner and his

00:07:15 ensured that the commissioner and his closest colleagues were kept appraised of sensitive issues as they unfolded. This was further confirmed in a 2006 report which described HN81 Hagen's contribution to senior MPS officers as quote both timely and significant.

00:07:26 quote both timely and significant. There is other evidence to suggest that senior MPS leadership or authorized SDS

00:07:37 senior MPS leadership or authorized SDS targeting. HN72 held a senior managerial role as the detective inspector of the SDS from 2005 to 2007. He stated to operation Hearn that HN81

00:07:50 He stated to operation Hearn that HN81 David Hagen's task tasking to the Steven Lawrence inquiry would have come directly from the then deputy commissioner Sir John Stevens who gave quote the go-ahad. Sir John Stevens was also in place in 2003 when HN43 Peter

00:08:04 also in place in 2003 when HN43 Peter Francis made a witness statement in his civil claim against the MPS. The inquirers heard the powerful opening statements made on behalf of Dr. Neville Lawrence, Baroness Lawrence OB and

00:08:17 Lawrence, Baroness Lawrence OB and Michael Mansfield King's Council. They are in no doubt that the concern expressed at the highest levels of the MPS that Baroness Lawrence and her

00:08:29 MPS that Baroness Lawrence and her family were quote a problem demonstrates that the suggestion that the Lawrence family were the subject of collateral intrusion is simply untenable. The opening statement made on behalf of

00:08:41 The opening statement made on behalf of Dwayne Brooks OB explains how John Grief as deputy assistant commissioner of the MPS and head of the Steven Lawrence murder investigation covertly recorded meetings he had with the drain Dwayne Brooks's legal team. It is understood that Sir Paul Condon

00:08:53 It is understood that Sir Paul Condon has made a statement to the inquiry. It is also understood that the inquiry has obtained a copy of the statement provided by Sir John Stevens to Operation Hearn. However, it is unclear

00:09:08 Operation Hearn. However, it is unclear whether a further inquiry statement will be sought for from Sir John Stevens. What is clear is that both these important former commissioners must be called to give oral evidence to this inquiry to publicly account for their involvement in some of the most

00:09:21 involvement in some of the most egregious abuses that this inquiry will consider.

00:09:23 consider. So, you've also heard an opening statement from the home secretary. The group are pleased to hear that the home secretary considers that it is vital that this inquiry gets to the truth of

00:09:35 that this inquiry gets to the truth of what happened to ensure that lessons can be learned. The group however remain dispa dismayed that again in an opening statement to this inquiry. The home

00:09:51 statement to this inquiry. The home secretary remains largely silent on what the home office knows about the SDS and the role it played in the matters you are investigating. This is simply not a frank, transparent or candid response. It is not consistent with the legal duties in the public office accountability bill 2025.

00:10:07 office accountability bill 2025. The evidence in tranch 3 now indicates that the SDS may have succumbed to pressure from the home office in how it ran its operations. For example, there is some suggestion

00:10:21 For example, there is some suggestion from Commander Donald Buchanan that the Home Office is quote very slippery to deal with and quote wanted too many briefings. Commander Donald Buchanan himself um identified uh identified himself and commander Ben Gun as

00:10:42 himself and commander Ben Gun as officers who stood up to the home office and as a result were quote not popular. The evidence in charge 3 also suggests that the Metropolitan Police special branch decision to create secret back channels to provide intelligence to the Steven Lawrence review team was

00:11:00 Steven Lawrence review team was motivated by political pressure on the MPS from the home office and from the highest levels of government. In the course of these secret meetings, DI Richard Walton is recorded by DI Bob Lambert as having quote explained that there is great sensitivity around the Lawrence issue with both the home secretary and the prime minister

00:11:12 secretary and the prime minister extremely concerned that that the Metropolitan Police could end up with its credibility in the eyes of the London's black community completely undermined.

00:11:23 undermined. There is also a contemporaneous file note written by D. Lambert documenting that DI Walton explained how quote the home office was very sensitive about the wider implications of the Lawrence case

00:11:41 wider implications of the Lawrence case in particular the potential for rioting or disorder by sections of the black community in the wake of an irretrievable loss of confidence in the police. Allied to this was a concern

00:11:53 police. Allied to this was a concern about the damaging effects of sustained political pressure from the hard-left and anti- police elements. Di Lambert stated to Operation Hearn in 2013 that the Home Office knew about what the SDS were doing in respect of reporting around the Steven Lawrence

00:12:10 reporting around the Steven Lawrence campaign and the McFersonson inquiry. He stated in interview, quote, Richard Walton was one of us customers. I suppose he was a particular customer with a particular requirement

00:12:21 with a particular requirement because he was working directly for the commissioner in relation to the Metropolitan Police response to the Steven Lawrence inquiry. He later said

00:12:32 Steven Lawrence inquiry. He later said in that same interview that quote it was widely understood at the time you know across the home office on what we're doing you know SDS um and particular senior management you know regular discussion with the home office at the

00:12:43 discussion with the home office at the highest level on what this the threats were

00:12:49 were as the inquiry knows HM43 Peter Francis claims in his witness statement to the inquiry that quote the home office or at least certainly the home secretary was aware of the unit and allegedly the prime minister was aware.

00:13:01 prime minister was aware. The group has highlighted in previous opening statements the evidence to indicate that the SDS was known about at the highest political levels. There is now evidence in tranch 3

00:13:18 There is now evidence in tranch 3 indicating in a renewal of authorization that certain reporting produced by HN 104 Carlos Sarrai cover name Carlo was noted to have quote been invaluable to the security service and the cabinet office. Why was the cabinet office so

00:13:30 office. Why was the cabinet office so interested in SDS reporting? The group asks this question must be explored in this inquiry. Disclosure in charge 3 raises even more questions as to the extent to which the

00:13:42 questions as to the extent to which the SDS was known about at highest levels of government. HS uh HM43 Peter Francis has provided documentation created for the 1983 Metropolitan Police Special Branch

00:14:00 1983 Metropolitan Police Special Branch Centinary Ball which was attended by the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the then Home Secretary William Whiteaw. This documentation includes handwritten comments from former Prime

00:14:11 handwritten comments from former Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher with an attached briefing document on the Metropolitan Police uh special branch on which someone has written the words the SDS. The handwriting which says the SDS has been redacted by the inquiry which

00:14:24 been redacted by the inquiry which prevents comparison with the other handwriting in this document. The inquiry should ascertain who made this document and clarify who made the annotation, the SDS.

00:14:35 annotation, the SDS. Reflecting on the way in which the SDS was an affront to the rule of law and a rules-based democracy, Michael Mansfield King's Council makes the following observation in his written opening statement to the inquiry.

00:14:49 statement to the inquiry. Politicians must account through oral evidence in tranch 3 for the central role that they played in the sanctioning of the SDS and its activities. Oral evidence from those politicians

00:15:02 Oral evidence from those politicians involved is the only way for the inquiry to get to the heart of this attack on the rule of law. These politicians must be questioned on the political motivations for specific undercover reporting.

00:15:13 reporting. The fact this day the Home Office and NPS are unwilling to admit the political motivation for the SDS activities demonstrates that the affront to the rule of law is ongoing.

00:15:25 rule of law is ongoing. The Home Office has confirmed in its transoping statement that it has not been asked to provide a witness statement to this inquiry. Given the lack of candid engagement by

00:15:37 Given the lack of candid engagement by the home office in this inquiry, surely the time has now come for the home office and other relevant departments of state to provide corporate witness statements to this inquiry.

00:15:48 statements to this inquiry. The group supports and reiterates what has been said by Imran Khan King's Council in the written opening statement submitted to the inquiry, namely that without clarity on the chain of accountability, the inquiry risks

00:16:04 accountability, the inquiry risks leaving unexamined the systematic and institutional forces that enabled unlawful SDS surveillance. In tranch 3 phase one, the inquiry will hear oral evidence from 26 witnesses. however will not hear from HN26 cover

00:16:21 however will not hear from HN26 cover named Christine Green as she is outside of the jurisdiction and has refused to give evidence. The group presume that HN26 is seeking

00:16:32 The group presume that HN26 is seeking to avoid having to account in public for her egregious conduct. In this context, the group highlight the evidence given

00:16:45 the group highlight the evidence given by the non-state core participant Ellie. She was told by HN16 Thompson that many undercover officers were leaving the country until the inquiry had blown over.

00:16:52 over. The group are concerned that HN81 David Hagen is not attending the tranch 3 hearings given the central role he played in the events under scrutiny in this tranch.

00:17:04 this tranch. So you heard uh from Mr. men on King's Council yesterday about the critical questions that HN81 must answer in respect of the reporting and targeting of Dwayne Brooks Obbe. It is also deeply unsatisfactory that HN86 is now refusing

00:17:15 unsatisfactory that HN86 is now refusing to give oral evidence. HN86 was a former manager who was alleged to have directed the targeting of justice campaigns and who is the subject of serious

00:17:32 who is the subject of serious allegations of racism made by HM43 Peter Francis. As you have indicated, sir, HN86 is a critical witness with important evidence to give to the inquiry to assist you in making the findings that you need to make.

00:17:45 findings that you need to make. I'll now make some observations on the legal and regulatory regime and the evidence in tranch 3 and this is this is set out in fuller detail in the group's written opening. In tranch 3 significant changes were

00:17:56 In tranch 3 significant changes were introduced to the legal and regulatory regime governing the exercise of state power to ensure greater protection of fundamental rights and due process. This included the introduction of the human

00:18:11 included the introduction of the human rights act 1998 which came into force in October 2000 and the regulation of investigatory powers act 2000 ripper which came into force in September 2000. Both these pieces of legislation have

00:18:25 Both these pieces of legislation have direct relevance to the oversight and scope of undercover policing. This was also the era when the then MPS commissioner S. Paul Condom was

00:18:40 commissioner S. Paul Condom was trumpeting his quote crusade against police corruption in the MPS. In tranch 3, there was also parliamentary scr scrutiny of the woefully inadequate system for investigating police complaints and ensuring police accountability.

00:18:56 ensuring police accountability. However, these changes to regulatory, legal, and operational oversight did nothing to curb the SDS. Rather, in Tranch 3, intrusion and abuses continued

00:19:09 Tranch 3, intrusion and abuses continued with the SPS SDS being allowed to remain a secretive unit marred by a culture of exceptionalism and impunity, a unit that operated above the law. This included flagrantly disregarding the

00:19:20 included flagrantly disregarding the requirements to be met under RIPER and the authorization of targeting which

00:19:31 the authorization of targeting which clearly breached articles 3, 8, 10, and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights as incorporated into UK law by the human rights act. This is a theme which continues with the National Public Order Intelligence Unit NOIU.

00:19:40 NOIU. It is also significant that by tranch 3

00:19:52 It is also significant that by tranch 3 certain SDS tranch 2 undercover officers had received promotions into managerial roles and higher offices office within the MPS.

00:19:54 the MPS. This no doubt facilitated the continuation of aborant behavior and trade craft first masterminded by some of the most notorious undercover officers. Under the watch of these

00:20:12 officers. Under the watch of these managers, the SDS continued to engage in criminality and misconduct, as well as misleading the police and the courts. Institutional racism and misogyny also continued, as did deceitful sexual and close personal relationships.

00:20:26 close personal relationships. The closure of the SDS began in October 2007 and concluded in February 2008. This led to the preparation of the SDS

00:20:37 This led to the preparation of the SDS closing report in June 2009, authored by DSHN273.

00:20:42 DSHN273. This report contains a scathing review of the SDS from the date of its inception to its long overdue closure. The inquiry is bound to consider where the following closure process robust

00:20:53 the following closure process robust questions were asked about the ethics

00:21:08 I'm afraid technology has intervened and cut you off.

00:21:17 Sorry. I'm afraid that for reasons I don't begin to understand. You were cut off in the mid mid-sentence. Okay, I'll start again. The Can you hear me now?

00:21:24 me now? Yes, I can. The inquiry will know from the SDS closing report that there probably were some attempts to cover up SDS practices before the review took place because the

00:21:36 before the review took place because the closing report states, quote, there is a possibility that an element of weeding has been done and that the papers left at Tintageel House represent what was considered appropriate for retention or independent review. Conversely, the

00:21:51 independent review. Conversely, the written record of SDS activity and some of its consequences may have been completed in a manner that left little trace of matters detrimental to the squad.

00:22:01 squad. The inquiry will also need to consider the extent to which certain SDS tradecraftraft was knowingly exported around the country by NIU undercover officers. As the inquiry knows, the STS

00:22:15 officers. As the inquiry knows, the STS and NOIU overlap for several years, and MOIU trade craft often mirrored that used by the MPS. For example, Hen12 Mark Kennedy used the cover job of being a delivery driver, incorporated a

00:22:31 delivery driver, incorporated a traumatic backtory into his legend in order to exploit sympathy and build trust amongst target

00:22:42 by mirroring their personal interests. In tranch three, the inquiry can see that the SCS continued to develop new and aborant trade craft. This included, for example, customers from the wider

00:22:55 for example, customers from the wider special branch meeting STS operatives at STS manager and cover uh officer home addresses. Undercover officers continue to seek to gain an advantage in legal proceedings. They also engaged in

00:23:07 proceedings. They also engaged in international travel, including for purported intelligence gathering to add credibility to cover and withdrawal strategies for team bonding exercise.

00:23:19 strategies for team bonding exercise. says there was also an expansion of the use of deceitful sexual relationships. And you heard yesterday about HM15 Mark Jenner's long-term cohabitation with Allison at her home address and the devastating effect of his conduct.

00:23:34 devastating effect of his conduct. There was increasing usage of cover vehicles to include minibuses. undercover officers joined trade unions and whilst there was a cessation of the use of deceased children's identities

00:23:48 use of deceased children's identities there was the unauthorized use of the identity of Kevin Crossland by HN16 James Thompson STO SDS undercover officers even enrolled in college tranch 3 also sees the extensive use of code names by undercover officers

00:24:01 code names by undercover officers perhaps suggesting the extent to which they reveled in the secretive nature of their work whilst at the same time operating under an exaggerated perception of risk. A few examples

00:24:12 perception of risk. A few examples include HM 104 Carlos Sarrai who is referred to as Craggy Island, HN81 David

00:24:26 referred to as Craggy Island, HN81 David Hagen as Wim Milton Tilter, HM5 John Dyn as Hawks Bay, HN3 John Bishop as Red Herring and Quill Feather, HN14 Jim Boing as Psycho Dream, and HN15 Mark Jenner as Touchy Subject.

00:24:38 Jenner as Touchy Subject. I'm now going to turn to make some specific comments about HN16. HN16 James Thompson's activities provide for one of the most egregious examples

00:24:53 for one of the most egregious examples of an undercover officer left to his own devices over many years, exploiting the weak oversight systems of the SDS and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. HN16 Thompson was often referred to at

00:25:08 HN16 Thompson was often referred to at the time by his targets as James Blonde or posh SAB. He used his role as an undercover officer to manufacture reasons to travel around the world on trips authorized for intelligence gathering or operational purposes, which produced little to nothing by way of

00:25:19 produced little to nothing by way of intelligence. His deployment involved sexual relationships with at least two deceived women and other examples of serious misconduct, including criminality for which he was not

00:25:33 criminality for which he was not formally disciplined or prosecuted. Rather, he was protected by senior officers within the special branch. Even after these issues emerged, HN16 Thompson went on to enjoy a career

00:25:48 Thompson went on to enjoy a career elsewhere within the special branch. Later apparently holding a teaching position at Brunell University and taking on his current role, which he has opaquely referred to as quote security manager for Middle East and North Africa.

00:26:03 Africa. HN16 Thompson lacks credibility and has a proven record of lying to this inquiry. During the inquiry's anonymity process, HN16 Thompson was specifically asked about whether he had any relationships with four females, Sara,

00:26:19 relationships with four females, Sara, Ellie, Wendy, and Lucy. In his response, he denied inappropriate relationships with all four women, knowing that his denial would be submitted to the inquiry for the purposes of a closed hearing to consider his application for anonymity.

00:26:34 consider his application for anonymity. HN16 Thompson only provided the inquiry with an updated quote corrective statement months later in which he accepted that he had in fact had relationships with three of the women

00:26:45 relationships with three of the women about whom he'd been asked to comment. That is Sarah, Ellie, and Lucy. However, he only did this after having misled the

00:26:58 he only did this after having misled the inquiry and only when it became apparent that this lie would not stand up to scrutiny.

00:27:00 scrutiny. HN16 Thompson's own description is that in lying he quote fell back on his quote instinct, something which the inquiry must be alive to when assessing his credibility.

00:27:15 credibility. This conduct by HN16 Thompson follows a long and wellestablished pattern of deception by him during his deployment, including lying to his managers, making dishonest expenses claims, traveling abroad in his cover identity on trips

00:27:34 abroad in his cover identity on trips which were not authorized, and removing pages from his passports to avoid SDS management becoming aware of his activities. HN16 Thompson used the name of the deceased child Kevin Crossland as a second false identity and without authorization,

00:27:45 authorization, even registering this name on the electoral register, forging a false signature to apply for a driving license and attempting to obtain banking facilities.

00:27:58 facilities. The inquiry must therefore be alert to HM16 Thompson's propensity to lie and should not be led astray by his ability to appear quote articulate and rational

00:28:10 to appear quote articulate and rational as he was described at the time by Chief Superintendent HN146 Colin Black H16 Thompson's own manager DCI HN36 Mike Dell identified that he has quote an

00:28:24 Dell identified that he has quote an inclination to admit only that which he is with which he is confronted. Tranch 3 phase 1 contains clear examples of deployments that were unlawful,

00:28:39 of deployments that were unlawful, lacked contemporary justification, and should never have been authorized. In the SDS closing report, DSHN273 described the review of the annual authorizations for all SDS officers deployed in 1999 as quote rubber stamping.

00:28:52 as quote rubber stamping. HN16 Thompson was deployed between January 1997 and April 2002, a period of five years and four months in total. An analysis of the output of HN16

00:29:04 analysis of the output of HN16 Thompson's deployment shows that it remained obviously unjustifiable for an

00:29:16 remained obviously unjustifiable for an inexcusable length of time. This was due to the lack of scrutiny by management. However, in 2002, DCI HN36 Mike Dell concluded that in respect of the latter two years of HN16 Thompson's deployment, his operation had been quote, "a sham

00:29:30 his operation had been quote, "a sham founded on the false assumption that he had placed himself at the center of a group of the most extreme animal rights activists, and characterized by routinely dishonest and substantial expenses claim to support a lifestyle

00:29:44 expenses claim to support a lifestyle entirely divorced from the intelligence requirements made of him. There can be no possible basis for Commander HN85 Roger Pierce to have authorized and reauthorized HN16

00:29:57 authorized and reauthorized HN16 Thompson's deployment for the purposes of preventing disorder and crime by anarchists and animal rights activists. HN16 Jame Thompson's deployment highlights that the formalities brought

00:30:11 highlights that the formalities brought in by the SDS following the coming into force of RIP and the Human Rights Act were no more than paper exercises that did not lead to any adequate or meaningful review of the legal and

00:30:23 meaningful review of the legal and regulatory justification for undercover deployments. This is most readily demonstrated by the fact that the

00:30:34 demonstrated by the fact that the grounds for deployment for HN16 Thompson and HN16 Dave Evans were identically worded.

00:30:38 worded. The non-stake participant Wendy having reviewed HN16 Thompson's reporting expresses her view as follows. quote, "I

00:30:50 expresses her view as follows. quote, "I feel utterly disgusted that our money as taxpayers was used for what crumbs across to me from the tone of the disclosure as a boy club to report on who was sleeping with who and for making jokes about people's relationships. I think it shows that there is a systemic

00:31:05 think it shows that there is a systemic problem within the MPS that this kind of travesty of justice was allowed to continue for decades and continue to be funded and lorded and as an example of effective undercover work. It was

00:31:19 effective undercover work. It was effectively arrogant spittle little boys playing James Bond. The fact that SDS targeting was clearly devoid of a genuine basis for authorization was not exclusively down

00:31:33 authorization was not exclusively down to inadequate and weak management. HN81 David Hagen reported extensively on justice campaigns. He told Operation Hearn that he discussed all elements of

00:31:44 Hearn that he discussed all elements of his deployment with his handlers and was given direction on where to focus. This undermines any suggestion that such reporting was merely collateral intrusion. DI HN72

00:31:56 DI HN72 stated to operation hear that discussion around that tasking would have been done separately to the normal SDS meetings and was protected by quote Chinese walls.

00:32:07 walls. The inquiry must consider whether the secrecy around targeting and deployments arose from managerial knowledge that what was being asked of undercover officers was not lawful and did not

00:32:21 officers was not lawful and did not comply with RIPER or the Human Rights Act.

00:32:23 Act. Operation Lime was a significant covert operation instigated by HN16 Thompson in respect of an alleged attempt by activists to procure a firearm and

00:32:34 activists to procure a firearm and explosive powder from an individual in France. The operation was allowed to go ahead with HN16 Thompson making multiple trips to France for various purposes.

00:32:48 trips to France for various purposes. However, contemporaneous documents show managers had concerns both during and after the operation that HN16 Thompson had fabricated the grounds for the

00:32:59 had fabricated the grounds for the operation to prevent and delay his withdrawal from the field. Operation Lime is a damning example of how easy it was for the SDS to carry out operations without lawful justification

00:33:12 operations without lawful justification and at the whim of an undercover officer seeking to protect his position at all costs. The fact that such an operation was authorized demonstrates the unsuitability of the formal

00:33:26 unsuitability of the formal authorization process in the SDS and the extent to which senior managers failed to assess the veracity of the information being provided to them. Whilst I've highlighted HN16 Thompson as a key example of an undercover officer

00:33:42 a key example of an undercover officer who was unlawfully deployed, he is not the only example. The involvement of HN26 Christine Again,

00:33:58 I'm afraid you've been cut off in bed sentence for reasons I don't begin to understand.

00:34:40 Sorry, sir.

00:34:46 Right.

00:35:11 Okay.

00:37:41 Good afternoon again. I understand the internet in the court building from which you are speaking went down as it has now again done. Yeah. Sorry about that. I'll I'll carry on where I understand uh I left off.

00:37:55 on where I understand uh I left off. You left off at just beginning HN26. Thank you very much. The involvement of HN26 Christine Green in an operation releasing 6,000 link from Crow Hill Farm in Ringwood,

00:38:08 from Crow Hill Farm in Ringwood, Hampshire was clearly unlawful. This was a

00:38:16 assistant commissioner Helen B accepting that quote the decision making surrounded this incident would simply not happen is in today's Metropolitan Police Service.

00:38:28 Police Service. On Monday, the MPS accepted that this was an egregious example of HN26 participating in crime, demonstrating a complete failure to seek proper

00:38:39 complete failure to seek proper authorization or to properly plan and manage HN26, including a serious misjudgment not to inform Hampshire constabularary. I now turn to reporting on political and

00:38:55 I now turn to reporting on political and social justice campaigns, family justice campaigns, community organizations, and group campaigning for police accountability. The group endorses the powerful opening statements made on behalf of category

00:39:09 statements made on behalf of category G&J core participants and all those other non police state participants impacted by this unlawful and discriminatory targeting. By tranch 3, the direct targeting and reporting on justice campaigns was such an accepted practice within the SDS and wider MPS that it was specifically

00:39:22 wider MPS that it was specifically highlighted in the 1995 to 1996 SDS annual report. This annual report stated that involvement in the Brian Douglas campaign quote at an organizational

00:39:35 campaign quote at an organizational level inevitably produces high-grade intelligence of the aims and tactics of generally volatile and outraged groups. The 1994-5

00:39:47 The 1994-5 annual report openly noted that quote anti police and anti-criminal justice act campaigns end of quotes were key

00:39:58 act campaigns end of quotes were key aspects of HM15 Mark Jenner's firstear targeting strategy. The in

00:40:13 HN73 was a special branch officer who liazed with the SDS in Tanch 3. He told Operation Hearn that upon his return to Sea Squad in 1995, one of his quote

00:40:30 in light of the admissions made by the MPS and Tranch 3. Forgive me for interrupting you, but I'm afraid you're being intermittently cut off now and I didn't catch the last two sentences. Can you hear me now?

00:40:43 Can you hear me now? I can hear you now. Yes, but I'm afraid something is going wrong with the internet. You've been cut off again. Inquiry should treat with great skepticism. Am I still here, sir? Yeah,

00:40:57 Am I still here, sir? Yeah, you're still you're still there. You come and go intermittently. I have the faintest idea why uh the these contraptions are made to baffle us, but um uh let's I'll keep going until you indicate I'll I'll keep an eye on you until you indicate otherwise.

00:41:08 indicate otherwise. Yes.

00:41:11 Yes. Um okay. In light of the admissions made by the MPS, the inquiry should treat with great skepticism any attempts by undercover officers and their managers to justify SDS infiltration into and reporting on justice campaigns and

00:41:25 reporting on justice campaigns and community groups. Similarly, the inquiry should not accept that HN15 Mark Jenner's reporting on community- based

00:41:40 Jenner's reporting on community- based groups was for public order reasons. HM5 Jenner's entire deployment was curated from the start to allow him to spec specifically place himself as an anti-establishment figure to immerse himself in quote community activism.

00:41:53 himself in quote community activism. HM15 Jenner now attempts in his witness statement to distance himself from the description of his deployment in the 1995 1996 SDS annual report as allowing him quote unique access to a range of anti- police campaigns.

00:42:08 anti- police campaigns. This lacks credibility. The description of Jenner's deployment was not inaccurate phrasing from management, but rather a clear signal that such campaigns were specifically being targeted.

00:42:18 targeted. I'll now make some comments on uh the existential threats to the SDS, and this is set out in much more detail in our written opening statement. The prevalence of unlawful SDS

00:42:37 The prevalence of unlawful SDS deployments and operations occurred in a context of a unit desperately concerned about its own survival. In the 1990s, the notable reduction of security service interest in SDS reporting of subversion was compounded by a decrease in public order issues within the

00:42:50 in public order issues within the Metropolitan Police District. This meant that the SDS was forced to justify its relevance. As a result, the unit pushed itself further into political policing and allowed its focus and objectives to

00:43:09 and allowed its focus and objectives to be dictated by its customers. Structural developments within the NPS also led to competition between the SDS and other policing units. By 1997, SDS management could clearly not justify deployments into the so-called hard left, calling it quote an uncomfortable

00:43:20 left, calling it quote an uncomfortable position of having to quote wait and see what happens before a long-term strategy can be mapped out. In the 1995 to 1996 SDS annual report,

00:43:33 In the 1995 to 1996 SDS annual report, SDS management boasted about the unit's success, quote, in bringing offenders to arrest and conviction, but stated that this quote requires

00:43:46 but stated that this quote requires prudent management if SDS are to avoid appearing at court. This same SDS annual report referred to the development of what that strategy as being essential.

00:43:58 being essential. The inquiry must investigate what this strategy entail.

00:44:07 I'm afraid you've been cut off again.

00:47:07 Mr. Gina, I understand you're taking over.

00:47:11 over. That's correct. Apologies for Miss Heaven, whose link has cut out in court. Yes. Thank you for stepping in. So, just picking up on the last sentence. The inquiry,

00:47:24 the inquiry must investigate.

00:47:32 what this strategy entailed and how the SDS sought to avoid the state's disclosure obligations. The changing political and intelligence landscape also appears to have also led to an eagerness within the SDS to

00:47:46 to an eagerness within the SDS to promote its intelligence and to focus on customer requirements. This customerization appeared in individual UCO annual performance reviews.

00:47:58 reviews. This included positive comments about Dave Hagen's interpretation of intelligence benefiting a quote wide circle of customers and C squad personnel quote who ensure its

00:48:09 personnel quote who ensure its marketability to a much wider audience. The inquiry must obtain concrete answers as to who formed part of this wider circle of customers, particularly in

00:48:20 circle of customers, particularly in respect of H&81 Hagen's reporting on family justice and police accountability campaigns.

00:48:33 campaigns. The SDS closing report commented that there was quote little evidence of regular or systematic internal or external independent third-party review of the SDS operation. Whether or not there was intrusive

00:48:45 Whether or not there was intrusive supervision, appropriate management or the effective leadership, however, deficits were clearly by design as the SDS sought to insulate itself from external review.

00:48:56 external review. The monitoring of expenditure would have been a key mechanism for SDSMPS officers to supervise this and the general activities of the SDS. However, in

00:49:07 activities of the SDS. However, in tranch 3, meaningful oversight into expenditure was obstructed by the fact that the SDS budget breakdown became

00:49:19 that the SDS budget breakdown became less transparent in the 96 to 1997 SDS annual report. Few questions were asked by senior MPS officers about undercover officer expenses, overtime, and other perks.

00:49:35 expenses, overtime, and other perks. Despite an inescapable overall picture of SDS extravagance, extravagance and opulence,

00:49:38 opulence, whilst the 199697 SDS annual report made broad assurances of more effective use of resources,

00:49:49 of more effective use of resources, trance 3 saw saw a number of social and international trips taken by the SDS. This included two trips to Amsterdam and a team bonding exercise, team bonding trip to Las Vegas. The SDS also held

00:50:02 trip to Las Vegas. The SDS also held Christmas parties at hotels outside of London, a paintball excursion in Birmingham and day trips to Hastings and the Cotswwells. UCOs also used their SDS vehicles not

00:50:14 UCOs also used their SDS vehicles not only for transporting activists but for recreational trips. This was because there was no adequate basis to oversee extensive expense claims. Overtime continued to be a significant expense as part of the SDS in T3.

00:50:30 expense as part of the SDS in T3. DI Bob Lambert and DCI Keith Edmonson sought to protect Peter Francis from being unnecessarily burdened by various permutations of an administrative nature when making overtime claims. HN16 James

00:50:44 when making overtime claims. HN16 James Thompson's evidence is that overtime was paid on the basis of an entitled entitlement to a capped amount. So it was irrelevant therefore what you were actually doing at the time. He accepts that some of this time he was with Sara and Ellie in an intimate setting which

00:51:01 and Ellie in an intimate setting which may technically have been the subject of an overtime payment. It therefore comes as no surprise that in 2007 around the time in which decisions were being taken to close the SDS, the unit was also

00:51:12 to close the SDS, the unit was also subject to review by the covert finance unit. This review highlighted 23 areas of concern regarding the SDS's financial affairs and noted that the SDS had a cash deficit in excess of £9,000.

00:51:29 cash deficit in excess of £9,000. In 1993, Sir Brian Hayes visited the SDS when he was at the HMIC. However, this was not part of a formal inspection of the SDS for the MPSB, but rather following a request from his

00:51:41 rather following a request from his personal friend, the then commissioner Peter Imbert to visit the SDS as a morale boosting exercise for undercover officers. This lasted a couple of hours, and so Brian states that he when he

00:51:55 and so Brian states that he when he conveyed his positive impression of the unit to Commissioner Inbbert, this was yet another missed opportunity to properly investigate the SDS. The fact that this visit was effectively to quote to congratulate the troops did not prevent the SDS management from using

00:52:14 prevent the SDS management from using this as a capital in their 1993 and 1994 annual report. On the 8th of January 1999,

00:52:16 1999, Superintendent Fineore visited the SDS as part of an HMIC inspection to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the unit. Superintendent Finemore requested

00:52:27 unit. Superintendent Finemore requested to meet field officers and met with HN26 Christine Green, HN81 David Hagen, and a closed UCO, each of whom were selected for this task by SDS management.

00:52:46 He also met DCI 58, DIHN53, and DshN52 Bernie Greeny. DCI HN58 briefed Superintendent Fineore on the structure and processes of the SDS and concluded that Superintendent Fineore

00:53:01 concluded that Superintendent Fineore seemed satisfi satisfied indicating that the SDS had good procedures and processes in force. However, the group questioned the robustness of this con conclusion given that the chosen UCOs were explicitly told to refrain from

00:53:16 were explicitly told to refrain from going into too much detail about their operations. an internal SDS note providing directions to the UCOs in advance of this visit records as follows. Each should be clear about

00:53:30 follows. Each should be clear about their objectives, how their intelligence is likely to be used and the codes of practiced. This clearly reveals the attitude of management that codes of practice were part of an armory to be deployed as part of any review of the SDS, but the UCOs

00:53:41 of any review of the SDS, but the UCOs were not expected to have been already familiar with them in their day-to-day employment deployments. The group also query whether the 1998 SDS code of practice dated the October

00:53:58 SDS code of practice dated the October 1998 was in fact produced in response to this announced inspection. In the latter part of of tranch 3, there are indications that it was becoming increasingly difficult for the MPSB to

00:54:16 increasingly difficult for the MPSB to ignore the deficiencies of the SDS. The SDS was subject to reports from a body referred to as an internal audit. However, these visits took place infrequently, once in 1997 and once again in 2003 and 2004.

00:54:31 again in 2003 and 2004. The 2003 and 2004 audit concluded that controls which had been introduced in 1997 are either not operating efficiently or are no longer in place. It may be for this reason that in 2004

00:54:42 It may be for this reason that in 2004 DCI Richard Walton was tasked to conduct a review of the SDS. It is not yet clear why it was thought appropriate that DCI Walton conduct the review given his involvement six years

00:54:55 review given his involvement six years earlier in obtaining SDS intelligence on matters surrounding the McFersonen inquiry and the Steven Lawrence family campaign. DCI Walton's report recommended reform in certain areas but otherwise found the unit to be

00:55:06 otherwise found the unit to be professionally run and well-managed. Despite these positive conclusions, it appears that the senior MPSB management

00:55:19 appears that the senior MPSB management was not convinced as they commissioned a further report almost immediately. This was completed just two months later by DS Crane, formerly of the Directorate of Professional Standards. The review included 22 recommendations for reform. The SDS responded in the usual way,

00:55:35 The SDS responded in the usual way, demonstrating sheer arrogance borne out of an enduring culture of exceptionalism. As described in the 2008 SDS closing report, the SDS responded to the report with a detailed rebuttal, although both

00:55:47 with a detailed rebuttal, although both subjective and selective of most most of the points and recommendations made. They maligned the manner in which the research had been conducted, describing the work as shoddy and thoroughly dishonest.

00:56:00 dishonest. Senior MPSB management supported most of the recommendations from the review. Recommendations included that the code of conduct for undercover special branch officers should be updated to reflect RIPER and to include relevant sections

00:56:11 RIPER and to include relevant sections of the nationally accepted instructions to evidential undercover officers. This suggests that at this time the MPSB acknowledged and accepted that the SDS was profoundly out of step with

00:56:26 was profoundly out of step with legislative and regulatory requirements of the time. It is inconceivable that the outcome of this review should not have been known about by the commissioner of the day.

00:56:40 Inadequate managerial control. Sir, management of the SDS operate of the SDS operated in a purely reactive manner, responding to the eruption of various scandals rather than

00:56:51 various scandals rather than implementing any proactive attempts to ensure compliant, well-managed deployments in the wake of the scutair and the viability report prepared in respect of the SDS. Commander HM143 Ben

00:57:03 respect of the SDS. Commander HM143 Ben Gun commented that it would be desirable to tighten what was described as the long reigns of supervision allowed to daily field officers. Commander HM143 gun has accepted in his witness statement to the inquiry that for some

00:57:21 statement to the inquiry that for some reason the invisaged degree of contact was not introduced or not maintained. It would not be credible for SDS managers to suggest in this inquiry that they were not aware of the aborant tradecraft in tranch 3. There is no clearer example of comprehensive

00:57:35 clearer example of comprehensive managerial due knowledge than than the titles of the scenario questions prepared for SDS undercover officer candidates during their recruitment process. These scenarios were entitled fundraising, a spy in our midst, racial

00:57:57 fundraising, a spy in our midst, racial violence, sex, drugs, and rock and roll, weary wedding, spending plans, arrest, evidence gathering, the embassy plot, racial issues, egghehead versus bonehead, shopping nightmare, and to split or not to split. This clearly

00:58:08 split or not to split. This clearly shows the extent to which the aborant SDS tradecraft was encouraged by managers including DI Bob Lambert, a

00:58:21 managers including DI Bob Lambert, a manager who as a UCO committed a litany of misdeeds and abuses as investigated and exposed by this inquiry during tranch 2.

00:58:23 tranch 2. According to Peter Francis, the unethical manner in which the unit was run was integral to its survival. He tells the inquiry, quote, I do not think the SDS could have could have run if

00:58:43 the SDS could have could have run if ethical considerations had come into it. It would have been closed down. Instead of reckoning with its inability to function within necessary legal frameworks, the SDS clearly saw itself as a special a special worthy of praise. Effective SDS management was also un undermined by UCO clicks. DSHN52

00:58:57 undermined by UCO clicks. DSHN52 Bernie Greeny was James Thompson's handler and oversaw potential criminal offenses by that undercover officer. He told Operation Hearn that he'd not been

00:59:12 told Operation Hearn that he'd not been a field officer himself and as such had had to accept that field officers had their own clicks and invariably the first port of call for them will be their colleagues or predecessors, mentors who'd been in the field. They

00:59:27 mentors who'd been in the field. They were an inner circle you are never part of. HN43 Peter Francis claims that DNI DIHN67

00:59:29 DIHN67 was not regarded with esteem by UCOs because he was considered by them to be a shadow paddler. This apparently impacted how undercover officers would behave as they did not tend to go to

00:59:41 behave as they did not tend to go to DIHN67 about operational matters. HN43 Francis also claims that DI Bob Lambert who replaced DIHN67

00:59:55 who replaced DIHN67 was the highest regarded SDS officer manager who ever served in the SDS celebrated as a very deep swimmer and the officer who'd been responsible for the convictions of two people for arson at Deanham's

01:00:06 at Deanham's despite being the detective inspector under DCI Keith Edmonson Di Lambert was referred to as the lynchpin of the SDS He appears to have been the true power behind the SDS managerial throne. HN43

01:00:23 behind the SDS managerial throne. HN43 pet Peter Francis claims that due to DCI Edmonson not having completed his time in the back office and ultimately never having been deployed as an SDS field officer, he was viewed by SDS UCOs as a

01:00:35 officer, he was viewed by SDS UCOs as a failed back office boy who'd been put in charge.

01:00:38 charge. It is therefore unsurprising that the evidence reveals a degree of insubordination from UCOs who probably felt a sense of superiority over their handlers or managers. It must not be

01:00:49 handlers or managers. It must not be forgotten that overtime payments meant that UCOs were earning in the same region as an officer in the rank of superintendent.

01:01:03 superintendent. The group's written statement deals with the evidence which shows the MPSB was completely unwilling or incapable of implementing proper disciplinary procedures for undercover officers even in cases where there was potential criminality. In the case of HN16 Thompson, informal discipline was

01:01:15 Thompson, informal discipline was preferred notwithstanding the risks of this approach which DCIL DCI Mike Dell identified as quote neglect of duty,

01:01:32 identified as quote neglect of duty, impropriy, lack of supervision, failure to comply with RIPER, prejudice to morale, vulnerability to the embarrassment of the MPS. The ends do not justify the means. The SDS closing report sets out what should have been a fundamental principle

01:01:46 should have been a fundamental principle at the heart of the unit. We as a police service are accountable to those we serve and must act within the law to achieve our goals. Whether or not the

01:01:59 achieve our goals. Whether or not the legislation and complaint constraints placed upon us make it operationally more difficult to reach our desired outcome. In short, the ends do not always justify the means and it is rarely if ever at whatever cost. This

01:02:11 rarely if ever at whatever cost. This amounts to a contemporaneous admission by the MPS that the means employed by the SDS did not justify the ends. The SDS closing report criticized

01:02:24 SDS closing report criticized inappropriate reporting on a justice campaign and identified political policing through the evidence of reporting on individuals who appear to hold little more than political views. The inquiry should robustly reject DI

01:02:36 The inquiry should robustly reject DI Lambert's comments to Operation Hearn that the SDS wasn't that bad or a legitimate operation and quote still does stand up as being a unit that did

01:02:50 does stand up as being a unit that did good work. The closure of the SDS also led to the identification of quote various serious and deep-seated operational shortcomings that were not in line with national standards which had developed over the years for the conduct of undercover deployments.

01:03:03 conduct of undercover deployments. However, the closure of the SDS did not remedy the inherent issues with intelligenceonly undercover operations.

01:03:17 intelligenceonly undercover operations. This style of reporting continued within the NPOIU which will be the subject of further exploration in branch 4. SDS culture. It appears that all SDS management roles were held by white men. SDS reporting signed off by managers used racist,

01:03:35 signed off by managers used racist, misogynistic, and outdated language well into the mid 1990s. HN16 James Thompson acknowledges that there there probably was a general approach then which would be considered to be sexism. Now the inquiry will no doubt scrutinize a number of the assertions made made by

01:03:52 number of the assertions made made by HN43 Peter Francis suggesting that there was a culture within the SDS of racism and misogyny misogyny including the activities of undercover officers and managers during SDS trips to Amsterdam.

01:04:03 managers during SDS trips to Amsterdam. A toxic and misogyn misogynistic culture within the SDS and the wider MPS also explains the continued trade craft in T3P1 of targeting and interfering with

01:04:15 T3P1 of targeting and interfering with vulnerable individuals without regard to their well-being. H16 James Thompson spying on Wendy when she was a minor and she when she was extremely vulnerable, including at a

01:04:26 extremely vulnerable, including at a time when her me me me me me me me me me me me me me me me me me me me me me mental health was very poor during the terminal illness of her mother.

01:04:33 mother. Undercover officers in trance 3 phase 1 continued to choose cover identities younger than their real ages even after the practice of using diseased children's identities was said to have been discontinued and UCOs were

01:04:47 been discontinued and UCOs were utilizing entirely fictional personas. UCOs also continued to deploy emotionally manipulative withdrawal stat strategies.

01:04:59 strategies. The next short section is on undercover officers criminality and acting as a provocator. There is evidence that suggests that the SDS or MPSB formally sanctioned the practice of acting as an azon provocator. In a witness statement to

01:05:13 provocator. In a witness statement to operation hear, chief superintendent Ray Parker referred to the existence of a document dated 1991 which he says left the impression of being the rules of engagement for an Azon provocator. He

01:05:29 engagement for an Azon provocator. He commented that he felt quite amazed that it was allegedly part of an SDS of a special branch document. It is concerning that the inquiry in the MPS had been unable to recover this important document. The inquiry is asked to investigate the conditions under

01:05:42 to investigate the conditions under which this document appears to have disappeared. The SDS closing report highlighted concerns about SDS undercover officers

01:05:55 concerns about SDS undercover officers joining criminal conspiracies and acting as a provocator, having reviewed the documents available in 2009. This report commented on evidence of occasions where UCOs were more than merely joining a conspiracy that was

01:06:10 merely joining a conspiracy that was already laid out, but were present when such action was initiated and may have facilitated it. The SDS closing report went on to criticize a lack of appropriate managerial response. By 1995, possible criminality was so

01:06:25 By 1995, possible criminality was so ingrained and expected within the SDS that it featured within recruitment interviews. HN81 Dave Hagen was asked about a hypothetical scenario regarding

01:06:36 about a hypothetical scenario regarding a deployment into an extreme right-wing group where the members are racially abusing an interracial couple and making sexualized comments to the woman. It is

01:06:47 sexualized comments to the woman. It is perhaps telling that HN81 Hagen answered that he would join in with the abuse to maintain cover. It is even more telling that H&81 Hagen was recruited after answering that he would commit a crime in this scenario and specifically one

01:07:02 in this scenario and specifically one which involved both racist and sexist elements.

01:07:03 elements. This clearly demonstrates the extent to which criminality, racism and sexism was embedded in the SDS in 1995.

01:07:20 legal professional privilege and reporting on lawyers. The group have highlighted in previous opening statements the shocking trade craft of reporting on criminal and civil proceedings when reporting on those connected to justice campaigns.

01:07:32 connected to justice campaigns. H81 Hagen reported what he claimed to be the advice of Dwayne Brooks's lawyers in respect of his civil claim against the MPS. H81 Hagen further reported that an

01:07:50 MPS. H81 Hagen further reported that an individual was intending to sue the MPS, providing details of the solicitor's firm he spoke spoke with and their advice as to how to deal with the matter. HN15 Mark Jenner reported on the McLibel support campaign, including

01:08:01 McLibel support campaign, including information from Dave Morris about the progress of the trial and revelations that London Greenpeace had been uh infiltrated on four occasions. HN43 Peter Francis reported on the advice

01:08:19 Peter Francis reported on the advice given to Lisa Tusha from the immigration advisory service. The inquiry is asked to identify the customers for these reports and what was done with the information they contained. It appears that either little or no thought was given by the SDS to the risk of reporting on matters subject to legal professional privilege. HN43 Peter

01:08:33 professional privilege. HN43 Peter Francis claims that he was advised to be arrests savvy, namely to behave in the same manner as activists if arrested and to even use the same solicitors that they used. There also appears to have been few

01:08:49 There also appears to have been few qualms about reporting on lawyers. And sir, you've already heard today about the impact of this in the opening statement today delivered by Imran Khan KC on behalf of Michael Manfil KC. Reporting on politicians,

01:09:00 Reporting on politicians, T3P1 included continued reporting on politicians and individuals running for political office. H81 Dave Hagen reported on Alex Olard's standing a

01:09:14 reported on Alex Olard's standing a local government election in Angel Ward under a movement for justice banner. HN43 Peter Francis similarly reported on a member of militant labor becoming a Tower Hamlet counselor. HN81 Hagen states that if a me

01:09:27 HN81 Hagen states that if a me particular member of Parliament was agitating for unlawful behavior or was making inflammatory statements, this would have been passed on to undercover officer handlers. But that would but that given prohibition with an MPSB of

01:09:44 that given prohibition with an MPSB of reporting on sitting MPs he doubts that this would have been recorded in a written report. A report which refers to Dave Nellis provides his MPS reference and gives the special branch full special branch reference which indicates that this file

01:10:03 reference which indicates that this file was created the same year he was elected as an MP. Dave Nellis in his witness statement asked for this inquiry to thoroughly consider whether he was specifically targeted for this reason. Reporting on trade unions. In T3P1,

01:10:16 Reporting on trade unions. In T3P1, there was a continuation of undercover officers reporting on trade union membership and the activities of individuals and groups. Trade unions continue to have their own Metropolitan Special Branch reference in tranch 3.

01:10:33 Special Branch reference in tranch 3. HN43 Peter Francis attended trade union demonstrations and reported on union activities. He discloses that if he identified any of his targets as trade

01:10:47 identified any of his targets as trade unionists, that would almost guarantee they would have a special branch file because trade unionists were seen by their nature as being subversives. HS HN15 Mark Jenner reported on industrial disputes. He also joined a trade union, namely the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and

01:10:58 Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians, which he claims was done to bolster his credibility. The inquiry must ascertain the true

01:11:09 The inquiry must ascertain the true extent of his activities within the trade union movement given his contradictory accounts of his involvement on blacklisting and vetting. The practices of undercover officers reporting the employment details of individuals continued into T3P1.

01:11:25 individuals continued into T3P1. the customers for this information. The extent of its dissemination, including for the purposes of blacklisting and vetting, as well as the impact of this reporting, is something which this inquiry must investigate. The consulting association possessed a

01:11:41 The consulting association possessed a secret database of 3,200 union activists in the building industry and this was used by the major multinational construction firms to check workers against this list for the purpose of blacklisting those appeared who appeared

01:11:55 blacklisting those appeared who appeared on it. The consulting association held a file in Lisa Tisha's name. Lisa Tisha has never worked in the building industry was reported extensively by Peter Francis. The ina information commissioner's office stated in 2012 that some of the content contained on

01:12:07 that some of the content contained on the blacklist could only have come from

01:12:16 the blacklist could only have come from the police or the security services. The group looked forward to receiving the evidence from MPSB commander Donald Buchanan in tanch 3 phase three to elaborate on the comments he made to

01:12:30 elaborate on the comments he made to operation hear relating to the issue of blacklisting which are noted as quote economic lead consulting associates earlier days gathering information selling to sell to business we were aware and concerned didn't know information it disappeared there clearly exists ed an awareness

01:12:42 there clearly exists ed an awareness within the SDS that blacklisting was occurring as evidenced in the report of HN15 Mark Jenner signed off by DCI Keith

01:12:53 HN15 Mark Jenner signed off by DCI Keith Edmonson. This described the fact that a longstanding activist had been blacklisted because of his enthusiasm for trade unionism. The impact of blacklisting cannot be underestimated as expressed by the

01:13:05 underestimated as expressed by the non-state core participant Frank Smith

01:13:16 non-state core participant Frank Smith who was reported on by HM15 Mark Jenner. Frank Smith credits the stress of being blacklisted as a reason for the end of his longterm relationship and says it completely turned his life upside down. The extent to which blacklisting took place using SDS intelligence and the

01:13:29 place using SDS intelligence and the effect on those who were blacklisted and the knowledge of this practice within MPS are critical issues going directly to the terms of reference. These issues must therefore be thoroughly investigated by the inquiry in tranch 3.

01:13:42 investigated by the inquiry in tranch 3. The group understands that despite this, the inquiry is not calling Dave Smith to give evidence in trance 3 phase one. Dave Smith was the secretary of the

01:13:57 Dave Smith was the secretary of the blacklist support group and co-author of the book blacklisted the secret war between big big business and union activists and has critical evidence to give to this inquiry.

01:14:09 give to this inquiry. Sir in conclusion the group urges the inquiry to be mindful of the duty of candle that is currently before parliament. The group also reiterate the importance of ensuring that s the substantial truth is revealed as to the motivation for directing SDS targeting

01:14:24 motivation for directing SDS targeting and how it came to be that the SDS and later the NPOIU was permitted to continue for as long as they did and why lessons were not learned. This requires a transparent approach

01:14:39 This requires a transparent approach from all the state core participants and all government departments particularly where they appear in the in the disclosure. The NPSCPS look forward to hearing how the NPS, the Home Secretary, and the Security Services will fully and

01:14:52 and the Security Services will fully and candidly account for what occurred in T3 and beyond. Thank you, sir.

01:15:02 and beyond. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much indeed for stepping in at the last moment to perform a task which you were not expecting to do. In addition to the sterling work that I know you have done uh on behalf of uh

01:15:13 know you have done uh on behalf of uh the participants who you represent, the inquiry through me expresses its gratitude to you. Thank you, sir.

01:15:25 Thank you, sir. Uh we will now um rise. We will not sit tomorrow. Uh the witness who was going to give evidence unfortunately uh for health reasons is unable to do so tomorrow. Uh we will resume on Friday with uh the witness who is known as Sarah.