Opening statement by Kirsten Heaven on behalf of non-state core participants responding to Metropolitan Police Service admissions of wrongdoing in Tranche 2. While welcoming MPS acknowledgments of serious wrongdoing, counsel condemns them as 'too little too late' - 13 years after SDS exposure. Statement criticizes MPS attempt to challenge chairman's Tranche 1 findings and resist modern standards. Details systematic failures in targeting, oversight, and justification. Condemns spying on justice campaigns, lawyers, elected politicians, and trade unions. Highlights Roger Pearce's novels featuring undercover officers fathering children, suggesting senior management knew about sexual relationships. Raises serious procedural concerns about inquiry disclosure practices disadvantaging non-state participants.
00:19:57 e e
00:20:33 we will now resume with an opening statement by Miss Heaven good afternoon sir good afternoon this is the opening statement on behalf of all the cooperating non-p police non-state core participants who have
00:20:45 non-state core participants who have expressed a view for tranch two Phase 1 it supplements the statements that have been made directly on behalf of non-state individuals and groups by their instructed lawyers so in the TR
00:20:59 their instructed lawyers so in the TR one interim report you found found the tactic of long-term infiltration of political or single issue groups by the SDS between 1969 to 1982 was not
00:21:11 SDS between 1969 to 1982 was not justified because subject to a very few exceptions you found that the means employed by the SDS did not justify the ends you also found that had the right questions been addressed at the highest levels within the Metropol and Police
00:21:23 levels within the Metropol and Police Service and the home office and had the means employed by the SDS been publicly known about then the SDS would have been
00:21:34 known about then the SDS would have been in your words sir brought to a rapid end the nonp police stakehold participants
00:21:45 the nonp police stakehold participants welcome these findings the inquiry ought now to proceed on the basis that what follows in trch to and Beyond is unjustified and unjustifiable SDS operations in tranch 2 should never have
00:21:57 should never have happened so you have before you so far inched to many witness statements submitted by the non-state co- participants all have whom have been deeply affected by SDS undercover policing these statements set out a
00:22:08 policing these statements set out a Litany of shocking intrusion and abuses by the state of the fundamental human rights of the public including the right to privacy it is therefore important that the inquiry recognizes that had the SDS been disbanded in tranch one the
00:22:21 SDS been disbanded in tranch one the consequent trauma suffered by many of the nonp police state cor participants would simply not have occurred as has been EXP explained by B in the witness
00:22:33 been EXP explained by B in the witness statement submitted to the inquiry quote those means have been very damaging to many lives those women they had sexual relationships those they befriended and betrayed those whose Valiant campaigns
00:22:48 betrayed those whose Valiant campaigns were undermined for example the families of people campaigning for truth and Justice after their relatives were killed by police or racists and also the mental health of the police officers used as spies and their families who were also
00:23:02 were also betrayed now so on Monday you heard that the Metropolitan Police Service now accepts and acknowledges that there were quote serious wrongdoings by some SDS undercover officers and the mismanagement by SDS and metol and
00:23:17 mismanagement by SDS and metol and Police Service special branch managers during the tranch 2 period and quote there was a general failure by the SDS managers and Senior managers in the metropolen police special Branch to lead the SDS properly
00:23:29 the SDS properly effectively specifically the Metropolitan Police Service now acknowledge and Sir you'll appreciate this is just a short summary of The Salient admissions that during tranch 2 there were nine deceitful sexual
00:23:45 there were nine deceitful sexual relationships there was unnecessary reporting on political and social justice campaigns Community organizations as well as groups that were campaigning for police accountability there was racist sexist and homophobic expressions and
00:23:57 and homophobic expressions and descriptions used in reporting that were derogatory arrogant and rude with some reporting not meeting the standards of the home office guidelines on the work of the special branch which as we know was published in
00:24:13 as we know was published in 1984 there's also an acceptance that the Metropolitan Police Service engaged in discriminatory policing in respect of the targeting of anti-racist campaigns that were Seeking Justice for members of black and Asian communities in London and attempting to hold Metropolitan
00:24:25 and attempting to hold Metropolitan Police Service accountable for the way it policed those communities this was described on Monday by the Metropolitan Police Service as quote an example of unacceptable
00:24:36 quote an example of unacceptable political policing by the Metropolitan Police Special Branch so as you know the non-p police state cor participants suggest that the evidence of political policing by the SDS as overseen by the Metropolitan
00:24:47 SDS as overseen by the Metropolitan Police Service goes well beyond their targeting of anti-racist campaigns and is reflected in all the biased and one-sided targeting and reporting of
00:24:59 one-sided targeting and reporting of those perceived by the police to be on the political left wing whilst the admissions that have been made by the Metropolitan Police
00:25:11 been made by the Metropolitan Police Service are important Admissions and of course they are welcomed they are also quite frankly too little and too late the non-p police state Corp participants wish to place on record their deep disappointment that it has taken the metral Police Service until now to make
00:25:26 metral Police Service until now to make what are qualified admissions in respect of this shameful period in British policing the SDS was exposed as long ago as 2011 it should not have taken 13 years for the Metropolitan Police
00:25:37 years for the Metropolitan Police Service to say what it did on Monday of this week the non-p police state called participants note that in their opening statement the Metropolitan Police
00:25:49 statement the Metropolitan Police Service not only call into question some of your findings sir in the trans run interim report but they also assert that the inquiry should not be judging the actions of the SDS by so-called modern day professional legal and ethical
00:26:01 day professional legal and ethical standards the nonp police state Corp participants will respond to the points raised by the Metropolitan Police
00:26:12 raised by the Metropolitan Police Service on Monday in their trch 2 phase two opening in September but we simply note at this stage that so you've already considered and rejected the arguments that are being made by the Metropolitan Police Service in the tranch one interim report so you
00:26:23 tranch one interim report so you highlighted some of the key evidence demonstrating that there were concerns at time that the type of policing being engaged in by the SDS could not be legally Justified and indeed would
00:26:37 legally Justified and indeed would result in public embarrassment to the commissioner were it to be exposed overall the nonp police state Corp participants consider that it's a gross
00:26:45 gross mischaracterization by the Metropolitan Police Service to suggest that the only real problem with the SDS was that quote its good work was overshadowed by the indefensible misconduct of some officers
00:27:00 indefensible misconduct of some officers and the mismanagement which allowed that misconduct to flourish the truth is that the Metropolitan Police commissioners of the day not only knew about and sanctioned the SDS but they were so proud of its
00:27:13 the SDS but they were so proud of its work that they positively considered it to be quote The Duel in the special Branch Crown the nonp police state call participants call upon the Metropolitan Police Service to admit and accept that the SDS was a unit that engaged in
00:27:28 the SDS was a unit that engaged in widespread political policing and that it developed abor and unlawful trade craft and practices under the direction not just of SDS and special Branch man
00:27:41 not just of SDS and special Branch man managers but with the full knowledge and connivance of the senior hierarchy of the Metropolitan Police Service including the police commissioners of the day namely the late sir Kenneth Newman and the late Lord Peter imbert imbert so I now want to make some
00:27:53 imbert so I now want to make some comments on the evidence and for your benefit I know I've been jumping around a bit but we're now going to paragraph 28 of the written document you have and that will be page
00:28:04 that will be page 13 now the nonp police state court participants note that at this early stage they've only seen part of the evidence to tranch two but it's clear from The Limited and shocking
00:28:15 from The Limited and shocking information that's already in the public domain in press reporting Publications and previous investigation reports that between 1983 to 1992 the means by which the SDS conducted its activities in
00:28:29 the SDS conducted its activities in tranch 2 could not POS possibly justify the ends in trch two you'll be considering yet further Evidence documenting widespread and systematic abuses of the fundamental human rights of members of the public by the SDS
00:28:40 of members of the public by the SDS undercover officers with the support and encouragement of SDS managers senior NPS police officers and on occasion the security service and indeed the home
00:28:55 security service and indeed the home office in trch two undercover officers continued invading people's lives abusing women and engaging in sexual and close personal relationships when
00:29:07 close personal relationships when undercover and even after the conclusion of their operational deployment while still using their cover identities undercover officers fathered children with activists before disappearing stealing the identities of deceased children and compiling information on
00:29:24 children and compiling information on children and teenagers there is further unlawful trespassing into the private homes of members of the public violations of the intimacy of priv private family lives and the personal and private dealings of members of the public including partners and children there is a continuation of widespread
00:29:36 there is a continuation of widespread Mass surveillance and data collection not just for the security services but also for the Metropolitan Police Special Branch
00:29:45 Branch registry now in relation to recordkeeping in tranch 2 there's no evidence of any attempt by undercover officers to comply with the 1984 home office guidelines on the work of a special Branch the nonp State cor
00:30:02 special Branch the nonp State cor participants are yet to understand if undercover officers and managers understood and reflected on the relevance to the ests of the data protection act which came into force in 1984 there is evidence of racist language being used by undercover
00:30:14 language being used by undercover officers and an undercover officer alleges being the subject of racism whilst in the SDS undercover officers
00:30:25 whilst in the SDS undercover officers continue to adopt significant positions of responsibility and influence they directed groups so disc and acted as aan provocators there is more abor and misogynistic reporting with undercover officers committing
00:30:38 with undercover officers committing criminal offenses and attending Court in their cover identities brazenly interfering with the justice system and misleading the court resulting in unfair trials and unsafe convictions SDS managers and under covers in tranch 2
00:30:50 managers and under covers in tranch 2 continued to show consistent disregard for the Integrity of the criminal court process such that it evolved into an established trade crash
00:31:02 established trade crash so you'll also see evidence that the SDS was clearly being used for a range of unlawful and unjustifiable tasks plainly going beyond the remit of special Branch with significant influence and encouragement from the security service
00:31:15 encouragement from the security service this includes defensive policing of the so-called quote enemy to direct targeting of police accountability groups and those described as irritants to the establishment it also includes using the SS to avoid quote
00:31:27 using the SS to avoid quote embarrassment to the state and widespread reporting on and targeting of Family Justice and defense campaigns lawyers and politicians there is breaching of Legal Professional
00:31:38 breaching of Legal Professional privilege and the emergence of a tradecraft of directly penetrating and closely monitoring and Reporting on
00:31:50 closely monitoring and Reporting on community organizations for example the roach family support committee and the gross Family Support campaign to name but two this targeting foreshadows the evidence that is to come in relation to for example SDS targeting of community- based pressure groups community centers
00:32:05 based pressure groups community centers and the family of Steven Lawrence Dwayne Brooks OB and Michael mansfi Casey now so as you know SDS managers will not feature in tranch 2 phase one but I just want to make a few comments in relation to them in terms of what the
00:32:21 in relation to them in terms of what the disclosure shows and some general points on guidance it has not been possible to review the evidence of the key SDS managers as it was disclosed just a few days ago but it's already clear that Tran 2 it will become increasingly
00:32:32 Tran 2 it will become increasingly impossible for the SDS managers to distance themselves from what the Undercovers were doing under their command and to maintain um that they did not know what was happening or that they did not appreciate the inherent risk of abuse and undercover criminal conduct
00:32:48 abuse and undercover criminal conduct from the nature of the SDS operations in respect of category H and the women deceived into sexual Relationships by undercover officers the non police state Corp participants note that the
00:32:59 Corp participants note that the Metropolitan Police Service accepted in their opening on Monday that quote in their written evidence for TR 2 Phase 2 the SDS managers will each say that during their tenure they were unaware of the full extent of the conduct detailed
00:33:13 the full extent of the conduct detailed above the MPS wishes to be clear that it does not accept the level of General ignorance professed by SDS managers in their statements some of them did know or did suspect that sexual relationships were
00:33:27 were occurring this admission is long overdue and and you heard yesterday that it welcomed by the category H women along with the important acceptance by the Metropolitan Police Service of the role played by a wider culture of sexism and misogyny in the police so just to
00:33:42 misogyny in the police so just to highlight some of the evidence in trch to phase one on this point hn 99 detective Chief Inspector Nigel David short warned hm67 Alan Bond about being tempted by quote flesh pop females we
00:33:54 tempted by quote flesh pop females we also now know that around November 1985 hn9 Malcolm shearing gave a presentation to members of the security services on
00:34:09 to members of the security services on the SDS and tradecraft hm 1115 detective Chief Inspector waight gave what was termed quote a light-hearted
00:34:17 termed quote a light-hearted introduction which included making quote a comments the effect that one of our animal people had been involved in a pregnancy scare but the fact of the child being mixed race ruled out the officer entirely so you may consider that this comment speaks for itself
00:34:28 that this comment speaks for itself we can also see that hn 78 Trevor Morris vaguely recalls that when he was uh when he made SDS management aware that he be
00:34:42 he made SDS management aware that he be he denied the advances of an influential swp woman during his deployment that quote someone suggested that a relationship with a woman other than the influential swp woman might create a distraction and calm the situation down however there is also other
00:34:55 down however there is also other evidence to suggest that relationships when under cover were known about at the highest levels in the Metropolitan Police Service as you've already heard hn 85 Roger Pi targeted friends of
00:35:06 hn 85 Roger Pi targeted friends of Freedom press in tranch 2 and then went on to become commander of special branch and director of intelligence for the Metropolitan Police Service hn 85 is also a novelist and on the 7th of June
00:35:21 also a novelist and on the 7th of June 2012 he published a novel entitled agent of the state which features an undercover officer protagonist who fathers a child with an act IST who is deceived into having sex whilst Undercover the same protagonist also
00:35:36 Undercover the same protagonist also appears again in 2013 in Pierce's novel The
00:35:37 The extremist this second novel also features a female and cover officer deceiving an activist into having a sexual relationship when undercover now
00:35:49 sexual relationship when undercover now in terms of context the public reporting of the n12 mark Kennedy's long-term relationships when undercover occurred in January 2011 and that hn10 Bob lamber had had a long-term relationship when
00:36:01 had had a long-term relationship when undercover was reported in the press in October
00:36:05 October 2011 however the first reporting of Bob lbert having a child with an activist was in the guardian in January 2012 the timing we say is significant the nonp police state Corp participants believe
00:36:18 police state Corp participants believe that Pius came up with his protagonist's backstory and wrote his first book well before Kennedy and Lambert were publicly exposed and based his plot lines on his personal knowledge of the unit in which he served and then
00:36:30 he served and then commanded but not only that the fact that Pius thought in 2012 and then in 2013 that it was appropriate to write these books is
00:36:43 these books is disgraceful it perfectly illustrates the sense of enduring impunity that ran through the SDS it shows the extent to which senior Metropolitan Police Service managers at the highest levels are Unapologetic and even as late as 2013
00:36:58 Unapologetic and even as late as 2013 still considered that the SDS was above the law and accountable and had done nothing wrong the nonp police state cor participants want to know whether when PS published his books and sought to make money trading on the abuses
00:37:09 make money trading on the abuses committed by his fellow undercover officers and those under his command he gave any thought to the effect the books might have on those Abused Women and the children of undercover officers that he knew existed the inquiry should be
00:37:22 knew existed the inquiry should be extremely skeptical about any suggestion from PI that he did not know about these matters at at the time but was simply drawing inspiration from the revelations
00:37:37 drawing inspiration from the revelations that were exposed in the media after all Pi boasts on Amazon that quote in his novels the author draws upon his knowledge and firsthand experience of a career in National Security at every level when SDS managers for to give
00:37:49 level when SDS managers for to give their evidence later in the inquiry it will also be impossible for them to maintain the assertion that is made in every annual report that welfare and supervision were of Paramount importance in tranch two there is more evidence
00:38:00 in tranch two there is more evidence indicating red flag Behavior including undercover officers returning to their target groups and raising very serious allegations about the lawfulness of SDS operations undercover officers
00:38:11 operations undercover officers identifying with their target group directing and inciting groups undercover officers being placed at risk suffering mental health breakdowns developing
00:38:23 mental health breakdowns developing alcohol dependency and going absent without leave so you will also be hearing evidence about what is termed the stepan Affair in relation to the
00:38:34 the stepan Affair in relation to the alleged misconduct of hn 95 Stefan Scutt and how it was dealt with and divided under cover officers and SDS managers in terms of the understanding
00:38:46 managers in terms of the understanding of the boundaries in relation to privacy there is now documentary evidence to suggest that the security service considered that SDS reporting on financial data was not justified and indeed ordered that steps were taken to destroy some of this reporting the documents that were ordered to be
00:39:03 documents that were ordered to be destroyed related to hn8 reporting of the financial position and published accounts of CND so if the security services who were interested in every little detail could see that the SDS had gone too far in its reporting it does
00:39:14 gone too far in its reporting it does beg the obvious question as to whether SDS managers also appreciated the same the nonp police state Corp participants asked the inquiry to challenge undercover officers and managers about
00:39:27 undercover officers and managers about obviously inappropriate reporting that quite probably breached the data protection act 1984 so that some SDS reporting was in part destroyed and not distributed by the security services is
00:39:39 distributed by the security services is a matter that you will no doubt have in mind when you reflect upon the suggestion by the Metropolitan Police Service that was made on Monday that quote the concept of personal privacy was not as developed as it is
00:39:50 was not as developed as it is today so on this latter point I would ask that you read the Council of Europe convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic
00:40:02 individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data 108 which was implemented in domestic UK law
00:40:13 was implemented in domestic UK law through the data protection act 1984 and which the UK um ratified in 1985 so um for your note it's footnote 38 of our written
00:40:15 written opening now in terms of guidance in tranch 2 phase one there's a reference to a number of new purported guidance documents that have not been seen before um such as code of conduct for
00:40:26 um such as code of conduct for undercover officers offers the code of conduct for special Branch officers the selection safety and Welfare for undercover police officers the code of conduct for SDS officers deployed overseas there is also a document
00:40:44 overseas there is also a document entitled SDS policy guidelines regarding participation in crime which is undated with the coming into force of the data protection act 1984 there was apparently a recognition of the need to subject Metropolitan Police Service undercover policing by S so10 to regulation the
00:40:59 policing by S so10 to regulation the purpose of S10 was defined as covert policing and evidence Gathering curiously though it was thought that the rules for S10 did not and could not apply to the
00:41:11 apply to the SDS so this was the era when sir Kenneth Newman was commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service that's 82 to
00:41:23 Metropolitan Police Service that's 82 to 87 and during this time he published his book and guide to the police entitled principles of policing this book was given to all police officers and it contained an extensive explanation of how modern-day legal moral and ethical principles apply to the police for example it placed great emphasis on
00:41:39 example it placed great emphasis on policing adhering to the rule of law and respecting the fundamental rights of individuals of maintaining police standards and ensuring the regulation of police conduct now of note we can see in
00:41:57 police conduct now of note we can see in the t2 disclosure that according to hn11 122 Neil Richardson on return from his deployment SDS officer hn9 Malcolm shearing hung a framed version of commissioner Newman's principles of policing above his desk hm122 States
00:42:09 policing above his desk hm122 States this was intended as a practical joke that the SDS undercover officers saw upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights as simply a joke is no surprise the nonp police state cor participants await an explanation from
00:42:23 participants await an explanation from the Metropolitan Police Service and the Witnesses in Tred to as to how they ensured that commissioner Newman's principles were taken seriously and actually apped in the SDS what is now clear from TR 2 Phase 1 disclosure is that officials within the
00:42:36 disclosure is that officials within the home office were on notice of the desire of some senior officers with the within the Metropolitan Police Service such as hn 3962 assistant commissioner crime John Wilson to use the police in illegitimate ways to spy on groups
00:42:48 illegitimate ways to spy on groups critical of the police quote in order that they the MPS can adequately respond to criticism it is also now abundantly clear that at the start of T2 tranch 2
00:42:59 clear that at the start of T2 tranch 2 so that's 1984 to 1986 the home office did have some knowledge that the SDS was quote directly penetrating or closely
00:43:11 quote directly penetrating or closely monitoring and Reporting on defense and Family Justice campaigns and groups um simply because they were critical of the police the home office knew this was controversial and Senior civil servants
00:43:24 controversial and Senior civil servants such such as Sir Gerald Hayden Phillips were
00:43:30 were concerned in trch one questions remained unanswered as to exactly what was known within the home office cabinet office and by the prime minister of the day on the minui of the tradecraft of SDS
00:43:43 the minui of the tradecraft of SDS undercover officers it was unfortunate that senior civil servants and Senior Metropolitan Police Service police officers who were able to give evidence were not called in tranch one this was an opportunity that was lost by the
00:43:54 an opportunity that was lost by the inquiry and this opportunity should not be lost in tranch 2 tranch 2 is a pivotal period for the home office in this inquiry given the significant events that occurred in January 1983 the Metropolitan Police Service published
00:44:06 Metropolitan Police Service published its report on political extremism and the campaign for police accountability within the Metropolitan Police District um that we've been calling locally the police accountability report which
00:44:17 police accountability report which caused the home office real concern in December 1984 the home office guidelines on the work of a special Branch were published with a secret and problematic cover letter in April 1985 the home
00:44:30 cover letter in April 1985 the home Affairs select committee inquiry into special branches published it to report following the hearing of evidence the home office involvement in these significant events and the aftermath
00:44:41 significant events and the aftermath must be established the Metropolitan Police Service was accountable to the
00:44:52 Police Service was accountable to the Home Secretary the non-p police state Corp participants therefore consider that the inquiry ought to request a corporate witness statement or a position statement from the home office requiring them to give evidence as to their exact state of knowledge in
00:45:04 their exact state of knowledge in respect of the SDS in trch to and Beyond in particular the home office should be asked to address the issues of concern that have been raised by Council of the inquiry and the non-state Corp participants in relation to the police accountability report the 1984
00:45:20 accountability report the 1984 guidelines and the giving of evidence to the home Affairs select committee the nonp police state core participants support the suggestion made yesterday by Mr scobby KC on behalf of CND and L Jermain that new evidence should be obtained from Sir Michael Partridge KBC
00:45:31 obtained from Sir Michael Partridge KBC to St Sid step the concerns in relation to parliamentary privilege that you know were raised in respect of the tranch one closing
00:45:43 closing submissions and I want to turn please to justification so this is paragraph 38 page 20 of the written opening that you have before you in the Tran closing statement of February 2023 the
00:45:54 statement of February 2023 the commissioner for the Metropolitan Police Service accepted that by modern standards the SDS deployments in tranch one were unjustifiable because of the way they were structured quote not least because there was a failure to consider
00:46:08 because there was a failure to consider intrusion necessity and proportionality the non police state cor participants welcome the Metropolitan Police Service admission in trch two that quote in many cases the value of the intelligence
00:46:19 cases the value of the intelligence produced during long-term open-ended deployments by SDS officers did not justify the duration and depth of their intrusion into the private lives of those with whom they had
00:46:31 those with whom they had contact the Metropolitan Police Service also stated paragraph 76 of their written TR two phase one opening that quote the fact an undercover officer deployment does not ultimately produce intelligence of operational value or
00:46:47 intelligence of operational value or does not do so consistently does not automatically mean that it was not adequately Justified and properly motivated at the outset so the nonp police state cor participants do not disagree with this proposition on
00:47:00 disagree with this proposition on justification this is really an issue that arises for the managers but the point view sir is that in considering justification for a deployment you must
00:47:11 justification for a deployment you must consider the assessment of justification that was carried out by managers at the outset and prior to a particular deployment commencing to check whether there was proper and rigorous consideration of the necessity and proportionality of said
00:47:24 proportionality of said deployment on this point the inquir is reminded that in the investigatory Powers tribunal judgment Kate Wilson versus commissioner of the metropolis and National Police Chiefs Council 2021 the court considered the lawfulness of
00:47:43 the court considered the lawfulness of undercover targeting by reference to the nature of the authorizations safeguards and scrutiny and oversight of the undercover deployment these matters will be dealt with further in trch 2 phase two and I want to consider justification through the lens of the annual
00:47:58 the lens of the annual reports the inquiry must investigate whether following the home Affairs select committee report and the publication of the 1984 guidelines SDS managers the Metropolitan Police Special Branch hierarchy and indeed the home office robustly and honestly reflected
00:48:18 office robustly and honestly reflected on the work of the SDS in how they dealt um with and discussed justification the SDS annual reports and the home office authorization letters are important in this regard and so we urge you to give
00:48:30 this regard and so we urge you to give short shrift to the suggestion on Monday by Mr Kel Skelton KC on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service that too much weight is being placed on the SDS annual reports and quote the reports were not about justifying the unit's existence but were simply a stock
00:48:42 existence but were simply a stock take so in tranch 2 the SDS annual reports portray a unit Desperately Seeking to justify its relevance where public disorder was broadly in Decline
00:48:54 public disorder was broadly in Decline where guidance to special branches was tightening with accountability firmly resting with the chief officer of the force through the head of special branch and where the remit and interests of the security service were changing the
00:49:10 security service were changing the inquiry should scrutinize the priorities of the Metropolitan Police Service and special Branch through their annual reports to better understand the reason for the survival of the SDS which as we know should have been
00:49:21 know should have been disbanded in tranch two given to decline in public order the SDS annual reports show the unit clearly shifting its focus to various ill or non-defined uh groups referred to interchangeably as quote militant militant animal rights groups
00:49:36 militant militant animal rights groups wide range of extremist Street activity extremist groups militant leftwing extremists terrorism and animal rights extremism and single issue groups carrying out equally IL defined Street activity there is in fact no definition
00:49:55 activity there is in fact no definition of militant or extremist in the 1984 and updated 1994 home office guidelines on the work of a special branch the inquiry must consider whether this is intentional and the extent to which the lack of a definition for these nebulous terms allows the Met police
00:50:11 nebulous terms allows the Met police special branch and the SDS to justify spying without reference to specific policing
00:50:13 policing Powers the inquiry must also consider whether changes entr due to the focus of the security service are relevant to the Strategic shift in the SDS in 1991 the SDS began to place significant emphasis
00:50:26 SDS began to place significant emphasis on quote identifying suspects in breach of the law foreshadowing the increasing focus on the prevention of crime that will emerge in chch three the inquiry must probe whether the alleged change in
00:50:40 must probe whether the alleged change in the focus of the security service placed a greater burden on C Squad and the SDS to justify their activities and whether this contributed to a pressure to
00:50:51 this contributed to a pressure to produce more intelligence this is this is an issue that must be put to SDS managers who had oversight in this era but also to the under CS who should be
00:51:02 but also to the under CS who should be asked whether this had any impact on the requirements being communicated to them the inquiry is also asked to disclose all the Metropolitan Police Service and special Branch annual reports for trch to so that we can better understand the changing demands within special branch
00:51:13 changing demands within special branch and on this point it's noted that the DL lawyer cor participant grouping in their opening refer to a number of annual reports that we have not
00:51:24 reports that we have not seen at the start of tranch 2 the SS managers appear to be struggling to justify the unit's existence to the home office as is seen in tranch one there is more evidence of SDS managers overstating the utility of the SDS the justification of resource saving
00:51:43 justification of resource saving continues in tranch 2 with an occasional nod to the Metropolitan Police Service commissioner's policy of reducing the number of uniform police officers at public order events um the non-p police state cor participants in category H addressed the legality of the resource
00:51:57 addressed the legality of the resource justification extensively in opening and closing submissions for trch one and so you found that the SDS reporting assisted senior officers to avoid the deployment of large number of police officers when not required but that quote its contribution should not be overstated and quote a remarkable
00:52:10 overstated and quote a remarkable quantity of reports concern groups who activities had no bearing on the threat of public
00:52:16 of public disorder the non police state Corp participants agree with the conclusion in the inter report that quote the principal explanation for the reporting
00:52:31 principal explanation for the reporting and retention of this information cannot be that it provided material assistance to those responsible for maintaining public order in London it has to be sought
00:52:36 sought elsewhere in terms of public order the 1983 SDS annual report pointed to increasing volume of Demands on the SDS but this amounted to only a modest increase in the number of demonstrations that required more than 100 uniformed
00:52:50 that required more than 100 uniformed officers from 150 in the preceding year to
00:52:51 to 172 the request for funding was therefore grounded on the premise that there was an indication that less law-abiding elements within the annibal
00:53:02 law-abiding elements within the annibal Liberation and anti-nuclear groups would increase activities which threatened public order despite an acknowledgement that intelligence was being provided on groups whose main actions included peaceful
00:53:13 peaceful demonstrations the the 1984 SDS annual report requested funding from the home
00:53:25 report requested funding from the home office in part on the grounds that there had been quote no respite in political demonstrations and direct action by political extremists despite the annual report itself concluding that the SDS was operating in quote the relatively quiet or public order scene and that quote extremist groups have already have had a
00:53:37 groups have already have had a relatively quiet Year from a public order point of view rather than draw rational conclusions from the lack of threats from the groups being targeted the 1984 SDS Amy report sought to
00:53:48 the 1984 SDS Amy report sought to outline that the quiet year was a course for concern on account of the suggestion that the groups had been quote productively reorganizing and prep preparing for an opportunity which they can exploit the annual report concluded
00:54:04 can exploit the annual report concluded it is not possible to forecast what this will be and therefore there is always a need for vigilance further descriptions of acquir year are found in the 1985 SDS annual report this annual report
00:54:16 annual report this annual report defensively argued that the movement away from largescale peaceful demonstrations to direct action did not lessen the need for SDS intelligence this theme continued into
00:54:29 intelligence this theme continued into the 1986 SDS annual report with a shift in focus from large public demonstrations to quote various ad hoc single issue groups the SDS had no more to say about these ad hoc single issue groups other than the opaque suggestion that they
00:54:41 than the opaque suggestion that they remain potentially Troublesome the nonp police state Corp participants question whether this is in fact a euphemism for political embarrassment given the same SDS annual report boasts that SDS
00:54:54 SDS annual report boasts that SDS intelligence had managed to file two publicity stunts from the campaign against police repression which bore no question of violence occurring but did contain the potential for embarrassment
00:55:06 contain the potential for embarrassment of media attention through the unfurling of a banner at the royal wedding and a plan to d a message on The Lawns outside the Royal Apartments the 1986 SS annual
00:55:18 the Royal Apartments the 1986 SS annual report concluded speculatively that the runup to the next general election may lead to quote an overs spell into the streets of conflict between the British national party National front and the extreme left the relevance of the SDS as a unit responsible for providing Intelligence
00:55:32 responsible for providing Intelligence on Mass public order events was further diminished in 1987 by its by its own admission due to two factors first the reported continuation of the trend away from large scale demonstrations and
00:55:44 from large scale demonstrations and towards smaller ad hoc campaign groups and second the coming into force of the public order act 1986 in April 1987 under the public order act 1986
00:55:59 1987 under the public order act 1986 written notice was required for certain types of public Pro sessions with organizers facing the risk of prosecution if notice requirements were not met the inquiry must query whether a diminishing diminishing sense of relevance and utility is what led SDS
00:56:13 relevance and utility is what led SDS manages to place the arrests of Andrew Clark and Jeffrey Shepard friends and center of the 1987 SDS annual report and in the letter to the home office Clark and Shephard were referred to as being
00:56:24 and Shephard were referred to as being involved in quote militant animal rights movement
00:56:26 movement and whilst the annual report painted these arrests as a success story there is no real information about the involvement in and contribution to the
00:56:38 involvement in and contribution to the arrests to the events and arrests by SDS undercover officers actions which may well have been criminal whilst the 1988 SDS annual report an Associated correspondents referred to a Resurgence in Street
00:56:49 referred to a Resurgence in Street demonstrations the SDS appeared unable to identify any real corresponding increase to the risk of public disorder thus referring to an increase in the comp idence of extreme leftwing groups any purported increased threat to public
00:57:04 any purported increased threat to public order arising out of leftwing confidence was clearly not made out as it simply doesn't feature in the 1989 to 1990 SDS annual report this annual report instead Justified the SDS on the grounds that
00:57:20 Justified the SDS on the grounds that potential for disorder arising out of public protest quote is such that it requires continual scrutiny rather than being able to point to a threat of public disorder the report focused on the utility of the SDS and lowering the resources required at
00:57:36 and lowering the resources required at events where the estimates of proposed attendees given by the organizers uh were wildly optimistic by the time of the 1990 1991 SDS annual report the SDS managers were
00:57:49 SDS annual report the SDS managers were once again scrabbling around seeking to justify the utility of the SDS against the backdrop of the pole tax demonstrations and the Iraq war in the context of the pole tax protests it St ated that Undercovers had been able to quote fully identify to investigating
00:58:04 quote fully identify to investigating officers several persons who were seen to commit criminal acts and who were subsequently arrested and charged identifying persons is standard police work that could and should have been carried out by local police forces and by publication in the media it is
00:58:17 and by publication in the media it is not a sufficient justification for the SDS there's also no evidence that the SDS changed the way in which the pole tax protests were policed in reference to So-Cal extremist groups engaged in
00:58:29 to So-Cal extremist groups engaged in public order protest against the Iraq War the SDS is vaguely described as having provided quote vital current information concerning the policies and
00:58:40 information concerning the policies and activities of those groups at this stage there was no covering letter from the home office approving funding and so the inquiry must ask for an explanation from the home office as to what questions they asked and what they were told about
00:58:51 they asked and what they were told about the activities and justification for the SDS thank you 1991 saw a strategic shift in the operation of the SDS and whilst
00:59:05 in the operation of the SDS and whilst the operational aims remain the same as listed and set out on the 20th of May 1969 by Arthur Cunningham they were accompanied by the articulation of a fiveyear strategy to reassess deployments identify new fields of
00:59:17 deployments identify new fields of coverage and optimize coverage within existing Resources by 1992 the focus within the information gathering operational aim had apparently broadened out from militant left-wing extremists to militant political
00:59:34 extremists to militant political extremists whilst the operational aim of obtaining evidence relating to breaches of the law had been dropped referring only to the aim of identifying suspects it remains unclear from the evidence disclosed so far what reasons were behind the apparent shift in Focus save
00:59:48 behind the apparent shift in Focus save that the SDS appeared at this time to be grappling with the impact of disclosure requests being made during the course of criminal
00:59:56 criminal trials I'm now going to turn to the ad aacy of targeting authorizations by managers and so for you this is Page 27 paragraph 54 of your hard copy
01:00:10 paragraph 54 of your hard copy document in trch 2 phase one there is no evidence to suggest that SS undercover officers was subject to any of the strict controls as required by law for the type of surveillance engaged in by the SDS and in its decision making the
01:00:24 the SDS and in its decision making the key themes emerging out of trch 2 Phase 1 evidence of the undercover officers are of SDS manag and senior special Branch officers directly um take Taking targeting decisions but undercover officers describing minimal oversight
01:00:38 officers describing minimal oversight supervision and feedback by SDS managers including in relation to welfare the Undercovers are often left their own devices as to which groups to Target and they were given significant discretion the Undercovers do not describe SDS
01:00:52 the Undercovers do not describe SDS managers consistently and frequently reviewing the necessity or proportionality of SDS operations and deployments either before or during the deployment although there is evidence to suggest SDS managers knew
01:01:06 evidence to suggest SDS managers knew they should do this feedback was sought by SDS Managers from customers towards the end of tranch 2 not withstanding the level of Direction provided as to the initial targeting decision it's apparent that managerial oversight as to
01:01:17 that managerial oversight as to targeting remained light touch the initial targeting of the swp in July 1991 by h178 Trevor Morris was de
01:01:28 1991 by h178 Trevor Morris was de decided upon by SDS management as he was then quote more or less left to get on with it and developed his targeting as he thought appropriate hn 78 Trevor Morris does not recall any specific targeting um with generic tasking
01:01:40 targeting um with generic tasking communicated by a DCI di or DS at the twice weekly meetings and no real change or refinement in his tasking h65 John
01:01:53 or refinement in his tasking h65 John carry was not given any further guidance on the information he was expected to obtain there is some very limited evidence of managerial oversight and feedback on intelligence reporting but
01:02:08 feedback on intelligence reporting but this appears to be the exception minimal intervention took place with respect to the assessment of proportionality and necess necessity of some deployments once they were underway for example h88 Timothy Spence remained in place having infiltrated the Hackney branch of CND and he continued to report on CND in
01:02:23 and he continued to report on CND in 1986 despite managerial knowledge of him quote finding things slow and quote
01:02:34 quote finding things slow and quote being slightly underemployed as early as 1984 his own account of his pattern of working life was that quote there was more hanging out in socializing than formal
01:02:37 formal meetings despite a suggestion from the security service that he be moved to infiltrate the swp hm15 DCI waight made the managerial decision that he should remain in the
01:02:50 remain in the CND it also remains to be seen what consideration was given to the implications of infiltrating a so-called associate group of the SDS his intended target the lack of concern about reporting on associate groups
01:03:01 about reporting on associate groups indicates that the SDS viewed anyone engaged in political activity as fair game and they were consequently subject to a hoovering up of any personal data a question for the inquiry again is to
01:03:14 question for the inquiry again is to explore where the safeguards were in place in relation to Associated groups hn9 Malcolm shearing describes numerous months going by where he says he may
01:03:25 months going by where he says he may have had nothing to report on and he postulates that the office may have been tactful and even shredded a report of no significance he submitted to help justify his deployment He suggests that it would
01:03:37 deployment He suggests that it would have been obvious from his reports that the RCP BML were a diminishing group and that his deployment wasn't the best use of resources despite this he wasn't moved H in 19 States I was in a
01:03:48 moved H in 19 States I was in a comfortable rut and I didn't motivate this change even after detective Chief Inspector short accepted in a meeting with the security service that hn1 19's deployment was no longer Justified it
01:04:01 deployment was no longer Justified it took a further few months for hn9 to be ordered to move his targeting the inquiries also asked to scrutinize the evidence of trch 2 SDS managers about their role in authorizing and reviewing
01:04:15 and reviewing targeting for example in tranch one you recall sir that hn 307 Trevor Butler suggested that hn 65 John Ker's tasking to the CND may have occurred once he had left the SDS and that he had quote no
01:04:26 left the SDS and that he had quote no dealings with anybody reporting back on the CND yet evidence disclosed in trch 2 Phase 1 shows that Trevor Butler signed
01:04:39 Phase 1 shows that Trevor Butler signed off on hm65 is reporting on the CND and the evidence of hm65 is that the targeting of CN was arrived at quote by consensus with his managers now um in terms of the
01:04:52 managers now um in terms of the justification in respect of public order targeting the nonp state cor participants opening written opening summarizes the evidence in detail so I just want to make some short preliminary observations now on the evidence the
01:05:08 observations now on the evidence the resource justification is used in trch 2 Phase 1 by undercover officers as a justification for the SDS often in circumstances where there is no credible public order threat one example includes h65 John Kerry who states as far as I'm aware my reporting contributed to
01:05:20 aware my reporting contributed to effective policing of CND and other events and more efficient deployment and the use of PS resources for public order
01:05:33 the use of PS resources for public order as much by informing assessments to show that there was no real threat of public order suggestion that intelligence was sought to assist in effective policing must be viewed in the context of the intelligence reports there is ample evidence of reporting which appears otos
01:05:52 evidence of reporting which appears otos given the documented evidence of liaison between the organizers of PE peaceful events and the police with examples including CND and h65 John kery a further example can be found in an
01:06:04 further example can be found in an intelligence report from October 1983 from hn33 Lee bonser on the Lambeth peace Forum where she stated quote although local police have not yet been told of these plans one of the organizers intends to inform two or
01:06:15 organizers intends to inform two or three days uh intends to inform them two or three days before the event hn 78 Trevor Morris suggested that he provided a detailed report to assist in guiding
01:06:30 a detailed report to assist in guiding uniformed officers as to how the Welling demonstration should be pleased and yet he says this was ignored calling into question the purported public order value of the intelligence gleaned hm Roger Pius suggests that the SDS achieved the benefit of quote maintaining public tranquility and preventing public disorder as the
01:06:42 preventing public disorder as the intelligence quote enabled uniformed Branch uh to formulate a more effective policing plan for demonstrations however that justification inevitably requires heavy
01:06:55 justification inevitably requires heavy caving as he importantly states that he quote cannot give specific examples of this justification in practice in terms
01:07:08 this justification in practice in terms of the work of his colleagues because of the secrecy of the operations hn9 Mark kry states that the main objective of his deployment in the swp from 1988 onwards was to provide useful public order intelligence suggesting that such intelligence was vital because of the
01:07:21 intelligence was vital because of the fact that there was no requirement for demonstrators to theate of the police ahead of marches and pickets but he doesn't address the impact of the the coming into force of notification requirements of the public order act 1986 some undercover officers provide
01:07:33 1986 some undercover officers provide alternative justifications not seen in T1 for example H 65 John kery refers to the need to avoid political and diplomatic consequences that would follow if nonviolent direct action had
01:07:48 follow if nonviolent direct action had the significant potential to engage US security Personnel present on the airbase at greenham common H 25 Kevin Douglas refers to information that provided preventing quote National
01:08:00 provided preventing quote National embarrassment um and attempts to justify some of his reporting during his deployment LED hn9 Mark Kerry to suggest that he was gathering information which may help others recruit people as informant or
01:08:13 informant or sources some Undercovers do not even attempt to justify some of their intelligence gathering and tasking simply implying that the Gathering of limited information was also permissible
01:08:31 limited information was also permissible on the basis that it was quote all GR to the mill or alternatively as was heard in tranch one that it was the job of others to filter intelligence and determine its relevance now in relation to subversion in trch one Council the inquiry noted um
01:08:46 in trch one Council the inquiry noted um that in relation to the justification of the SDS in the context of subversion that quote no one appears to have considered whether after its introduction both limbs of the Harris definition were met and had they done so there is a strong case for concluding
01:08:59 there is a strong case for concluding that they should have decided to disband the SDS so you noted in the TR and interim report that the Harris definition of the subversion required the presence of a threat to the safety and well-being of the state which is an objective
01:09:08 objective consideration there was plainly no evidence of subversion in the open material in tranch one in tranch two the Security Service Act 1989 becomes law
01:09:19 Security Service Act 1989 becomes law but despite there being no reference to the term subversion the language of the Harris definition is reflected in section one two of the act the right honorable Douglas herd MP expanded upon
01:09:30 honorable Douglas herd MP expanded upon his predecessor's comment on subversion when he introduced the act in Parliament and stated the security service is not interested in the normal and proper conduct of the trade unions of this
01:09:46 conduct of the trade unions of this country it is not interested in thating those who seek to persuade others that government policies are wrong or that their priorities are wrong it is not interested in those who join together to make their views heard on for example the environment or on our defense
01:09:58 the environment or on our defense policies it is interested in any who might collectively or individually overtly or clandestinely be planning the deliberate overthrow of our parliamentary democracy and in doing so present a real threat to our security
01:10:12 present a real threat to our security and safety so you've already commented and identified the questionable unofficial approach to the definition of subversion in the confidential side letter that was attached to the 1984 home office guidelines on the work of a
01:10:26 home office guidelines on the work of a special Branch it contain the suggestion that a group engaging in lawful activities could be subversive if the long-term aims were subversive the nonp police state core participants await an explanation from the home office the
01:10:37 explanation from the home office the security service and the Metropolitan Police Service as to how the approach to subversion in the closed side letter was thought to be justified in tranch two
01:10:48 thought to be justified in tranch two and how it satisfied the requirement for an objective and quote real threat to our security and safety in the opening statement for trch Phase trch 2 Phase 1
01:11:00 statement for trch Phase trch 2 Phase 1 the Metropol and Police Service accepted that in respective groups who were considered by the security service to be subversive quote it is acknowledged that except in specific instances where individuals in those groups were
01:11:18 individuals in those groups were involved in serious crime or disorder or presented an active threat to National Security as opposed to Simply holding subversive views their long-term infiltration by uos on a just in case basis was a dispropor method to gather intelligence on
01:11:31 intelligence on them in terms of the justification and respect of subversion the following propositions derived from the tranch 2 Phase 1 disclosure the security service exercised influence on SDs tasking and targeting throughout tranch 2 making
01:11:42 targeting throughout tranch 2 making questionable demands and requests going beyond the official and unofficial defin
01:11:54 beyond the official and unofficial defin definition of subversion including after 1989 with the majority of ss product including vast amounts of sensitive personal data being sent to box 500 this indicates that despite the shift in its
01:12:07 indicates that despite the shift in its priorities the security service remained the main customer for the SDS in tranch to the disclosure also shows that SDS managers do not appear to quote exercise strict control over the selection of targets particularly where the activities were quote lisant and
01:12:24 activities were quote lisant and peaceful and there is no evidence that targeting was quote conducted with particular care in areas such as educational establishments trade unions and racial minorities and of course this was required in the 1984 guidelines many Undercovers admit that
01:12:38 guidelines many Undercovers admit that they were left to their own devices in so far as targeting was concerned and were given significant discretion under covers had a confused and inaccurate understanding of subversion which operated as a catchall approach and
01:12:51 operated as a catchall approach and there is a suggestion that the home office even designated a group as subversive as in March one and the covers did not appear to question or have the definition of subversion
01:13:06 have the definition of subversion clarified by managers there is evidence that SDS manag SDS managers themselves did not understand what constituted subversion there is evidence that SDS reporting was being used by the security service to determine whether a group was
01:13:18 service to determine whether a group was subversive as opposed to already meeting the
01:13:21 the threshold and the SDS also retained a cozy relationship with the security service with continuing trips to the pub and as noted by Mr Men on KC earlier
01:13:39 and as noted by Mr Men on KC earlier during the trch DU period Roger Pier had meetings with the security service desk officer which were facilitated by SDS management but described as being against official policy in the unredacted trans to phase one disclosure there is no evidence of subversion as understood by Parliament
01:13:56 subversion as understood by Parliament and many undercover officers accept that they did not witness actual subverse activity and I I want to make some comments on the SDS annual reports and how they deal with subversion so this is your page
01:14:05 your page 35 the SDS annual reports for tranch 2 do not directly address the definition of subversion and the 1983 annual report didn't even mention subversion between 1984 to 1986 the SDS annual reports
01:14:19 1984 to 1986 the SDS annual reports assert that it was the SS's duty to supply information to the special branch and security survey concerning individuals and organizations
01:14:34 concerning individuals and organizations considered to be subversive referring to the invaluable contribution made by the security service in monitoring subversive Elements by 1991 there appears to be the beginnings of an official recognition in the annual reports that the landscape
01:14:47 the annual reports that the landscape may be changing in terms of the security service interests and demands on the secur on the SDS by 1992 to 93 the quote long heralded changes in the study of sub ion
01:14:58 heralded changes in the study of sub ion by the SDS had led to a reduction in the number of reports that were being sent to box 500 um quote because of the new criteria in 1992 special Branch lost Primacy on
01:15:12 1992 special Branch lost Primacy on investigating Irish Republican terrorism on the mainland to the security service and hn9 Mark Kerry suggests that this led to a redirected attention and some resources away from counter subversion he claims that this change also
01:15:25 he claims that this change also reflected a new assessment of the threat from subversion in the United Kingdom due to the fall of Communism throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union the inquiry must question whether the shift in the regulation of security
01:15:36 the shift in the regulation of security service impacted on the SDS and whether there's any link to the emergence of the new self-identified area of work for the SDS in the 1993 1994 SDS annual report
01:15:54 SDS in the 1993 1994 SDS annual report to the quote irritant and often unlawful activity of groups which included quote Environmental ecological activism whatever the official position um SDS position in TR to the security service were clearly interested in
01:16:05 service were clearly interested in environmental activists for example in 1991 the security service asked hn 86 if hm5 John dines could give them an update on the anarchist London Green Piece from
01:16:18 on the anarchist London Green Piece from a monitoring point of view the SDS noted to F4 of the security service that there are only four hardcore members that the
01:16:30 are only four hardcore members that the group had been infiltrated by McDonald's and that the latter was taking out injunctions against lgp for lious literature hn 86 that said that he would ask hm5 to produce an update on the
01:16:41 ask hm5 to produce an update on the group now in terms of influence of the security service on SDs targeting whilst the 1983 SDS annual report referred to the final decision on targeting resting with the officer in charge of the unit it acknowledged that
01:16:55 charge of the unit it acknowledged that to avoid duplication of effort by other sources the initial placing of each officer is arrived at by reference to Squad Chief superintendent and the security service to ensure greater customer
01:17:06 customer satisfaction a prime example of the security service influence targeting influence on targeting in the earlier part of tranch 2 is the continuing targeting of the CND throughout 1981 to
01:17:22 targeting of the CND throughout 1981 to 1986 by h65 John kery and hn 88 Timothy Spence h65 John Ker's reporting on the cnd's spectacular growth in membership in 1982 was praised by the security service in a letter to the deputy
01:17:35 service in a letter to the deputy assistant commissioner special branch on the 22nd of February 1982 um stating expressing thanks for the use report on the quote relative influence of the various subversive
01:17:50 influence of the various subversive groups within CND which Accords very well with our own thinking specific requests were made by the security service for information relating to nonviolent Direct direct action training workshops and these were provided despite the security service language
01:18:03 despite the security service language relating to subversive groups within CND hm65 John kery accepts that his experience of CND at all levels and the vast majority of its membership only
01:18:15 vast majority of its membership only supported peaceful activities whilst the view of the SDS was made clear in March 1984 that quote there was no effective ring of subversives unduly influencing the Democratic structure of the CND but reporting continued on what appears to
01:18:26 reporting continued on what appears to be the result of the security services having quote put their case face by face on the
01:18:32 on the matter despite the security services putting their case in 1984 the absence of a credible subversive threat was acknowledged even by tasking under
01:18:45 acknowledged even by tasking under covers with keeping an eye open for any major
01:18:48 major change justification was therefore based on a projection of subversion rather than the reality of it that this was unjustified was plainly known by special
01:19:00 unjustified was plainly known by special branch and the security service hence an apparent discussion about reviewing the infiltration of CND following the Parliamentary Select Committee in January
01:19:08 January 1985 by October 1986 the SDS was still offering the security service the opportunity to request the infiltration of CND asking whether Security Service wish to support a successor by which
01:19:20 wish to support a successor by which point security service was adamant that there was no such requirement however evidence shows that the SDS continued reporting on the CND and those intelligence reports were provided to
01:19:31 intelligence reports were provided to the security service via box 500 even as late as November 1986 once the contemporaneous documents show reference to deployments being made or information being pro provided at the
01:19:44 or information being pro provided at the request of security services in order to report on subversive elements h88 Timothy Spence denies his work was in pursuit of intelligence gathering on subversives um threats at all stating I would not consider these groups to be
01:19:59 would not consider these groups to be subversive in any common use of the word their aims were to improve particular aspects of society from their point of view rather than overthrow the current workings of the state and covers also participated in an approach of hoovering
01:20:13 participated in an approach of hoovering up and filtered intelligence and related to the group in which they had been deployed sometimes plainly at the direction of senior officers for example h65 John Kerry received an instruction from a manager in esquad who commented while you're gliding down the River
01:20:25 while you're gliding down the River don't forget to glance at the banks which was taken to mean that information quote however peripheral or even wholly
01:20:38 quote however peripheral or even wholly unrelated should be delivered to office staff to allow them to determine the importance now just turning to prevention and detection of crime nonp
01:20:49 prevention and detection of crime nonp police state Corp participants will deal with this topic in trch 2 phase two so I'll just make some brief points it's imposs whether the SDS prevented or detected any crime in respect of the trans to phase one undercover officers on this issue the SDS annual reports cannot be relied on as accurate and
01:21:01 cannot be relied on as accurate and impartial contemporaneous documents given the tendency towards exaggeration seen in tranch one the nonp police state cor
01:21:13 one the nonp police state cor participants have yet to see any special Branch threat assessments or feedback from the customers of SDS reporting the nonp police state core participants notee that in the 1992 to 3 SDS annual report on their own admission SDS managers conceded that they had
01:21:32 SDS managers conceded that they had little insight into how to measure the accuracy and relevancy of their work noting that quote the SDS is unique within the British Police Service nevertheless from the extremely small
01:21:44 nevertheless from the extremely small sample size of the survey that went to special Branch 222 surveys and 133 replies only 39% said the S the S
01:21:55 replies only 39% said the S the S reporting uh was useful 60% said it was of interest and a mere 27.8 one perent thought it was accurate from the security service um when they were sent customer feedback they there were 39 replies from a 10% sample the responses indicate that only one customer out of
01:22:11 indicate that only one customer out of the 39 replies considered that the SDS product was extremely valuable at the cusp of T2 to trch 2 to tranch 3 in 1992 the SDS had produced
01:22:25 tranch 3 in 1992 the SDS had produced 1,425 reports with only 611 apparently relating to events affecting public order even on their own evidence the SDS remained preoccupied by producing totally unjustifiable reporting for the security service much of which was
01:22:41 security service much of which was inaccurate and had no value and I want to turn to make some comments about operational governance and oversight so this is now page 41 of your hard document dealing first with the government and the home
01:22:52 government and the home office so you found in the interim report that the home office took little if any interest in the activities of the SDS and received little information about them between 1977 and
01:23:04 about them between 1977 and 1982 as of 1984 the home office was requesting to have more information about the groups and activities at the focus of the SS's work via discussions
01:23:15 focus of the SS's work via discussions with the special Branch the request for discussions acknowledged the inevitable political sensitivity of this sort of
01:23:28 political sensitivity of this sort of operation the the timing of this request is potentially significant coming after the publication of the police accountability report in January 1983 which put the home office on notice that SDS targeting had quote gone too
01:23:39 that SDS targeting had quote gone too far in targeting normal and legitimate political activity following a suggestion from Michael Partridge Deputy under secretary for police Affairs to assistant commissioner crime John Del that it would be helpful to know which
01:23:53 that it would be helpful to know which groups were the focus of the SDS a visit took place on the 5th of June 1984 by Roy Harrington F4 division of the home office to Commander Peter felen this occurred at the instigation of Brian s
01:24:04 occurred at the instigation of Brian s Brian cubin who was quote concerned to know that the SDS could be defended as a current response to current problems and was not just something which had been allowed to drift on after having been set up for a specific purpose in
01:24:20 set up for a specific purpose in 1968 having been shown the 1983 SDS annual report by Peter felen Roy Harrington expressed The View that he had enough material to quote allay so Brian Cuban's fears and he later
01:24:36 Brian Cuban's fears and he later confirmed in a letter dated 16th of July 1984 that both Michael Partridge and S Brian cubbin were content with the squad's role including how it had been adapted this level of interrogation led to a proposal by Deputy assistant
01:24:48 to a proposal by Deputy assistant commissioner Colin hwit to provide more information on groups targeted in the annual Grant request letters to the home office
01:24:54 office F the discussion with Peter felen appears to have been proposed for 1985 and in 1986 during John K Jil cot's
01:25:05 and in 1986 during John K Jil cot's early weeks commanding officer St Simon CAW took the SDS annual report to him and discussed the contents now it is of real significance that the 1987 SDS
01:25:17 real significance that the 1987 SDS annual report was seen by the then Home Secretary Douglas herd Who quote expressed his approval at the work referred to in a letter from from Deputy under Secretary of State sent in 1988 it appears that the work being
01:25:29 1988 it appears that the work being referred to was the infiltration of groups leading to the arrest of Andrew Clark and Jeffrey Shepard this letter has not been disclosed by the inquiry so it is not yet known whether the Home Secretary saw
01:25:47 yet known whether the Home Secretary saw the 1987 SDS annual report report before or after he addressed Parliament on the security service bill in December 1988 governance Arrangements do not appear to have been made by the home
01:26:00 appear to have been made by the home office in respect of the SDS because any of these because of any of these discussions suggesting that the effective practice seen in tranch one of the home office rubber stamping the SDS continued into tranch two by tranch two the structural permanency of the SDS
01:26:14 the structural permanency of the SDS appears to have become accepted in the mind of the home office as in 1989 the need for formal ongoing annual review and funding correspondence on the groups being targeted by the SDS ceased
01:26:25 groups being targeted by the SDS ceased the question of the authorization of the SDS was then then transferred to the MPS and ultimately to the special Branch this decision was taken by the deputy and Secretary of State in
01:26:38 and Secretary of State in 1989 and was made with the Proviso that any quote significant change to the squad's role targeting an operational practice would quote refi require further consultation thus leaving the
01:26:50 further consultation thus leaving the SDS with even more autonomy compared to tranch
01:26:54 tranch one now the Metropolitan Police Service at the highest level was preoccupied with embarrassment the home office was on notice that SDS undercover officers were being used um to prevent embarrassment to the state where there
01:27:11 embarrassment to the state where there was no public order threat the campaign against police repression is described within the 1986 annual report as espousing nonviolence in support of its aim which was opposing the public order bill but that it had the potential for causing severe embarrassment for the
01:27:27 causing severe embarrassment for the state and in a letter of February second of February 1986 to Michael Partridge um from John Del seeking authorization for funding for the SDS
01:27:38 authorization for funding for the SDS for a further 12 months there is again that reference to filing of two publicity stunts surrounding the royal wedding which I've already
01:27:50 wedding which I've already mentioned Al the SS annual report of 1989 sets out information about the approach to targeting there is no evidence that this or any subse reports were reviewed by the home office
01:28:03 were reviewed by the home office including actual intelligence reporting a later SS annual report for 199 1991 acknowledges the political sensitivity of the SS operation and refers to that as a reason for taking
01:28:16 refers to that as a reason for taking great care to ensure the targeting and penetration of an organization can be fully Justified on the basis of the commissioner's responsibility for preservation of public order in the Metropolis there is no evidence in March
01:28:29 Metropolis there is no evidence in March 2 Phase 1 to suggest that this purported Renewed Energy to take great care on targeting decisions arose from any feedback or oversight from the home office despite earlier concerns around the police accountability report throughout the Char two period
01:28:43 report throughout the Char two period the Home Secretary remains accountable for the actions of special branch and security service and this was indicated by the Secretary State for the home Department um Kenneth Clark in 1992
01:28:55 Department um Kenneth Clark in 1992 the evidence given by hm 307 Trevor Butler in trch one phase 3 was that once a month he met with an individual from the home office who had a role in
01:29:06 the home office who had a role in enabling SDS operations evidence should be sought on whether this practice continued Beyond hn 307 Trev Butler's time which concluded in around January 1982 the details of any invol
01:29:21 1982 the details of any invol individuals involved and any Associated material should be obtained and disclosed the January 2015 in investigation into links between the SDS and the home office which as we know is called the Taylor report concluded that when funding ceased in 1989 no
01:29:34 when funding ceased in 1989 no accountability was required until the SDS closed in 2008 and no significant
01:29:46 SDS closed in 2008 and no significant evidence was identified of any links to the home office throughout this period the Taylor report noted that detailed file searches failed to identify relevant documents and despite the availability of a consistent file reference there's no record to show
01:29:57 reference there's no record to show where the file is or when it may have been destroyed the report notes that this is a concern quote given that the material would have been classified as secret or top secret it is not possible
01:30:08 secret or top secret it is not possible to conclude whether this is human error or deliberate concealment it is inconceivable that there was not continued information sharing in liaison between the SDS and the home office throughout the trch 2
01:30:21 the home office throughout the trch 2 period hn 78 Trevor Morris states that the Home Secretary himself along with the commissioner wish to visit an SDS safe house to thank undercover officers for the intelligence provided relating to the Welling demonstration on 16th of October
01:30:33 October 1993 the the inquiry should obtain a fuller picture of the state of knowledge of the home office during this period including an explanation for the
01:30:44 including an explanation for the apparent strategic change which took place from around 1990 now in terms of wider government knowledge beyond the home office evidence disclosed in trch one phase 1
01:30:56 evidence disclosed in trch one phase 1 soorry charch 2 Phase 1 indicates that the SDS had customers at the highest levels within government including the then prime minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher h133 Lee bomser States in respect of a conversation she had with
01:31:09 respect of a conversation she had with the superintendent prior to joining the SDS quote at our meeting he indicated that the Prime Minister wanted to know what the green and women were doing and so he the superintendent was asking
01:31:24 so he the superintendent was asking whether I would be interested in helping the police find out given the extent to which the then prime minister and her ministers were concerned about the embarrassment being caused to the UK government by the women of greenham common this was an opportunity for the SDS to please those at the very top of government reminiscent of Chief
01:31:36 government reminiscent of Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon's original offer to do something about groups which were embarrassing the government of the day in 1980 sorry
01:31:47 in 1980 sorry 1968 and to attempt to justify itself on a more national scale the state in turn benefited from by being able to utilize a secret unit which would pass under the Public's radar in this instance to
01:31:59 Public's radar in this instance to undermine the movement at greenham common in effect acting in a fundamentally undemocratic way so as to interfere with popular opposition to what was an unpopular government
01:32:15 policy now turning to Metropolitan Police Service operational governance and
01:32:19 and oversight the SDS closing report concludes that the SDS directed operations with quote significant Tactical latitude with a minimal organizational
01:32:30 organizational constraints end of quotes this is likely because of the special treatment afforded to the unit quote there is no doubt that the sdfs operation was perceived as the duwel in the special banch crown and the level of support
01:32:43 banch crown and the level of support afforded by the top echelons of the SPs was reflected in the number of visits made to their offsite premises by senior officers end of quote hn 85 Roger Pier
01:32:55 officers end of quote hn 85 Roger Pier States the white security infrastructure held the SDS in high regard because of its operational effectiveness in tranch 2 there were more regular visits by undercover officers to undercover officers by senior metr Colton Police
01:33:09 officers by senior metr Colton Police Service officers by January 1984 it was well known to the deputy assistant commissioner that deployments were envisioned to be a four-year period so he issued instructions to be provided
01:33:21 he issued instructions to be provided with proposed deployment dates SS annual reports refer to visits to the safe house Flat 1986 and 1987 from the assistant commissioner J Del involving quote an exchange of views described as friendly and constructive on both
01:33:35 friendly and constructive on both occasions AC Del as well as Deputy AC CER CAW were fully appraised of all aspects of the SDS operation and clearly failed to ask probing questions or
01:33:46 failed to ask probing questions or Institute any proper process of scrutiny from within the Metropolitan Police Service friendly discussion was clearly no substitute for formalized oversight Arrangements the picture that begins to emerge very clearly in tranch 2 Phase 1 is of
01:34:01 clearly in tranch 2 Phase 1 is of managers being aware condoning and even promoting some of the most abor tradecraft with such practices becoming further sened as tradecraft in later tranches for example h67 Alan Bond who was alleged to have fathered a child
01:34:13 was alleged to have fathered a child through a sexual relationship with an activist whilst deployed returned to the SDS as a detective inspector and second in command between 1991 and 1993
01:34:26 in command between 1991 and 1993 h& 10 Bob Lambert allegedly responsible for a wide range of abor behavior during his time um became a detective inspector managing the SDS from 1993 into the
01:34:41 managing the SDS from 1993 into the tranch 3 period Lambert was also heavily involved in the nent mentoring scheme h85 Roger Pius became Commander operations with oversight of the SDS in October
01:34:46 October 1996 followed by a concurrent role as director of intelligence for S10 and so1 in October 1998 various officers officers including hm67 Allan Bond took up roles as mentors to
01:34:59 Allan Bond took up roles as mentors to incoming SDS officers and are recorded as having provided extended counseling at times of added stress related to
01:35:11 at times of added stress related to activities of former field officers the inquiry must investigate whether a handful of the worst offending undercover officers played a significant part in aor trade craft continuing through through the later tranches category H demonstrated in
01:35:22 tranches category H demonstrated in their tranch one closing statement the extent to which metropola Police Service officers including Commissioners viewed legal constraints upon police action as an impediment to policing which they were required to evade the nonp police
01:35:35 were required to evade the nonp police state Corp participants question where there a similar sense of arrogance and superiority within SDS management continued into tranch two as the SDS 2009 closing report details quote
01:35:50 2009 closing report details quote officers were not required to attend the national undercover training and assessment course by their management M after its introduction as it was not seen by the SDS management as appropriate for what was considered a unique
01:36:04 unique operation now the topics of selection training management and care of undercover officers Recruitment and vetting are all dealt with in the non police state core participants written opening and clearly given the pressures of time I'm not going to be talking
01:36:15 of time I'm not going to be talking about those matters today but I will if I may say a few comments about targeting um and this is page 60
01:36:26 um and this is page 60 of your written document so in trch one the SS developed a trade craft to monitor Family Justice and defense campaigns including those with some element of anti-racism campaigning and those focused on police racism
01:36:42 those focused on police racism harassment and police brutality on the cusp of tranch 2 the SDS also became interested in reporting on the activities of police monitoring groups and police accountability groups in trch two SDS reporting on defense and Family
01:36:55 two SDS reporting on defense and Family Justice campaigns police accountability and monitoring groups and anti-racist groups exploded former undercover officer Peter Francis has stated that his tasking was to find out quote any intelligence that might be used by the
01:37:12 intelligence that might be used by the MPS to smear the Lawrence Family now the evidence in trch one and tranch 2 phase one and in particular the actions and reporting of hm12 Mike Harley hn 88 Timothy Spence and hm25 Kevin Douglas illustrate the extent to which category category G so that's the family of
01:37:23 category G so that's the family of Steven Lawrence Dwayne Brooks OB and Michael Mansfield KC fall squarely into the sidelines and established SDS Trad craft as matters stood at the end of the trch 2
01:37:35 trch 2 period the home office and senior members of the Metropolitan Police Service were aware that the SDS was reporting on Justice and defense
01:37:46 reporting on Justice and defense campaigns as well as on polic related pressure groups and tacitly or explicitly approved this apart from the clear and consistent references to
01:37:57 clear and consistent references to police accountability groups and defense and Justice campaigns in the annual reports there is a letter from J chilcott of the home home office dated the 16th of June 1987 thanking Deputy
01:38:08 the 16th of June 1987 thanking Deputy assistant commissioner hn 603 Simon CAW of the Metropolitan Police Service for bringing the latest 1986 uh SDS annual report over and discussing it with chil cot during his early weeks stating that quote we are content with the report of
01:38:20 quote we are content with the report of these activities over the past year and the way in which it has plan they should be conducted in the future now this annual report sets out the direct penetration or close
01:38:31 the direct penetration or close monitoring of amongst others the Guilford 4 campaign this was the year of Peter uh in Lord Peter int's appointment as commissioner of the Metropolitan
01:38:51 as commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service the significance of this will not be lost on the inquiry Lord Peter rimbert as Deputy head of the Metropolitan Police anti-terrorist branch in
01:38:55 branch in 1974 was the police officer who oversaw the arrest and interrogation of the Guilford fall an investigation that was later characterized by law chief justice Lane as quote a sequence of false confessions and police
01:39:09 confessions and police deceits the extent of the SDS tradecraft of targeting and Reporting on a full range of campaign groups in tranch 2 can be placed in Stark Technicolor by reflecting on some of the various campaign groups with special Branch special Branch registry files
01:39:25 Branch special Branch registry files which feature in SD reporting in T2 P1 and I'm just going to read out a non-exhaustive list of some of those groups so Under The Heading Family Justice campaigns we have the friends of
01:39:40 Justice campaigns we have the friends of Blair Peach the gross family support and Community defense campaign Joy Gardner Memorial campaign the roach family support committee the Trevor monaville campaign and the heading Community campaigns we have the Hackney Community defense Association the Hackney legal
01:39:54 defense Association the Hackney legal defense committee the Hackney solidarity solidarity campaign Lambeth police consultative committee south or black sisters new and mon monitoring project The Stoke Newington and Hackney
01:40:09 The Stoke Newington and Hackney Community defense campaign under defense campaigns we have the Broadwater Farm defense campaign the Tottenham 3 the free Birmingham 6 campaign the free the Guilford 4 campaign the newm 7 defense
01:40:23 Guilford 4 campaign the newm 7 defense campaign the newm 8 defense campaign and the Danny mne support group and antiracism groups we have the anti-racist alliance the East London workers Against Racism the East London campaign against racist attacks and police harassment workers Against Racism in the anti-nazi league under police
01:40:37 in the anti-nazi league under police accountability and monitoring groups we have the GLC police committee support unit under community centers the Colin roach Center and the newm Civil Rights Center and under ngos we have inquest
01:40:52 Center and under ngos we have inquest The Institute of race relations and the National Council for civil liberties obviously now known as Liberty moving on to the targeting of members of parliament and elected politicians in trch Two Face Wess we've seen in tranch one senior MPS and SDS
01:41:04 seen in tranch one senior MPS and SDS managers gave no consideration to the threat to democracy and the political and Democratic process of the mass
01:41:15 and Democratic process of the mass Gathering of Intelligence on elected politicians elected representatives political organizations and those involved in lawful political activity during tranch 2 the SDS directly penetrated all Coast monitored labor
01:41:26 penetrated all Coast monitored labor briefing a magazine produced by members of the labor party whose contributors included Tony Ben MP and Jeremy Corin MP the labor committee on Ireland a pressure group within the left wing of the labor party which sought British
01:41:39 the labor party which sought British withdrawal from Northern Ireland was also directly penetrated or closely monitored from April 1989 to the end of March 1990 and during the year from April
01:41:48 April 1990 the nonp police state Corp participants written opening contains much further detail on how elected politicians feature in the trans 2 Phase 1
01:41:58 1 material moving on to trade unions reporting on trade unions occurred in tranch 2 and the disclosure shows that it clearly went further than simply monitoring industrial disputes of
01:42:13 simply monitoring industrial disputes of public order but was part of the broader ideological and anti-democratic attack on the entire left which treated Trade union membership synonymously with subversion in this sense the reporting on the labor party elected politicians
01:42:25 on the labor party elected politicians and trade unions are all facets of the same problem within the special branch in tranch one and tranch 2 and should be seen in this border light the nonp state core participants written opening
01:42:36 core participants written opening contains much further detail on how trade unions and their support groups were targeted and reported on in tranch to but I do just want to mention now very briefly the extensive targeting in
01:42:54 very briefly the extensive targeting in trch 2 Phase 1 material of minor support groups supporting striking miners um as a particularly Stark example of unjustified political policing the 1984 annual report notes that miners support groups were effectively penetrated by SDS officers some examples include hn12
01:43:10 SDS officers some examples include hn12 Mike Harley going with the S WP to South Wales in March 1985 reporting on a group who were providing the strike support committee and local miners with cash and food even reporting on food distribution hn33 Lee
01:43:22 reporting on food distribution hn33 Lee bonds are reported on speeches given by minor wives and hn 67 Alan Bond reported on when a coach uh carrying food for Miners and their families would leave
01:43:34 Miners and their families would leave cuden now turning to spying on lawyers um which has been dealt with briefly by Mr Men on casc already today there is clear overlap between monitoring and direct targeting Justice and defense
01:43:48 direct targeting Justice and defense campaigns and lawyers in trunch 2 the evidence before this inquiry overwhelmingly demonstrates that to maximize intelligence gathering at all costs and justify police action and gain a litigation Advantage SDS managers
01:44:01 a litigation Advantage SDS managers oversaw the development of a practice of intrusive SDS reporting on lawyers and material subject to L um uh litigation privilege with no sense that such
01:44:12 privilege with no sense that such monitoring or targeting would be legal properly Justified or in any way proportionate this was evidently enabled by a culture of disregard for legal or ethical norms and an utter lack of appreciation for the rule of law
01:44:23 appreciation for the rule of law unacceptable in a Democratic Society this also Dem demonstrates the total disregard which both the SDS and the special Branch had for the rights of individuals to obtain advice and legal
01:44:38 individuals to obtain advice and legal representation the nonp police state cor participants written opening statement also deals with what the trch 2 Phase 1 material reveals on SDs targeting and race the farri right blacklisting and vetting conscious and subconscious
01:44:54 vetting conscious and subconscious sexism and misogyny abor reporting STDs yes under cour of officers committing criminal offenses and acting as aent
01:45:03 provocator now so I'm just looking at the time I've got a few comments to make on procedural issues which hopefully I will get done by half past when I know the stenographer needs to break so you're doing very well forgive me for interrupting you're doing very well
01:45:15 interrupting you're doing very well indeed and I know that she is perfectly content for you to continue until you finish uh you are doing expeditiously thank you thank you so um so for your benefit I'm now moving back to the beginning of the written document that
01:45:28 beginning of the written document that you have so that's going to be page four of your
01:45:29 of your document when on the 29th of June 2023 the then Home Secretary swell braan laid the interim report before Parliament she noted that this first report has taken
01:45:44 noted that this first report has taken eight years to compile at a cost of 64 million a significant amount of which has been spent on legal costs I know that those affected by the issues under examination will wish this inquiry to come to conclusion swiftly so as to bring accountability and closure the
01:45:57 bring accountability and closure the government are engaged with the inquiry chair and continue to stress the importance of delivering as soon as practicable at a meeting with the U members of the inquiry legal team on the 27th of September 2023 the inquiry
01:46:10 27th of September 2023 the inquiry unexpectedly announced that it would produce its final report by November of 2026 the inquiry website now confirms that the final report is to be published by December
01:46:21 by December 2026 this inquiry has clearly been placed under intolerable pressure by the home office to come to its final conclusions sooner than originally envisaged the nonp
01:46:35 than originally envisaged the nonp police state Corp participants can only assume that the rationale behind this decision by the home office is to save costs however it's also become clear in the leadup to the trch two evidential hearings that the imposition of this
01:46:50 hearings that the imposition of this arbitrary end date by the home office has led to the inquiry managing disclosure in a manner that has resulted in huge personal and emotional burden being placed on the nonp state Corp participants whil it's profoundly
01:47:02 participants whil it's profoundly impacting on the ability of many of them to effectively participate in tranch 2 Phase 1 in short some nonp police state cor participants have been unable to
01:47:19 cor participants have been unable to prepare their witness statements as they were not provided with all the relevant disclosure in a timely manner and some provided statements while disclosure remains
01:47:20 remains outstanding the problems surrounding late disclosure must be seen against a backdrop of repeated Promises of disclosure to some nonp police state
01:47:33 disclosure to some nonp police state Corp participants which have simply not be met by the inquiry and some non-p police state cor participants were denied access to the tranch 2 Phase 1 open hearing bundle until um they had submitted their witness statements many
01:47:44 submitted their witness statements many non police state core participants have been asked to provide witness statements after receiving limited and redacted disclosure that the inquiry consider considers quote relevant and necessary
01:47:55 considers quote relevant and necessary only a small number of core participants have been given disclosure of unredacted statements from former undercover officers many non police state Corp
01:48:07 officers many non police state Corp participants have been disclosed only a fraction of the statements and are prohibited from speaking to each other about the material thus frustrating their ability to understand and comment on The Wider context it is difficult for the non-p
01:48:25 context it is difficult for the non-p state co- participants to understand the justification for withholding access to the hearing bundle and generally limiting disclosure to the non- police state Corp participants where such disclosure has either been served on and or and or already seen by many of the
01:48:40 or and or already seen by many of the other state core participants in what is an inquisitorial process this is particularly so given this inquiry has been established so that those who have been subjected to historical policing injustices abuses and miscarriages of
01:48:54 injustices abuses and miscarriages of Justice can understand the truth about how the state violated their fundamental rights the nonp police state core
01:49:06 rights the nonp police state core participants consider that in adopting this approach the inquiry has lost a valuable opportunity to obain their perspective on the totality of the material it will be difficult to rectify this during the limited time
01:49:18 rectify this during the limited time available in the evidential hearings and in circumstances where certain individuals with the knowledge to assist the inquir will not even be giving evidence the nonp police state core participants remind the inquiry that
01:49:30 participants remind the inquiry that they have valuable evidence to give on The Wider context and the linkages between deployments and SDS tradecraft which may not be immediately apparent to the inquiry when determining the
01:49:42 the inquiry when determining the relevance of documents for each non-p police state call participant now the nonp police state cor participants in tranch 3 have
01:49:54 cor participants in tranch 3 have observed the mounting procedural crisis in tranch 2 and are deeply concerned about the implications this has for future tranches which will be investigating more recent police practices going into the 21st century and where the quantity of available evidence is likely to increase it
01:50:12 evidence is likely to increase it appears from recent correspondence with the inquiry that the intense pressure from the government to conclude this inquiry by 2026 may lead to the exclusion of crucial evidence in trch three the nonp police state core participants note that they have provided the inquiry with
01:50:25 they have provided the inquiry with information about spying on groups in tranch 3 but those groups are not currently listed on the ucpi website now the inquiry has responded as follows quote some rlrs have raised queries in
01:50:44 quote some rlrs have raised queries in respect of groups and campaigns which do not have CP status for the avoidance of Doubt separate disclosure will not be given in respect of these groups campaigns the inquiry is working to a very tight timetable and extensions of time will not be given now this means that many of the most
01:50:55 now this means that many of the most important groups from the trch 3 era will not receive disclosure and group statements which have been offered to the inquiry will not be
01:51:06 the inquiry will not be sought some disclosure pertaining to these groups may be received by individual nonp police state cor participants because they happen to be named within the documents but that will not provide a complete picture of the
01:51:19 not provide a complete picture of the extent of the spying particularly as the inquiry has stated quote we do not expect costs to be incurred by a lengthy review of documents evidence should be concise and focus on the questions asked so the nonp police state Corp
01:51:33 asked so the nonp police state Corp participants remind the inquiry that it is a clear requirement of its terms of reference to investigate whether and to what purpose extent and effect undercover police operations of targeted political and social justice
01:51:44 political and social justice campaigners that cannot be done without hearing proper evidence from individuals associated with groups that were spied on by multiple undercover officers from both the SDS and the national public
01:51:56 both the SDS and the national public order intelligence unit often for years and often um over a long period of time at present who gives that evidence and the questions to be asked about it will
01:52:11 the questions to be asked about it will be established quote on the basis of the material the inquiry legal team has reviewed to date so in other words that means the evidence provided by the police this approach in effect Sidelines the core participant ANS and civilian
01:52:23 the core participant ANS and civilian Witnesses in this inquiry allowing the perpetrators of the abuse the police to frame what evidence is to be gathered the nonp state core participants considered this is a completely
01:52:41 considered this is a completely unacceptable approach and they urged the inquiry to reconsider its position and to engage with the concerns of nonp police state co- participants from tranch 2 and tranch four the nonp police state cor participants wish to make clear that whilst it's important for this inquiry to progress its work
01:52:53 this inquiry to progress its work without unnecessary delay this should not come at the expense of accountability the nonp police state Corp participants asked the inquiry to formally recognize the disadvantage
01:53:04 formally recognize the disadvantage faced by all of them in this inquiry the inquir is asked to further reflect on and clarify how moving forward it will ensure that there is fair and equal treatment of all cor participants in this
01:53:13 this inquiry now the nonp police state cor participants have also been made aware that certain significant undercover officers are outside the jurisdiction and are refused to cooperate with the
01:53:26 and are refused to cooperate with the inquiry by returning to give evidence this includes for example hn 88 and hn33 who uh have provided statements but are refusing to return to the United
01:53:37 are refusing to return to the United Kingdom to give evidence and they are of course very important undercover officers there is also hn 95 Stefan
01:53:49 officers there is also hn 95 Stefan Scutt hn11 Mike chitty and hn5 John dyes there may be other undercover officers but these are the ones we know about including for CH to phase two the nonp police state Corp participants have expressed a view consider that it's disgraceful that these former officers
01:54:04 disgraceful that these former officers who have retired on pensions funded by taxpayers are able to avoid accountability for their actions they consider that the inquiry should take all steps to ensure oral evidence can be
01:54:17 all steps to ensure oral evidence can be obtained from former undercover officers who no doubt will return to the United Kingdom in key holiday periods so the non police state participants ask that the inquiry considers again using its
01:54:29 the inquiry considers again using its powers under section 21 of the inquiries act 205 backed up with appropriate enforcement this will send a strong message to all future undercover officers who are considering
01:54:41 officers who are considering deliberately evading giving evidence to this
01:54:48 inquiry the nonp police state corant understand that in charch 2 there are 15 undercover officers whose evidence will be considered in closed proceedings and that the inquiry intends to provide extracts of the statements of these
01:55:03 extracts of the statements of these undercover officers as the inquiry knows the nonp police state core participants are concerned that in the first set of closed hearings which took place in tranch one which are termed tranch one phase 4 the non police state Corp participants were unable to play any
01:55:14 participants were unable to play any meaningful role despite requests both in previous hearings submissions and correspondence the inquiry has indicated that no formal protocol for closed hearings will be published in tranch one phase 4 there was no opportunity
01:55:25 phase 4 there was no opportunity afforded to the non-p police state cor participant groupings to ask the inquiry to pursue legitimate further questions
01:55:36 to pursue legitimate further questions arising from the evidence given in the closed sessions the nonp police state courp participants are extremely concerned that this inquiry will increasingly rely on closed proceedings such a development would be unprecedented in a public inquiry such
01:55:50 unprecedented in a public inquiry such as this and it would fundamentally limit the ability of nonp police state Corp participants and the public to participate and learn the truth about why they were spied on by the SDS with the passage of time the nonp police stakehold participants once again query
01:56:01 stakehold participants once again query whether closed hearings and sessions are necessary and if they are they should be an absolute Last Resort by um in this inquiry so in conclusion the nonp police state Corp
01:56:16 conclusion the nonp police state Corp participants wish to remind the inquiry that they are not in an equal position to state core participants who are either The Originators or asset holders of the closure the nonp police state Corp participants consider that the inquiry has failed to give sufficient
01:56:28 inquiry has failed to give sufficient consideration to the impact upon them of the chaotic nature of the disclosure and the resultant stress in circumstances
01:56:40 the resultant stress in circumstances where they and civilian Witnesses are having to balance the emotional consequences of what they are reading discovering for the first time what
01:56:51 discovering for the first time what happened to them whilst juggling their own lives family and employment needs this approach to Disclosure by the inquiry further exacerbates the other structural disadvantages the non-p police state Corp participants face the
01:57:03 police state Corp participants face the state Corp participants have had decades to consider the material before this inquiry and the undercover officers and managers have an inherent knowledge and understanding of their and their fellow officers spying their legal
01:57:16 officers spying their legal representatives are also at an advantage for example the designated lawyer officer co- participant group represents 102 SS undercover officers and so can
01:57:27 102 SS undercover officers and so can receive and reflect at an early stage on all the intelligence reporting of relevance in a tranch and well before preparing their opening statement the nonp police state cor participants are being given at most months but often just weeks and in some
01:57:42 months but often just weeks and in some cases days to consider the material the inquiry has yet to recognize this inherent bias in every case it is the non-p police state cor participants who are the last to know what has happened
01:57:54 are the last to know what has happened whilst they are given the least amount of time to process a huge amount of material that is deeply personal and upsetting to them so at the end of tranch one the non police state core
01:58:09 tranch one the non police state core participants remind the inquiry of their core demands um and ask the inquiry to take stock the nonp police state Corp participants are once again asking the inquiry to rethink its procedures and practices to ensure that there is robust public scrutiny of undercover policing
01:58:25 public scrutiny of undercover policing in tran to and Beyond and to ensure that the nonp police state cor participants are treated fairly and remain at the heart of the process so sir unless I can assist you further those are my opening submissions on behalf of the non police non-state core participants thank you
01:58:44 non-state core participants thank you thank you very much may I say two things one on my own behalf and one at the request of uh the Metropolitan Police Commissioners lawyers uh on my my own behalf I acknowledge that uh there have been
01:59:00 acknowledge that uh there have been great burdens placed on non-state core participants who have uh attempted frequently successfully to participate in the workings of the inquiry I acknowledge the difficulties
01:59:11 inquiry I acknowledge the difficulties they face no uh system dealing with the vast quantitive material that my inquiry has to deal with can never be perfect and can never say satisfy everybody
01:59:24 and can never say satisfy everybody uh I ask those that you represent and all non-state carpet core participants to bear with us while I with the
01:59:35 to bear with us while I with the assistance of the inquiry team am attempting to get to the truth about what happened I'm determined to do it uh processes that that have been put in
01:59:55 processes that that have been put in place are those that seemed to me and to the inquiry team to be the most likely to enable me to do that given that it's a human activity
02:00:09 that given that it's a human activity the end result can never be perfect and the means by which it's arrived at can never be perfect all I can ask is for patience please bear with me uh I acknowledge the worth of the input of non-state cor participants I ask them
02:00:22 non-state cor participants I ask them for patience in allowing me to put it to good effect um I'm sorry about that um rather lengthy um um statement by me but I thought in the light of what you said I I should say
02:00:34 I I should say it the query that I have from the metropolitan police commissioner's legal team uh can I think be more shortly answered
02:00:45 answered um it's pointed out I think correctly
02:00:57 um it's pointed out I think correctly that you submitted that it was asserted on behalf of the commissioner uh that the annual reports were open quote simply a stock take and not an opportunity to persuade senior managers that the unit should stay in existence close quote uh I'm told and I think this is correct that that assertion was made
02:01:09 is correct that that assertion was made on behalf of the designated lawyers team uh and not on behalf of the commissioner if that's right uh then I think it
02:01:20 if that's right uh then I think it should be put right as a matter of Correction yes sir I'm sure you're correct in that regard and thank you for that um correction I think it was probably added
02:01:31 correction I think it was probably added at last minute um so if it was incorrect I
02:01:32 I apologize thank you very much um thank you none of us can get everything right all the time thank you thank you that
02:01:43 all the time thank you thank you that concludes uh the opening statements and the proceedings for today we will resume on Monday at 10:00 uh when we will hear the first live evidence