Peter Skelton KC delivers the Metropolitan Police Service's opening statement for Tranche 2 Phase 1, acknowledging serious wrongdoing by undercover officers including sexual relationships, unnecessary surveillance of justice campaigns, and management failures. The MPS apologizes for these failings while defending the legitimate role of undercover policing.
00:14:58 e e
00:16:05 ready time is now 2:00 and we resume uh openings with Mr Skelton King's Council for the commissioner Mr Skelton thank you sir so at the outset of this opening statement uh the Metropolitan Police Service wishes to acknowledge the serious wrongdoing by some SDS uos and
00:16:17 serious wrongdoing by some SDS uos and the mismanagement by SDS and MPS special branch managers that occurred during the t2 period without seeking to be comprehensive this includes the
00:16:33 comprehensive this includes the following three three matters first at least nine undercover officers in T2 engaged in deceitful sexual relationships whilst they were deployed this was completely unacceptable so too was the failure of their managers to
00:16:44 was the failure of their managers to identify and prevent those relationships from
00:16:45 from happening the MPS apologizes to the women affected and to the public for these failings and for the wider culture of sexism and misogyny which allow them
00:16:58 of sexism and misogyny which allow them to happen it's committed to eradicating all forms of discrimination and to ensuring that undercover policing like all other policing is conducted and held to the highest Professional
00:17:12 to the highest Professional Standards second there was unnecessary reporting on political and social justice campaigns Family Justice campaigns Community organizations and groups that were campaigning for police accountability these groups did not present any risk of serious public
00:17:26 present any risk of serious public disorder and were not engaged in any criminal or subverses activity third despite some good examples of effective management for example by detective inspector hn 109 there was a
00:17:44 detective inspector hn 109 there was a general failure by the SS's managers and by senior managers in npsb to lead the SDS properly and effectively these failings extended beyond the issues of illicit sexual relationships and improper engagements with the criminal justice system other
00:17:56 with the criminal justice system other unprofessional behavior by UCA included in a rate reporting and the claiming of illegitimate expenses such conduct was below the standards that were expected of police officers at the
00:18:07 of police officers at the time another significant as aspect of this is welfare although SGS managers did attempt to manage the wellfare of
00:18:18 did attempt to manage the wellfare of UCA properly they didn't always get it right attempts were made to foster a culture in which those struggling with mental health and other issues as a result of their deployments could seek support but despite this UC didn't
00:18:31 support but despite this UC didn't always feel that they could ask for that support or when they did it wasn't always effective and some officers were undoubtedly harmed by the work that they did so there was a proper role for
00:18:44 did so there was a proper role for undercover policing during the t2 period as an effective means of gathering Intelligence on individuals and groups who presented a serious risk to public
00:18:55 who presented a serious risk to public order and the safety of the public some of the deployments undertaken by SDS officers were justifiable and did produce valuable intellig for these purposes and it's important to note that many of the uos themselves did good professional work in accordance with
00:19:06 professional work in accordance with their training and the methods of the time but the MPS accepts that their good work was overshadowed by the indefensible conduct of some officers
00:19:18 indefensible conduct of some officers and the mismanagement which allowed that misconduct to flourish the MPS recognizes the seriousness of these failings much of the evidence of misconduct and all the SS's manager's evidence will be considered in Phase 2
00:19:33 evidence will be considered in Phase 2 and in due course the module 2B hearings nonetheless the MPS can say at this stage phase one that the SDS should have been subject to robust oversight and intervention by senior managers so that
00:19:45 intervention by senior managers so that professional standards and conduct were reviewed and maintained throughout its duration poor standards and misconduct should have been identified and dealt with swiftly before they became embedded into the culture of the unit uos whose
00:19:57 into the culture of the unit uos whose conduct fell below acceptable standards should have been identified removed from the field and disciplined where necessary so I now turn to make three
00:20:11 necessary so I now turn to make three General points about undercover placing the first concerns applicable standards so the MPS accepts the conclusion in your interim report of June
00:20:19 June 2023 that the intrusion into the lives of many hundreds of people in the T1 era required cogent justification before it could have been contemplated as a police tactic that conclusion applies with
00:20:35 tactic that conclusion applies with equal force to the t2 period and indeed thereafter prior to the regulation of investigatory Powers Act or Ripper there was no stategy regime for the
00:20:46 was no stategy regime for the authorization of undercover operations and so no formal requirement on SDs managers and officers to continue to consider the nature and extent of the associated intrusion into
00:20:58 extent of the associated intrusion into people's private and political lives nor was there any significant EMP emphasis on keeping that that intrusion to a minimum this reflected the fact that the concept of personal privacy was not as developed as it is today and was not given the priority that it should have
00:21:14 given the priority that it should have been by the police and the intelligence Services care must therefore be taken not to judge mpsb and SS managers together with uos by professional ethical standards that didn't emerge until after the two T2
00:21:25 until after the two T2 period nevertheless as the MPS acknowledged in its closing statement for T1 the managers of mpsp and the SS should have recognized that a certain
00:21:38 should have recognized that a certain level of s seriousness or operational necessity was required for seeking intelligence and information via such intrusive means given the level of interference for those who would inevitably be affected where this was
00:21:54 inevitably be affected where this was not present deployments should not have been initiated or should have been brought to a close the next general point concerns the grounds for Undercover deployments the mps's view is that not withstanding that Ripper was not in
00:22:05 withstanding that Ripper was not in force in the 1980s the seven grounds
00:22:16 force in the 1980s the seven grounds that it prescribes are each a legitimate basis for the deployment of uos during those earlier periods subject to the application of the requirements of necessity and proportionality at the very least the permissible categories in the period before Ripper when there was no statutory regulation should not be
00:22:29 statutory regulation should not be narrower than would have been the case if such regulation have been brought into Force earlier the MPS would welcome early clarification from the inquiry as to whether the Ripper grounds although not in force represent acceptable objectives
00:22:43 in force represent acceptable objectives by which to evaluate the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for SDS work in this period the MPS is concerned with the apparent conclusion in the inquiry's interim report that undercover deployments against to Target believed
00:22:56 deployments against to Target believed to be subversive could only be readily Justified if the target in fact in quotes threaten the safety or well-being of the state so if applied in practice
00:23:10 of the state so if applied in practice such an approach would rule out the use of uos to assess suspected threats before they became active threats including monitoring the evolving intentions and capabilities of persons or groups that have the potential to cause significant harm the consequences of not monitoring
00:23:22 harm the consequences of not monitoring such threats could be catastrophic such as a terrorist attack and so that is not a safe way to protect the public the final General point is about
00:23:36 public the final General point is about the nps's intelligence partners for many decades The NPS has relied on the security service and other agencies including the secret intelligence service and the government Communications Headquarters or gchq to identify and assess evolving
00:23:50 gchq to identify and assess evolving threats of subversion National Security and terrorism and to make requests of the police to gather or share specific information to inform the intelligence picture
00:24:01 picture it does so because it's those agencies not the MPS itself that have the institutional responsibility now enshrined in legislation expertise and competence to make such assessments and requests and so the inquiries asked to
00:24:18 requests and so the inquiries asked to bear this in mind as its investigations progress towards the present day the mps's vital role in protecting the public will be harmed if it cannot continue to rely on the work and the assessments of the security and intelligence agencies where necessary
00:24:29 intelligence agencies where necessary when authorizing and conducting covert counterterrorism work including but not limited to undercover
00:24:40 operations so I'm now going to address the central failings that occurred in the t2 period with a particular Focus as the inquiry has requested on phase one the first of these is sexual relationships as Mr Baron uh spoke about
00:24:57 relationships as Mr Baron uh spoke about earlier at least nine SDS uos had sexual relationships or otherwise engaged in sexual activity while undercover during the t2 period the MPS understands that three of these will be considered in Phase One Trevor Morris hn 78 he had deceitful
00:25:09 Morris hn 78 he had deceitful relationships with B between 1992 and 1993 and with Jenny in 1995 Alan Bond hm67 who made admissions about a sexual
00:25:20 hm67 who made admissions about a sexual relationship to the risk assessor during the anonymity process and to hn1 19 during the course of his deployment and finally Mike Harley hn12 who's now dead but had previously admitted two sexual
00:25:34 but had previously admitted two sexual encounters the sexual misconduct of the six other uos will of course be considered in phase two Mike jitty Andrew Kohl's John dyes Robert Lambert Matt rer hm1 and
00:25:47 Matt rer hm1 and hm87 The NPS accepts that these sexual relationships occurred and that further relationships will be examined during the inquiry later investigations of T2 T3 and T4
00:25:58 T3 and T4 such conduct was a gross violation of the women's privacy and human rights it was abusive deceitful manipulative and wrong the MPS apologizes again
00:26:12 wrong the MPS apologizes again unreservedly to the women whose lives have been and continue to be affected The NPS also apologizes to the wives partners and families who've also
00:26:30 wives partners and families who've also been harmed by the misconduct of the OS and the failure by the S SS's managers and by Senior Management in mpsb to prevent that misconduct the public and the women concerned rightly want to know whether SDS and wi MPS management knew about UCO
00:26:42 SDS and wi MPS management knew about UCO having sexual relationships and why they failed to prevent them the manager's evidence is yet to be disclosed in its entirety or tested so it wouldn't be appropriate for the MPS to single out
00:26:56 appropriate for the MPS to single out individual Witnesses for comment however in their written evidence for phase two the SCS managers will each say that during their tenure they were unaware of the full extent of the conduct detailed earlier The NPS wishes to be clear that
00:27:08 earlier The NPS wishes to be clear that it does not accept the general level of ignorance professed by the SS's managers in their statements which are in the process of course of being disclosed by the inquiry and will be considered more
00:27:23 the inquiry and will be considered more thoroughly in phase two some of them did know or did suspect that sexual relationships were occurring none of the relationships were or could have been formally authorized knowledge or suspicion that they were occurring should have led to
00:27:34 occurring should have led to investigation and as necessary disciplinary action concerns should also have been escalated to senior officers within mpsp and with the senior management of the MPS instead those managers turned a
00:27:47 MPS instead those managers turned a blind eye to the risks and activities of the UCA listed above and the SDS uos and
00:27:58 the UCA listed above and the SDS uos and managers who were late later promoted to senior positions in the MPS also failed to act at that
00:28:04 stage so during the t2 period findings of sexism in the MPS were made by the independent police people and police in London study particularly in its 1983
00:28:16 London study particularly in its 1983 report the police in action more recent reviews have demonstrated that sexism and misogyny continued to be widespread and enduring features of the culture within the NPS the prevalence of sexual misconduct
00:28:27 NPS the prevalence of sexual misconduct on the part part of SDS officers in the t2 period the general disregard for the personal autonomy and dignity of the women affected together with the inaction or indifference of their
00:28:38 inaction or indifference of their managers in response is a clear and acute manifestation of that culture for which the MPS unreservedly apologizes sexism and misogyny are
00:28:55 apologizes sexism and misogyny are matters of grave concern for the MPS and it is committed to learning from the failures of the past work on transforming the nps's internal culture has already begun with a particular emphasis on these issues all new and
00:29:06 emphasis on these issues all new and current offices are being trained to identify and call out sexism and misogyny and there are now checks of individual officers records so that repeat patterns of sexist and misogynistic Behavior are identified and
00:29:22 misogynistic Behavior are identified and stopped more specifically for the purpos of this inquiry present day uos and their managers are told in their training that sexual relationships are unacceptable where the inquiry identifies the need for further improvements in this and indeed other
00:29:33 improvements in this and indeed other areas of policing the MPS will continue to work with the inquiry to secure robust recommendations for the reform of future
00:29:43 future practice the second failing relates to the welfare support given to uos it's clear from the SDS annual reports in the t2 period that the SDS management recognized early on the stresses of living
00:29:55 stresses of living undercover these arose from living double life for extended periods of time the pressure of remaining Vigilant to potential exposure and risks to personal safety but also the stress of living
00:30:07 safety but also the stress of living apart from partners and children and without free and open contact with real friends and real colleagues the MPS accepts that welfare contact should have been more proactive
00:30:21 contact should have been more proactive and interventionist and that there were missed opportunities to safeguard the Ware of
00:30:27 Ware of uos attempts were made to get the issues of welfare right but those efforts were not always was adequate for example errors were made in the recruitment of officers who were ill suited to the role and the 1992 mentoring scheme needed to be more robust in its methods and
00:30:39 be more robust in its methods and objectives while a uco's domestic life formed an important consideration in the welfare picture the extent to which it could mitigate the difficulties experienced by some uos was
00:30:53 experienced by some uos was overestimated and put an undue burden on the partners and families of the uos many uos did feel sufficiently supported but some did suffer psychological problems as a result of their deployments and didn't get all the
00:31:05 deployments and didn't get all the support that they needed the risk of compromise was a particular source of ongoing anxiety for some uos and could continue to cause additional stress long after their deployments ended which
00:31:17 after their deployments ended which affected both them and their families this should have been recognized at the time providing effective and appropriate welfare support to uos remains highly
00:31:30 welfare support to uos remains highly important to The NPS in the modern era as as what was explained in the nss's opening statement for T1 P1 many of the practices that the inquiry will examine in the t2 era are now long out of date
00:31:42 in the t2 era are now long out of date the MPS is approaching the evidence with a commitment to further improved best practice for supporting officers when they undertake undercover work the third failing relates to the use of deceased children's
00:31:58 use of deceased children's identities the MPS sincerely wishes that more effective and secure alternatives to this practice have been sought and used by the STDs in the 1970s and 80s to provide fictional identities for uos as the MPS explained in its closing
00:32:09 uos as the MPS explained in its closing statement for T1 using the identities of deceased children was believed to be the only effective practical and safe means
00:32:24 only effective practical and safe means of preserving the safety of STS officers who undertook longterm deployments into security conscious and often hostile organizations no evidence has been discovered or alternative methods being used elsewhere in the t2 period that ought to have been considered by the SDS the MPS has seen the powerful
00:32:36 SDS the MPS has seen the powerful accounts that have been given to the inquiry by family members who've been affected by the use of deceased children's identities it accepts that the managers of the SDS fail to
00:32:50 the managers of the SDS fail to recognize the hurt distress and anger that this practice would cause the families of the children and the public concern that would result if the practice had been revealed it apologizes unreservedly to the families for this it also wishes to acknowledge that their
00:33:02 also wishes to acknowledge that their distress will have been compounded by the Revelation that some us SDS officers behaved indefensibly while using their children's names as acknowledged elsewhere in this
00:33:18 elsewhere in this statement so the fourth failing relates to the language of the SS's reporting some of the terminology used by some of the uos in their reports wouldn't have been recognized as being offensive or problematic in the 1980s
00:33:31 offensive or problematic in the 1980s that wouldn't have been written with any ill intention on the part of its authors however even allowing for this some of
00:33:44 however even allowing for this some of the language they used was unequivocally unacceptable specifically racist sexist and homophobic expressions and descriptions that were derogatory arrogant or rude about the people being reported
00:33:54 reported on intelligence reports are professional documents and Professional Standards should have been employed they should not have contained this type of language when seen by managers they should have been amended and not recorded or retained in that form managers should
00:34:09 retained in that form managers should have spoken to the reporting offices and should have taken steps to address the opinions and attitudes un underpinning the inappropriate language the final failing relates to the content of SDS
00:34:21 the content of SDS reporting so the factual content of the SS's reports must be judged by reference to the requirements and standard of the
00:34:34 to the requirements and standard of the 1984 home office guidelines on the work of a special Branch this required npsb like all police special branches to gather information about threats to public order and to assist the security service in its task of defending the UK
00:34:45 service in its task of defending the UK against actions from subversive persons and
00:34:45 and organizations this included carrying out inquiries with a view to identifying and describing numerous people connected with organizations that the security service assessed and informed special
00:34:59 service assessed and informed special Branch were sub Ive as explained in the statement of witness y the MPS accepts that the SS is reporting in the t2 period includes examples of factual reporting that do
00:35:11 examples of factual reporting that do don't meet the standards set by these guidelines specifically some reports include irrelevant personal or private information that is of no apparent intelligence value for the purposes of
00:35:22 intelligence value for the purposes of maintaining public order or countering subversion or protecting National Security however it also should be acknowledged that intelligence reports contain personal details that would have
00:35:33 contain personal details that would have been considered relevant at the time and so were correctly recorded it was the long-standing practice of mpsb and other special branches to record certain types of information such as personal
00:35:45 of information such as personal descriptions and addresses that might be of future value to the police or the security service for purposes including vetting even though that value would in some cases have been
00:36:00 uncertain so the Next Issue I'd like to address is the justification for the SS's work and its value in TR to the SS's intelligence work must be judged in its proper historical and
00:36:11 judged in its proper historical and societal context it's important that the inquiry builds a comprehensive and a balanced picture of the many incidents
00:36:23 balanced picture of the many incidents of public disorder violence criminality and terrorism which contributed to the annual decision by the home office to maintain the SDS as a covert mpsb resource during the t2 period until 1989 when funding was passed entirely to npsb as The NPS has stated in its
00:36:37 npsb as The NPS has stated in its previous written and oral statements to the inquiry an understanding of the historical context is also essential for any Fair assessment of the justification for and value of the SS's work that remains the position in T2 in
00:36:49 remains the position in T2 in furtherance of which the MPS has drawn the inquiry's attention to some of the relevant contemporaneous government documents that are retained by the National Archives
00:37:00 National Archives and has again invited the inquiry to continue that research what then were the SS's objectives in the t2 period the SS was an mpsb unit so its objectives reflected those of mpsb which
00:37:17 objectives reflected those of mpsb which in this period was set by the guidelines the 1984 home office guidelines on the worker special Branch these confirm Under The Heading specific functions that the work of special Branch arises from the chief officer's responsibility
00:37:30 from the chief officer's responsibility for the preservation of the Queen's pece its work is to assist the chief officer in discharging this responsibility the guidelines State at paragraphs 5 and six that a special
00:37:41 paragraphs 5 and six that a special Branch gathers information about threats to public order such such information would enable the branch to provide assessments on whether marches meetings demonstrations and pickets pose any threat to public order and help the chief officer determine an appropriate level of
00:37:52 level of policing a sec a special Branch assists the security service in carrying out its tasks of Defending the realm against attempts at Espionage and sabotage or from the actions of persons and
00:38:03 from the actions of persons and organizations whether directed from within or without the country which may be judged to be subversive to the state where where special Branch identified a need for intelligence the
00:38:17 identified a need for intelligence the means for obtaining it remain Limited in the t period the options in short with the overt traditional policing inquiries technical interception surveillance
00:38:28 technical interception surveillance civilian informs and finally undercover police officers by contrast other methods undercover officers were in principle a flexible trustworthy and dynamic resource used in combination with other means to secure information
00:38:41 with other means to secure information they could gain access to intelligence which couldn't be easily secured or reliably secured through other means they were necessarily able to get behind closed doors and elicit carefully
00:38:52 closed doors and elicit carefully guarded information that wouldn't for example be dis discussed at an open meeting or in a telephone call they could use Prof professional skills to find the best source of information and their reporting was not compromised by
00:39:03 their reporting was not compromised by self-interest throughout the t2 period the SDS used uos to gather intelligence on indiv individuals and groups for several purposes first to detect and prevent crime including in respect of
00:39:17 prevent crime including in respect of the growth in respect of the growth of criminal activity within the animal rights field second to to assist uniform police to handle events at which there was a risk of public disorder by
00:39:28 was a risk of public disorder by identifying which events those might be and establishing the intentions and plans of any extreme groups involved as is reflected in the special Branch functions I have quoted Above This extends to identifying events at which disorder was not
00:39:41 disorder was not expected third to assist the security service to discharge its responsibility for the defense of the realm counter terrorism and National Security where the focus was was on individuals and
00:39:57 the focus was was on individuals and groups that the security service not The NPS assessed to be subversive or an act ual or Potential Threat to National Security and finally for the long-term intelligence purposes so that mpsb were readily able to identify whenever
00:40:10 readily able to identify whenever required people who were of interest to the police or intelligence services so these are all legitimate intelligence goals which at the time were considered by mpsb and within it the SDS to provide adequate
00:40:21 the SDS to provide adequate justification for the deployment of uos the breadth of information sort reflected The Wider intelligence culture in this era namely of gathering information on a significant proportion
00:40:39 information on a significant proportion of people involved with organizations of Interest which may be of intelligence value at the time or at a future date as in T1 the high level requirements for intelligence was set by npsb customers principally the uniform public order branch of the MPS animal
00:40:54 public order branch of the MPS animal rights and other criminal and specialist policing units the security service and the UK government mpsb like other special branches retained operational Independence it could decline to conduct intelligence work that fell outside its
00:41:07 intelligence work that fell outside its functions or was Impractical ineffective or
00:41:08 or unsafe so it follows that when considering the issues of justification for deployments and their ultimate value it's essential for the inquiry to consider the extent of the mpsb work in
00:41:19 consider the extent of the mpsb work in this period by reference to firstly its customers intelligence requirements and secondly the overall operational structure of MPS B and its inter
00:41:30 structure of MPS B and its inter relationship with both its customers and its internal operational units this evidence hasn't yet been fully gathered by the inquiry so it's not possible to address these the issues of
00:41:41 address these the issues of justification and value definitively in this opening statement so the following remarks are on a preliminary
00:41:52 on a preliminary basis the important question of whether the SDS is deployments were Justified can only be answered based on the totality of the relevant documentary and witness evidence including that of the managers uh in SDS MPS senior managers the SS's customers all of which of
00:42:07 the SS's customers all of which of course will be adduced in phase two and module
00:42:12 module two however from the outset of T of T2 The NPS wishes to acknowledge that in many cases the value of the intelligence produced during long-term open-ended deployments by SDS officers did not
00:42:27 deployments by SDS officers did not justify the duration and depth of their infusion into the pr private lives of those with whom they had contact the MPS repeats the points it made about ethics and proportionality at the conclusion of T1 which apply with
00:42:43 the conclusion of T1 which apply with equal force to the t2 period and I'll quote the SS's work involved serious intrusions into the private lives of some of the individuals and the groups that it targeted and other people
00:42:57 that it targeted and other people associated with them in many cases those intrusions lasted years it's accept by The NPS that the nature of the
00:43:06 by The NPS that the nature of the intrusions should have been evaluated at the highest level by The NPS and by the home office who authorized and funded the SDS and the security service who benefited greatly from its work from an ethical perspective against the public interest in obtaining the intelligence sword that is so despite there being no
00:43:21 sword that is so despite there being no legal or procedural requirement to do so despite society's views on personal privacy and human rights being far less developed than they are now
00:43:32 turning then to the groups uh in summary that were the target of deployments during the 1980s and early 1990s politically extreme groups continued to be of direct interest to the security service in the UK
00:43:45 the security service in the UK government on subversion grounds and to be of concern to the police for their public disorder or criminal activities a significant proportion of the STS deployments were targeted against groups that the security service has now
00:43:56 that the security service has now confirmed met the working definition observ verive during the t2 period and about which the service actively required detailed
00:44:12 required detailed intelligence however it is acknowledged by the MPS that except in specific instances where indiv where those individuals in those groups were
00:44:21 individuals in those groups were involved in serious crime or disorder or presented an active threat to National Security as opposed to Simply holding subversive views their long-term infiltration by uos on a just in case basis was a disproportionate method to gather intelligence on
00:44:34 gather intelligence on them anti-nuclear and peace groups were also the subjects of significant government and Military interest in the 1980s as is clear from contemp contemporaneous documents including those held by the National Archives it
00:44:49 those held by the National Archives it was feared at the time that they could jeopardize the UK's National Security including the safety of its nuclear weapons bases not least because the security service was concerned that major groups such as the the campaign for nuclear disarmament CND could be
00:45:00 for nuclear disarmament CND could be infiltrated by communist groups in the KGB the G the Soviet Union's principal intelligence agency these threats didn't of course materialize but for a significant time
00:45:11 materialize but for a significant time the risk that they would was a real one with which the security service and npsb were obliged to monitor with a view to taking any necessary preemptive action
00:45:24 taking any necessary preemptive action the deployment of uos into those groups was therefore justifiable until the point it became clear that their activity principally nonviolent direct action nvda presented no threats of this nature as in fact occurred in hn 33's deployment into groups associated with
00:45:39 deployment into groups associated with the greenan greenham common peace Camp which was brought to an end in
00:45:50 1986 so during the t2 period 1983 to 1992 the SDS also reported on several individuals who are involved in political and social justice campaigns Family Justice campaigns and community organiz I ations these included the Broadwater Farm defense campaign the
00:46:03 Broadwater Farm defense campaign the Hackney campaign against the police Bill the Hackney police monitoring group The Colin roach defense campaign and family support committee and the East London campaign against racist attacks and police
00:46:17 police harassment the SDS reporting indicates that these groups were of interest to other groups such as the troops out movement and the swp that were already being targeted by uos with two exceptions the intelligence reports produced by these offic officers are not indicative of direct targeting
00:46:29 are not indicative of direct targeting of these campaigns by the SDS but rather of uco's following existing targets into those
00:46:37 those groups however the majority of the individuals that the SDS reported on in these groups were not engaged in any criminal or subversive activity and didn't present any serious risk of public disorder any risk at all in fact
00:46:51 public disorder any risk at all in fact it follows that the SDS officers should have been told by their managers not to report on those groups and in those cases where UCO were following other legitimate targets they
00:47:07 following other legitimate targets they shouldn't have obtained Intelligence on individuals in those groups or that intelligence should not have been retained by
00:47:19 mpsb sir it is particularly indefensible that many of the anti-racism campaigns mentioned in SDS reports were Seeking Justice for members of the black and Asian communities in London and were attempting to hold the MPS itself accountable for the way in which it pleased those
00:47:30 pleased those communities the MPS accepts the corrosive effect this type of discriminatory policing has on public trust and apologizes unreservedly for
00:47:41 trust and apologizes unreservedly for this the fact that the SDS reported on these groups was the result of a critical failure on the part of its managers and Senior managers within mpsp to ensure that SDS deployments were conducted in accordance with proper
00:47:54 conducted in accordance with proper professional and ethical standards it's also an example of unacceptable political policing by mpsb which the home office had unequivocally criticized in 1983 in response to an intelligence
00:48:06 in 1983 in response to an intelligence report on the activities of the greater London council's Police committee sir the MPS accepts corporate responsibility for these failings although there have been areas of
00:48:19 although there have been areas of progress since the t2 period racism and discrimination remain an enduring challenge within the MPS substantial reforms are underway to address the organizational culture and discriminatory behavior and conduct within the force and the MPS is
00:48:36 within the force and the MPS is committed to rebuilding the trust of black Asian and minority ethnic communities in
00:48:42 London what work did the SDS what value did the SS's work have so for present purposes The NPS makes just two overarching points about this issue this question first as The NPS stated in its opening statement to
00:48:59 NPS stated in its opening statement to the inquiry the fact that UCA deployment doesn't ultimately produce intelligence of operational value or doesn't do so consistently doesn't automatically mean that it was not adequately Justified and properly motivated at the outset a
00:49:13 properly motivated at the outset a deployment can and could be wholly Justified But ultimately unsuccessful additionally its value might still exist in establishing a
00:49:24 might still exist in establishing a negative such as ruling out a threat of violence all of this Remains the position in the present day second the question of whether the SDS met its customers intelligence requirements is best answered by the customers themselves principally MPS a
00:49:38 customers themselves principally MPS a branch and its successors uniform public order police the security service the government the animal rights National index or Arne and the individual police constabularies who use the SDS and npsb intelligence for their operations
00:49:51 intelligence for their operations against animal rights related criminal activity during the TT period the MPS submits the in the interests of fairness it's important that the inquiry obtains and considers all of the available contemporaneous
00:50:03 all of the available contemporaneous documentary evidence and uces witness evidence from the above sources not just the security service together with officers from mpsb operational squads who can provide an overview of the work
00:50:23 who can provide an overview of the work of mpsb including its s and C squads of which the SDS was only a small part during the t2 period
00:50:32 so before making my concluding remarks may I just briefly address the criticism made of the MPS and the opening statements of some non state core participants that the MPS has deliberately delayed this inquiry and
00:50:45 deliberately delayed this inquiry and has sought to silence the non-state core participants the volume of sensitive documents that are being reviewed and have been reviewed disclosed and
00:50:56 have been reviewed disclosed and published by this inquiry is vast and unprecedent ented it is a legal requirement that all those documents are reviewed and where necessary redacted to protect the public interest and to
00:51:07 protect the public interest and to protect people's privacy including that of the non-state Corp participants themselves that is a painstaking timec consuming and intensive
00:51:19 consuming and intensive process so the MPS has heavily resourced the assistance it has given the inquiry throughout the last 9 years and has consistently made immense efforts to ensure that it has met the inquire very stringent
00:51:31 stringent deadlines so sir as I know you are aware there's no basis whatsoever for the
00:51:42 there's no basis whatsoever for the suggestion that the MPS has dragged its feet or in any way wishes to delay the inquiry or hamper the full and proper participation of the inquiry's other participants and its
00:51:48 Witnesses so I turn finally to my concluding remarks on behalf of the
00:51:59 MPS there was a justifiable role for undercover intelligence operations in the 1980s and early 1990s providing valuable information that could be used to counter serious public disorder and crime and to assist the National Security work of its principal long-term intelligence partner
00:52:16 principal long-term intelligence partner the security service undercover policing was also an important asset for the investigation of crimes and the prosecutions of criminals during this period some of the setta's undercover
00:52:27 period some of the setta's undercover deployments did contribute to The Wider intelligence efforts of npsb in the security service during T2 and as I stated earlier it's important to note that good and honorable work was carried out with skill and professionalism by
00:52:42 out with skill and professionalism by many individuals SCS officers and many individual managers however this good work is overshadowed by the serious misconduct of some of the uos and by the more General failure of its managers and
00:52:57 General failure of its managers and Senior managers in npsb to set and to enforce professional ethical and policing
00:53:05 policing standards sexual relationship should not have occurred reporting on Justice and anti-racism groups who pose no threat no criminal or public order threat should not have occurred and would not occur today open-ended long-term deployments which caused a level of personal
00:53:20 which caused a level of personal intrusion that was out of proportion with their value should have been reassessed and ended further the S the MPS should not
00:53:31 ended further the S the MPS should not have allowed a culture of exceptionalism and impunity to develop within the SDS which as will be seen in T3 made its officers resistant to the changes and improvements brought about by Ripper and by the national undercover working
00:53:45 by the national undercover working group so these failings are serious and they have damaged public confidence in the use of undercover policing the MPS
00:53:57 the use of undercover policing the MPS is committed to assisting the inquiry in its work of investigating how and why things went wrong within the SDS and later the national public order intelligence unit and of developing recommendations that will ensure that public confidence in undercover pleasing
00:54:09 public confidence in undercover pleasing which remains an important tactic in the present day is rebuilt thank you thank you very much Mr Skelton um that concludes your opening remarks and
00:54:22 that concludes your opening remarks and indeed our procceedings for today thank you thank you
00:54:25 sir e