Opening statement on behalf of CND and SWP by counsel who forcefully protests inadequate disclosure process. Lindsey German received only 42 documents before June 6, then 12,000 pages in 2.5 weeks. Security Service statement served one weekend before hearings. Argues this silences victims, constitutes fundamental unfairness. Describes CND as peaceful broad-church organization wrongly targeted despite posing no public order or subversive threat.
00:24:27 e e
00:25:19 good afternoon uh we will now resume with uh opening submissions by Mr scobby King's Council Mr scobby thank you sir uh I appear along with Pierce Marquis from Dy Street stre Chambers and Paul Haron of the public
00:25:31 Chambers and Paul Haron of the public interest Law Center in this tranch of the inquiry we represent uh the campaign for nuclear disarmed cndd Lind Le chman and Michael chart a
00:25:46 cndd Lind Le chman and Michael chart a complete and fully referenced version of this opening statement can be downloaded from the ucpi and public interest Law Center
00:25:57 Center websites in our previous statements to the inquire
00:26:08 the inquire we've kept our focus on the evidence and have avoided making significant observations on the inquiry procedure
00:26:13 procedure however the manner in which TR 2 has been prepared has left us unable to continue without making reference to the circumstances in which this statement has been
00:26:28 has been drafted the statement has been served in accordance with the inquiry's direction on Monday the 24th of June 2024 the process of disclosure to the non-state core participants on the Epic platform began on the 3rd of June
00:26:50 platform began on the 3rd of June 2024 in total approximately 12,000 Pages have been served since that date the S swp was the most infiltrated organization in tranch 2 Lindsey German
00:27:05 organization in tranch 2 Lindsey German was was on the Central Committee of the swp for the entire trch 2 period prior to this recent part of the disclosure process that the German had been served with just 42 documents all of the
00:27:20 with just 42 documents all of the remaining material in relation to the S swp has been served in the two and a half weeks since the 6th of June 2024 there is still significant material outstanding including all documents relating to hn
00:27:34 all documents relating to hn 95 who was employed at the swp headquarters in
00:27:46 headquarters in 1986 and who had extensively asong with MI5 the witness statement on behalf of the security services was served on Friday the 21st of June 2024 it is 105 pages long and unsurprisingly makes repeated reference to the swp
00:28:04 to the swp vast majority of the so of the security service documents associated with that statement have not yet been served our insight into mi's involvement has been limited to incomplete
00:28:17 has been limited to incomplete disclosure of liazon notes which had been served peacemeal officer by Officer we are clearly not in a position to make an opening statement on behalf of Lindsay J
00:28:29 on behalf of Lindsay J we cannot read material that has not been served we've not been given the
00:28:41 been served we've not been given the time necessary to read the material that has been served plainly if we do not have the time to even read material we cannot consider and assess it share it with our clients take
00:28:52 it share it with our clients take instructions on it and then draft and present an opening statement to the
00:29:04 present an opening statement to the standard that they deserve we also raise at this stage the unfairness of lindsy German being expected to provide oral evidence of the inquiry in these circumstances consequently we have restricted our points in relation to lindsy J and the infiltrations of the S
00:29:23 lindsy J and the infiltrations of the S swp and its Central Committee to a bare minimum we ask for the opportunity to expand on these on those points in a further opening statement at the beginning of phase two in October in the circumstances that cannot be an unreasonable request in respect of
00:29:35 unreasonable request in respect of Michael CH statement of the one officer whose sped on the rcpb ml hn9 was not served till after the till well after
00:29:46 served till after the till well after the deadline for the submission of his statement we note that the security service has been on notice that it would be required to provide a statement on the TR two period since at least February 2020
00:29:58 February 2020 they have had the TR 2 Rule n requests for over 12 months staff from across the security services as well as legal advisors and councel worked on it for
00:30:10 advisors and councel worked on it for eight months supplying the inquiry with a closed version in February it's taken a further five months to redact the
00:30:21 a further five months to redact the statement we've been given one weekend consider it without the benefit of the accompanying documents this brings us to a wider point the state core
00:30:36 a wider point the state core participants have had the benefit of time and considerable resources they've had access to the material for years and have extensive teams of staff and lawyers the police Witnesses are retired on generous
00:30:55 Witnesses are retired on generous taxpayer funded pensions most of our core participants are still working full-time this imbalance has always existed in this
00:31:10 has always existed in this inquiry however the approach to trch 2 is strongly suggested of a deliberate attemp to silence the non-state core participants to be clear we are not aiming this criticism at the inquiry's legal team the process of this inquiry
00:31:22 legal team the process of this inquiry has been delayed from the outset by the police core participants the home office has used that delay to criticize the process of the inquiry and limit its time and
00:31:38 the inquiry and limit its time and resources the impact of that has di this been to place intolerable pressure on the inquirer's lawyers inevitably that pressure has been passed down the line the nonstate
00:31:52 been passed down the line the nonstate core participants and their legal teams the result of that is to muzzle the victims of this fate sponsored policing we call on the coming government have the courage to reverse
00:32:07 government have the courage to reverse this process in transes three and four to commit to this inquiry being given the time to ensure the victims are participants in more than name only we will focus the rest of our opening statement on
00:32:18 statement on CND must be pointed out whilst we we receive more disclosure at an earlier time for CMD the points made about the
00:32:35 time for CMD the points made about the late disclosure of the security service material also plainly apply to them we note that MI5 has been comparatively silent about their interest in CND and wholly silent about the SDS reporting on
00:32:50 wholly silent about the SDS reporting on CND that they they received between 1981 and
00:32:54 and 1986 there's been no material served by the home office or any other departmental customer of the SDS MI5 and home office material is plainly fundamental for this inquiry to discover
00:33:21 fundamental for this inquiry to discover the truth about the SDS infiltrations of CND that is a fact that they must both be very much aware of the science is telling campaign for nuclear disarmed CND was founded in 19 1958 it is well known as a broad Church
00:33:40 1958 it is well known as a broad Church Democratic Mass membership organization with groups across the United Kingdom and members from a broad section of society CND is also well known for having conducted Mass demonstrations on an enormous scale all of the
00:33:51 scale all of the demonstrations have been peaceful prior to and going into trch to the TR 2 period C indeed posed no significant threat to public
00:34:04 significant threat to public order that fact is inescapable and was inevitably acknowledged by the inquiry at the
00:34:11 at the outset it was also well know that CND was not by any definition a subversive organization the very nature of its
00:34:24 organization the very nature of its campaign made clear it had no subversive intention it was and always has been a
00:34:37 intention it was and always has been a single issue campaign CND attempted to utilize parliamentary democracy to achieve its aim of nuclear disarmament it would be perverse to
00:34:56 disarmament it would be perverse to conclude that in in doing so it wished to undermine parliamentary democracy throughout the 1960s and70s MI5 had maintained an interest in the organization because some leading members were associated with the Communist Party of Great Britain however by the end of this 1970
00:35:10 Britain however by the end of this 1970 the concluded rightly orbe it later than most that cndd had no subversive
00:35:22 most that cndd had no subversive intention cndd was not directly targeted by the SDS in the tranch one period the dawn of the 1980s that position changed the British States spying on CND reached such a pitch that two examples leaked
00:35:38 such a pitch that two examples leaked and became very public scandals the way in which the British State dealt with those scandals informs their approach to this
00:35:46 this inquiry Madeline Haye in 1981 a CND member meline hay was visited at her
00:36:00 member meline hay was visited at her home by two police officers officers who claim to be investigating a fraud her
00:36:08 fraud her mortification at being associated with any kind of criminality led her to investigate her investigators 3 years later her determination led to an admission Mr
00:36:20 determination led to an admission Mr Philip Knights the chief cable of the West Midland Police those visiting officers were from special Branch they investigating Mrs ha for her CND membership and the
00:36:34 for her CND membership and the Apparently subversive Act of writing a letter to her local newspaper about Cru missiles CD's reputation as a peaceful raw Church organization was the main
00:36:49 raw Church organization was the main reason for the public outcry over the treatment of meline hay and the oppressive and repressive nature of this kind of
00:36:59 kind of policing the ha incident was a key driver the home Affairs committee inquiry into the activities of special branch in
00:37:08 branch in 1984 the home Affairs committee had the ha case in mind when they stated
00:37:42 right
00:38:12 I'll just say what is happening um the connection uh with uh Mr scobby has broken uh I am now going to pause to let it be uh re connected we will proceed when it
00:38:26 is
00:40:26 e e
00:40:59 I believe that we have now been reconnected uh Mr scobby I'm sorry you were interrupted I haven't the Fest idea what happened but these things do um you'd reached according to my reading
00:41:11 you'd reached according to my reading the top of page eight of your written opening yes
00:41:20 um I'll I'll go from the top of page if it's repetition I'm sorry um the hay incident was a key driver for the home Affairs committee inquiry the activities of special Branch
00:41:33 of special Branch 1984 um home Affairs committee had the hay case in mind when they stated special branches of the police forces have been in danger of acquiring a Sinister reputation of a force which persecutes harmless citizens for
00:41:45 persecutes harmless citizens for political reason acts in the various ways to assist the security services is accountable to no one and represents a threat to our civil liberties the association of chief police offices
00:41:57 association of chief police offices assured that inquiry a that data on individuals or organizations was not collected or held solely on the basis
00:42:09 collected or held solely on the basis that such a person or or or organization supports unpopular causes that Chief officers paid close
00:42:21 causes that Chief officers paid close attention to ensure that information was only recorded if it had a subversive or public order function and see that special brch would not fall a whole organization I ation because some members may be considered subversive Metropolitan poli's own
00:42:33 subversive Metropolitan poli's own Deputy assistant commissioner Colin hu assured the committee that it was certainly not true that records were kept on politically active CND members
00:42:46 kept on politically active CND members all in all it was presented that madin Haye was very much an isolated case and that the officers in question were just overzealous
00:42:57 overzealous DAC hu's final Assurance was that the police do not engage in lots of other activities which are quite improper the police position was
00:43:08 improper the police position was supported by assurances from the home office according to the Home Secretary Leon Brit it was manifestly untrue that
00:43:19 Leon Brit it was manifestly untrue that someone who was not breaking the law and did not plan to could be watched and have files opened on them it was made crystal clear that CN could not possibly be considered to be
00:43:36 be considered to be subversive the madine Hain was raised so often by those who wish to criticize special branches because there was no other evence evidence of them doing
00:43:48 other evence evidence of them doing anything wrong the Home Secretary gave evidence accompanied by a home office civil
00:43:52 civil servant Michael Partridge theond Britain stated that anyone who was concerned they might be SP on by the state just had to ask themselves a simple set of
00:44:03 had to ask themselves a simple set of questions what have I got to do to be the subject of special Branch interest do I threaten the safety or well-being
00:44:15 do I threaten the safety or well-being of the state well hardly that on top of that do I intend to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy well
00:44:30 undermine parliamentary democracy well I'll do that if I put the two together do I come with in that well certainly not the concept of parliamentary privilege prevents us from question the Integrity of the evidence given in the course of those committee
00:44:49 course of those committee hearings coun to the inquiry pointed out in his closing address in TR one that such issues are a matter for parament we hope that in the context of the TR two evids the the inquiry will join us in proposing that the next
00:45:01 join us in proposing that the next Parliament does investigate its own process in respect of that home Affairs committee report the evidence given to
00:45:12 committee report the evidence given to that committee enabled the continuance of the
00:45:16 of the SDS as a matter of historical context as of the 17th of April 1985 when the report was published the committee congratulated itself in on having dispelled the myths
00:45:29 having dispelled the myths that had surrounded special Branch for so
00:45:34 so long he reassured the public that there was nothing for anyone to worry about happy massacre in 1981 the same year West Midland special Branch were
00:45:45 year West Midland special Branch were visiting meline Haye an experienced MI5 Des officer Kathy Mass was put in charge of the security services desk that covered CND
00:46:01 covered CND 193 she left the security service because of her disir over mi5's intrusive and oppressive monitoring of citizens particularly in the trade unions and the peace
00:46:12 unions and the peace movement in early 1985 Kathy Mass blew the whistle the journalist Jeffrey seed produced the documentary for channel 4's
00:46:33 produced the documentary for channel 4's 2020 Vision series titled mi5's official Secrets the 20th of February 1985 only three weeks after the police and home office had given evidence to the home Affairs committee the independent broadcasting Authority banned the broadcast of the program they were
00:46:46 broadcast of the program they were concerned that broadcast would lead to prosecution under the official Secrets act the documentary was finally broadcast on the 8th of March 1985
00:46:57 broadcast on the 8th of March 1985 I Mass's Chief concern in respect of CNB was that the security services were
00:47:12 CNB was that the security services were engaging in the political Arena ramping up spying operations from 1981 in the run the June 1983 general election in the Autumn 1982 the labor party had adopted unilateral nuclear
00:47:25 party had adopted unilateral nuclear disarmament at its National Conference and the party leader Michael foot declared himself supporter of CND in 1979 CND had 4,267 members by April
00:47:39 4,267 members by April 1982 MI5 reported that cndd was expanding at such a rate the chairman
00:47:50 expanding at such a rate the chairman Bruce Kent no longer knew precisely how large its membership was the security service estimate was 30,000 now National members and 250,000 local members by 1983 the
00:48:05 250,000 local members by 1983 the national membership had more than doubled to 75,000 CND D become a mass dissenting
00:48:16 75,000 CND D become a mass dissenting movement and a powerful electoral force with the potential of changing policy and government in January 8 1983 Michael Hass became the defense Secret
00:48:36 Hass became the defense Secret he visited greenham common Air Base in February in March he set up a special information propaganda unit defense Secretariat 19 or DS9 with a specific purpose of combating cnb's unilateral unilateralist message
00:48:52 cnb's unilateral unilateralist message in the Rong the June general election to fulfill Mr hz's brief DS9 went straight to MI5 asking for information about the subversive
00:49:04 for information about the subversive political affiliations leading members of
00:49:08 of cndd including members of the National Council and people working for CMD the director general of MI5 John Jones gave in tood pressure to supply
00:49:19 Jones gave in tood pressure to supply dirt on CND and gave ds19 material they requested the third and fourth of April
00:49:30 requested the third and fourth of April 1983 the conservative press ran articles suggesting the hardle ran CND the Articles named 28 individuals
00:49:42 CND the Articles named 28 individuals who were either leading members of CND or people who worked for CMD and attempted to suggest their motivations were
00:49:53 were political the 22nd of April 1983 Michael hin sent a letter conservative candidates in marginal seats for use when El when electioneering he repeated The Narrative used in press campaign stating that
00:50:09 used in press campaign stating that behind the carefully turned phrases about peace lies the calculated political professionalism of full-time socialists and
00:50:22 socialists and Communists he referred to a conspiracy of the left that is now the driving force distorting the language of Peace on the 20 third of April Mr heslin delivered a tel ified speech in which the same language was
00:50:38 the same language was repeated it was this that led to Kathy ma Mass's
00:50:39 ma Mass's resignation she said the security service stated specifically that CNB was basically a broad-based
00:50:52 basically a broad-based organization drawing support from a very wide range of political opinion as far as cath m was concerned MI5 was providing information on a party political issue
00:51:09 information on a party political issue and that was not legitimate function of the security Port Services because it directly contravenes the charter so she resigned and in March 1985 she blew the
00:51:23 1985 she blew the whistle despite this Kathy Massac was never prosecuted under the official Secret said at the time the consensus was that the equival of Clyde Ponting in February
00:51:36 February 1985 discouraged the state from pursuing another prosecution however the disclosure in this inquiry suggests another explanation in terms of the
00:51:49 another explanation in terms of the source of mi5's Intelligence on CND the focus of Kathy Mas M's Revelations was on M's use of telephone TS and the placing of an MI5 agent inside cnd's
00:52:08 inside cnd's headquarters the agent was said to have been an elderly former Communist Party member named Harry Newton according to Kathy masser his first job inside CND was to attend the CND National Conference in November
00:52:22 CND National Conference in November 1982 and report as soon as possible after after the conference who the new people on the National Council were so
00:52:34 people on the National Council were so that MI5 could pass the information on to interested parties in white after that conference newon was said to have volunteered at cn's head office and became
00:52:45 office and became mi5's eyes and ears he provided very general information about what was going on inside CND headquarters fairly low level St
00:53:01 headquarters fairly low level St internal CN documents and papers and a diagram of the layout of the offices the clear implication of the broadcast of the master Revelations was that Harry Newton after November 1982
00:53:17 that Harry Newton after November 1982 was a significant source of the material passed to DNS 19 in March 1983 however a security service briefed to the SS officer John Kerry makes it
00:53:29 John Kerry makes it clear the last material that nii themselves sourced from within cnd's head office was in October
00:53:43 head office was in October 1982 if Harry Newton was their agent his November 192 conference report was not his first job but it was very close to being his last the following moment
00:53:54 being his last the following moment Harry Newton was so onwell he had to move back to Yorkshire far away from cnb's head office in Goodwood Street he died a few months
00:54:11 Goodwood Street he died a few months later in January 1983 MI5 were asking SDS directly for details of the new national executive committee of cndd they made a similar and more detailed request at the end of April
00:54:22 detailed request at the end of April requests of a similar nature followed in 93 1984 1985 so whilst Kathy Massac may have given a
00:54:35 whilst Kathy Massac may have given a source she gave a dead Source she did not give up the real Source inside CND MI5 of course knew that as did the Metropolitan Police the real Source was
00:54:51 Metropolitan Police the real Source was a metropolitan police officer using the name John
00:54:57 name John Harry the broadcast revelation focused on
00:54:57 on MI5 in respect to special Branch they went no further than a passing line from the
00:55:04 the narat Cathy M says there were other agents inside CNB put there by special branches around the country a line that
00:55:15 branches around the country a line that says to the British state that she knew more but to avoid prosecution would not be say it's the first time that the existence of the SDS and its Regional
00:55:29 existence of the SDS and its Regional equivalent were publicly alluded to it predated the true spies documentary series by 17 years the lack of detail on special Branch agents inside CND meant
00:55:44 special Branch agents inside CND meant that no further Evidence could be given to the home Affairs Committee in March 1985 had not yet concluded its report had the full Revelations been made and the home Affairs committee
00:55:55 made and the home Affairs committee could not have come to the conclusion that they had dispelled myths and there was nothing to worry about instead the minority view of that committee would
00:56:06 minority view of that committee would have held sway two of the eight voting committee members David Winnick MP and Claire SCH MP did not support the committee's conclusions instead they
00:56:21 committee's conclusions instead they concluded that the civil liberties of a number of
00:56:28 number of individuals have been undermined by the ACT of the special branches and the intelligence Services they deplored the fact that such activities had occurred and in all likelihood continued to occur they
00:56:40 likelihood continued to occur they called for a change in the MI5 Harris definition of subversion which allowed two wider discretion to special branch and a reversion the Lord Denning definition of that
00:56:56 that concept they decried the total lack of parliamentary scrutiny over these government agencies and they called for an independent Commission of inquiry into the practices and Records special Branch an inquiry 34 years before this
00:57:10 Branch an inquiry 34 years before this one was called and 39 years before the public disclosure of the true extent of the SDS infiltration of CNB the mass Revelations must have been
00:57:24 CNB the mass Revelations must have been terrifying for special for special R all
00:57:36 terrifying for special for special R all the more so because they came before the home Affairs committee finalized their report clean some insight from a 1998 document in relation to Lee Bon's deployment into CND and The Wider the peace
00:57:50 peace movement 1998 document at the height of CND activities a number of potentially embarrassing exposes occurred most notably the former SE security Service Officer Kathy merer who questioned the service's investigation
00:58:07 questioned the service's investigation into the activities of CND members this produced widespread media interest clearly any revelation of police involvement in such groups would equally create considerable embarrassment
00:58:21 embarrassment embarrassment is the Metropolitan P's favorite
00:58:26 favorite understatement the SDS would and should have been finished in 1985 how they were allowed to get away with it should be a major focus of this inquiry parliamentary privilege or not
00:58:40 inquiry parliamentary privilege or not in their trch one phasing statement the non-state core participants group proposed that David Winnick and clar sha be called to give evidence at this inquiry obtaining new evidence by the rule n process is a way of sidestepping
00:58:58 rule n process is a way of sidestepping parliamentary privilege and ensuring the inquiry is not restricted in it search for the
00:58:59 for the truth Leon Britain and DAC G it are both dead however as we
00:59:13 DAC G it are both dead however as we understand it Michael Partridge from the home office now Sir Michael Partridge case b is not he should be called the home office are aware of the evidence that was given on their behalf uh to the home to the home
00:59:30 behalf uh to the home to the home affairs committee they are aware of the evidence that has been given to this inquiry it is their responsibility and moral duty to ensure
00:59:41 responsibility and moral duty to ensure that this inquiry is enabled to consider evidence of such clear importance the SS in CND Kathy Mer's Revelations were
00:59:52 Revelations were groundbreaking she was both Brave and principal to to have made them but they
01:00:03 principal to to have made them but they were the tip of the iceberg Kathy M was the MI5 desk officer C for CN from 1981 at first cndd mounted to roughly
01:00:16 1981 at first cndd mounted to roughly half of her work two and a half years later CND was all of her work Kathy M's placement is as the CND desk officer coincided with the
01:00:27 desk officer coincided with the deployment of John kry into CND in January 1981 and the visit to madin hay in July
01:00:37 in July 1981 the increase in her workload exactly mirrored The increased interest in CND from the
01:00:52 in CND from the SDS car car's reporting increase in righty W and then again as he took positions of responsibility in CND through 1982 1983 as his reports increase so too did Kathy Mass's
01:01:03 Kathy Mass's workload by the time she left the service in 1983 she would also have been receiving reports from Catherine Lee B
01:01:18 receiving reports from Catherine Lee B MI5 have been given the details of the new peace woman including a report on her progress and personal particulars in in July
01:01:31 in July 1983 other officers reported on CND as a sideline from their main appointments and their main deployments the 1981 to 1983 period these included but were not
01:01:44 1983 period these included but were not limited to Malcolm shearing Roger Pierce Nan Bond all of their reports were sent to MI5 box 500 they would all have been passed over to Kathy Master's death taking up all of her time as the
01:02:02 her time as the MI5 desk officer of CND Kathy M would have known the reports were from SDS police officers infiltrating the organization Harry Newton's short soldier in 1982 chatting to Bruce Kent in the cndd office was not the news as
01:02:19 in the cndd office was not the news as shocking as it was at the time the real news was the detail behind the special Branch offices infiltrating CND around the country country some of them embarking on 4year undercover
01:02:34 embarking on 4year undercover deployments Harry Newton had not been needed to attend the CND National Conference in 1982 because John kery was already going in fact he'd already been the National Conference of
01:02:47 the National Conference of 1981 Newton was not required to report back as soon as possible so that the information could be pass the whiteall in 1981 John Kerry provided 106 p report within 15 days of the conference
01:02:59 report within 15 days of the conference ending John car's 1982 conference report was 135 babies long was completed within 16 days worth noting that John Kerry
01:03:10 16 days worth noting that John Kerry reported on 150 named individuals in that report the list included people like Paul
01:03:23 like Paul o with a special Branch file dating back to 1962
01:03:29 to 1962 Harry Newton's name was not there Harry Newton was allegedly mailing things doing our jobs and Reporting fairly lowlevel stuff Don KY on the other hand could considered himself a trusted
01:03:42 could considered himself a trusted activist he' already provided details of CN headquarters and the location of the membership computer he was providing MI5 with very detailed reports on meetings from CN National Council he was
01:04:01 from CN National Council he was attending Council meetings of the London region CND as secretary chair of cnd's hon group har new was a distraction he was named as a source of information that in all likelihood he did not sort at the end of March 1983
01:04:19 did not sort at the end of March 1983 when MI5 handed their material to ds19 for use in the government's election campaign Harry Newton was long gone John kry
01:04:31 kry was 2 years into his 4year deployment John
01:04:35 John carry mad hay was being visited and lied to by special branched officers John KY was was actively deceiving cndd members across London he tripped his way into
01:04:48 across London he tripped his way into their homes attending parties and having dinner taking their drinks and food as he abused their Hospitality generosity and
01:04:59 and trust he smoked joints with some members too and then he reported them for doing the same he watched hawkwind with the MC glassbury Festival where he can only be
01:05:16 glassbury Festival where he can only be reasonably certain that he did not share a t saur covered his over this overtime and John car's take-home pay increased significantly at the time the UCO earning Mar 25,000 a year which was over three times the national reach wage for each officer who abused the
01:05:33 wage for each officer who abused the trust of our citizens or nurses living saving lives in hospitals amongst other things John KY reported on people's sexual relationships and sexual activity personal family details employment
01:05:45 personal family details employment details parentage and ethnicity he reported on hundreds if not thousands of people most of whom had no police
01:05:58 people most of whom had no police records all special Branch files and no legitimate reason to have you reported um on Christian cnd's peace Pentecost weekend ex Services CND World
01:06:11 Pentecost weekend ex Services CND World War I procession you reported details of tree party and children and of a children's peace party his reports join those of other officers such as Alan Bond's reporting on shooting CND and
01:06:24 Bond's reporting on shooting CND and their plans for a badge making and face pting event a drawing competition in CND balloon set all of those reports were sent to
01:06:41 all of those reports were sent to MI5 public order and subversion rational John kery maintains that he was not initially tasked into CND he says there have been plans to deploy him into the swp OR IM But ultimately he was deployed without a
01:07:02 ultimately he was deployed without a Target his first report was on the peace movement in Hamstead That Then followed about four months of reporting on the campaign against racist laws during which time he managed to get himself appointed as temporary Secretary of the north London Branch he also appears to reported on a labor Party Conference in
01:07:17 reported on a labor Party Conference in March 1981 although the report from that event has not been disclosed but from May 1981 John kery
01:07:30 disclosed but from May 1981 John kery was reporting exclusively on CND he says that the his infiltration of cndd came about because of the potential for elements within the campaign to use mvda
01:07:41 elements within the campaign to use mvda nonviolent direct action tactics he says that he identified the potential for for public disorder that could arise to nvda by activists and those on the fringes of cm and once he had his
01:07:57 fringes of cm and once he had his infiltration of hand CND was agreed with his
01:08:01 his managers in his second statement John kery maintains that he persuaded detective Chief Inspector Dave Short to allow him to focus on CND it would be truly remarkable if a
01:08:14 CND it would be truly remarkable if a detective Council were able to Simply choose to infiltrate an organization as politically sensitive as CND and
01:08:25 politically sensitive as CND and persuade his managers that it was a good idea yeah particularly on ground as spous as nonv direct action the fringes
01:08:37 spous as nonv direct action the fringes of CND had been involved in nonv direct action since cnd's Inception in the late 1950s and yet the SDS did not infiltrate CND to light 81 which
01:08:48 which coincidentally was the same time the state's po political interest in CND commen
01:08:57 commen there was no pressing need for John carry to identify CND members involvement in mvda where members had been engaging in it for 25 years the
01:09:09 been engaging in it for 25 years the undercover reporting makes it clear that much of the nvda that members engaged in was publicized in advance in any event CND
01:09:23 publicized in advance in any event CND members ran open workshops on nvda that covered issues such as the history and philosophy of mvda conf deescalation nonviolent communication and legal rights on John Ker's only
01:09:37 and legal rights on John Ker's only admission nbda activity was centered on green and
01:09:38 green and common he could not get close to that and the SDS already had an office there
01:09:51 and the SDS already had an office there cnd's association with nonviolent direct action does not constitute a public order
01:09:52 order justification the criminal law and respect of public order off is intended to penalize the use of violence and or intimidation by individuals or groups
01:10:08 intimidation by individuals or groups the SDS was a sensibly established to prevent a repeat the 1968 violent disorder and growth of square the existence of the SDS for that purpose was not justifiable it was certainly not justifiable to prevent
01:10:22 certainly not justifiable to prevent making holes in fences taking part in a city an occupation with dancing hiding seeking picnics or an event decorating an air based fence with perms flowers and pumpkins any ination from John car
01:10:39 and pumpkins any ination from John car that Cal offenses on process L to more traditional policing purpose to his deployment do not stand scrutiny the events is envisaged such as obstructing a highway or breaching the peace are less serious in the hierarchy
01:10:51 peace are less serious in the hierarchy of criminality in his own engagement in supplying cannabis as a peace off so my passing it joint see nd's commitment to nonviolence has always been essential to its core
01:11:08 has always been essential to its core principles mvda by its nature name is nonviolent try to equate CND member actions with real public disorder is desperate and
01:11:20 desperate and disingenuous retrospectively John car's own account has to recognize that CND did not POS a significant risk of public disorder his suggestion that elements within CND and fellow Travelers
01:11:34 within CND and fellow Travelers alongside it could potentially pose a public order challenge is hollow is a matter of historical and police record CN with its broad base
01:11:47 police record CN with its broad base support an array of fellow Travelers has never B risk to public order in any event the thir Travelers
01:12:00 order in any event the thir Travelers will were already heavily infiltrated by SDS officers reports of those officers overwhelmingly suggest their target groups had very little interest in CND
01:12:11 groups had very little interest in CND demonstrations John K's reporting kept up the appearance of gathering Intelligence on alleged subverses by
01:12:24 Intelligence on alleged subverses by occasionally mentioning pis and anus but the CND infiltration told the police less about their approach the peace movement
01:12:25 movement and the other also unjustified SDS infiltrations in any of it as early as February 1982 John CL been clear that
01:12:38 February 1982 John CL been clear that that purported subversive organizations such as the swp and IMG were smaller than than labor and Christian groups in CND with no foreseeable likelihood of
01:12:51 CND with no foreseeable likelihood of their influence grow particularly on the National Council the offices that infiltrated CND regularly reported that demonstrations were expected to be entirely peaceful that CND Le police in
01:13:09 entirely peaceful that CND Le police in advance of those demonstrations and had large contingence of organized and trained
01:13:10 trained stewards one of the least attractive arguments put forward by the police is that reports indicating no
01:13:22 that reports indicating no disorder are as valuable to policing as reports of disorder logically speaking it gives license for the police to spy on
01:13:33 license for the police to spy on everyone Jeffrey CRA called this the ultimate defense line respect of CN has no merit at all anyone on any Street any time in the 1980s to tell the police the conclusion
01:13:46 1980s to tell the police the conclusion that John Cary came to at the end of his
01:13:57 that John Cary came to at the end of his deployment in his own words there was no real threat to public order John K's account of a public order motivated deployment does not make any sense a more accurate description of the purpose of John cl's appointment in his own words is that he was providing a
01:14:10 words is that he was providing a longterm assessment of the organization that inform the state's approach to it Don K is certainly right the long-term assessment was thought is infiltration of cndd last from May
01:14:27 of cndd last from May 1981 to December 8 4 it overlapped with that of leas bonsor who was deployed from June 83 until March 886 and Timothy Spence Timothy Spence was deployed into
01:14:41 Spence Timothy Spence was deployed into the field in October 83 his first report on CND was in February 1984 and he continued to report on them until November 1986 there are SDS reports covering
01:14:54 1986 there are SDS reports covering every single one of the CN national conferences in that 6-year period timy Spence's deployment was unusual in a sense he was initially
01:15:06 unusual in a sense he was initially targeted into an area rather than a group a
01:15:11 group a targeting uh discussion between the SDS and MI5 indicates that Hackney was
01:15:23 and MI5 indicates that Hackney was apparently so subversive as to Warrant a deployment targeting the borrow itself hay community relations executive was the proposed starting point timathy Spence entered hatle and reported on a number of police monitary and Justice
01:15:35 number of police monitary and Justice campaigns JY groups and lawyers like his fellow CND infiltrators Timothy Spence also reported on the local Council Harry
01:15:48 also reported on the local Council Harry Barrow Council allowing local CND to use the library as a meeting place was worthy of a report whether Timothy Spence himself knew it or not his deployment was clearly targeted at managing descent as L5 and SDS had discussed
01:16:04 descent as L5 and SDS had discussed Timothy Spence fired a more defined Target in the beginning of 1984 when he started to infiltrate CMD after John K's exfiltration cndd became Timothy Spence's Focus Timothy
01:16:18 became Timothy Spence's Focus Timothy Spence is also unusual because for the most part his account of his deployment
01:16:30 most part his account of his deployment appears to be be refreshingly honest he is very clear that the groups he reported on were not subersive the highest point is that there was a potential through marches
01:16:41 there was a potential through marches and obstruction of the highway which he rightly acknowledges would have been minor infringements of the law equally Lee bonson did not see a public order justification for her deployment her
01:16:52 justification for her deployment her Targets in CND and then Lamb with women of peace and green and common but always peaceful public order threat went no
01:17:04 peaceful public order threat went no further than a disruptive city which could have caused problems for pedestrians or traffic bons is also clear her targets could not have been said to be sers it was simply against nuclear bombs and probably would have preferred a later
01:17:24 probably would have preferred a later government deny Spence says there was a general interest in CND from both MI5 and special a view which Accord with John car's view of an assessment in the interest of the state this is also born out by the by
01:17:39 state this is also born out by the by the MI5 and SDS leaon documents in the six four years s CND was directly infiltrated by the SDS MI5 did not need telling that CND was not even a potentially subversive organization because they
01:17:50 organization because they knew but if the SCS was slow on the upate even though were clear in March
01:18:03 upate even though were clear in March 1984 at a meeting with four MI5 officers that there was no ring of subversives unduly influencing the Democratic structure of CND despite that knowledge the SBS continued to improve its
01:18:17 the SBS continued to improve its coverage of CND and Report the details of the organization's membership and finances in July 84 SDS management expressed concern having three offices in CN was too much however MI5 were well
01:18:29 in CN was too much however MI5 were well satisfied with the information they were receiving they were also so concerned at the considerable Gap that John carer's retirement would leave partic particularly the loss of his valuable
01:18:49 particularly the loss of his valuable access to London C that they pressed him pressed for him to be retained after is expected exfiltration date in October 1982 I told uh the SDS they no longer
01:19:03 1982 I told uh the SDS they no longer put much effort into finding agents and certain organizations such as the swp because the SDS had so many officers there by July
01:19:14 SDS had so many officers there by July 84 with such extensive SDS coverage of CND this possible MI5 took a similar approach 1994 St reming said on record the allegation the service investigated organizations which were not in themselves to verses is quite
01:19:37 not in themselves to verses is quite untrue she did not mention that the SDS were doing it all them by by November 1984 the same SDS management was declining in my five proposals to move Timothy Spence into an swp infiltration and insisting that he be John ky's
01:19:53 and insisting that he be John ky's successor in CND Timothy Spence was the last undercover officer in CN the SDS attempted to obtain MI5 support for a successor to him in October
01:20:06 successor to him in October 1986 Security Service were by n adamant there was no requirement the SDS penetration of CND continued as the home Affairs committee deliberated despite a
01:20:19 Affairs committee deliberated despite a clear recognition in special branch that it was highly problematic the light of that
01:20:20 that investigation simply similarly the penetration continued as Channel 4 broadcast the Kathy Master revelations in fact on the very day that the
01:20:31 in fact on the very day that the documentary aired ten Spence was reporting that the secretary of the atne CMD group he was a signatory to their bank account interestingly having been sent to MI5 this particular
01:20:52 sent to MI5 this particular report um as this report was returned as not being security interest previously similar
01:20:56 similar reports including only one six months before from Lee bonser had not been retired similarly Tim Timothy Spence's report on the 1985 CND National Conference as a handwritten note
01:21:08 Conference as a handwritten note indicating that the treasur report on finances had been destroyed on receipt by
01:21:15 by MI5 MI5 had certainly not been so concerned about keeping copies of treasur treasur reports 1982 and 1984 it appears that having taken the brunt of
01:21:26 appears that having taken the brunt of the media attention placed Mass MI5 at least wanted to be a little more careful what they were accepting the SDS on the on the other
01:21:42 accepting the SDS on the on the other hand were relatively unscathed by the mass Revelations ultimately the home Affairs committee went the way the special Branch had wanted it would have
01:21:53 special Branch had wanted it would have been incredibly worrying to them at the time there's been extremely limited disclosure of internal Poli documentation on the issue I one document gave an insight into the level of concern the documentary would have
01:22:04 of concern the documentary would have caused them in September 1989 special Branch received intelligence the journalist Jeffy seed was getting close to them again and planning another documentary this time he'd been in contact with a former member of big
01:22:23 contact with a former member of big flame the very person who had confronted SDS Officer Rick Clark with his birth and death certificate in 1976 he offed seed a photograph of Clark and some papers on the subject those
01:22:36 and some papers on the subject those papers would doubtless have been the fire that Richard chesson told the inquiry about they included the birth and death certificates of the real Rick
01:22:49 and death certificates of the real Rick Gibson as well as the scrolled note that Clark had written to his girlfriend in big
01:22:50 big flame that would have been the first evidence of SDS sexual relationships with
01:22:56 with activists it had been published
01:23:07 activists it had been published then Mary would have known the truth far sooner than she did every sexual relationship post 1989 would not have happened be and Jenny and every woman abused by an SDS
01:23:21 Jenny and every woman abused by an SDS office officer thereafter would not have to experience this inquiry special Branch went into overdrive Commander Ops was immediately informed
01:23:33 Commander Ops was immediately informed Arrangements were made to esquad for the situation to be monitored closely and for any future relevant takes to be made available for scrutiny had Mr seed been taped since 1985 on whose
01:23:50 1985 on whose authority the documentary was never made and the FES never come to light managing descent this qu quiry has so far refrained from expressing any view about the proposition that the SCS was one of
01:24:11 the proposition that the SCS was one of the instruments set up by a conservative State suppress the aspiration of those who wish to produce radical change by political
01:24:17 political means the inquiry cited limited evidence as the
01:24:18 as the rational however inquiry now has evidence of deployments served no viable or even remotely arguable justification
01:24:38 or even remotely arguable justification on public order or subversive grounds in addition there is evidence that the state endorsed and orchestrated a longterm deeply interest penetration despite that lack of justification putting aside the
01:24:50 justification putting aside the background to the home Affairs committee we not permitted to question due to parliamentary privilege there is evidence that the state prevented parliamentary scrutiny of its activity in the face of that this inquiry will have to answer these
01:25:06 inquiry will have to answer these questions why was an open broad Church single isue organization the decades long reputation the peaceful protest suddenly infiltrated in 1981 and why was it that that
01:25:25 1981 and why was it that that organization was so extensively and persistently penetrated until 1986 Kathy M was clear that the increased interest in CN
01:25:36 clear that the increased interest in CN was political there was a reason for the increased workload cndd was a politically sensitive
01:25:47 politically sensitive issue the difference is a political one the state's particular interest in CND began in 1981 the same time that CND became cap became a mass dissenting movement capable of changing policy and potentially government the language used in the SDS
01:26:05 government the language used in the SDS an annual reports is reflective of that 1981 the stated concern was that CND would prevent the implementation of government policy 82 that cndd would pose a more direct challenge to the government in 1983 cnd's widespread
01:26:25 government in 1983 cnd's widespread National support was a focus N4 CD size was the concern l policy of unilateral assignment and increasing public awareness was specifically cited the drivers of the increased
01:26:36 drivers of the increased membership CND was said to have skillfully manipulated public opinion so the obvious irony of that statement the subtext is that the
01:26:49 statement the subtext is that the concern could be assuaged by a skillful manipulation of public opinion in the opposite
01:26:53 opposite direction infiltrations were clearly political
01:26:56 political and were examples of the state approach to managing descent positions of responsibility at the close of TR one on behalf of Richard Chester Maran and
01:27:10 behalf of Richard Chester Maran and Lindsay J we set out details submissions on the evidence of offices attaining positions of responsibility in the organizations that they infiltrated we set out the extent of SDS
01:27:28 of SDS management knowledge and endorsement of this particular tactic as well as as inevitable implications to an organization an undercover officers take on such roles Chief Inspector Jeff C's method in the troop site movement including a set routine the under
01:27:42 including a set routine the under undercover officer one infiltra the branch two ensured election to chair or
01:27:56 branch two ensured election to chair or secretary position in that PR three use that position to guarantee a delicate role to Regional meetings and or use Presence at those meetings to gain a delicate position to National meetings
01:28:14 delicate position to National meetings that pattern was exactly replicated by both John KY and simy Spence in their infiltrations of CMD both John KY uh
01:28:25 infiltrations of CMD both John KY uh antim expense repeated the standard UC line about accidentally taking these positions of responsibility this is a corporate line is taken precisely because the tactic so obviously destabilizing and anti-democratic John car's appointment
01:28:39 anti-democratic John car's appointment as temporary Secretary of the campaign against racist laws only happened he says because he didn't look down quickly was deemed to have volunteered he did not see the role he
01:28:52 volunteered he did not see the role he then obtained at Hamad cndd he was just chosen to fulfill it he downplayed the position he took by describing it as a facilitator and said that he was
01:29:05 facilitator and said that he was disappointed that the secretary this the security service documents consistently refer to him as chairman of the hamster branch of
01:29:12 branch of CND there was no such role facilita in any CND group Mii refer to John Kerry as chanon because that is what he was
01:29:24 chanon because that is what he was chairman was in charge of the group and the role gave him delicate access to the London region John carry says that his attendance at London CND Council meetings should not be overstated
01:29:40 meetings should not be overstated because the council only meant to share news of events and occasionally to organize London wide events but MI5 were particularly pleased with his attendance as a devoted campaigner at those
01:29:51 as a devoted campaigner at those meetings in his access to the London Regional office John K's own reporting was clear the London Council was a
01:30:02 was clear the London Council was a stepping stone in the hierarchy of national
01:30:06 national CND his position and presence there eased his roote into the national conferences that he and Timothy Spence reported on every year in June 1983 John kery was also the chief steward of an
01:30:22 kery was also the chief steward of an important and highly publicized piece of nonviolent direct action involving the linking of hands the and US embassies John Kerry states that that the chief St title is grander than his actual responsibilities on the day which were
01:30:37 responsibilities on the day which were effectively setting up the the dis and loud speakers this new account is contradicted by his own report from the time which details his involvement in arranging the timetable for the event
01:30:51 arranging the timetable for the event including stewards meetings and ensuring that all stewards were correctly positioned on the route his report details are concern by the organized the numbers attending might well exceed their requirements and could reach
01:31:07 their requirements and could reach 50,000 demonstrates to be chief steward at a CND demonstration in London is an enormous responsibility it is key to ensuring that roots and Agreements are kept to and that public order is maintained John Kerry gave his copy of CN notes for Mars and stward to his
01:31:25 CN notes for Mars and stward to his superiors in the SDs that document made it clear that all sters were to behave as ambassadors for CND with the responsibility for ensuring that the demonstrations were peaceful and successful on this occasion downplaying
01:31:40 successful on this occasion downplaying the role has not served John Kerry well if setting up loud speakers is all he
01:31:52 if setting up loud speakers is all he did when he should have been making sure that that demonstration went as planned then he put CND at grave risk taring their unblemished reputation for exceptional Shing peaceful demonstrations for an or for an organization such as CND having a chief stward who does not do his job in a
01:32:05 stward who does not do his job in a highly publicized Flagship demonstration is almost as dangerous as the destabilizing actions com taken by Rick Gibson the troops out movement as John Ker's successor Timothy Spence exactly mirrored his progress
01:32:25 Spence exactly mirrored his progress this was clearly the intention as alazon note in July 84 between MI5 and SDS makes clear Timothy Spence became Secretary of the Hanney CND group he also downplays the role he does not recall taking the position when he took
01:32:40 recall taking the position when he took it or how he came to take it yet Timothy Spence's own reporting recognizes the obvious importance of his role his early
01:32:52 obvious importance of his role his early reporting from hne group cndd blames low membership on group leadership by March 1985 6 months after he reported that this affection he was group secretary himself immediately after that he was
01:33:09 himself immediately after that he was reporting on the London region executive and Council meetings and AGM like John kenry before you he also downplay that attendance there's an interesting example of the importance of group secret from Timothy Spence is
01:33:22 group secret from Timothy Spence is reporting September 1986 London region CND were proposing to send a peace delegation to Moscow they sent letters to the group secretaries across London asking for both their views on the idea and for funding the response was
01:33:34 and for funding the response was disappointing as there were only two replies act and CND opposed the idea the
01:33:53 replies act and CND opposed the idea the happy group Timothy Spence encouraged it but refused funding CNB are clear that John KY and Timothy Spence took roles that were important in terms of communication meetings membership coordination recruitment support and representation in the case of Rick
01:34:05 representation in the case of Rick Clark's deployment on into the troop side movement the evidence conclusively demonstrated that SDS was knowingly used to
01:34:15 to destabilize and in that case attempt to decapitate Democratic movement CND was a much larger organization no obstacle have done that level of
01:34:29 no obstacle have done that level of damage in a four-year deployment and of course Rick Clark's exposure as an undercover officer taught the SDS a lesson about taking too high a role but it's interesting that Jeff Craft's
01:34:45 it's interesting that Jeff Craft's fingerprints are all over the style of these officers progression at the CN hierarchy craft had been the SDS inspector for Clark's deployment for John Ken's deployment he was the Chief superintendent of special Branch with
01:34:59 superintendent of special Branch with overall responsib responsibility for the SDS which he described as his biggest responsibility when craft left that role and hand it over to Chief superintendent
01:35:12 and hand it over to Chief superintendent Tucker MI5 was still very happy with SDS coverage of the troop s movement and there were three SDS officers inside CND D when he gave evidence in TR one clar denied all knowledge of Rick Clark's
01:35:26 denied all knowledge of Rick Clark's movement up an activity in the hierarchy of the troop site movement despite having signed off most almost all of the reports respect to CND despite being in charge of three of the most politically
01:35:38 charge of three of the most politically sensitive politically driven deployments in SDS history he denied all knowledge of any CN off CND officer other than Lee bonson he was unable to assist his
01:35:52 bonson he was unable to assist his inquir to why John kery was deployed furthermore he was unable to assist whether there had been pressure put on the SDS from the government and the home office to deploy these officers into CN his evidence did not square with his own
01:36:09 his evidence did not square with his own report in February 1984 that the SDS had obtained first class information 1983 particularly in the Troublesome anti-nuclear area John K's detective inspector Trevor Butler who also gave
01:36:26 inspector Trevor Butler who also gave evidence in charge one said he had no no dealings with anybody reporting back on the
01:36:30 the CNB despite having signed off many of John car's reports we reiterate an aspect of our tranch one Closing one way to ensure the inquiry concludes there's limited
01:36:46 inquiry concludes there's limited evidence of the proposition is for the for the police to refuse to give it counter subversion and disruptive assistance an important feature to tranch one evidence was the cabinet office disclosure indicating that various interdepartmental groups in
01:36:58 various interdepartmental groups in government were customers of the SDS either direct as a result of special Branch membership of those groups from 1972 or count or circulated by the
01:37:13 1972 or count or circulated by the security service as a product of their intimate
01:37:14 intimate relationship purpose of these groups was not simply to gather intelligence but to use it for what they called counter
01:37:27 use it for what they called counter subversion certainly in the mid 1970s the Metropolitan Police were attendees these group meeting or recipients of their reports and minutes other named attendees were
01:37:41 other named attendees were representatives in the cabinet office foreign and Commonwealth office home office Departments of education employment and of course the security service one of the methods that was explicitly discussed was the manipulation of the mainstream media
01:37:57 manipulation of the mainstream media or as a state called it the enlivening of the home information machine especially in relation to the press the disclosed cabinet office documents detailed a number of examples of the state's media manipulation to further
01:38:13 state's media manipulation to further its ends MI5 certainly not been Avers to engaging in that kind of activity throughout the 1970s and early 1980 in early April 1983 when the conservative press ran
01:38:24 1983 when the conservative press ran articles as part of the DS 19 propaganda campaign against CNB they named 28 individuals who were either leading members of or worked for the organization John Kerry had reported on
01:38:39 organization John Kerry had reported on 24 of those 28 members in his 1982 na of conference report one of the 28 was reported on in a March 1983 document from John kry listed the results of the London region CND executive committee
01:38:53 London region CND executive committee election incidentally that report was signed up by none other than Chief superintendent Jeff Crown before it was sent to
01:38:59 sent to MI5 another John car report from February 1983 details the meeting of the CND National Council from the 15th and 16th of January 1983 in which the 1983
01:39:14 16th of January 1983 in which the 1983 National officers were elected it named 11 of the 28 in total these three reports all exactly contemporan the ds19 campaign reported
01:39:34 contemporan the ds19 campaign reported on 27 the 28 members named in the press in defense of the real the authorized history of the security services MI5 claimed that the material they gave to DS9 in March 1983 related to only seven members of CMD and was open source
01:39:52 members of CMD and was open source similarly the MI5 whistleblower Annie M wrote the 1983 three the service had refused requests from Michael htin to hand over CN membership lists and details of members political
01:40:05 details of members political activities that in itself raises some interesting questions Ministry of Defense must have had its own research is capable of of accessing open source material they have not gone to MI5
01:40:18 material they have not gone to MI5 asking for material that they already had access to themselves when the approach was made by the M they must
01:40:35 approach was made by the M they must have been conscious that their request invol asking MI5 to breach the max 5 directive they clearly expected the direcor to be breached and if the authorized MI5 account of the information given is correct it was breached but if MI5 did only give them
01:40:48 breached but if MI5 did only give them open source information on seven names d19 must have been sorely disappointed the nood wanted contemporaneous information on the CN leadership as of the spring of
01:40:59 leadership as of the spring of 1983 can it simply be a coincidence the
01:41:11 1983 can it simply be a coincidence the ds19 Press included not seven names but 28 and the SC had recently reported on 27 of
01:41:13 27 of them there's been no disclosure of a list of the SDS customers at DS 19 and 10 nothing of any use from MI5
01:41:25 10 nothing of any use from MI5 there was nothing to stop from going directly to the Metropolitan Police in relation to the melin ha incident s Philip Knights made it clear that West Midland special Branch had
01:41:38 that West Midland special Branch had received previous requests directly from the home office to make inquiries like those involving Mrs hay he said that he had turned them down but the SS had been generating reports that could not
01:41:52 generating reports that could not conceivably any other purpose other than the party political in October 1982 John Kerry submitted a report stating that London Regional CN
01:42:08 report stating that London Regional CN prepared a plan for campaign at the next general election there would be a pilot campaign in February 1983 just leting the prime minister's constituency an election fund will be set up and members will be asked to pledge time to election campaigning another report PR 1983 deals with cnb's awareness from the Press
01:42:23 with cnb's awareness from the Press conservative party was using a publicity agency to come to CND arguments the SDS report details and a member of John K's H the group saying they knew someone who
01:42:38 H the group saying they knew someone who worked for the agency and would ask them to give advanced notice of publicity campaigns in July 82 John Kerry was reporting a forthcoming CNB day school with discussions on how to count a media B against
01:42:52 B against CND these documents are Stark examples of report
01:42:56 not on subversion but on engagement in the process of parliamentary democracy they were signed off by Chief superintendent Nigel short and sent for onward
01:43:08 Nigel short and sent for onward distribution we know they were sent to MI5 because it was the security services Who provided the reports to the inquir
01:43:24 Who provided the reports to the inquir to the inquiry we do not know where else they was sent because the Metropolitan Police to just destroyed their copies and their front sheets they're clear of no of no use to anyone other than the conservative government and a state interested in
01:43:35 government and a state interested in preserving the status quo they had no purpose other than electioneering there are only two customers who would have considered them of any
01:43:42 of any value whilst the s19 was was seeking dirt on CND Lee bonser was approached and asked to join the SDS with a
01:43:53 and asked to join the SDS with a specific intention of infil the green and peace campaign she was asked directly by a superintendent who told her that the Prime Minister herself
01:44:04 her that the Prime Minister herself wanted to know what the Greenland women were doing and asked if she would help the police find out the prime ministerial request was in February or March 1983 Co coincidentally exactly at the same time that
01:44:20 same time that ds19 was seeking dirt they that they could not obtain from MI5 Hickman the solicitor to to some of the women the green and common Camp observes in their statement to the inquiry that prior to March 83 the tabid media had
01:44:37 prior to March 83 the tabid media had been fairly neutral in its reporting of the greenand camps that reporting then deteriorated into a concerted effort to dehumanize and demean C occupants Miss hman notes the
01:44:49 occupants Miss hman notes the correlation between the content of some of those media reports and reporting of Lee
01:44:54 Lee bonser uh Peter Francis had been clear whilst deployed in youth Against Racism in Europe in 1993 he gathered intelligence that could undermine
01:45:05 intelligence that could undermine support for those campaign for Steven Lawrence he said I was asked the same as all other campaigns is there anything the police could possibly use through
01:45:19 the police could possibly use through the media start maybe tiing the campaign it means the amount of sympathy that that campaign can generate is going to be vastly diminished he said that using intelligence to smear a campaign was a
01:45:33 intelligence to smear a campaign was a general remit that it always that that is always our remit we find out the
01:45:46 is always our remit we find out the intelligence and if it is needed it will be used the home office the home office knew of the SDS existence because they signed authorities for it every year there is no doubt they were aware of and approved the extent targeting of cndd
01:46:00 approved the extent targeting of cndd because they had cite of the 1983 SDS annual report there's evidence of an internal home office report being prepared in relation to the sdss 1983 activity but this has not been traced
01:46:13 activity but this has not been traced the home officers wanted to be sure that the SDS could be defended as a current response to current problems in other words they wanted to make sure that the targeting was appropriate in their view Michael
01:46:24 appropriate in their view Michael partridge had written to the police proposing discussion with Deputy assistant commissioner H to inform the home office about which group and activities were the current focus of the
01:46:39 activities were the current focus of the squad's work and how that is carried out part also noted the sensitivity of such noted the sensitivity of such undercover work 1983 report contained
01:46:51 undercover work 1983 report contained details on SDs personnel and targets and included clear reference the infiltration of political and pressure groups CND was given prominence and was described as undoubtedly a Main Street activity of the SDs that year having
01:47:04 activity of the SDs that year having been made aware of the Contex of the annual report Michael Partridge is noted confirming that he and sanan C were entirely content with the way the squads
01:47:24 entirely content with the way the squads Ro adapted to changing circumstances six months later Partridge company the Home Secretary Leon brist when he gave evidence of the home Affairs investigation to special Branch DAC C had also given evidence shortly before is also Beyond doubt that the home office also read the 1986 annual report
01:47:43 office also read the 1986 annual report which contained a significant section on CND and noted this was a very sensitive area of police monit so M Partridge signed off the home office authorization for the SDS to
01:47:56 office authorization for the SDS to continue 93 1984 and 1985 he approved the funding without challenge to the budget request or exu the expenditure despite requests for funding increases that far outstripped
01:48:07 that far outstripped inflation the letter requesting authorization 1986 was also sent to him his then r as Deputy under secretary of state so ID Bish had also been a
01:48:20 state so ID Bish had also been a recipient of a letter from the security services is detailing how in advance of giving evidence to the home Affairs committee the home office and police
01:48:32 committee the home office and police Witnesses could consert tactics agree lines the tap and avoid drawing attention to the points they wanted to cover up it is beyond doubt the home office was aware of the detailed
01:48:46 office was aware of the detailed operational activity and all the groups infiltration 1983 and 1986 it is inconsolable there would have been no discussions in the the home office had categorically and enthusiastically endorsed the
01:48:58 enthusiastically endorsed the infiltration of CND by undercover officers as the deputy under Secretary of State Michael Partridge as he is now was interviewed by Steven Taylor for
01:49:12 was interviewed by Steven Taylor for 2015 report on the links between SDS and home office we do not know whether he was asked about the knowledge of the SDS and the evidence given to the home office home Affairs committee we do know knew that there was very little
01:49:24 knew that there was very little recollection of anything related to the SDS save for an unnamed official who was imposed to 1984 who was able to recall discussions
01:49:43 1984 who was able to recall discussions on the SDS with the commander and Deputy assistant commissioner at the time that officially was apparently unable to recall the detail we also know that the key F which contains the evidence of home office interaction in relation to the SDS 96
01:49:55 interaction in relation to the SDS 96 2008 probably no longer exists and there is no record of what happened to it Stephen Taylor was not able to conclude whether that is human error or deliberate concealment no records
01:50:16 deliberate concealment no records remained in the home office covering the whole 40-year existence of the SDS save the 24 letters dealing with the annual reports and funding we do not know whether Michael Partridge informed Leon brist of the extent of his knowledge of the SDS because there are no records
01:50:27 the SDS because there are no records however partridge's successor as Deputy under Secretary of State s John chilcott certainly informed the Home Secretary dougas herd in
01:50:40 dougas herd in 1988 chilcott and R 86 report discussed its content with special Branch at the time he then received letters outlining the work of the SDS in ' 87 and 88 and authorized funding accordingly when ch
01:50:59 authorized funding accordingly when ch fur the work of the SDS to D was heard the Home Secretary is noted as having expressed his approval in June 1989 when chut was still Deputy on the secretary and Douglas her was still home secretory the annual link to the home office was seven
01:51:17 annual link to the home office was seven the home office still considered the SDS valuable but home office had had no further need to know the source of management aspects unless something of real concern occurs we do not know why the home office took this View at this stage however it is
01:51:29 this View at this stage however it is readily apparent that a new approach to funding Ur the paper trail between the SCS and the home office would completely dry
01:51:40 dry up when there are no records there is no evidence however in 1993 the Home Secretary Michael hard was due to
01:51:51 Secretary Michael hard was due to personally attend the SDS office with the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police
01:51:56 Police the absence of documents does not equate to an absence of knowledge both douis herd and Michael hard can assist this inquiry in respect to the key issues of government knowledge if the inquiry has
01:52:12 government knowledge if the inquiry has not already done so they should both be required to provide evidence of their knowledge we understand the home and cabinet office material will be served the later undisclosed date for consideration the TR three in their TR
01:52:28 consideration the TR three in their TR one State the security service maintain that the pressure to investigate these or organizations often came from the Prime Minister and from White W in the
01:52:40 Prime Minister and from White W in the authorized history of MI5 it was noted that Margaret fer took great interest greater interest in the intelligence Community than any prime minister since Winston church that wording suggests an interest in The Wider intelligence Community it is apparent there was a
01:52:54 Community it is apparent there was a significant interest in the Merk side a special Branch Dennis Skiller MP maintained in the 1980s Margaret fion turned the police into her own private Army the CND infiltrations suggest an
01:53:11 Army the CND infiltrations suggest an extension of that the last point that we will make in relation to cndd is the correlation between the start and end the SDS the national opinion Po in July 1982 the same time that John Cary was reported on a cndd day school on
01:53:27 reported on a cndd day school on countering Bast in the media National opinion polls suggested that 63% the people in Britain were opposed to the decision to buy trient and 53% were against polarus by November 1986
01:53:39 against polarus by November 1986 66% thought that Britain should continue to possess nuclear weapons 49% supported the completion of the Trident program whilst only 39% supported unconditional removal the weight of public opinion
01:53:53 removal the weight of public opinion had shifted and with it the threat to state and government policy that CND had
01:54:04 state and government policy that CND had posed Timothy Spence completed his final report and the SDS infiltration of CND was over additionally CND was rapidly losing members was becoming less of a perceived threat to the establishment Kathy
01:54:20 Kathy Mass's certainty that reporting was political was not misplaced lindsy German and the Socialist were party from the disclosure that we've been able to review it is clear that the SS continued their Relentless
01:54:32 SS continued their Relentless infiltration of the S swp throughout the trans Tu period since 1973 MI5 had been obsessed with the idea of SDS officers obtaining a place in the in the swp headquarters in the Tran one
01:54:46 in the swp headquarters in the Tran one period that that Obsession culminated in coling Clark and Phil Cooper taking taking Direction setting positions in
01:54:58 taking Direction setting positions in the party and for 6 years between 1978 and 1983 satisfying the MI5 orders of obtaining a permanent place in the party's Center in a run up to Phil Cooper's 1983 exfiltration two new members were plac into the swp and MI5 affirmed their
01:55:12 into the swp and MI5 affirmed their interest in the new national swp office
01:55:24 interest in the new national swp office SDS management emphasized how Keen they were to find a pay a way of replacing Phil Cooper and HQ were reluctant to follow the same method they had previously adopted of having one undercover officer introduced and
01:55:35 undercover officer introduced and recommend another to the party the SDS were hopeful that Alan B would make a name for himself in time as he had recently become a Committee Member in brickton
01:55:41 brickton swp I5 had considered Phil Cooper to be the SS's most difficult officer but the levels access that he have was set as a
01:55:54 levels access that he have was set as a benchmark to be replicated the fact that he had left the S swp having brewed a r at headquarters was positively reported
01:56:08 at headquarters was positively reported the SDS admitted they were finding their coverage of the swp to be extensive to be too extensive to justify by May of 1984 regretfully informing MI5 there were no there was no hope of more than two offices in the par further they did not expect that either of the two
01:56:21 not expect that either of the two current officers and that green and Alan Bon would make HQ in their time by September 1984 MI5 was refreshing about their lack of access to S swp HQ to such an extent they proposed
01:56:39 S swp HQ to such an extent they proposed that Timothy Smith be withdrawn from CND and use his position in Hackman to gain access to the swp HQ instead Alan Bor was also proven to be difficult as he would not move from Dro swp as he had
01:56:54 would not move from Dro swp as he had been directed to do the time Bond B on seual relationship with a member of cwp which perhaps explains the reluctance to move ultimately an Bond did make it to HQ he secured work there
01:57:05 did make it to HQ he secured work there by pretending to be a carpenter MI5 gly reported he had learned carpentry on the job from the Readers Digest September 1985 MI5 met Alan Bond whilst he was
01:57:25 1985 MI5 met Alan Bond whilst he was still a serving officer to discuss his continued access to swp new HQ print shop complex and give him specific tasking Alan Bon's last task before his exfiltration in November was to provide MI5 with extensive reports on the location of s swp's new office all of
01:57:43 location of s swp's new office all of those reports have been heavily redacted no doubt to protect the saate the trade craft around the kind of building installation he had been required to do on m5's behalf the SDS the great assistance he had given MI5
01:57:56 the great assistance he had given MI5 for the new swp HQ in the 1985 annual report When Alan Bond left MI5 offered
01:58:07 report When Alan Bond left MI5 offered to do anything they could to help Stefan velosi progress in his swp access 905 referring to an officer's progress as
01:58:19 referring to an officer's progress as his career in the swp April MI5 would would pleased this very good program in the swp by the a of 86 St vosi had also managed to find employment of swp
01:58:32 also managed to find employment of swp HQ he too was summonsed to an in-person meeting with MI5 it also appears after Bond's exfiltration the end of 85 Nick green had also defied expectations and gained access to headquarters stepan
01:58:50 gained access to headquarters stepan vos's deployment last until 1988 we are not clear how long he maintained his access to HQ because the material relation to deployment has not been
01:59:04 relation to deployment has not been disclosed however by January 199 MI5 was so key on an officer accessing HQ again they were happy to help pay to facilitate it when discussing their coverage requirements with the SDS the indicat is that direct access to SW phq and the part's computer is of prime
01:59:21 and the part's computer is of prime importance MI5 also very happy that the s s decided to deploy Mark carry into the swp mark Cary established himself well and the S and in the SS words sucked Lamberth North swp dry of
01:59:36 sucked Lamberth North swp dry of intelligence he progressed enough to be involved in an attempt to help set up a new WP branch in Kingston but it's not clear that he made it into the swp HQ
01:59:48 clear that he made it into the swp HQ however 1990 the SDS were maintaining
01:59:59 however 1990 the SDS were maintaining their target been two officers in the swp any one time not clear who those officers were because a number are either giving evidence in closed hearings or were never given hand nominal identifiers it may be that an
02:00:12 nominal identifiers it may be that an unders officer hit his MI5 Target when Mark carry was debriefed by MI5 in September 1992 he suggested that black agents took more chance of getting to S swp Center in July 199 one the SDS were
02:00:23 swp Center in July 199 one the SDS were now so well practiced in targeting their officers into the center of the swp they were concerned that their black agent
02:00:35 were concerned that their black agent Trevor Morris might progress too rapidly and that he could progress into the position with too high profile TR Morris states that he was a close associate of at least one member of the swp Central Committee after his
02:00:50 of the swp Central Committee after his own Declaration of having been a leading swp member was characterist characteristically hyperbolic but it certainly ensured that he received taxpayer funded holidays to Germany and Egypt to Aid his
02:01:01 Egypt to Aid his exfiltration mi's interest in HQ continued certainly until 1995 from the fastest routs obscuring access to the sensor discussed in their debrief of TR
02:01:16 sensor discussed in their debrief of TR Morris we are unclear as to exactly how many officers the SDS put in the swp during tranch 2 but it certainly appears that a minimum of two was a standard any
02:01:32 that a minimum of two was a standard any one time it's also apparent MI5 of their own agents in the swp over the period the indiscriminate harvesting of Intelligence on the swp's organizational structure Administration finances and
02:01:48 structure Administration finances and membership continued our provisional and incomplete review TR two documents suggested personal details onment details and trade affiliations continue to be a primary focus in the reporting MI5 certainly required Target priori
02:02:07 MI5 certainly required Target priori prior prioritization of the membership of certain swp branches to Aid their betting
02:02:11 betting requirements the sexual abuse of the swp membership undercover offices also continued over the period and we assure that category H opening will address the key features such as Alan Bon's fathering child with one of his swp
02:02:25 fathering child with one of his swp targets and the extent to which that was widely known of throughout the SDS and special Branch Alan Bon was a very good friend of Vince Harvey and was the
02:02:36 friend of Vince Harvey and was the SDS uh detected inspector for Trevor Morris both of whom deceived s swp members into sexual relationships Alan Bond was also good friends with John dines and Bob Lambert who Morris also gave character reference his in his
02:02:48 gave character reference his in his statement along with a string of other
02:03:00 statement along with a string of other officers Matt Raina and K in boiling and Mar together they all the Hallmarks of the rooming rooming we also raise an issue respected Nick green when he booked his place at the skate M Easter rally in 1985 he booked with a female member
02:03:14 member bwp he completed their registration on the same form which was a requirement they wanted to share room for the weekend the inquiry has the the woman's details we asked if Theus had been if inquiries have been made of her public
02:03:25 inquiries have been made of her public order the SDS annual reports painted a general picture across the decade of the swp posing even less of an alleged
02:03:36 swp posing even less of an alleged public order threat an entran one the annual reports indicated that street activity had marketly declined or made no reference at all the swp being involved in disorder the S swp's Focus
02:03:49 involved in disorder the S swp's Focus was said to be on building its base in trade unions and con concentrating on
02:04:00 trade unions and con concentrating on building a larger more politically aware membership in 85 the SDS needed to show that the S swp was still a legitimate Target so they so stated that they posed a threat to public order but gave no examples of actual involvement in
02:04:13 examples of actual involvement in disorder 1988 there was reference to an increased swp involvement in demonstration but again no examples of any significant disorder reported intelligence that the
02:04:28 disorder reported intelligence that the S swp would provoke as much disorder as possible in relation to the Pearl tax was shown to be sensationalist and inaccurate in 1989 the SDS admitted that the party did not Envision for one moment the national demonstration were turn into a riot and when it did the S
02:04:45 turn into a riot and when it did the S swp members present as a whole made no attempt to become actively involved instead the swp spent a considerable amount of time contemplating theorizing and speculating 1990s were no different 1990 the S swtp took no part as an
02:05:02 1990 the S swtp took no part as an organization in any of the disorder that took place nor did foresee that any would take place 1991 swp members prefer to sell Publications display barers and CH slogans that indulg in Street
02:05:18 CH slogans that indulg in Street violence generally the swp did not pose any major threat public disorder environment Behavior was not a general characteristic amongst the ranks of the swp or the enl to Morris disagree with
02:05:32 swp or the enl to Morris disagree with the overall SDS assessment based on more than a decade of comprehensive infiltration instead he cited his own stories about the 1993 Welling demonstration as an example we do not
02:05:45 demonstration as an example we do not propose to give Mr Morris for Warning by elaborating here on the questions that he'll be that we will be asking Council of the inquiry propose by the R 10
02:05:56 of the inquiry propose by the R 10 process we simply say there should be a full and separate public inquiry into the events of Welling in 1993 that inquiry should deal with a full police response to that demonstration should consider the accounts and Analysis of a wide range of participants not be
02:06:08 wide range of participants not be possible to come to any safe conclusion based on the self-interested account of a seral fantasist and philandra in general terms we made submissions previously on the manner in which the
02:06:21 previously on the manner in which the priest could have prevented disorder in relation to the activities of fascist organizations the TR 2 period included the first SDS deployment into fascist
02:06:32 the first SDS deployment into fascist organization When Alan Nick Nicholson attempted to infiltrate the British national National Party he had more detailed observations on the SDS and the inquires approach to fascist infiltrations that we will make at the
02:06:44 infiltrations that we will make at the beginning of phase two if we are given the opportunity once we have read and analyzed all the material at this stage it is apparent the nichelson deployment simply a token infiltration he was deployed on a part-time basis into a
02:06:56 deployed on a part-time basis into a moribond unit of six BMP members that was near dorant he didn't do a single report his first few months he ex was filtrated himself after 10 months because he was terrified and he' be
02:07:08 because he was terrified and he' be killed he believed he'd been outed to the fascists by another undercover SDS officer Nicholson's primary conclusion in relation to disorder was that the BMP would try to inflict as much physical
02:07:20 would try to inflict as much physical harm as possible on leftwing groups aswp paper Celler would have given the police the same intelligence it was clear 199 1991 the BMP was not operating at
02:07:32 1991 the BMP was not operating at lighton when nichon was deployed they were operating out of their headquarters in Welling if there had been a will to prevent the violence that the fascists were engaging in and inciting at the
02:07:47 were engaging in and inciting at the time Nicholson would have been sent into Southeast London if operating out of Welling You' have been very least would have been able to confirm the bookshelf at Welling was not some sort of mine Camp
02:08:01 Camp wat it was fortified like a bunker and was incapable of being torn down or indeed burnt down by demonstrators as Trevor Morris alleges subversion the Socialist Workers Party did not threaten
02:08:19 Socialist Workers Party did not threaten the safety or well-being of the state in the tranch one period it must have been readily apparent it not do so in the tranch 2 period either in February 1991 the MI5 desk officer in charge of investigating the swp was
02:08:30 charge of investigating the swp was Annie na she was tasked to research each area OFW activities Finance membership student numbers and Industrial relations among others in order to assess whether the part is a threat to National
02:08:42 the part is a threat to National Security part of her investigation included being the lead of four MI5 officers who debriefed Mark carry September 1992 to after painstaking
02:08:59 September 1992 to after painstaking research and access to the intelligence crew over the 15 years the SDS had had almost unbroken access to the SW
02:09:12 almost unbroken access to the SW headquarters missm was in no doubt that the swp was small relatively poor and their politics fell outside mfi criteria for investigation their policies advocated educating people so they could take part in a democratic movement to replace the existing political system as
02:09:25 replace the existing political system as she said this was hardly the stuff of of revolutionary nightmare despite Miss M's assessment Senior Management in F2 in
02:09:36 assessment Senior Management in F2 in short the S swp assumed an increasingly prominent role in the work of the branch and unremittingly applied pressure to
02:09:48 and unremittingly applied pressure to beef up the case of the study of the swp of the swp particularly after its legitimate support for a number of in industrial disputes in the early 19 the early
02:10:00 early 1990s which of course posed no threat to National Security or parliamentary democracy even where the service knew that many individuals attended meetings
02:10:14 that many individuals attended meetings to protest against specific issues such as the NHS CS or the poice subjects of of legitim and their details were nevertheless recordable by my farm it is not surprising that miss Ma is
02:10:31 it is not surprising that miss Ma is barely referred to in the statement of witness why as the argued in trch one the true purpose of these SW infiltrations was political economic and indust in the book star an a fund
02:10:47 indust in the book star an a fund comments starzy was the internal Army by which the government kept control its job was to know everything about everyone using any means it chose it
02:11:00 everyone using any means it chose it knew who your visitors were it knew who you telephoned and it knew if your wife slept
02:11:18 slept around it was a bureaucracy plasticized through East German Society overt and covert the CNB and SW deployments demonstrated that the SDS was a very British
02:11:39 sty so thank you very much for the over time um you've um Extended a little beyond the uh time that we thought you were going to take but no matter um may
02:11:50 were going to take but no matter um may I ask you one question please in towards the end of your stat statement you said the questions uh you don't propose to um mention in your opening statement as you haven't yes the questions that you will
02:12:02 haven't yes the questions that you will be asking Council to the inquiry to put to Trevor Morris um because as you know Trevor Morris is giving evidence on the 1st and 2nd of August and U his evidence must be
02:12:15 August and U his evidence must be completed then uh would you be willing to um uh discuss with Council to the inquiry before then uh what questions you seek Council to pose so thank you
02:12:28 you seek Council to pose so thank you thank you very much for asking uh we've already done it uh we we've met up already and we've already spoken on the
02:12:42 already and we've already spoken on the subject so uh Council of inquiry has our suggested are is the questioning I'm glad to hear that forgive me your knowledge is greater than mine about the some of the details of the uh conduct of the inquiry and that's an in that's no problem I'm very glad you asked us it's
02:12:56 problem I'm very glad you asked us it's been done thank you thank you very much indeed that concludes proceedings for today uh we will resume at 10:00 tomorrow with further openings thank you