David Barr QC delivers comprehensive opening statement for Tranche 1 Phase 2 covering 29 SDS officers 1973-1982. Addresses continuation of SDS after 1968, minimal criminality reported, extensive personal information collection, first use of deceased children's identities, first sexual relationships between officers and activists, and lack of formal training.
00:08:21 foreign foreign
00:08:42 good morning everyone
00:08:50 and welcome to the first day of opening statements at the undercover policing inquiry
00:08:54 inquiry my name is Neil Fernandes and I am the hearings manager this is day one of the opening statements in tranche 1 phase two and this phase will conclude in three weeks time on the 14th of May
00:09:13 weeks time on the 14th of May I will now hand over to our chairman Sir John mitting to formally start proceedings chairman thank you very much Mr Barr would you make your opening statement please thank you sir at the hearings held by the inquiry in November 2020 we received oral and
00:09:30 November 2020 we received oral and written evidence about events leading up to the formation of the undercover police unit that will be the focus of a good deal of this inquiries work the unit was known by a variety of names
00:09:46 the unit was known by a variety of names during its 40-year history I shall refer to it throughout as a special demonstration squad or SDS the evidence was to the effect that the SDS was set up to gather intelligence
00:09:59 SDS was set up to gather intelligence about the Vietnam solidarity committee which I shall call the VSC and in particular it's 1968 Autumn offensive
00:10:13 particular it's 1968 Autumn offensive the desire for more intelligence about the VSC appears to have stemmed from concerns both within the police and within the government that there would
00:10:25 within the government that there would be a repeat of the serious and violent public disorder that had occurred outside the American Embassy in Grosvenor square at the demonstration organized by the VSC in March 1968. the evidence about the sds's first
00:10:41 the evidence about the sds's first months of operation demonstrated that it was focused on those planning demonstrations against the Vietnam War principally the VSC but also maoists who had founded a separate organization the
00:10:55 had founded a separate organization the British Vietnam solidarity front which I shall refer to as the bvsf many of the early SDS undercover officers were deployed for only a few weeks or months they were all special
00:11:07 weeks or months they were all special Branch offices with experience of house special Branch had hitherto gathered and recorded intelligence this had included attending activist
00:11:22 this had included attending activist meetings in plain clothes and giving a false name if asked as SDS undercover officers they appear to have reported the same type of information in the same format
00:11:38 format the difference was that the information which they reported was obtained by assuming
00:11:42 assuming for an extended period of false identity and playing the role of an activist doing so resulted in their obtaining
00:11:53 doing so resulted in their obtaining much more access to private meetings of political activists it also meant that some undercover police officers began to participate in the social lives of political activists regular reports were
00:12:12 political activists regular reports were provided by the SDS about the activities of the VSC and the bvsf during the Autumn of 1968. in the event the massive VSC organized demonstration held on the 27th of October 1968 passed off peacefully
00:12:29 October 1968 passed off peacefully following a route from the embankment to Hyde Park
00:12:31 Hyde Park tarika Lee one of the principal organizers of the demonstration gave evidence that the vsc's leadership had no wish to see a repeat of the violence that had occurred in March 1968.
00:12:48 that had occurred in March 1968. the route which the VSC chose avoiding the American Embassy and the group's public pronouncements were intended to avoid violent clashes
00:12:59 avoid violent clashes there were violent scenes again outside the American Embassy which was the destination of a planned Breakaway organized by the bvsf
00:13:14 organized by the bvsf we received evidence about how and why the SDS continued to exist after the 27th of October 1968 demonstration in particular we admitted into evidence
00:13:25 in particular we admitted into evidence correspondence between the Metropolitan Police Service which I shall call the MPS and the home office about the continued need for and funding of the SDS
00:13:33 SDS we noted concerns on the part of the home office that it might be embarrassed if the SDS did not observe tight security
00:13:43 security the sensitivity committed to paper at that stage was about the use of public money to pay for cover accommodation
00:13:55 money to pay for cover accommodation documents demonstrated that the security service was aware of the existence of the SDS from the start and already had an established working relationship with
00:14:12 an established working relationship with special Branch before the SDS was formed it appears to have been supportive of the unit and to have valued its intelligence reporting much of which appears to have been copied to it using the address box 500.
00:14:29 the address box 500. the sds's value to the security service was relied upon by the MPS to the home office as a reason to continue the existence of its undercover operations the document suggests that the MPS
00:14:41 the document suggests that the MPS security service and the home office proceeded on the basis that SDS intelligence assisted the security service in the discharge of its responsibility to counter subversion
00:14:55 responsibility to counter subversion we considered carefully the definitions of subversion applicable at the time definitions which it is important to keep in mind during phase two
00:15:12 keep in mind during phase two we saw how the SDS continued to operate after October 1968 with ucos deployed into a growing list of left-wing organizations for periods of time longer than the majority of the sds's initial operations
00:15:26 operations groups were no longer being infiltrated on the basis of concerns about a particular imminent threat to public order
00:15:37 order they were infiltrated on the basis that having undercover officers established within left-wing activist groups was necessary in order to provide timely intelligence if trouble were to brew suddenly
00:15:50 suddenly a byproduct of this approach it was said was the ongoing provision of intelligence useful to the security service particularly in relation to the organization and members of groups considered to be subversive
00:16:03 considered to be subversive a noticeable feature of the evidence admitted in phase one was how little criminality was reported amongst the groups that were being infiltrated how
00:16:16 groups that were being infiltrated how often groups reported on had subversive aims but lacked the means to realize those aims and The Limited extent of serious public disorder after 1968. former undercover officers
00:16:33 1968. former undercover officers nevertheless often felt that the SDS had provided timely and accurate intelligence which permitted appropriate police resources to be allocated for the purposes of public order policing
00:16:47 purposes of public order policing at opposite ends of the spectrum there was on the one hand some reporting connected with irish-related terrorism about the funding of terrorism on the other there was considerable
00:17:04 on the other there was considerable reporting on causes considered today to be mainstream anti-racism and women's rights
00:17:06 rights another striking feature of the SDS reporting in phase one was the extensive detailed and highly personal reporting on individuals
00:17:20 on individuals some such reports were drafted in terms indicative of attitudes that are relevant to the issues of race and sex discrimination that we are investigating the phase one SDS deployments
00:17:32 the phase one SDS deployments particularly after October 1968 often appear to have involved the UCO being
00:17:46 appear to have involved the UCO being given a significant degree of latitude in relation to which events to attend and what information to report in some cases that Latitude extended to which groups to infiltrate in terms of what was reported SDS
00:18:00 in terms of what was reported SDS undercover officers seen typically to have cast their Nets wide their understanding seems to have been that it all helped to build the intelligence picture or that it was for others to decide what was relevant or
00:18:17 others to decide what was relevant or that it might be useful at some point the written evidence that we have obtained for phase two is consistent with the themes and we will be exploring the detail further in oral evidence
00:18:29 the detail further in oral evidence in total the deployments of 25 former
00:18:40 in total the deployments of 25 former SDS undercover officers were covered in phase one together with evidence relating to four early managers
00:18:48 we now Embark upon phase two of the inquiries hearings the inquiries method in relation to the SDS remains to investigate on an officer by Officer basis
00:19:01 by Officer basis in this phase we will be receiving evidence which results from our investigation of a further 29 former SDS undercover police officers in keeping
00:19:15 undercover police officers in keeping with our investigative approach we will be calling Witnesses and admitting written evidence about the deployments of these SDS undercover police officers in a broadly chronological order
00:19:31 seven of the former ucos are the subject of restriction orders which cover both
00:19:46 of restriction orders which cover both their real and cover names the amount of evidence that the inquiry can publish emanating from or relating to these offices is limited by the need to protect their identities however the inquiry has obtained documents relating to all seven
00:19:57 documents relating to all seven deployments and witness statements from each of the former undercover officers which form part of the closed evidence that you sir will take into account a single composite gist containing the
00:20:09 a single composite gist containing the evidence relating to all seven which can be made public is being published on the inquiries website today
00:20:23 inquiries website today all but one of the remaining 22 former ucos in phase two are the subject of orders which restrict the publication of their real names but not their cover names
00:20:37 names I will refer to them as open officers the exception is hn297 Richard Clark who is not the subject of any restriction order
00:20:55 subject of any restriction order the earliest deployment in this group is that of the officer known by the Hern nominal hn45 who use the cover name David Robertson our investigation suggests that he deployed between 1970 and 1973. the latest deployment is that of
00:21:08 the latest deployment is that of hn155 who use the cover name Phil Cooper
00:21:20 hn155 who use the cover name Phil Cooper we understand that this officer deployed in 1979 and remained undercover until either late 1983 or early 1984.
00:21:34 either late 1983 or early 1984. all of the phase II officers infiltrated political groups and all of their principal targets were left-wing organizations one officer hn 303 who used the cover name Peter Collins was instructed by his Target group and not the SDS to
00:21:54 Target group and not the SDS to infiltrate right-wing groups he appears to have done so presumably in order to maintain his cover a wide range of groups was reported on but the evidence will show that the group most commonly targeted by the SDS during the 1970s was that known until
00:22:17 during the 1970s was that known until 1977 as the international socialists and thereafter as a Socialist Workers Party the average length of the phase 2 undercover officers deployments is markedly longer than that of the very earliest SDS deployments
00:22:28 earliest SDS deployments deployments of between three and five years are the norm although there are exceptions and there is a significant
00:22:40 exceptions and there is a significant amount of variation between individual deployments for example shorter deployment could result if an undercover officer has to be withdrawn as the officer who used the cover name Jeff Slater
00:22:52 Jeff Slater hn351 States occurred or if the officer's cover identity was
00:23:06 or if the officer's cover identity was compromised to some degree has happened in the case of hn297 Richard Clark the officer who used the cover name Rick Gibson
00:23:08 Gibson we are investigating a large number of issues in relation to the SDS but three
00:23:25 issues in relation to the SDS but three deserve particular mention at the outset in phase two we will receive the first evidence of sexual contact in sexual relationships occurring between SDS undercover police officers in their undercover identities and women whom
00:23:36 undercover identities and women whom they met whilst using those undercover identities secondly we will investigate the first instances in which the SDS instructed
00:23:54 instances in which the SDS instructed its undercover offices to use aspects of the identity of a deceased child upon which to found their undercover identities finally we will hear evidence that will require the chairman to consider whether to refer cases to a panel set up to consider potential miscarriages of
00:24:11 consider potential miscarriages of Justice arising from undercover policing I will return to all three of these important topics later this morning
00:24:22 important topics later this morning of the 22 open officers in phase two four are deceased we are due to hear oral evidence from eight former undercover officers seven more that provided witness
00:24:35 seven more that provided witness statements but will not be called to give oral evidence for a variety of reasons in the remaining three cases we have not been able to obtain a witness
00:24:49 have not been able to obtain a witness statement from the officer but we have recovered documents relating to his deployment in one of these cases that of hn296 who use the cover name Jeff Wallace the inquiry anticipate being able to obtain
00:25:03 inquiry anticipate being able to obtain a witness statement at some point in the future
00:25:10 future the procedure for admitting the evidence of those former ucos who give oral evidence will be to publish their witness statements and the documents relating to their deployment on the inquiries website at the start of the
00:25:22 inquiries website at the start of the session in which the officer will give his evidence the evidence of the former ucos who have provided witness statements the two will
00:25:34 provided witness statements the two will not be called to give oral evidence will be summarized by Junior Council to the inquiry in a live streamed session the witness statement and documents relating to the deployment will be
00:25:46 relating to the deployment will be uploaded onto the inquiries website at the same time the documents relating to the deployments of those former undercover officers from whom there is no witness statement will be published on the
00:26:03 statement will be published on the inquiries website at a point appropriate to his place in the chronology the documents relating to the deployments of those former undercover officers from whom there is no witness statement will be published on the
00:26:14 statement will be published on the inquiries website at a point appropriate to his place in the chronology we are not investigating the security service but an important aspect of our investigation of the SDS concerns its
00:26:26 investigation of the SDS concerns its relationship with the security service we have been greatly assisted to date by the security service in our search for potentially relevant documents we have
00:26:38 potentially relevant documents we have been further assisted by the provision of a corporate witness statement which provides important contextual evidence it also explains the security services
00:26:49 it also explains the security services perspective on documents which evidence the relationship between it and the SDS during the transform era the witness statement made by the a
00:27:07 the witness statement made by the a security service witness whom we are calling witness Zed together with a significant number of associated documents will be published on the inquiries website today we will have the benefit of more evidence from activists who were
00:27:23 evidence from activists who were reported upon by the SDS in phase two than we had in phase one nine Witnesses in this category will be giving oral evidence three more have provided witness statements two of these will be read
00:27:38 statements two of these will be read into evidence and the third posted on the inquiries website in addition to the former undercover police officers and those who were subject of SDS reporting the evidence of
00:27:51 subject of SDS reporting the evidence of six more witnesses completes the program for phase two the inquiry has been provided with helpful statements from the relatives of two of the deceased former undercover
00:28:06 two of the deceased former undercover officers hn 300 who use the cover name Jim Pickford and hn 13 who use a Cabernet Barry or Desmond loader we will be hearing from two of the risk
00:28:18 we will be hearing from two of the risk assessors appointed by the Metropolitan Police Service because there is a dispute of fact about what was said in their presence by the officer who used the cover name Phil Cooper hn155
00:28:35 the dispute concerns whether or not he said that he had engaged in sexual activity with another person in his undercover identity
00:28:46 undercover identity finally we have two witness statements which address the question whether or not
00:28:51 not hn298's conviction in his undercover identity was ever recorded in the criminal record of the living person whose name hn298 used as a cover name
00:29:05 hn298 used as a cover name these will be posted on the website when hn298 gives evidence the default position for a witness who gives evidence in phase two is that he or she will do so remotely over a
00:29:19 or she will do so remotely over a virtual audio visual link which enables the chairman Council to the inquiry other relevant lawyers and the witness to see and hear one another the audio visual feed will usually be streamed
00:29:31 visual feed will usually be streamed live at the inquiries hearing venue the Amber Hotel Marble Arch in the cases of two witnesses for specific reasons
00:29:46 two witnesses for specific reasons accepted by the chairman only the audio feed will be streamed live at the hearing venue in all cases people who wish to follow the evidence other than at our hearing venue will be able to do so online
00:30:00 venue will be able to do so online the audio feed of all of the sessions at which Witnesses give oral evidence to the inquiry will be streamed online with a 10-minute delay The Inquirer is near real-time
00:30:13 The Inquirer is near real-time transcript will also be streamed online subject to the same 10-minute delay a finalized version of the transcript will be published on the inquiries website at the end of each day
00:30:33 website at the end of each day some non-police witnesses have exercised the option to have both the audio and visual feeds of their oral evidence streamed with a 10-minute delay core participants will begin making their opening statements for phase two
00:30:50 their opening statements for phase two this afternoon and will continue through to the end of the week they will all be streamed live on the inquiries YouTube channel
00:30:52 channel we will be pausing at 10 A.M tomorrow for a minute silence to remember Stephen Lawrence on the anniversary of his death 28 years ago
00:31:03 28 years ago we will also pause at 10 o'clock on Friday for a minute silence to remember Blair Peach who died on the 24th of April 1979.
00:31:16 April 1979. the evidential sessions will begin next Monday and last until Thursday the 13th of May
00:31:27 of May a timetable for the witnesses and other evidence being received will be published on the inquiries website together with an operational note
00:31:39 issues we remain guided but not straight jacketed by the lists of issues published on the inquiries website two of the inquiries published issues
00:31:51 two of the inquiries published issues lists are in very large part relevant to the phase II investigation first the module one special
00:32:02 first the module one special demonstration Squad issues list which is directed at the sds's undercover officers
00:32:03 officers second the module 2A special demonstration Squad issues list which concerns unit level management of the SDS
00:32:18 I turn now to say a little about the political and geopolitical context in which the events that we will be hearing about in phase two occurred
00:32:34 about in phase two occurred the long-running Vietnam war came to an end in 1975 and the remainder of that conflict did not provoke any further public disorder in this country on the scale seen in Grosvenor Square in March 1968.
00:32:45 1968. however the Cold War continued throughout the period we are now considering and formed an important part of the context in which events with
00:32:56 of the context in which events with which the inquiry is concerned occurred at its core was the Rivalry between two systems communist and capitalist
00:33:12 systems communist and capitalist the latter often referred to as the Free World by its supporters and imperialist by its detractors there was concern within government that foreign powers especially the Soviet
00:33:23 foreign powers especially the Soviet Union were seeking to foment Division and unrest in fact one SDS undercover officer hn 106 who used the Cabernet Barry Tompkins did report being approached by the
00:33:39 did report being approached by the Soviet foreign intelligence service the KGB
00:33:43 KGB but such contact was an isolated occurrence for the SDS more relevant for our purposes is the apparent interest in any form of
00:33:54 apparent interest in any form of left-wing political activity considered subversive the evidence heard in phase one and that in phase two indicates that this interest emanated both from the security service and special branch
00:34:07 service and special branch counter subversion was a part of the security services remit to defend the
00:34:18 security services remit to defend the realm a part of special branches remit was to assist the security service in its counter subversion work relations between the west and the People's Republic of China changed
00:34:36 People's Republic of China changed significantly During the period in which the phase II ucos were deployed at the start of the period China was merist relations with the West were poor
00:34:47 relations with the West were poor relations gradually improved President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 was an important step in that process diplomatic relations between the United States of America and China were restored at the start of 1979.
00:35:03 restored at the start of 1979. Mao died in 1976 and China entered a post-marace era two phase two SDS officers hn 45 David Robertson and hn13 Desmond or Barry
00:35:14 Robertson and hn13 Desmond or Barry loader specifically infiltrated maoist
00:35:30 loader specifically infiltrated maoist groups the former in 1970 and the latter in 1975. why these groups were targeted and whether their infiltration was justified remained the subject of Investigation we shall be hearing oral evidence from Diane Langford a prominent member of
00:35:44 Diane Langford a prominent member of maoi's groups at the time his activities personal and political were reported on by a number of undercover officers the prime ministers during the phase two era were Edward Heath Harold Wilson James Callahan and Margaret Thatcher
00:35:58 James Callahan and Margaret Thatcher the home secretaries during the phase two era were Reginald modeling Robert
00:36:09 two era were Reginald modeling Robert Carr Roy Jenkins Merlin Reese William whiteclaw and Leon Britton the troubles in Northern Ireland which had flared in 1969 continued throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s the early
00:36:23 the 1970s and into the 1980s the early to mid 1970s were particularly violent
00:36:34 to mid 1970s were particularly violent especially after the killings on Bloody Sunday on the 30th of January 1972 special Branch retained lead responsibility for countering irish-related terrorism on the mainland throughout the phase II deployments a consistent theme in the phase II
00:36:51 consistent theme in the phase II evidence is special Branch's interest in groups campaigning about the situation in Northern Ireland two of the deployments that we are considering in phase two were targeted specifically at Irish related groups
00:37:07 specifically at Irish related groups hn347 who use the cover name Alex Sloan targeted the non-sectarian but as it described itself Anti-Imperialist Nash Irish National Liberation solidarity front the i n l s f in 1971.
00:37:30 front the i n l s f in 1971. both hn347 and Dr Norman Temple who was a member of the inlsf will be giving oral evidence hn344 who use the cover name Ian Cameron was transferred into the SDS having
00:37:42 was transferred into the SDS having secured an entree into the northern minorities Defense Force in 1972 the nmdf is recorded as believing that Civil War was imminent in Northern Ireland and is seeking to provide
00:38:02 Ireland and is seeking to provide military training to volunteers prepared to fight in the anticipated conflict many left-wing groups of the era campaigned in support of a United Island among other causes very many of the phase II ucos reported on this activity
00:38:18 phase II ucos reported on this activity in the context of their infiltration of the group's concerned racism was an important political issue for the left-wing throughout the period
00:38:29 for the left-wing throughout the period of the phase II deployments reporting on the anti-racist activities of both single-issue groups and left-wing groups generally is very common amongst the
00:38:41 generally is very common amongst the documents we have recovered the issues of the day were both domestic and international and the evidence that we will be receiving in phase two needs to be considered in conjunction with the
00:38:54 be considered in conjunction with the related evidence already taken in phase one
00:38:55 one there was considerable protest against the system of apartheid in South Africa that was in place throughout the phase one and two eras
00:39:06 one and two eras this included for example the work of the anti-apartheid movement or aam as I shall call it in specific campaigns such as the stop the 70 tour or s t s t
00:39:24 as the stop the 70 tour or s t s t there was also protest against the government of Rhodesia which had unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom in 1965 and persisted almost unrecognized internationally with
00:39:41 almost unrecognized internationally with a system of white minority rule until it was forced to capitulate after a long Guerrilla War the country was granted International recognition as Zimbabwe in 1980 following elections won by Robert mugabe's zanu party
00:39:57 mugabe's zanu party at the start of the phase two era Portugal remained a right-wing dictatorship which exercised colonial
00:40:19 dictatorship which exercised colonial power over a number of African countries of specific relevance for our purposes these included Angola and Mozambique the dictatorship fell in the 1974 Carnation Revolution and with it Portuguese colonial rule the SDS reported for example on the activities in England of the dambusters
00:40:34 activities in England of the dambusters mobilizing committee a campaign against the kabora Bassa Dam project in Mozambique the project was a collaboration between Portugal South Africa and Rhodesia there are other occasional mentions in
00:40:46 there are other occasional mentions in SDS reporting of events both in Portugal and its Southern African colonies at home the 1970s witnessed a marked rise in far-right political parties
00:40:59 rise in far-right political parties especially the national front and the British movement there was considerable tension between these groups and groups on the left which resolutely opposed them these tensions spilled over into
00:41:13 these tensions spilled over into violence sometimes violence was on a small scale for example in relation to the sale of party newspapers
00:41:27 party newspapers but occasionally violence occurred on a larger scale particularly when there were demonstrations and counter demonstrations there is a significant amount of SDS reporting about the struggle between the far right and anti-racist anti-fascist groups
00:41:39 groups in terms of public order policing perhaps the biggest single race related disturbance reported upon in the phase II period by SDS officers was that which
00:41:57 II period by SDS officers was that which occurred when the national front marched from new cross to lewisham on the 13th of August 1977. an occasion known colloquially as the battle of lewisham amongst other things we will be
00:42:13 amongst other things we will be examining the role played by the SDS in policing before during and after that event
00:42:18 event we have obtained two news reports about the Battle of lewisham which give a flavor of the events that took place we are grateful to the BBC and Associated Press respectively for them
00:42:30 Press respectively for them please could we play a doc 043
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00:50:47 thank you on the 23rd of April 1979 the national front held a meeting at South Old Town Hall in the run-up to the 1979 general election
00:51:03 general election it was met with staunch opposition from counter-demonstrators in the course of the public disorder that ensued that evening Blair Peach an anti-racist anti-fascist member of the swp and anti-nazi League which I shall refer to as the ANL received a Blow To The Head
00:51:16 as the ANL received a Blow To The Head that was to prove fatal the lethal blow was almost certainly struck by a member of the mps's special Patrol group
00:51:29 of the mps's special Patrol group the aftermath of Blair Peach's death and the Justice campaign that was established after his death were reported on by members of the SDS we shall be exploring the extent to which
00:51:46 shall be exploring the extent to which it did so and hearing oral evidence from Celia Stubbs Blair's partner who was also reported on hn 106 if you use a cover named Barry Tompkins
00:51:53 Tompkins infiltrated and reported on the East
00:52:06 infiltrated and reported on the East London workers Against Racism or elwar the group was connected to the Revolutionary Communist Party it had as the name suggests revolutionary aims elwell's members are recorded as visiting victims of racist attacks and organizing vigilante Patrols in areas
00:52:21 organizing vigilante Patrols in areas with a history of racist attacks by this route hn 106 may have come into contact
00:52:32 give me and reporters on the identities of the victims of racist attacks he stated that he would I quote would go as a group of three or four people to offer support to families that were
00:52:44 support to families that were experiencing difficulties as a result of their race and we would offer assistance and invite them to become involved with workers Against Racism
00:52:57 workers Against Racism he certainly reported on elwar's activities in this regard could we please look at ucpi000018095
00:53:20 thank you
00:53:28 on Saturday the 8th of May 1982 a contingent of members of the East London workers Against Racism elwar assisted by contacts of the Revolutionary Communist Party
00:53:40 Party RCP Sheffield branch visited so-called defense cases in the East London area the main area of activity was a prior reporter stage in walthamstow a total of 17 members and contacts
00:53:56 a total of 17 members and contacts visited a number of blocks on The Priory Court estate with the intention of gaining physical support for the Privacy redaction of privacy redaction ublock who claimed to have suffered
00:54:09 ublock who claimed to have suffered racial harassment from use on the estate accompanying this group was privacy redaction of timeout magazine who as previously reported is gathering
00:54:21 previously reported is gathering material for an article on racism to be published in his magazine future plans by elwar involving this estate including the issuing of a statement in the name of privacy redaction appealing for
00:54:42 of privacy redaction appealing for assistance for his family the holding of a public meeting at the local residence hall and a leaflet detailing instances of racism on the estate that document could be taken down please
00:55:02 through elwar hn 106 also reported on a March in support of the new M8 campaign a public meeting of the new M8 defense campaign held on the 28th of October 1982 was the subject of another report although hn 106 has no recollection of it
00:55:12 it there appear to be at least some
00:55:23 there appear to be at least some similarities between hn 106 deployment and that of hn 81 who used the cover name David Hagan in the 1990s David Hagan reported on the Stephen Lawrence campaign he did so having infiltrated another group which
00:55:36 having infiltrated another group which campaigned Against Racism the movement for justice
00:55:45 racial tensions between the police and people in the London borough of Lambeth combined with serious social and economic problems boiled over in April 1981 when the Brixton riots occurred
00:55:57 1981 when the Brixton riots occurred the scale and ferocity of the violence that ensued was considerable the documents that we will be putting into evidence do not suggest that there is a that there were significant SDS
00:56:11 that there were significant SDS intelligence either before or during the riots but there is some evidence of reporting in their aftermath for example hn356 had a name Bill Biggs had been
00:56:24 hn356 had a name Bill Biggs had been infiltrating the Socialist Workers Party or swp in southeast London particularly in Greenwich and plumstead for some time before the riots however he appeared in Brixton in the months following the
00:56:39 Brixton in the months following the riots apparently in connection with a newly formed branch of the swp many of the civilian Witnesses in phase two were very active anti-racists both
00:56:51 two were very active anti-racists both Lord Peter Hayne and christabel Gurney Obe held particularly prominent leadership roles all have evidence to give relevant to the infiltration of anti-racist groups
00:57:03 anti-racist groups campaigning for sexual equality continued throughout the phase II era many of the groups infiltrated by the SDS supported this cause towards the end of the phase one
00:57:19 towards the end of the phase one hearings we heard evidence from hn348 whose Cabernet was Sandra she infiltrated the women's Liberation Front reporting on members of that group including Diane Langford
00:57:30 including Diane Langford our oral evidence in phase two will begin with hearing from Diane Blandford towards the end of our oral hearings we will also hear from Madeleine his
00:57:41 will also hear from Madeleine his activism within the women's voice subgroup of the swp was reported on by hn354 Vint Miller in the late 1970s
00:57:56 hn354 Vint Miller in the late 1970s the 1970s particularly after the oil crisis of 1973 and the early 1980s where a period of
00:58:08 and the early 1980s where a period of economic malaise and Industrial unrest there was high inflation and mass unemployment a number of the groups infiltrated by the SDS involved themselves in the industrial unrest and championed Associated causes for example the support of both the
00:58:21 for example the support of both the workers revolutionary party and the international socialists for Shrewsbury II and Shrewsbury 24 campaigns was reported on by SDS officers there were
00:58:36 reported on by SDS officers there were also protests against unemployment such as Right to Work marches which the phase two evidence indicates were infiltrated by SDS officers we will be exploring why such reporting was made and whether it was justified
00:58:49 and whether it was justified Trade union and strike action organized
00:59:02 Trade union and strike action organized by them were prominent in the 1970s and early 1980s references to trade unions and Trade union membership is common amongst the phase II documents that appears to arise in the context of SDS deployments into left-wing political groups and not as a result of any
00:59:15 groups and not as a result of any specific targeting of trade unions it includes some references Decor participant unions ucat and the num one officer hn299342 cover named David Hughes has
00:59:33 hn299342 cover named David Hughes has stated that he joined a trade Union the transport and general Workers Union which I shall refer to as the tgwu however we have found no evidence that trade unions with a specific Target of an SDS deployment
00:59:44 an SDS deployment there will be some evidence to the effect that the groups infiltrated by the SDS were themselves seeking to infiltrate and influence the direction of trade unions
00:59:56 of trade unions we will be examining why trade unions and Trade union membership featured in SDS reporting one particularly protracted industrial dispute at the time is mentioned
01:00:11 dispute at the time is mentioned repeatedly in SDS reporting and involved significant public disorder at that at the granite film processing Laboratories the dispute about Union recognition involved a two-year strike
01:00:30 involved a two-year strike we are grateful to the Associated Press for the following contemporary reports please could we display doc 041
01:01:30 [Music] thank you
01:01:51 [Music] [Applause] [Music]
01:02:06 foreign
01:02:23 [Music]
01:02:34 all right
01:02:45 [Music]
01:02:49 now
01:03:24 returning to the international stage other events occasionally feature in the evidence that we will be educing for example the death of Franco in 1975 which led to the end of fascist dictatorship in Spain and a transition to democracy the Arab Israeli conflict
01:03:37 to democracy the Arab Israeli conflict which persisted throughout the phase two period and the coming into power in Cambodia of Pol pots Khmer Rouge
01:03:45 before I turn to introduce some specific documents that will form part of the evidence in phase two I should make some preliminary observations on document generally
01:03:56 generally shortly before the start of the tranche one phase one hearings we posted a disclosure note on the inquiries website setting out for the whole of tranche one how the documents in the hearing bundle
01:04:14 how the documents in the hearing bundle had been obtained selected and redacted on the 25th of March we published an addendum amongst other things the addendum set out how we have obtained material from the security service and outlined the contents of the phase 2 hearing bundle
01:04:28 hearing bundle the vast majority of the documents that we will be putting into evidence in phase two have come either from the Metropolitan Police Service or the security service in many instances copy
01:04:39 security service in many instances copy quality is a serious problem I'm afraid that some of the documents that we will be working with are very difficult to read in some places text is illegible
01:04:52 read in some places text is illegible it has sometimes been necessary to put into the hearing bundle documents which post date The Phase 2 era for example so
01:05:03 post date The Phase 2 era for example so that they can be put to Witnesses who we are calling in phase two and avoid having to recall them at a later date say for one exceptional case such documents have been redacted to the
01:05:14 documents have been redacted to the state in which they will be used not just in phase two but also later in the inquiry it is important that people bear in mind that some of the persons
01:05:30 in mind that some of the persons mentioned in these documents will not have their say about them until much later in the inquiry the truth or fairness of their contents may be disputed
01:05:41 disputed future Witnesses may have important context to add the inquiry will be considering these documents at this stage on that basis annual reports
01:05:52 annual reports we are today uploading to the inquiries
01:06:04 we are today uploading to the inquiries website the sds's annual reports for the years 1975 to 1984 inclusive and Associated correspondence earlier annual reports were admitted into evidence in Phase One and are already on the website the pattern in
01:06:19 already on the website the pattern in the period 1975 to 1984 is similar to that of previous years a report was produced by the SDS itself and signed either by the Chief Inspector or by one of the units detected
01:06:30 or by one of the units detected inspectors it was passed at the chain of command and clearly informs the contents of a letter from a senior officer in the metropolitan police to the home office
01:06:42 metropolitan police to the home office advocating the continuing need for the unit and seeking continued funding for the SDS for another year
01:06:53 the SDS for another year approval was then forthcoming in a written response the annual reports contain a great deal of information about the SDS
01:07:05 of information about the SDS we will be examining their accuracy and significance in oral evidence in this phase and in phase three when we will be hearing from former SDS managers the later reports overlap with both
01:07:22 the later reports overlap with both deployments of ucos and the tenure of managers who will be considered in tranche 2
01:07:23 tranche 2 I consciously leave until then consideration of such material for example the references to the campaign
01:07:34 example the references to the campaign for nuclear disarmament and the animal rights movement the records record information about the size of the SDS between 1975 and 1984
01:07:47 size of the SDS between 1975 and 1984 the overall size of the unit fluctuates between 15 and 18 persons the number of undercover officers fluctuates between 9 and 12. most usually it is 12.
01:07:59 usually it is 12. Staffing of the back office is usually five or six although in 1977 it fell to four
01:08:10 four a common feature of the annual reports is a statement about the purpose of the unit they differentiate between what is
01:08:28 unit they differentiate between what is stated to be the primary role of the SDS which relates to the policing of public order and a secondary aim relating to subversion for example paragraph two of The 1975
01:08:39 for example paragraph two of The 1975 report States I quote since 1968 the SDS has concentrated on Gathering intelligence about the activities of those extremists whose political views are to the left of the Communist Party
01:08:52 are to the left of the Communist Party of Great Britain generally described as the ultra left and the anarchist and libertarian movements the primary aim has been to
01:09:05 movements the primary aim has been to give warning of impending demonstrations and to obtain information not available from any other source regarding the number of persons taking part and the degree of planned or likely public disorder
01:09:18 disorder this information enables a department to assess the required police coverage to ensure adequate control in pursuance of this aim valuable information is also obtained regarding subversive
01:09:35 obtained regarding subversive organizations which is passed to other special Branch squads and to the security service one explanation given from time to time in the documents to justify the sds's
01:09:50 in the documents to justify the sds's role is an assertion that some left-wing groups did not cooperate with police when organizing demonstrations for example paragraph 7 of The 1975 report States such schisms amongst left-wing groups
01:10:06 such schisms amongst left-wing groups and smaller groupings are of course to the advantages of the police whose Manpower would be severely stretched such should the ultra left sink their differences and unite for joint demonstrations
01:10:23 demonstrations this Advantage however is to some extent outweighed by the need for greater SDS coverage of the smaller groups who unlike the larger more established
01:10:35 unlike the larger more established organizations rarely inform police of their intention to demonstrate and lacking a committee structure or headquarters cannot be contacted in the normal way such information which is
01:10:46 normal way such information which is obtained by the SDS is passed with the necessary safeguards by Commander operations to Commander a department
01:10:58 the assistant commissioner crimes covering letter to the home office in 1977 developed the point I quote non-cooperation with the police is a current feature of ultra-left
01:11:11 current feature of ultra-left revolutionary philosophy and the primary and almost unique value of the special demonstration Squad lies in its ability not only to provide warning of
01:11:25 not only to provide warning of forthcoming events but also to forecast the size of the support and the degree of threat to public order this intelligence is of immense value to our uniformed colleagues who are able to assess the strengths of police coverage required as well as to deploy that
01:11:38 required as well as to deploy that strength operationally in the most suitable way that is to say both overt and in reserve needless to say this
01:11:50 and in reserve needless to say this brings a side benefit in ensuring the most economic use of manpower the fact that many of the individuals and organizations have concerned to the
01:12:06 and organizations have concerned to the squad fall into the subversive category produces a byproduct of information which is of direct interest to the security service and which is acknowledged by them as being of considerable assistance
01:12:20 considerable assistance another reason given within the annual reports to continue SDS operations is the risk of sudden future public disorder even during times when public disorder was on the way
01:12:32 disorder was on the way in other words infiltrate just in case paragraph 31 of the 1975 report reads whilst for a variety of reasons there has over the past few years been a
01:12:47 has over the past few years been a decline in the disorders associated with political demonstrations violence generally has increased within our society and the potential for attacks on public order are ever present the
01:13:04 public order are ever present the situation could change rapidly and it is the responsibility of the SDS to watch such Trends carefully and be strategically placed to take efficient action
01:13:09 action in the same vein paragraph 18 of the 1979 annual report succinctly States a constant supply of intelligence about
01:13:24 constant supply of intelligence about the intentions of the extremists remains an in central ingredient of police preparations in preventing disorder and is the primary object of the special demonstration Squad
01:13:35 demonstration Squad a third reason is the argument that maintaining public order is important sensitive and only the SDS could obtain the intelligence that it did it is
01:13:51 the intelligence that it did it is articulated at paragraph 33 of the 1975 report I quote the commissioner has stated that the maintenance of order during political
01:14:03 maintenance of order during political demonstrations has always been the most sensitive problem of the Metropolitan Police
01:14:09 Police the SDS was formed in 1968 to assist in providing a solution to this very problem and the office is currently serving closely supervised and constantly aware of the need for security will continue to provide
01:14:22 security will continue to provide valuable Intelligence on public order which only they can obtain
01:14:32 the annual reports always give an indication of the groups that the SDS has targeted a list of those groups divided by report is set out in appendix one to the written version of this opening statement
01:14:45 opening statement with the exception of a little reporting on the far right which resulted from hn 303 being tasked to do so by the workers revolutionary party all of the groups
01:14:56 revolutionary party all of the groups are either left-wing or tended to draw support mainly from the left a large number of different groups were infiltrated falling into the following categories trotskiest
01:15:10 trotskiest maoist or Marxist leninist Irish related Anarchist alternative Society anti-racist and anti-fascist
01:15:21 anti-racist and anti-fascist revolutionary socialist and laterally anti-nuclear animal Liberation groups also appear as a category in their own right on the lists towards the end of the period
01:15:41 lists towards the end of the period there are sometimes other groups such as the national abortion campaign and in 1984 therefore trans 2 minus support groups
01:15:51 groups hn 303's infiltration of the thyroid is summarized in the 1975 annual report which reads for the first time an officer has penetrated the national front that the instigation of a leading member of the
01:16:06 instigation of a leading member of the workers revolutionary party with whom he is particularly friendly and is obliged to lead a treble life by attending National front meetings in the East End of London he has discovered a small group of hard-line fascists dissatisfied with the national front
01:16:24 dissatisfied with the national front leadership calling themselves the Legion of Saint George whose intent is to move even further to the right although few in number such a group could well pose future public order problems
01:16:42 future public order problems the apparent explanation as to why the SDS did not infiltrate the far right until later in its history with the exception of hn 303's unexpected diversion into the right at the behest of the wrp can be found in the 1976 annual report
01:16:53 annual report special Branch already had excellent sources in the far right the SDS however made it clear to its superiors that it
01:17:05 made it clear to its superiors that it stood ready to infiltrate the far right if it were to become necessary paragraph 9 of the 1976 report reads for some months in 1975 an officer from
01:17:22 for some months in 1975 an officer from the squad penetrated the national front at the behest of his parent trotskiest organization the information gained added nothing of real value to that obtainable from
01:17:38 real value to that obtainable from already excellent special Branch sources and since the officers withdrawal early in 1976 it has not been considered necessary to replace him if the Metropolitan Police is to keep the peace between the extremes of the political Spectrum it is clearly essential that accurate information be
01:17:53 essential that accurate information be readily available from both ends should existing sources on the far right show any sign of weakening the SDS will give immediate consideration to renewed coverage there
01:18:09 coverage there the justification given for infiltrating Anarchist groups is a concern that they will spawn further serious violent offending of the type committed by the
01:18:22 offending of the type committed by the angry Brigade in the early 1970s in this vein paragraph six of the 1976 annual report States little has changed on the anarchist front in the last year those professing the Creed are a continuing nuisance on demonstrations and from the circles with
01:18:40 demonstrations and from the circles with it within which they move come rumors of the formation of angry Brigade type cells bent upon violence several individuals known to hold such views have appeared in political campaigns
01:18:51 have appeared in political campaigns recently and SDS coverage of anarchist groups continues in the hope that Advance warning may be obtained of any intention to carry political protest into the Realms of violence
01:19:03 into the Realms of violence references to SDS intelligence leading to arrests are uncommon generally in our work but one such reference appears in connection with the anarchist scene at
01:19:19 connection with the anarchist scene at paragraph two three C of the 1978 annual report which reads during the past year SDS coverage of the Amicus scene has been continued in June two people known by four names only and
01:19:38 two people known by four names only and wanted by police for conspiracy to cause explosions were identified and although their appearance had been changed
01:19:51 their appearance had been changed radically located and as a result of the information provided they were arrested the 1982 report contains evidence of a raid on the freedom Collective of anarchists based on SDs intelligence but which did not result in arrests police are recorded as having found
01:20:04 police are recorded as having found pamphlets dealing with the manufacture of explosive devices homemade guns assassination techniques and booby traps which were seized it also recorded the results of SDS
01:20:18 also recorded the results of SDS intelligence gathering in the aftermath of the Brixton riots I quote SDS information has indicated that no links exist between the highly
01:20:29 that no links exist between the highly politicized Brixton anarchists and the local young black community
01:20:39 a review of the unit's activities during the year is always included in an annual report
01:20:43 report the content reports Salient events and issues typically the major demonstrations and public order issues of the year are covered sometimes with specific reference to the sds's
01:20:57 specific reference to the sds's contribution to public order policing for example against a background of recent confrontations between the left and right paragraph 29 of the 1976
01:21:08 and right paragraph 29 of the 1976 annual report includes the following Passage
01:21:16 Passage similar confrontations were planned in Blackburn and Walsall on the 11th and 25th of September respectively and it was a matter of some satisfaction within the SDs that the squad was able
01:21:30 within the SDs that the squad was able to provide the police forces concerned with accurate assessments of likely Ultra left involvement based on the 1977 annual review the assistant commissioner crime wrote to
01:21:46 assistant commissioner crime wrote to the home office in early 1978 about both the industrial dispute at chronics and the battle of lewisham
01:21:57 1977 saw the escalation an eruption of Street violence in London in the granix industrial dispute and the confrontations between extreme rights and extreme left-wing political parties which reached its Venice in the lotion street battle in August throughout these
01:22:12 street battle in August throughout these confrontations the intelligence supplied by the special demonstration Squad of the numbers and intent of the numerous revolutionary parties enable the uniform Branch to effectively and economically
01:22:26 Branch to effectively and economically police some of the most violent public disorder in recent times how accurate an assessment the above passage was in relation to the sdss contribution will be examined
01:22:38 contribution will be examined hn354 cover name Vince Miller has stated that valuable intelligence which he provided shortly before the Battle of militiam was not acted upon
01:22:54 before we proceed further so it would now be a convenient moment
01:22:58 so I think you're on mute
01:23:04 foreign
01:23:16 we will now adjourn for a quarter of an hour when you will resume her opening thank you
01:23:28 we will now take a 15-minute break the time is 11 15 a.m so we shall reconvene at 11 30 a.m thank you
01:38:37 foreign foreign
01:38:46 welcome back everyone I will hand over to the chairman to continue proceedings chairman
01:38:48 chairman thank you Mr Barr thank you sir an example of the SDS providing public order intelligence to a regional police
01:39:01 order intelligence to a regional police force is given in the 1982 annual report at paragraph 27. it relates to the picket organized by the swp outside the conservative party's Autumn Conference held in Brighton
01:39:23 held in Brighton Sussex police are stated I quote to have placed on record their appreciation of the assistance rendered by the SDS in connection with the event
01:39:29 the assistant commissioner g.j kelland asserted to R.J Andrew the deputy under
01:39:40 asserted to R.J Andrew the deputy under Secretary of State at the home office by letter dated the 7th of March 1980 that the SDS had been invaluable to the policing of extremist activity during the 1979 election campaign
01:39:53 the 1979 election campaign the terms in which she did so make clear that the SDS had provided intelligence relating to events following the death of Blair Peach the friends of Blair Peach committee is not mentioned by name
01:40:09 not mentioned by name the description used is and I quote the subsequent campaign against police paragraph three of the letter reads as follows
01:40:20 follows the focal point of much of the extremist activity in 1979 was the general election held in May with the extreme left contriving to take advantage of the national front election campaign to
01:40:32 national front election campaign to provoke hostile confrontation whenever possible the culmination of the virulent anti-fascist demonstrations was the death of the anti-nazi league supporter
01:40:47 death of the anti-nazi league supporter Blair Peach and the subsequent campaign against the police during this period
01:40:58 against the police during this period the special demonstration Squad was able to provide useful information which was invaluable enabling uniformed officers to be effectively deployed there can be little doubt that tensions between left and right were running High during the 1979 general election
01:41:09 during the 1979 general election campaign and with it the need for intelligence to inform public order policing however we know the defensive language used to describe the Blair
01:41:21 language used to describe the Blair Peach Justice campaign and the fact that reporting on it was communicated to the home office as having been a part of an invaluable service we shall need to
01:41:32 invaluable service we shall need to examine the motives for reporting on the campaign
01:41:40 campaign in this regard paragraph 9 of the 1979 annual report upon which AC kellen's letter was presumably based is also worded defensively when referring to the Blair Peach campaign it explains the
01:41:51 Blair Peach campaign it explains the sds's action has been directed at public order policing the general election held in May was the focal point of intensive activity by
01:42:02 focal point of intensive activity by several extremist parties the Socialist Workers Party issued contesting any constituency in favor of a policy of confronting the national front during
01:42:14 confronting the national front during the latter party's election campaign the swp contrived to make use of all public meetings arranged by the national front
01:42:28 meetings arranged by the national front to arouse anti-fascist feeling the death of Blair Peach an active supporter of the anti-nazi league which was a consequence of a violent anti-fascist demonstration in Southall provided the
01:42:41 demonstration in Southall provided the extreme left wing with an opportunity to mount a sustained campaign to discredit and criticize the police information supplied by SDS staff was of Great Value in enabling uniformed officers to deal effectively with the
01:42:55 officers to deal effectively with the public order problems which arose both During the period before the election and on subsequent demonstrations held in connection with the death of peach
01:43:07 connection with the death of peach on security the authors of the annual reports are clearly conscious of the risk of criticism should what the SDS was doing become known
01:43:18 was doing become known in the following passage at paragraph 10 of the 1975 report the author refers both to the risk of embarrassing the commissioner and the need to protect undercover police officers it reads over
01:43:33 undercover police officers it reads over the past eight years since the Inception of the SDS security has been of Paramount importance not only to prevent
01:43:46 Paramount importance not only to prevent embarrassment to the commissioner should any leakage of our activities occur but also to protect the field officers themselves this is achieved primarily through supervision and it is probably true that no other unit of police officers is so regularly or strongly supervised
01:44:04 regularly or strongly supervised in addition to normal supervisory visits the field officers have been seen by Commander operations Deputy assistant commissioner and the assistant commissioner crime
01:44:20 assistant commissioner crime paragraph 14 of the 1976 annual report addresses what is described as the political sensitivity of the SDS operation in the following terms the political sensitivity of the SDS operation is fully recognized by all
01:44:34 operation is fully recognized by all officers concerned and to protect the ultimate defense line great care is taken to ensure that penetration of an organization can be fully Justified on the basis of the commissioner's
01:44:47 the basis of the commissioner's responsibility for the preservation of public order in the Metropolis whether the SDS maintained what the author styled the ultimate defense line
01:44:59 author styled the ultimate defense line is of course an important issue for the inquiry
01:45:15 inquiry the group big flame discovered that SDS UCO detected Constable Richard Clark about whom I shall have more to say later was not who he said he was consequently DC Clark had to be withdrawn from his deployment the event is referred to in the 1976 report and appears to have contributed
01:45:26 report and appears to have contributed to considerable police suspicion about the group
01:45:27 the group even though it was not thought to have been involved in any illegal activities in London
01:45:34 in London a quote the Sinister big flame organization which originated in the Northwest but soon spread to London was the subject of close scrutiny until
01:45:48 the subject of close scrutiny until September when for security reasons it was decided to withdraw whereas the ultra left as a whole claims to be security conscious no organization has shown practical Ingenuity in the
01:46:02 has shown practical Ingenuity in the field of Investigation to compare with that big flame paragraph 8 of the 1982 annual report suggests that maintaining security had
01:46:15 suggests that maintaining security had become more difficult over time and the precautions have been developed to address this issue I quote the difficulties in maintaining a high degree of security have increased in direct proportion to the length of time the squad has been in existence now
01:46:36 time the squad has been in existence now 14 years to combat this problem security precautions are continually reviewed each new operational officer is carefully selected thoroughly schooled in a cover story provided with appropriate documentation to substantiate his new existence
01:46:50 to substantiate his new existence improvements over the years have catered for most if not all loopholes or anomalies say for the human error
01:47:01 anomalies say for the human error amongst the documents associated with the annual reports are minute sheets which show the report passing up the chain of command within the MPS as well as being evidence of the knowledge of
01:47:14 as being evidence of the knowledge of the senior officers concerned about the SDS and its activities the documents record high praise and support for the SDS for example on the 26th of February 1979
01:47:27 1979 Deputy assistant commissioner Brian wrote to the assistant commissioner crime that I quote this SB special
01:47:40 crime that I quote this SB special demonstration Squad SDS annual report is submitted for your consideration the work of the unit scarcely needs extolling and its members have yet again made most valuable contributions in the public order field election year will no
01:47:54 public order field election year will no doubt increase the demands upon them but I have every confidence in their ability to respond amongst the documents we which we have grouped with the 1983 annual report in
01:48:09 grouped with the 1983 annual report in the hearing bundle is what appears to be an Illuminating program and briefing pack prepared for a visit to the SDS by Sir Kenneth Newman then commissioner of the Metropolitan Police it is clear from the program that the
01:48:29 it is clear from the program that the plan was for the commissioner to spend two hours with the unit over a buffet lunch at what is described as an in-field location could we have a look please at NPS Dash 0730903
01:48:44 and once that's up can we go to page 30 please
01:48:56 give people a moment to absorb that
01:49:07 thank you could you take it down please
01:49:22 The Briefing pack includes a brief profile of each member of the SDS at the time detective Sergeant Roger Pearsons has not had to be redacted so we can look at that one please could we display mps-0730
01:49:32 mps-0730 903 and when we get to it can we have page 40 please
01:50:02 thank you could that be taken down the profiles include the officer's Target and detective Sergeant Pierce's case it was the anarchist field these documents add to the evidence that the
01:50:14 documents add to the evidence that the most senior officers within the SDS were aware not only of the unit's existence but to some extent the details of what it was doing the phase two documents also indicate that the home office was receiving at
01:50:27 that the home office was receiving at least a little more information about what the SDS was doing and then is recorded in the relatively brief annual letters seeking the continued authorization and funding of the unit's existence
01:50:38 existence the 1984 letter from the home office authorizing the continued existence of
01:50:49 authorizing the continued existence of the SDS concluded with a request to know more about the current focus of the squad's work and how it was being carried out I quote without in any way making that Authority provisional I
01:51:00 making that Authority provisional I think it would be helpful for us in due course to know more about which groups and activities are the current focus of the squad's work and how that is carried
01:51:11 the squad's work and how that is carried out both on resource grounds and in view of the sensitivity of such under clever work it would be desirable to have this indication of how the squad's task and role has adapted to current circumstances since the days of the
01:51:25 circumstances since the days of the Vietnam War demonstrations when it was set up
01:51:29 set up a brief account of this in a report or by way of discussion between Colin Hewitt and Roy Harrington here would be very helpful the home office is 1985 annual authorization letter to the assistant
01:51:41 authorization letter to the assistant commissioner confirms that a discussion of the client requested had taken place the year before the same sort of discussion was again being sought unquote because of the inevitable
01:51:58 unquote because of the inevitable political sensitivity of this sort of operation we should like to keep in touch in general terms with their current areas of interest and it would be helpful to us if those concerned here could have the same sort of informed
01:52:09 could have the same sort of informed discussion with Peter Phelan as took place last year Roy Harrington will be getting in touch with him a minute dated the 7th of June 1984 from
01:52:24 a minute dated the 7th of June 1984 from Deputy assistant commissioner C.V Hewitt to the assistant commissioner crime records the 1984 meeting it took place on the 5th of June 1984. Roy Harrington
01:52:38 on the 5th of June 1984. Roy Harrington from F4 division of the home office had met with Commander Phelan it is significant for two reasons first it records the home office's concern that the SDF might have been quote something
01:52:55 the SDF might have been quote something which had been allowed to drift on after having been set up for a specific purpose in 1968. second the minute records that Harrington was shown and permitted to
01:53:15 Harrington was shown and permitted to make notes on the 1983 SDS annual report this is significant because we have not found evidence that the annual reports were sent to the home office the terms of the note suggests that security concerns might have been the reason why could we display please
01:53:32 nps-0737-347 and when it's up can we go to the bottom of page nine please
01:53:37 foreign
01:53:55 just read that out Roy Harrington F4 division home office came to this office on the 5th of June 1984 and discussed the special demonstration Squad with Commander Phelan Harrington told Phelan that inquiries by Sir Brian caban had instigated partridge's letter sir Brian
01:54:08 instigated partridge's letter sir Brian was concerned to know that the SDS could if we could move to the next page thank you be defended as a current response to current problems and was not just something which had been allowed to
01:54:20 something which had been allowed to drift on after having been set up for a specific purpose in 1968. Phelan showed Harrington the annual report of the SDS for 1983 and
01:54:34 report of the SDS for 1983 and underlined the very sensitive nature of its content Harrington was allowed to make some notes and he expressed The View that he had enough material to allay Sir Brian coven's fears and to answer more than adequately the points
01:54:47 answer more than adequately the points raised in partridge's letter he proposed to do this by way of an internal home office note the terms of which he discussed with Phelan insufficient detail to ensure that nothing in it could jeopardize the security of our operations
01:55:00 operations in future I think we should include in the annual letter for Renewal some comment on the targeting of the squad and the results being achieved if you agree I will ensure that the draft letters are prepared accordingly
01:55:12 letters are prepared accordingly if you could take that down now please
01:55:23 my turn now to the SDS policy file 19 further documents from that file are being uploaded onto our website today to supplement those from the phase one era published in November last year
01:55:36 published in November last year the new documents are dated between the 17th of April 1974 and the 13th of November 1981. most concerned Financial or Personnel related issues however
01:55:48 or Personnel related issues however three documents deserve specific mention here
01:55:50 here the first two are linked and shared light on how the SDS sought to justify its continued existence to the home office in the light of a decline in public disorder
01:56:02 public disorder in a memorandum dated the 24th of
01:56:15 in a memorandum dated the 24th of February 1976 Commander Roger tasked the then Chief superintendent Rolo watts to set up a study group to consider three questions the purpose of the study group's work was expressly to assist preparation of that Year's case for
01:56:26 preparation of that Year's case for continuation of the SDS to the home office
01:56:27 office could we have up please mps-0730658
01:56:48 thank you I'm just going to read the first four paragraphs another year has passed and we are required to submit a case within the next few weeks to home office for the continuation of the special demonstration Squad SDS for a
01:57:01 special demonstration Squad SDS for a further period of 12 months as you are aware this squad has been in existence since the summer of 1968 and it is
01:57:12 since the summer of 1968 and it is considered timely at this juncture for a complete review of the squad to be undertaken its activities and objectives the SDS was set up initially to produce intelligence by way of penetration by
01:57:26 intelligence by way of penetration by undercover special Branch officers at a time when Ultra extremists left-wing activity on the Streets of London was at a peak
01:57:32 a peak confrontation with police with the planned objective of creating scenes of
01:57:44 planned objective of creating scenes of violence and public disorder by diverse propskiest maoist Anarchist Etc were exceedingly regular features over the past seven years however this form of political activity by minority extremist groups has dwindled considerably and with the exception of
01:58:04 considerably and with the exception of the Red Lion Square conflict in 1974 and possibly one or two other incidents of deliberate confrontation up surges of violence in the streets have become less and less frequent over the past seven sorry to assist
01:58:15 over the past seven sorry to assist therefore in preparing the case for submission to Mr Robert Armstrong the deputy permanent assistant Secretary of State I wish you to set up a small study
01:58:31 State I wish you to set up a small study group under your chairmanship comprising Chief superintendent R Wilson Chief superintendent hn332 Chief Inspector Neil and inspector craft your terms of reference are as follows
01:58:45 follows a is there a continuing need for the SDS as constituted at present B does the public order problem demand
01:58:56 B does the public order problem demand the coverage of the range of extremists subversive organizations currently affected
01:58:58 affected C What proportion of the overall intelligence gathered is a primary benefit towards assisting uniform police to control public meetings and demonstrations and that which is of
01:59:14 demonstrations and that which is of Interest mainly to the security service could that be taken down please
01:59:26 the members of the study group were well versed in the work of the SDS three of them especially so hn332 had been the Chief Inspector of
01:59:39 hn332 had been the Chief Inspector of the unit Neil was the then current Chief Inspector and craft his Deputy soon to succeed him the group's unanimous findings are set out in a memorandum day to the 15th of March 1976.
01:59:53 March 1976. could we have up please mps-0730 745
02:00:20 I'm going to read the whole page in order to review the current situation regarding the special demonstration Squad I set up a working party as directed by you comprising Chief superintendent R Wilson and hn332 together with Chief Inspector Neil and detective inspector craft under my
02:00:34 detective inspector craft under my chairmanship I should at the outset say that during our deliberations I found
02:00:45 that during our deliberations I found complete agreement amongst all members on the issues we discussed these can best be summarized as follows well certainly the degree of violence associated with public demonstrations has declined since the formation of the squad in 1968. however if anything the
02:00:59 squad in 1968. however if anything the popularity of Street demonstrations has increased so that public issues like abortion trespass unemployment civil liberties
02:01:11 liberties Etc have brought very large numbers onto the streets with with the ever-present potential for public disorder two with respect to the degree of coverage considered necessary by the SDS two aspects are a primary importance
02:01:24 two aspects are a primary importance firstly the degree of involvement and manipulation exercised by the ultra left in all protest organizations particularly in ad hoc committees formed
02:01:39 particularly in ad hoc committees formed to arrange major demonstrations secondly the number of Splinter groups continually being formed invariably consisting of militant elements the latter do not recognize the need to liaise with police regarding proposed
02:01:54 liaise with police regarding proposed demonstrations and pickets many of which if you could move down there please
02:02:06 foreign notice and coverage within or access to these organizations is essential if adequate police arrangements are to be made
02:02:13 made nevertheless with the reduction in political public disorders the strength of the SDS has gradually been reduced from the original 26 operational offices to the current 12 officers engaged in
02:02:29 to the current 12 officers engaged in the field it is agreed that this is the minimum coverage necessary to prove effective and might have to be increased if the situation deteriorated bearing in mind that the primary task of the SDS is to provide intelligence in
02:02:41 the SDS is to provide intelligence in the public order field it is difficult to proportion their value in this field compared with the offspin information provided for the security service for example if an officer covers a
02:02:54 for example if an officer covers a meeting called to discuss whether to demonstrate or not and the latter view prevails and the only positive result of his attendance is seen in the subsequent report of individuals attending
02:03:06 report of individuals attending Etc which is of interest to box 500 nevertheless is reasons for attending are of equal importance from a public order point of view
02:03:19 order point of view suffice it to say that the contribution made by the SDS to the national interests of the security service is a very considerable one a point which is fully acknowledged could that be taken down now please
02:03:37 the third document dates from just over two years later the first of May 1978. it is significant because it is a rare survival of a document expressly
02:03:53 rare survival of a document expressly recording in any detail the relationship between the SDS and a department of the MPS the primary consumer of the sds's public order intelligence moreover it relates to a large and significant
02:04:05 relates to a large and significant anti-racist event The Rock Against Racism rally and concert which is a memorandum from the then newly appointed detective Chief
02:04:16 newly appointed detective Chief Inspector of the SDS Michael Ferguson hn135 to the detective Chief superintendent s branch and is a defense of criticism apparently made by a
02:04:29 of criticism apparently made by a department Deputy assistant commissioner about the accuracy of SDS intelligence there was no disorder at the event a Department's criticism was apparently that the sds's intelligence about the level of attendance at Rock Against
02:04:40 level of attendance at Rock Against Racism had been inaccurate the content of the document provoked thought about
02:04:54 of the document provoked thought about whether intelligence or disorder was not expected was of use to the police if so could it have been obtained by other means
02:04:55 means if the memorandum is accurate the SDS had reported both that no disorder was planned or in or envisaged at the a l event and that those attending it did
02:05:07 event and that those attending it did not intend to oppose a national front March planned for the following day that
02:05:18 March planned for the following day that intelligence is stated to have come from and I quote constant contact with our sources
02:05:26 home office documents five further documents obtained from the home office are being uploaded onto the website today the first is a late camera from the phase one era recording an informal review conducted on the 13th of November
02:05:41 November 1967. now the instance of the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins to consider whether there was any duplication in the work of the security service and of special branch of the Metropolitan Police it is principally of interest
02:05:56 Police it is principally of interest because paragraph three explains the respected interests of the two organizations in relation to subversive activities it may assist in understanding why information was reported and stored implicit in the
02:06:08 reported and stored implicit in the passage is a view that a subversive threat could be long term which may explain why the SDS reported on the
02:06:19 explain why the SDS reported on the membership of some organizations over the course of many years whether they were justified in so doing is one of the issues which the inquiry must consider the relevant passage reads I quote both
02:06:33 the relevant passage reads I quote both bodies were often interested in the same Target but the security service sought to assess the long term as well as the short-term threat and were therefore particularly interested in the policy and membership of subversive
02:06:45 and membership of subversive organizations the immediate police interest was in discovering what action such as a demonstration was being
02:06:56 such as a demonstration was being planned the interests of the two bodies LED them to complement rather than duplicate one another's activities the second document is a home office circular number 97 of 1969 entitled
02:07:09 circular number 97 of 1969 entitled informants who take part in crime it featured in The Phase One bundle and is repeated here not least because of its relevance to the question of whether miscarriages of Justice may have
02:07:21 miscarriages of Justice may have occurred as a result of the activities of one or more phase two SDS undercover police officers I shall return to that topic later
02:07:34 topic later the third document is dated the 29th of May 1974 and is a letter from the Zen
02:07:45 May 1974 and is a letter from the Zen director general of the security service to achieve constables in England and Wales including the commissioner of police of the Metropolis following concerns raised in Parliament it sought to remind Chief constables of the guidance given in the terms of
02:07:57 the guidance given in the terms of reference for a special Branch issued on the authority of the association of chief police officers in June 1970. we considered those terms of reference in Phase One in particular the letter
02:08:08 Phase One in particular the letter emphasized the distinction between subversion and militancy the former being of interest to the security service the latter off Linux
02:08:21 service the latter off Linux could we have a look please at ucpi00004545
02:08:40 could we go down please to paragraph seven
02:08:53 thank you in this connection it may be helpful to remind you of the distinction we draw between subversion and militancy in industrial disputes in the following definitions subversion is defined as activities
02:09:08 subversion is defined as activities threatening the safety or well-being of the state and intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political industrial or violent means industrial militancy is defined as
02:09:20 industrial militancy is defined as Readiness to use or threaten the use of strikes sit-ins or other forms of aggressive action in the further ends of
02:09:33 aggressive action in the further ends of industrial disputes and an unwillingness to seek or accept compromised Solutions through negotiations conciliation or arbitration while we have this document up could we scroll down to paragraph eight please
02:09:46 oh forgive me the definition continued over the page I must continue militancy in pursuit of Trade union disputes with employers is not subversive unless the motivation and purpose of the militants
02:09:58 motivation and purpose of the militants is primarily political and threatens the Parliamentary democratic system opposition to Industrial policies of the government of the day is not in itself subversive I wanted also to mention
02:10:11 subversive I wanted also to mention while we have this document up paragraph 8 which is relevant to blacklisting it is standing Security Service policy not to pass to non-official agencies commercial firms or employers
02:10:22 commercial firms or employers organizations or any information deriving from their investigation into subversive activities in Industry it is equally important that police forces
02:10:36 equally important that police forces should not give to their contacts in trade unions firms or employers organizations information deriving from official sources about subversive organizations or individuals
02:10:48 organizations or individuals could you take that down now please
02:10:57 the final two documents are both dated December 1984 and so forth shortly after the deployment of the last officer whose
02:11:09 the deployment of the last officer whose evidence we will be considering in phase two the first is entitled home office guidelines on the work of a special branch
02:11:10 branch much of the content is in line with similar with similar older documents that we have published of note is the fact that it contains the first
02:11:21 fact that it contains the first substantial guidance that we have obtained on the subject of data protection we assume that it was the result of the enactment of the First Data protection act in 1984. we assume
02:11:34 Data protection act in 1984. we assume that it was sorry we will be considering in due course in charge 2 whether this new legal regime made any difference in practice to what was recorded by the SDS
02:11:46 practice to what was recorded by the SDS and retained for the moment we know that the document permits a comparison between practice prior to 1984 and that which from then on
02:11:57 which from then on ought to have been complied with could we have a look please at ucpi00004538
02:12:06 foreign
02:12:17 if we could scroll down to paragraph 16 please
02:12:29 thank you rep Awards records should be maintained in order to discharge effectively the functions listed in paragraph 3 to 12 above it is important however because of the particular sensitivity of the information concerned that only
02:12:44 information concerned that only information relevant to those functions should be recorded close attention should therefore be paid to paragraph three to twelve and to the definitions
02:12:57 three to twelve and to the definitions given in paragraph 20 in deciding what information should be recorded or not recorded data on individuals or organizations should not under any circumstances be collected or held
02:13:08 circumstances be collected or held solely on the basis that such a person or organization supports and popular causes are on the basis of race or Creed it is also important to ensure that
02:13:19 it is also important to ensure that wherever possible information recorded about an individual is authenticated and does not give a false or misleading impression
02:13:30 impression care should be taken to ensure that only necessary and relevant information is recorded and retained each special brand should therefore
02:13:39 if we could move down please
02:13:52 thank you maintain an effective system both for updating information where necessary and for weeding out and destroying information which can no longer be clearly related to the discharge of its functions
02:14:04 discharge of its functions access to information held by special Brown should be strictly limited to those who have a particular need to know under no circumstances should information be passed to commercial firms or to employers organizations
02:14:19 firms or to employers organizations the security of Records maintained by special branch is of Paramount importance because of the sensitivity of the information concerned and because of the damage to individuals which might
02:14:32 the damage to individuals which might result if unauthorized persons were to gain access to it or if improper use were made of the information special branches must ensure that the most stringent and appropriate precautions
02:14:44 stringent and appropriate precautions are taken to safeguard the information and to protect it against both unauthorized access or disclosure and accidental loss thank you if that could be taken down please
02:15:04 foreign Office document is an updated version of the home office guidelines on the work of a special Branch issued to Chief officers of particular significance is the guidance in this section entitled
02:15:16 the guidance in this section entitled assistance to the security service which is highly germane to our investigation as to whether aspects of the SDS as intelligence gathering were Justified were the lines drawn by the guidance drawn in the right place
02:15:27 drawn in the right place if so were they crossed by the SDS we also note the emphatic statement of paragraph four of the guidance about the importance of training
02:15:42 importance of training thus far in our hearings we have had no evidence that the SDS provided any formal training to its ucos but relied
02:15:53 formal training to its ucos but relied upon General police and special Branch training combined with the sds's informal Arrangements could we have a look please at ucpi00004584
02:16:05 foreign
02:16:17 like to read from paragraph four please that could be moved up a little
02:16:28 beaten from starting from paragraph four because of the exceptional thank you because of the exceptional sensitivity of much of the work undertaken by special branches it is of the utmost importance that special Branch offices attain a high degree of
02:16:43 Branch offices attain a high degree of professional competence and that to this end all special Branch officers should attend the appropriate training courses run by the Metropolitan Police Special branch and security service officers should attend refresher courses
02:16:55 should attend refresher courses particularly when they have been away from special Branch duties for some time assistance to the security service when a special branch is operating in support of the Security Service Chief
02:17:07 support of the Security Service Chief officers should attach importance to the need to consult that service and to seek its advice as necessary this is
02:17:18 its advice as necessary this is particularly important when collecting processing and recording information about subversive or potentially subversive organizations or individuals
02:17:32 subversive organizations or individuals under the definition of subversion given in the guidelines paragraph 20 an organization currently organized operating within the law they nevertheless be subversive because it's long-term aims satisfy the definition and therefore be a proper subject of Investigation
02:17:43 Investigation senior officers must exercise strict control over the selection of targets for investigation when the current activities of an organization are
02:17:58 activities of an organization are legitimate and peaceful if we could scroll up please
02:18:11 when intelligence is gathered on subversive organizations very great care should always be taken not to give grounds for special Branch inquiries being misrepresented as wrongful police interference in the exercise of civil and political Liberties this applies
02:18:29 and political Liberties this applies especially to coverage of demonstrations and protest marches which will often provide an opportunity for the collection of information about subversive elements in a particular organization and quickly go to the next page please
02:18:48 special Branch investigations into subversive activities in particularly sensitive fields for example in educational establishments in trade unions in industry and among racial minorities must be conducted with particular care so as to avoid any
02:19:03 particular care so as to avoid any suggestion that special branches are investigating matters involving the legitimate expression of views inquires into subversive activities in these fields which may be necessary to meet
02:19:15 fields which may be necessary to meet the requirements of the security service should be initiated only after consultation with the security service okay should also be taken to ensure that investigations in relation to Industrial
02:19:27 investigations in relation to Industrial disputes are not misrepresented as being aimed at the penetration of trade unions rather than the investigation of subversive groups which may be active in disputes or for public order purposes
02:19:45 disputes or for public order purposes subversion should not be confused with industrial militancy industrial militancy is a use or threatened use of strikes sit-ins or other disruptive action in the
02:19:56 other disruptive action in the furtherance of industrial disputes and an unwillingness to seek or accept compromised Solutions through negotiations conciliation or arbitration the actions of industrial militants only become subversive when their intent is
02:20:12 become subversive when their intent is to threaten the safety and well-being of the state and to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy it is not the function of the Force Special Branch to investigate individuals and groups merely because their policies are unpalatable or
02:20:24 their policies are unpalatable or because they are highly critical of the police or because they want to transform the present system of police accountability would that be taken down please
02:20:40 returning to the corporate witness statement and documents provided by the security service it is divided into two parts
02:20:50 parts the first part addresses questions about the role and remit of the security service throughout the period covered by the inquiry's terms of reference it also covers the role of Metropolitan Police Special Branch particularly vis-a-vis
02:21:05 Special Branch particularly vis-a-vis the security service for the same period the second part of the statement deals in more detail with the tranche one era it is focused upon the security services relationship with Metropolitan Police
02:21:17 relationship with Metropolitan Police Special branch and the SDS in particular during this period the inquiry will be requesting further trunch specific evidence from the
02:21:28 trunch specific evidence from the security service as our investigation proceeds
02:21:32 proceeds individual Metropolitan Police Service witnesses will be providing us with their own evidence about the liaison relationship during the tranche one era in this phase and phase three
02:21:53 in this phase and phase three time does not permit me this morning to deal at any length with the security services evidence which can be read online however I will make a few observations before I move on at the start of the phase two era the official definition of subversion was that contained in the Maxwell five
02:22:06 that contained in the Maxwell five directive to which I referred last November
02:22:10 November it is so important to our work that I shall repeat it the security service is part of the Defense Forces of the country its task is the defense of the realm as a whole from external and internal dangers
02:22:24 from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at Espionage and sabotage or from actions of persons and organizations whether directed from
02:22:39 organizations whether directed from within or without the country which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the state the director of f Branch with which branch the SDS have direct contact defined subversion in 1972
02:22:51 defined subversion in 1972 as I quote activities threatening the safety or well-being of the state and intended to undermine or overthrow
02:23:03 intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political industrial or violent means direct to F's above definition was formally adopted by Lord Harris of
02:23:14 formally adopted by Lord Harris of Greenwich in a debate in the House of Lords on the 26th of February 1975. it has since been known as the Harris definition we note in particular that the Harris
02:23:28 we note in particular that the Harris definition has two limbs first do the activities threaten the safety or well-being of the state and second are
02:23:40 well-being of the state and second are they intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political industrial or violent means what amounts to an activity which threatens the safety or well-being of the stage is not defined
02:23:51 the stage is not defined however the threshold for meeting this
02:24:05 however the threshold for meeting this test is important in the context of this inquiry because so many of the groups infiltrated to described by the SDS [Music]
02:24:08 [Music] that's happening
02:24:15 but lacking the means to realize
02:24:37 is that the threat must be to the system of parliamentary democracy and not just to the government of the day witness said explains that in 1978 the then direct deputy director general of the security service clarified that some
02:24:51 security service clarified that some version did not equate to activity which threatens government policies or may threaten its very existence witness said also refers to essentially the same point being made publicly by
02:25:06 the same point being made publicly by Sir Leon Britton then the Home Secretary in 1985. he was quoted as saying there is a clear distinction between subversion and opposition to the policies of the government of the day or peaceful campaigning to bring about changes in those policies or to
02:25:17 changes in those policies or to influence public opinion generally witness said further explains that the security services counter subversion role was as the provider of objective
02:25:31 role was as the provider of objective factual information about the security status of individuals and groups these are all important parameters against which we can test the sds's
02:25:45 against which we can test the sds's reporting especially that with that which was provided to the security service
02:25:50 service witness that evidence is that within the context of its investigations into subversion the security service was most interested in subversive groups that sought to influence non-subversive organizations through obtaining
02:26:05 organizations through obtaining membership of those organizations for example trade unions in order to achieve the subversive goal of undermining parliamentary democracy
02:26:17 of undermining parliamentary democracy what he describes as Ultra left groups consisting of trotskiest maoist and anarchists were considered a threat but didn't take high priority until the mid-1970s
02:26:34 mid-1970s as to what the security service did with the sds's reporting witness said states that
02:26:35 that I quote it appears that on at least one occasion the security service considered disseminating SDS intelligence to
02:26:46 disseminating SDS intelligence to Liaison Partners however we have found no evidence to suggest that any SDS intelligence was in fact shared outside the security service witness that confirms that the security
02:27:01 witness that confirms that the security service did provide the SDS with what is described as quote occasional and limited assistance with the development of SDS undercover officers cover identities witness said adds that quote there is
02:27:14 witness said adds that quote there is also limited evidence to suggest that the security service was occasionally able to help protect the safety of an SDS officer at risk of being compromised
02:27:31 SDS officer at risk of being compromised on the question of targeted witness said accepts that the security service made requests of the SDS for certain intelligence and that security service briefings may have influenced SDS decisions
02:27:44 decisions however witness said emphasizes that the decisions were ultimately for the SDS paragraph 108 of witness said statement reads
02:27:52 reads whilst the meetings with the SDS
02:28:03 whilst the meetings with the SDS discussed the targeting of SDS agents it is important to note that the decisions on deployment of SDS agents were taken by the SDS alone further for various reasons including lack of relevance to the mpsb's remit and availability of resources the SDS
02:28:18 and availability of resources the SDS did not provide intelligence in relation to all Security Service requests the SDS were responsible for their agents and while the security services briefings may have influenced SDS
02:28:30 briefings may have influenced SDS decisions the security service had no control over the placement or targeting of the SDS agents as to the debriefing of SDS undercover
02:28:48 as to the debriefing of SDS undercover police officers by the security service witness said observes that only three formal requests for debrief in the relative period were exceeded to by the
02:29:01 relative period were exceeded to by the SDS in 1982 and 1983 the however witness said accepts that there were other meetings albeit that witness said understanding as if these were contrary to SDS policy turning to the utility of SDS reporting
02:29:20 turning to the utility of SDS reporting to the security service as perceived at the time witness said states that I quote the development in the relationship is evidence that the security service found on the whole SDS reporting to be useful enabling them to gain intelligence into subversive
02:29:34 intelligence into subversive organizations which may not otherwise have been readily available witness said to view now of the utility of the sds's reporting is essentially the same
02:29:44 the same of notice witness said's view that it helped to assess the subversive threat that each group or individual posed
02:29:55 that each group or individual posed paragraph one two three of witness said statement reads I have been asked how useful the SVS
02:30:06 I have been asked how useful the SVS reporting is considered to have been now and for what purpose was the reporting useful
02:30:10 useful it appears from the review of documents that the SDS reporting was useful to assist a security service in building The Wider intelligent pictures in respect of subversive individuals and
02:30:23 respect of subversive individuals and organizations it is clear from a review of the security services intelligence requirements summarized above but the purpose of the reporting for the security service was to obtain detailed information
02:30:34 information about the functioning of these groups and the individuals within them which in turn would help towards the security services assessment when combined with other intelligence of the subversive
02:30:49 other intelligence of the subversive threat that each group or individual posed
02:30:53 posed the SDS reporting did not provide comprehensive coverage of these organizations in part as a consequence
02:31:04 organizations in part as a consequence of their Law and Order remit it is clear to me that the SDS reporting was one element of intelligence that the security service relied upon to fulfill its functions to protect the United Kingdom from subversion the documents that a company witness
02:31:21 the documents that a company witness said statement evidence what appears to be a fluctuating level of contact between security service and SDS managers over the tranche one period we shall be examining that in more detail in phase three when we will hear
02:31:37 detail in phase three when we will hear evidence from some of the sds's managers we will also be raising with individual officers who give oral evidence any
02:31:48 officers who give oral evidence any material directly relevant to them with both of those points in mind I shall only make two observations on the document at this stage first in January 1973 the then commissioner's concerns about the potential of the SDS to cause
02:32:01 potential of the SDS to cause embarrassment recorded in the security service file note the note records a meeting between the security services F4 and DAC Vic Gilbert it states quote
02:32:13 it states quote special special Branch penetrate these groups by The Hairy Squad that is to say special Branch officers who are given a false identity and background Gilbert said the commissioner was
02:32:34 Gilbert said the commissioner was concerned about possible embarrassment arising out of this operation and he Gilbert felt that the hairy Squad survived almost day to day at a meeting between SDS managers and the security services F6 on 8th of April 1980 what appeared to
02:32:49 on 8th of April 1980 what appeared to have been perceived as the advantages of the sds's operation over Security Services own were recorded the material part reads this discussion also highlighted the advantages they have
02:33:04 highlighted the advantages they have over ourselves when Butler told me that they meet their sources two to three times a week their sources are fully briefed and all options are discussed at these meetings evidence of subversion
02:33:17 evidence of subversion there are numerous examples of documents
02:33:33 there are numerous examples of documents in the hearing bundle which evidence the subversive aims of some Far left groups however I must mention one particular document dated the 15th of May 1974. from
02:33:35 from hn299342 David hughes's reporting it relates to what is referred to as a Marxist study group although from the
02:33:47 Marxist study group although from the context in which it is found it is clear that it was a Marxist leninist group it is an isolated example but in terms of subversive aims it is the most disturbing document that we have found
02:34:07 disturbing document that we have found could we look please at ucpi zero zero zero zero zero zero double eight two three
02:34:20 and could we expand paragraph three please
02:34:21 please okay
02:34:24 thank you
02:34:29 privacy redaction during the course of his numerous interventions stated that when the Socialist Revolution took place some two million people in this country would
02:34:41 million people in this country would have to be liquidated because they could never be converted to the cause of the Revolution and would present a permanent threat to its continuance he counted among both these people such groups as
02:34:58 among both these people such groups as senior police officers especially those in special Branch members of the security service senior army officers big businessmen and all leading members of the conservative party
02:35:11 thank you could the document be taken down please
02:35:21 David Hughes states that these sorts of views were present to varying degrees but that the majority of people he encountered during his deployment were not that extreme Witnesses this morning time does not
02:35:35 Witnesses this morning time does not permit me to introduce the evidence of all of the witnesses who will give evidence in phase two or to go through each of the deployments of the undercover office as being investigated however the written version of this opening statement which will be
02:35:49 of this opening statement which will be posted on the inquiries website contains sections which set out the relevant issues from the inquiries issues lists identifies the managers of the period and introduce each of the civilian
02:36:09 and introduce each of the civilian Witnesses and under cover officers in this phase in addition as we did in phase one we are appending to the written version of this opening statement a lengthy appendix 2 which summarizes the evidence obtained to date relating to each former undercover officer in the phase
02:36:22 officer in the phase miscarriages of Justice I now turn to some of the main themes that we will be exploring in the oral
02:36:33 that we will be exploring in the oral hearings first miscarriage of Justice that actions have undercover police officers have the potential to give rise to miscarriages of justice is well known particularly if they act as on provocateurs
02:36:47 provocateurs if necessary disclosures are not made to prosecutors or if a court is misled the fact that Mark Kennedy's undercover deployment as a member of the national
02:36:58 deployment as a member of the national public order intelligence unit was not properly disclosed led to a number of convictions being overturned and a large number of prosecutions being abandoned
02:37:11 number of prosecutions being abandoned The Inquirer is terms of reference so it require it to review the extent of the duty to make disclosure of an undercover operation during a criminal prosecution and the scope for miscarriage of Justice
02:37:25 and the scope for miscarriage of Justice in the absence of proper disclosure they also reflect a concern that we may discover further potential miscarriages of justice as we investigate the material parts of the terms of reference readers follows
02:37:36 reference readers follows the inquirer's investigations will include a review of the extent of the duty to make during a criminal prosecution disclosure of an undercover police operation and the scope for
02:37:48 police operation and the scope for miscarriage of Justice in the absence of proper disclosure the inquiry will refer to a panel consisting of senior members
02:37:59 to a panel consisting of senior members of the crown prosecution service and the police the facts of any case in respect of which it concludes that a miscarriage of Justice may have occurred as a result
02:38:13 of Justice may have occurred as a result of an undercover police operation or its non-disclosure the panel will consider whether further action is required including but not limited to referral of the case to the criminal cases review Commission
02:38:27 Commission it is clear from the terms of reference that the inquiry is not required to decide whether there has been a miscarriage of Justice rather it must refer any case in which it concludes that the miscarriage of Justice may have occurred as a result of an undercover
02:38:42 occurred as a result of an undercover police operation or its non-disclosure it is not the inquirer's function to determine criminal liability section two of the inquiries act 2005 expressly
02:38:54 of the inquiries act 2005 expressly provides that an inquiry panel is not to rule on and has no power to determine any person's civil or criminal liability however that provision also states that an inquiry panel is not to be inhibited
02:39:12 an inquiry panel is not to be inhibited in the discharge of its functions by any likelihood of liability being inferred from Facts it determines or recommendations that it makes a miscarriages of Justice panel as
02:39:23 a miscarriages of Justice panel as required by the terms of reference has been established the inquiry will not wait until it has completed its work to make references to the panel in appropriate cases if evidence is admitted which meets a
02:39:42 evidence is admitted which meets a threshold test for referral to the panel then a referral should be made I know sir that you will be considering immediately after the current hearings whether a referral should be made the principle that there is an obligation on the prosecution to
02:39:53 obligation on the prosecution to disclose the use of a participating informant to enable the court to be
02:40:09 informant to enable the court to be sufficiently informed to ensure a fair trial Now comprehensively set out in Patel and others was an established principle governing the disclosure obligations on the prosecuting authorities in the phase II era in the crown against Marx and baphus the Court held that the prosecuting Authority is entitled to withhold the names of those
02:40:22 entitled to withhold the names of those from which information has been obtained unless at trial the judge considers that the disclosure of the name of an informant or the nature of the information is quote necessary or
02:40:37 information is quote necessary or desirable in order to show the prisoners innocence
02:40:42 innocence contemporaneous reference to the same broad principle can be found in the crown against bertels in which the court reiterate that quote within certain
02:40:57 reiterate that quote within certain limits informers should be protected but that the court of trial should not be misled
02:41:04 misled the court gave as an example of such an occasion the facts giving rise to the crown against macro a case in which the fact of a participating informant was not disclosed
02:41:14 disclosed the principles to be derived from macro were later distilled for The Wider consumption of police and Prosecuting
02:41:27 consumption of police and Prosecuting parties in the home office circular 97 of 1969 informants who take part in crime
02:41:28 crime to date the only relevant written guidance that we have received in evidence concerns the home office
02:41:39 evidence concerns the home office circular 97 of 1969 the guidance was addressed to Chief constables and directed at informants who take part in crime the guidance sets out broad principles endorsed by the then-home
02:41:50 principles endorsed by the then-home Secretary of particular interests are paragraph three and four could we have a look please at mps-0727104
02:42:14 thank you can we start with paragraph three
02:42:24 the conference in general agreed on the following points no member of a police force and no police informant should cancel Insight or procure the commission of a crime
02:42:35 of a crime B where an informant gives the police information about the intention of others to commit a crime in which they intend that he shall play A Part his partitions is a big apartment his participation should be allowed to
02:42:50 participation should be allowed to continue only where one he does not actively engage in planning and committing the crime two he is intended to play only a minor role and three his
02:43:02 to play only a minor role and three his participation is essential to enable the police force to frustrate the principal criminals and to arrest them albeit for lesser offenses such as attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime or
02:43:18 conspiracy to commit the crime or carrying offensive weapons before injury is done to any person or serious damage to property the informant should always be instructed that he must on no account act as ajon provocateur whether by suggesting to others that they should
02:43:38 suggesting to others that they should commit offenses or encouraging them to do so and that if he is found to have done so he will himself be liable to prosecution could go over the page please
02:43:49 see the police must never commit themselves to a course which whether to protect an informant or otherwise will constrain them to mislead a court in any subsequent proceedings this must always be regarded as a prime consideration
02:44:05 be regarded as a prime consideration when deciding whether and in what Manner an informant may be used and how far if at all he is to be allowed to take part in an offense if his use in the way
02:44:18 in an offense if his use in the way envisaged will or is likely to result in it being impossible to protect him without subsequently misleading the court that must be regarded as a decisive reason for his not being so used or not being protected
02:44:34 used or not being protected D the need to protect an informant does not justify granting him immunity from arrest or prosecution but the crime if he fully participates in it with a requisite intent still less in respect
02:44:46 requisite intent still less in respect of any other crime he has committed or May in future commit e the handling of informants calls for the Judgment of an experienced officer there must be complete confidence and frankness between supervising officers
02:45:02 frankness between supervising officers and subordinates and every chief officer of police should ensure effective supervision of his detectives a decision to use a participating informant should be taken at a senior level F payment to informants from public
02:45:17 F payment to informants from public funds should be supervised by a senior officer G where an informant has been used it was taken part in the commission of a crime for which others have been arrested the prosecuting solicitor
02:45:29 arrested the prosecuting solicitor Council and where he is concerned the director of public prosecutions should be informed of the fact and of the part that the informant took in the commission of the offense although
02:45:45 commission of the offense although subject to C above not necessarily of his identity H careful instruction should be given to detectives in training the Home Secretary fully endorses these
02:45:56 the Home Secretary fully endorses these broad principles he feels sure that they are already widely applied in the police service but in view of recent public interest he thinks it right to bring
02:46:08 interest he thinks it right to bring them to the notice of all Chief officers of police he asks that you will find means of commending them to everyone who may be concerned in your Force he has
02:46:19 may be concerned in your Force he has instructed hm inspectors of constabulary to pay particular attention in the course of their inspections to the arrangements made in police forces for supervision and training in these matters
02:46:30 matters could that be taken down please
02:46:39 in Phase One the evidence was to the effect that many officers stated that they understood the need not to act as a jean-provocateur but few could recall seeing the circular none could recall any formal training
02:46:56 none could recall any formal training with the SDS but all had naturally had basic police training and training by special Branch none could recall any direct involvement with the SDS By Her Majesty's inspectorate at constabulary we shall continue to explore the
02:47:08 we shall continue to explore the understanding which undercover police officers had in relation to matters Germain to miscarriages of Justice not
02:47:19 Germain to miscarriages of Justice not just their own actions when deployed but also their training instructions supervision and oversight we will be receiving evidence from three
02:47:33 we will be receiving evidence from three civilian Witnesses christabel Gurney Obe professor rosenhead and Ernest Rodger and from one former SDS undercover police officer hn298 about the incident which occurred on the 12th of May
02:47:45 on the 12th of May 1972 all four together with others were arrested whilst protesting against apartheid outside the star and garter hotel in Richmond all four were subsequently prosecuted and convicted all of the witnesses say for Ernest
02:47:58 all of the witnesses say for Ernest Rodger will give oral evidence we will be exploring with the witnesses who give oral evidence the circumstances to establish what happened and in
02:48:11 establish what happened and in particular whether or not there may have been a miscarriage of Justice the inquiry has also established that
02:48:26 the inquiry has also established that one of the deceased former SDS officers hn13 was twice arrested and subject to criminal proceedings together with others in his undercover identity the relevant evidence will be posted during the course of the hearings you
02:48:37 during the course of the hearings you will sir need to consider whether any of the resulting convictions Merit the referral to the miscarriages of Justice panel
02:48:57 deceased children's identities in an opening statement on behalf of the relatives of deceased individuals Ms Williams Queen's Council eloquently explained the hurt distress and revulsion felt by the relatives about the practice of using deceased by children's identities when constructing
02:49:08 children's identities when constructing undercover Legends She Drew attention to
02:49:20 undercover Legends She Drew attention to the condemnation of the practice both by the home office select committee the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police Services apologies she explained the investigations to date which I shall not repeat and emphasize the desire of the relatives for answers
02:49:35 the desire of the relatives for answers to all of the questions to which use of the practice has given rise the inquiry legal team has as far as possible established whether or not
02:49:48 possible established whether or not former SDS undercover officers used a real person's identity in cases where a deceased child's identity was used and the officer's cover name is not restricted we have
02:50:00 cover name is not restricted we have sought to establish whether there are surviving close relatives who can be traced and contacted in relation to the phase two era we have contacted relatives in eight cases in none of
02:50:11 relatives in eight cases in none of those cases have the relatives wish to apply for core participant status or to participate as Witnesses in the inquiry none of the former undercover officers
02:50:26 none of the former undercover officers who have whose evidence was received in Phase One stated that they had been instructed to use a deceased child's identity to construct their cover identity
02:50:34 identity Chief Inspector Dixon wrote the study paper entitled penetration of extremist groups
02:50:40 groups which covered the construction of a cover Legend but did not Advocate using a deceased child's identity the study paper does not appear to have been circulated amongst SDS undercover
02:50:57 been circulated amongst SDS undercover officers though and the evidence was to the effect that there appears to have been little guidance given to early officers about how to construct their undercover identities the steps taken to produce a clever
02:51:11 the steps taken to produce a clever identity by early SDS ucos appeared on the evidence to have been basic some of the early SDS of undercover officers who did not use a real person's identity were either compromised or
02:51:24 identity were either compromised or withdrawn from their deployments because of the risk of compromise we will be hearing oral evidence from hn45 who was recognized by a neighbor at an activist meeting and from hn 47 who who was
02:51:38 meeting and from hn 47 who who was withdrawn after being accused of being an undercover police officer the reasons for that suspicion will need to be explored
02:51:47 explored at some point during the early to mid 1970s the SDS began to instruct its ucos to use deceased children's identities
02:51:58 to use deceased children's identities no written instruction or guidance to record the introduction of the practice survives if such ever existed
02:52:11 survives if such ever existed the written evidence that we have obtained from hn347
02:52:17 hn299342 hn298 and hn 301 suggests that the SDS was not
02:52:30 suggests that the SDS was not instructing its officers to use deceased children's identities in 1971 the year in which they all joined the SDS however the evidence relating to hn353 cover named Gary Roberts hn351 Cabernet Jeff Slater
02:52:53 hn351 Cabernet Jeff Slater hn297 cover name Rick Gibson and hn 200 cover name Roger Harris who all joined the SDS in 1974 is that they each use deceased children's identities to some extent
02:53:01 extent hn 301 cover name Bob Stubbs an hn344 cover name Ian Cameron who joined the
02:53:14 cover name Ian Cameron who joined the SDS in 1971 and 1972 respectively each told their risk assessors at the anonymity stage that they were not constructed to use a deceased child's identity
02:53:28 three cases deserve specific mention first
02:53:29 first hn298 who use the cover name Michael Scott states that he obtained that name by visiting the registry of births and deaths then at Somerset house in 1971.
02:53:47 deaths then at Somerset house in 1971. however his recollection is that he was not guided or instructed to do so unlike later officers who were instructed to use a deceased child's identity he did not ascertain whether
02:53:58 identity he did not ascertain whether the person whose identity he used was dead or alive the inquiry has established that the real Michael Scott was not dead and was not a child in 1971.
02:54:12 not a child in 1971. we have been able to trace and contact him
02:54:16 him he did not wish to give evidence and we are respecting that wish the facts give rise to a concern that the criminal conviction that hn298 received in his cover identity might
02:54:31 received in his cover identity might have been entered onto the real Michael Scott's record our investigations have confirmed that the star and garter conviction is not
02:54:43 the star and garter conviction is not recorded against Michael Scott on the police national computer however we have not been able to establish whether or not there ever was a record of conviction
02:54:57 a record of conviction the witness statements of Karen progle and detected Constable Katie McAleer which go to this issue will be published on the day that hn298 gives oral evidence
02:55:11 evidence the second case is that of H and hn297 detected Constable Richard Clark AKA Rick Gibson although he is deceased it appears that he used a deceased child's identity because one of the
02:55:26 child's identity because one of the groups that he infiltrated big flame discovered that fact Mr chesson will be giving evidence about Richard Clark's deployment including the
02:55:37 Richard Clark's deployment including the discovery that he was not who he said he was thus we will hear that one of the first SDS undercover officers to use a
02:55:49 first SDS undercover officers to use a deceased child's identity found that it was not robust enough fully to protect his cover story the third case is that of hn 80 who use the clever name Colin Clark he has stated that he refused to use a
02:56:05 he has stated that he refused to use a deceased child's identity he states that I quote it distressed me to consider using the details from a dead child's birth certificate and I knew that it
02:56:20 birth certificate and I knew that it would necessarily cause distress to that child's family if it was discovered foreign
02:56:24 foreign most of the phase two officers describe in their statements using only some information about the deceased child whose identity they used typically the
02:56:36 whose identity they used typically the name or part of the name together with the date and or place of birth few describe visiting the area where the deceased child lived although there are two exceptions first hn 304
02:56:49 two exceptions first hn 304 who describes making a detour of his own volition to the place where the deceased child in question had been born second hn 96 who used the cover name
02:57:02 second hn 96 who used the cover name Michael James Goes further he describes being instructed to visit Blackpool the
02:57:16 being instructed to visit Blackpool the birthplace of the deceased child Robert Michael James whose middle and last names he had adopted moreover he states that he was assisted
02:57:28 moreover he states that he was assisted by the local special Branch to establish that Robert James's family no longer lived at his former address thus we have an example of inquiries being made about the deceased child's family
02:57:40 family we will be exploring in more detail the issues surrounding the use of deceased children's identities with the phase two witnesses who give oral evidence
02:57:53 witnesses who give oral evidence we have included the sds's tradecraft manual in the phase 2 hearing bundle because of the content relating to the use of deceased children's identities that is to say Section 3 and appendix e
02:58:09 that is to say Section 3 and appendix e however readers should be aware that as far as we have been able to ascertain this document appears to date from the 1990s long after deployments of the officers who will be giving evidence in phase two
02:58:25 sexual relationships Ms Kaufman QC and Ms Williams QC in their respective opening statements made crystal clear the devastating and
02:58:37 crystal clear the devastating and life-altering impact that deceitful sexual relationships conducted by undercover police officers have had and the burning need for answers felt by the core participants in category h
02:58:50 core participants in category h the Metropolitan Police Service has long since issued an unreserved apology which amongst other things has accepted that
02:59:05 amongst other things has accepted that sexual relationships between undercover police officers and members of the public should not happen there can be no doubt that deceitful sexual relationships were one of the
02:59:18 sexual relationships were one of the principal issues of public concern which led to this public inquiry being established we shall be pursuing our search for the truth on this issue throughout the inquiry
02:59:26 inquiry the importance of the present phase to the process is that the evidence that we are going to hear and read concerns the first known sexual contact between SDS
02:59:42 first known sexual contact between SDS undercover officers and members of the public
02:59:50 there was no evidence of sexual contact between SDS undercover officers and members of the public in phase one however there was evidence of some
03:00:02 however there was evidence of some social conduct contact of the kind which may be a precursor to more intimate contact
03:00:08 contact hn336 cover named dick X gave evidence that he had a drink with a female activist there was also evidence of a blurring of the lines between undercover work for policing purposes whether or
03:00:24 work for policing purposes whether or not it was justified and social contact with a woman befriended by an SDS officer for other purposes hn345 Peter Fredericks gave evidence that after he had left the police he returned to the home of a female activist
03:00:39 activist the evidence in phase two is going to be altogether different we move into a period when there is evidence that at least five former SDS
03:00:51 evidence that at least five former SDS officers had sexual contact with as many as 12 different women the evidence that I briefly introduced below is obviously subject to the oral
03:01:03 below is obviously subject to the oral evidence that we are about to hear and we do not rule out taking further Evidence about these officers if more witnesses come forward
03:01:14 witnesses come forward Richard Clark cover name Rick Gibson hn297 is deceased he deployed into the troops art movement in big flame between 1974 and 1976. he is described by hn 304 as
03:01:30 1976. he is described by hn 304 as having a reputation for being something of a ladies man mayor is written evidence is that Clark was a frequent visitor to her flat and
03:01:43 was a frequent visitor to her flat and they had half-hearted sexual encounters which she did not initiate and fizzled out
03:01:44 out she has stated quote had I known he was a police officer there is absolutely no way I
03:01:55 officer there is absolutely no way I would have had any sexual contact with him at all a flatmate confided in her that she too had become sexually intimate with him
03:02:09 had become sexually intimate with him Richard chesson has provided a witness statement which explains that he knew Rick Gibson well and he had sexual relations with at least four women in his undercover identity Mary was one of those women all were activists we will be exploring
03:02:26 all were activists we will be exploring insofar as possible Clark's motives for forming these relationships a Hallmark of his deployment is how thoroughly he appears to have infiltrated his Target group and how
03:02:43 infiltrated his Target group and how active and influential he was within it Mary's impression is that detective Constable Clark was seeking to use sexual activity with her to bolster his cover
03:02:57 hn 300 who is now deceased use the cover name Jim Pickford to infiltrate Anarchist groups between 1974 and
03:03:10 Anarchist groups between 1974 and 1976. there will be evidence that he was known as a philanderer who chased after women his second wife to whom he was married at the start of his deployment and family members made a statement during the course of the anonymity process which indicates that Jim
03:03:23 process which indicates that Jim Pickford met a woman in his undercover
03:03:37 Pickford met a woman in his undercover identity whom he went on to marry hn 300 and his third wife had a child together the marriage did not last and ended in divorce
03:03:38 divorce there is corroborative evidence in the closed officer gist that hn 300 told a fellow UCO that he had fallen in love
03:03:50 fellow UCO that he had fallen in love with a woman associated with his group and wanted to tell her everything
03:04:00 hn354 who used the cover name Vince Miller
03:04:06 Miller infiltrated the swp between 1976 and 1979.
03:04:12 1979. he has stated that he had four he says one night stands whilst in his undercover identity at a time when he was single on his account two of the women with
03:04:25 on his account two of the women with whom he slept were activists and two were friends of friends he states that he did not tell his managers
03:04:36 managers as I have already mentioned one of the activists with whom he slept was Madeline
03:04:40 Madeline her account of the relationship is different
03:04:41 different she states that there was a sexual relationship initiated by Vince Miller which lasted up to a couple of months and which occurred soon after the breakup of her marriage
03:04:58 breakup of her marriage it was not a casual thing for her and she was very upset when Vince Miller disappeared we shall be hearing oral evidence from them both
03:05:04 them both we are grateful to Madeline for providing the inquiry with photographs of Vince Miller during his undercover deployment we can look at one of those now
03:05:15 now can we display please ucpi0000
03:05:22 three four three three one
03:05:46 thank you could that be taken down please
03:05:48 please thank you
03:05:53 thank you two of the fully Anonymous officers hn 302 who served in the 1970s and hn 21 who served in the late 1970s and early 1980s have stated that they had sexual
03:06:07 1980s have stated that they had sexual contact with women whilst in their cover identities the material parts of their witness statements have been included in the closed officer gist could we look please at ucpi000034307
03:06:23 oh my gosh
03:06:34 could we turn to page four please
03:06:39 and could we look at paragraph 20.
03:06:48 most officers state that they did not engage in any sexual relationships in their cover identities the exceptions to
03:06:59 their cover identities the exceptions to this are a one officer hn302 describes a brief sexual encounter early in his deployment with a woman from a group reported on whilst undercover Estates
03:07:12 reported on whilst undercover Estates after a couple of meetings I developed a friendship with a woman we had a drink after one of the meetings and then we went back to my cover accommodation I was a single man at the time both in my real life and my clever identity it did
03:07:23 real life and my clever identity it did not go further than that night I did not come across her again in my deployment I did not set out to sleep with anyone but the circumstances presented themselves to me and I did not say no having a
03:07:38 to me and I did not say no having a drink with this woman did bolster my cover identity but the fact that we ended up having sex did not at least in my view provide any additional benefit in terms of cover and that is not why I
03:07:49 in terms of cover and that is not why I did it any friendly interaction you had with anyone added layers to your Legend but it was not necessary to sleep with people to have a well-rounded cover
03:08:00 people to have a well-rounded cover identity it was not something that my management told me to do and I did not
03:08:11 management told me to do and I did not speak to my managers about it afterwards I did not think it was necessary to do so it was not relevant to any instructions or training I had received it was just something that happened before my deployment had really got
03:08:22 before my deployment had really got going that did not require any further actions on their part
03:08:34 actions on their part be another officer hn21 describes having engaged in occasional sexual encounters with two women whilst deployed during his deployment in the late 1970s and early 1980s hn21 attended an evening class he attended the evening class and his cover identity but not with his
03:08:47 his cover identity but not with his Target group he never reported on the evening classes he engaged in some kissing and fondling on a few occasions with one named woman from the if we could go over the page please
03:09:03 classes he had sex a couple of times with another woman who was associated with the evening class and who attended socials after them neither woman was a target of his infiltration and he did
03:09:17 target of his infiltration and he did not see either woman again neither of the women was involved in any of the groups he infiltrated thank you could you take that down please
03:09:33 so I noticed the time I've got about six or seven pages to go which is about 15 minutes
03:09:37 minutes um I think it is better that you should finish and we should then break but 15 minutes later than intended but for the same period
03:09:48 same period thank you sir both hn 302 and hn21 are going to give oral evidence in closed hearings this is necessary in order to avoid undermining the Restriction orders made in respect of their real and cover names it is also necessary to enable
03:10:06 names it is also necessary to enable them to be questioned freely without the questions having to be tailored and the answer's stifled in order to avoid undermining the Restriction orders we will be reviewing after they have given evidence what can safely be put into the public domain
03:10:18 public domain hn 106 we use the cover name Barry Tompkins denies that he had any sexual relationships in his cover identity
03:10:29 relationships in his cover identity however there is a security service document which suggests that his managers thought that he had probably bedded I am quoting a woman and they had warned him off there is also evidence
03:10:46 warned him off there is also evidence that another woman was referred to by some activists as quote Barry's girlfriend hn 106 states that he had a close friendship with the second woman but
03:10:59 friendship with the second woman but denies having sex with either of them hn 106 is unable to give evidence because he is both abroad and in ill health hn155 who use the cover name Phil Cooper denies in his witness statement having
03:11:12 denies in his witness statement having any sexual encounters or relationships whilst in his undercover identity however the risk assessors understood him to have admitted to having quote a number of Liaisons
03:11:27 number of Liaisons hn155 denies making the submission that dispute effect will need to be decided I should make clear that we are seeking to establish the facts on the question of sexual contact we are not drawing
03:11:41 of sexual contact we are not drawing bright lines between one-night stands and lengthy relationships such that we are investigating one but
03:11:52 such that we are investigating one but not the other nor are we investigating only sexual contact with activists we ask former undercover officers whether they engaged in any sexual
03:12:03 whether they engaged in any sexual activity in their cover identities as will be apparent from the case as to which I have just referred we have elicited evidence of a wide variety of intimate relationships and sexual contact
03:12:16 contact however the chairman necessarily has to make sex sensitive judgments on a case-by-case basis about how far we should pursue investigations the terms
03:12:31 should pursue investigations the terms of reference do not require exhaustive investigation of every instance of sexual contact even in those instances which the inquiry would wish to investigate
03:12:42 inquiry would wish to investigate further we sometimes cannot do so we are not always able to trace Witnesses some civilian Witnesses whom we do contact may not reply to the inquiry
03:12:57 contact may not reply to the inquiry whether and if so the extent to which deceived women participate in the inquiry is entirely voluntary the need to protect a former undercover police officer from harm May in some
03:13:10 police officer from harm May in some cases such as hn 302s outweigh the need to trace and contact a deceived woman we have found no evidence of any written instruction for SDS officers relating to sexual activity in their undercover
03:13:23 sexual activity in their undercover identities during the phase two era nothing to state that they must not engage in sexual activity in their undercover identities with members of the public
03:13:34 the public nothing to state that they should there will be some evidence that SDS officers were advised against it orally there is also evidence such as the
03:13:45 there is also evidence such as the reference to hn 106 being warned off which suggests at least some management opposition to sexual relationships however we will
03:13:57 to sexual relationships however we will also be hearing evidence that there was comment and joking amongst SDS undercover officers about sexual
03:14:08 undercover officers about sexual relationships that it is stated would have been made in the presence of managers
03:14:09 managers moreover the officer to whom hn 300 spoke about falling in love with a woman
03:14:22 spoke about falling in love with a woman who became his third wife states that he agreed to act as a conduit between hn 300 and his managers in phase one five of the SDS officers
03:14:33 in phase one five of the SDS officers who served in the earliest years of the SDS were female in phase two all of the officers and their managers are male we will be exploring whether the
03:14:45 we will be exploring whether the complete absence of female officers from the SDS after 1973 until 1983 when hn
03:15:00 the SDS after 1973 until 1983 when hn 3398 joined the SDS affected the culture within the SDS in particular we will be examining whether it affected the attitude within the unit to mail officers in their undercover identities having sexual contact with women who did not know who the men really were
03:15:17 the overwhelming majority of SDS undercover officers were married or in a relationship when they joined the SDS of those who have made witness statements
03:15:28 those who have made witness statements 12 were married two others had Partners only one states that he was single the reasons for this phenomenon will need to be examined there is clear evidence of
03:15:43 be examined there is clear evidence of marital state has been noted at the time of recruitment we see this in the case of two officers who went on to have sexual relationships with women in their undercover identities
03:15:55 undercover identities if marital status was thought to be a deterrent to the formation of sexual Relationships by ucos in their undercover identities it did not always prove to be so could we look please at nps-0724152
03:16:25 could return to page three please and I'm going to read paragraphs two and three
03:16:30 three detective Constable hn 300 has been seen and has indicated his willingness to join the squad he joined the force in 1969 and the branch in 1973 a married
03:16:42 1969 and the branch in 1973 a married man age 30 he lives with his wife and child in redacted he has passed the promotion examination and has served in roles including in sea squad surveillance section
03:16:55 surveillance section detective Constable Richard Clark has also been approached with a view to joining the SDS and is willing to do so he joined the force age 29 with redacted children and lives that redacted D.C
03:17:07 children and lives that redacted D.C Clark has attended the junior CID course and has passed the promotion Examination for the last six months he has worked on e-squad brackets black power close
03:17:22 e-squad brackets black power close brackets could that be taken down though please
03:17:28 in our quest to get to the truth there will plainly be a great deal to explore in oral evidence on the issue of sexual relationships I must not preempt that
03:17:40 relationships I must not preempt that evidence or the findings of fact that you will make sir but it can safely be said that from the mid-1970s onwards sexual contact between SDS officers in their undercover
03:17:55 SDS officers in their undercover identities and members of the public was not uncommon
03:18:02 analysis of undercover office's witness statements the requests for witness statements at the inquiry issues to former SDS undercover officers pursuant to rule nine of the inquiry rules 2006
03:18:18 to rule nine of the inquiry rules 2006 are organized under common headings this facilitates a gathering and Analysis of evidence across themes we have obtained witness statements from 15 undercover officers in phase two who are not fully Anonymous all will be uploaded onto the inquiries website
03:18:33 uploaded onto the inquiries website during the course of the hearings for followers of the inquiry to read we have analyzed them and make the following observations about General themes and Broad patterns in the evidence
03:18:43 evidence all of the undercover offices were recruited from within special Branch all but one hn 200 held the rank of
03:18:54 but one hn 200 held the rank of detective Constable when recruited into the SDS four more were promoted to detective Sergeant during their service with the SDS all who gave specific
03:19:06 with the SDS all who gave specific answers served in B Irish or C extreme left squads of special Branch at some point in their special Branch service that is to say branches likely to have had a particular interest in SDS intelligence
03:19:18 intelligence to state that they had done undercover work prior to joining the SDS over and above the usual special Branch activity
03:19:29 above the usual special Branch activity of attending activist meetings in plain clothes
03:19:31 clothes hn299342 and hn155 recruits were mostly approached by current or former members of the SDS a minority asked to join there is no
03:19:44 minority asked to join there is no evidence that the role of SDS undercover officer was advertised or that there was any formal Recruitment and selection process Beyond an interview
03:19:57 process Beyond an interview the SDS provided no formal training of any kind however the majority recall spending months in the sds's back office
03:20:09 spending months in the sds's back office before deploying those who do not recall doing so are confined to the early part of the phase two period when taken together with the phase one evidence in which we heard that some of the earliest officers had no or only brief stints in the SDS back office we
03:20:25 brief stints in the SDS back office we see a clear Trend emerging the practice of spending some months in the back office before deploying becomes cemented hn 200 and hn126 recall the longest
03:20:39 hn 200 and hn126 recall the longest periods both recall spending six months in the back office a few officers recall being given specific six specific guidance about what to do in
03:20:52 specific guidance about what to do in the event of an arrest most officers did not recall being given any specific advice about involvement in private lives sexual relationships criminal
03:21:03 lives sexual relationships criminal activity or legal professional privilege the majority of officers could not recall being shown home office circular 97 of 1967 entitled informants who take part in crime
03:21:20 part in crime a trend appears to the effect that the later officers commonly recall being told to expect a deployment of approximately four years duration
03:21:32 approximately four years duration starting with hn 304 who joined in 1976 five of the officers have this or a similar recollection all 15 officers Had cover employment sometimes fictional and a cover address non-shared their accommodation with
03:21:43 non-shared their accommodation with activists only hn 96 and hn 106 who shared on accommodation with one another recall sharing with another officer a trend emerges towards the end of the
03:21:57 a trend emerges towards the end of the phase two period to the effect that more officers recall living in their cover identity for a period before approaching their targets hn 304 106 96 and in so
03:22:12 their targets hn 304 106 96 and in so far as he can remember one five five all of the officers who joined from a point in 1971 onwards recall having a car only hn 45 and hn347 do not
03:22:23 hn 45 and hn347 do not on the question of targeting the majority right in their statements of being steered by senior SDS managers or
03:22:34 being steered by senior SDS managers or collaborating with them in the making of decisions to hn298 and
03:22:39 hn298 and hn299342 refer to it being their decision and right respectively of self-tasking and being left to his own
03:22:51 self-tasking and being left to his own devices both of these officers reported on and appear to have mixed with a significant number of different groups there is a broad Trend over time which as earlier officers recalling weekly
03:23:02 as earlier officers recalling weekly meetings in the SDS Safe House hn 45 347-298 then Thrice weekly meetings for
03:23:14 347-298 then Thrice weekly meetings for a period and then Recollections of twice weekly meetings unless the officer is too busy appears to have been a position only hn298 recalls being arrested and
03:23:26 only hn298 recalls being arrested and being advised with others by a solicitor most officers state that they did not offend in their undercover identities those who did so refer to minor offenses fly posting graffiti and obstruction
03:23:41 fly posting graffiti and obstruction most of the officers state that they at least witnessed some violence during their deployments only one office of states that he joined a trade Union
03:23:58 states that he joined a trade Union hn299342 who state city joined the tgwu former SDS ucos in the phase II era typically believe that their work contributed to the effective and efficient policing of public order most also refer to their work assisting the security service
03:24:13 security service only one officer hn 106 states that he had Direct contact with the security service during his deployment many of the officers assumed positions of responsibility
03:24:27 of responsibility hn298 became the membership Secretary of the Putney branch of the young liberals hn353 became the vice president of the Student Union which was not his Target an hn 106 formed a new group with two
03:24:39 an hn 106 formed a new group with two others however by far the most common examples of the Assumption of responsibilities occurs in deployments into the international socialists or swp
03:24:53 into the international socialists or swp as it became positions such as Treasurer paper sales organizer or member of a committee with responsibility for a particular activity such as the right to work campaign are typical non-state city became a Branch Secretary and there is some evidence that this
03:25:07 and there is some evidence that this post was actively avoided the Assumption of positions of responsibility occurs mostly at Branch level but sometimes at higher levels Richard Clark hn297 was particularly active in the
03:25:24 hn297 was particularly active in the troops out movement he did not avoid the role as secretary and worked his way up from Branch Secretary having been involved in the setting up of the branch to London organizer and then National organizer
03:25:33 organizer on the question of subversion many officers describe their targets as
03:25:46 officers describe their targets as having subversive aims but not the means with which to realize those aims some targeted groups that were in no way subversive
03:25:57 subversive Recollections at senior police officers visited the SDS are common many recall visits by the commissioner of the day there was no formal welfare support provided by the SDS for its officers however many officers described their managers as having been supportive
03:26:10 managers as having been supportive there is no formal post-deployment support
03:26:12 support most officers recall that overtime payments increase their income in some cases dramatically non-states that he used his SDS
03:26:24 non-states that he used his SDS undercover legend in the private sector after having left the SDS
03:26:31 future hearings turning to the Future conduct of the inquiry after the phase two hearings the outstanding elements of tranche 1 of our investigation will include
03:26:42 investigation will include first closed hearings at which some of the fully Anonymous Phase 2 former SDS ucos will give oral evidence
03:26:56 ucos will give oral evidence second the tranche 1 phase 3 open hearings these are being held principally so that the inquiry can receive evidence from former SDS managers and administrators in particular those whose postings to
03:27:18 in particular those whose postings to the SDS fell holy within the transform era the managers will be preceded by further evidence from a new core participant Lindsay German it had been Our intention to hold the phase three hearings in October 2021 but in order to permit time to obtain
03:27:32 in order to permit time to obtain evidence from Lindsey German it will need to be put back a further advantage of putting the date back is that it should enable a less pressured Preparatory phase than has been the case in phases one and two
03:27:48 been the case in phases one and two we anticipate being able to set a new date for phase three by July third closed hearings at which former SDS managers can give oral evidence the purpose of any such hearings will be to
03:28:02 purpose of any such hearings will be to hear evidence that cannot be given at a public hearing the inquiry will be taking steps to obtain witness statements for tranche six Witnesses from the tranche Run era in other words from senior police
03:28:19 in other words from senior police officers in the chain of command above the SDS itself and relevant Witnesses from other parts of Her Majesty's government to ascertain their state of awareness of the sds's undercover operations
03:28:34 operations I explained in November that the work of the inquiry has been seriously affected by the global pandemic that was before the second wave serious disruption has continued to
03:28:46 serious disruption has continued to affect the inquiry and those upon whom we rely to advance our work the impact on our timetable is now more serious than we anticipated last November
03:28:56 November we no longer expect that the trans-2 hearings will be ready for hearing in 2022
03:29:07 2022 detailed re-planning work for trans2 and later tranches is currently ongoing I would like to end by thanking everyone involved in the preparations for the present hearings
03:29:19 present hearings publicly investigating the actions of undercover police officers involved in the private lives of members of the public is no easy task
03:29:31 public is no easy task we are very conscious that we have in the course of our work had to ask many people to work to tight deadlines
03:29:42 people to work to tight deadlines we are grateful for their considerable efforts
03:29:45 efforts thank you Mr Barr um I there is no criticism for me whatever if you're overrunning you've taken in the shortest period of time and the reason it could have been taken to explain the
03:30:01 activity that the inquiry has undertaken its product in general terms and what we are about to undertake in the next three weeks
03:30:19 weeks because we were run we will resume at 20 past two not two talk as anticipated so the time scales will be put back thank you
03:30:29 we will now take an hour's break for lunch
03:30:30 lunch proceedings will resume at 2 20 pm