Counsel to the Inquiry delivers closing statement for Tranche 1, summarizing evidence about the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) from 1968 to early 1980s. The statement addresses formation of the SDS, its operations, targeting decisions, use of deceased children's identities, sexual relationships with activists, institutional sexism, and questions whether public order/counter-subversion justifications warranted the intrusion into people's lives.
00:10:48 foreign
00:11:09 thank you sir inquiring publicly into the actions of an undercover police unit which was gathering intelligence about political activists half a century ago is no easy task however we have now reached the
00:11:28 task however we have now reached the point at which we have obtained prepared for publication and reduced evidence about the formation of the special demonstration Squad the SDS and its operation from 1968 until the early 1980s
00:11:40 1980s we have investigated 56 undercover offices ucos all of whom joined the SDS at some point between 1968 and 1979.
00:11:58 at some point between 1968 and 1979. we obtained witness statements from 36 of these officers 16 former undercover officers and two risk assessors gave oral evidence in
00:12:10 risk assessors gave oral evidence in open hearings and a further five gave closed oral evidence 21 civilian Witnesses provided witness statements and 12 of them gave oral evidence
00:12:26 evidence we have also investigated the management of the SDS obtaining witness statements from 13 former managers or administrators who served within the SDS and calling seven of them to give oral evidence
00:12:38 evidence witness statements from six former
00:12:49 witness statements from six former police officers who were involved either in the sds's higher chain of command or as disseminators or consumers of SDS intelligence have been put into evidence as have four witness statements from
00:13:05 as have four witness statements from former home office officials all of whom discharged functions with some connection to the SDS the evidence of witnesses is valuable and on some issues invaluable
00:13:20 and on some issues invaluable however at this removing time there can be no doubting the utility of contemporary written records the discovery of very extensive surviving records from the tranche one era enables a much more effective
00:13:33 era enables a much more effective forensic exercise than would have been possible had we had to rely upon human memories alone
00:13:49 I do not propose either to rehearse or to analyze in detail the evidence that we have received we have already produced detailed openings for each of the hearings in
00:14:02 openings for each of the hearings in tranche 1 as well as submissions on the law which would serve no purpose to repeat
00:14:03 repeat rather I shall summarize the broad conclusions which it appears to us can be drawn from the evidence on issues in which core participants
00:14:23 on issues in which core participants have a particular interest they or their Council will make more detailed submissions I shall in places seek to identify emerging themes and Trends although I am conscious sir that for the purposes of
00:14:35 conscious sir that for the purposes of your interim report you may decide that some such issues are best left until you have heard all the evidence
00:14:48 have heard all the evidence as in previous submissions I shall also use SDS throughout to refer to the undercover unit which at least in its early years was referred to formally and informally by a variety of other names
00:15:07 Metropolitan Police Special Branch was already Gathering intelligence about groups and individuals on the far left of the political Spectrum amongst others before the special demonstration Squad
00:15:19 before the special demonstration Squad was established it conduct it collected such intelligence from numerous sources
00:15:33 such intelligence from numerous sources a common source with plain closed police officers who attended and reported on meetings held by activists such officers could attend public
00:15:45 such officers could attend public meetings but were not always successful in their attempts to attend private meetings
00:15:52 meetings they either did not deceive others as to their Identity or did so briefly using only temporary and superficial cover intelligence was recorded in the same format and on the same forms as were first used by the SDS
00:16:05 first used by the SDS special Branch used these sources to build up a detailed picture not only of the groups but also their members and sympathizers especially leading members
00:16:23 sympathizers especially leading members in 1967 and particularly 1968 there was an increase in violent political demonstrations both in London and across Europe especially prominent to a massive
00:16:35 Europe especially prominent to a massive demonstrations against the Vietnam War a cause which United not only far left groups but also large sections of the public
00:16:42 public the shocking violence and narrow margin by which protesters were prevented from breaking through to the American Embassy on the 17th of March
00:16:54 on the 17th of March 1968 prompted great concern within the government and the Metropolitan Police Service both were determined to avoid a repeat of the violence
00:17:06 repeat of the violence the SDS was born of this concern and formed on either the 30th or the 31st of July 1968.
00:17:25 July 1968. its principal purpose at this stage was to obtain and coordinate intelligence relating to the forthcoming October demonstration initially the SDS gathered intelligence using a wide range of methods of which undercover policing was but one
00:17:36 undercover policing was but one very quickly however the SDS became a purely undercover police unit it was and remained a part of special branch
00:17:48 remained a part of special branch the first recruits to the SDS were allocated to the unit by management and instructed to attend an initial meeting
00:18:00 instructed to attend an initial meeting thereafter recruitment was typically by way of a targeted approach to an existing special Branch officer whom it with thought might make a good undercover officer in its very early years the SDS was
00:18:13 in its very early years the SDS was predominantly but not exclusively male three female officers served in the unit in 1968 and two more were recruited as ucos in 1970 and 1971 respectively
00:18:28 ucos in 1970 and 1971 respectively after their deployments ended in 1973 SDS ucos were all male throughout the remainder of the tranche one era
00:18:49 remainder of the tranche one era in the period between its formation and the October demonstration most of the groups infiltrated by the SDS were involved in preparations for that demonstration or were supportive of it The Depths to which the groups were
00:19:01 The Depths to which the groups were infiltrated and the level of intrusion into the lives of individuals in 1968 was notably less than it was in later years
00:19:12 years in some cases there was not a great deal of difference between the traditional approach adopted by plain clothed police officers and that of a very early SDS undercover officer
00:19:24 undercover officer they concentrated on attending meetings did not spend a great deal of time with their groups outside meetings and slept in their real homes what was different
00:19:36 in their real homes what was different was a continuous use of a cover identity and a change of appearance which enabled the officers to appear to be genuine activists
00:19:52 activists the result was greater access to private meetings and social events at which activists spoke more freely SDS undercover offices sometimes ended entered the homes of activists and others in their undercover identities
00:20:08 others in their undercover identities this happened occasionally in the very early days of the SDS but more frequently later there is no evidence that the legality of doing so was given any consideration
00:20:27 the intelligence gathered by the SDS formed the basis of a series of reports produced by Chief Inspector Dixon and detective Constable Roy creamer their reports which are in Chief Inspector Dixon's name were fed up the chain of
00:20:43 Dixon's name were fed up the chain of command they must have helped to inform the home office in the result the main body of demonstrators marched without serious disorder on the 27th of October
00:20:56 disorder on the 27th of October the only serious trouble was occasioned by Breakaway maoist and Anarchist demonstrators in Grosvenor Square there is no doubt that in official circles the SBS was credited with
00:21:11 circles the SBS was credited with contributing to the successful outcome there was even mention of undercover officers in the press the times lauded the home secretary's handling of the demonstration and attributed his success
00:21:25 demonstration and attributed his success to intelligence received from the police special Branch received a letter of thanks from the American ambassador
00:21:37 first thing the actual contribution of undercover policing to the outcome on the 27th of October 1968 is more difficult the Vietnam solidarity campaign's
00:21:51 the Vietnam solidarity campaign's leadership promoted a peaceful outcome the Breakaway group's intentions were well known special Branch had sources other than the sds's undercover police officers however it might be said that the undercover officers reports were timely
00:22:04 undercover officers reports were timely authoritative and consequently provided further Assurance to those planning the
00:22:15 further Assurance to those planning the police response they helped to avoid an overreaction
00:22:24 the perceived success of the SDS combined with continuing concerns about forthcoming Mass demonstrations rapidly led to a decision to maintain the unit
00:22:36 the unit Chief Inspector Dixon set out his vision for the unit's continued existence in a paper entitled penetration of extremist groups
00:22:48 groups of note are the respects in which his vision was not followed in practice his advice the deployments should last no more than a year
00:23:01 no more than a year and that undercover police officers must not take office within a group chair meetings or draft leaflets was ignored
00:23:14 meetings or draft leaflets was ignored the home office played a pivotal role in the continued existence of the SDS
00:23:25 the continued existence of the SDS it funded cover accommodation for the SDS which required periodic approval from the financial year
00:23:32 1972-73 onwards approval was granted for each Financial year in response to a letter from a very senior officer commissioner crime
00:23:48 senior officer commissioner crime from the outset there was unease within the home office about the SDS it feared embarrassing Revelations
00:24:01 it feared embarrassing Revelations ostensibly the fact that the home office was funding the unit unorthodox accommodation contemporary documents emanating from the home office
00:24:18 the home office repeatedly impressed upon senior police officers the need to ensure that the sds's ongoing existence remained a secret
00:24:20 secret however
00:24:26 however it was not until 1984 that anyone in the home office asked for more details and was then permitted to see a copy of an SDS annual report one might infer from these facts that
00:24:43 one might infer from these facts that the home office was more concerned about the SDS remaining a secret than it was about precisely what the SDS was doing
00:24:58 about precisely what the SDS was doing although the home office can rightly say that operational decisions are properly matters for the police it is nevertheless striking that the home office was so uninquisitive about such sensitive operations
00:25:15 sensitive operations for example sir Hayden Phillips stated that I quote all I recall was that my predecessor and immediate Superior had taken the view
00:25:31 immediate Superior had taken the view that our role was to support the mpsb and I authorized continued funding accordingly that is a long way from the caution originally advocated by Sir James Waddell in 1968 who asked the MPS to
00:25:47 Waddell in 1968 who asked the MPS to keep the reasons for the sds's Existence under review and did not think that the SDS should become a permanent feature of the branch
00:26:08 home office officials might have taken comfort from senior police officers who enthusiastically supported the SDS and referred to the unit in glowing terms whenever they sought continued funding from the home office
00:26:20 from the home office the evidence shows that senior officers visited the SDS periodically and
00:26:31 visited the SDS periodically and received reports from the unit to inform successive bids for funding from the home office these reports spelled out in some detail what the SDS had been doing and to what effect
00:26:42 effect they trumpeted the work of the SDS we noted in the evidence on occasions a disconnect between the evidence of undercover officers
00:26:54 undercover officers and the terms in which managers represented their deployments in the annual reports
00:27:10 further anti-vietnam War demonstrations did not materialize on the same scale after October 1968. however
00:27:19 however 1969 brought the unwelcome resumption of serious violence in Northern Ireland there was also militant anti-apartheid
00:27:33 there was also militant anti-apartheid protest which included the use of direct action by the stop the 70 tour campaign in 1970.
00:27:36 in 1970. it fueled concerns that anti-apartheid was an issue that was likely to continue to generate large-scale protests
00:27:47 to generate large-scale protests these two developments together with other disturbances were more than enough to persuade the home office and Senior
00:27:59 to persuade the home office and Senior police officers of the continuing need for the SDS it was all also argued that the time taken for an undercover police officer
00:28:14 taken for an undercover police officer to win the trust of some groups was such that infiltration had to be conducted proactively rather than reactively in these circumstances the SDS morphed after the October demonstration into
00:28:29 after the October demonstration into something quite different from what it had originally been the unit had been created to deal with a specific
00:28:36 specific large-scale threat to public order it had conducted numerous short-term relatively shallow infiltrations broadly
00:28:50 relatively shallow infiltrations broadly directed to Gathering intelligence about that forthcoming demonstration officers had been given no specific training and in some cases no time to create a cover identity either
00:29:06 create a cover identity either early undercover officers deployed very rapidly when they joined the SDS after the October demonstration the SDS
00:29:22 after the October demonstration the SDS quickly became an undercover police unit which conducted long-term infiltrations of groups on the far left of the political Spectrum it continued to operate without providing its undercover police officers with any bespoke formal training
00:29:33 with any bespoke formal training however there was a trend towards officers spending longer and longer in the back office before deploying
00:29:44 the back office before deploying time that was spent learning informally becoming accustomed to the ways of the SDS and building an undercover identity
00:29:55 the size and management structure of the SDS varied only a little after the October demonstration it was normally
00:30:06 October demonstration it was normally led by a detective Chief Inspector he was supported by at least one and sometimes as many as three detective inspectors
00:30:20 inspectors there was also always at least one and sometimes as many as three Sergeants typically one Sergeant dealt with reporting whilst another was responsible for other administrative matters
00:30:31 for other administrative matters but the unit was so small that those of managerial rank sometimes discharged other tasks and covered for colleagues the number of undercover officers varied a little but was typically 12.
00:30:47 a little but was typically 12. a pattern begins to emerge even during the tranche one era of former SDS undercover police officers returning to the unit to take up managerial posts early undercover offices
00:31:05 early undercover offices hn135 Mike Ferguson and hn218 Barry Moss who used the cover name Barry Morris each went on to lead the SDS before the end of tranche 1.
00:31:21 end of tranche 1. we will be investigating the impact that former undercover officers who returned as managers had on the culture and practices within the unit as we progress through tranches 2 and 3.
00:31:39 through tranches 2 and 3. there was no formal recruitment or selection process for undercover officers
00:31:40 officers special Branch offices were usually approached and interviewed some recruits describe having asked to join and then being considered
00:31:51 being considered new undercover officers were mostly detective constables although some were detective Sergeants
00:32:02 detective Sergeants it became the norm after the first few years for the SDS to recruit officers who were either married or in long-term intimate relationships
00:32:20 intimate relationships almost all Witnesses gave answers to the effect that a reason for this practice was to help anchor the officer to reality
00:32:21 reality many also either stated or alluded to the fact that there was a belief that it would serve to discourage undercover officers from forming Intimate
00:32:36 officers from forming Intimate Relationships whilst in their undercover identities we regard this as important early recognition that there was a risk of such relationships
00:32:50 such relationships a practice also developed by which managers would visit prospective undercover officers often in their own
00:33:03 undercover officers often in their own homes to meet their Partners it probably started in 1978 when hn 96 cover name Michael James was recruited managers sought to assure themselves that the officer would have a supportive home
00:33:16 officer would have a supportive home environment and to give assurances to the officers partner SDS managers like their undercover colleagues received no bespoke training when they joined the SDS
00:33:29 when they joined the SDS it is tempting to attribute problems which occurred to the lack of bespoke training for all concerned
00:33:40 training for all concerned or a lack of regulatory oversight for that matter but I refrain from doing so at this stage
00:33:46 stage these are issues which need to be investigated in future tranches before conclusions can be reached safely after consideration of all the evidence
00:34:02 consideration of all the evidence we are keenly aware that in transform we will be receiving evidence about a unit whose members had specific training and operated under the statutory framework imposed by the regulation of
00:34:13 imposed by the regulation of investigatory Powers Act 2000. despite these developments we know that
00:34:28 despite these developments we know that deeply problematic activities continued explanations other than training and regulation need to be considered for example where their deep-seated
00:34:42 for example where their deep-seated cultural problems which proved to be impervious to both training and statutory regulation
00:34:49 Legend building by new undercover officers was initially rudimentary the very earliest undercover officers deployed immediately for example
00:35:04 for example hn329 cover name John Graham stated that he deployed quote straight away Never Had cover employment but did rent a bed set
00:35:20 a bed set cover accommodation cover employment and changes to dress and appearance rapidly became the norm Vehicles followed with driving licenses in the office's cover identity being normal in phase two however in other
00:35:35 normal in phase two however in other respects undercover identities remained superficial cover accommodation was typically a bed set
00:35:53 set only two transuan officers shared cover accommodation hn 106 cover named Barry Tompkins and hn 96 Cabernet Michael James
00:35:54 James SDS offices appear to have been given considerable latitude when constructing their undercover identities such that
00:36:06 such that hn298 cover name Michael Scott took the extraordinary step of adopting the name of a living adult
00:36:22 of a living adult it is of particular concern that hn298 later went on to be convicted in that name
00:36:29 name despite persistent efforts we have not been able to trace the record of this conviction a marked change occurred in the early to mid 70s
00:36:35 mid 70s the practice of basing cover identities on at least some of the particulars of a deceased child was introduced no written instructions about how to
00:36:52 no written instructions about how to find and use a deceased child's Identity or part thereof when constructing a cover Legend have survived from this time if they ever existed
00:37:05 time if they ever existed however the practice was certainly introduced
00:37:17 introduced almost all the subsequent SDS undercover officers in the tranche one era adopted at least a part of the name of a deceased child Some Gave evidence that they conducted research in the location where the child in question had lived for example hn 304 cover name Graham
00:37:35 for example hn 304 cover name Graham Coates made a detour to the location of his own volition hn 96 cover name Michael James stated that he had been instructed to visit Blackpool and was assisted by the local
00:37:53 Blackpool and was assisted by the local special Branch to establish that Michael James's family no longer lived at their former address however in most cases the evidence is that officers did no more than conduct research using the registers of birth
00:38:11 research using the registers of birth and deaths before selecting a deceased child for legend building purposes there appears to be have been no consistent practice as to the age at death of the child who should be selected
00:38:21 selected one school of thought was that a child who had died very young would leave much less evidence of their real life for
00:38:37 less evidence of their real life for anyone investigating the officer to find the opposing school of thought was that death certificates of an older child would be much more time consuming to find few researchers would be inclined
00:38:49 find few researchers would be inclined to stick at the task for long enough to uncover the deception
00:38:55 at the heart of the rationale for adopting the name of a real individual was that it afforded protection at the material time from anyone who might
00:39:06 material time from anyone who might decide to check whether the undercover officer had a real birth certificate the register of births in those days was kept in hard copy and entries were made in order in books
00:39:18 in order in books a person who did not adopt the identity of a deceased individual was vulnerable to a straightforward check of the register which would give rise to a
00:39:33 register which would give rise to a strong suspicion that they were not who they said they were pulse entries could not be inserted into the records because they were compiled in order in hard copy
00:39:48 in order in hard copy even on a utilitarian analysis there were strict limits to the level of additional protection that adopting a deceased child's identity would afford from hostile inquiry
00:39:59 from hostile inquiry anyone persistent enough to search through the register of deaths might eventually find the child's death certificate
00:40:12 certificate this is precisely the Fate which befell hn297 Richard Clark cover name Rick Gibson one of the earliest officers to use a deceased child's name
00:40:28 at a moral level adopting the name of a deceased child is deeply problematic deceased children leave bereaved parents siblings and other loved ones
00:40:39 siblings and other loved ones typically former members of the SDS appear to have taken the view that this did not matter because they believed that relatives would never find out
00:40:52 that relatives would never find out it is unclear precisely why the SDS adopted the practice of using aspects of deceased children's identities in the construction of cover Legends
00:41:04 construction of cover Legends there have there had been no previous compromise of an SDS officer because he did not have a verifiable birth certificate
00:41:18 certificate it is known that others including the KGB used the technique it had also received wide publicity because of the use because of its use in The Day of the Jackal we have not been
00:41:31 The Day of the Jackal we have not been able to establish who initially decided upon or authorized the sds's use of the practice
00:41:48 we have received a variety of accounts about how decisions about targeting were made and by whom they are not all reconcilable and there does not appear to have been a single rigid approach
00:42:02 rigid approach individual ucos recalled varying experiences some were tasked at the outset of their deployments quite specifically
00:42:16 deployments quite specifically others were given much vager briefs based upon feels of activism or Geographic areas most describe a process of discussion with and steering from their SDS managers
00:42:30 managers two state that they were essentially left to their own devices hn298 cover named Michael Scott and hn299342 cover name David Hughes
00:42:43 hn299342 cover name David Hughes both these officers mixed with a significant number of different groups
00:42:54 significant number of different groups the security service communicated either to special Branch offices or direct to SDS managers those groups that it had an interest in
00:43:06 interest in gaps in coverage that it wished to see filled and on occasions some very specific intelligence requirements for example the security service on occasion made very specific requests for
00:43:22 occasion made very specific requests for intelligence about the Socialist Workers Party the swp the security service did not decide how SDS ucos were deployed but its
00:43:36 SDS ucos were deployed but its requirements as a major consumer of SDS intelligence were clearly influential it was for example very interested in the workers revolutionary party a party
00:43:49 the workers revolutionary party a party that was infiltrated by the SDS despite it posing no public order threat and pursuing its revolutionary aims Through The Ballot Box
00:44:01 The Ballot Box ultimately responsibility for targeting remained with the police the ucos investigated in tranche 1 infiltrated groups on the extreme left wing or which were suspected of being
00:44:18 wing or which were suspected of being influenced by the extreme left wing the most frequent targets were trotsky's groups particularly the international socialists who became the swp in 1977
00:44:31 socialists who became the swp in 1977 the international Marxist group and the workers revolutionary party maoist groups were also targeted as were anarchists
00:44:42 anarchists anti-apartheid groups groups campaigning about Ireland and groups campaigning for race or sex equality
00:44:49 equality the evidence suggests that the groups infiltrated by the SDS were the kinds of groups that were of interest to special branch and which special Branch would
00:45:03 branch and which special Branch would have gathered intelligence about with or without the SDS more notable are those groups which were of interest to special branch and or the security service but were not infiltrated by the SDS
00:45:15 infiltrated by the SDS in particular the Communist Party of Great Britain and the extreme right wing in both cases it appears that the most likely reason is that there were
00:45:30 likely reason is that there were alternative sources of intelligence available
00:45:35 available in the case of the far right there might also have been some reticence about the risks involved although SDS managers did go so far as to make clear that the unit
00:45:54 go so far as to make clear that the unit could if needed infiltrate the far right moreover the SDS did in fact go on to infiltrate the far right later the groups infiltrated by the SDS were also in the main the kind of groups
00:46:06 also in the main the kind of groups which featured in reports produced for the various counter subversion committees evidence of whose activities is contained in the documents adduced in our module 2C investigation
00:46:22 our module 2C investigation the SDS was also reporting on public order issues that were of specific interest to the home office and the cabinet office
00:46:38 cabinet office for example the October demonstration at the start of the tranche 1 era and the aftermath of the Brixton riots at the end of that period were both of particular interest to these departments in other words the work of the SDS went with the grain of concerns that were
00:46:51 with the grain of concerns that were being discussed at the top of government there are though limits to the extent to which the work of the SDS correlated with concerns within government
00:47:03 with concerns within government as I have already observed the SDS did not Target the Communist Party of Great Britain the cpgb and the intelligence which it provided in relation to
00:47:19 which it provided in relation to subversion within industry was limited this despite both the cpgb and Industrial unrest being of real interest to the government of the tranche one era
00:47:37 a striking feature of SDS intelligence reports is a sheer breadth of intelligence gathered information about individuals and groups was hoovered up for later analysis
00:47:50 was hoovered up for later analysis without a great deal of filtering by the SDS
00:47:57 SDS some officers stated that they knew what to report based on previous experience with special branch many officers took the view that it was for others to decide what was relevant
00:48:09 for others to decide what was relevant and what was not because they the ucos did not have the full picture consequently they cast their Nets wide they were not told to do otherwise
00:48:22 they were not told to do otherwise they saw precedence whilst working in the back office before deploying their reports were signed off by managers
00:48:31 managers and their product was gratefully received by customers
00:48:38 in relation to individuals more attention was paid to leaders and committed activists than to others however reporting was by no means limited to such people
00:48:49 limited to such people individual attendees at meetings are often listed in reports where they could be identified
00:49:00 be identified supporters and sympathizers of groups are sometimes mentioned as well as members in some instances people are identified in reports for no more than expressing interest in a group
00:49:15 expressing interest in a group a wide range of information was recorded about individuals where it could be obtained for example names addresses employment particulars physical
00:49:26 employment particulars physical appearance race sexual orientation Intimate Relationships marital status children health issues
00:49:44 children health issues finances and vehicle particulars as well as political beliefs and political activities the extent to which officers became involved in the lives of the activists upon whom they were reporting is
00:49:55 upon whom they were reporting is striking there are instances of ucos attending weddings and of babysitting children
00:50:09 children reporting relating to Children was not always ancillary to the activities of their parents the political activities of teenagers were sometimes recorded independently the security service had an interest in
00:50:30 the security service had an interest in the efforts made by political groups on the extremes of the political Spectrum to influence school-aged children and the activities of the youth wings of political parties which it considered to be subversive the SDS serviced these intelligence requirements where it could do so
00:50:44 requirements where it could do so there were also fears that politicized teenagers posed a public disorder threat as with other facets of the sds's work
00:51:02 as with other facets of the sds's work what it did in recording details about children was not out of kilter with wider special branch operations for example a registry file was opened on the core participant we refer to as
00:51:20 on the core participant we refer to as Madeline in 1970 when she was 16 years old
00:51:26 old the tone of SDS intelligence reports is on many occasions sarcastic or otherwise unprofessional
00:51:39 or otherwise unprofessional the attitudes betrayed by the language used in reports are significant there is sexism there is racism there are many examples
00:51:52 there is racism there are many examples such reporting was known to managers and accepted because they signed off the reports
00:51:53 reports there appears to have been no anti-discrimination training for either
00:52:06 anti-discrimination training for either officers or managers despite the coming into force during this era of the sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the race relations act 1976. sir you will need to consider whether
00:52:22 sir you will need to consider whether racism and or sexism influence targeting and in the case of Justice campaigns whether it influenced the deployment that will involve considering not only the evidence of attitudes contained in
00:52:40 the evidence of attitudes contained in the reporting but in other written and oral evidence that you have heard the same applies to the sexual activities of undercover police officers with members of the public in their cover identities
00:52:56 cover identities this may be an issue that you choose to wait to deal with in your final report once we have the benefit of the full evidential picture for both the SDS and the npoiu
00:53:14 reports often centered upon how disorganized divided and ineffective groups were such observations serve to cast further
00:53:26 such observations serve to cast further doubt upon whether the people and groups reported on really were a sufficient threat either to public order or to parliamentary democracy as to justify deploying undercover police officers into their midst
00:53:38 into their midst reporting on groups sought to build up as full a picture as possible of a given group's activities everything from a group's Constitution
00:53:59 everything from a group's Constitution policies literature membership details financial affairs leadership factions interpersonal Dynamics aims conferences social events meetings demonstrations and other political activities were reported upon
00:54:23 activities were reported upon very long and detailed reports on the proceedings and national conferences were common and often Drew praise we do not suggest that detailed professional reporting on a group or an individual by an undercover police officer
00:54:33 officer is in principle wrong but the threat posed by the group or
00:54:45 but the threat posed by the group or individual must be sufficiently serious to justify such reporting on them it is one thing to infiltrate an organized crime gang and Report relevant intelligence it is quite another to
00:54:58 intelligence it is quite another to infiltrate a law-abiding political party or protest Group which is neither a threat to public order nor threatens the safety or well-being of the state
00:55:09 safety or well-being of the state securing a position as Treasurer or membership secretary within a group was a route often taken by undercover officers
00:55:20 officers it's afforded access to accurate and comprehensive intelligence about the
00:55:32 comprehensive intelligence about the group's financial and membership details this practice was particularly common amongst but not limited to those officers who infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party two ucos
00:55:41 two ucos hn80 cover name Colin Clark an hn155 cover name Phil Cooper secured
00:55:56 hn155 cover name Phil Cooper secured access to the swp central office where they obtained and reported much confidential information
00:56:15 hn297 Richard Clark Rose through the ranks of the troops out movement home becoming a Branch Secretary Regional organizer and then convener of the Secretariat The Taking of offices of this nature was unusual and many officers gave evidence to the effect that roles such as secretary would deliberately avoided
00:56:27 secretary would deliberately avoided because of the risk that the officer would become involved in decisions which would influence the direction of the group
00:56:35 group Mr chesum gave important evidence about the influence which Richard Clark had in Tom and his effects within the group
00:56:50 Tom and his effects within the group there can be no doubt that managers were aware that ucos were taking office within Target groups they signed off the reports which record their election to these officers
00:57:01 these officers having an undercover police officer
00:57:18 having an undercover police officer assume an office within groups such as the swp and Tom is deeply problematic even more so where the role involves participating in decision making on behalf of the group we have not found evidence that elected politicians were specifically targeted elected politicians are sometimes
00:57:40 elected politicians are sometimes mentioned in SDS intelligence reports for example prominent figures on the left of the labor party appear in reports from time to time however the references to them are usually incidental to reporting on Extreme left-wing groups
00:57:51 Extreme left-wing groups typically politicians such as these are referred to in reports because they have spoken at events attended by the uco's Target group
00:58:04 Target group occasionally there was closer contact although it too was incidental to the
00:58:22 although it too was incidental to the targeting of an extreme left-wing group similarly we have not found evidence that trade unions were specific SDS targets or that individual trade unionists were reported upon solely because of their Trade union activities
00:58:42 because of their Trade union activities however trade unions and trade unionists are both mentioned in SDS reporting there was a clear interest in the activities of members of extreme left-wing groups within trade unions especially so when this was thought to be clandestine
00:58:54 be clandestine the influence of extreme left-wing groups within trade unions was reported upon
00:59:01 upon one SDS undercover officer joined Trade union the transport and general Workers Union to enhance his cover
00:59:21 hn299342 cover name David Hughes specific Justice campaigns often feature in SDS reporting this tended to occur when an infiltrated group supported the campaign in question for example the
00:59:34 campaign in question for example the reporting on the Shrewsbury 2 action committee and the new M8 defense campaign was ancillary to deployment into other groups there is also reporting about protests
00:59:51 there is also reporting about protests against the police and the activities of police monitoring groups in the tranche one era
00:59:53 one era as we discussed in our recent opening
01:00:05 as we discussed in our recent opening statement for module 2B and module 2C in the trans1 era there is evidence of a freestanding interest within the Metropolitan Police in gathering intelligence about campaigns which it
01:00:18 intelligence about campaigns which it considered to be anti-police and police monitoring groups the friends of Blair Peach campaign is an example of a Justice campaign
01:00:29 an example of a Justice campaign critical of the police which was the subject of reporting by officers operating within sympathetic groups reporting continued despite evidence
01:00:42 reporting continued despite evidence that the campaign was not causing public disorder
01:00:44 disorder the sensitivity of the case did not prevent SDS attendance at the funeral
01:00:58 prevent SDS attendance at the funeral we have heard moving evidence from Celia Stubbs about the impact which these Revelations have had upon her the women's Liberation Front or wlf was infiltrated by the SDS and existed
01:01:16 infiltrated by the SDS and existed specifically to Champion sexual equality however it was a maoist group and may have been targeted because it was maoist similarly most extreme left groups in
01:01:30 similarly most extreme left groups in the tranche one era campaigned for sex equality and their appear and they appear to have been infiltrated not because they did so but because they were on the extreme left and considered
01:01:45 were on the extreme left and considered to be either a threat to public order or subversive or both nevertheless it is striking that an undercover police officer was deployed into the very small wlf which was
01:02:04 into the very small wlf which was campaigning for things many of which are either required by law or considered entirely normal today particularly so when the wlf itself was not involved in criminality other than fly posting
01:02:16 fly posting pose no threat to parliamentary democracy and was not a threat to public order
01:02:32 order we submit that this deployment which lasted for almost two years is a particularly clear example of unjustified targeting the aims and objectives of the wlf included
01:02:43 included equal rights for women equal pay
01:02:45 equal pay equal opportunities in employment education training social and political life
01:02:52 life to fight against discrimination with regard to marriage divorce inheritance of property Taxation and insurance
01:03:05 of property Taxation and insurance and discrimination against children born in and out of wedlock the right to contraception and abortion facilities
01:03:16 facilities women's involvement in political and social activities and to support the struggle of workers and oppressed people around the world
01:03:28 reporting on campaigning for race equality arose in various ways on occasion the SDS specifically targeted groups which were single issue groups
01:03:45 groups for example the anti-apartheid movement and the stop the 70 tour campaign the anti-apartheid movement is another example of a particularly questionable Target
01:03:55 Target the anti-apartheid movement did not have subversive aims it also cooperated with the authorities when organizing and conducting demonstrations
01:04:11 demonstrations its demonstrations although large do not appear to have been a threat to public order
01:04:13 order more frequently officers reported on race-related activism having infiltrated extreme left-wing groups whose
01:04:24 extreme left-wing groups whose campaigning on Race equality was but a part of the group's activity the Socialist Workers Party is but one of many examples of such groups the deployment of hn 106 cover name
01:04:40 the deployment of hn 106 cover name Barry Tompkins developed a significant focus on race-related campaigning it started with a brief defined groups on the far left
01:04:51 on the far left other than the ones which the SDS already had well covered hn 106 infiltrated a number of groups including the revolent Revolutionary
01:05:05 including the revolent Revolutionary communist group through which in its various manifestations he became involved in the East London workers Against Racism
01:05:16 Against Racism it is a deployment which appears to have some similarities with the later deployment of hn 81 cover name David Hagan who reported on the Stephen
01:05:29 Hagan who reported on the Stephen Lawrence campaign via the movement for justice in the 1990s occasionally officers appear to have been steered mid-deployment to a
01:05:48 been steered mid-deployment to a race-related issue which was of concern in particular the SDS sought to gather intelligence in the aftermath of the Brixton riots hn 356 cover name Bill Biggs moved from Southeast London swp to the newly formed Brixton swp soon after the riots
01:06:11 Brixton swp soon after the riots there was in general little awareness of what legal professional privilege is amongst SDS undercover officers still less was there a recognition of the fundamental importance of Legal
01:06:22 the fundamental importance of Legal Professional privilege to the rule of law
01:06:26 law on occasions SDS undercover police officers became privy to legally privileged material and reported it back it was not filtered out of the formal reports which were produced and filed
01:06:45 reports which were produced and filed consequently we have found instances of privileged material being recorded in SDS intelligence reports we have found no evidence to suggest that legally privileged material was
01:06:58 that legally privileged material was specifically sought out by SDS officers or requested by its customers in the tranche 1 era however procedures should have been in place to prevent the violations of Legal Professional privilege which clearly occurred
01:07:10 occurred similarly there appears to have been little awareness of the importance of protecting independent journalism again protections should have been in
01:07:22 again protections should have been in place to prevent inappropriate reporting
01:07:31 special Branch was the last single largest consumer of SDS intelligence written SDS intelligence reports were
01:07:42 written SDS intelligence reports were usually filed by special Branch as well as being circulated to parts of the organization which it was felt needed to be aware of them
01:07:53 be aware of them once filed they could be retrieved and used for various purposes the most obvious purpose for Which special Branch appears to have used SDS
01:08:07 special Branch appears to have used SDS intelligence was to inform reports which were made to assist the A8 Branch to keep the peace SDS intelligence played a role not just in relation to Major demonstrations but in relation to demonstrations pickets
01:08:22 in relation to demonstrations pickets and other forms of protest of varying size
01:08:24 size the role played by the SDS to assist with keeping the peace was not confined to written reports valuable real-time or near real-time intelligence was also
01:08:43 near real-time intelligence was also telephoned in when it was too urgent to use the normal written channels of communication for example intelligence was telephoned in during the battle of lewisham another purpose for which SDS intelligence reports might have been
01:08:58 intelligence reports might have been relied upon by special Branch was for vetting purposes we cannot rule out that SDS intelligence reports were leaked by special Branch
01:09:13 reports were leaked by special Branch officers to private sector organizations which then used them for blacklisting purposes
01:09:17 purposes the provision of intelligence of this sort to private sector organizations such as the economic League was against regulations however as we have noted in previous
01:09:30 however as we have noted in previous submissions there appears to have been some recognition that special Branch officers were in practice likely to be tempted to do so
01:09:48 tempted to do so information gathered by the SDS may also have been relied upon in special Branch reports provided to government especially the home office it is also likely to have been used by R Squad the research department and other parts of special branch
01:10:03 parts of special branch most SDS intelligence reports were copied to the security service the provision of SDS intelligence to the security service
01:10:16 security service appears to have occurred throughout the tranche one era the security service filed the SDS intelligence which it received the security service appears to have considered SDS intelligence useful it was monitoring most of the groups
01:10:31 it was monitoring most of the groups infiltrated by the SDS and had its own vetting function it appears that SDS intelligence might on occasions have formed part of the body of evidence used by the security
01:10:52 body of evidence used by the security service to compile reports for at least some of the various counter-subversion committees which we considered in tranche 1 module 2C
01:11:05 tranche 1 module 2C there was a considerable overlap between the groups and individuals of interest to the security service and those of interest to special branch the basis for the security services interest was its duty to consider counter subversion whereas special
01:11:16 counter subversion whereas special branches remit was based upon its duty to keep the Queen's peace as it then was and to assist the security service
01:11:30 and to assist the security service witness said stated that as far as can be ascertained from surviving written records there is no evidence that the security service passed on SDs
01:11:41 security service passed on SDs intelligence to any third party outside government on occasion information appears to have been passed to the security service from the SDS orally in the tranche one ERA this usually took
01:11:54 in the tranche one ERA this usually took place through meetings with SDS managers such meetings were more frequent towards the end of the tranche one era at least
01:12:11 the end of the tranche one era at least two SDS undercover officers met directly with the security service hn 106 cover named Barry Tompkins and hn336 cover name dick Epps the fact that we have found so many
01:12:25 the fact that we have found so many intelligence reports from as long ago as a tranche one era gives rise to questions about why they have been retained for so long and for what purpose
01:12:36 purpose we suggest that this is an issue best pursued in future tranches and considered at the end of the evidential hearings
01:12:46 hearings there is some evidence that the SDS played an evidential role in the detection and prosecution of crime but it is limited early in the life of the SDS
01:13:01 early in the life of the SDS hn323 Sergeant Helen Crampton was involved in the prosecution and conviction of a member of black power for incitement to Riot
01:13:13 for incitement to Riot the case was regarded as important the then director of public prosecution considered it as well as the attorney general who consulted the Home Secretary about it
01:13:23 about it the original intention was that evidential work should form a part of the sds's work in practice the SDS quickly became and
01:13:37 in practice the SDS quickly became and remained a purely intelligence gathering unit
01:13:39 unit we have found no other example in the trans1 era of SDS undercover officers
01:13:50 trans1 era of SDS undercover officers giving evidence for the prosecution as a result of SDS operations there is evidence of SDS intelligence leading to the identification of suspects and their arrest
01:14:01 suspects and their arrest the 1978 annual report records the arrest of two anarchists wanted for conspiracy to cause explosions
01:14:16 conspiracy to cause explosions the role of SDS undercover officers in court proceedings in their cover identities is a matter of concern the foremost example is that of hn298 cover name Michael Scott
01:14:33 cover name Michael Scott he was convicted with others in the name of a real living person he violated the legal professional privilege of his co-defendants
01:14:46 privilege of his co-defendants his real identity was not disclosed to the prosecution [Music]
01:14:48 [Music] nor was it disclosed to the court consequently the court was misled and a miscarriage of Justice occurred
01:15:01 miscarriage of Justice occurred the work of this inquiry has helped to put that right the convictions of christabel Gurney Ernest Rodger and Professor Jonathan rosenhead were overturned last month
01:15:14 rosenhead were overturned last month the SDS appears to have put the security of its operation over and above its duty to the court and the rule of law
01:15:25 and the rule of law the priority accorded to protecting the secrecy of the sds's work is consistent with other evidence that we have received
01:15:34 received including the visit which hn 45 cover name David Robertson received from very senior officers
01:15:48 senior officers Vic Gilbert and Roland Watts after his cover was blown on his evidence it was made clear to him that should he ever need to explain
01:15:59 that should he ever need to explain himself he was expected to pretend that he was acting on his own initiative sir you will need to consider whether a further referral to the miscarriage of Justice panel should be made arising
01:16:13 Justice panel should be made arising from the evidence about the deployment of hn 13 cover name Barry loader he was prosecuted twice in barking and
01:16:28 he was prosecuted twice in barking and Lambeth magistrates courts on the first occasion when he was tried with others the documents recalled that the court was told that one of the defendants was an informant
01:16:41 an informant however Mr Craft's evidence is that he informed the court that hn13 was an undercover police officer on the second occasion the documents indicate that the court was informed
01:16:54 indicate that the court was informed that hn13 was quote a valuable informant in the public order field this is a level of information which falls short of confirming that the man before the court was really an
01:17:08 before the court was really an undercover police officer acting in a false identity his case was tried separately from that of three other activists but all four were convicted
01:17:27 hn68 cover name Sean Lynch was convicted in his cover identity together with five others for obstruction at Bow Street magistrates Court in 1970 after they all entered guilty pleas there is no
01:17:46 entered guilty pleas there is no evidence that the court was aware of hn 68's real identity there is also some evidence that hn 68 may have been convicted of fly posting in his cover identity
01:18:02 hn339 cover names Stuart Goodman was stopped by police on suspicion that he was driving with excess alcohol he gave his real name but thinks that he may have been prosecuted in his cover name after Chief Inspector Saunders
01:18:14 name after Chief Inspector Saunders informed the court who hn 339 really was many trans1 SDS officers participated in the commission of minor offenses
01:18:26 the commission of minor offenses typically fly posting or obstruction
01:18:37 typically fly posting or obstruction managers clearly regarded such offending as justified by the nature of the operations that the ucos were participating in one officer hn298 cover named Michael Scott committed a crime of Violence by hitting an activist leader Jerry Lawless
01:18:54 hitting an activist leader Jerry Lawless no action was taken either by Lawless or the SDS
01:19:02 there is uncontested evidence that five SDS tranche one undercover police officers became involved in sexual activity with women who they met Undercover
01:19:18 Undercover two of these five officers are known to have had sexual contact with more than one woman
01:19:25 one woman another ultimately married the activist with whom he began a relationship and had a child with her the other sexual contact involved ranged from isolated encounters through friendships which became sexual to what
01:19:43 friendships which became sexual to what appeared to Madeleine to be potentially the beginning of an intimate long-term relationship the motives of the officers varied from case to case motis included sexual gratification
01:19:58 motis included sexual gratification advancing or protecting a deployment and in hn 300s case seemingly love the deceived women were mostly but not
01:20:10 the deceived women were mostly but not always activists and members of Target groups
01:20:14 groups two of the undercover officers have had to remain fully anonymous in the case of hn 302 we can consequently only say that he served in the 1970s
01:20:28 the 1970s all the other deceiving officers served in the mid 1970s or later
01:20:41 in the mid 1970s or later the inquiry has heard oral evidence from the three surviving undercover officers who have admitted sexual activity in their undercover identities we have heard evidence about the other two who are both deceased we have also had the benefit of the
01:20:57 we have also had the benefit of the accounts of two of the deceived women whom we refer to by the pseudonyms Madeleine and Mary
01:21:12 hn 300 cover name Jim Pickford was married to his second wife and had children when he deployed as an undercover police officer real questions arise as to his suitability for the role based on the evidence of his contemporaries
01:21:26 evidence of his contemporaries he is described as having had an alcohol problem
01:21:27 problem being a philanderer who chased after women and as a man who fell in love all over the place hn 304 cover name Graham Coates
01:21:40 hn 304 cover name Graham Coates said in evidence that hn 300 I quote could not be in the presence of a woman without trying it on
01:21:51 without trying it on we are particularly grateful to hn 300 second wife and children whose evidence confirms that hn 300 left his second wife to marry a woman whom he had met
01:22:15 wife to marry a woman whom he had met whilst operating as an undercover police officer the fact that hn 300 third wife was heard referring to hn 300 in his cover name indicates that the relationship started whilst he was in that role
01:22:21 that role hn 300 second wife provided evidence at hn 300 went on to have a child with his third wife
01:22:33 third wife she has also confirmed that hn 300's third marriage failed we know that there appear to be at least some parallels between hn 300s case and that of hn14 Jim boiling have a name Jim
01:22:58 that of hn14 Jim boiling have a name Jim Sutton Whose actions some 20 years later we will be investigating in tranche 3. of some importance is the evidence of what was known within the SDS of hn 300 sexual conduct whilst deployed it will be for you sir to decide who
01:23:11 it will be for you sir to decide who knew what and when and I will not set out all of the relevant evidence here I know that others are going to make more detailed submissions on this issue
01:23:27 more detailed submissions on this issue it perhaps suffice us to say that there is a very strong body of evidence to demonstrate that hn 300's reputation as a womanizer was well known within the SDS
01:23:44 SDS further the evidence of a closed officer was to the effect that he told hn244
01:23:53 hn244 detective inspector Angus McIntosh at least that hn 300 had fallen in love with an activist enough to lead to hn 300's departure from the SDS although this specific evidence was not accepted by Mr McIntosh in evidence it
01:24:09 accepted by Mr McIntosh in evidence it is consistent with more General evidence from hn 304 cover name Graham coats
01:24:19 hn297 Richard Clark is another officer who was the subject of unflattering evidence from his contemporaries he was described amongst other things as a womanizer and a carnivore
01:24:32 womanizer and a carnivore there is evidence that he was involved in the sexual deceit of as many as four women
01:24:40 women two of the women were active within Southeast London troops out movement at least one of the other two was associated with big flame the group that Clark was attempting to
01:24:58 the group that Clark was attempting to infiltrate when it was discovered that he was not who he said he was it is particularly troubling that Richard Clark's was deployed as a man with a carnivorous sexual appetite into a university setting
01:25:14 into a university setting the more so because he was significantly older than most undergraduates the risk of sexual misconduct was surely foreseeable
01:25:26 foreseeable Richard Clark's motive may not have been limited to sexual gratification Mary's impression was at hn297 deceived her to bolster his cover
01:25:40 her to bolster his cover whatever his motive she was clear that there was absolutely no way that she would have consented to sex with him had she known that he was an undercover police officer
01:25:52 police officer his actions understandably left her feeling used and invaded both by him and the state
01:26:02 the state there is clear evidence that Richard Clark's colleagues knew something of his sexual activity with activists he appears to have told them himself
01:26:14 he appears to have told them himself whether Clark's managers knew is less clear they deny it which brings their evidence into conflict with that of hn 304 cover name Grant coats
01:26:38 hn354 Vince Harvey cover name Vince Miller admitted to sexual activity with four different women during his undercover work for the SDS two of the women were not activists and the sexual activity in these cases
01:26:50 the sexual activity in these cases consisted of a one-night stand on his account
01:26:51 account The Third Woman was Madeleine and the fourth like Madeleine was also a member of the swp sir there remained some differences of
01:27:02 sir there remained some differences of fact between Madeleine and Vince Harvey that you will need to decide although we note that Madeleine's version of events benefits from corroboration
01:27:15 benefits from corroboration the corroborative evidence comprises of a near contemporary document and the
01:27:27 a near contemporary document and the evidence of Julia Poynter both tend to show that the sexual contact was not confined to a one-night stand but occurred over time Madeleine puts a period at about two months
01:27:34 months Mr Harvey was the first undercover police officer who has admitted to having sex with a member of the public whilst in his undercover identity to give oral evidence to the inquiry
01:27:48 give oral evidence to the inquiry he accepted that what he did was wrong and that he did not think that Madeleine
01:27:59 and that he did not think that Madeleine would have consented to sex with him had she known that he was a police officer he did not use contraception he did not tell anyone because he did not attribute much importance to it
01:28:12 not attribute much importance to it Madeleine is the first deceived woman to give oral evidence to the inquiry Vince Harvey's cover story had the
01:28:24 Vince Harvey's cover story had the effect of evincing sympathy from her she feels betrayed vulnerable and disgusted
01:28:28 disgusted sir I have dealt with this evidence only briefly conscious that advocates for both Madeleine and Mr Harvey will be addressing you in more detail in due course
01:28:46 hn21 admitted to having become friendly with and then having sex with a woman who was not an activist he had met the woman through an evening class which he was taking in his undercover identity
01:28:57 undercover identity he stated that a lot of alcohol was involved on both his and her part the encounter occurred on an evening
01:29:10 the encounter occurred on an evening when hn 21 was staying to protect her from The Unwanted sexual advances of another man hn 21 gave evidence that the pair remained close enough to have kissed and cuddled on a couple of further occasions
01:29:24 cuddled on a couple of further occasions and then had sex again some six or seven months after the first encounter he does not know if the woman would have consented to sex if she had known who he really was he used contraception
01:29:39 he used contraception he accepted that what he did was wrong and unprofessional but his guilt appeared to be focused more upon the fact that he was being unfaithful to his wife than the fact that he was a police officer on duty
01:29:55 officer on duty he did not consider that at the time he did not tell anyone about these events which he regarded as a mistake hn 302 gave evidence that he became friendly with a woman through attending
01:30:10 friendly with a woman through attending meetings which he was using to build up his cover
01:30:11 his cover this took place over an extended period of perhaps six months he socialized with her both in company and alone
01:30:24 her both in company and alone they had sex after he invited her back to his bed set he used contraception although she had been involved in activism he did not see her again after that
01:30:34 that he said that he did not draw a distinction between a friendship and sexual activity because he was trying to live a parallel life and was trying not to be a police officer
01:30:49 to be a police officer he thought having sex might enhance his cover
01:30:50 cover but it didn't he did not tell his managers because he thought it was part and parcel of living in his undercover identity he does not think that he would have
01:31:04 he does not think that he would have been given more than advice that he had perhaps made a mistake had he informed his managers we can see from these admitted sexual
01:31:19 we can see from these admitted sexual relationships alone that instances of sexual activity between undercover police officers in their cover identities and members of the public were not uncommon from the mid 70s onwards
01:31:28 onwards in addition to the admitted cases there is at least some evidence that a further three tranche one undercover officers were involved in sexual activity with
01:31:40 were involved in sexual activity with members of the public in each of these cases sir you will need to evaluate the evidence and reach a conclusion
01:31:57 evidence and reach a conclusion Mr Neil Hardy volunteered information to the inquiry and later made a statement about
01:31:58 about hn126 cover name Paul Gray in his witness statement Mr hardy states that
01:32:10 witness statement Mr hardy states that he was an anti-nazi League activist when he met hn126 he gives his reasons for believing that there was a deceitful intimate
01:32:22 there was a deceitful intimate relationship between Paul Gray and a now deceased activist Ross Gardner there is evidence to corroborate the fact that at times Paul Gray and Ms
01:32:34 fact that at times Paul Gray and Ms Gardner moved in the same circles during hn126's deployment the inquiry has afforded hn126 the opportunity to respond to Mr Hardy's
01:32:51 opportunity to respond to Mr Hardy's allegation which he categorically denies the documents raised suspicions that hn 106 Barry Tompkins might have been involved in sexual activity with two different women the evidence in relation
01:33:03 different women the evidence in relation to the first woman comes from a security service document made after a meeting with SDS management which records that hn 106 had quote probably bedded the
01:33:18 hn 106 had quote probably bedded the woman and been quote warned off by his managers
01:33:22 managers the evidence in relation to the second woman is that she is described in documents as quote Barry's girlfriend
01:33:39 documents as quote Barry's girlfriend hn 106 was too ill to give oral evidence but house provided a witness statement in which he denies engaging in any sexual activity with activists his explanation in relation to the second woman whom he stated was not an activist is that there was a close
01:33:50 activist is that there was a close friendship which developed after her husband left her and that sometimes he slept in her spare room finally there is a case of
01:34:02 finally there is a case of hn155 cover name Phil Cooper
01:34:13 the dispute of fact in this instance is whether he confessed to sexual activity in his cover identity to police risk assessors in 2017. both risk assessors have given oral evidence to the inquiry to the effect that he did so and stand
01:34:29 to the effect that he did so and stand by the written records of their dealings with hn155
01:34:35 we have found no evidence of any positive management instruction in tranche 1 that SDS undercover officers should engage in sexual activity with anyone Undercover
01:34:48 anyone Undercover accordingly the key questions on the evidence we suggest turn upon what managers did or did not know of the sexual activity that was occurring
01:35:02 sexual activity that was occurring whether managers did enough about such sexual activity as any of them were aware of
01:35:06 aware of whether managers were aware of the risk of sexual misconduct whether they did enough to prevent ucos from engaging in sexual activity with members of the public in their false identities and
01:35:20 public in their false identities and whether the actions of members of the SDS both officers and managers were affected by their attitudes to women I shall leave detailed submissions to
01:35:31 I shall leave detailed submissions to the core participants with the greatest interest in these issues but as I have touched upon already there is evidence of at least some management knowledge of some of the sexual activity that took
01:35:48 some of the sexual activity that took place there is also evidence that the risk of sexual misconduct was both obvious and recognized more could and should have been done to reduce the risk of sexual misconduct by ucos
01:35:59 ucos there was no formal training there is some evidence that advice was given not to participate in sexual activity but it seems to have been haphazard
01:36:14 seems to have been haphazard if you accept the evidence that managers had some knowledge of sexual activity then the response to it was inadequate a theme which we shall need to explore
01:36:28 a theme which we shall need to explore in later tranches is whether the absence of a disciplinary response was influenced by the prevailing culture including attitudes to women and or the
01:36:40 including attitudes to women and or the desire to keep the activities of the SDS Secret
01:36:45 Secret the evidence of more than one SDS witness on the issue of sexual relationships was striking in that it focused upon the risk to the SDS or the risk to the UCO
01:37:00 or the risk to the UCO or the impact upon the uco's real-life partner
01:37:02 partner the impact upon the member of the public with whom the UCO was engaging in sexual
01:37:13 with whom the UCO was engaging in sexual activity was either not a concern or not the first concern sir I am aware that you are considering how far to go in dealing with the more thematic aspects of this part of the inquiry in your interim report and what
01:37:27 inquiry in your interim report and what is best left for a decision once we have the benefit of all the evidence that the inquiry will hear about deceitful sexual activity
01:37:39 activity there is ample evidence that long-term undercover deployments of the kind that became the norm in the SDS were very stressful
01:37:56 stressful there was a constant fear of being found out and of what the consequences would be were that to happen plus the disorientating effect of leading to very different lives in parallel
01:38:12 parallel the mental health of a striking number of officers was adversely affected by their work most offices were positive about the support which they received from their managers but there was a lack of specialist support
01:38:23 specialist support there was also a lack of aftercare this is an issue on which we will be hearing a lot more evidence in tranches
01:38:36 hearing a lot more evidence in tranches 2 and 3. so too is the way in which the partners of SDS officers were treated in tranche one two former heads of the SDS
01:38:44 SDS hn218 Barry moss and hn34 Jeffrey craft
01:38:57 hn218 Barry moss and hn34 Jeffrey craft accepted with hindsight that better care and attention could have been paid to them
01:39:02 the evidence shows that the existence of the SDS was well known to many senior police managers in the chain of command they visited the unit received its
01:39:15 they visited the unit received its annual reports and lobid for continued funding from the home office extolling the virtues of the unit as they did so they are likely to have been aware in
01:39:30 they are likely to have been aware in Broad terms of what the SDS was and what it was doing but less likely to have been aware of the details the SDS must have been at least reasonably well known within special
01:39:42 reasonably well known within special Branch more generally albeit shrouded with some mystery this is so because special Branch was a relatively small Institution those who served in the SDS were
01:39:53 those who served in the SDS were recruited from within special branch and usually returned to its more conventional postings after their time with the SDS the security service knew about the SDS from the latter's very Inception
01:40:14 from the latter's very Inception although the number of people within the security service who knew appears to have been deliberately limited to a select few Conrad Dixon had a pre-existing working relationship with the security service before the SDS was
01:40:25 the security service before the SDS was established and met with members of the security service on the 2nd of August 1968 which was two or three days after the SDS was founded
01:40:38 the SDS was founded the security service received most of the sds's intelligence reports throughout tranche 1 and from 1974 onwards filed SDS intelligence as such
01:40:58 onwards filed SDS intelligence as such the degree of direct personal contact at the security service had with the SDS varied over time but was sometimes frequent
01:41:03 frequent there was certainly some knowledge of the SDS within the home office it received an approved requests for funding and in 1970 the then Home
01:41:14 funding and in 1970 the then Home Secretary was personally consulted about such funding in 1984 Mr Harrington was permitted to
01:41:25 in 1984 Mr Harrington was permitted to inspect and make notes on the sds's 1983 annual report We have dealt at some length in our
01:41:39 We have dealt at some length in our trans1 phase 3 and tranche 1 module 2B and 2C opening statements with home office documents about the role of special Branch assisting the security service with counter subversion work
01:41:50 service with counter subversion work some of the officials involved in those conversations knew of the existence of the SDS the concerns raised within the
01:42:04 the SDS the concerns raised within the home office in the late 1970s and early 1980s about special branches role in countered subversion were opposite I invite you sir to consider whether an opportunity relevant to the SDS was
01:42:16 opportunity relevant to the SDS was missed when those concerns were not acted upon in particular insofar as they relate to persons who were acting lawfully and were not threatening either the safety or well-being of the state
01:42:32 or well-being of the state the result of much debate emerged in 1984 in the form of the home office guidelines on the work of a special branch and accompanying confidential letter these documents continued to
01:42:44 letter these documents continued to permit counter-subversion work to be carried out by special Branch including the SDS against people who were obeying
01:42:59 the SDS against people who were obeying the law and only potentially subversive it is likely that knowledge of the existence of the SDS was disseminated within some of the high-level counter subversion committees discussed in our
01:43:10 subversion committees discussed in our recent opening statement for module 2B and module 2C in the trans1 era by those
01:43:21 and module 2C in the trans1 era by those on the Committees who knew about the SDS the membership of these committees included representatives from various parts of government but with an emphasis on the home office and the cabinet office
01:43:34 office by way of examples the subversion at home committee chaired by the then cabinet secretary suburb Trend appears
01:43:47 cabinet secretary suburb Trend appears from the cryptic contents of its January 1969 minutes to have been aware of the existence of the SDS Deputy assistant commissioner Vic Gilbert sat on the subversion in public life committee he had had Direct contact with the SDS
01:44:11 he had had Direct contact with the SDS because he is one of the senior officers who hn 45 cover name David Robertson stated spoke to him after he was compromised
01:44:21 the primary stated purpose of the SDS was to provide intelligence for public order purposes there can be no doubt that the SDS did that
01:44:36 that its ucos provided intelligence before during and after demonstrations and other forms of protest intelligence provided in advance of demonstrations as to likely numbers demeanor and other matters no doubt
01:44:48 demeanor and other matters no doubt assisted those charged with policing public order to calibrate the police response
01:45:00 response in some cases SDS intelligence would simply corroborate other sources in other instances particularly in relation to secretive groups which did not cooperate with the police other
01:45:16 not cooperate with the police other sources will usually have been fewer and potentially less reliable intelligent during events must have helped police on the ground other forms of assistance such as
01:45:30 other forms of assistance such as identifying hotheads or offenders from photographs at value however it is hard to identify a single instance in which SDS intelligence
01:45:44 instance in which SDS intelligence averted a public order Calamity in the trans1 era without the SDS the police would still have had all their other sources available to them
01:45:57 available to them I do not propose to conduct a systematic analysis of every Group infiltrated by the SDS but the threat to public order posed by different groups differed widely both between groups and over time
01:46:11 widely both between groups and over time the evidence from ucos about some groups was to the effect that the group was not a public order threat at all I have already mentioned the
01:46:24 I have already mentioned the anti-apartheid movement women's Liberation Front and workers revolutionary party in that regard
01:46:37 revolutionary party in that regard sometimes the public order justification offered was the fear that a group might become a public order threat other groups were involved in public disorder
01:46:52 groups were involved in public disorder notably the international socialists who became the Socialist Workers Party and grew considerably in size during the tranche one era the international Marxist group although small could
01:47:04 Marxist group although small could provoke trouble out of all proportion to its size as events at Red Lion Square show
01:47:09 show some maoists and some activists could do the same
01:47:10 the same to stop the 70 campaign was not violent but it was uncooperative with police and used direct action to further its aims
01:47:37 used direct action to further its aims there were times which were particularly febrile from a public order perspective the Autumn of 1968 principally amolson the peaks of tension between the far left and the far right especially but not limited to 1977 were also challenging for police
01:47:49 also challenging for police but there were other times when things were quieter the utility of SDS intelligence for public order purposes is only one part of the equation
01:48:03 of the equation the level of intrusion into people's lives arising from SDS operations particularly once long-term deployments became the norm with very considerable
01:48:17 with very considerable moreover the intrusion resulting from the sds's operations was into very sensitive areas of people's lives their political lives their financial affairs
01:48:36 political lives their financial affairs their legal Affairs their families their friendships and even in some instances their sex lives operations were not limited to times of heightened risk nor confined to the shadow paddling of the earliest SDS
01:48:56 shadow paddling of the earliest SDS undercover officers they were long-term and highly intrusive operations conducted continuously in these circumstances we submit that the need for and value of the public
01:49:09 the need for and value of the public order intelligence provided by the SDS was not an adequate justification for
01:49:20 was not an adequate justification for the intrusion caused by the SDS model of long-term undercover policing in the tranche one era
01:49:29 the sds's ancillary purpose was to assist the security service to defend the realm against subversion the principal difficulty that we have with what occurred is quite simply stated
01:49:41 stated the groups infiltrated were not subversive they do not meet the Harris definition which was adopted by the security
01:49:55 which was adopted by the security service in 1972 and made public in 1975. most although not all wished to overthrow parliamentary democracy
01:50:08 overthrow parliamentary democracy however on the evidence that we have received they did not threaten the safety or well-being of the state
01:50:19 safety or well-being of the state a definition that uses the present tense none were anywhere close to toppling multi-party democracy non had International backing of the kind enjoyed by the cpgb some fan the Flames of industrial unrest
01:50:36 some fan the Flames of industrial unrest although that activity was not the focus of SDS reporting some organized demonstrations or counter demonstrations which were violent
01:50:48 demonstrations which were violent insofar as they did either of the things though they could not be said to have threatened the well-being of the state or if we are wrong about that and they did so then the scale and duration of
01:51:01 did so then the scale and duration of any such threat was not serious enough to justify the level of intrusion that in fact occurred personal information recorded by SDS
01:51:20 personal information recorded by SDS officers may have been used when files were later interrogated for vetting purposes
01:51:25 purposes however vetting occurred both before and after the sds's existence the level of
01:51:36 after the sds's existence the level of intrusion into people's lives occasioned by SDS infiltrations does not seem to justify
01:51:39 justify I beg your pardon does not seem to be justified by any additional relevant data that the SDS might have collected it is certainly not a purpose which features prominently in the documents
01:51:56 there is no evidence that anyone took legal advice about or considered the legality of the methods that the SDS was using
01:52:05 using someone should have done so had they considered domestic law there would have been areas of concern which
01:52:16 would have been areas of concern which should have prompted at least relevant training and supervision especially in relation to trespass to property and The Taking of confidential information
01:52:33 information some of the circumstances in which SDS ucos obtained access to private homes and took confidential information appear to have been of doubtful legality the threat to public order
01:52:51 the threat to public order National Security if it existed at all appears simply not great or immediate enough
01:52:52 enough to amount to a defense there was no statutory framework for undercover policing during the tranche one era nor was there any system of
01:53:03 one era nor was there any system of judicial oversight a statutory framework
01:53:14 judicial oversight a statutory framework was only introduced in 2000 very shortly after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into Force in the absence of a statutory framework it is Highly Questionable whether the United Kingdom was compliant with its international law obligations under
01:53:32 international law obligations under article 8 of the European convention on human rights at any point during the transuan era in relation to the undercover policing conducted by the SDS
01:53:46 undercover policing conducted by the SDS how important that observation is to the work of this inquiry in tranche one is perhaps another matter the much bigger questions I suggest in
01:53:59 the much bigger questions I suggest in relation to statutory Frameworks is why things continue to go wrong after the introduction of the regulatory regulation of investigatory Powers Act 2000 and whether the current statutory framework is adequate
01:54:14 framework is adequate those are questions for later tranches since I am touching upon legal issues this is a convenient place at which to say a little about the core participants written closing statements we are grateful for the submissions
01:54:29 we are grateful for the submissions received and the considerable thought and Industry which they reflect however the submissions made by the
01:54:43 however the submissions made by the teams led by Mr scoby King's Council Mr Menon Kings Council Ms heaven and Mr Sanders King's Council urge you to impugne the evidence given to the home Affairs select committee and or accuse politicians of misleading Parliament
01:54:59 politicians of misleading Parliament parliamentary privilege prevents you sir from entertaining any such submissions such issues are a matter for Parliament alone
01:55:10 alone there is also mention in some submissions of case and the burden of proof this inquiry is being run on an inquisitorial basis
01:55:27 inquisitorial basis there is no question of deciding between competing cases or imposing a burden of proof upon any participant
01:55:34 I turned finally to some concluding remarks
01:55:40 remarks the SDS was created in 1968 to deal with a specific large-scale public order threat for which there was a concrete basis for concern
01:55:53 concern it used relatively short and shallow deployments to gather valuable intelligence about the October 1968 demonstration
01:56:05 demonstration the unit then became a permanent feature deploying undercover officers continuously into far-left groups often with vague remits
01:56:17 with vague remits individual deployments which lasted for several years became the norm officers became involved in the lives of those they were spying on although they were not ordered or
01:56:30 although they were not ordered or encouraged to do so in some instances this went as far as sex reporting was extensive
01:56:41 reporting was extensive unfiltered deeply personal and often recorded in unprofessional terms we cannot rule out that some of it once filed was leaked to the private sector and misused to Blacklist activists
01:57:03 and misused to Blacklist activists the whole operation was secret and a very high priority was accorded to keeping it that way courts were sometimes misled miscarriages of Justice occurred as a result
01:57:12 result an officer whose cover was compromised was told to pretend that he was acting independently discipline was not enforced
01:57:23 discipline was not enforced aspects of deceased children's identities were used even though they
01:57:37 identities were used even though they added only a limited further protection these operations have caused a lot of harm
01:57:42 harm Democratic freedoms have been infringed outrage and pain has been caused the damage is not limited to members of the public
01:57:53 the public former undercover officers have suffered psychiatric injury the primary reason for conducting these operations was to gain intelligence to
01:58:05 operations was to gain intelligence to assist police to maintain order on the streets
01:58:06 streets however the level of threat posed to public order was often not commensurate with a need to deploy undercover police officers for this purpose
01:58:21 officers for this purpose not in the way that they operated the benefits which the unit's intelligence brought to public order policing do not in our submission justify the means
01:58:38 justify the means the ancillary reason for the sds's work was to assist the security service to counter subversion however the evidence of the sds's own officers and other contemporary
01:58:54 officers and other contemporary documents show that the groups targeted by the SDS did not meet the official definition of subversion many of those targeted were revolutionaries
01:59:05 revolutionaries but they did not threaten the safety or well-being of the state in the words of Commissioner of police for the Metropolis Sir Robert mark they were a bad joke
01:59:20 there was a remarkable lack of oversight formal training and instruction however the SDS was not a Road Unit
01:59:31 however the SDS was not a Road Unit it was part of a larger intelligence gathering apparatus and counter subversion effort which also operated in secrecy
01:59:39 secrecy the SDS was known to the chain of command within the Metropolitan Police Service
01:59:45 Service senior officers visited the unit on occasion and met its undercover offices they received annual reports about the
01:59:57 they received annual reports about the unit's work the existence of the SDS was known to some within the security service the home office and to a lesser extent the cabinet office
02:00:10 extent the cabinet office we remain of the view expressed in last month's submissions there was no effective review of the sds's operation no one appears to have considered whether the level of intrusion
02:00:22 whether the level of intrusion occasioned by the SDS long-term undercover police deployments was justified
02:00:30 justified no one appears to have addressed their mind specifically to the legality of SDS operations no one appears to have considered
02:00:43 no one appears to have considered whether after its introduction both
02:00:54 whether after its introduction both limbs of the Harris definition were met there is a strong case for concluding that
02:00:58 that had they done so they should have decided to disband the SDS thank you very much Mr Barr we will
02:01:13 thank you very much Mr Barr we will resume I think shortly after midday with Mr Skelton for the CL team thank you
02:01:24 foreign
02:12:26 Mr Skelton I not entirely sure that the device is fully operational yet um I'll pause while it becomes so thank you sir oh it is now skeleton uh now is the time for your closing submissions on behalf of
02:12:37 closing submissions on behalf of Metropolitan Police Commissioner by understanding is that you're going to take a little over an hour um if if you think it's sensible take a break when when you wish to so it fits
02:12:50 break when when you wish to so it fits in more or less so everyone can have a convenient lunch thank you sir thank you so in its written closing statement and
02:13:01 so in its written closing statement and in this oral statement the MPS Endeavors to draw conclusions from a detailed analysis of the evidence so far obtained by the inquiry in charge one which covers the formation of the SDS in 1968 and its operations until 1982.
02:13:22 1968 and its operations until 1982. in doing so the na The NPS doesn't shirk from accepting that certain conduct by the SDS and its officers was indefensible however it also seats seeks to judge the SDS fairly by reference to The Wider socio-political legal and policing context in which the SDS did its work
02:13:35 context in which the SDS did its work but also with the benefit of a modern perspective recognizing that some of the values of the past may have been wrong and should have been known to be wrong at the time
02:13:49 at the time in doing so sir the MPS seeks to draw a distinction between matters that have been thoroughly investigated in trans1 and in respect of which findings May safely be made at this stage matters that have not yet been
02:14:02 matters that have not yet been investigated or investigated fully where the inquiry may wish to defer making findings until a later point in its work matters in respect to which it would be unfair to speculate or Draw firm
02:14:13 unfair to speculate or Draw firm conclusions because of the passage of time and the non-availability of relevant evidence and matters that are outside the inquiry's terms of reference or lawful remit
02:14:24 or lawful remit so this oral opening is not a repetition of the mps's written closing statement and its dependencies but it will cover the same themes and in places it will repeat what has been written
02:14:36 repeat what has been written I'm going to cover the following General topics sexual relationships institutional sexism and misogyny the legal framework the responsibilities of the police
02:14:48 the police the historical context and justification and value
02:14:51 and value and then I will make um
02:14:52 um some remarks on a few discrete topics training personal reporting and language criminality and the use of deceased children's identities before making some very short concluding remarks
02:15:07 very short concluding remarks so the first of those topics sir is sexual relationships I would like to address this at the outset because it's so important and because it resonates with public
02:15:20 because it resonates with public perception of the MPS and the conduct of its officers in the present day during the T1 period 1968 to 1982 SDS officers had sexual relationships with women with whom they had contact well deployed the MPS said at the opening of the
02:15:31 the MPS said at the opening of the inquiries evidential hearings in 2020 and repeats now those relationships were unacceptable and wrong they should not
02:15:44 unacceptable and wrong they should not have happened and they have caused and continued to cause immense hurt and suffering
02:15:51 suffering during this tranche the MPS has read and listened to and wishes to make clear that it accepts the evidence of Madeleine and Mary who gave evidence the inquiry about the relationships they had with undercover officers and the effects these have had on them
02:16:02 these have had on them the MPS reiterates its unreserved apology to them and to the other women with whom undercover officers had sexual relationships so it's not possible to determine that
02:16:14 so it's not possible to determine that this remove precisely how many ucos had sexual relationships during this period all the identities of all of the women involved
02:16:27 involved the available evidence indicates that it was a small minority of ucos who served in the SES during this period although this doesn't detract in any way from the holy objectional conduct that did occur and most STS officers
02:16:41 and most STS officers maintained the professionalism and personal Integrity that was to be expected of police officers in their position and knew that they should do so several SDS officers expressed a clear view in their evidence to this inquiry that the type of this type of conduct
02:16:58 that the type of this type of conduct was wrong and this would have been well understood at the time or should have been
02:17:00 been nevertheless the deployment of male police officers into groups in which they had regular and in most cases long-term contact with women created a clear risk that left unchecked some officers would start sexual
02:17:12 officers would start sexual relationships with those women that risk together with the unacceptable nature of such conduct should have been fully and
02:17:23 such conduct should have been fully and openly recognized by the sds's managers so too should the consequential risk that any sexual relationships could have a grave impact on the women concerned none of whom it can be safely assumed
02:17:34 none of whom it can be safely assumed would have wanted to have any form of sexual contact with an undercover police officer
02:17:40 officer so the sds's managers should have taken robust and effective measures to prevent sexual relationships from occurring and specifically they should have made clear to the uco's informal explicit
02:17:52 to the uco's informal explicit instructions and training that such
02:18:03 instructions and training that such relationships were prohibited and absent and exceptional excuse such as the need to prevent otherwise imminent loss of life would amount to Serious professional misconduct the MPS again apologizes unequivocally for the fact that none of this happened the evidence reduced by the inquiry
02:18:18 the evidence reduced by the inquiry doesn't indicate that the sds's managers in the T win T1 period authorized or encouraged ucos to engage in sexual relationships to improve their cover or to further efforts to gather intelligence however there is some evidence
02:18:29 however there is some evidence suggesting that some managers may have been aware that sexual relationships were occurring or were in possession of sufficient information to appreciate a risk that they were
02:18:40 risk that they were and gave informal guidance that such relationship should be avoided this knowledge has been denied by the few managers who are still alive and are in a position to give evidence in response
02:18:50 response so faced with these conflicting and incomplete accounts from a few elderly Witnesses who were drawing on memories that are over 40 to 50 years old the
02:19:01 that are over 40 to 50 years old the inquiry may consider that it's no longer possible or fair to make reliable findings as to what was known or was not known or said by individual SDS managers at the time however for the avoidance of doubt the
02:19:13 however for the avoidance of doubt the mps's position is that whatever the SDS managers in fact suspected knew or said at the time they failed to take
02:19:25 at the time they failed to take effective steps to stop relationships from happening
02:19:33 so I'm now going to say a few words about institutional sexism and misogyny as its lists of issues make clear the inquiry is actively investigating the important question of whether the actions of SDS officers and the SDS managers were affected by sexism
02:19:48 managers were affected by sexism in their closing statements the category H non-state core participants argue powerfully that you should look Beyond undercover policing and consider the
02:20:03 undercover policing and consider the wider culture and practice in the MPS in the 1970s and thereafter with a view to identifying more pervasive sexism and misogyny
02:20:06 misogyny these submissions of course resonate in the present day when trust and confidence in policing has continued to be undermined by the appalling criminal acts and behavior of MPS officers in a
02:20:18 acts and behavior of MPS officers in a series of high profile cases involving misconduct towards women the MPS has no wish to resist the investigation of this issue or any conclusions that may justifiably result however if the inquiry chooses to
02:20:31 however if the inquiry chooses to investigate it then the process by which it does so should be thorough open and fair so the inquiry will need to conduct its own investigation not simply rely on the findings of others and this may
02:20:43 the findings of others and this may include consideration of the evidence that used in subsequent tranches in which sexual sexual relationships and the mismanagement mismanagement of officers conduct are likely to feature
02:20:54 officers conduct are likely to feature to an even greater extent than they have done in charge one it may also include consideration of the 1983
02:21:03 1983 police in action report by the policy Studies Institute as well as well as other potentially relevant reports and papers some of which have been referred to in the closing statements for this tranche
02:21:15 tranche but for present purposes sir the mps's position is that it would not be appropriate to make generalized findings about policing culture and practice unless and until that work has been done
02:21:28 my turn now to the legal framework so a neutral Observer reading the closing statements made to you at the conclusion of tranche one might be forgiven for thinking that the SDS is on
02:21:39 forgiven for thinking that the SDS is on trial in a court not under investigation by an inquiry such is the level of legal argument and the volume of case law that is now being put before you I will not add unnecessarily to that
02:21:54 I will not add unnecessarily to that misapprehension today not least because you've already had the mps's detailed written submissions but given the importance of the question of how the inquiry can and should approach its assessment of the legal framework I'll try and summarize the key points that the MPS has made in its written closing statement
02:22:06 written closing statement first in terms of reference which are the starting point these require the inquiry to identify and assess the adequacy of the statutory policy and judicial regulation of undercover policing
02:22:21 undercover policing they do not as has been suggested by your Council require the inquiry to determine in quotes whether undercover policing was conducted lawfully the legality of tactics or the lawfulness of undercover policing as it was carried
02:22:34 undercover policing as it was carried out by the SDS instead their focus is on the nature and adequacy of the ways in which undercover policing was authorized regulated and governed over time by the primary and secondary legislation
02:22:46 primary and secondary legislation government policies policing policies and the Judiciary as is well known in the T1 ERA this framework was for the most part non-existent or underdeveloped in
02:22:57 non-existent or underdeveloped in particular there was no legislation to govern undercover policing which wasn't introduced until the enactment of the regulation of investigatory Powers Act ripper in 2000 part two of which
02:23:10 ripper in 2000 part two of which provided for the authorization of covert human intelligence sources or chis a point which I will repeat today sir is that you may wish to investigate why for many years the government didn't consider it necessary or helpful to
02:23:24 consider it necessary or helpful to introduce the kind of legislation that was needed for the regulation of all undercover deployments by the police in this country not just those by the SDS second section two of the inquiries Act 2005.
02:23:36 2005. public inquiries find facts and in many cases make recommendations unlike courts they do not make the law or produce judgments that determine civil or criminal rights however their findings
02:23:50 criminal rights however their findings may need to be underpinned explicitly or implicitly by legal standards such as what is permissible in terms of the use of force by a state agent in such cases inquiries are not making
02:24:04 in such cases inquiries are not making the law but rather identifying the law as it is known to apply to certain activities the prohibition in section 2 of the act together with the explanatory note reflect this important and nuanced position
02:24:15 position so far as the MPS is aware the domestic civil courts have never determined any cases in which allegations of trespass to property breach of confidence or breach of Human Rights prior to 2000 at the second of October 2000 have been
02:24:27 the second of October 2000 have been leveled against ucos and the criminal courts have never determined any cases in which ucas have been accused of burglary arising from their work
02:24:38 burglary arising from their work so determination of the legality of the sds's work would therefore require the inquiry to assume wrongly the judicial function of a court none of the public inquiries cited in
02:24:55 none of the public inquiries cited in Council to the inquiries legal framework submissions have taken such an approach to do so in this inquiry would reach section 2 of the ACT third principles of fairness and reasonableness in the absence of a court
02:25:09 in the absence of a court a judgment determining definitively that the sds's operations or aspects of them were unlawful under the Civil or criminal law as it applied in the period 1968 to 1982 it would also be unfair and unreasonable for the inquiry to make such a determination for itself
02:25:24 such a determination for itself a finding of unlawfulness could only be made as it would by a court by examination of the facts in a specific case
02:25:29 case I.E particular occasions when ucos entered the private property of an activist on which he or she was gathering intelligence and this has not occurred
02:25:38 occurred even it did even if it did occur the exercise wouldn't be a reasonable or Fair one in the context of the inquiries inquisitorial proceedings in a civil or criminal trial the
02:25:52 in a civil or criminal trial the commissioner and the officers concerned would be entitled the basic procedural safeguards such as the right to call their own Witnesses which don't apply in a public inquiry findings of illegal illegality in
02:26:04 findings of illegal illegality in respect to the T1 era would also not be reasonable or Fair unless before reaching them the inquiry had given careful explicit consideration to the question of whether such findings could
02:26:15 question of whether such findings could safely be made 40 to 50 years after the index events as the MPS said in its first opening statement for transwan the immense passage of time means that the inquiry is deprived of the evidence of many key Witnesses senior officers politicians
02:26:30 Witnesses senior officers politicians civil servants and Intelligence Officers and many relevant documents to quote what was there said in some cases it may be clear what is missing and it may be that reliable inferences can be drawn from what remains or what
02:26:44 can be drawn from what remains or what those lost documents might have contain but that may not always be the case the inquiry in its participants may be wholly unaware that significant relevant evidence once existed but has now been
02:26:58 evidence once existed but has now been lost and erroneous conclusions might be unwittingly and unfairly drawn as a result
02:27:04 so you have seen the mps's submissions on the four legal allegations that have been considered by your Council trespass to property burglary breach of confidence and breach of article 8 of
02:27:15 confidence and breach of article 8 of the European convention on human rights Beyond repeating that each of those allegations would need to be considered on the facts of a specific case I will
02:27:27 on the facts of a specific case I will not restate what is said about the first three issues but I would like to say something about article 8 because consideration of it has wider implications for the inquiries work the convention like the English common law is a living instrument which both responds to and influences the
02:27:43 responds to and influences the individual and Collective values and mores of the societies it serves together with their governments it is possible to identify and chart how in the late and mid to late 1970s the
02:27:55 in the late and mid to late 1970s the Strasbourg court and in the early days the European commission developed the principles that now underpin consideration of article 8 the right to respect for private and family life these include consideration of the requirement for necessity by reference
02:28:09 requirement for necessity by reference to the concept of pressing social needs the requirement for interferences in article 8 rights to have some basis in domestic law and for that law to be accessible and foreseeable
02:28:25 accessible and foreseeable and more specifically in the context of secret surveillance by a state of its citizens the need for procedural safeguards such as independent preferably judicial oversight however as much of the T1 period these principles simply didn't form part of English law and this is exemplified by the case of
02:28:39 and this is exemplified by the case of Malone in which the English High Court declined to find that the UK's Communications interception regime was unlawful but a few years later the European commission and Strasbourg Court took a different View
02:28:51 took a different View a finding which was rectified ultimately by the enactment of the interception of communications act 1985 which came into Force the next year
02:29:02 the more difficult task is to chart the evolution of human rights law in the UK and Strasbourg sorry van to charge the evolution of human rights law in UK and Strasbourg is that of identifying what the values of
02:29:13 that of identifying what the values of mores or to use Strasbourg terminology depressing social needs of UK Society in the 1960s and 1970s were and how they've evolved over the last 50 years
02:29:31 evolved over the last 50 years this task has not been undertaken by the inquiry as yet and would require a very different kind of evidence from that which has so far been obtained in the context of article 8 what the inquiry can more readily do in fulfillment of its terms of reference is to identify that there was no statutory
02:29:47 to identify that there was no statutory framework no common law framework and no procedural safeguards for undercover policing during the T1 era it may be thought that the various governments at the time either didn't
02:29:59 governments at the time either didn't consider this absence to be problematic legally or morally just as they hadn't in respect of the interception of communications regime or that they didn't consider it necessary or expedient to do anything about it that sir is a question only the home office can answer
02:30:14 can answer in any event there are many reasons why the inquiry might conclude that this state of affairs was unsatisfactory without recourse to the retrospective application of human rights laws then were not part of English law at the time
02:30:30 so during the T1 P3 opening statements you put to me that on the whole my understanding is that the police forces of this country have always sought to operate within the civil law hence the need for warrants to perform acts that
02:30:44 need for warrants to perform acts that would amount to breach of the civil law and you invited submissions on this issue
02:30:48 issue the MPS is positioned in summary is that the police like other agents of the state should act within the confines of civil criminal and public law to do otherwise would undermine the rule of law and as a consequence the
02:31:00 of law and as a consequence the principle of policing by consent which will only be given by the public if the police are seen to act lawally the courts of England and Wales have however recognized that in some limited
02:31:19 however recognized that in some limited circumstances the police and other state agencies do go beyond the boundaries of the law in pursuit of law enforcement and National Security objectives the mps's written closing statement refer to several cases in which the courts applying the public policies that underpin the execution of the law
02:31:33 underpin the execution of the law including the wider public interest and the principle of proportionality have declined to censure certain authorized activities of the state which would otherwise be unlawful
02:31:45 otherwise be unlawful so why this is the case and whether it is acceptable our moral and political not just legal questions which require more careful consideration by the inquiry in its core participants than can be afforded in these closing statements in this tranche
02:32:08 the next topic I would like to cover is the responsibilities of the police in particular public order and subversion first public order the principal role of the police as has long been recognized is the maintenance of the queen or King's peace I.E public order
02:32:21 order however the maintenance of public order or public Tranquility must always be balanced against the basic Democratic right to demonstrate and protest
02:32:32 right to demonstrate and protest the tension in policing terms is in ensuring a fair balance between individual rights and the general interests of the community what is considered an appropriate or acceptable policing response to public order differs in different countries
02:32:51 order differs in different countries the evidence in the T1 period shows that there was a real concern at the highest level about maintaining a traditional British policing response to public order in other words a response that minimize confrontation and the use of force by the police for that model of policing to work it
02:33:02 for that model of policing to work it required and indeed still requires as much Advanced information as possible about the event in question so that the level of policing is commensurate with the task and neither
02:33:13 commensurate with the task and neither provokes nor fails to prevent disorder and its escalation into serious violence that is why the work of the mbsb was so special Branch was so important to
02:33:28 special Branch was so important to public order policing all the more so in an era when political protest was instrumental to so much public disorder
02:33:39 instrumental to so much public disorder the second issue is subversion the 1980 1970 sorry akpo terms of reference for special Branch stated that its officers were responsible to their Chief officers and their function was to acquire security intelligence both secret and
02:33:51 security intelligence both secret and overt a to assist the chief officer in the preservation of public order and B as directed by the chief officer to
02:34:03 as directed by the chief officer to assist the security service and the task of defending the realm from attempts at Espionage and sabotage and from the actions of persons and organizations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the state
02:34:14 the security of the state the wording of the second of special branches responsibilities of course echoed that of the directive given by the Home Secretary sir David Maxwell Fife to the director general of the security service in 1952 seven years
02:34:28 security service in 1952 seven years after the end of the second World War the 1970s terms of reference were applicable to the work of all special branches including mpsb and the SDS as
02:34:39 branches including mpsb and the SDS as part of mpsb throughout the T1 era they were not replaced until 1984 when the home office produced its guidelines on the work of special branch which also
02:34:50 the work of special branch which also emphasized the responsibility of special Branch officers and their two primary tasks of gathering information about threats to public order and assisting the security service as your Council have pointed out the 1984 guidelines Incorporated the
02:35:03 1984 guidelines Incorporated the subsequent definition of subversion given by Lord Harris of Greenwich minister of State at the home office to the House of Lords in 1975 which itself derived from an internal security
02:35:16 derived from an internal security service definition dating back to 1972. under the Harris definition to be considered subversive the activities in question needed to satisfy two limbs that is to be one generally regarded as threatening the safety or well-being of
02:35:28 threatening the safety or well-being of the state and two intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political industrial or violent means however Lord Harris didn't elaborate it
02:35:49 however Lord Harris didn't elaborate it may be thought deliberately on precisely what kind of conduct would satisfy the first limb of the definition I.E what kind of conduct would constitute the requisite threat the home office guidelines in 1984 were accompanied by a confidential covering letter which is significant for the
02:36:03 letter which is significant for the width of its interpretation or arguably application of special Branch's second function to gather information on potentially subversive organizations or individuals even if they were currently acting lawfully from one perspective sir it may be
02:36:21 from one perspective sir it may be thought unethical and anti-democratic for the government to take such an approach to the activities of its citizens
02:36:22 citizens or at least it could be in respect of those individuals and groups who in fact have no real capacity to threaten in the state
02:36:29 state but from another perspective it may be thought sensible to take a precautionary approach to questions of National Security and to monitor certain groups of people before they become actively
02:36:44 of people before they become actively dangerous I.E before it is too late to stop them
02:36:46 stop them prior to and throughout the T1 period the security service saw itself and was seen by government as the only state body competent to determine whether a
02:36:59 body competent to determine whether a group was or wasn't subversive that is why the service not special Branch produced the overarching papers on subversion for the cabinet office throughout the T1 period and routinely advised the government on subversion via formal channels
02:37:10 formal channels such as the various committees on subversion which you have seen and directly by meetings between the director General the Prime Minister senior cabinet ministers and Senior civil servants
02:37:27 civil servants special branches function was to gather intelligence and subversion for the security service not to analyze it Services function was both to gather intelligence and to assess it which it did based on the entirety of the government's intelligence gathering
02:37:42 government's intelligence gathering apparatus including its own intelligence and that produced by special branch and the SDS
02:37:44 the SDS it was therefore necessary for special Brands to consult with and defer to the security service on the critical
02:37:55 security service on the critical question of what constituted subversion and which individual groups met that definition that process of consultation and advice is referred to directly by the home office in its confidential covering
02:38:07 office in its confidential covering letter for the 1984 guidelines to which I've referred it was not therefore constitutionally appropriate necessary or practical for The NPS to challenge the security services assessments on those matters
02:38:23 services assessments on those matters in their statements to you Council to the inquiry have advanced a narrow interpretation of the Harris definition of subversion which they submit should have been applied by special branch and
02:38:35 have been applied by special branch and which if it had been should have led the police to conclude that it was wrong to use undercover police officers to monitor the activities of left-wing activist groups particularly the ones that the SDS infiltrated
02:38:46 that the SDS infiltrated so such a legalistic approach is wrong in principle it also doesn't do justice to the evidence that the inquiry has obtained particularly from the cabinet office which indicates that the groups that the SDS monitored the 1970s were perceived
02:38:59 SDS monitored the 1970s were perceived to be subversive by the government and the security service and so legitimate targets for close monitoring by the state's intelligence apparatus of which the SDS was but one part
02:39:11 the SDS was but one part if the inquiry does wish to make high-level generalized findings of this nature it will need to conduct a more detailed investigation of the issue of
02:39:22 detailed investigation of the issue of how subversion was viewed in this period and to interrogate more carefully the working relationships between the cabinet office the home office the security service and special Branch topics which I've already touched on
02:39:41 I turn now to the historic historical and socio-political context in which the SDS did its work
02:39:50 the inquiry is aware that the SDS was formed in Late July 1968 comprising a small group of officers under the supervision of detective Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon with instructions to ascertain what information they could about the upcoming Vietnam solidarity
02:40:07 about the upcoming Vietnam solidarity campaign or VSC demonstration scheduled to take place in Central London in October 1968. however the SDS was only one element of a wider policing response to large-scale public disorder and so it's essential to
02:40:20 public disorder and so it's essential to place it in its historical political and policing context
02:40:25 in each of the mps's opening statements during charge one it is it has emphasized the importance of the inquiry obtaining neutral independent evidence when expert historian so that the work of the SDS can be properly
02:40:38 of the SDS can be properly contextualized and understood in this way
02:40:41 way in the absence of such evidence it now falls to the MPS and other core participants to provide their own versions of what they judge to be the relevant historical context with the inevitable if unwelcome consequence that those versions will be
02:40:56 consequence that those versions will be criticized and dismissed as partisan and incomplete nevertheless the exercise is an important one the mps's written closing statement therefore contains an account
02:41:08 statement therefore contains an account of some of the key events that bear upon the formation and function of the SDS during the T1 period I won't repeat that summary today but you will see that particular attention is given to the year 1968 including the 17th of March demonstration against the war the
02:41:20 demonstration against the war the Vietnam War concerns about public disorder concerns about subversion the formation of the SDS and the October 1968 demonstration and then the aftermath of that
02:41:35 and then the aftermath of that demonstration including the involvement of the cabinet office and the home office
02:41:36 office and the home secretary's comments to Parliament on the 7th of November 1968 during which he said and I quote there are groups of people who go under the name of Mark maoists anarchists
02:41:52 the name of Mark maoists anarchists trotskyites and half a dozen other small factions who are determined to provoke trouble with established Authority mostly in the person of the police on any occasion when they can find suitable excuse for so doing I have no sympathy with these people nor have the
02:42:03 with these people nor have the overwhelming number of people in the country a careful watch must be kept on any intentions that they may have
02:42:14 any intentions that they may have attention is also given in the mps's written closing statement to the home of the home office's authorizations of the sds's work
02:42:25 authorizations of the sds's work which was much more than approval for funding of officers accommodation as Council to the inquiry have implied the contemporaneous documents indicate quite clearly that the home office was fully aware of the nature of the sds's work and expressed no legal or moral
02:42:39 work and expressed no legal or moral qualms about the use of its long-term Undercover deployments
02:42:48 so I'm going to move on now to the topic of justification and value if I may
02:42:54 and I'd like to say this by way of introduction the inquiries terms of reference require it to identify and assess the adequacy of justification of undercover policing identifying the contemporaneous
02:43:08 identifying the contemporaneous justifications for the sds's deployments as opposed to the adequacy of those justifications is relatively speaking a simple task the general aims of the SDS at their
02:43:19 the general aims of the SDS at their highest may be summarized in these terms in furtherance of the responsibilities and function of special Branch as set in the 1970 terms of reference the SDS
02:43:30 the 1970 terms of reference the SDS obtained intelligence that could not be obtained from other sources and which assisted uniform branch in policing public order and assisted the security service in its counter subversion work the available evidence shows that the
02:43:42 the available evidence shows that the SDS was widely believed to be and was successful in meeting those two goals which in the late 1960s and 70s were closely intertwined as I have said as public order was often fermented by
02:43:56 public order was often fermented by groups whom the security service judged to be subversive contemporaneous justifications can also be identified within documents prepared at the time including the sds's annual
02:44:08 at the time including the sds's annual reports mpsb's annual reports and then exchanges between the MPS and the security service and within government level papers that the inquiry is published
02:44:14 published further contemporary justifications can and should be identified by inference from the historical context these would not of course have been
02:44:26 these would not of course have been recorded but may well have been apparent to the managers at the time the inquiry can't be confident that it has secured all that type of evidence at this stage
02:44:39 this stage the thornier question sir is whether the contemporaneous justifications were adequate
02:44:45 adequate it's not clear how the inquiry intends to approach its assessment of this it may be at a high level as CTI attempts in their opening statement for
02:44:58 attempts in their opening statement for trans1 modules to B and 2C or it may be more detailed year by year Group by group deployment by deployments or report by report a more detailed and contextualized approach is in principle preferable but would of course require a complete
02:45:09 would of course require a complete evidential picture which is lacking so care must be undertaken must be taken with a view to assisting the inquiry the MPS has sought to evaluate in summary form the evidence that the inquiry is so
02:45:21 form the evidence that the inquiry is so far obtained in respect to the principal Fields into which the SDS deployed that is the Vietnam solid solidarity campaign to stop the 70 tour the international socialists Socialist Workers Party and Splinter groups
02:45:35 Splinter groups the Socialist labor league and workers revolutionary party the international Marxist group maois groups Anarchist groups and Irish support groups
02:45:48 support groups this analysis is contained in appendix C to the written submissions which should be read alongside appendix B A chronology of relevant historical events during the T1 period and appendix d a summary of the sds's work in the
02:46:00 summary of the sds's work in the specific context of the battle of lewisham in 1977. so I'm not going to attempt to summarize those documents today instead I'd like just to make a few comments about the
02:46:11 just to make a few comments about the question of justification and then look briefly at the conclusions that can be drawn from the available evidence
02:46:17 first and most importantly the MPS frankly acknowledges that special Branch officers who authorize the deployments by the SDS did not
02:46:29 the deployments by the SDS did not consider their intrusive nature and the right privacy of the individuals targeted
02:46:32 targeted nor did they balance these factors against their value for them the value of the intelligence that the SDS produced and it's clear they thought it had did have a high
02:46:43 they thought it had did have a high value was ample justification by itself for its continuation
02:46:53 in failing to recognize or consider the intrusive nature of the undercover work MPS officers were acting in alignment with the general undeveloped appreciation of privacy at the time within the police the home office which authorized the S Test's work the
02:47:04 authorized the S Test's work the security service which received and you used its intelligence and the cabinet office which consumed Intelligence on the groups that the STS infiltrated this would not occur now
02:47:17 this would not occur now applying modern policing standards and under the current legal and policy framework since Ripper however it would be wrong to judge the MPS and mpsb officers who authorized
02:47:28 MPS and mpsb officers who authorized each of the sds's deployments by simply applying modern standards they were seeking to fulfill their responsibilities without the benefit of illegal and Regulatory framework and in an era where privacy rights were as highly were not as highly valued by
02:47:41 highly were not as highly valued by society and had not yet been articulated in domestic law
02:47:48 second the way in which the SDS operated in this period was generally to undertake long-term open-ended undercover deployments into groups this meant that a continuous stream of Intelligence on public order and subversion was available
02:47:59 subversion was available ucas were then well placed to gather specific Intelligence on plans of public disorder in advance of it occurring or to confirm the anticipated disorder may not occur
02:48:10 not occur the MPS acknowledges that this methodology which has been described as hoovering up information over long periods of time led to the creation of many reports which at an individual
02:48:23 many reports which at an individual level may not have been significant or valuable
02:48:24 valuable it would be right to say that the existence of some reports of lesser relevance sorry would not be right to say that the existence of some reports of lesser relevance undermines the overall adequacy of the Contemporary
02:48:43 overall adequacy of the Contemporary release justification but the MPS fully accepts that there may be a Tipping Point where reporting that is made consistently of low value over time is inappropriate
02:48:57 third the type of detailed direct intelligence that the SES ucos routinely produced couldn't have been obtained by any other means that were then available to the MPS open Communications attendance at public meetings the use of informants or indeed interceptions each of the groups plan
02:49:14 interceptions each of the groups plan their activities in private or in secret and many individuals were security conscious
02:49:15 conscious such methods simply wouldn't have captured the quality and quantity of Intelligence on the problems of public disorder and subversion as they were perceived at the time
02:49:31 fourth and finally the MPS would like to address a phrase or concept that has become something of an undefined shorthand within the inquiry it has been suggested that there was some form of prohibition on a UCO taking up a in quotes position of
02:49:43 up a in quotes position of responsibility in a Target group that phrase wasn't used contemporaneously and there was no such prohibition the correct position is that a UCA was expected to be a follower not a leader and not to influence the direction of
02:49:58 and not to influence the direction of the group into which they were deployed there was value in uco's assuming positions such as secretary or Treasurer in which they could exploit access to
02:50:09 in which they could exploit access to better information about their targets so long as they were able to do so without crossing the line between follower and leader or into agile provocateur that value should be acknowledged
02:50:20 Council to the inquiry question whether a desire to maintain a police response characterized by having sufficient but
02:50:31 characterized by having sufficient but not excessive police numbers is a valid one with respect it plainly was and is the desire of those in leadership positions that this should be achieved insofar as that is possible despite its efforts the inquiry is not in a position to assess whether during each event within the T1 decade
02:50:47 each event within the T1 decade many of which can be seen at the in the chronology at appendix B the policing decisions on the ground were positively or negatively or not at all affected by SDS intelligence the inquiries investigation simply
02:51:01 the inquiries investigation simply doesn't allow for this given the absence of relevant intelligence and pre-demonstration assessments and the absence of a comparative analysis of alternative European style models of policing
02:51:17 policing with respect it is simplistic to advance the point that it's hard to identify a single instance in which the SDS intelligence averted a public order Calamity in the T1 era the fact that there were few such calamities is itself evidence that the
02:51:33 calamities is itself evidence that the system to which the STS contributed was working demonstrations were placed effectively those involved with Gathering intelligence and policing public order were not going to record for the benefit of posterity their hypotheses on what might have happened at each
02:51:45 might have happened at each demonstration if it had been differently pleased
02:51:47 pleased the evidence that is available to the inquiry in fact provides strong support for the general conclusion that the sds's intelligence made a valuable
02:51:58 sds's intelligence made a valuable contribution to public order policing and this includes the contempreneurs documentary evidence which I've referred to the evidence given by the sds's officers and managers to this inquiry and the evidence given by A8 officers
02:52:09 and the evidence given by A8 officers for example Anthony speed who said in his unchallenged witness statement we in A8 could not have done our job without the special Branch assessments quite frankly we could not begin to design an
02:52:26 frankly we could not begin to design an operational plan until we knew where the demonstration was taking place how many people would turn up the expected violence and whether there was to be any opposition once we knew this we were
02:52:37 opposition once we knew this we were able to talk about the number of uniform officers and the command structures required
02:52:42 the evidence obtained by the inquiry also indicates that the scs's deployments furthered the Empire special branches special special branches second function the provision of intelligence
02:52:53 function the provision of intelligence to the security service on groups that the service judged to be subversive SDS reporting was routinely provided to the service and special Branch arms today answered a stream of requests for information throughout the T1 period
02:53:07 information throughout the T1 period witness Zed on behalf of the security service accepts the value of this intelligence and his conclusion has not been challenged by the inquiry I say sorry their conclusion has not been challenged by the inquiry The Limited
02:53:20 challenged by the inquiry The Limited number of cabinet office documents that there are in evidence although not commented upon by witness said also established that the groups targeted by the SDS were of genuine concern to the government throughout the T1 period and
02:53:32 government throughout the T1 period and that assessments of their activities and intentions were considered and relied upon at the highest level of government including within the home office the cabinet office and by the prime minister
02:53:47 cabinet office and by the prime minister important relevant documents are missing however from the cabinet office papers for example the reports of the inter-departmental group of subversion public life which senior officers in special Branch were entitled to receive and also missing are the minutes of the
02:54:03 and also missing are the minutes of the committee administers set up in 1972 And chaired by the then prime minister sir Edward Heath nevertheless as CTI observed the available records clearly demonstrate consistent appetite it appears without reservation for continuous detailed
02:54:15 reservation for continuous detailed intelligence about subversive groups throughout the T1 period complemented by a desire to take active steps to counter
02:54:28 a desire to take active steps to counter subversion it's incontrovertible so that the sds's intelligence contributed to this process and to the security services efforts to closely monitor each of the groups they identified to be subversive
02:54:42 so I'm going to turn now to the discrete topics of training personal reporting and language criminality and the use use of deceased children's identities
02:54:56 the inquiry is evidence demonstrates that SDS officers didn't receive formal course-based standardized training for their undercover rules the MPS accepts that in the field of modern on Modern undercover policing as in many other
02:55:12 undercover policing as in many other types of policing work formal training is an essential tool for fostering professionalism honing skills and developing resistant resilience however policing culture was very different in the 1960s and 1970s and in particular there were no formal
02:55:23 particular there were no formal standards for undercover police deployments in respect to the sds's initial operation between August and October 1968 its officers were not recruited to a pre-existing role and in some cases
02:55:40 a pre-existing role and in some cases the work of these initial recruits went little beyond the type of inquiries plain clothes mpsb officers might conduct save that the undercover officers would have a backstory to rely on and a false name to give if challenged and then returned to meetings again and again
02:55:51 again and again thereafter as the work of the SDS extended those in charge might fairly
02:56:03 extended those in charge might fairly have concluded that the expertise in how to carry out an undercover role resided within the unit rather than in any external course for this reason the method of training developed whereby an officer due to be deployed would spend a period of time in the back office of the SDS learning about the type of reporting being
02:56:15 about the type of reporting being carried out and the type of work being done by existing undercover officers by processing that intelligence and visiting the safe house for regular meetings and debriefings
02:56:26 meetings and debriefings there can be no doubt that those in charge of the unit consider this period to be training I.E on the job learning
02:56:39 to be training I.E on the job learning a pathway analogous to an apprenticeship in a similar vein whilst there was no formal end in deployment training officers expected to receive informal advice and instructions during SDS meetings throughout their deployment
02:56:52 those in charge of the SDS would have appreciated that they could rely on the fact that in almost all cases the new recruit was an mpsb special Branch officer this would have meant they'd
02:57:03 officer this would have meant they'd undergone a rigorous selection process and a training program By 1979 at least special Brands ran six initial training courses and two Advanced courses annually
02:57:21 Advanced courses annually the initial calls included sessions on the role of special branches and mpsb structure the role of the security service
02:57:25 service police Security Service liaison an introduction to the threat from subversion subversion in industry trotskis anarchists and the alternative Society subversion in the UK colored Community as it was then called A8
02:57:39 Community as it was then called A8 public order the ultra left public order in the industrial field trotskius and public order and right-wing extremism the advanced course included sessions on the role and responsibility of the
02:57:53 the role and responsibility of the security service and introduction to the services study of subversion the ultra left International communism current problems in the subversive scene and left-wing current priorities together with a session on A8 branch and public order
02:58:04 order it's also clear that for the purposes of detailed written guidance special Branch had its own comprehensive standing orders at this time and SDS officers would also have to a
02:58:24 and SDS officers would also have to a lesser or greater degree some experience of special Branch inquiry work routine work required officers to attend the meetings of activists as I've said sometimes discreetly in addition selection for the SDS was typically on the basis of personal recommendation thus indicating that the recruits attributes had impressed an STS officer or manager
02:58:38 officer or manager while there was an expectation that soundings would have been taken this approach must now be recognized to lack transparency they were however such approaches were far more common across many policing and
02:58:54 far more common across many policing and non-policing areas in this era including of course the legal profession that would be the case today
02:58:59 however the MPS accepts particularly in the light of the sexual misconduct of SDS officers and the topics that I will now address that it's abundantly clear that considerably better training
02:59:13 that considerably better training guidance and support was needed and was provided to the SDS officers at the relevant time turning them to personal reporting in language
02:59:19 language the aims of the SDS in this period are set out in its 1969 terms of reference and they included identifying those who engage in preliminary planning or who take part in public demonstrations and
02:59:33 take part in public demonstrations and Gathering and recording information for long-term intelligence purposes this was an aspect of work which the SDS did which also supported the security service
02:59:44 service there are a number of the examples as I've said of the security service seeking specific and general information about individuals involved in the organization's concerned and this was confirmed by officers who
02:59:55 and this was confirmed by officers who gave evidence to the inquiry that they reported on individuals in this way and that that reporting would be passed to the security service as the inquiries evidence demonstrates
03:00:08 as the inquiries evidence demonstrates the SCS gathered and recorded personal information such as personal descriptions and other information such as details about individuals addresses house moves Vehicles finances
03:00:19 house moves Vehicles finances associations domestic arrangements and employment this reporting includes some highly personal details about individuals private circumstances events or activities in some cases there is a reporting about children
03:00:35 reporting about children the MPS invites the inquiry to take into account Five Points when reviewing this type of reporting first the whole scale hoovering carried out by the SDS would not occur in the context of undercover operations today the SDS was operating in an era before
03:00:46 the SDS was operating in an era before careful pre-planned and proportionately
03:00:59 careful pre-planned and proportionately assessed targeting of the type required by Ripper and the app code of practice these governing instruments recognize the particularly intrusive nature of undercover policing and through the concepts such as collateral intrusion seek to minimize intrusion into the private lives of those who are not the target of the deployment second even in the environment the SDS
03:01:12 second even in the environment the SDS worked in I.E without a clear framework for assessing the risks of intrusion and minimizing collateral intrusion some of the language used by the officers in
03:01:25 the language used by the officers in some of the reports was not acceptable this includes rudeness derogatory and arrogant language which was objectionable even at the time it had no intelligence value and it's not defended but simply it shouldn't have occurred
03:01:38 but simply it shouldn't have occurred and when seen by managers it should have been amended and the issue explained to the reporting officer
03:01:44 third officers shouldn't now be criticized for the use of language and terminology which is unacceptable now but wasn't considered problematic at the time an example of this is the use of a word
03:01:55 an example of this is the use of a word such as colored which would not be used now but which was commonplace during that period and examples of this can be found in many places including in Parliament
03:02:06 fourth the inquiry should appreciate that many categories of personal information are capable of being relevant and valuable for intelligence purposes
03:02:12 purposes personal reporting is not improper per se even highly personal reporting which may be valuable and justified in certain circumstances examples of this are considered in
03:02:23 examples of this are considered in detail in the mps's written statement finally it would not always have been obvious at the time or be clear in retrospect which intelligence was valuable and which should have been
03:02:38 valuable and which should have been thought not have been sought and kept even when giving evidence many SDS officers didn't appreciate what value individual items of intelligence might have been capable of having and in an operational context this is
03:02:49 operational context this is understandable particularly in respective information where the greater intelligence value was to the security service rather than the police the decision whether a piece of
03:03:01 the decision whether a piece of intelligence is relevant or a value was and is for the analyst of that intelligence not the undercover officer reporting it further as the MPS stated at the start of T1 intelligence can have a latent
03:03:17 of T1 intelligence can have a latent latent value that doesn't manifest until sometime after it has been gathered or
03:03:22 or has been gathered but ended up being of little value if the individuals or groups targeted proved to be harmless but that is only a judgment that can be made in retrospect
03:03:33 made in retrospect in summary sir it may be appropriate to report and to retain even highly personal private information in the context of a properly Justified deployment the inquiry is therefore urged not to make any finding at the level of General generality about any
03:03:48 level of General generality about any class of information being off limits for intelligence purposes how it's however it's recognized that no special or directed guidance was given to STS officers about the types of reporting that were plainly sensitive and personal
03:04:02 and personal the MPS accepts that it should have been clearer or clear to Managers from the early days that SDS officers had access to far more personal and private information than was available through normal mpsb inquiries
03:04:14 normal mpsb inquiries it would have been beneficial for some form of guidance on this topic to have been given to undercover officers to
03:04:25 been given to undercover officers to ensure that reporting remained relevant necessary and ethical and was only retained with good reason it's clear that this type of consideration simply was not an Evidence in the intelligence community of the time many years before Ripper
03:04:36 time many years before Ripper just as the evaluative exercise which I've outlined in respect of the overall deployments wasn't in place but should never or less have been given some consideration
03:04:52 criminality the guidance in respect of Engagement in criminal conduct which was in operation from close to the beginning of the T1 period was the home office circular 97 1969.
03:05:00 1969. concerning the use by the police of informants who take part in crime the Salient parts of which are quoted in the mbs's written statement although it's not Plain on its face that
03:05:15 although it's not Plain on its face that this circular applied to police officers in addition to civilian informants it should have been clear from at least two 1974 criminal cases mcavilion Lee a million Sheridan that it did
03:05:27 did unsurprisingly few of the SDS officers who gave evidence to the inquiry recalled the circular by name or recognized it in its original format but its Central principles at least in so far as not acting as an Asian
03:05:38 so far as not acting as an Asian provocateur were broadly understood by the majority some recalled this type of guidance being given expressly in the
03:05:54 guidance being given expressly in the context of the sds's work others did not roycrima for example suggested in his evidence that the rules were clear within the STS from the outset many ucos have informed inquiry that law breaking was not an issue in their deployments as the groups into which
03:06:05 deployments as the groups into which they were deployed were not engaged in criminal conduct however a number of ucos were involved in fly posting or conduct during demonstrations which would amount to obstruction both of which appear to have been tacitly
03:06:19 which appear to have been tacitly authorized and treated at the time as being the type of conduct necessary to show the requisite enthusiasm for their role and to maintain their cover
03:06:30 maintain their cover however in the mps's written closing statements it considers sport four specific case studies in which SDS officers engaged in criminality I will not repeat those now but it may be thought that certain
03:06:47 but it may be thought that certain themes arise from the examples given in particular the fact that there were no clear policies for managing the involvement of ucas in the criminal justice system and for managing offices undercover officers knowledge of Legally privileged information
03:06:59 privileged information second the fact that the courts were repeatedly misled by not being informed that undercover police officers were appearing as defendants
03:07:12 appearing as defendants third the fact that managers didn't take appropriate disciplinary action in response to criminal conduct by an undercover officer which will no doubt
03:07:23 undercover officer which will no doubt be a matter that the inquiry will wish to consider further in the conduct of the management of STS deployments in later tranches
03:07:31 so those are matters where the MPS recognizes that criticisms can and should be made and finally as the closing statement acknowledges inquiry may want to give further consideration to referrals to the miscarriage of Justice panel
03:07:49 the use of deceased children's identities the MPS acknowledges as it did at the start of the tranche one hearings the insufficient consideration was given by
03:08:06 insufficient consideration was given by the SDS to the impact the practice might have had if revealed or discovered on the families of concern of those concerned that impact was neither intended nor foreseen but for the families it has
03:08:19 foreseen but for the families it has been significant and the MPS apologizes again for the shock and distress that they have suffered it's not clear precisely when the SDS first started using deceased children's identities or what indeed prompted it to do so there's some evidence that suggest
03:08:37 do so there's some evidence that suggest that the practice was popularized by The Day of the Jackal a novel published in 1971 but this is far from conclusive whatever the correct position the practice was already in use by the time the managers Who provided evidence the inquiry joined the SDS and they either authorized its continued use or
03:08:49 authorized its continued use or informally maintained the pre-existing practice
03:08:51 practice from the mid-1970s it was standard practice for ucos to use children's identities as part of their Legend building this corresponded with an increase in the length of the undercover deployments and the moved infiltration
03:09:08 deployments and the moved infiltration of more security conscious organizations these two factors created a significant ongoing risk that the uco's false identities would be uncovered thereby terminating their work and more importantly exposing them to a real risk of physical harm
03:09:24 of physical harm it was therefore essential for ucos to create credible identities that could withstand close proactive scrutiny including checks of birth records which at the time were publicly available in hard copy at the general Records Office it wasn't possible at that time to
03:09:37 it wasn't possible at that time to falsify entries into these records so using the identity of a real person was considered necessary for safety purposes it also had the secondary advantage of
03:09:48 it also had the secondary advantage of giving uca's access to hard copy birth certificates which they needed to obtain driving licenses and passports in their cover identities the person in question
03:10:00 the person in question needed to have been born at about the same time as the officer to avoid suspicion as to the disparity between age and appearance but it could also not have been a living person it might have been known to a member of the group
03:10:20 member of the group or discovered by research or accident or by didn't of deployment gain a special Branch file for all these reasons it needed to be someone who had died the use of a deceased person's identity still itself carried an inherent inherent risk that the uca's death in inverted commas would be exposed by
03:10:34 inverted commas would be exposed by reference to the corresponding public records of deaths using the identity of a child was believed to minimize this risk by
03:10:46 believed to minimize this risk by maximizing the difficulty of finding the associated record it also meant that other personal records that could jeopardize the UCO such as employment or education records would either be non-existent or difficult to find a hostile researcher may not have
03:11:01 a hostile researcher may not have thought to look for the death of a child or may not have wanted to search many years of historical archives
03:11:10 years of historical archives the manner in which records were kept in separate Ledges made it more difficult to establish a link between birth and death particularly in circumstances where a child had been a little older when they died because birth and death certificates wouldn't have been located close to each other
03:11:27 close to each other in summary sir in the T1 period the use of deceased children's identities was believed to be the only effective practical and safe means of preserving SDS officers false identities over the course of their long deployments while the practice wasn't entirely itself without risk it remained the
03:11:40 itself without risk it remained the securest method available and this view prevailed notwithstanding the fact that the link between birth and death had been established during the deployment
03:11:54 been established during the deployment of one officer hn297 and had led him to be compromised and withdrawn from the field
03:11:56 field during this inquiry no one has yet identified an alternative method which would have been as effective and as safe at the time and the inquiry is asked to accept that
03:12:09 and the inquiry is asked to accept that this was a necessary practice in all the circumstances or alternatively that it was reasonable for the sds's managers to have believed it to offer the best and safest solution
03:12:25 in its opening statement for T1 P3 the MPS formally requested the inquiry investigated whether the practice of using deceased children's identity identities originated or where it originated including whether it was used by other UK State bodies such as the
03:12:40 by other UK State bodies such as the security service prior to its use by the SDS
03:12:41 SDS so the answer that question may be felt to be important it is directly relevant to the assessment of whether the use of the practice may have been reasonable at
03:12:54 the practice may have been reasonable at the time because it represented standard practice within the intelligence community
03:12:58 community and it may also be relevant because it would objectively confirm that there were no other practical and safe methods for preserving the long-term security of ucos or rather covert human intelligence sources
03:13:11 sources so at the start of that hearing you declined the mps's request on the grounds that it wouldn't illuminate the origins of the practice within the STS following this the MPS wrote to the
03:13:25 following this the MPS wrote to the security service directly to ask if they would clarify the position however they also declined to do so from the fbs's perspective these responses have caused a significant missed opportunity to assess the use of deceased children's identities by
03:13:39 deceased children's identities by reference to its proper historical context
03:13:44 so I've now concluded the main body of my exhibitions almost on time and I would just like to make these very short remarks at the end if I may
03:13:55 first I would like to Echo what I said at the start of the T1 hearings on behalf of The NPS and that is that the inquiry continues to have the absolute commitment of the MPS in its work
03:14:11 commitment of the MPS in its work and the the MPS will assist the inquiry and will continue to assist inquiry in every way it can and second I'd like to emphasize again that the MPS approaches the issues under investigation by the inquiry with
03:14:22 investigation by the inquiry with humanity and with a willingness to identify and learn from the mistakes of the past
03:14:33 so that concludes my all opening statement
03:14:38 thank you very much Mr Skelton you've come well within the time that the inquiry was willing to a lot to and I'm very grateful to you for doing so it will um reduce the pressure of time
03:14:49 will um reduce the pressure of time under which we all operate thank you
03:15:00 under which we all operate thank you we will now resume at five past two uh with Mr Sanders for the DL team thank you
03:15:27 I did cut it right now I hope it was helpful it's very difficult for you to hear the same thing again and again when you've read it um I do appreciate it
03:15:35 you'll find about the news
03:15:39 because the leading Association for the