Afternoon session of Tranche 1 closing statements featuring Metropolitan Police legal counsel arguing the justification for the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) 1968-1982. Counsel defends public order intelligence gathering and counter-subversion work, arguing police faced serious public disorder requiring intelligence to prevent violence to officers and civilians. Extensive debate with the Chair on the extent and value of SDS intelligence contribution to specific public order events.
00:22:35 foreign
00:23:42 we're ready to proceed Sir John thank you Mr Sanders good afternoon sir can you hear me okay I can indeed excellent thank you um
00:23:53 um I know your team is aware but you might not be aware that I'm I'm in fact on leave at the moment and I uh when the these hearings were originally listed for before Christmas and I had last week and this week booked off
00:24:06 and this week booked off so I've done my best to read all the other closings uh yesterday um but there's there's only so much I could do but um I'm really going to stick to my script in any of it can I
00:24:18 stick to my script in any of it can I apologize for interrupting your leave and express my gratitude to you for coming back in uh when really you ought to be um putting your feet up yes well I'm not at all that so it's uh no problem thank you sir
00:24:30 problem thank you sir um so what I'm I'm going to do is is is follow uh broadly the the outline of of our of our written closing uh so to deal with the main body of the closing first and then turn to the to the legal
00:24:45 and then turn to the to the legal framework submissions I'm not of course going to attempt to read through everything I will just try and pick up some some key themes and and headlines um and so starting with
00:24:56 um and so starting with um the point that I'm going to come back to in terms of the legal framework we've given you an outline of of what we say
00:25:07 given you an outline of of what we say that you the inquiry can do in relation to the legal framework and then at the end I'll turn to what we say you cannot get into
00:25:14 get into um so in in our submission um it is quite right and proper for the inquiry to take account of the legal framework uh within which the the SDS
00:25:28 framework uh within which the the SDS was operating uh so far as that's clear and uncontentious um and the propositions that we say uh meet that description are as follows and they're really as regards
00:25:39 they're really as regards the rights of individuals the corresponding duties of the police and also the powers of the police so starting with the rights of in individuals
00:25:53 individuals um there's of course the right to demonstrate peacefully uh and that's a right of all citizens
00:26:06 uh and that's a right of all citizens whatever their view so the right of far left groups to demonstrate and protest is precisely the same as the right of far-right groups to do this to do so unless of course they are prescribed organizations [Music]
00:26:13 [Music] um
00:26:20 um accompanying that there's the right to hold and attend election meetings um on uh public premises um and there's also the right of other citizens who don't wish to demonstrate or protest to go about their their
00:26:33 or protest to go about their their ordinary business without without let or hindrance
00:26:34 hindrance so those are those are the rights that um that the that the police must respect um and the corollary of those rights of the following duties of the police
00:26:46 the following duties of the police so first is the duty to maintain public order and to prevent disorder and those are there are of course two limbs to that
00:26:56 that um uh two sides to that coin um but maintaining public Tranquility the king's peace is one part of it and ensuring that
00:27:07 ensuring that um that is not destroyed and that there isn't disorder and quelling disorder is is another part of it the second key Duty that the police had and still have
00:27:19 Duty that the police had and still have of course is to prevent and detect crime and there are various public order offenses uh that were enforced at the time and relevant at the time which of course it was for the for the police to enforce
00:27:30 enforce um and then the final Duty we just mentioned and pick up on is the duty of police special branches in this case in particular the Metropolitan Police Special branch to assist and support
00:27:53 to assist and support um a their uniform colleagues in in policing public order and B MI5 in dealing with Espionage um subversion uh and extremism uh and National Security matters generally
00:28:04 matters generally um so those are the duties that the the police were under and then just in terms of their powers um in particular we pick up of course there were the the powers that the that the police had under the public order
00:28:18 the police had under the public order act 1936 in relation to processions so they had the power to impose con conditions on processions not on any and every protest or demonstration but moving non-static protests and demonstrations
00:28:31 demonstrations uh and also to ban them and those Powers were exercisable um in advance which would obviously require intelligence uh upon which to exercise those powers and they would also be exercisable in response to
00:28:49 also be exercisable in response to unfolding uh situations uh on the ground um and then the other power that the police had relevant power was their permissive common law power um to do anything that wasn't prohibited so that's what we say the the the framework the legal framework was
00:29:00 framework the legal framework was insofar as it's clear and uncontentious and should be taken into account by the by the inquiry um
00:29:09 um the key points arising out of all of this in our submission sir is that the police were faced with a very difficult balance to strike that they had to they obliged to facilitate demonstrations and
00:29:31 obliged to facilitate demonstrations and also simultaneous counter demonstrations um they were obliged to treat the far left and the far right uh anyone in between or outside of that in the same way
00:29:39 way um and they had to do that while also ensuring that those not interested in
00:29:50 interested in politics or Marxism or fascism were able to use the highways um and the public spaces and go about their business um as they saw fit so there's a very
00:30:04 um as they saw fit so there's a very difficult balance for the for the police to strike there and that's what we say comes out you can see from the legal framework
00:30:06 framework um
00:30:11 um in terms of the the public order problem um we start our submissions um with this observation which is see it
00:30:25 um with this observation which is see it comes from from our clients that they're they feel that there is a heads-eye win Tales you lose um theme to The inquiries proceedings whereby an absence of violence or an
00:30:41 whereby an absence of violence or an absence of serious disorder is taken to suggest that there was no need for public order intelligence um and the occurrence of violence or serious disorder is taken to indicate that
00:30:55 that um the intelligence was ineffective and therefore
00:30:56 therefore um pointless and we say that that's um
00:31:10 um a it proceeds from from a false premise there was in fact during the 1968 to 1982 period a very serious and escalating public order problem um particularly in the capital
00:31:25 um particularly in the capital um and that subsisted in a very high number of public order events particularly political public order events uh with a very high potential for disorder um and while it is true that for the
00:31:36 um and while it is true that for the most part the Metropolitan Police was able successfully to avoid uh repeat or recurrence of what happened in Grosvenor Square on the 17th of March 68.
00:31:48 Square on the 17th of March 68. that was not because the problem went away or evaporated it was because of the steps that the Metropolitan Police took to address the problem and to maintain
00:32:03 to address the problem and to maintain maintain itself on top of the problem on an ongoing basis and there were really three parts to that uh the measures those measures the first was the establishment of A8 so A specialized public order branch that will coordinate across the fourth
00:32:19 that will coordinate across the fourth or offices from divisions and deal with uh public order events secondly the development of specialist training
00:32:31 training or offices on public order duties and then lastly the development of specialist equipment particularly the protective Shields um and then thirdly and importantly from your perspective sir was the
00:32:44 your perspective sir was the establishment of the the SDS as a resource to um significantly improve the intelligence that the special Branch was able to provide A8 um in connection with its management of of public order
00:33:04 of public order and we've uh returned to some of the the statistics we set out um
00:33:12 um in 2020 in our in our in our first T1 P1 opening sir and I just remind you of of the the bear headlines there um between 1968 and 1982 there were thousands of significant public order events in London
00:33:27 events in London um there were thousands of arrests at those events there were thousands of injuries to police officers at those events and there were also hundreds of injuries to civilians
00:33:40 to civilians and this all in our submission speaks of a as we say a very serious um public order problem that the police needed to maintain on top of keep on top of
00:33:55 um also looking at the statistics sir what one one sees is that there was an increase across the T1 period uh in events requiring the deployment of more than 100 officers from just over
00:34:07 more than 100 officers from just over one a week to just over one a day by the end of the the T1 period um but one also sees uh alongside that statistic that events requiring the
00:34:22 statistic that events requiring the deployment of more than 50 officers remain relatively stable so in the region of 400 to 5 500 a year throughout the 70s and what in our submission that that tells us is that you can see
00:34:38 is that you can see um there was just an increase in the number of officers required to keep order
00:34:40 order um
00:34:48 um one also sees that in the statistics for numbers of officers deployed on public order duties annually which increased from around twenty thousand deployments per year at the beginning of the 70s to more than a hundred thousand uh by the end of the T1 period and what in our submission is vitally
00:35:01 and what in our submission is vitally important is that the inquiry properly appreciates and reflects the realities of public order policing and the realities of disorder
00:35:17 and the realities of disorder the those realities most immediately uh were visited upon police officers the police police officers who were required to police those events uh and then by virtue of
00:35:26 virtue of having to redeploy offices from elsewhere they they had an impact on on The Wider police um notwithstanding the fact that the police would be wearing by and large helmets
00:35:41 helmets the vast majority of injuries that occurred during this period were injuries to police officers um as I say thousands to police officers and hundreds to civilians and so they
00:35:55 and hundreds to civilians and so they bore the brunt of public order policing and then that of course has a knock-on effect for um individuals and for society um
00:36:03 um what we have tried to do in our closing so as you'll have seen um is to research video footage of some of these events and so far as we're able to obtain it
00:36:14 to obtain it um in order to try and demonstrate and bring home the reality of what of what the public order policing
00:36:25 the public order policing um situation was there is limited footage available particularly from the late 1960s and
00:36:36 particularly from the late 1960s and early 1970s and so all we can do is put forward effectively a snapshot of some clips of some events um and it's it's fairly random fairly ad hoc there are some significant events
00:36:47 hoc there are some significant events that there's no footage of and there are some more minor events that one can get footage of um but
00:36:51 um but if one views the footage what it shows is not only um police officers being shouted at and pushed and shoved um we see them pelted with missiles
00:37:13 um we see them pelted with missiles um and attacked with weapons so coins Stones bottles bricks staves
00:37:18 staves um marbles thrown under the Hooves of police horses um flares and fireworks thrown at the police uh flower and a paint
00:37:32 police uh flower and a paint ammonia flung in the office in the eyes of officers petrol bombs used for more than one occasion um various things set on fire Windows smashed protesters scaling scaffolding
00:37:49 smashed protesters scaling scaffolding balconies and roofs so very significant and difficult physically difficult to deal with situations um
00:37:53 um there's also of course the logistical side of policing those um types of events what we've tried to do to set out in the written closing and I won't take you through each and every incident is to to demonstrate that
00:38:07 incident is to to demonstrate that between March and October 1968 there continued to be um very serious incidents of violence and disorder that were difficult to contain and that those continued after October 1968.
00:38:20 October 1968. um and there were multiple instances of very serious disorder in 1969 1970 1971 1972
00:38:38 1972 um we include the stop the 70 tour as being relevant to consider um
00:38:38 um add the um the South African Cricket tour not been canceled they would of course have been very significant
00:38:51 course have been very significant disorder at uh test match grounds as the stop the 70 tour campaigners tried to have the tour canceled Midway through
00:39:02 have the tour canceled Midway through and that in our submission was clearly something that it was appropriate to um to police and that required intelligence about in order to do that
00:39:13 intelligence about in order to do that and that's got nothing to do with being for or against apartheid it's just a question of dealing with disorder we then come in the chronology to what we say is a key event
00:39:29 we say is a key event um which is in 1972 Idi Amin expelling the Ugandan Asians from Uganda
00:39:37 Uganda um Edward Heath's government deciding to admit 27 000 to this country that event is widely
00:39:39 is widely um
00:39:40 um seen as the trigger to the increasing popularity in the 1970s off the national front we've given some references to
00:39:52 front we've given some references to that it also appears in some of the um some of the subversion related papers obtained from a home office and cabinet office
00:39:57 office that that event and then
00:40:08 that that event and then media hysteria and public concern about the implications of it was is widely seen as a key vital event in in the upsurge in National front popularity um and what this did was introduce a new dimension to the public order scene
00:40:22 dimension to the public order scene um and the reason in particular that it did that
00:40:26 did that was not only because there was [Music]
00:40:26 [Music] um
00:40:27 um moderate opposition to the National front from uh mainstream parties and from Faith groups and so on but there
00:40:39 from Faith groups and so on but there was militant opposition to the National front
00:40:40 front and the particular reason for that was that the rise in membership support of the national front
00:40:58 the national front um engaged Marxist trotsky's Doctrine um about fascism Fascism and racism so the theory was that um as Society moves as capitalism collapses and Society moves towards the revolution
00:41:12 revolution um fascism and racism can become a way of dividing the working class and thereby avoiding the Revolution and so fascists and racists must be to use the the far left terminology smashed they
00:41:29 the far left terminology smashed they must be smashed on the streets they must be prevented and that is in order to ensure that the revolution can then take place that's that's simply the theory um and that coupled with um
00:41:40 um Marxist trotsky's theory about the police being representatives of the um of capitalism and of the establishment and Defenders of the system who must also be smashed
00:41:52 also be smashed um generated a
00:42:03 um generated a um a perfect storm from the public order perspective of uh conflagration of um factors
00:42:05 factors um and it it really became a symbiotic self-escalating relationship between the far left and the far right each giving
00:42:19 far left and the far right each giving each other a reason to exist each giving each other something to uh get excited about to fight against um and then a Tit for Tat series of events
00:42:29 events um and what one sees is that
00:42:44 um and what one sees is that throughout the period the demonstrations and counter demonstrations between the far left and the far right become the key public order Factor and a very serious one at that
00:42:58 that's the the problem uh and the legal framework tells us that it was the police's job to manage it so we then come to
00:43:04 the justification for
00:43:11 for um public order policing and for for the obtaining in particular of intelligence um it it's self-evident sir that demonstrations large numbers of people gathered together particularly large numbers of people of opposing views wishing to
00:43:23 wishing to to counter each other have to be pleased or they will result in disorder um doing this without resort to the use of or the threat of uh plastic baton
00:43:35 of or the threat of uh plastic baton rounds quarter Cannon tear gas is not straightforward um and as we set out in our closing statement under policing and over policing are both problematic
00:43:49 policing are both problematic um they both have an impact on morale an impact on recruitment and retention
00:43:58 impact on recruitment and retention uh an impact on the effectiveness of the police the the ability of the police to do other works and therefore an impact on crime and disorder elsewhere um and I'm just I'm not going to read out much of the closing but I want to read out a paragraph 2.2.5
00:44:09 read out a paragraph 2.2.5 if there had been more disorder and violence during the T1 era there would have been more damage to property and to people's businesses and livelihoods more injuries and probably more deaths
00:44:26 injuries and probably more deaths demonstrations and protests would have been more dangerous for everyone protesters police and others even if all public order events had been massively over policed the right to demonstrate and protest would have been curtailed they would still have been
00:44:44 curtailed they would still have been disorder and violence damage to property businesses and livelihoods injuries and possibly deaths and there would also have been more crime elsewhere and that means more offenses against the person theft criminal damage and so either way individuals in society as a
00:44:58 either way individuals in society as a whole would have suffered so the problem of public order policing isn't simply matching the number of officers to the number of demonstrators or matching the number of officers to the to the mood of the demonstrators
00:45:09 the demonstrators um it it's important that the the balance is struck correctly under policing
00:45:20 policing will tend to lead to disorder over policing has adverse consequences elsewhere
00:45:25 elsewhere the proposition that intelligence is vital to being able to do this effectively one can see that the Supreme Court decision of cat um
00:45:37 um one can one knows that demonstrators who wish to cause disorder and whose objective is to smash the police are not going to cooperate with the police and give them the information they need to stop them uh that that self-evident
00:45:52 stop them uh that that self-evident uh intelligence is also important for Logistics
00:45:54 Logistics and one sees and the evidence particularly the eight eight the A8 evidence
00:45:59 evidence um and also in the videos that we provided what those Logistics looked like and they were extremely taxing not just simply pressing a button and having a certain number of police officers
00:46:16 a certain number of police officers turning up at a particular event there was a need to call up officers cancel leave um backfill officers called up so that there were other officers to cover the duties they would have been doing um transporting them to to the event
00:46:31 um transporting them to to the event they couldn't just all arrive on the bus or the tube and Catering providing toilets accommodating them um dealing with traffic restrictions traffic orders closing roads um bringing the right amount of them of
00:46:44 um bringing the right amount of them of temporary crowd control barriers so all of those logistical math is needed to be dealt with and that required intelligence about what was going to happen and what was needed
00:46:54 needed and this was not in our submission just on an event by event basis what was needed and what the police needed was an understanding of the public order seen as a whole so they
00:47:07 public order seen as a whole so they needed to know who was who in terms of individuals and groups um which groups were related opposed to each other Allied to each other likely to cooperate or join in unlikely to do so
00:47:20 so um which organizations were really fronts for other organizations um what not only what threat would one
00:47:34 um what not only what threat would one group pose but what threat would two or three or four groups pose in aggregate if in the same place um
00:47:35 um as recognized in cat intelligence gathering is inevitably indiscriminate and hit and miss you can't only collect um valuable intelligence
00:47:48 um valuable intelligence um it has to be collected and then assessed
00:47:53 assessed so in order to fulfill its functions in our submission uh the Metropolitan Police Special Branch needed to maintain a large intelligence database um so it could
00:48:06 um so it could so that the squads in special Branch could provide um A8 with assessments on particular events and this inevitably meant
00:48:18 events and this inevitably meant um as has been referred to hoovering up a great deal of information that was never used um and you've seen sir in the in the special Branch files that there were files on
00:48:31 files on um local authorities and Charities and retailers
00:48:36 retailers um it wasn't simply about collecting information on uh groups or individuals who might be of concern it was about compiling a picture um that was cross-referenceable
00:48:48 cross-referenceable um so that um detailed assessments could be prepared depending on what the the circumstances were
00:48:59 circumstances were and that picture needed to be maintained and kept updated on an ongoing basis um the public order scene did fluctuate and have Peaks and troughs and cycles and it could flare up in
00:49:17 and cycles and it could flare up in reaction to particular unexpected events so for example internment or Bloody Sunday
00:49:19 Sunday um and
00:49:22 um and as we said in our first opening at the outset it's not possible to wait until
00:49:33 outset it's not possible to wait until uh events have heated up and become more intense and then try and infiltrate groups in order to obtain uh intelligence one has to be there um on a on a long-term basis um so that when
00:49:44 um so that when things do occur um the intelligence can be obtained
00:49:53 that so is what we say is the the justification in terms of your identification of the justification for the work of the SDs that it was it was it was a public order problem uh it's well recognized that policing
00:50:08 uh it's well recognized that policing public order requires intelligence to a certain level of detail um and that was what the SDS was there
00:50:20 um and that was what the SDS was there to do in terms of whether it contributed to that whether it um whether it's work um assisted that objective the I noticed that Mr Barr in his closing said it's difficult to identify an instance where an SDS intelligence averted a public order calamity
00:50:35 averted a public order calamity uh in our submission that's there are a number of problems with this approach first the inquiry hasn't investigated
00:50:49 first the inquiry hasn't investigated um whether there were instances where public order Calamity was averted um secondly it's not possible to retrospectively or it's not easy retrospectively to work out work what SDS intelligence contributed to specifically because it
00:51:03 contributed to specifically because it was Kept Secret and hidden at the time it was not the A8 Witnesses were not even aware of the existence of the SDS so there's no contemporaneous um trace of its intelligence and of
00:51:18 um trace of its intelligence and of decisions being taken on the basis of its intelligence um and finally we say it's not a sensible yardstick the avoidance of public order Calamity is of course
00:51:29 public order Calamity is of course importance but the avoidance of all of the
00:51:30 the um
00:51:31 um damage and injury that's involved in that can be involved in public order is equally important from a public interest perspective
00:51:43 perspective so turning to those three matters in terms first the inquiry has focused on he insofar as it's looked at particular events it's
00:51:55 it's looked at particular events it's focused on key disorderly events so a look at Red Lion Square Nick
00:52:01 Nick the so-called Battle of wood green the so-called Battle of lewisham and Southall
00:52:02 Southall those are that are the the big five that have been picked up apart from Grosvenor Square in 1968.
00:52:15 apart from Grosvenor Square in 1968. um what the inquiry hasn't done sir is investigate um the numerous number of other large and comparable events which did not result in serious disorder and we've referred to some of these in
00:52:30 and we've referred to some of these in our closing statement insofar as we're able to
00:52:31 able to to identify them but there are numerous events during the T1 period which had an obvious potential disorder and where this was contained
00:52:45 this was contained uh and where therefore the event isn't Remembered in the in the annals of of public disorder history
00:52:54 history so following Red Lion Square there were numerous other confrontations between the far left and the far right so far right demonstrations usually not always and far left counter demonstrations and there were numerous those con
00:53:10 and there were numerous those con confrontations on a large scale without major violence major disorder um and we've just we've given details of some of them and so far as we're able to identify them
00:53:21 identify them um in our closing so the first is Islington on the 25th of March 1975 where there were 600 National front uh demonstrators
00:53:35 demonstrators opposed by 3 000 anti-fascists uh and we're 1 500 officers um on what we've been able to find were deployed and serious disorder was avoided
00:53:52 avoided um there's Chelsea town hall on the 11th of October 1975 where we found some met police footage of this significant 3 000 counter demonstrators opposing the national France AGM in Chelsea town hall and in the
00:54:03 Chelsea town hall and in the commissioner's annual report he says that there was trouble expected and it was avoided through a very large police operation
00:54:11 operation um then moving on between um the Battle of wood green and the
00:54:22 um the Battle of wood green and the Battle of lewisham one sees this series of events linking those two major episodes
00:54:26 episodes and one of those is a new cross on the 2nd of July 1977 um where it's clear that there was in intelligence that the the national front were going to attack the far left so a
00:54:40 were going to attack the far left so a an swp and um lewisham 21 or lewisham 24 defense committee um demonstration uh and that was avoided
00:54:52 um demonstration uh and that was avoided there were 67 arrests mostly of national front supporters and really serious disorder was avoided um and there's reference there to that being the result of intelligence and preemptive measures
00:55:04 preemptive measures we have the ilford by-election on the 25th of February 1978. um where trouble was anticipated
00:55:15 um where trouble was anticipated um and where the commissioner decided to ban marches for two months in the capital now that decision must have been taken on the basis of intelligence and
00:55:27 and significant disorder violence was avoided
00:55:31 avoided um but part of that was the deployment of 5 800 police officers so a significant proportion of all the officers
00:55:41 officers were deployed to that one event at uh in ilford
00:55:44 ilford about one election meeting to avoid trouble
00:55:45 trouble and that of course required some intelligence as to as to what could be expected
00:55:53 expected that ban was then maintained sir and was enforced at the on the 15th of April 1978 when there was a similar meeting in Brixton
00:56:00 Brixton near Loughborough Junction um at a school with the national front held an election meeting um the ban was kept in force
00:56:14 um the ban was kept in force 2400 officers were deployed and although there was disorder in in the meeting itself
00:56:18 itself um and this is the occasion when hm13 was arrested
00:56:32 serious disorder was avoided another event sir was at Great Eastern Street on the 24th of September 1978. where the commissioner in his annual Court says he considered a ban there were very very serious concerns about disorder a ban was considered
00:56:48 disorder a ban was considered one wasn't implemented but six thousand four hundred officers um were deployed um and violence and disorder was averted now again that consideration that was given to a ban
00:57:01 given to a ban would have required the consideration of um
00:57:02 um special Branch assessments which would have been based on intelligence and then in Whitehall on the 12th of November 1978 so A Remembrance Day event
00:57:17 November 1978 so A Remembrance Day event three thousand officers deployed to keep the far left and the far right apart in Southall on the 23rd of April 1979 this is coming to the the um the death of Blair Peach
00:57:32 the um the death of Blair Peach it's noticeable that that was one of a series of national front election meetings that had to be placed within a very short space of time and the documents show that um trouble was expected
00:57:46 um trouble was expected um or needed to be avoided at all of them
00:57:46 them so we see Battersea on Wednesday the 18th Islington on Friday the 20th two demonstrations in south or one on the Sunday the 22nd and one on the Monday the 23rd and then straight away after
00:58:03 the 23rd and then straight away after falfall another event in East ham uh on the 25th of April and all of those required large-scale deployments of offices in order to avoid disorder and all of
00:58:16 in order to avoid disorder and all of that planning and that work and one can see in the video of of uh the East Ham Town Hall demonstration there's had to be two days after Southall there's an enormous Camp has
00:58:29 Southall there's an enormous Camp has been set up in a local park to house all of the officers the police horses there are um crowd control barriers being delivered all of that's uh required intelligence and again that was an
00:58:44 intelligence and again that was an episode which could have descended into disorder but didn't um
00:58:48 um next one mentioned in our in our closing 29th of June 1979 uh there were a number of events that day and almost 8 000 officers deployed on public order Duty one single day
00:59:06 one single day um later that year again remembrance Sunday the 11th of November 4 500 officers deployed um one sees southwark on the 2nd of March 1980 5 300 officers deployed to keep the far left of the far right apart
00:59:21 keep the far left of the far right apart lewisham on the 20th of April 1980 4 200 officers
00:59:22 officers and then between Marble Arch and Paddington the 23rd of November 1980s not National front this is a British
00:59:33 not National front this is a British movement march with 3 400 officers had to be deployed now we say these are all examples which could have led to Major disorder
00:59:44 could have led to Major disorder um or to use Mr Barr's term public order Calamity but they didn't and in our mission the the contribution of special Branch um relying in large part on on SDs
01:00:00 um relying in large part on on SDs intelligence must have been important to that and there's been no investigation of those specific events um to see what Trace there might be in the assessments or matching up special uh special demonstration Squad
01:00:15 uh special demonstration Squad intelligence reports with the assessment may I interrupt you there uh there has been I have done it and um
01:00:19 and um I have been able to identify uh five out of your 13 instances in which there was um
01:00:30 um SDS intelligence which has survived in three of them it's one report and in two of them it's three reports there are
01:00:44 of them it's three reports there are many reports after the event of what the groups who participated in them were talking amongst each other about but as regards prior intelligence only five of your 13
01:00:54 your 13 on my analysis appear to have received um prior retrieved intelligence from the SDS
01:01:04 SDS was that obviously I can't comment on that because I I haven't seen any of the documents and as I'm unable to ask follow-up questions or or pursue lines of inquiry
01:01:15 of inquiry um but first it's not always possible to see um
01:01:22 um which reporting was from the SDS secondly the special Branch squads were relying on
01:01:34 relying on um the background information they had in the registered files which were of course
01:01:41 course um contributed to and topped up by SDS intelligence there was um undocumented um intelligence and discussions
01:01:54 um intelligence and discussions um there were undercover officers on the ground and it's at this remove of time to say well I have recovered some documents there are lots of documents are not surviving
01:02:05 are not surviving um it doesn't appear that all the public order related documents would necessarily have gone to MI5 um it's just that it's um I can't comment on what you've said um but
01:02:16 um but from our perspective the the volume of reporting on these groups the groups that were involved in the violence and disorder
01:02:21 disorder um it's Unthinkable that this this wouldn't have assisted in in the um in the assessments that provided to A8
01:02:36 I was simply picking up on your assertions that the analysis had not been done um it has been and that's something I think you would have wished to have been done um
01:02:51 if they're taught to the result of the analysis is well uh it's not all going to be there to a limited extent I accept that
01:03:01 that um but it's not I I think I'm all that helpful
01:03:02 helpful uh to say this proves that SDS reporting contributed to the intelligence significantly more
01:03:13 intelligence significantly more significantly than the analysis that I've indicated would suggest for example on the right wing um that there was no um infiltration of
01:03:26 um that there was no um infiltration of the right wing during this period apart from one as a byproduct of a left-wing infiltration As We Know and it's obvious that there was Intelligence on what the right wing were doing
01:03:33 doing um hence
01:03:35 um hence Chelsea Town Hall um the trouble would be anticipated
01:03:47 or um new cross where there was trouble and that that
01:03:51 that that um
01:03:52 um uh there would have been uh Intelligence on the right wing then as as there was I I think you you would uh agree
01:04:04 I think you you would uh agree um on all major incidents involving left-wing right-wing clashes that either occurred or were prevented yes sir I mean they
01:04:15 yes sir I mean they this is all news to me um you see the analysis has been done but it hasn't been um it hasn't been disclosed to us I'm not aware of it um I haven't been able
01:04:28 not aware of it um I haven't been able to take instructions on it or put it to any offices um give me a lot of your officers were deployed at that time do you know obviously Daryl Clarks were deployed at that time and you've had disclosed to
01:04:39 that time and you've had disclosed to you in full the um reporting that they um put in and which has been retrieved so although you may not have had the whole picture um because not all of the undercover
01:04:51 um because not all of the undercover officers who were deployed at that time were DL plans and the CL have certainly had the whole picture and um
01:05:08 I I don't think you can now say we haven't had the opportunity of looking at this um you have had a pretty extensive opportunity of looking at it
01:05:16 um it's it's very difficult to um say take Chelsea Town Hall um
01:05:29 it's difficult for us as a legal team to know that was an event uh where trouble was averted and to be able to piece together what intelligence there was one of your clients did report on the left green
01:05:41 clients did report on the left green side of Chelsea Town Hall he's one of the three instances where there's one report
01:05:46 report we will say well we don't have all the reports we don't have the the undocumented intelligence and I completely take you saying I don't
01:06:02 and I completely take you saying I don't have in front of me documents uh where I can trace SDS intelligence to the avoidance of disorder but it doesn't follow
01:06:09 follow that you can conclude it didn't contribute and all the other evidence in my submission tells you that it did um
01:06:19 um and one sees this in the evidence from A8 about the
01:06:34 the evidence from A8 about the importance of special Branch assessments the vital importance of that the fact that those assessments were based on files
01:06:35 files um
01:06:36 um that were produced by the squads based on what was in the in the special Branch registered files and that those files were contributed to significantly by SDS
01:06:50 were contributed to significantly by SDS intelligence reports you can also derive it from the fact that the squads um helped set the SDS intelligence requirements so the squads that were required to um produce the assessments were telling
01:07:11 um produce the assessments were telling the SDS what they wanted Intelligence on they wouldn't have been telling the SDS they wanted Intelligence on matters if it if they didn't need it or if it wasn't of use to them um but in relation to all of these events
01:07:21 events um we haven't seen I mean even if you say well what can we find in the that we think was derived from the SDS we haven't seen the the operational
01:07:32 we haven't seen the the operational briefings uh the operational orders any other documents I know you say you have an analysis has been done but it's just not possible for me to to comment on that and then to take it away and follow it up
01:07:44 and follow it up um but
01:07:51 um but in circumstances where there's special squads were providing the the assessments and requesting the intelligence in order to help them do so and saying that
01:08:05 to help them do so and saying that um they were finding the work of the SDS valuable it's it's difficult to think that could be the case if if it was really of no use
01:08:11 um as it happens we do have a small number
01:08:15 number six in all of threat assessments from this period and it's possible to see um to what extent they were contributed to by SDS offices
01:08:30 well I I have seen very few we have seen very few threat assessments and I take the point was that that's not they didn't need to be put to um DL offices because do officers didn't see them but
01:08:43 see them but um again it's not something I I can comment on well you and I are in the same position in that we've all seen the documents that there are six threat assessments and it is possible to
01:08:59 assessments and it is possible to analyze the SDS reporting insofar as it contributed to them um
01:09:05 um the major one is the Battle of lewisham but there are others um the
01:09:13 first anniversary of the death of Blair Peach uh there was a threat assessment there and it is possible to analyze to what extent SDS reporting contributed to it um
01:09:29 all I can do is to look at the evidence that I have got and when I've got it when we've all had it it is possible to analyze it and to draw limited conclusions from it
01:09:41 conclusions from it yes I haven't seen any threat assessments on the the um the events I've just mentioned that had the potential for disorder but didn't lead to disorder no there are
01:09:53 didn't lead to disorder no there are there aren't any there there will if I assume they did exist they've gone um that's because they were held by the police and the police have not retained them
01:10:04 them um it just so happens that because the home office took an interest in the first anniversary of the death of black Beach demonstration um we do have the threat assessments there and it's possible to compare SDS input into the the outcome and to see
01:10:25 input into the the outcome and to see what other sources of intelligence were in that instance SDS reporting contributed virtually nothing what's it um I mean uh
01:10:37 I mean uh I I haven't referred to to that as being an event with a high potential for disorder where disorder was alert it
01:10:41 alert it um but there is a difference between saying
01:10:43 saying I don't have in front of me contemporaneous documentary evidence of SDS intelligence feeding into threat assessments and saying therefore it didn't one has to
01:10:55 saying therefore it didn't one has to look at all the surrounding documents you say we just don't have these threat assessments and I don't understand how one can say well there's only three or six or whatever occasions when we can we can see SDS intelligence
01:11:10 can see SDS intelligence um contributing when one only has six threat assessments [Music]
01:11:12 [Music] um
01:11:21 um the other significant one is Southall uh the occasion when Blair Peach sustained his fatal injuries and there there is a very careful threat assessment uh the
01:11:36 assessment uh the prior reporting such as it is uh there is some evidence about that and it is plain if One Compares the prior reporting with the threat assessment the threat assessment did not rely to any significant extent if at all on SDs reporting
01:11:52 now all I'm doing is pointing out in the limited instances one or two of them have some significance where it is possible to make the analysis it doesn't bear out the wider proposition that you're seeking to advance
01:12:07 you're seeking to advance well so there's there's what you can derive from fragments of surviving information about a handful of um events uh the Southall was unusual because
01:12:18 because um
01:12:19 um it involved um
01:12:22 um also demonstrators from the local community and the same as at the Battle of lewisham um so those those are factors that obviously the SDS didn't report on them
01:12:38 obviously the SDS didn't report on them the Indian workers Association or or the more militant um youth group that was behind it in Southall um so there may be reasons for that in particular events but the the overall picture is of thousands of events
01:12:53 picture is of thousands of events and to take six threat assessments relating to
01:12:58 slightly unusual events or events where that where there was disorder and and extrapolate conclusions in my submission it isn't safe I I I see the difficulty you're in
01:13:08 you're in um but one has to consider again in my submission the the surrounding evidence uh the special Branch squads providing threat assessments and we have very few of them left
01:13:23 of them left um requesting intelligence from the SDS in order to help them do so um they wouldn't in my submission have done that if that intelligence wasn't helpful to them
01:13:34 helpful to them um and just the way in which SDS intelligence isn't necessarily um it doesn't travel with a an SDS stamp on it
01:13:41 on it um unless it's kept by MI5 um but but you've seen the evidence from those in A8 they didn't even know there was an SDS um so in my submission it's one thing to say I can't I don't
01:13:58 it's one thing to say I can't I don't have lots of pieces of paper telling me that here's an occasion when the SDS averted public order calamity but it's another thing to say therefore it didn't
01:14:04 it didn't um when it was providing a high volume of information about the groups involved in disorder but to ensure that the picture is fairly
01:14:15 to ensure that the picture is fairly placed um they should be put on your side of the equation uh the reporting before the Battle of lewisham which was extensive and did include a good deal of SDS reporting
01:14:27 SDS reporting which informed both the commissioner's decision not to ban the national front March
01:14:37 March and the Tactical deployments that took place on the day
01:14:44 so yes and and we again I the difficulty is to to take these
01:14:53 was difficult to say that something went wrong at grumwick but particularly in relation to the other four the episodes where there was serious disorder and um uh and there are fragments of information left behind and then to
01:15:08 information left behind and then to to say that was the totality of the picture
01:15:10 picture um and we know that in relation to the to the the Battle of lewisham there was a lot that the offices involved um and in relation to the Battle of wood green
01:15:18 green who were there um and who were able to report on where
01:15:34 um and who were able to report on where bricks were being piled up and so on and indeed I I heard their evidence uh I um believed it and um I do not one moment doubt that um what they fed into the intelligence picture was of value to those who were attempting to police these events now I only I'm pointing
01:15:48 these events now I only I'm pointing putting these specific uh propositions to you was to suggest that um SDS reporting was only part of the picture and that in so far as it is possible to
01:16:03 and that in so far as it is possible to analyze what's been recovered not always significant sometimes yes quite often
01:16:13 um and and for a huge number of events just just unknown but I mean I I take the point that um the special Branch registered files were not populated entirely by reports from the SDs that Noble reports from
01:16:26 Noble reports from intercepts and other sources and other research and inquiries um
01:16:28 um in amongst them um but what one has in particular um with the far left groups who wouldn't cooperate with the police and who were infiltrated by the STS is a valuable and
01:16:43 infiltrated by the STS is a valuable and reliable source of Intelligence on their intentions numbers mood and so on um and if the SDS intelligence wasn't helpful
01:16:53 helpful um it it just doesn't make sense that the the the special Grant squads were still requesting it and saying it was helpful
01:17:09 before we um cease this exchange can I put one further um proposition to you which um stems from an analysis that I've I've undertaken of um uh special Branch right SDS reporting for
01:17:31 Branch right SDS reporting for a period as it happens it's 1975 to 1978 The Three Financial years which span battlewood green battle blue ocean um
01:17:31 um and and deal with the time when the future of the SDS was being considered internally
01:17:44 internally um it suggests that rather over half of the retrieved reports uh not a lot over half but a little over
01:17:59 uh not a lot over half but a little over half are reports about individuals their names addresses lives families political views and so forth um of the remainder um just under half uh
01:18:08 only about
01:18:14 seven percent or thereabouts appear to cover
01:18:15 cover uh
01:18:20 uh reports about forthcoming events that might give rise to a public order Problem in London and elsewhere in the country
01:18:25 country and it doesn't look from the retrieved reports as if the great percentage had anything to do with forthcoming public order events
01:18:36 order events well against I can't comment on that because I haven't seen your analysis and I haven't seen what it's based on and I don't know how complete
01:18:50 don't know how complete um the retention was my understanding is that unless it came from MI5 there was very little left but the the way in which inevitably in pre-computerization the the special
01:19:02 pre-computerization the the special Branch intelligence system operated was to have a large database of files that could be cross-referred and pulled out so that those on the the squad desks
01:19:13 so that those on the the squad desks knew could know what was going on and
01:19:27 knew could know what was going on and they could also get further information on the phone and meetings and so on and what the the SDS contributed um
01:19:34 bolstered um fed into those files and that knowledge base and that was all um in our submission important and that's just the nature of intelligence and there may have been uh information that proved irrelevant
01:19:50 uh information that proved irrelevant never went anywhere but it was it was maintained so that there was
01:19:56 um not in the in the possession of one individual but organizationally corporate a corporate brain which understood the public order scene and was able to um assess
01:20:08 um assess what might happen of course imperfectly it's going to make mistakes get it wrong there might be occasions where it wouldn't be acted on
01:20:23 wouldn't be acted on um but on the whole it was a system which worked and what one sees is from 1968 onwards a8s established the SDS is established and by and large
01:20:36 and by and large um notwithstanding this huge antipathy between the the far left and the far right and public order is maintained in in our submission one takes from what the A8 Witnesses say about the value of the intelligence
01:20:47 value of the intelligence what um what the the desks and the squads were saying about the value of the intelligence was that it it contributed
01:20:56 um and that's um
01:21:05 I appreciate it's it's difficult you you have very little to go on but um it's just a common sense um conclusion to to draw from from the evidence
01:21:14 evidence um and I can't I can't I would like to see the analysis and see what it was based on and and contribute to it but it sounds like
01:21:25 sounds like you're you're you're lifting a a curtain on what's going to be in your interim report and it's all it's all news to me well in the period I've um
01:21:36 well in the period I've um canvas the the three years um
01:21:36 um [Music]
01:21:38 [Music] your dear Clans um represented um a majority of the officers who were reporting at that time and you've had full disclosure of that
01:21:50 and you've had full disclosure of that to you and you can tell from their own reports whether my own order of magnitude is roughly right I'm not claiming Precision for these figures but simply to try and
01:22:01 simply to try and get as an order of magnitude and
01:22:03 and I'd be surprised if the order of magnitude that I've arrived at is very seriously out
01:22:16 um well I I can't comment sir um and I I think that to do the exercise what would one would really need to see is the threat assessments and the A8 files and to see how how they they fit together and and also to know
01:22:29 together and and also to know what was passing backwards and forwards that wasn't um put into intelligence reports the reports that maybe weren't retained and so on
01:22:36 so on um but I can't
01:22:45 if you say that there's analysis of these Financial years and these are the statistics I mean I just can't I can't comment on that no but I mean you you could you could if you had thought it was worthwhile and you may say it's not worthwhile but you could if you thought
01:22:58 worthwhile but you could if you thought it was worthwhile do it on the basis of the reports produced by the officers that you represent
01:23:07 I really can't because we we are not in any way comparable to the inquiry legal team we're a very small and not particularly well-resourced group representing individual officers the the rule 9 witness packs we we get are
01:23:18 rule 9 witness packs we we get are subject to a restriction order which means we could we can only discuss the contents of any one witness pack with the relevant
01:23:32 the relevant um witness and it's just not possible for for me or or for my team or discuss the only to to undertake analytical work of that kind or we could comment on it if it were disclose to us we could maybe
01:23:44 were disclose to us we could maybe contribute to it but I mean we can't um have run a a mirror inquiry um so there wouldn't be any point in in um
01:23:53 um undertaking now a further disclosure exercise to you because all it would show would be that what you already had is roughly representative of of the
01:24:07 is roughly representative of of the rather larger figures for those that include
01:24:10 include um undercover officers who are not drug clients
01:24:13 clients um so this wouldn't be much point it seems to me and um what you've said in piling you with further documents which you wouldn't be able to analyze
01:24:30 no sir but I mean there would be a point in in sharing the analysis um
01:24:35 um or allowing us to make representations on it all of the core participants to make representations on it um and in those financial years what one sees what what I'm able to see from the commissioner's annual reports is a consistent concern that public order
01:24:50 a consistent concern that public order is draining the resources of uh the Met it's deterring um recruitment it's having an adverse effect on retention
01:24:58 retention um it's a serious problem and anything that can be done to ameliorate to mitigate that um any obtaining of intelligence and the SDS was
01:25:09 SDS was in the grand scheme of things as we've set out in our closing didn't cost much to run
01:25:15 to run um that could contribute and could help and could have significant public order benefits in terms of
01:25:26 benefits in terms of um how public order events were policed and what happened at them give me I've interrupted you enough and please let me get you back to your thread
01:25:41 thank you sir um that's the that what we said the justification um and we do say that the the idea that because we don't have particular
01:25:57 because we don't have particular examples or that many examples of an SDS intelligence report averting what Mr barkles a public order calamity um
01:25:59 um does not mean that it didn't make a contribution and wasn't valuable and for the reasons I've said the evidence the surrounding evidence it all points in
01:26:10 surrounding evidence it all points in the direction of it being of value and being of importance um so moving Lexa to the adequacy of the public order justification
01:26:22 um and we accept that some discipline some deployments were discontinued or or not renewed that there was always a risk that there would be a deployment that wouldn't yield
01:26:34 be a deployment that wouldn't yield anything because you can't know until you're until you're obtaining intelligence whether whether it's of value
01:26:40 value um but accepting that caveat um there was a need for intelligence
01:26:53 um there was a need for intelligence um the special Branch had available to a method of obtaining that intelligence um
01:26:55 um the European convention and human rights wasn't incorporated into domestic law so there was no obligation to undertake proportionality assessments it was
01:27:07 proportionality assessments it was a special Branch like MI5 was entitled to take a broad brush precautionary approach as a matter of policy in terms of what did it think would help it um or did the Met think would help it
01:27:22 um or did the Met think would help it and policing public order and containing this significant problem um
01:27:26 the commissioner obviously had the duty to to maintain public order he had a duty of care to protect his officers
01:27:37 duty of care to protect his officers um and to try and ensure uh Recruitment and Retention and allocate resources effectively um
01:27:42 um as we said in our closing we I recognize that General considerations of resources and Effectiveness and of um avoiding consequential knock-on
01:27:54 um avoiding consequential knock-on effect on other community policing and so on that they are they're difficult uh considerations to place in the balance against the impact of undercover
01:28:06 against the impact of undercover deployments on the real lives of specific individuals um and I accept also that you must look at that impact the impact of the deployments and of intelligence gathering on individuals who were
01:28:18 gathering on individuals who were involved in in public order events um but the it wasn't simply a question of
01:28:25 of individual rights versus generalized public interest considerations um on that side of the equation we say
01:28:37 um on that side of the equation we say and one can see it in the in the video footage that we've tried to um obtain one sees police officers on the ground police officers with blood streaming down their faces police officers in hospital beds
01:28:49 officers in hospital beds um the night after being the day after being attacked at a demonstration or a protest
01:29:00 protest one sees the statistics of one in ten of the officers deployed at lewisham sustaining injuries these incidents whether it's being spat at or shoved or
01:29:13 whether it's being spat at or shoved or pushed or having a brick smashed in your face are not um part and parcel of being a police officer they're not something that police officers must simply endure police are citizens in uniform they are
01:29:29 police are citizens in uniform they are entitled they have the same human rights as everyone else
01:29:41 as everyone else you sir and your team do not travel into the inquiries office offices wondering if you might be spat at or punched or kicked or hit with a brick or have ammonia thrown in your eyes or attacked with a petrol bomb no one should have to travel into work
01:29:52 no one should have to travel into work wondering if that's going to happen but that was the reality for officers attending public order duties I'm not talking about TUC or CND or pro-choice large-scale
01:30:04 TUC or CND or pro-choice large-scale moderate marches but attending public order duties in the 1970s where there were demonstrations and counter demonstrations with one side determined to silence the other
01:30:21 to silence the other and it wasn't of course just police officers who were affected it was their families and one can well imagine how it would feel or the child of a police officer to be told
01:30:32 be told well that is not coming home tonight because he's been he's in hospital because at work he's been hit with a brick or beaten to the ground
01:30:47 brick or beaten to the ground um that has an impact on the private lives of those families um
01:30:48 um whether or not these are to be characterized as public order calamities their avoidance is important
01:30:59 is important it was right that the commissioner did everything within his powers he as as he was at the time to try and minimize the number of
01:31:10 to try and minimize the number of injuries to officers and also the number of injuries to members of the public and then keeping the peace generally um these are all important considerations that need to be placed in the other side of the balance
01:31:24 placed in the other side of the balance so one does have the impact on activists who were reported on but one also has the greater impact on those who might have been physically or psychologically injured
01:31:38 psychologically injured had public order policing uh been less affected
01:31:42 affected so in terms of the adequacy of the justification
01:31:53 um it's a policing judgment uh for the commissioner and for the for the force as it was at the time to to come to a view on
01:31:59 view on um but in our submission that is an adequate justification um
01:32:04 um bearing in mind what the legal framework was and bearing in mind the consequence is the very real consequences um for those who might be hurt at demonstrations and if they weren't better police and if they weren't better Intelligence on them
01:32:19 Intelligence on them um and it is of concern to to my clients that this doesn't this Factor doesn't seem to um sound or resonate um in in any documents we see coming
01:32:31 um in in any documents we see coming from the inquiry there's obvious there's rightfully a focus on um those who were impacted by deployments um but what's in the other side of the balance which is not just resources and
01:32:46 balance which is not just resources and public interest considerations it's it's real impact on real people who are simply trying to serve the community um and trying to ensure that those who
01:32:58 um and trying to ensure that those who aren't interested in Marxism or fascism are allowed to live their lives um in peace um so we get that having an undercover officer in your home or at a meeting or a social event not knowing who they are
01:33:16 a social event not knowing who they are that's an impact and that's an intrusion um but so is being spat at and punched and kicked uh an injured um and all of the impact that that had on police officers families as well and for those reasons we say that there
01:33:34 for those reasons we say that there there was a justification uh and it was adequate it was in the range of reasonable responses for the commissioner to the special Branch as a whole um to take the approach that it did
01:33:46 um that that's on the the public order side of the of the equation so
01:33:56 turning to the the um the secondary justification in terms of your terms of reference there identifying what the justification was and then assessing its adequacy the
01:34:09 was and then assessing its adequacy the secondary justification was the counter subversion justification um so in this area um MI5 had Primacy um as a matter of competence and expertise and responsibility
01:34:23 expertise and responsibility um the approach to subversion was set by MI5
01:34:27 MI5 um and that was a national security assessment the task of special Branch was to assist um and in another mission it's it's unrealistic it's unreal
01:34:46 unrealistic it's unreal um to suggest that special Branch or the SDS could or should have game said or disputed mi5's assessment it simply wasn't its place um it didn't as I say it didn't have the confidence or the expertise to do that um all the officers who were asked what's the definition of subversion
01:35:04 what's the definition of subversion the bottom line was that the definition of subversion was what MI5 said it was the groups in my five treated as subversive were to be treated as subversive
01:35:13 and one has all these one has this Kaleidoscope of of definitions moving around in in front of our eyes when it comes to this so there's the Maxwell five definition the Denning definition
01:35:26 five definition the Denning definition the Harris definition there's a document referring to the Rough and Ready definition um
01:35:32 um in our submission what's important is to see that there was there were these nebulous definitions there was this this gray area and not to to grab hold of and cling on to one definition and use that as a basis for
01:35:52 definition and use that as a basis for testing everything that happened it's to appreciate that they're that it was for MI5 to set uh and it took it took the approach that it did um the inquiry hasn't investigated apart from the statement of witness said
01:36:03 from the statement of witness said investigated what the justification was what the concerns were um you you and your team have rightly um identified various threads and that may or may not have been in play the
01:36:15 may or may not have been in play the extent to which state sponsorship was or wasn't important um
01:36:21 um um but whatever the Harris definition may have said and whatever the the appropriate meaning of that and it's it's sort of two limbs is
01:36:31 is um special branches were told by the government and by MI5 to look at um potential and future threats and to treat those as subversive um and one sees that in in the The
01:36:42 um and one sees that in in the The Confident the classified confidential covering letter that went with the the um the new special Branch terms of reference
01:36:52 reference and it's important in our submission that the Harris definition was not a statute and was never seen um internally as prescribing what could or would or should be done
01:37:13 or would or should be done um and the approach of uh Mr Barr and his team is to is to focus on um whether the practice fitted the definition if it didn't to say the practice should have been stopped
01:37:21 stopped um but that could equally be turned on its head and just and to say whether the definition should have fitted the practice whether the definition should have been changed there's in fact three possibilities one
01:37:35 there's in fact three possibilities one um if you don't think that what happened really fell within the four corners of the Harris definition one possibility is you change the practice and you you investigate fewer groups
01:37:48 investigate fewer groups um it's inconceivable the MI5 would have supported that at the time or that the home office would have done the second possibility is you change the definition and the third possibility is you you either you don't have a public
01:37:59 either you don't have a public definition or use or you just proceed on the basis that it doesn't matter whether the theory and the practice are entirely aligned
01:38:08 aligned um
01:38:11 um and it's important contextually to bear in mind that at this point in time National Security matters were seen very differently to how they are seen today and this is before
01:38:24 and this is before there was a Security Service Act an intelligence Services act National Security matters were seen as non-justiciable and they were never considered by courts um
01:38:34 um there would be ministerial conclusive certificates if they ever became relevant to anything um and they were seeing a secret um and what we say about this is nothing to do with um proceed questioning proceedings in
01:38:47 um proceed questioning proceedings in Parliament there's nothing to do with what Lord Harris knew or said or did um in the chamber of the House of Lords um this definition was published more widely than just in Parliament
01:39:04 widely than just in Parliament um the important point is that the home office in MI5 told the special Branch what to do all the special branches what to do and they did it um
01:39:13 um and
01:39:23 and as we've set out 28 of mi5s work in the 1970s was on subversion as it as its source of version as it assessed it uh and both MI5 and special runs were involved in a huge number of vetting inquiries
01:39:32 inquiries um
01:39:33 um so that was the justification from the perspective particularly of the SDS and of the of the police um in terms of the adequacy of the counter subversion justification
01:39:44 counter subversion justification uh in our submission sir it's facile to
01:40:02 uh in our submission sir it's facile to say that those treated as subversive or potentially subversive did not present an existent existential threat to the state or um incapable of toppling multi-party democracy um
01:40:06 um that isn't the test it's not simply just could could this group um bring down Parliament um first that's hindsight and was something that couldn't be
01:40:17 and was something that couldn't be verified without investigation of of the groups themselves and the knowledge of what their capabilities were or weren't um secondly it was something that would never be a one-off assessment it was
01:40:30 never be a one-off assessment it was something that MI5 would always need to uh it was a dynamic and evolving assessment something that MI5 needed to keep on top of a group might be incapable of really producing any significant effects one
01:40:45 producing any significant effects one year it might not be receiving uh State sponsorship what have you but it it might change the following year um and MI5 is responsible for National Security and is entitled to take a
01:40:57 Security and is entitled to take a precautionary approach and to to keep on top of that um
01:41:01 um it's important to bear in mind bear in mind also the Cold War which was clearly a factor uh it hasn't we haven't been able to explore with MI5 why or to what
01:41:15 able to explore with MI5 why or to what extent the Cold War was a factor but one can see that when the cold war came to an end
01:41:21 an end the approach to subversion changed radically and was scaled back um
01:41:23 um and
01:41:25 and crucially the the National Security assessment of MI5 isn't something that
01:41:37 assessment of MI5 isn't something that the inquiry has been able to investigate uh and so therefore from the police perspective it was an adequate justification they were doing their job whether
01:41:51 were doing their job whether underlying that the National Security assessment was right or wrong isn't something that any of us can can confirm or deny
01:42:00 um that's all we say about um subversions uh um I've dealt we've dealt at the end with a number of specific issues and I'm just going to deal with three very
01:42:11 just going to deal with three very briefly and then just touch on the remainder in in just a sentence so the first is the the extent of the personal information
01:42:22 personal information um recorded in and the language used in intelligence reports as I've already mentioned the the way in which a paper-based intelligence database needs to work is
01:42:35 intelligence database needs to work is that there is a hovering up of a large amount of information um
01:42:36 um uh and that's simply inevitable um that information was not shared widely it was used internally by a
01:42:47 widely it was used internally by a special branch and it was shared with MI5
01:42:51 MI5 um so in terms of the proportionality of its of its collection um in my submission that that's something that um
01:42:58 um can't now be be criticized um Mr Barr says in his closing that the reports can contain racism and sexism
01:43:16 sexism um I don't know specifically what he's referring to um
01:43:17 um we see in the reports um contemporary attitudes and contemporary language
01:43:28 contemporary language um but nothing uh in my submission out of keeping with um the time with Society in the 1970s
01:43:43 as for the point made about tone is of course something that's easier to hear than to read um in our submission a sense of humor is not unprofessional
01:43:54 is not unprofessional um it is of course the case that um attempts at Rye remarks or jokes can fall flat and particularly when read
01:44:12 fall flat and particularly when read after the event but that doesn't mean that the person writing it down is acting unprofessionally um one
01:44:17 um one Mr Barr of course is an Avid Reader of private eye sir um uh his subscription fully enforced and there's the long-running joke in private eye about Judges making jokes good one Malad
01:44:36 good one Malad um people make jokes they they use sarcasm from time to time um and it doesn't mean that is unprofessional um it can look a bit off but that is just in our submission life and we do
01:44:52 just in our submission life and we do say that it's quite difficult to square um Council to the inquiry repeatedly referring to the sds's targets as a bad joke
01:45:01 joke um and seemingly enjoying that label to square that with the claim that occasional sarcasm about those targets was unprofessional it's just
01:45:09 it's just part of
01:45:12 part of um normal life um forgive me again for interrupting you the bad joke is Sir Robert Mark's words and that's why it features I know yes of course is from his Memoir and I said
01:45:28 course is from his Memoir and I said that's primarily about his time as Chief Constable of uh greater Manchester or maybe it's Liverpool but the the label has been adopted uh in uh Mr parr's closing and I think in his um module 2B
01:45:41 module 2B and b2c
01:45:47 and b2c um opening as well as applicable to the groups
01:45:52 groups um so it's been it's been used as as a basis for saying for um trivializing or belittling what the SDS were doing it seems to me um and
01:46:06 um and it's it's not it's not flattering uh not everything in the intelligence reports was flattering um not everything that um some of the groups that were reported on by the SDS did was deserving a flattery
01:46:17 did was deserving a flattery um and one season some reports there are reports saying that such and such a speaker was was boring or difficult to understand that may have been useful intelligence and there are equally bits of reports
01:46:29 and there are equally bits of reports which say someone was a very effective or powerful speaker a good orator and that's helpful to know because one can see whether or not they're likely to rise and go further or or not um so it's
01:46:42 um so it's it's really in my submission scraping the Barrel in terms of trying to find
01:46:51 to find um criticisms to make against those involved who would who were public servants doing their best to to say well they were they were sarcastic and so they were unprofessional
01:47:04 they were unprofessional um there's no language in the reports in my submission that one doesn't find in in judgments at the time um and that wouldn't have been commonplace in all other walks of life in the 1970s
01:47:19 in the 1970s um and and words like racism and sexism are such slur words in our society now that banding them around um in order to denigrate people who who simply were living in a different time and subject to different expectations
01:47:35 and subject to different expectations um in a very different Society with a different
01:47:36 different um
01:47:36 um demographic profile um to
01:47:44 um to to smear them with those words uh in my submission is is is highly unfair um I mean are just as someone who who did publish in the mid 90s um
01:47:54 um I heard a lot worse um and that that was at the bar and um that that wasn't right but in terms of what's in these intelligence reports
01:48:05 what's in these intelligence reports um it was simply in keeping with the times
01:48:07 times um
01:48:11 um the second point I just want to touch on um
01:48:12 um is in relation to children um there seems in in my submission to be a certain amount of confected outrage
01:48:24 a certain amount of confected outrage about the fact that intelligence reports included information about children um the government funded the education system
01:48:35 system it did so in order that children could be educated it paid the teachers um children went to the school to learn and develop not to be recruited to extremist ideologies and it is a fact
01:48:51 extremist ideologies and it is a fact that both the swp and the national front actively sought to recruit other people's children to their causes um that's a proper subject for the state to be concerned about
01:49:09 to be concerned about it's paying for this system is it being um used is it being abused um by Outsiders um
01:49:13 um it's simply
01:49:20 do not see why that's thought to be objectionable to mention someone who's under 18 in an intelligence report um and to turn a complete Blind Eye and not investigate it would have been in my submission um an abdication of responsibility
01:49:36 um an abdication of responsibility um there was no reason to allow the State education system to become a recruiting ground for for extremists it's not what most parents would have wanted
01:49:51 wanted um so in our submission that's a proper subject for reporting um and
01:49:52 um and there was no rule that you should not report on someone under 18 and there was no reason to have such a rule um the school leaving age wasn't was even younger than 18 at the time
01:50:04 even younger than 18 at the time um so the the third and final matter just to address you on uh under this heading
01:50:11 heading um in a little more detail is just in relation to I'll take political neutrality and Justice campaigns together
01:50:18 um as you've mentioned that the SDS did not report on the far right in the in the T1 era initially because it didn't pose a threat to public order and then after the national fronts increasing
01:50:31 after the national fronts increasing popularity because it was it was covered by other sources um it would in our mission have been
01:50:44 um it would in our mission have been unlawful and wrong but special Branch or the SDS to try and judge or identify righteous causes and to treat them differently to allow anti-apartheid campaigners um more leeway than others it's a
01:50:55 it's a it's a
01:50:57 it's a um
01:50:58 um a pop a politically neutral um process matter to make maintaining public order it doesn't matter to the police who's arguing for what it's just a question of them
01:51:10 a question of them um ensuring public tranquility um in terms of specific Justice
01:51:21 um in terms of specific Justice campaigns and anti-police campaigns again there's no rule against um
01:51:22 um reporting on them or collecting Intelligence on them it must of course depend on whether they they might present a risk to to public order but
01:51:40 present a risk to to public order but the police can't treat them differently uh mentioned in our in our submissions that the mark Duggan case that was a um a
01:51:44 um a an anti-police incident that escalated into serious disorder it couldn't possibly have been right for the the Mets say well we're not going to police this we're not going to try and gather intelligence on this
01:51:58 intelligence on this um because it was it was the action of a police officer that may have sparked It Off
01:52:06 Off um one sees that in in the in the in the 1970s with the lewisham 21 or lewisham 24 defense committee which was heavily heavily targeted and used by the swp and became wrapped up
01:52:19 used by the swp and became wrapped up um in in the in the build up to Lewis in the period of time between wood green and uh and lewisham um it's inevitable that public order intelligence needs to on occasion um cover groups of that kind
01:52:33 um cover groups of that kind um so far is concerned East London workers Against Racism um that that simply wasn't a Justice campaign it was a largely white
01:52:47 campaign it was a largely white um revolutionary Communist Party front organization uh looking to recruit minority support for the reasons going back to Marxist chotsky's theory that racism it will be used to divide the working classes and to prevent and
01:53:04 the working classes and to prevent and to prevent the revolution uh and we say it's not remotely comparable to the Stephen Lawrence campaign
01:53:15 Stephen Lawrence campaign um and it was it was MI5 were interested in it and it was it was legitimate to report on it at the time um
01:53:18 um the only point to wish to make about um
01:53:20 the the friends of Blair peach or the Blair Peach funeral and related demonstrations was that they were major public order events
01:53:29 events um they had heavy swp ANL involvement and it was inevitable that they would be covered
01:53:38 covered um
01:53:45 um in relation to the funeral in particular that some of the questions uh put to offices
01:53:47 offices seem to imply that they had attended a small private family funeral in a in a church
01:53:58 church um the funeral itself and we produced some footage of it um it was attended by 1278 police officers in uniform uh and five to ten thousand mourners so it was
01:54:10 five to ten thousand mourners so it was a major event roads had to be closed I'm not saying um it did or even that it it might have resulted in disorder um but it was something that the
01:54:21 um but it was something that the Metropolitan Police uh needed to be aware of and to consider
01:54:30 um I'm not going to address you in details here on what I've said on uh other topics um this is at the end of our closing um collected Representatives that simply tangential uh unobjectionable reporting in our submission uh positions of
01:54:46 in our submission uh positions of responsibility within groups is just a question of um
01:54:49 um the need to differentiate uh substance and form and to apply Conrad Dixon's um firm line between leader and follower there were
01:55:00 there were secretary or treasury type um quote-unquote positions of responsibility but they didn't cross the line
01:55:11 line um neither side the Rick Clark case uh they didn't cross the line between leader and follower um
01:55:16 um uh you've got our submissions on participation in crime and Azure and provocateur and the the um the circular um we've already addressed you on the
01:55:33 um we've already addressed you on the minimal resources that were expended on the SDS in in the grand scheme of both special branch and met police expenditure um
01:55:36 um I have nothing to add on cover identities really from what we've said in the in previous openings
01:55:47 in the in previous openings um I've set out some points on sexual relationships um
01:55:52 um we do say that there's a difference between
01:55:57 between casual sex one night stands um and
01:56:01 um and relationships going further than that that doesn't mean the form is excusable the three clients of mine who um
01:56:12 um um disclosed that they'd had one night stands um
01:56:14 stands um accepted it was it was wrong um we've given you some points of detail on HM 106 hm126 and hm155
01:56:33 on HM 106 hm126 and hm155 um then the only point to just to raise in this regard sir is just the the Mr Barr's statement that sexual contact between undercover officers in their undercover identities and members of the public was not uncommon um we say that's that's an exaggeration
01:56:46 that's an exaggeration um there was on the evidence there was none at all during the T1 P1 period And if One Compares the overall number of officers um
01:57:01 um with the the number of incidents um
01:57:04 um it's it's an exaggeration to say it was not uncommon um
01:57:06 um that may change when Once one gets so
01:57:19 that may change when Once one gets so the t2 and T3 eras but In fairness to the SDS as it was run in the 1970s um
01:57:20 um that that not uncommon um would give an impression that isn't really borne out by the facts um that's not to say that the the
01:57:34 um that's not to say that the the incidents that did happen weren't wrong or regrettable um it's just a a question of quantification or how to describe it um then there's finally there's just a
01:57:45 um then there's finally there's just a linguistic point about the meaning of uh embarrassment
01:57:57 um so those are those are my substantive submissions in uh closing uh on particularly public order and subversion I just um
01:57:59 um have the legal framework to deal with
01:58:06 I'm just going to glance at my watch to sleep
01:58:07 sleep oh we're getting on um
01:58:10 um if you want to pause um you have plenty of time still and by all means do if you can complete comfortably um please do that as an alternative
01:58:25 um please do that as an alternative um I'll I'll press on because I don't think it's uh I've set out the submissions in some details sir uh I'm not going to attempt to address you as if this were
01:58:43 to address you as if this were a judicial review there's no bundle of authorities not going to take take you through um the dictator of Lord Justice whoever um just focusing briefly to on uh trespass to land and breach of
01:58:55 trespass to land and breach of confidence these seem to be the two main areas that have have um have been suggested as matters for the
01:59:09 have been suggested as matters for the inquiry to address and in our submission um it would be unlawful for the inquiry to do that um there's three reasons and I I think I'm
01:59:14 I'm um fairly well aligned with Mr Skelton on this three reasons in our submission
01:59:26 on this three reasons in our submission one your terms of reference do not allow you to make findings as to lawfulness um civil liability um two
01:59:40 um two um your powers under the inquiries act also do not allow you to do that and three the arguments themselves are misconceived and wrong um in relation to the terms of reference you must your obliged uh
01:59:54 you must your obliged uh inquires obliged by section five five of the inquiries act to act within your within the terms of reference uh and they do not include lawfulness um and it in in our submission
02:00:05 um and it in in our submission um the way in which justification is included doesn't allow for determination of lawfulness as a as a facet of that so what the the terms of reference provide
02:00:17 what the the terms of reference provide is that the inquiry should identify the justification so what was the what was the police's justification at the time and assess its adequacy was that
02:00:30 and assess its adequacy was that justification adequate did those involved at the time um
02:00:34 um take the justification they had and act reasonably um
02:00:38 um that was the approach that um Sir Christopher signaled at the outset um that was the approach that's reflected in the issues lists um none of the rule 9 requests
02:00:51 um none of the rule 9 requests um that our clients received were directed to considerations of lawfulness anything to do with trespass to land or breach of confidence none of the
02:01:02 none of the um module one Witnesses were asked about lawfulness when they were when they were questioned orally um
02:01:12 um and
02:01:16 and when it came to the issues lists the inquiry went out of its way um to make the point that deception the effect of deception on consent in the context of trespass to the person and
02:01:29 context of trespass to the person and sexual relationships was something that would not be determined by the inquiry um as far as we can tell no one had in fact urged the inquiry to include that as an issue but nevertheless
02:01:42 as an issue but nevertheless um it it went out of its way to say that it wouldn't be appropriate um in our submission there's no rational basis for treating trespass to the person and trespass to land differently
02:01:54 person and trespass to land differently or for treating just us to the person in breach of confidence differently these are all issues of civil liability and they fall outside the the scope of your terms of reference
02:02:06 terms of reference um I understand the logic of the position that says um
02:02:13 um had it been the case that there was no power
02:02:14 power to do what was done then that couldn't have been Justified and but that doesn't then entitle you to go on and determine whether or not
02:02:25 whether or not there was a lawful power to do it that's you could say if there was no power then it wouldn't have been Justified anyone could understand that but that doesn't then allow you to go outside the scope
02:02:37 then allow you to go outside the scope of the terms of reference to determining issues of of civil liability of of the officers or of um of the police itself and so just on section two
02:02:52 and so just on section two there are no in fact no authorities on on the meaning of section two of the inquiries act um there's the one Northern Ireland permission decision um and in our submission there's no Authority for the view that section 2
02:03:08 Authority for the view that section 2 allows the exploration or determination of contentious and untested legal arguments
02:03:10 arguments um
02:03:14 um public inquiries in fatalities um
02:03:15 um are slightly different um particularly when they're held in lieu of an inquest inquests are even further removed
02:03:33 further removed um from section two of the inquiries Act reference made to the pounder decision um does not support the argument that um in public inquiries can determine issues of civil liability in this way in fact pounder is completely irrelevant rule 42 of the coroner's rules 1984
02:03:45 rule 42 of the coroner's rules 1984 played no part in the decision making of the coroner that was subject to judicial review in that case and it played no part in the um in the decision of Mr
02:03:56 part in the um in the decision of Mr Justice Blake in terms of the outcome the possibility of an unlawful killing verdict in that case wasn't raised um it was simply a question of
02:04:07 um it was simply a question of um the coroner agreed that the appropriateness of the force used should be left to the jury but he he thought that should be done without guidance as
02:04:19 that should be done without guidance as to the law Mr Justice Blake said he they the jury should have been given that guidance because it was crystal clear that the officer's concerned didn't have a power to restrain Adam rickwood um rule 42 is only mentioned obata in
02:04:34 um rule 42 is only mentioned obata in connection with a with a side argument about whether or not questions about legality might have um raised the need to give self-incrimination warnings that might have inhibited people's evidence
02:04:47 have inhibited people's evidence um so pounder takes takes the matter no further and in our submission section two means what it says coming thirdly to whether or not the arguments are sound the argument's about just bus to land and breach of confidence
02:05:01 confidence um we we say they're not um
02:05:05 um in relation to trespass to land there are two questions what was the physical act where did the
02:05:16 what was the physical act where did the person go what did they do not what was their Identity or their motivations or what were their objectives um and was that physical act permitted in this context in all of the authorities purpose in terms of the purpose of going on the land or doing
02:05:30 purpose of going on the land or doing something on the land is only ever used in connection with um what was physically done it's not purpose in a subjective sense of ulterior purpose um there's no Authority for the
02:05:42 um there's no Authority for the proposition that fraud or deception is capable of invalidating negating uh nullifying or vitiating a license to enter
02:05:51 enter um the inquiry is always and only as to the scope of any Express or implied license and whether this was exceeded by The Visitor um
02:06:01 um and one can see that in the case law a lot of the case some of the case law sorry is post states that the crunch one period
02:06:08 period um but it says the exact opposite Whitaker and Clarence both make clear that um that forward and deception don't as a matter of law or fact appreciate consent
02:06:20 appreciate consent um Archbold doesn't say anything different
02:06:22 different um
02:06:26 um the fake Gas Men cases do not turn on the fact that um there was some deception or or pretense they turn on on the fact that um the relevant people were there to steal not to read the meter
02:06:39 steal not to read the meter um and as for Smith and Hogan um
02:06:41 um it's wrong um in saying that the there's a difference between the Australian High
02:06:52 difference between the Australian High Court decision in in Barca and the the court of appeal decision in Bern um
02:06:56 um embark on the majority expressly refer to and rely upon and say that they're following Barca they're following burn sorry
02:07:03 sorry um and so the the editors of Smith and Hogan have have just got that wrong um and one can see how that's happened because their focus is in relation to
02:07:19 because their focus is in relation to men's rare uh and what the defendant's men's rare may have been in terms of realizing whether or not the person letting them on land had made a mistake um
02:07:29 um the law on chess Pastor land is is and is intended to be uh straightforward and to involve a factual inquiry about scope of license and whether that's exceeded um and there are a number of reasons for that first it's a tool that's actionable per se so
02:07:45 it's a tool that's actionable per se so it needs to be clear whether or not the Talk's been committed um and that it it affects um the duty of care so the occupiers liability acts apply differently depending on whether your address bars are or
02:07:57 are or um a visitor um furthermore any case of trespass to land has to be decided on a case-by-case basis on the facts
02:08:10 on a case-by-case basis on the facts so one has to consider first what was the license what the terms and limitations if any of the license have General was it and then what did the the individual on the land do where did they go what did they do so it's not
02:08:24 go what did they do so it's not something that can be dealt with um
02:08:28 um as a as a matter of general theory and then finally this has never been tested in the context of undercover offices or
02:08:41 context of undercover offices or um covert human intelligence sources uh and so there are public interest and justifications leaving aside whether or not a license has been exceeded uh that have just never been ventilated
02:08:52 never been ventilated um by the courts and it's not possible for this inquiry to predict or anticipate what the what the result of um uh adjudication on those matters might be
02:09:02 might be um and all of this has implications or not just undercover officers but other people who are not telling the
02:09:14 other people who are not telling the truth about who they are or what they're doing
02:09:19 doing um anyone with an ulterior purpose undercover journalists undercover activists
02:09:21 activists um it it has implications in numerous other areas and all of that has never been tested um
02:09:33 um I'd say no more about the the the law on trespass to the person the in my submission what one gets from the case of moniker and DPP is an obvious conclusion but in any event the law
02:09:48 conclusion but in any event the law cheats land and and bodies differently uh just in relation to breach of confidence uh um in my mission Malone leads the decision of the vice Chancellor gives a good indication of what uh the courts would have made of the claims of breach of
02:10:01 have made of the claims of breach of confidence if they'd come before it in their 70s
02:10:05 their 70s um but even post spycatcher and post-immerman um there's no basis in our submission for saying the collection of confidential intelligence by the police
02:10:19 confidential intelligence by the police is unconscionable or necessarily a form constitutes a form of misuse or is in any way ultravares um police
02:10:25 um police and journalists and others are generally free to obtain information and then decide what to do with it and they may be obligations that arise at that point
02:10:38 be obligations that arise at that point as regard onward use but it all depends on a case-by-case analysis of what's the information what's the nature and extent of the of the actual or apprehended use what's the public interest justification how does this bear on the on the conscience of
02:10:54 this bear on the on the conscience of the of the proposed or actual defendant um and there's a wealth of case or establishing that the police can obtain use confidential information in order to discharge their functions so we see Hello l x party a b woolgar and Cat
02:11:10 Hello l x party a b woolgar and Cat and consistently with this is the line of authorities um providing that non-police confidants are generally permitted to disclose confidential information to the police or follow-up
02:11:25 or follow-up um and that that's it's not a breach of confidence for them to do that um
02:11:28 um that's what I say about breach of confidence um the final matter I just want to address you on very briefly sir is just
02:11:39 address you on very briefly sir is just um a fallback argument uh that seems to have emerged in in um ctis in Mr Bell's recent submissions which is to complain well there's no evidence
02:11:49 evidence um that those involved at the time considered the legality of the taxes considered whether or not uh there was a trespass to land or a breach of confidence
02:12:02 confidence um and in our mission that that's it's not fair to raise that now
02:12:13 that's it's not fair to raise that now without having investigated it without having apart from some last minute questions to t1p3 managers um consideration given to legality is not something that the inquiry has
02:12:24 not something that the inquiry has looked at and it's not it's not fair to to complain now um that there's no evidence I don't know whether or not um thought was given to it um but what we can say is that in the
02:12:36 um but what we can say is that in the 1800s the the pope report uh confirmed that undercover policing was was valid um
02:12:47 um and that at this time in the 1960s and 1970s
02:12:49 1970s um police officers uh generally knew what their powers were and sought to act in accordance with them one sees that in relation to that the mulvina
02:13:09 that in relation to that the mulvina case Matt Roger addressing the court um police officers were were fairly familiar with legal matters um at the time um and in terms of no evidence of the SDS or special Branch considering considering questions of legality
02:13:24 considering questions of legality um it didn't occur to anyone involved in the inquiry for seven years that entering private premises with the ostensible Commission of the of the Occupy might be a trespass to land or that obtaining
02:13:36 that obtaining um intelligence might be a breach of confidence um and if it didn't occur to Mr Barr and Ms Kaufman
02:13:48 Ms Kaufman um in my submission it's unfair to say that it should have occurred to those running the SDS um
02:13:52 um and there was a very reason very good reason why it didn't occur to them it there's simply no basis for the claims it's just uh flying a kite to suggest
02:14:10 it's just uh flying a kite to suggest that going into private premises without saying who you really are or why you're really there might be a trespass to to land or that collect it or police officer collecting confidential information might be a breach and actionable breach of confidence um and in that regard it's important to remember that the 1960s the 1970s were much less
02:14:29 the 1960s the 1970s were much less um litigious times uh and very different to
02:14:38 to um now in terms of public authorities Consulting lawyers or taking legal advice
02:14:40 advice um I I don't know if you'll you'll remember sir but uh it's not in uh Wade and Forsyth now but earlier editions of uh weighed on administrative law
02:14:52 uh weighed on administrative law um made the point that there were very few lawyers in government uh apart from technicians dealing with with drafting
02:15:06 technicians dealing with with drafting um and it's after the transform period that once he's the reform of judicial review and the explosion of judicial review the introduction of the judge over your shoulder book to the Civil
02:15:19 over your shoulder book to the Civil Service the culture in terms of running things by lawyers was very different um it's well after 1982 well after the trance one period uh it was still the case that MI5 and MI6
02:15:34 it was still the case that MI5 and MI6 shared one lawyer and there was a person at gchq who had apparently done a-level law
02:15:38 law they were very very different times there and to say now um that Conrad Dixon didn't didn't go down to see Council to take advice it wouldn't have occurred to him it just simply wouldn't have been part
02:15:50 it just simply wouldn't have been part of the culture it may well be different now but again it's an instant of uh with hindsight criticizing people for doing things that are done now with very good reason but in very different times
02:16:04 reason but in very different times um and then one last point just in relation to article 8. it's just a flag that
02:16:18 that in our mission there's there's no point uh that it serves no purpose for the inquiry to point out that um the the regulation of um or the statutory regulation of undercover policing was was lacking uh didn't meet the in accordance with the
02:16:30 didn't meet the in accordance with the law test because one knows that now it's clear from the stress book authorities and for the legislation that was passed uh in consequence of those authorities um in the 1970s there had been as we've
02:16:42 um in the 1970s there had been as we've set out in our in our closing there had been very few decisions from Strasbourg in relation in cases involved in the United Kingdom the jurisprudence was very early on its in its development uh the government in
02:16:54 its development uh the government in Malone which came later still argued that um interception was in accordance with the law um class only came out at the end of the 70s so all of that is
02:17:09 70s so all of that is is not really something that the inquiry needs to comment on but it it's worth bearing in mind that when it comes to proportionality um the asbesta decision of the commission
02:17:25 commission um upholds the the proportionality of uh MI5 and special branch and maintaining um Intelligence on [Music]
02:17:29 [Music] um potential extremists and subversives
02:17:38 um potential extremists and subversives um in the interests of National Security um and in that regard in relation and that's for vetting purposes and it's important when it comes to vetting this goes back to the subversion point that um
02:17:49 that um well these individuals didn't have didn't have power to threaten um our institutions or um to threaten uh the state um if you give someone with no power
02:18:01 um if you give someone with no power highly classified information you give them
02:18:07 them um the power to cause damage and that's the reason for having vetting so there are some people unable to do anything to to subvert or undermine parliamentary democracy
02:18:17 democracy um but who would be able to cause it real damage if given highly classified classified information about defense or intelligence um and that's something that um the
02:18:32 um and that's something that um the vetting system uh was and still is in place to um to catch and to avoid happening
02:18:33 happening um and it lots of people will be in vetting uh files who are never vetted and lots of people will be inventing files who pass their betting
02:18:44 files who pass their betting um but that doesn't mean that that intelligence shouldn't be collected um so I will leave there [Music]
02:18:53 [Music] um
02:18:59 um well in advance of 520 and uh I'm I'm grateful for your time I shall look forward to seeing the interim report thank you very much and especially for um finishing within the two hours that
02:19:11 um finishing within the two hours that you were um uh allotted and indeed with a bit of overrun if you wanted it grateful to you thank you and uh please get back to your break I will do thank you
02:19:23 you that concludes the proceedings for today we're going to start I think at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning uh and um we will have quite a lengthy cast of what will be shorter submissions