UCPI Evidence Hearings | Tranche 3 (Phase 3) | Day 21 - (16 July 2026) - AM

Full transcript

00:55:28 Good morning everybody. Uh today's proceedings will be transmitted uh over the live link but only after a 15minute delay. Those with mobile telephones may use them to report what they hear in the

00:55:40 use them to report what they hear in the hearing room but only after 15 minutes have elapsed since the event that they're reporting. They may not be used for recording or photography. May the witness be sworn please. Thank you.

00:55:51 witness be sworn please. Thank you. Would you

00:55:51 Would you like to stand and take the Bible and repeat after me? I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth

00:56:03 shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but truth and nothing but the truth. Thank you

00:56:10 Thank you everybody. Good morning. [snorts]

00:56:16 Um can I have your full name please? Alan Alexander Mitchell, you've produced two witness statements for the purposes of today's hearing. The

00:56:27 for the purposes of today's hearing. The first one is behind tab A1 MPS0749916

00:56:33 dated the 16th of October 2025. If that can be up on screen, please. And are the contents of your witness statement true and correct to the best

00:56:45 statement true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief? Yes, they are. Second witness statement is witness statement three behind tab A2 MPS 0750013

00:56:56 dated the 19th of the 3rd 2026. Do you recognize that as your witness statement? Yes, I do. And are the contents of that true and correct to the best of your knowledge

00:57:07 correct to the best of your knowledge and belief? They are.

00:57:09 They are. Thank you. Um, in witness statement three, uh, between paragraphs three and five, you set out your dates that are relevant to

00:57:21 set out your dates that are relevant to this hearing. Um, in 1979, you joined the MPS. You would have been about 19 years old, I think. Is that about right? No, at the time I'd be about 21.

00:57:33 No, at the time I'd be about 21. Oh, 21.

00:57:35 Oh, 21. Um, 1982 joined special branch. Uh, that's correct. And from 84 to 86 you for two years went back to uniform policing.

00:57:47 back to uniform policing. Uh that's correct. And in ' 86 you rejoined special branch and served on C squad, E squad, P squad

00:57:58 squad, E squad, P squad and then uh subsequently promoted to detective inspector, detective chief inspector and by the time we get to 2000 you were promoted to the detective

00:58:10 you were promoted to the detective superintendent of C squad and MPIU. Is that

00:58:16 Is that that's correct?

00:58:19 um 2002 2003 we're now on uh paragraph five

00:58:28 you were promoted to detective chief superintendent

00:58:37 so 2002 2003 um and you say that your limited involvement with the MOIU effectively ceased at that point more or less with the MPU at that time.

00:58:49 more or less with the MPU at that time. I would attend meetings uh on behalf of the commander and I would also uh if the management of the MPU had any particular issues with the Metapolon Police

00:59:00 issues with the Metapolon Police Service, I would try and facilitate that.

00:59:02 that. Okay. So, you still had some involvement. We'll come to the OPH Hearn meeting that you had uh later on in the course of today's evidence, but essentially uh at page six of that uh uh

00:59:15 essentially uh at page six of that uh uh meeting, it's noted that you said your involvement with the MOIU would have ended completely in 2005 2006 when Antonet was brought in as national

00:59:28 when Antonet was brought in as national coordinator of domestic extremism. Does that ring a bell? Uh yes that would be correct. At that time uh he took over and any links with MPS uh as was uh

00:59:42 and any links with MPS uh as was uh ceased to to be continued. Okay.

00:59:46 Okay. Um

00:59:49 Um during your time then between 2002 slash3 when you're first promoted to uh chief superintendent is it right that you were you had some

01:00:01 is it right that you were you had some supervisory role or line management role in relation to the SDS and the MOIU it's I may have had a a brief role uh when I was doing my statement it was

01:00:12 when I was doing my statement it was very difficult to remember exactly um what my role and position was as I didn't have uh reference to any paperwork and it was a time when Colin Black was there and Roger Pierce was

01:00:24 Black was there and Roger Pierce was there and uh there was quite a lot of movement so to be absolutely specific as to what I was line managing but I certainly I would say I had some responsibilities at some time for both

01:00:35 responsibilities at some time for both these units. Okay. It may help if we can bring up uh the tranch 3 timelines which is a document that the uh inquiry has created

01:00:46 document that the uh inquiry has created to show where based on the evidence we can see that people seem to have some responsibility for the SDS. Um, we can see here if we if we scroll

01:00:57 Um, we can see here if we if we scroll along the bottom to 2000.

01:01:03 So that we have the timeline in between 2000 and 2005.

01:01:16 We scroll along a little bit more please. So we can have the full timeline in where we see

01:01:23 um uh your name where you see chief superintendent down the left hand column if you look across the right we can see HN236 Alan Mitchell

01:01:36 HN236 Alan Mitchell and what this chart illustrates is that it appears based on the evidence we've looked at that you come in as uh uh having responsibility for the SDS this around the middle of

01:01:49 for the SDS this around the middle of 2003

01:01:51 2003 up until the end of 2005. And above you in line of command, you have Janet Williams for the for the most part of that

01:02:01 that there is a bit of a crossover where um Colin Black H1 146 is OCU commander and he's promoted from chief superintendent to commander

01:02:12 to commander and we see that uh in the autumn of 2003. Do you see that on the chart? Yes, I do. Yes. Okay. Roger Pierce by that time, middle of 2003, has uh ceased having

01:02:25 of 2003, has uh ceased having responsibility for the SDS. Does that [clears throat] accord with your recollection? It didn't accord with my recollection, but seeing it in the chart, I I wouldn't disagree with it.

01:02:37 disagree with it. underneath you a superintendent. We've got Andrew Rintol for a period towards the end of 2003 into 2004.

01:02:48 towards the end of 2003 into 2004. Uh Joe Connell for a short period and Anthony Fuller and then Renol again. Can you help us with the accuracy of that? I honestly

01:03:02 with the accuracy of that? I honestly can't remember uh who would have been the superintendent escort at that time. Uh so unfortunately there would be these individuals but I

01:03:13 there would be these individuals but I would also have added another couple of names as well uh which are obviously not on the chart. So my memory of that unfortunately is not as good as your chart.

01:03:22 chart. Okay. Do you want to write those names down of the other superintendents who would have had a role in supervising or responsibility for the SDS?

01:03:38 [clears throat]

01:03:45 Okay. Yeah.

01:03:48 Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. And if you wouldn't mind handing that up so that the chair can see that.

01:04:02 And just so we're clear in relation to those names that you've written down, they're superintendent in S squad. Uh we understand that the SDS was a part of S squad at that time. It was a unit that

01:04:14 squad at that time. It was a unit that sat within S squad. Is that right? Yes. To the best of my recollection, it would have been always with an S1. I fear your handwriting is as bad as mine and um

01:04:25 mine and um it may be necessary for me to ask you to print.

01:04:28 print. Had I realized I was going to pass it on, I would have put it in block capitals. I thought it was for my own rations. My apologies. I think you will have to be asked to put it in block capitals. Please. No, that's all right. I think it accords

01:04:39 No, that's all right. I think it accords with what's here actually. It's Renol, Connor, Fuller, and Renol. So, they they are the the Uh the three superintendents are they that were in

01:04:50 superintendents are they that were in Yes. Um there is another superintendent whose name escapes me um who who I believe would have been there as well. Um probably before Anthony Fuller. I'm

01:05:04 Um probably before Anthony Fuller. I'm just trying to remember. Right. Well, don't don't worry if you can't remember at the moment. Um, in terms of the chief inspector at the time, Michael Dell, do you recall Michael Dell?

01:05:16 Michael Dell? Um, yes, I knew Michael because he was also just as I was joining C squad, he was uh on C squad at that time. Okay. And do you remember him uh in

01:05:27 Okay. And do you remember him uh in terms of S squad heading up the SDS during the time that uh we can see here between 2003 2005? I can remember his involvement with it. Um and I'll take the charts uh guidance

01:05:40 Um and I'll take the charts uh guidance that he was the the person there during that whole period of time. Uh he he gave evidence to to this inquiry and he said that uh in relation to you Alan Mitchell he was in charge of

01:05:52 to you Alan Mitchell he was in charge of both the SDS and the NOIU but he sat above them. Is that correct? Um I would say sat above them. I wouldn't say that I was in charge of the

01:06:03 wouldn't say that I was in charge of the NIOU. The MPU had its own steering group and its own structure. So I would never describe myself as um in charge of the MU at that time as a chief superintendent,

01:06:14 superintendent, but certainly in relation to the SDS. Um yes, certainly it would look like that. Yeah. Um, Detective Chief Superintendent Black that we heard from

01:06:25 Superintendent Black that we heard from earlier this week said uh in his witness statement uh page 144, I don't need to bring it up, paragraph 304 that Chief Superintendent

01:06:37 paragraph 304 that Chief Superintendent Mitchell was taking over from me and he was fully aware of the unit and how it operated. So what we can see on this chart is where HN146

01:06:49 chart is where HN146 Colin Black where his uh bar ends in the middle of 2003 his evidence was that you took over from him and that you were fully aware of the

01:07:01 him and that you were fully aware of the unit and how it operated. Does that sound right? I would say that's a rather sweeping statement from Colin and that the the full details of how the unit operated. It would depend very much on what level

01:07:12 It would depend very much on what level of detail. I knew the unit was there. But in terms of uh deployments, selections, uh and resettlements, I was never involved in any of those. So it would

01:07:24 involved in any of those. So it would depend very much what Colin meant by the scope of that. Did you have much of a dealing with uh Michael Dell? Um not particularly. No. The the way

01:07:35 Um not particularly. No. The the way again the SDS reporting was is that they were authorized uh use and conduct by a commander and as they were reporting uh to the commander uh most of the

01:07:47 to the commander uh most of the information and uh around that would I assume go to the commander if there was any particular issues as with any of the superintendent or chief inspectors they would come to me but for term in terms

01:07:59 would come to me but for term in terms of the actual uh management of deployments and the officers themselves that I would say we've been a role for a commander

01:08:08 commander and and we know that you uh stepped in for the commander when she was absent as well in terms of we'll come to some of the the ripper authorizations and that sort of thing that you were aware of the

01:08:20 sort of thing that you were aware of the um her her operation in relation to the SDS. Is that right? Yes, I was aware of uh her relationship with the SDS and I was aware uh in her absence uh I'd be briefed by Mike Dell or whoever was

01:08:33 briefed by Mike Dell or whoever was designated to come and talk through the operation with me. Okay,

01:08:39 Okay, thank you. That can be taken down now.

01:08:44 Um, in terms of your experience of public order policing between 2000 and 2005,

01:08:52 2005, your second witness statement on page two, paragraph 9, uh, touches on your role, including the policing responses to domestic and

01:09:03 policing responses to domestic and public order extremism intelligence across London, which, and, if we can bring that up, please.

01:09:12 I'll just give you a moment to to read that.

01:09:33 Can we have B up as well, please?

01:09:52 [snorts]

01:10:02 Have you read that? Yes.

01:10:03 Yes. So Mick Messenger, he was in charge of public order policing, wasn't he? That's correct. He was the commander in charge of public order police. And so your role within uh special branch was to basically uh do threat

01:10:15 branch was to basically uh do threat assessments uh and pass intelligence to Mick Messenger who would be able then to determine how to manage uh public order police officers to to manage events

01:10:26 police officers to to manage events across London. Is that right? That's correct. Um

01:10:30 Um you were a detective superintendent intendant in special branch covering C squad between 2000 until your promotion to chief superintendent in 2002 2003. So

01:10:43 to chief superintendent in 2002 2003. So you were in C squad during those years. Is that right? That's correct. And in terms of your ability now to help us understand the value of undercover

01:10:55 us understand the value of undercover policing to public order policing, can you explain how that worked? What what was the benefit? How what can you tell us the impact was on public order

01:11:07 us the impact was on public order policing? Um it was part of a jigsaw in that uh as well as the undercover unit, you would also have uh CHIZ, which is the uh paid

01:11:20 also have uh CHIZ, which is the uh paid informance to police. You would also have uh inquiry work done by the officers themselves and also um the uniformed forward intelligence teams would be doing work. So depending on

01:11:32 would be doing work. So depending on what the issue was would depend on where the majority of your information was coming from. Uh you would also rely on looking at what had happened in previous instances when an organization had uh

01:11:46 instances when an organization had uh taken part in either an action or a protest. Um, so it would depend very much on what we were dealing with as to whether the SDS uh were of value or whether we would lean more to what was

01:11:58 whether we would lean more to what was being provided by the covert human intelligence sources. And when you talk about the officers doing their own research as well, are you talking about open- source research and and

01:12:09 and and material that's in the public domain? The squad officers would do uh open- source research, read around the subject. um not at that time but certainly historically what would happen

01:12:21 certainly historically what would happen with uh officers officers would actually attend meetings uh this I'm talking about in the early 80s they would attend meetings not as chairs not as undercover officers but they would just attend a

01:12:32 officers but they would just attend a meeting and then they would report on that meeting and again that was a historical action that had uh taken place. You're talking about meetings, uh, public meetings for campaigners and

01:12:43 uh, public meetings for campaigners and political group. Public meetings and public events during 2001. Obviously, we'll come to this in a bit more detail uh shortly, but Mayday 2001 was a big event. Mayday,

01:12:56 but Mayday 2001 was a big event. Mayday, every year is a big event um in London is a one of the key events [snorts] is it for public order policing each year? Um I I'm not in the best position to say

01:13:07 Um I I'm not in the best position to say whether it would be a major event. I think that would be one for uh the Metropon Police's public order event. They deal more with the scale and that in terms of gathering. I would say it

01:13:18 in terms of gathering. I would say it was um

01:13:22 was um one of a series of events going back historically that um effort was put into uh policing and that goes back to the 1980s when there was issues like stop the city and various other protests

01:13:34 the city and various other protests going there. So there was a theme running uh almost annually going back either around media or other days when uh you would get protests. Media itself

01:13:46 uh you would get protests. Media itself um mainstream was never really an issue but there would be people who would look to exploit the fact it was mi to take on their individual actions. in 2001 when you were in S squad. Uh we understand

01:13:59 you were in S squad. Uh we understand that there was some SDS reporting coming into C squad relating to Mayday 2001. Whe whether you're able to recall anything in relation to that

01:14:10 anything in relation to that specifically are you able to recall anything? Ah um if we can have behind B1 MPS 305795.

01:14:21 This is a report from uh Carlos Saraki known to this inquiry uh under the the the cipher um HN 104

01:14:32 uh under the the the cipher um HN 104 and [clears throat] his cover name was Carlo Neri.

01:14:38 Uh this is a report that he submitted on the 30th of April 2001. So on the eve of Mayday 2001. And we can see basically it sets out a

01:14:50 And we can see basically it sets out a bit of a timetable for what was due to happen that day. This is the only report that we can find in relation to his reporting on Mayday 2001. But in terms of uh what it sets

01:15:03 2001. But in terms of uh what it sets out,

01:15:05 out, is that the does this jog any memories for you?

01:15:08 for you? No, [snorts] it doesn't. Um this sort of information wouldn't normally come to me anyway. What would uh happen within sea squad is depending on the size and scale of the event. We would appoint a

01:15:20 of the event. We would appoint a detective sergeant or a detective inspector or in very very large uh high-profile events, a chief inspector to be the intelligence coordinator. and we would have an intelligent cell to

01:15:31 we would have an intelligent cell to deal with this sort of information and also information coming in from either open sources or from chises or from anywhere else. So although it may well

01:15:43 anywhere else. So although it may well have come into sea squad, it's not something I would have expected to have seen.

01:15:47 seen. Um the value of a report like this on the night before uh Mayday, would that have had any impact on the type of policing of the event the following day?

01:15:58 policing of the event the following day? I'm I'm always very reticent to step onto the uniform police officers toes as to what impact it has. Um our job would be to provide the

01:16:10 our job would be to provide the intelligence and it would then be for the uniform officers to decide the value of it and to decide how they would exploit it. Um certainly in my experience the public order branch

01:16:22 experience the public order branch police never had any criticism of the intelligence we were providing them. Is it unlikely to have really made a significant difference to the people that were ready to police the event the following day?

01:16:33 following day? It may have particularly looking at this particularly around Koots Bank in the Strand.

01:16:39 Strand. Um that I would have thought would have been of interest not only to the Metropolitan Police but also potentially to the city police in case it spilled on to to their force area. So that would be

01:16:50 to to their force area. So that would be something. But again, um it may have been just one of a number of potential targets that had been identified over a period of time. And in terms of the threat assessment

01:17:01 And in terms of the threat assessment for that event, um other sources of information like leaflets, open source material would have fed into that in any event.

01:17:10 event. Absolutely. Yes. And to what extent were you involved in that threat assessment? Normally what would happen would be the assessment would be prepared by the desk that specialized in that particular group or

01:17:22 specialized in that particular group or area and then uh either myself or one of the superintendent or sometimes the chief inspector would read that sign it off and then would uh pass that on to

01:17:34 off and then would uh pass that on to the public order branch and be in a position to answer any questions they might have. Uh what was what was your particular role? um really to look at it and make sure as much as I could that it was in

01:17:47 sure as much as I could that it was in uh a readable form that the English was correct and that it wasn't going to let the branch down in the way it was drafted and written and if I had any concerns about uh the content I could

01:17:58 concerns about uh the content I could ask the officers to perhaps clarify it more uh to provide benefit to the uniform colleagues. We can see at paragraph uh 12 of your second witness statement. So this is on

01:18:09 second witness statement. So this is on page five

01:18:11 page five that um the intelligence in relation to this in 2001.

01:18:22 Um if you want to read paragraph A

01:18:28 [snorts]

01:18:40 [snorts and clears throat]

01:18:56 Is it is it right that you were the senior branch officer responsible for managing the gathering and assessment and dissemination of intelligence for May Day 2001? I can't say for definite

01:19:07 May Day 2001? I can't say for definite that I would have been the person signing off in the threat assessment, but as the head of C squad at the time, it would be my responsibility ultimately to uh be responsible for the

01:19:18 to uh be responsible for the intelligence being passed. And and that was the basis on which you then later gave evidence in court in relation to the litigation around this event. Is that right? That's correct.

01:19:29 That's correct. Um, [snorts]

01:19:33 were Gold and Silver Command that day aware of undercover officers in the crowd, particularly in relation to SDS officers?

01:19:45 officers? Uh, I cannot honestly remember if they would have been aware. My initial feeling would be no. the fact that undercover officers were deployed or the

01:19:56 undercover officers were deployed or the fact that we actually had a unit uh dealing with undercover officers wasn't widely known and I don't believe at that time that uh the public order branch

01:20:07 time that uh the public order branch would have been aware of it. uh they may have thought that we had covert human intelligence sources deployed and perhaps even officers from the desk deployed as spotters, but I don't think

01:20:18 deployed as spotters, but I don't think or believe that they would have been aware that we had undercover officers deployed.

01:20:22 deployed. When you got the um intel through from Carlos Saraki that we've just looked at that intel report, would you not have fed that over to say Mick Messenger to say this is from a a secret and reliable

01:20:34 say this is from a a secret and reliable source? Did you not grade the the It would probably I I can't uh in this particular case say why it was graded, but what would normally happen would be to protect sources, the intelligence

01:20:46 to protect sources, the intelligence would go into the uh cell and then it would be disseminated in a manner that wasn't necessarily going to compromise the undercover officer. So whether it

01:20:57 the undercover officer. So whether it was given just [clears throat] as that or the the format in which it was given, I couldn't say at this time. Um we're going to come back to the civil litigation um that happened in 2005.

01:21:10 litigation um that happened in 2005. Sticking with uh 2001 in the chronology at that time um you were involved to some degree in the act well the disciplinary uh discussions around James

01:21:22 disciplinary uh discussions around James Thompson who we know is HN16 um and was a cover name James Straven. Do you recall that? I can remember I I believe it probably was Colin that I

01:21:34 I I believe it probably was Colin that I was speaking to at the time, but I can't remember any of the details. I knew the officer uh not necessarily because of his SDS role, but from uh previous involvement with him when he'd been uh

01:21:45 involvement with him when he'd been uh on my relief and uniform as a sergeant. Okay. If we can have up please MPS 00007241.

01:21:55 It's a file note by DCI Dell. in relation to Magenta Triangle which was uh James Thompson's code name. Um this is from the 6th of November 2001.

01:22:07 this is from the 6th of November 2001. Um you haven't seen I don't think you have seen this report before have you wasn't in your bundle. Um but what we can see is that um

01:22:20 you you mentioned Colin Black. Um he has been briefed here. We can see in paragraph one by Mike Dell

01:22:33 and in the second paragraph we can see that Mike Dell and his DIHN53

01:22:43 he will be on your cipher list if you need to have a look at uh his identity. You can see that those two who were in charge of the SDS in 2001.

01:23:24 Are you able to assist where I might find it on the s the cipher list? Um, it should be in numerical order on the the the um

01:23:34 um state officers cipher list.

01:23:39 Oh, thank you.

01:23:44 Oh yeah. Yeah. Do you remember him? I remember him. Yes. Okay. Um the two that were in charge of the SDS at the time, they discussed the matter with you. You're noted here in this uh file

01:23:57 you. You're noted here in this uh file note as Alan Mitchell, MOIU. Um, sorry. It says today HN53 and I discussed with Alan Mitchell Miu progress on inquiries into the

01:24:09 progress on inquiries into the activities of L2 and L3. Um,

01:24:14 Um, can you recall having involvement with this issue regarding HN16 about um the there was operation cottonbud which was about a a gun run to

01:24:27 cottonbud which was about a a gun run to France if you recall and it was suggested that L2 with L3 were going to uh mount some kind of retaliation against L5. Now, all of those can be

01:24:40 against L5. Now, all of those can be found in your civilian cipher list if you want to have a look at those. I have only the vagolction because I can remember Colin Black um

01:24:51 remember Colin Black um being quite indignant about it at the time uh and Mike Dell being quite indignant uh about it. Sorry. Uh the officer being quite uh indignant about it at the time.

01:25:03 it at the time. Do you recall there being an MPIU operation to try and get further intelligence or evidence for prosecution

01:25:16 intelligence or evidence for prosecution against L2 and L3? I'm afraid I've no recollection of that at this time. Uh to how to what extent were you involved in this? Um I can't actually

01:25:31 involved in this? Um I can't actually remember any involvement in it at all. Uh obviously it's documented here but I can't remember any involvement other than as I say the rather I rate uh discussions.

01:25:42 discussions. There's talk of MT Magenta Triangle being withdrawn so that um the operation could continue against L2 and L3. Um what we know now

01:25:54 against L2 and L3. Um what we know now is that well that there is evidence to suggest that this um uh uh gun plot and retaliation plot was something that was

01:26:05 retaliation plot was something that was made up by HN16. Do you recall anything about that? Do you recall those discussions? No, I can't I can't I can't recall any of the specifics. All I can remember is the two officers being quite indignant

01:26:17 the two officers being quite indignant about this officer, but I can't remember the details and I can't remember any NPIU involvement. And when you say indignant about that officer, what do you mean? Um,

01:26:28 Um, just the the fact that they weren't happy with him. They didn't really trust him and uh they had strong views about his

01:26:39 they had strong views about his reliability.

01:26:42 And by this time in November 2001, we know that um James Thompson had been to Indonesia against uh instructions not to

01:26:55 Indonesia against uh instructions not to go so against or any authorization. He went to Indonesia on a an authorized trip. Were you aware of that at the time?

01:27:03 time? I can't remember. I may have been aware made aware of it, but I can't remember any specifics about that. It'd be a fairly significant thing for an officer to do, wouldn't it? Was that not raised with you?

01:27:16 Was that not raised with you? In the grand scheme of things, given many of the other HR issues across the command, although it stands out as being uh quite a significant one, there was

01:27:28 uh quite a significant one, there was also lots of other significant issues as well. And I can't remember any details of this specific one, I'm afraid. what an undercover officer making up a a a gun plot and

01:27:41 making up a a a gun plot and disappearing across to Indonesia shortly after 911. I may have been aware of at the time, but I cannot recall now any of the the details of it. I'm afraid

01:27:52 details of it. I'm afraid the suggestion here is that he should be withdrawn. Um,

01:28:00 Um, was that an our understanding is that NOIU was more of an evidence gathering uh operation and would would um support prosecutions

01:28:12 and would would um support prosecutions against people. Is that right? As opposed to the SDS being an intelligence gathering operation. The NPOIU didn't have facilities to

01:28:23 The NPOIU didn't have facilities to prosecute itself. It did not have any what people might understand as uh investigators like I suppose national crime agency or national crime squad at the time. It uh looked to develop

01:28:36 the time. It uh looked to develop intelligence in partnership with other police services or forces or indeed with the national crime squad. So in a situation like this I notice it says on

01:28:47 situation like this I notice it says on the document in front of me the NCS who had a leazison officer in the NPIU. I would believe that if uh any operations or investigations were going to be taken forward uh what would happen would be

01:28:58 forward uh what would happen would be that it would be the NCS who we would look to lead on that or to identify a force to lead on it and then the NPIOU would provide any billing inquiries or

01:29:10 would provide any billing inquiries or intelligence support to that. And in terms of magenta triangle being withdrawn here, we can see in paragraph one, Colin Black was mindful of revelation or disclosure issues.

01:29:23 revelation or disclosure issues. Was this undercover officer being withdrawn so as to avoid any disclosure in a future potential prosecution? To be honest, I'm not really in a position to answer that. I can't can't

01:29:36 position to answer that. I can't can't remember uh any real specifics about that. I'm sorry.

01:29:42 Given the concerns that were had at that time with HN16, does it seem unusual to you that efforts were still being made

01:29:53 you that efforts were still being made to investigate and continue in operation against L2 and L3 who appear to have been completely innocent in relation to this?

01:30:04 this? Uh again, not being privy uh at this time to all the information that uh either Colin or the SDS management had. I'm not really I don't really feel competent to comment on their uh

01:30:17 competent to comment on their uh decision making. Um I could speculate that uh they were concerned that despite their suspicions, if it was an actual event and it had gone wrong, um they

01:30:30 event and it had gone wrong, um they would have had uh really quite a large mess to clear up. But again, I would only be speculating, I'm afraid, on that.

01:30:36 that. Um, you've mentioned that they appear to be quite indignant in relation to this officer. Was there any sniff of the fact that uh the suggestion that the operation may have been fraudulent from

01:30:49 operation may have been fraudulent from start to finish? I can't honestly remember. If it was, then that would be quite a serious thing, wouldn't it? Setting up innocent members of the public. We heard from L L3 uh last autumn in relation to

01:31:03 from L L3 uh last autumn in relation to the fact that he said this is the biggest thing that's ever happened to me in my life that I knew nothing about and the outcome could have been very very different in terms of any prison sentence that

01:31:14 in terms of any prison sentence that would have occurred. I I think serious is possibly an understatement. Um it's uh outrageous and and and no discussions that you can recall at

01:31:26 no discussions that you can recall at this time in relation to that. Not that I can discuss. I know what my reaction is in reading this now. Uh and I would imagine my reaction would have been exactly the same that it's not something

01:31:37 exactly the same that it's not something to surely shalley about. You got to look at removing the officer and looking at discipline or any other processes that he might well have broken. So had you uh known about what was

01:31:49 So had you uh known about what was happening at the time, you would have thought the the step to take would be to remove him. And what do you mean by that? I I would like uh I would like to think that I would have spoken with Colin and

01:32:01 Colin and said that not only has the officer got to be removed, but you've got to look at any possible offenses that the officer might have committed. Um and also look at if he's done if an officer has done

01:32:12 at if he's done if an officer has done this, what else might they have done that you might want to find out about? What might else might be hiding under a rock?

01:32:20 rock? We know there were further investigations and the billing data from his mobile phone indicated that he was having a relationship with two women. Um, were you made aware of that?

01:32:31 Um, were you made aware of that? No, I can't I have no recollection of that.

01:32:34 that. Would that have been something that would have been highly unusual and something you would have expected to have learned about? It would depend at that time who was dealing with or who

01:32:45 that time who was dealing with or who was leading on looking at the officer and investigating the officer. Um,

01:32:54 I would have I would have thought that I may well have been advised about it or been told about it, but I can't recollect it. And I think this is possibly the first time I've heard that.

01:33:05 possibly the first time I've heard that. In terms of any steps in terms of the inquiries or operations against L2 and L3, what sort of inquiries would have been made against L2 and L3?

01:33:16 been made against L2 and L3? Again, without remembering or having the full details of what the allegations were and what they were investigating. It's difficult for me at this stage to say what measures the NPIU

01:33:28 this stage to say what measures the NPIU might have taken other than uh detailed here billing inquiries. Uh, I'm sorry. Billing inquiries being on mobile phones.

01:33:38 phones. Yeah. Yeah. Billing inquiries on mobile phones.

01:33:41 phones. Uh, surveillance would that have been that wouldn't have been a job for the MPU because it didn't have a surveillance capability. That would be something that it would have gone to either um Met Special Branch or if it

01:33:52 either um Met Special Branch or if it was a MET officer, they may have been inclined to outsource it to the National Crime Squad or another force. Um, Miu undercover officers, would they have

01:34:03 undercover officers, would they have been targeted towards L2 or L3? [snorts] No.

01:34:07 No. And why not? Um, most of the NPIU officers at that time and it was a small unit already had areas that they were being deployed to,

01:34:18 areas that they were being deployed to, uh, if I recollect and to start redeploying them, um, would interfere with the work they were doing potentially for other forces.

01:34:28 Can we have on screen please MPS0719722.

01:34:41 So we can see in relation to James Thompson magenta triangle this is an overview and summary of the inquiries that were conducted into his actions. Page 11 of that please. Again, this is

01:34:55 Page 11 of that please. Again, this is not something that was in your witness pack.

01:35:01 We can see here in relation to paragraph one

01:35:05 one the concerns that were had

01:35:10 both by him initially that he expressed to HN1

01:35:15 to HN1 that the offic's inquiries related to the fact that he had established relationships whilst in the field

01:35:23 in in terms of the background to the inquiries those concerns were groundless but the frequency of contacts with non-active female subscri sub subscribers could show that this was the case. So, this is something um that the

01:35:36 case. So, this is something um that the SDS were then looking into to try and establish whether he had uh relationships with Ellie and uh Lucy. But we can see that there were other um

01:35:48 But we can see that there were other um women involved in this as well, particularly Wendy and Sarah that we we get from the billing data elsewhere in this document. Um, [snorts] I don't need to show it to you unless had you seen

01:36:00 to show it to you unless had you seen this document? I have no recollection of having seen that. No.

01:36:04 that. No. Were you aware that there was a significant investigation ongoing in relation to HN16 at the time? No.

01:36:13 No. Um,

01:36:15 Um, in terms of what happened with this investigation into the deceit of women, it doesn't appear to have gone anywhere.

01:36:26 it doesn't appear to have gone anywhere. We know that those relationships did happen. It's been admitted and we've heard from Ellie and Sara and Wendy, three uh women that he had close relationships with, two of which were

01:36:38 relationships with, two of which were sexual.

01:36:40 sexual. What do you say should have happened in relation to that investigation? Would you have expected that to have been a full investigation and to have reached

01:36:51 full investigation and to have reached conclusions? Yes, I I I'm I'm surprised that there doesn't appear to be an outcome at it because the the whole aspect of that, not only have you got

01:37:03 aspect of that, not only have you got the uh personal invasion of the individual's privacy and sort of potential deception uh of the individuals, but you've got a whole

01:37:15 individuals, but you've got a whole range of operational security issues as well in that um is the officer If he's doing this, what else is he doing? Is he being diverted from his primary role um to become

01:37:30 from his primary role um to become involved with females? If the females were involved in a group that he was looking at, is he going to start slanting his intelligence to protect the individual? Is more of his time focused

01:37:41 individual? Is more of his time focused on looking uh at his relationship than his work? It raises a whole range of of questions that I would expect somebody to be asking and at the very least

01:37:53 to be asking and at the very least removing him. Uh probably around about that time the metapon police were quite keen to have thing called goal groups where if you had an issue that was potentially uh serious and had quite a

01:38:06 potentially uh serious and had quite a large impact you would hold a gold group and then something like this. Uh I think also you'd probably be looking to get uh advice from our uh legal branch as well as to uh

01:38:19 as to uh any particular issues around the fact that the women had been uh in effect targeted by this officer and any uh

01:38:30 targeted by this officer and any uh liability that the police itself had uh in terms of this. You mentioned in your witness statement that had you known about this sort of thing, you would have uh tried to do

01:38:41 thing, you would have uh tried to do something to support the women, inform the women. Uh is that something you could have done? I think what I would have done is I would have looked at and I would have taken advice in terms of what Met Legal

01:38:54 taken advice in terms of what Met Legal Services were telling me. Um and also we would be looking at the psychological impact of telling somebody this and what the long-term effect is. If you're going to tell something to somebody which is

01:39:07 to tell something to somebody which is going to affect them psychologically then you would think that you might need to think ahead about putting in some psychological first aid or safeguards. Um that sort of issue would be outside my and most police officer skill base

01:39:20 my and most police officer skill base but again uh legal services might be in a position to say legally what our liability would be. We know that um DS Thompson stayed in

01:39:31 We know that um DS Thompson stayed in touch with Ellie and Wendy post his deployment. So even when he was no longer a UCO, he still used his undercover identity to stay in touch

01:39:42 undercover identity to stay in touch with the women long after his deployment had finished. What steps could have been taken to prevent that from happening? [clears throat] Um

01:39:54 I suppose at its extreme you could have got uh and again my legal knowledge is is is not particularly good in this area. Um would have been you could have got a restraining order some form of injunction to prevent him. Uh

01:40:08 injunction to prevent him. Uh you would also be looking I would say if you'd been ordered not to have a relationship with them you would be looking at potential disciplinary issues.

01:40:16 issues. In fact, disciplinary issue would probably be the first step before you did anything else. When you talk about disciplinary issu steps, you mean formal disciplinary. Yeah. I think that if an individual

01:40:27 Yeah. I think that if an individual isn't taking note of what's happening uh and has been told to stop it and continues to do it, then um the next course would be formal disciplinary action.

01:40:39 action. We know that no formal disciplinary action was taken against HN16 and his um uh security clearance was demoted from DV to SC for a a period of

01:40:52 demoted from DV to SC for a a period of I think it was two years. Um but he was still allowed to be in a a position where as a protection officer and he was also still allowed to have an authorized firearm.

01:41:04 firearm. What do you say about that given the deception that uh he had engaged in? Um well, I'm not in a position to understand the reasoning for the people

01:41:15 understand the reasoning for the people if they didn't know all about this as to why they allowed him to continue that. So I wouldn't necessarily want to comment on their reasoning and rationale, but at the very least it

01:41:26 rationale, but at the very least it seems extraordinarily surprising. Um, we know from Ellie when she gave her evidence at the end of last year that when she found out that DS Thompson was

01:41:37 when she found out that DS Thompson was an undercover officer, she was scared to think that somebody who is keeping track of her and keeping in touch with her had access to firearms and mixed with people

01:41:48 access to firearms and mixed with people who could potentially harm her given what uh given the communications that had taken place between them. she didn't know what to do and whether speaking out would put her in in danger.

01:42:01 speaking out would put her in in danger. I'm paraphrasing her her evidence in relation to that, but was any consideration given, as far as you know, to um uh contacting

01:42:14 to um uh contacting any women that had been deceived by undercover officers uh in the SDS. Um well at that time I didn't know any woman had been deceived so I wouldn't really be in a position to comment as to

01:42:26 really be in a position to comment as to whether any decision had been taken or any thought had been given. What

01:42:34 given that there was some suspicion here in HN16's case um albeit you didn't know about it um is what your evidence is. it.

01:42:48 what your evidence is. it. Would you have expected steps to have been taken to establish whether any other women had been deceived by undercover officers?

01:42:59 [sighs] Again, um I think it's certainly something that would have been asked as to what the process and procedure was and what officers had been advised and

01:43:11 and what officers had been advised and told around that. Was there a standard operating procedure? Um, I know from experience in other in the

01:43:22 I know from experience in other in the MPU that if an officer felt that there was a chance that he maybe uh going into relationship there was a method and methodology that could be used to uh

01:43:35 methodology that could be used to uh enol that but I wasn't uh aware of any within the SDS. So that wasn't a discussion that reached you? No.

01:43:47 No. Uh you weren't aware of any historical issues in relation to that? No.

01:43:54 No. Um can I have on screen please behind tab B2 MPS0749 763.

01:44:08 [snorts]

01:44:10 Page two,

01:44:15 this shows a letter that was sent from the partner of HN123. Um, that officer was an undercover officer [snorts] in the uh SDS in the

01:44:27 officer [snorts] in the uh SDS in the '9s.

01:44:28 '9s. And you can have a look at what his cipher his real identity is on your cipher list.

01:44:46 Yep. Did you know that officer? Uh only in terms of uh involvement in legal cases.

01:44:58 involvement in legal cases. Okay. Um, this letter we can see is from his partner to ACSO Vaness

01:45:07 Vaness and it's dated the 8th of August 2002. So this is just prior to the True Spies documentary if you recall that which aired in October and November of 2002.

01:45:19 aired in October and November of 2002. Do you recall? Yeah, I'm very much aware of the True Spies documentary. Yeah. And at the time in 2002, you were in C squad with respons some responsibility for the

01:45:30 respons some responsibility for the NOIU. Is that right? Yes. Probably just about handing over that responsibility, I think. Yeah. We can see at the end at the bottom

01:45:42 We can see at the end at the bottom paragraph on that page too. Interestingly, one of the Christmas parties that I was ordered by SDS management to attend was held in a public place with members of the public overhearing what was being said. I was

01:45:54 overhearing what was being said. I was disgusted by what I heard I saw and heard particularly while SDS manager stood around. For example, some people were laughing about Roger Pierce who had been under cover in SDS some time

01:46:05 been under cover in SDS some time earlier. And it was said that he had boasted about certain things he had done while undercover um and over the page.

01:46:17 It said that over the years [snorts] undercover officers have boasted of amongst other more serious things their extrammarital affairs while undercover both heterosexual and homosexual and of

01:46:28 both heterosexual and homosexual and of children born as a result of some affairs.

01:46:32 affairs. Yet SDS line management insist on SDS officers being in a stable heterosexual relationship in their nonundercover lives and they seek to undermine the very relationship they rely on. As you

01:46:45 very relationship they rely on. As you once described to me, the SDS is indeed a cowboy outfit. I wonder if MPS andor the fathers of those children are paying for their upkeep. Perhaps not yet.

01:46:58 upkeep. Perhaps not yet. Um,

01:47:01 Um, did you attend any of the Christmas parties

01:47:04 parties for the SDS during your time? No.

01:47:09 No. Were you aware of this letter that was sent to ACSO FNess in 2002? No, I have no recollection. I haven't seen it before.

01:47:22 Um, were you aware of SDS or SB officers boasting of the exploits

01:47:31 of their time in the SDS? No.

01:47:36 No. Does it surprise you at all that they did?

01:47:41 It's it would surprise me if what the letter is saying was accurate. Um but again I have I wouldn't want to say that it that it surprised me that they were

01:47:52 it that it surprised me that they were saying that because I have no evidence other than this letter that they were saying that and it's a letter I haven't seen. So again I without wishing to uh question the the veracity of the

01:48:04 question the the veracity of the individual's comments. I wouldn't like to condemn a lot of fellow officers just on that.

01:48:11 on that. What would surprise you about it? the fact that they were bo seemingly boasting about it or the fact that some of that appears to have been done in a public place.

01:48:25 I'm I'm just surprised given uh

01:48:30 given uh some of the SDS officers I know that that actually happened. Um,

01:48:39 Um, I'm not I, as I've said, I wouldn't want to question the the the truth of the individual's letter, but I have no evidence uh in my experience that SDS

01:48:50 evidence uh in my experience that SDS officers have said that or boasted about that. So, for me to comment on it, I think would be be wrong. We know that um some officers did have extrammarital affairs and we know that

01:49:03 extrammarital affairs and we know that some did father children. So is the fact that or the suggestion that they boasted about their exploits undercover that's the surprising thing

01:49:15 undercover that's the surprising thing is it

01:49:17 is it it's surprising that it took place and it's surprising that the uh letter writer alleges that they took place in public and that in her presence.

01:49:30 Had you heard any rumors at all about undercover officers fathering children? No.

01:49:37 No. So, no rumors about HN67 having fathered a child. Hence 67 will be on your cipher list.

01:49:47 No, definitely not. Any uh understanding of Bob Lambert fathering a child? No, not at that time. That was something I learned much later on. Had you heard

01:50:00 I learned much later on. Had you heard any rumors at all about a sexual indiscretion of HN36 Mike Dell? We understand that he didn't deploy as a UCO. Uh his account is very different

01:50:12 UCO. Uh his account is very different from Peter Francis's account. I think you've got the wrong officer. It's HN.

01:50:18 It's HN. Oh, I'm sorry. Um yes, I was going to raise my eye is not alleged to have been involved in that. It's uh DCI Edmonson.

01:50:30 It's uh DCI Edmonson. I don't I couldn't comment on that. Did you Did you understand that he had not deployed as a UCO? Uh

01:50:38 Uh but he was as a manager of the SDS. I may have known that at one time, but I certainly wouldn't have known about any uh allegations about him. I worked with

01:50:49 uh allegations about him. I worked with him uh in another area of special branch um but wasn't really aware of his uh involvement in SDS management and certainly it was never anything he

01:51:00 certainly it was never anything he mentioned to me. Um did you know he had been in the SDS? Um

01:51:06 Um I at this stage I can't honestly remember that he mentioned it to me. I may have been told that he'd been in the SDS but I can't remember him telling me that he'd been in the SDS.

01:51:17 that he'd been in the SDS. Um, had you ever heard of somebody called Mike Chitty and the fact that he had uh uh used his undercover identity to re-enter the field without authorization?

01:51:29 field without authorization? I only heard I never knew the officer and I only heard from much older colleagues uh disparaging comments about the individual, but nothing about any forms of relationships or anything.

01:51:44 Um, so you hadn't heard about him returning to the field and proposing to a a a woman he had a sexual relationship with?

01:51:53 with? No, I think he would have been well before my time and I have no recollection of ever hearing that. Um,

01:52:00 Um, HN78 Trevor Morris. Did you you probably heard about this in relation to the A and B litigation, but do you recall knowing about him having a

01:52:13 do you recall knowing about him having a girlfriend called B? Uh B should be on your cipher list. No, I I didn't didn't know anything about that. Um Okay.

01:52:20 Okay. He actually worked briefly in the NPIU. Um but I had no knowledge about that. We'll come to the AMB litigation in a moment in more detail, but HM43, do you

01:52:32 moment in more detail, but HM43, do you recall learning about the Peter Francis? Do you recall learning about his sexual relationships undercover? No, I don't.

01:52:43 No, I don't. Um, do you recall anything about uh DC Scut, something known as the Scut affair, and he him having a mental breakdown and talking to other officers

01:52:54 breakdown and talking to other officers about um other officers being involved in sexual misconduct? No, the only thing I knew about uh I think his name was Stephan Scott was

01:53:05 think his name was Stephan Scott was that he [clears throat] has he had been admitted at some time to a ward in the uh clinic a pependon um for psychiatric issues but the the specifics around that

01:53:18 issues but the the specifics around that no knowledge of. You don't recall there being any um discussion around him saying that the practice of having sexual relationships undercover was more widespread?

01:53:30 undercover was more widespread? No, definitely not. Do you recall learning about Helen D Helen uh uh Steel looking for dyn? Yes, I remember hearing about that.

01:53:44 Yes, I remember hearing about that. That was ongoing during the time that you were in the uh escort. Is that right? I can't remember the exact um time and I can remember I hearing about

01:53:55 time and I can remember I hearing about it uh mainly periphery because I think it was dealt with uh at other levels. Um and I think it was

01:54:07 and I think it was from what I recollect it was it was seen as a stalking issue. I think that's how it was described to me. Um did you understand that there had been a sexual relationship between the two? No,

01:54:18 two? No, that was never discussed. No, no, it was uh from what I remember I could the reason for looking to relocate him was uh it was sold told to me that

01:54:29 him was uh it was sold told to me that it was as a result of an ongoing stocking issue. What about somebody known to this inquiry as Rosa looking for uh DS Jim Boiling? That was around 2001 2002.

01:54:44 Boiling? That was around 2001 2002. So while you were in C squad. Yeah, I have no recollection of that. I recall Jim Boiling, but I can't remember that issue. I can remember

01:54:56 that issue. I can remember eventually uh reading about it, but I can't remember any any searches by that individual. Do you recall the SDS uh safe house having to move because of a a potential

01:55:09 having to move because of a a potential operational [clears throat] uh threat perceived uh from Rosa? contacting the office and trying to find Jim Boiling. No, I have no no knowledge of that.

01:55:22 No, I have no no knowledge of that. Um, what about somebody called Allison under her her cipher is Allison looking for DC Jenner? That would be that'll have been around 2001 as well.

01:55:34 have been around 2001 as well. No, I have no knowledge of that.

01:55:39 Were you aware at any point of undercover officers living with female members of the public for years in their undercover identities?

01:55:50 undercover identities? No.

01:55:52 No. You didn't know that that was uh uh something that happened as part of legend building and cover? No. No.

01:56:04 Were you aware of at least one or two sexual relationships of Carlos Saraki at least towards the end of 2001 2002? No, only as a result of this inquiry.

01:56:17 No, only as a result of this inquiry. So DCI Dell never raised that with you? No, I can't recall them ever raising that with me. We understand that DCIDell did know of a deceitful sexual

01:56:29 did know of a deceitful sexual relationship that Carlos Saraki had entered into in his undercover identity. Would you have expected DCIDell to raise that with you?

01:56:40 that with you? I'm very surprised that he didn't. Yeah, I'm very surprised. Why is that? Um because I always regarded as Mike as being an officer of the highest integrity who had high

01:56:51 the highest integrity who had high standards and expected officers to follow those standards and uh if he felt that officers were doing something which was wrong then he would take action

01:57:02 was wrong then he would take action himself.

01:57:06 And in terms of um what you would expect to have happened, had an officer admitted to a a deceitful sexual relationship in their cover identity,

01:57:17 relationship in their cover identity, what what steps would you have expect to have been taken in relation to that officer?

01:57:22 officer? Very similar to the ones I uh mentioned earlier. uh a a review of the officer's deployment, uh operational risks, uh risk to the individual they were involved with, um

01:57:34 individual they were involved with, um potential liability for the Met Police, uh the exactly the the same issues that I mentioned earlier. Um and we've spoken about HN16 and the

01:57:47 Um and we've spoken about HN16 and the relationships uh suspected through the phone billing. Would you have expected all of that if that was known to the officers in the SDS to have become a real issue?

01:57:59 SDS to have become a real issue? Something that managers at your level should have been aware of to be able to take steps in relation to doing something about it. I think yes, I think that all managers

01:58:12 I think yes, I think that all managers would want to know about issues that they could deal with. It's you rely on uh people to tell you things. You rely on you to dig a little bit but uh given

01:58:25 on you to dig a little bit but uh given the vast uh area of your command and responsibilities uh and also the fact that particularly in relation to USA's use and conduct is

01:58:36 in relation to USA's use and conduct is something that is signed off uh and managed by a more senior officer. uh you start getting to the level of treading on their toes and what they expect and what role they want to fulfill within

01:58:49 what role they want to fulfill within that.

01:58:51 that. Albeit some of these examples that I've referred to here are historical so before your time in relation in in the line management of the SDS would you

01:59:02 line management of the SDS would you have liked to have known about them? Would you have liked to have known that sex undercover was a real risk that the officers posed to members of the public? Yes, I would. I would like to have known

01:59:14 Yes, I would. I would like to have known about it. Uh there's a lot of things I think in terms of undercover deployments that uh it would have been good to have known about and might still be good to know about. And

01:59:26 might still be good to know about. And had you known about them, what steps might you have been able to take to prevent those sexual relationships from happening? I think a clear understanding of what's acceptable and what isn't acceptable. I

01:59:39 acceptable and what isn't acceptable. I think if you have a gray area where people aren't particularly sure what they're allowed to do and what they aren't allowed to do, it gives people scope to um make their own

01:59:50 scope to um make their own interpretation on it. Whereas if you put down uh clear guidelines uh that people are expected to follow, it then becomes much easier to hold them to account when they don't do that.

02:00:04 Um you say in paragraph 22 of your second witness statement, I don't need to bring it up, but you say that you would have expected information about sexual relationships undercover to have

02:00:15 sexual relationships undercover to have been escalated. And uh at paragraph 23, you cannot believe that DCIDell would would have tacitly condoned sexual uh

02:00:26 tacitly condoned sexual uh relationships. Um and your your evidence in your Whitler statement is that generally flowed uphill. Yes. I think that uh to put that into

02:00:38 Yes. I think that uh to put that into context, what it's a rather crude statement, but basically what it means would be that if uh somebody had been uh identified as doing something which was wrong or against the the ethos of the

02:00:50 wrong or against the the ethos of the the Metropolitan Police, what they might seek to do would be to actually put the the blame and the responsibility elsewhere that management knew about it and therefore acquested in that conduct.

02:01:03 and therefore acquested in that conduct. Uh it was a phrase that was quite common at the time. Uh it's probably not in use now, but that that was the basic sentiment of it. Um but I can't imagine Mike I still would find it very

02:01:14 Mike I still would find it very difficult to believe that Mike Dell would countenance any of that such such action.

02:01:20 action. In terms of what you'd have been able to do at your level, you've mentioned a couple of things about, you know, greater guide, more specific guidance, written guidance, um enforcement of

02:01:33 written guidance, um enforcement of that. Uh what about the supervisory element of it? Would you have had more discussions about things with your managers? I think one of the and again

02:01:44 managers? I think one of the and again hindsight is a great thing but looking back perhaps more involvement with uh the national undercover structure uh in

02:01:55 the national undercover structure uh in contrast to what I found with the NPIU where they were part of a national structure the national training national guidelines national selection um the way

02:02:07 guidelines national selection um the way SDS was structured it was a very internal and very specific uh role and structure. We know that the NPIU also had uh more

02:02:18 We know that the NPIU also had uh more stringent training for the undercover officers and and guidelines. Is that fair to say? I think I think whether it was stringent or not, it had a national framework which was endorsed across the country.

02:02:30 which was endorsed across the country. Uh and there was a as I recall there was a standing group uh who would meet to discuss it to progress it. I'm not saying it was perfect uh and I'm not

02:02:42 saying it was perfect uh and I'm not saying that uh there wouldn't have been room for improvement but at least there was something there and there was uh I suppose a desire for a recognized standard. I think any organization if if

02:02:54 standard. I think any organization if if you allow it to self inspect and selfexamine and self-perpetuate uh is is looking for potential mistakes.

02:03:05 uh is is looking for potential mistakes. And that's not wishing to take away anything from the fantastic work done by most of the SDS officers who weren't involved in sexual affairs and most of the management who did their best.

02:03:16 the management who did their best. Just before um I ask you any more about that ju the NOIU still had significant problems itself and it didn't stop uh sexual relationships from happening. We know that in the NOIU. Why why did that

02:03:30 know that in the NOIU. Why why did that uh better framework still not stop undercover officers from having sex undercover? I think is possibly human nature, possibly selection processes. Um also

02:03:46 possibly selection processes. Um also in terms of I think with the NPIOU uh

02:03:51 uh a reluctance of uh cover officers and dedicated cover officers to hold their uh field officers to account and to pass issues up uh in a sense up the food

02:04:04 issues up uh in a sense up the food chain. So there was I would say a series of feelings failings there um because of my experience again rather like with Mike Dell uh the management there

02:04:15 Mike Dell uh the management there [clears throat] would have been very keen to take rigorous action was there a culture within the SDS NPIU will be investigated in a later branch but within the SDS of don't ask don't

02:04:27 but within the SDS of don't ask don't tell and therefore these discussions were not happening up at your level there was not an openness about the issues that had clearly been uh uncovered throughout the history of the

02:04:39 uncovered throughout the history of the SDS.

02:04:40 SDS. I think um it's probably goes back to almost to the cold war and uh probably still a policy followed by other uh

02:04:51 still a policy followed by other uh agencies which is need to know. Uh and certainly when I joined special branch if you didn't need to know something you weren't going to ask about it. Uh we were told on day one that there was a

02:05:02 were told on day one that there was a unit that existed to do specialist work. Uh don't ask about it. If you need to know about it, you'll be told about it. And I think that culture probably

02:05:13 And I think that culture probably existed right up until uh the end of the cold war uh and probably lingered on after that. If you don't need to know, don't start asking. Don't start digging.

02:05:25 don't start asking. Don't start digging. would a a more open culture, particularly discussions around the risks of sexual relationships have helped uh to prevent them?

02:05:36 helped uh to prevent them? Again, because I'm not uh fully aware of what discussions or what training the SDS had in that at the time. Um I wouldn't really want to comment because they may already have had that.

02:05:49 they may already have had that. Uh uh support role players, I think. Did you have some involvement of that within the NPIU context? Um, if you're meaning identifying

02:06:01 Um, if you're meaning identifying individuals to in effect act as partners or in relationship. Yes. Um, any request for that from you from

02:06:14 Um, any request for that from you from the SDS?

02:06:16 the SDS? No. Uh and again I would probably have assumed that the SDS if it was a requirement would have looked uh within the broader special branch to identify

02:06:27 the broader special branch to identify somebody to fulfill that role. You thought that was under control? Well, it was not something that was ever raised to me and because it wasn't something that was raised as an issue, I probably assumed that there was a

02:06:38 probably assumed that there was a process in place to deal with it. Had it been raised with you, is that something that you could have supported? I think it would have looked at it would have been something that I or any

02:06:49 have been something that I or any management would have looked at and said uh okay relationships how do we manage them what do we do is there a best practice in dealing with that um because

02:07:00 practice in dealing with that um because uh I'm absolutely certain it also happens in the crime world and has happened historically in the crime world as well um so yeah I think you would look for best practice look for guidance

02:07:11 look for best practice look for guidance uh I don't think it's something that you would necessarily want to do overnight. Um, you mentioned about other officers, the vast majority of officers within the

02:07:22 the vast majority of officers within the SDS um, doing good work. I just want to uh bring up the tranch 3 timeline again if I can

02:07:31 if I can so that we can see the the open offices and obviously we have to be careful about any closed offices that were under your uh uh tenure

02:07:42 your uh uh tenure in the SDS. But what we can see is that about six there are about six open offices.

02:07:55 So if we can scroll down

02:08:01 we can see that between 2003 2005 where you're the chief superintendent in special branch. If we scroll down at the chart,

02:08:13 those that are operational, the open offices, we've got HN60 Dave Evans, HN3 Jason Bishop, HN 104 Carlo Neri, HN77

02:08:27 104 Carlo Neri, HN77 Jacqueline Anderson, and HN118 Simon Wellings. and for a time HN18 Rob Harrison.

02:08:38 Rob Harrison. [snorts]

02:08:42 And of those, three [clears throat] have admitted to at least one sexual relationship. HN60, 104, and 18.

02:08:55 104, and 18. Now, there may be rumors about the others, but nothing admitted or or established. But what how is it that you say well

02:09:06 But what how is it that you say well majority were is is it your evidence actually I don't want to put words in your mouth that the majority were not engaged in undercover sexual relationships. I would be looking at it historically uh

02:09:18 I would be looking at it historically uh across the whole time period of uh special branch SDS. Right. [snorts] Okay. But you're not making any claims that the majority of the UCOs under your tenure in the SDS.

02:09:34 Yes. Yeah.

02:09:39 That's right. Yeah. Yeah. You your your council has correctly said that I'm asking about all of the officers, not just the open offices, but we've got to take care in

02:09:51 offices, but we've got to take care in terms of the closed offices. My question is um in terms of the officers that we know of open officers, 50% of them have admitted to at least one sexual

02:10:02 admitted to at least one sexual relationship undercover. You say the majority were not involved in sexual relationships. Is that right? Uh and as I say, I would say

02:10:13 Uh and as I say, I would say historically the majority weren't involved. And again because I don't have access to the numbers of closed officers, I can't work out statistically whether the three officers are

02:10:27 whether the three officers are small number out of a majority of officers or if it is 50%. So I wouldn't say it's 50% because I haven't got the evidence in front of me around about the closed officers. It might only be 30%

02:10:39 closed officers. It might only be 30% which in itself isn't good. And um of the closed officers, are you aware of any that engaged in [clears throat] without naming anybody

02:10:50 [clears throat] without naming anybody uh any that engaged in sexual relationships? Not that I'm aware of, unless the inquiry has that knowledge, but I'm not. Did you take any steps to find out whether any of them engaged in sexual

02:11:01 whether any of them engaged in sexual relationships? at the

02:11:05 at the when it first became an issue uh with Mark Kennedy, the Metapolon Police asked myself and our operational security advisor to ask all the serving and

02:11:19 advisor to ask all the serving and recently serving SDS officers if they had uh anything that they would like to tell us, anything they would like to get off their chest before either investigation or inquiry found it. this

02:11:31 investigation or inquiry found it. this was to be a an opportunity for people to suppose truth and reconciliation but not so much a reconciliation but more the truth um so they would have been given an

02:11:42 they would have been given an opportunity I can't remember any of the closed officers coming out with that information that they had been involved in a relationship um how did HN18 tell you about his

02:11:57 um how did HN18 tell you about his relationship that's Robert Hastings Um I can't remember because I I don't have obviously the information in front of me from that time.

02:12:08 from that time. Um did you write a report? Um

02:12:12 Um I believe either myself or the operational security advisor would have written a report. I can't remember which of us did that. And it was I'm just wondering on what

02:12:24 And it was I'm just wondering on what basis you've said majority weren't involved because we know that um some of them have not admitted to it until very recently for for instance HN60 um David Evans didn't admit to that

02:12:36 um David Evans didn't admit to that until very recently this year. So how why is it you can feel like you can confidently say they weren't involved in

02:12:47 confidently say they weren't involved in sexual relationships given that you didn't know that they were at the time? Um, I suppose by knowing some of the officers involved historically, um, and their relationship with their

02:13:00 um, and their relationship with their partners or wives, it would be my assumption, I suppose, in the same way that, uh, you could make an assumption that they might have been involved in a sexual relationship. My assumption would be the majority were. It's not

02:13:12 be the majority were. It's not necessarily based on evidence, but it would be based on my assumption and um my knowledge of a lot of the officers concerned

02:13:19 concerned and say for asking them if they wanted to get anything off their chest, was there any other steps taken such as looking at billing? I can't remember. Uh certainly at that time we weren't looking at billing

02:13:32 time we weren't looking at billing because it wasn't uh an investigation.

02:13:37 Um, going back to the letter that was sent from HM123's partner, it appears that a woman who is outside of Special Branch knew more than the

02:13:48 of Special Branch knew more than the detectives within Special Branch just from listening to the UCOs's at social functions. H how did that situation come to be?

02:13:57 to be? Because she attended a social function. Um, I didn't attend that social function. Um, and again, whilst I'm not saying that the woman's

02:14:08 whilst I'm not saying that the woman's information was in any way wrong, it was uh something that I wasn't privy to.

02:14:18 Is it a lack of professional curiosity amongst the managers in charge of the SDS that led to a situation where they were not aware of what was going on in the field?

02:14:30 the field? Again,

02:14:36 historically, I I couldn't say whether that was the case or not. Or was it actually such common practice neither and either condoned or

02:14:47 neither and either condoned or encouraged or simply ignored because people didn't really care about it? Certainly in my experience, it wasn't something that was common knowledge and it wasn't something that was condoned. I can only speak for myself that uh it was

02:14:59 can only speak for myself that uh it was never something that I was aware of and it was never something that I condoned. Was it a topic that was never really focused on because people didn't really care about how uh women were treated as

02:15:10 care about how uh women were treated as part of an undercover deployment? No. Again, I I I don't feel like I'm in a position to comment, but I don't feel that there was a particularly Mr. Mr.

02:15:22 that there was a particularly Mr. Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson, sorry, getting my words on. um misogynist attitude within special branch in general. I can't comment for individual officers, but I never experienced or felt that that was

02:15:35 never experienced or felt that that was the case with the the female officers I worked with and I never experienced it being a particularly misogynistic uh unit.

02:15:45 uh unit. Did you ever get the sense that the SDS was a a cowboy outfit, a law unto itself applying different rules? No, I was never given that impression. Um, it was

02:15:56 never given that impression. Um, it was always something that uh senior officers in the special branch were always very keen to show whichever new commissioner was that this was something very

02:16:07 was that this was something very special. It was probably the first part of any special branch tour that a new commissioner would do. Uh and it was obviously something that very senior management special branch felt very proud with and confident that they could

02:16:19 proud with and confident that they could show commissioners.

02:16:23 And if we can scroll up to the top of the trench 3 timeline that's still on the screen, please.

02:16:35 We can see that um there was a crossover between Commissioner Stevens to Commissioner Blair during your tenure in ES squad. Do you recall

02:16:47 ES squad. Do you recall uh Commissioner Blair being uh uh uh uh invited to attend the SDS offices and

02:16:58 invited to attend the SDS offices and have a a tour of the SDS if you like? I believe he would have been, but I can't say for definite. I certainly know he visited special branch. Um, and I certainly know he was aware of the work

02:17:10 certainly know he was aware of the work of SD officers because he personally commended several of the officers.

02:17:17 Um, thank you, sir. I know we've run over the normal uh break time, but I've finished on that topic now, so it's good time.

02:17:25 time. We started a little late, so I don't think that um an excessive amount of time has been taken. We'll um break for 15 minutes.

02:35:47 Thank you. I'd like to move to a topic now about legal proceedings and and uh HN3 giving evidence as a defense witness uh following a protest at Grove House in

02:35:58 uh following a protest at Grove House in July 2004. Now, this isn't something that you've commented on in your witness statement, and you didn't have documents in relation to this in your witness pack. So, I'm going to take you through the

02:36:09 So, I'm going to take you through the documents today. Um, but essentially, uh, the SDS sought discontinuence of legal proceedings in relation to charges

02:36:20 legal proceedings in relation to charges of possession of articles to commit criminal damage. Um, and that was in uh uh in relation to Emily Apple, one of the CPS in this inquiry, and another

02:36:31 the CPS in this inquiry, and another activist charged with section 4 public order act uh offense and assault PC. HN3 Jason Bishop, do do you recall him? Um, no, not really. No.

02:36:44 Um, no, not really. No. Um, was he was present at the event outside Grovener House and he was to be a defense witness at the trial. We know that would just be his

02:36:57 that would just be his yes of course his real name will be on the cipher list if you want to have a look at that

02:37:20 sorry [clears throat] could you just give me his number again hn3 Thank you.

02:37:29 Yep.

02:37:32 Do you recall him vaguely? Yes. Through his time in the SDS. Uh not through his time in the SDS, but through other roles than SB, I think.

02:37:44 through other roles than SB, I think. We know that HN36 DCI Dell sought legal advice from Met Solicitors in [snorts] an attempt to avoid exposing HN3 by him giving evidence in his cover identity.

02:37:57 giving evidence in his cover identity. Recognizing the difficulties that there are in in somebody giving evidence uh under a false identity. Can we have on screen please MPS 0039592

02:38:16 which was a letter of the 10th of November 2004

02:38:22 to Commander Allison signed off by you. I'll give you a moment to refresh your memory in relation to this document.

02:38:43 [clears throat]

02:38:50 [snorts]

02:38:53 [clears throat]

02:39:09 [clears throat] [snorts]

02:39:10 [snorts] So we can see paragraph one sets out the circumstances of the arrest. We can see that Emily Apple is charged with possession of articles which were dolls

02:39:21 possession of articles which were dolls to be used in street uh puppet theater and it was suggested that she was going to use them to commit criminal damage. That was the the charge. um HN3 was

02:39:32 That was the the charge. um HN3 was present and was asked to give and we can see this at at paragraph five on the first page just above the redaction

02:39:43 first page just above the redaction that the solicitor acting for both defendants has asked the officer and other activists to make statements supporting the defendants in brackets fabricated version of events that the dolls were props for use in street

02:39:54 dolls were props for use in street theater. The officer has also been told to expect to give evidence in court. That word fabricated uh has been disputed by the solicitor

02:40:05 uh has been disputed by the solicitor and the defendants in that case because that was their uh legitimate defense and the suggestion that it was a fabricated version of events was not uh sustained

02:40:18 version of events was not uh sustained on the evidence provided by HN3. In fact, when HN3 gave evidence to this inquiry, he was asked um on what basis, to the best of your

02:40:31 um on what basis, to the best of your understanding, did Mike Dell write in paragraph five, and this is in relation to another a document that Mike Dell wrote, that the defendant's version of events that the dolls were props for use

02:40:43 events that the dolls were props for use in street theater was fabricated. An HN3 said, "I'm afraid I can't help you. My only thinking, you seem to have seen my report that they were to be

02:40:55 seen my report that they were to be thrown. Maybe he's disputing that street theater and throwing them were incompatible and I can't comment for him.

02:41:03 him. And the um reports that he put in in relation to that don't support the fact that the the defense was fabricated. um

02:41:14 um you've put it in your letter because it appears to have been based on a previous note to you by DCI Dell. And what we can see on page two under the first redaction

02:41:30 is what steps are being contemplated.

02:41:43 So we can instruct the undercover officer to let down his activist associates and simply not give evidence. um that would be a once only contingency plan, but DCIDell

02:41:55 plan, but DCIDell is in fact meeting with uh officers from the criminal justice unit in Westminster to discuss the dis possibility of discontinuing both of these cases. Do

02:42:07 discontinuing both of these cases. Do you recall anything in relation to this given that you're writing to the uh commander? No, I can't recall this. Um, I would

02:42:19 No, I can't recall this. Um, I would suspect that the letter was drafted on my behalf and I signed it and sent it. Uh, that having been said, as it's got my name on it, I would take responsibility for it.

02:42:31 We can see there is a further letter which is on the 15th of November. 5 days later behind MPS 0039615

02:42:48 and again this is authority being sought to explore the possibilities of discontinuing the charges. This is from Detective Superintendent Sate up to DAC

02:43:00 Detective Superintendent Sate up to DAC Yates. So the issue of an officer being asked to give evidence and his undercover identity at court is being raised up to DAC

02:43:13 raised up to DAC level. [clears throat] Is that what you would expect? Is that the protocol for raising these sorts of issues? I can't honestly remember uh at this

02:43:24 I can't honestly remember uh at this time what the protocol would have been. Uh

02:43:28 Uh but that would seem uh a reasonable level to escalate it to in terms of there being uh a characterization of the defense has been

02:43:40 characterization of the defense has been fabricated. You're simply using the words of DCI Dell, are you? In that letter that you sent?

02:43:48 sent? Yes. But again, as I say, it's got my name on it. I would accept responsibility for it even though um I might not necessarily now agree with it. [clears throat]

02:44:01 Um we can see that one of the reports from HN3

02:44:07 from HN3 behind um MPS 0035526.

02:44:13 [snorts] This was a report in relation to that event.

02:44:18 event. of the 13th of July [clears throat] 2004.

02:44:34 Halfway down the first paragraph there says the activists plan to make their own representation uh presentation to Lord Robert Rob Robertson which will consist of a doll possibly filled with fake blood to represent children killed

02:44:46 fake blood to represent children killed during conflict by the arms trade. And there may also be other dolls and legs and arms of dolls thrown to the point where Lord Robinson's car pulls up. And the source

02:44:58 Robinson's car pulls up. And the source comment says there's no hostile intent in throwing the dolls, but it may be the only way the activist can ensure Lord Robertson sees their protest if his security uh keeps them away from him.

02:45:13 So, this document predating the arrests appears to confirm that there was no intention to commit criminal damage or that the dolls were not intended for that purpose.

02:45:24 that purpose. Um

02:45:27 Emily Apple's evidence when she gave ev evidence to this inquiry says that even the throwing was something that was exaggerated. That was never an intention. That's something that H&3 has

02:45:38 intention. That's something that H&3 has put into this uh uh uh report. Um,

02:45:45 Um, was the reporting, can you recall whether the reporting was actually part of the dis the the information that was raised in discussions to do with discontinuence?

02:45:58 discussions to do with discontinuence? Um, I can't recollect having seen this and I can't recollect whether it would have been involved in discussions as I wasn't involved directly in the discussions.

02:46:09 discussions. Could

02:46:11 Could the the suggestion that it's a fabricated defense and that HN3 was being asked to give fabricated evidence in court

02:46:20 in court an attempt to discredit or uh undermine the uh the defendants here in this case? Um I couldn't comment because although I

02:46:32 Um I couldn't comment because although I signed the letter uh [clears throat] at this stage I didn't don't have the information to hand on it and wasn't involved in I suppose the original

02:46:44 involved in I suppose the original drafting and discussions with the officer.

02:46:47 officer. Do you know whether the original reports would have been provided to the court? I have no idea.

02:46:55 Uh is it unlikely given the security that surrounds the SDS and source? It would depend very much on what the legal advice from uh Met Police legal

02:47:07 legal advice from uh Met Police legal team was and I believe uh from an earlier uh discussion they were shown as being consulted. Did you have any concerns at all about

02:47:18 Did you have any concerns at all about exculpatory evidence being provided to the court in terms of uh uh requests for discontinuence? Um

02:47:29 Um at this stage I can't remember having thought about it and at the time uh and I would think that historically it may well have been something that had happened uh previously.

02:47:46 Um, was there any discussion at all whether S HN3

02:47:54 should be uh removed from his operation as opposed to giving uh evidence in court under a a pseudonym? I can't remember any discussions about

02:48:05 I can't remember any discussions about that.

02:48:07 that. Was misleading a court by an officer giving evidence in his undercover identity a significant issue uh for the SDS? Was it some was it

02:48:20 uh for the SDS? Was it some was it raised with you because it was so important or I think for any police officer to mislead a court is of significant importance. Uh I can't remember it being raised with me.

02:48:41 Um, in [clears throat] terms of LPP, legal professional privilege, um, Mike Dell in giving evidence to this

02:48:53 um, Mike Dell in giving evidence to this inquiry on the 30th of June, uh, part of his transcript at page 113, paragraph, line four,

02:49:04 paragraph, line four, I don't need to bring it up, but it says this.

02:49:07 this. My issue was again ensuring that the court was not misled, which is why I put fabricated in parenthesis. That was not the issue. Putting it in

02:49:19 That was not the issue. Putting it in parenthesis word fabricated [snorts] indicates that I am aware of the legal professional privilege issue and [clears throat] that evidence being fabricated means that legal privilege is

02:49:31 fabricated means that legal privilege is waved between lawyer and client [clears throat] and therefore I was not breaking any protocol there.

02:49:40 What was your understanding of why a word fabricated might be put into uh legally otherwise legally privileged material? Was there a reason to do that?

02:49:54 material? Was there a reason to do that? I can't think that I questioned it at the time or commented on it. Um and on first reading today, um I didn't look at it in terms of a legal term. Um,

02:50:06 it in terms of a legal term. Um, so I I I don't really feel in a position to comment. Would you have understood that provided the word fabricated is put into otherwise legally privileged material,

02:50:19 otherwise legally privileged material, it un it overrides the legal professional uh uh relationship between lawyer and client and therefore can be uh reproduced in a document. I wouldn't

02:50:31 uh reproduced in a document. I wouldn't have known unless a lawyer told me that. It's not it's not something [clears throat] you operated by. It's it's not a common phrase that I would have used. I'd like to move on to operation magma

02:50:43 I'd like to move on to operation magma and the officer A and officer B litigation. Um we can see at MPS 074978

02:51:02 This is [clears throat] the decision log in relation to the gold group meeting. You mentioned earlier in your evidence about gold group uh being set up for all sorts of serious issues within special

02:51:13 sorts of serious issues within special branch. Um this is one I think you were involved with and the first gold group meeting was on the 16th of January 2004. Do you recall being involved in that?

02:51:24 Do you recall being involved in that? Uh no.

02:51:28 If we go to page 10 please.

02:51:39 We can see a decision, decision number eight in the top box, top right hand corner,

02:51:45 corner, led to you

02:51:49 being required to review uh current mechanism

02:51:56 for tasking intelligence collection against support groups and the reason for that is set out in the box below. Can you read that without it being enlarged on the screen? If that's

02:52:07 enlarged on the screen? If that's I can read I can read that. Mhm.

02:52:14 So if we take that down or reduce that. Can you read the second part? Does that need expanding? I think that might need expanding. So operation magma has raised issues

02:52:26 So operation magma has raised issues about the targeting of previous SDS operations. This review will ensure current targeting is justified, necessary, proportionate and defensible.

02:52:39 proportionate and defensible. Um, now if we reduce that a little bit, um, that looks like officer Rol's writing [clears throat] and, uh, uh, Commander Williams has come

02:52:51 and, uh, uh, Commander Williams has come in and she's writed the words and lawful.

02:52:58 Do you recall having that task to undertake to review the current mechanism for targeting intelligence collection against support groups?

02:53:09 collection against support groups? Uh no I don't. Does the goal group docket does it have a list of attendees? Um, if we go back to the very top

02:53:23 and scroll down onto the first page,

02:53:30 um, I think

02:53:37 um, if we go to page 18.

02:53:53 We can see in the first box at the bottom

02:53:57 bottom the gold group

02:54:05 for the next gold group meet. The gold group meeting on this uh 12th of February 2004 was Commander Williams DCS Benjamin

02:54:17 DCS Benjamin U DSU Renol DIHN53

02:54:25 and I think that says DCI Dell there. Apologies by DCI Dell but that would be the gold group. So you were part of the gold group.

02:54:37 Does that help? Yes. Thank you. Yes.

02:54:42 [snorts]

02:54:47 Yeah. So if we can go back please that. [clears throat] [snorts]

02:54:53 [snorts] So whether you're actually in attendance on this occasion on the 16th of January 2004

02:55:01 2004 [clears throat]

02:55:05 your your name is throughout the document essentially as part of the gold group.

02:55:10 group. Yes. But it would be quite common to be given actions and not actually be in attendance at the gold group. That's why I was asking for clarification that I was actually there. Okay.

02:55:27 Um

02:55:30 we can clarify. Yeah. For you

02:55:36 in terms of what you understood that tasking to relate to the uh intelligence against support groups. What did you understand support groups were

02:55:48 understand support groups were at this distance in time? I wouldn't let comment on what I understood support groups were in terms of any tasking coming out of that goal group.

02:56:00 I would have to look further into the document to see what they were looking at and what they were discussing and what it might actually mean because with just uh that line I'm I'm not in a

02:56:14 just uh that line I'm I'm not in a position to assist them. Okay. Um if I take you to um

02:56:26 the second gold group meeting

02:56:33 which is MPS behind tab B6 MPS0749706

02:56:40 of the 20th of Jul January 2004. This is four days later.

02:56:48 We can see that you're present at that meeting.

02:56:52 meeting. Uh the the introduction sets out what the purposes of the or the objectives of the goal group were to protect the integrity of the MPS and ensure the benefits of SDS as an intelligence

02:57:04 benefits of SDS as an intelligence gathering operation were not lost to the MPS. So they're the the key objectives. This is obviously arising from the litigation by officer A and B who we know are Peter Francis and HM123

02:57:17 know are Peter Francis and HM123 in relation to the claim against the MPS uh of um failures in welfare protection and and the psychiatric damage that can be caused by their operations.

02:57:35 Was that the primary focus of the opera of operation magma at this distance in time? I can't honestly comment. Uh can't say

02:57:46 honestly comment. Uh can't say essentially was it um

02:57:51 uh to to protect the MPS's reputation overall?

02:57:55 overall? Again, I wouldn't like to to make that judgment at this distance in time. Would

02:58:02 Would you agree it suggests that the primary objective was not to support the two officers who had um uh uh experienced uh the the

02:58:15 uh the the damage caused by the SDS operation? Um no, I wouldn't agree with that. Uh because the first bullet point says to look at the circumstances leading to their medical retirement

02:58:27 their medical retirement and the progress of legal proceedings to date. So I believe that that was part of the the goal group based on what I'm seeing in front of me.

02:58:40 Page three at the bottom of page three

02:58:48 says that there is a in point 8 says that there is a review to be undertaken of current SPS mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection against support

02:58:59 intelligence collection against support groups and that was the the decision eight that we saw in the decision log a moment ago. Yes,

02:59:05 Yes, if that can be uh reduced please.

02:59:10 We can see that comes under risk assessments and the reference there is in relation to

02:59:19 to um the MPS deployments of Morris who we know is Trevor Morris, HN78 and HN81

02:59:28 and HN81 who we know is Dave Hagen his cover name.

02:59:37 Um those two officers were regarded uh regraded as critical

02:59:46 and that's because they were reporting around the the the same times in the same uh date frame generally speaking in the in the uh mid '9s

02:59:57 the in the uh mid '9s as as these two officers. and say they were uh co- uh colleagues

03:00:05 of Peter Francis and HM123, but they specifically reported on support groups and in particular in relation to um the Lawrence family after

03:00:17 relation to um the Lawrence family after the death of Steven Lawrence, the murder of Steven Lawrence in 1993 and uh the racist attack that Dwayne Brooks was a victim. victim

03:00:29 that Dwayne Brooks was a victim. victim of as well in 1993. What do you recall about the officers reporting on support groups around those campaign groups,

03:00:42 groups around those campaign groups, particularly the Lawrence family campaign group? Um, I don't recall anything about it at that time. My posting was elsewhere within the command. Um, and so I

03:00:53 within the command. Um, and so I wouldn't have been privy to their reporting or the deployment at that time.

03:00:57 time. you wouldn't have been there at the time that Steven Lawrence was murdered and Dwayne Brooks attacked, but what about when you're now being asked in uh 200

03:01:09 when you're now being asked in uh 200 four of doing a review of targeting against support groups? Were you looking historically at previous operations that

03:01:20 historically at previous operations that had targeted support groups? Uh, I can't say I can't remember what I was looking at and I can't remember um a

03:01:31 was looking at and I can't remember um a report. I really can't unfortunately assist you on that. Uh, how would you have gone about doing your review? Would you have received the reports from

03:01:43 reports from uh previous ex SDS officers in terms of the reports that they did write that touched on the the support groups and the campaigns family justice campaigns?

03:01:54 the campaigns family justice campaigns? Well, looking at it here uh in paragraph 8, it says a review to be undertaken of current MPSB mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection against support groups. So that could be broader than

03:02:06 groups. So that could be broader than just SDS. Um, and it doesn't specify what, uh, support groups it's asking me to look at there. So, um, I I would probably look to clarify

03:02:18 probably look to clarify what they were actually what I was actually being asked to do,

03:02:25 but as I say, I have no recollection at this time of that.

03:02:37 We understand that uh Peter Francis

03:02:43 in uh has

03:02:49 has made allegations that he was tasked to smear or discredit the Lawrence family. Are you aware of that? Aware of his allegations? Yeah. Uh only from reading about it.

03:03:07 Um

03:03:11 in terms of support groups, you've said that that might be quite wide. Would it have uh involved support groups for bereaveved family justice campaigns,

03:03:23 bereaveved family justice campaigns, police accountability campaigns and miscarriage of justice campaigns? And again, I would say that if I was going given that task, because it is a large task, I would actually ask for

03:03:35 large task, I would actually ask for clarification on what it was that they wanted me to look at specifically. My uh

03:03:44 My uh initial feeling would be I would have gone back to uh Janet as chair of the gold group and said, "What is it specifically you you want me to look at?"

03:03:57 Um, we know that um

03:04:07 we know that during uh

03:04:14 during the 1990s, well,

03:04:19 well, sorry, I'm jumping around a little bit. Um,

03:04:42 whilst we're c can we go back to the document uh MPS0749708,

03:04:49 please?

03:05:11 Um, and can we go to box eight? Uh, uh, page 18, please.

03:05:28 So this is decision 15 that was made in relation to this gold command group.

03:05:51 We can see at the very end of box two the sec the where it says action.

03:06:01 [clears throat]

03:06:13 This is in relation to um you and DI HN53 briefing named individuals and those are

03:06:24 briefing named individuals and those are the the named individuals um above who were the managers of the SDS. We can reduce that a little bit.

03:06:39 It's quite hard to read the writing, but it we can see the decision at the top is that at this time details of OP magma and in particular the statements of A and B should be disclosed uh should not be disclosed outside of the goal group

03:06:54 be disclosed outside of the goal group um other than to officers named in the statements or other agencies mentioned.

03:07:02 And the exception to this will be HN67, Bob Lambert, Keith Edmonson, HN58, all of whom were the uh DIs or DCIs of the SDS.

03:07:19 And in terms of the statements of A and B, [clears throat] you were we can see at the bottom of box two uh told to brief those named individuals along with DI HM53.

03:07:33 individuals along with DI HM53. Do you recall having that task to complete to brief those managers of the SDS in terms of the details of the

03:07:44 SDS in terms of the details of the statements of A&B? No, I don't recall that. Is it fair to say that you would have been familiar with the statements of A&B in order to brief those managers? Um,

03:07:56 Um, I can't honestly remember at this time, but I may have been familiar with them.

03:08:06 We can see at um

03:08:14 page 26 of this document [snorts]

03:08:23 box one second point DCS Mitchell and DI HM53 three to I think that says to deal

03:08:37 to I think that says to deal after former DCI Edmonson has been briefed.

03:08:41 briefed. Sorry, we'll take it from the top. Number one, former DCIN86 is to be approached with a view [clears throat] to providing evidence

03:08:52 [clears throat] to providing evidence for the defense. There's obviously a prospective uh claim being brought by officers A and B. So H&H6 was approached

03:09:04 So H&H6 was approached and you were to deal

03:09:10 after former DCI Edmonson has been briefed.

03:09:16 And point three, if HN86 is unfit to provide evidence, some documentary proof should be sought. Do you recall having that responsibility to go to the former

03:09:27 that responsibility to go to the former managers?

03:09:28 managers? No, I don't. To brief them in uh in view of a prospective claim being brought? No, I can't remember that at all.

03:09:46 Uh do you recall meeting with HN86? His his real name will be on your cipher list as well. Yeah. No, I don't recall meeting HN86. Do you recall

03:09:57 Do you recall um meeting with DCI Edmonson? No, I don't recall meeting with DC Edmonson.

03:10:08 Can we go please to the third gold group meeting which was the 12th of February 2004 behind tab B6 MPS0749712

03:10:21 two.

03:10:37 We [snorts] can see that you're present up at the [clears throat] top.

03:10:45 And on page two

03:10:49 again in relation to that initial decision eight, the review to be undertaken of current MPS mechanisms for tasking intelligence collection against support groups.

03:11:00 support groups. You had submitted a report to Commander Williams that was complete by that date, the 12th of February, 2004.

03:11:10 So, do you remember what the content or the conclusions were in relation to that? Uh, no. I'm afraid I can't help you with that.

03:11:26 You had also been asked to review existing MPS policy and this is number 10 at the bottom of the page on employing XSDS officers.

03:11:38 on employing XSDS officers. Um,

03:11:40 Um, do you recall dealing with that as well about what happens to the uh careers of ex SDS officers and where they're employed within the MPS? No, I don't recall that. Um but I do

03:11:54 No, I don't recall that. Um but I do recall there would have been an issue with some ex SD officers whether at that time or later um when they went within DCS's uh area of business.

03:12:08 Um page three of this document please.

03:12:20 We can see it number 14. Commander Williams had briefed the ACSO which was ACSO Vaness at that time on the 20th of January. So on the day of the first gold

03:12:31 January. So on the day of the first gold command group and that was complete. So Vaness was briefed on the A and B statements.

03:12:41 Do you recall that being something that happened that this was such an issue that it went up to the ACSO?

03:12:50 Um, no I can't remember or recall that page four

03:13:02 is again in relation to this decision 15 that we looked at. Um the details of OP magma and the statements of A and B should not be disclosed outside the gold group and the exception will be to show

03:13:13 group and the exception will be to show the statements to those officers that you were required to brief and um that remained appears still outstanding

03:13:24 outstanding in February DCS DCS Mitchell to arrange the viewing with HN53. three.

03:13:36 So, are those Did you have the statements? No, I I can't remember having uh copies of the statements. Looking at who HN53

03:13:47 Looking at who HN53 is. Uh I would assume at this time that HN53

03:13:53 HN53 would know these officers and in particular in relation to DCI Edmonson I think had retired at that time. It may well be that he took on that task of arranging uh to speak to these officers.

03:14:07 arranging uh to speak to these officers. I certainly can't remember speaking to these officers about this. So whilst you were

03:14:17 were uh asked to carry out this task uh you delegated that entirely did you to HM53 or did you at least read the statements? I I can't I can't remember. I may have

03:14:29 I I can't I can't remember. I may have read the statements. Um I can't remember at this stage doing it. I don't think it's necessarily a question of delegating all of it because the action has come to me to arrange viewing with

03:14:40 has come to me to arrange viewing with the officer which suggests um that the officer might have been best placed to arrange uh that these meetings whether I attended them I honestly can't remember now but I don't think I did. when you

03:14:53 now but I don't think I did. when you say attended what the meeting uh DCI Edmonson and Lambert okay so so you it's right isn't it that you were at least in attendance in the gold group meetings

03:15:04 gold group meetings yeah I was there in the gold group meetings but I because there's a documented record of me being there which I'm agreeing with but I can't remember um having shown the statements

03:15:15 remember um having shown the statements to uh Lambert Edmonson and the other uh numbered officers and in terms of the discuss discussions that you had with your superior officer um Janet Williams. Did you discuss the

03:15:28 um Janet Williams. Did you discuss the contents of the uh witness statements? I can't remember at this stage. Presumably, they were fairly uh incendurary witness statements,

03:15:41 uh incendurary witness statements, weren't they? There was quite significant allegations that were being made against the MPS. Yeah, I can't I can't remember if I uh saw the statements or heard the

03:15:52 saw the statements or heard the statements or if they were shared with the gold group at this time.

03:15:59 Um, you said in your third witness statement, MPS 07500

03:16:08 MPS 07500 013

03:16:11 013 at page six, paragraph 6, F, Roman numeral 2,

03:16:20 about halfway down, [clears throat] I knew about the A and B litigation when I was a DCS and I was tasked to attend at least one meeting, possibly two or three in Janet Williams's place when she was unavailable.

03:16:31 unavailable. Is it right that in fact you attended when she also attended? You weren't stepping in for her, but actually you were there in your own capacity because of your rank. No, I can only remember uh couple of

03:16:45 No, I can only remember uh couple of meetings with council where I went because uh commander wasn't able to attend. I can't remember attending meetings with her. I may have done but I can't remember. I couldn't remember when

03:16:56 can't remember. I couldn't remember when I made my statement. But just in in terms of these gold group meetings, Janet Williams was Janet Williams was at the gold group meetings, but the meetings I'm referring

03:17:07 meetings, but the meetings I'm referring to in my statement were the meetings that I had on her behalf with council at council chambers. Not the gold group meetings.

03:17:16 meetings. This is in relation to when the litigation starts. Yes.

03:17:20 Yes. Um,

03:17:26 officer A's witness statement

03:17:32 uh was written uh on the 18th of November 2003 and it refers within that to the use of violence uh uh sexual relationships and

03:17:44 violence uh uh sexual relationships and a psychiatric impact of deep infiltration. It's not in your bundle. Um, but it's at 0726970

03:17:58 on page 21, paragraph 103.

03:18:15 We can see there I was involved in very many violent situations. I have attacked people and caused them physical harm, not just in situations where I was protecting myself or protecting others.

03:18:26 protecting myself or protecting others. I took on the persona of a violent left-wing activist and played it to the full.

03:18:31 full. And at paragraph 22,

03:18:35 sorry, page 22, 105, he talks about um engaging in a number of sexual affairs

03:18:47 and cynically using the sexual relationships for the purpose of gaining intelligence and information.

03:19:01 Do you recall reading that? No, I don't. No, the section before um about the violent conduct. The way I remember hearing about that was actually

03:19:13 remember hearing about that was actually from the psychiatrist because the psychiatrist and concern had particular concerns about that. Um I had no recollection of reading the statement or reading this.

03:19:25 reading this. Um, but were those matters that were discussed? I can't remember whether they were discussed or not. Officer B in his witness statement

03:19:36 Officer B in his witness statement written on the 28th of July 2003 behind MPS 0726971

03:19:46 at page 8.

03:19:58 07. Yeah. Page 8, paragraph 22,

03:20:05 specifically references Mike Chitty, if you recall.

03:20:21 and the fact that HN123 was asked to trace a file on DCS Chitt's weary girlfriend. Um, so a sexual relationship he was

03:20:32 Um, so a sexual relationship he was having in his cover identity in the field.

03:20:36 field. Um,

03:20:38 Um, page 12,

03:20:46 paragraph 37.

03:20:51 references Trevor Morris

03:21:06 N123

03:21:11 being asked if I could find out any news on his weary partner B. You see that the cipher and her child with whom he had been living.

03:21:24 These are significant piece of information that were in the witness statements that you were tasked to brief the other officers on. the managers

03:21:36 the other officers on. the managers of the SDS, the managers who had been responsible for these officers at the time when they were conducting their operations in the way that they set out in the witness statements, including

03:21:47 in the witness statements, including violence and and and uh knowledge of uh uh uh undercover sexual relationships.

03:21:57 Is it right that these witness statements must have been read by those people who were in the gold uh uh group?

03:22:08 people who were in the gold uh uh group? Not necessarily. Now, as I say, I can't remember reading. I can't speak for my other gold group uh members. But if that was the purpose of why everybody was

03:22:19 was the purpose of why everybody was gathering to try and defend uh these uh uh potential claims against the MPS, surely reading the witness statements would be the first thing that people would do to understand what the matter

03:22:30 would do to understand what the matter was all about. Not necessarily. The way that the goal groups are conducted, the rather than reading all the statements, they would probably discuss um what the main issues

03:22:41 probably discuss um what the main issues were and what the the criteria were. I certainly uh can't remember reading this and I can't remember because I can't remember much about the goal groups it being discussed at a goal group.

03:22:54 being discussed at a goal group. Page 27 of this witness statement by H123 talks of um a lack of justification at paragraph 63 [snorts]

03:23:12 page 20 page 27.

03:23:19 Oh, paragraph 104. Sorry.

03:23:25 Ultimately, I began to think that many of these people did very little wrong to warrant my presence. Um,

03:23:34 end up page 33,

03:23:39 paragraph 137.

03:23:56 He talks about having attacked a person with a weapon in the course of his deployment. These are significant issues, aren't they? We discussed earlier today about,

03:24:09 they? We discussed earlier today about, you know, issues being raised with management. Here are two officers who have uh put in writing very significant issues arising in the course of their operations. They've put that in writing.

03:24:20 operations. They've put that in writing. We've got gold group now assembled with the senior managers in place. Are you saying that the these issues weren't discussed in the gold group? I can't remember them being discussed.

03:24:31 I can't remember them being discussed. Had they been, would that be something that would be really striking and stick in your memory? Yes, I think it would have stuck in my memory. Um, and it's also striking that

03:24:42 memory. Um, and it's also striking that the document, it doesn't appear at any time when it's gone through legal services or anybody else to have been flagged up that this was an issue as well. And that that that now uh in

03:24:53 well. And that that that now uh in retrospectively puzzles me that that wasn't the case because unless these things were seen as being a normal part of the operation or condoned

03:25:05 condoned they would be seen as really striking issues, wouldn't they? They would be. I certainly don't think they would been condoned as being routine issues. Is it likely that

03:25:17 Is it likely that since it doesn't stick in your mind that in fact this was just seen as part and parcel of undercover operations? Uh certainly not seen as any part of my

03:25:30 Uh certainly not seen as any part of my understanding of undercover operations and I doubt very much as seen as a normal part of uh Commander Williams' understanding of uh undercover operations.

03:25:50 Um, finally on this point behind MPS 0749711

03:26:00 page two.

03:26:06 This is an um

03:26:12 operation magma summary of the position at [clears throat] on the 20th of April 2004. That's what this document is. Um there have been no further gold group meetings since the uh third one

03:26:28 meetings since the uh third one uh which we referred to just then which was on um the 12th of February 2004. So there were two in January, one uh in

03:26:39 So there were two in January, one uh in the first half of February and nothing after that. Um what we can see on page two uh point 7 here

03:26:57 um inquiries are to be made to establish whether officers A or B are planning disclosures outside of the statements already submitted and the report a report on that was

03:27:08 and the report a report on that was submitted to Commander Williams by Detective Superintendent Renol advising no co covert action should be tak undertaken at this time which was to be kept under review. Um that having been

03:27:19 kept under review. Um that having been discussed, what sort of covert action could have been taken against officers A and B to to establish whether they were intending to make further disclosures.

03:27:33 intending to make further disclosures. I wouldn't like to speculate on that. I think that would be a question for Detective Superintendent Rento as he's the person advising on the covert action. So I'm not sure what he was thinking.

03:27:43 thinking. Was

03:27:46 Was that not something that was discussed? As I've said, I can't remember any of the discussions from the goal group. So, I'd be speculating to say that it was discussed. In your understanding, could covert

03:27:59 In your understanding, could covert action against these two officers who were bringing legitimate claims against the MPS ever be justified? I think that's why Detective Superman is advising no care what action should be

03:28:11 advising no care what action should be undertaken at this time.

03:28:18 Thank you. I'd like to move on to um your knowledge of Carlos Saraki and the Austin against the Met litigation.

03:28:32 Um, in your witness statement, your second witness statement at paragraph [snorts] 17, you say, "I did know Carlos Saraki from my work in Special Branch, but not

03:28:44 from my work in Special Branch, but not in connection with the SDS. I think he worked for me on Squad and may have been my translator on a visit to Italy." Um,

03:28:54 Um, is it right that um, you were in fact the senior officer who provided the main cover for Carlos Saraki when he was almost compromised after a chance

03:29:05 almost compromised after a chance encounter at an airport?

03:29:12 I have no recollection of that at all. No, it was um when he was flying to uh, Bologna.

03:29:21 Bologna. No, I have no knowledge of that at all. That would be a matter I would have expected um to have gone from es squad to uh our Italian las officer in Rome.

03:29:33 to uh our Italian las officer in Rome. Um

03:29:37 this document is not in the bundle. MPS 0527754.

03:29:51 Now it's a almost entirely redacted note to Commander Black. If we can um that's the minute sheet. So it's that in itself is not particularly helpful. But what we can see by scrolling down uh the page

03:30:04 can see by scrolling down uh the page um

03:30:06 um [snorts]

03:30:08 is that in fact it relates to uh travel authority to travel abroad for Craggy Island. Did you know um Craggy Island was Carlo Saraki and he's

03:30:19 was Carlo Saraki and he's I may have known I may have known that at the time but um I wouldn't like to confirm that that was the case because uh they would normally

03:30:30 the case because uh they would normally use their cover names and I would go with the cover names to avoid any confusion. Okay. But this is 2003. This is when you're uh detective superintendent uh chief superintendent

03:30:44 um and you are you are referring this travel application up to uh Colin Black. That's effectively

03:30:56 up to uh Colin Black. That's effectively what that minute sheet was at the very start, but there was obviously secret information in that which is why it was redacted out. But um do you accept that given that you are involved in the like

03:31:09 given that you are involved in the like chain of command here that you are at least have some knowledge of um uh Carlos Saraki's deployment and why he's

03:31:20 Carlos Saraki's deployment and why he's looking to travel abroad in 2003.

03:31:26 Given that I've done a minute sheet to Michael Dell's DCI, that would appear to be the case.

03:31:44 Were you aware that um we've got page five there? Yes. So the first paragraph on page five makes reference to reporting on the

03:31:55 makes reference to reporting on the socialist party. So we've got a socialist party formerly militant and no platform.

03:32:05 So they're effectively his main targets. [snorts]

03:32:11 So that's what you were aware of at the time in 2003.

03:32:19 It looks as if that was a case. Yeah. And at the same time at this in 2003, it's right, isn't it, that the Austin against the Met litigation was ongoing that you were involved with uh primarily

03:32:32 that you were involved with uh primarily as a witness. I can't remember the exact timeline, but um if you said so, I'm sure it's true. I think um we'll come to it but I think you had first at at least had a a a

03:32:45 you had first at at least had a a a meeting a conference from 2002

03:32:50 2002 and then the the actual trial was 2005. So in 2003 is it fair to say that you knew you had an undercover SDS officer

03:33:04 an undercover SDS officer infiltrating the socialist party?

03:33:09 on that date reading that report I probably knew but then it's not something that would have been in the forefront of my mind any time after that minute was written. [snorts] Okay. But the this will be a long-term

03:33:20 Okay. But the this will be a long-term deployment. So So is it fair to say that uh concurrently often litigation going on that you've had some involvement in

03:33:31 on that you've had some involvement in and at the same time you were aware of a a an undercover officer reporting on the Socialist Party. I probably wouldn't have put two turn and two together.

03:33:43 and two together. [snorts]

03:33:44 [snorts] Um, in terms of the legal process, um,

03:33:51 um, the the document that I've, uh, uh, [snorts]

03:33:59 I showed you a number of documents uh, this morning. Uh, one of them was a document that showed you were you you were part of um

03:34:13 showed you were you you were part of um a conference with the Met legal team on the 5th of November 2002.

03:34:24 Um, and

03:34:31 what that what that said at page three was that Alan Mitchell a discussion ensued about the socialist party and Alan Mitchell said that the

03:34:42 party and Alan Mitchell said that the socialist party was left of the socialist workers party and that Lois Austin may be a member. He will do a paper on the socialist party to hold in reserve. Do you recall knowing who Lois

03:34:55 reserve. Do you recall knowing who Lois Austin was? Obviously, at the time I probably knew who she was. Okay. And this litigation was a significant piece of litigation um that the Met Police did not want to lose. It

03:35:07 the Met Police did not want to lose. It involved kettling on Mayday 2001 in Oxford Circus. I think uh that would be a question for the legal services as to whether it was a

03:35:18 legal services as to whether it was a significant part of their work in terms of what they were also dealing with and whether they felt it was significant to to lose it or not. That um that's not a question I could answer. That would be a

03:35:29 question I could answer. That would be a question for legal services to answer. Okay.

03:35:36 And do you recall doing a paper on the Socialist Party in relation to the litigation? No, I don't. If I was to commission a paper, what would happen would be it

03:35:48 paper, what would happen would be it would be the officers on the desk who would do an assessment uh based on their knowledge on it because I wouldn't have that level of knowledge to do a report.

03:36:07 in a later conference references made to you. It doesn't appear that you were actually at this conference um in 2004.

03:36:18 actually at this conference um in 2004. It's a conference with the uh council for the Met Police and the note um at the very end uh page seven of the the handwritten note says that

03:36:39 um it's a note to speak to Mitchell. Are they what they seem?

03:36:51 if not massive conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. And what this refers to is whether the uh uh

03:37:03 to is whether the uh uh witnesses for the claimant in the Austin against the Met litigation were members of the Socialist Party or not. Now, we've heard from Lois Austin herself, and she said the me that that the witnesses were not members of the uh

03:37:15 witnesses were not members of the uh Socialist Party. There was a whole list of people, and maybe one or two were, but they weren't uh particularly close to her and most of the people were not members of the Socialist Party. Do you

03:37:27 members of the Socialist Party. Do you remember that being an issue that was raised with you as to whether the witnesses were members of the Socialist Party or not? I can't remember that as a

03:37:38 Party or not? I can't remember that as a specific issue being raised with me. That doesn't mean to say it wasn't raised. I just can't remember. You don't remember there being some suggestion that this might be a massive conspiracy. Uh and people were saying

03:37:51 conspiracy. Uh and people were saying they weren't members. I can't remember that. No, not at this stage.

03:37:57 stage. Um, a further document from November, the 2nd of November 2004 was a conference at council's chambers

03:38:14 and it shows that uh you were present and you gave uh background information to the Socialist Party and uh the the

03:38:26 to the Socialist Party and uh the the the uh

03:38:29 the uh uh matters of of the day relating to Mayday 2001. Do you recall having meetings with council in relation to that? I can

03:38:41 council in relation to that? I can remember there would be meetings with um people from involved from the Met Met legal services uh public order policing

03:38:52 legal services uh public order policing myself uh and council can't remember where they took place or how many.

03:39:01 And finally, there's a an email. And I I should explain the reason why we're not uh showing this to you on the screen is because these documents have not been made public on the Epic system.

03:39:14 not been made public on the Epic system. So, these were documents that were disclosed to Lois Austin as part of uh uh background information for her to write her last witness statement to this inquiry. Um and so these have been shown

03:39:25 inquiry. Um and so these have been shown to you in hard copy this morning. That's right, isn't it? That's correct. for you to have a a a view of because we can't bring them up on the screen. Um,

03:39:36 Um, and the the final document I want to show to you is an email from lawyer one who was the Mets uh solicitor

03:39:48 who was the Mets uh solicitor to uh John Begs and uh uh George Thomas who were the council for the Met. [snorts]

03:39:56 [snorts] and it's dated the 10th of November 2004. So this is a couple of months before the actual trial that was in January uh started on the 17th of January 2004.

03:40:10 And the fourth paragraph down says you will recall that Alan Mitchell of SB offered the services of his colleague redacted to obtain background

03:40:21 redacted to obtain background information on globalized resistance, the socialist party and so on. Can you please let me know exactly what you want from him so that he can start this work? I now have his contact details. So, do

03:40:34 I now have his contact details. So, do you recall being asked about getting background information on globalized resistance and the Socialist Party in November 2004? No, I don't. But uh again, that doesn't

03:40:45 No, I don't. But uh again, that doesn't mean to say it didn't happen. And by getting background information on globalized resistance and the socialist party, were you and and and being careful obviously about the sources uh

03:40:58 careful obviously about the sources uh uh uh uh of um intelligence. Were you thinking of Carlos Saraki? No.

03:41:06 No. Um,

03:41:10 if I could explain the again, if I was looking for detailed reporting on it, it would have gone in my assumption now to one of the officers on the desk who

03:41:21 one of the officers on the desk who specialized in that area who would draw together information um across our coverage uh and uh and that's the coverage that you talked

03:41:32 and that's the coverage that you talked about this morning. various various uh forms. Um

03:41:43 sir, I've been uh told to look at the clock. It's now 1:00. Is now a good time to break?

03:41:49 to break? Very well. Uh we'll resume at 2.