Roger Pearce — a former SDS undercover officer (HN85, 1980-1984) who rose to Commander of Special Branch Operations (1996-98) and then Commander/Head of Special Branch (1998-2003) — gives evidence about his oversight of the Special Demonstration Squad during what is put to him as its moral ‘Nadir’. Questioning centres on SDS officers’ deceitful sexual relationships with women they spied on, the unit’s failure to prevent, detect or discipline this conduct, the ‘tradecraft manual’ guidance on ‘sexual liaison’, and the disproportionate infiltration of black-led justice campaigns including the Stephen Lawrence and Jean Charles de Menezes campaigns. A major focus is DS James Thompson, whose extensive misconduct — identity theft, disobeying orders, multiple relationships — was deliberately kept from formal discipline to protect the unit’s secrecy and intelligence output.
00:34:29 Good morning everybody. Um, today's proceedings will be transmitted via uh live link uh save for a short period uh which will begin at uh 2:15 until 2:30
00:34:41 which will begin at uh 2:15 until 2:30 when there will be a short private session uh to protect the uh interests of a non-state core participant. Um, the proceedings will be transmitted
00:34:53 the proceedings will be transmitted after a 15minute delay. Those with mobile telephones may use them to report what they hear in the hearing room, but only after 15 minutes have elapsed since the event that they're reporting. They
00:35:04 the event that they're reporting. They may not be used for recording or photography. Thank you. May the witness be sworn, please. Your right hand and repeat the words after me. you. I swear by Almighty God
00:35:16 I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth and nothing but the truth.
00:35:27 and nothing but the truth. Thank you.
00:35:31 Please would you give your full name? Roger Charles Pierce. Mr. Pierce, you have provided a second witness statement to this inquiry. It
00:35:43 witness statement to this inquiry. It runs to 361 pages. It's dated the 30th of January of this year. Could you please confirm that the contents of that statement are true
00:35:56 the contents of that statement are true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
00:35:57 belief? Yes, they are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. Now in tranch 2 you gave evidence about your deployment as a UCO uh in the SDS
00:36:10 your deployment as a UCO uh in the SDS which was between 1980 and 1984. Yes.
00:36:14 Yes. Just want to go forward a few years between November 1992 and October 1996. Is it right that you were a detective
00:36:27 Is it right that you were a detective superintendent in charge of B squad? Yes, that's correct. Uh and so in that role, uh you would not have been working in S squad or had
00:36:38 have been working in S squad or had dealings with the SDS. That's correct. Okay.
00:36:41 Okay. October 1996 to the 27th of March 1998. Um was your role that of operational commands unit or OCU commander uh
00:36:55 commands unit or OCU commander uh responsible for operations or ops? Yes. And known as commander ops. And in addition to commander ops, you were also detective chief superintendent of es squad. Uh no, I was um just
00:37:10 of es squad. Uh no, I was um just commander ops as a chief superintendent which gave responsibility for B squad the Irish squad, C squad domestic extremism, E squad international
00:37:21 extremism, E squad international terrorism uh and S squad surveillance and SDS.
00:37:27 and SDS. So, Commander Ops October 96 to March 1998. And then there came a period between April 1998 and September 1998
00:37:38 between April 1998 and September 1998 that you weren't in special branch branch because you were completing the strategic command course in Bram Hill. That's correct. And then you were appointed as commander
00:37:49 And then you were appointed as commander head of special branch on the 20th of September 1999. Yes. Also
00:37:57 Yes. Also concurrently, is it is it right that between October 98 and June 2003, you were director of intelligence DOI in command of SO10 and SO11.
00:38:09 command of SO10 and SO11. Yes, correct. Concurrently with head of special branch and and that uh appointment as commander uh took you up to June 2003 when you retired.
00:38:19 retired. Yes. I I want to in my questions to you today to focus on that period from when you were commander of ops to commander head of special branch. So 1996 to 2003
00:38:34 head of special branch. So 1996 to 2003 just in terms of being clear about what your role was when you were commander ops in relation to the SDS. Was your role
00:38:46 in relation to the SDS. Was your role primarily one of strategic oversight, problem solving? It was oversight. Yes. Did that include in that role uh overall
00:38:57 Did that include in that role uh overall responsibility uh for the welfare of SDS officers?
00:39:03 officers? Yes. Would the primary responsibility would rest with the SDS management, but I would have overall responsibility beyond that. And if there's any particular problem, you would expect that to be escalated to you.
00:39:15 that to be escalated to you. Exactly. Yes. As commander, head of special branch, uh you were also responsible for reviewing and authorizing the SDS deployments
00:39:27 authorizing the SDS deployments ultimately. Is that correct? Correct.
00:39:29 Correct. As commander, did you report uh to AXO, the assistant commissioner, specialist operations, so David Veness? Yes, directly. Yes.
00:39:41 Yes, directly. Yes. Could you help us with the nature of of that reporting to him directly? Could you give us a picture of how regularly you reported? What was the level of formality of that? Could you paint a
00:39:53 formality of that? Could you paint a picture of your relationship with AXO David Veness, please? Well, we met formally through meetings of the Special Operations Management Board, which met about monthly. We'd
00:40:05 Board, which met about monthly. We'd meet formally at meetings of the security liaison group, but we'd also meet informally um in relation to any particular matter that he was concerned with or any particular issue which I
00:40:18 with or any particular issue which I identified within special branch or the director of directorate of intelligence. So our meetings were irregular um informal and formal
00:40:30 informal and formal over a period of say a year. How many roughly speaking how many times would you actually meet with him? Um I think over over the period of a year I would say two or three times a
00:40:42 year I would say two or three times a week we would have contact usually face to face or else by telephone. Where where would that be face to face? Would you go to his office or would he come and see you? Would you meet at a
00:40:53 come and see you? Would you meet at a Yes, almost invariably down in his office on the on the fifth floor. Occasionally he would come up to special branch to meet in my office. um or else by telephone.
00:41:05 by telephone. And in terms of the formality of that relationship, were you were you friends at all? Was there any social aspect of that or or or
00:41:16 there any social aspect of that or or or or or not? Yes, there was certainly a social aspect as well, particularly at close of play when we'd have a chat about events in the day. So, it was it wasn't friendship, but it was um a good working
00:41:28 friendship, but it was um a good working relationship. I'm going to ask if we could please bring up on screen MPS 0749763. So this document is at your tab B193.
00:41:41 So this document is at your tab B193. [cough]
00:41:43 out.
00:41:54 Now, this is a letter dated the 8th of August, 2002 from HN123's partner to assistant commissioner
00:42:07 partner to assistant commissioner Vanesse.
00:42:09 Vanesse. And just in terms of this document, is it correct that your your evidence is that the first time that you became aware of this document was when it was disclosed to
00:42:20 document was when it was disclosed to you by by the inquiry? That's correct. I want to ask you some questions about it.
00:42:26 it. So the letter begins with I've received your letter referring to um AC um Axo Vaness's letter of the 5th of August. And then
00:42:38 letter of the 5th of August. And then the the bottom paragraph, I wonder if we can just expand that. It's Thank you. Thank you. All right. So, HM123's partner writes, "Interestingly,
00:42:51 HM123's partner writes, "Interestingly, one of the Christmas parties uh that I was ordered by SDS management to attend uh was held in a public place uh with uh the members of the public overhearing
00:43:03 the members of the public overhearing what was being said. the SDS Christmas parties. It's something that that that stopped at one point, but did you attend
00:43:14 stopped at one point, but did you attend any of those uh gatherings? No. Um the only Christmas party I would have attended with my wife would have been while I was serving undercover myself in the 80s.
00:43:25 myself in the 80s. Okay. Thank you.
00:43:29 And in terms of what is stated here that uh HM123's partner describes it as being ordered by
00:43:40 partner describes it as being ordered by the SDS management to attend remembering back to to the 80s. Was there an expectation that this is an event that partners should attend? Um no it was encouraged um but there was
00:43:52 Um no it was encouraged um but there was no real expectation. there was the hope that um officers would bring their part their partners and that um this could be very much a welfare and morale boosting event.
00:44:04 event. Um she goes on to say this um I was disgusted by what I saw and heard particularly while SDS managers stood around. And then she says, for example,
00:44:17 around. And then she says, for example, some people were laughing about uh Roger Pierce who had been undercover in SDS some time earlier. A and it was said that he had boasted about certain things
00:44:29 that he had boasted about certain things uh he had done while uh under cover. Now you were not at this gathering that HM123's partner is describing.
00:44:40 HM123's partner is describing. That's correct. Okay. But could you help us with this that she described some people laughing about you and talking about you in terms
00:44:52 about you and talking about you in terms of
00:44:54 of reporting that you had boasted about doing certain things whilst under cover? Did do you know thinking back what that might be a reference to? I have no idea at all.
00:45:07 I have no idea at all. [snorts]
00:45:13 Is is there any uh scope or is there anyone else that you can think of? Perhaps maybe she is describing someone else that you that you knew who who did
00:45:25 else that you that you knew who who did boast about things. I mean, you must have considered this particular paragraph for some some time, reflected on it.
00:45:31 on it. Yes.
00:45:33 Yes. What do you think she might be describing uh here? Are you able to shed any light on this from from your perspective? Well, my first thought would be that I'm
00:45:45 Well, my first thought would be that I'm not really characterized as one of life's uh boasters. I don't go through life um
00:45:52 life um in that way. So, I just have no idea um either the event she's referring she is is referring to or the nature of the event. Um, I can't think of any time at
00:46:05 event. Um, I can't think of any time at all when I would have boasted about my time as a field officer or even really talked about it cuz when one left um that was a line drawn and although it
00:46:16 that was a line drawn and although it was helpful I think having been an undercover officer who rose to be head of special branch and had oversight of the existing unit um it wasn't um an opportunity to brag or boast about
00:46:30 opportunity to brag or boast about things that had happened in the past. didn't put a precise date on it, but did you ever meet HN123's partner? No.
00:46:44 The next sentence, um, HN123's partner writes, "Considering all I have heard about Mr. Pierce, I am surprised that he chose to ruin my life two years ago."
00:46:56 chose to ruin my life two years ago." Now, pausing there. This letter is dated the 8th of August, 2002. So referring back to 2000 again given you would have
00:47:07 back to 2000 again given you would have reflected over this and the wording of it. Could you assist us as to what that may be a reference to? No, I can't think who HN123 is, although
00:47:20 No, I can't think who HN123 is, although I have an idea. I'm going to stop you there. You have, I think, a file which has a list of HN's numbers. So please um if you just take
00:47:33 numbers. So please um if you just take your time uh and you can see that in that list um you will see HN123. Yes. Thank you. It should provide HN123's
00:47:44 It should provide HN123's uh real name and cover name. Having looked at that, does that that help you with with who? I certainly never never met HN123.
00:47:55 I certainly never never met HN123. um and above all have no idea what she's referring to as an event from 2 years ago unless this is to do with the civil litigation brought against the Met the
00:48:06 litigation brought against the Met the commissioner because you did have some dealings with that
00:48:10 that um only I think in terms of writing a statement in relation to um security necessarily to be imposed around that litigation.
00:48:22 litigation. Did you do anything in the context of that litigation that may have slowed down the claim or made it more difficult for HN123?
00:48:33 for HN123? So, officer A and B, HN43 and HN123, any any stance that you could have taken which may have slowed the process down that might have explained why HM123's
00:48:46 that might have explained why HM123's partner [clears throat] refers to it in this way as ruining um her life two years ago. No, I'm sure I took no part at all in the litigation. Okay, if we uh go please to the next
00:49:00 Okay, if we uh go please to the next page. So if we continue and if we look at the top paragraph of this. So over the years undercover officers
00:49:11 So over the years undercover officers have boasted. So a general reference here uh of undercover officers boasting not specific to you. uh amongst other
00:49:22 not specific to you. uh amongst other more serious things, their extrammarital affairs while undercover, both heterosexual and homosexual, and of children born as a result of some
00:49:34 children born as a result of some affairs. Now again in relation to that sentence um HM123's
00:49:46 that sentence um HM123's partner has clearly felt a need to put pen to paper a and to refer to this uh boasting. Does that in a general sense
00:49:57 boasting. Does that in a general sense you've you've described that you yourself not boastful is not something that you did but what about all the other undercover officers that you would have had contact with? Does that uh ring
00:50:10 have had contact with? Does that uh ring any bells? Does that chime with what you yourself experienced? Well, to my knowledge and recollection, this would um be totally opposite to the culture within the um SDS undercover
00:50:23 culture within the um SDS undercover community, if you like. Um, I never heard any officers boasting about extrammarital affairs, heterosexual and homosexual or or of
00:50:35 heterosexual and homosexual or or of children born as a result of those affairs.
00:50:38 affairs. So, Bob Bob Lambert, was he a friend of yours?
00:50:44 of yours? He he wasn't a friend of mine, but I came to know him um mostly um as commander special branch a and
00:50:53 and and commander ops and after I had um after he had left the SDS management role to um set up the Muslim contact unit. And so is he
00:51:04 Muslim contact unit. And so is he accepted that he had four relationships undercover uh and had a child TBS whilst undercover? Yes.
00:51:15 Yes. Um in terms of what is described there as boasting about extrammarital affairs whilst undercover. Yes.
00:51:25 Yes. In fact that that did reflect uh what had happened though, didn't it? Yes.
00:51:34 [clears throat]
00:51:38 In relation to the undercover officers that were serving during the period of your tenure, Peter Francis has admitted to uh one
00:51:50 Peter Francis has admitted to uh one night stands. Uh HN26
00:51:54 Uh HN26 believed to have had a relationship with ALF activist Thomas Frampton. Yes. Uh
00:52:03 Yes. Uh DC Mark Jenner, inappropriate relationships. Yes.
00:52:07 Yes. Jim Boiling, inappropriate relationships. James Thompson, inappropriate relationships. Recent uh evidence that HN60,
00:52:20 evidence that HN60, cover name David Evans, um also had an inappropriate relationship. Uh Carlos Saraki, inappropriate relationships.
00:52:31 relationships. And so
00:52:34 And so given that that was happening, uh would you um accept that uh the sentence
00:52:47 would you um accept that uh the sentence um that we have here? Um nothing to uh to challenge that even though your evidence is that you never came across the boasting um itself. Correct.
00:52:59 Correct. We have in this inquiry heard evidence from uh many of those who have been impacted by these uh
00:53:10 have been impacted by these uh relationships um but they've been uh heterosexual. Are you aware of any discussion any talk about homosexual uh relationships conducted in in cover
00:53:22 uh relationships conducted in in cover identities? No.
00:53:26 The next sentence, yet SDS line management insist on uh SDS officers being in a stable heterosexual relationship uh in their non uh
00:53:38 relationship uh in their non uh undercover lives.
00:53:42 lives. That's right, isn't it? That the position taken by the SDS was that it was important to have a stable relationship
00:53:54 relationship at home.
00:53:55 at home. That's true. And the criticism within that second sentence is that essentially it exposes
00:54:07 essentially it exposes the the partners to harm because uh their partners, their undercover partners are having all of these relationships. And so what is the the
00:54:19 relationships. And so what is the the point that comes across from reading that isn't it is that well the SDS insists on the UCOs being in relationships but at the same time all
00:54:32 relationships but at the same time all of these UCOs are having uh affairs and so can can you see that uh it does cause harm to those partners? Yes. uh and would provide an explanation
00:54:43 Yes. uh and would provide an explanation for why one of those partners in this case HM1
00:54:48 case HM1 123's partners case uh angry absolutely to right
00:54:53 to right absolutely was that a mistake looking back on the policy of
00:54:59 policy of [snorts]
00:55:00 [snorts] uh insisting that with the odd exception that the UCOs were married or in a an equivalent relationship was that was that a mistake because you are exposing
00:55:11 that a mistake because you are exposing the innocent partner uh to harm. Well, that's a that's a major risk of any undercover deployment. But the advantage of selecting officers who were
00:55:22 advantage of selecting officers who were married and or in a stable relationship um both during the 1980s when I was serving as a UCO and much later when I was as commander Oxen head of the whole
00:55:33 was as commander Oxen head of the whole branch was that we still felt that the greater likelihood of a good outcome to any UCO's undercover career was to be
00:55:44 any UCO's undercover career was to be married um perhaps with children to provide the anchor to go back from the false life, the deceitful life to the
00:55:55 false life, the deceitful life to the life of a loving family.
00:56:00 That that's a a a huge reliance on on on the partner though, isn't it? Oh, very much. And particularly over some of these deployments uh lasting several years.
00:56:13 deployments uh lasting several years. Yes. And the inquiry have heard evidence that there was a meeting right at the beginning of UCO's deployments. It's described as being about 45 minutes, maybe an hour and
00:56:25 about 45 minutes, maybe an hour and essentially that's it. So that is the the contact between the SDS and the UCO's partner. There's that short meeting. We've heard description of the the Christmas parties, but but
00:56:38 of the the Christmas parties, but but that is it. Would you agree that uh there was woefully inadequate uh support assistance uh to those partners that the SDS relied so much on?
00:56:50 SDS relied so much on? Um in hindsight I agree entirely with that.
00:56:56 that. What with hindsight what could have been done differently knowing what you know now? What what would you have done differently in relation to those uh partners? Well, I think um as you
00:57:10 partners? Well, I think um as you remark, there's an initial meeting with the officer and his partner at which the managers lay out as best as as best as they can the likely life that the
00:57:21 they can the likely life that the officer is about to lead and the strain that's going to impose upon the relationship and remarkably um partners accept this and all that goes all that
00:57:32 accept this and all that goes all that goes with it. The managers would invite the partner at any time to contact us if you feel that there's a need, there's a change in temperament or uh personality of your
00:57:45 temperament or uh personality of your partner and we will assist. But there was nothing um formal laid out to say that the SDS management would seek or would would require separate meetings
00:57:59 would would require separate meetings with the partners of officers serving undercover. And I think that was a mistake that we should have done that many years ago and that would have helped not only in reassuring the
00:58:11 helped not only in reassuring the partner but in enabling us to look for signs through the partner of a deterioration in the UCO himself. Another difficulty that the partners had
00:58:23 Another difficulty that the partners had is that they obviously told that their partners' deployments were secret and so they could they themselves couldn't talk to say their friends about
00:58:34 couldn't talk to say their friends about what what they were going through. That's exactly right. Yes. So so so isolated over extended period of time.
00:58:40 of time. The the the the deployment put the officer under great pressure but it also put the partner under great pressure. I think this wasn't um allowed for and
00:58:51 think this wasn't um allowed for and should have been. Just to continue with the correspondence, it then goes on to say uh they then seek
00:59:02 it then goes on to say uh they then seek to undermine the very relationship that they rely on as you and this is addressed to uh Axe Vanesse as you once described to me. The SDS is indeed a in
00:59:14 described to me. The SDS is indeed a in quotations cowboy outfit. Do you remember ever hearing th those words um spoken by uh David Vanesse
00:59:25 words um spoken by uh David Vanesse reference to a cowboy outfit referring to the SDS in in that way? No, David and I discussed the SDS quite a bit particularly where problems had arisen. I never I never heard that
00:59:38 arisen. I never I never heard that reference used. Did he ever express a view, maybe not those exact words, but with that with that me meaning that the the SDS was um
00:59:50 that me meaning that the the SDS was um say a maverick unit or or some or something of that uh tenure? Was it ever described in that way at all by him to you?
00:59:57 you? No, I think David Vaness viewed um both SDS and SO10, the undercover unit which dealt with criminal conspiracies um both as centers of excellence.
01:00:13 And in terms of the description here, um it's obviously not not describing it as a center of excellence, but
01:00:24 a center of excellence, but what you're saying is that that description is out of character completely. Um I wonder if MPS and or the fathers of those children are are paying for their
01:00:35 those children are are paying for their upkeep. Uh perhaps not. And then it says this. I understand that Roger Pierce had to produce a statement for the 2nd of August 2002. And do you think this could
01:00:47 August 2002. And do you think this could be what you were referring to earlier, a statement arising out of the uh civil proceedings, the officer in A and B litigation?
01:00:58 litigation? I don't recall the statement being connected to the subject matter which HN123
01:01:04 HN123 outlines there. I recall my statement as being concerned only with the necessary security around the litigation.
01:01:14 Just going through this letter, are are you surprised given your description of your relationship uh with David Finesse? Are you surprised that he never brought this letter to your attention?
01:01:27 this letter to your attention? I am
01:01:30 I am because the way in which you described uh your relationship with him and how often uh you would meet with him. This is just the sort of thing that from that
01:01:41 is just the sort of thing that from that description he he would have talked to you about it. I would have thought so. Yeah.
01:01:47 And then continuing, it says, "You will recall the obstacles that the SDS line management put up against my efforts to ensure that my partner did not have to complete a form for incapacity benefit."
01:02:00 complete a form for incapacity benefit." Now in relation to that, would you have had any
01:02:05 had any uh dealings with that detail of uh the uh uh case uh brought by uh HN123 relating to well, you're going to have
01:02:16 relating to well, you're going to have to fill out a form for incapacity benefit and some disagreement about well is it really necessary that he does that that that sort of issue. Is that something that would have been for one of a better word beneath you given given
01:02:29 of a better word beneath you given given your role or is that something that you you had any dealings with or knowledge of?
01:02:32 of? Yes. All I can say is I have no recollection at all of anything to do with uh claims for incapacity benefit. All right. And then if we just zoom out again please
01:02:45 and then we can see uh please be assured that that both you and your staff's uh wellbeing remain at the forefront of my mind yours sincerely and and we put a
01:02:56 mind yours sincerely and and we put a redaction label over HN123's uh uh partner in terms of the again this is a letter that you have as you've said since um reflected on but would you
01:03:09 since um reflected on but would you agree in terms of the emotion of the letter. I it's it's anger about one the way in which her partner HM123
01:03:21 one the way in which her partner HM123 had been treated, but but it's also a description and anger about the culture in the SDS at that time, particularly in relation to sexual relationships.
01:03:36 relation to sexual relationships. It it was the case, wasn't it, that given the the list that I uh referred to earlier, that this was a a time in the SDS's uh history where conduct of
01:03:49 SDS's uh history where conduct of officers uh was particularly bad, it appears to be that way. Yes, in in some respects if if the
01:04:00 in in some respects if if the description of this particular period with all of those officers misconducting themselves I in the ways we know about now. If someone were to suggest that
01:04:12 now. If someone were to suggest that this period here when you had oversight responsibilities, if it was described as as the Nadier of the SDS in terms of uh
01:04:23 as the Nadier of the SDS in terms of uh uh uh morality in the way it conducted themselves, what would you say to that? Yes. Firstly, this this letter demonstrates with stark clarity how we should have
01:04:34 with stark clarity how we should have done much more to support the partners of undercover officers. And secondly, it's a mark that it it arises at a time of um increased
01:04:47 of um increased illicit sexual relationship activity among UCOs within the unit. uh significant impact on the partners. But but of course the impact that this
01:04:59 But but of course the impact that this inquiry has heard uh evidence from those um who have described how their lives have been affected um the uh activists
01:05:12 have been affected um the uh activists or the individuals that these UCOs had sexual relationships with in the cover their cover identity. You would have seen for example many of the statements or indeed their evidence describing how their lives were shattered as a result.
01:05:25 their lives were shattered as a result. Yes. One one can't read about or listen to or watch the accounts of the activists, the women affected by these relationships
01:05:37 relationships without a a kind of deep sadness. And for me um the greatest impact comes not from the anger or rage of the women
01:05:48 from the anger or rage of the women deceived but almost from their bewilderment that they were in love. Um they believe the officer was in love with them as well. And there's a continuing and abiding sense of um
01:06:01 continuing and abiding sense of um sadness and incomprehension as to what what's happened to them. We've heard evidence from the UCOs, their cover officers, the DS's, the
01:06:14 their cover officers, the DS's, the layer above that DIS, the DCIS. In terms of what happened, give as far as your role as commander,
01:06:26 as your role as commander, what responsibility do you take and why for uh focusing on the relationships, allowing that to happen in in all those
01:06:37 allowing that to happen in in all those instances? What what what responsibility or blame to use that word would you yourself take or if if any? I do take responsibility, but I would distinguish that um from blame. But I take
01:06:49 that um from blame. But I take responsibility as I've expressed in my statement at I think par 255 or thereabouts. Um I should have done more um to adopt a more searching approach to
01:07:03 um to adopt a more searching approach to SDS management through commander ops. SDS management should have been more challenging of the officers for whom they were responsible.
01:07:14 they were responsible. Um but above all um they should have made it known that this was discreditable conduct. It would not be tolerated. It was never authorized
01:07:27 tolerated. It was never authorized either explicitly or implicitly. It should never have happened. And I think that in practical terms STS management should have done what might
01:07:39 management should have done what might be called dip sampling. um looking at particular officers and being more challenging of them as to their conduct. That was a failing on our part. But the
01:07:50 That was a failing on our part. But the blame, I have to say, um rests not so much with the SDS management, but with the UCOs themselves, whose stock in trade is deceit, deception,
01:08:04 stock in trade is deceit, deception, subtifuge. um a cold calculation towards how they were going to carry out their undercover job. Um when they turned that against the office, it broke down the
01:08:17 the office, it broke down the relationship of trust which should have existed between the two. We've heard for example from DCI HN53 and one of the things that he said in his evidence was that in fact with the
01:08:29 his evidence was that in fact with the UCOs
01:08:31 UCOs when he first met them that he was struck by the the high degree of professionalism and integrity. Yes. And given the number of UCOs that
01:08:42 Yes. And given the number of UCOs that engaged in this conduct a and you you have made very clear in your answer just now that well blame lies with the UCOs themselves but given all of these UCOs seemed uh to uh end up
01:08:58 all of these UCOs seemed uh to uh end up enacting this behavior. Do you think that was partly as a result of the lack of training and the culture within the SDS itself? So you have quite often relatively young uh officers uh joining
01:09:12 relatively young uh officers uh joining the uh SDS um but many of them if not the majority of them end up participating in in this sort of conduct. So I know that you've just said well the blame lies with them. Uh but
01:09:25 well the blame lies with them. Uh but could you not use that word blame also as a result of the culture and the lack of training in the SDS itself? Well, there could have been more more training, more intensive training, but
01:09:38 training, more intensive training, but UCOs selected for this difficult work are at the base level police officers and police officers are subject to the discipline code and illicit sexual relationships of
01:09:51 code and illicit sexual relationships of the type that we've seen in the unit at that time amount to discreditable conduct. Um there should be no need to have an express prohibition, although on
01:10:02 have an express prohibition, although on reflection we probably should have made that clearer. Um it's a matter of each individual officer um being faithful to the oath they've taken as police officers and not having illicit sexual
01:10:16 officers and not having illicit sexual relationships forms part of that. It's against the discipline code and it should be as plain to a UCO as um rules about legal professional privilege um
01:10:30 about legal professional privilege um aan provocator involvement of undercover officers in crime. These are these are standard values which every police officer should cherish and there's no excuse for the
01:10:42 cherish and there's no excuse for the kind of sexual relationships that we've seen during this period. It it's perhaps um generalizing but in relation to many of the detective sergeants or the cover officers that
01:10:53 sergeants or the cover officers that we've heard from that their evidence has been broadly that they were oblivious to these relationships. That's true. Yes. And when it was suggested that well that
01:11:05 And when it was suggested that well that their management style it should have been more intrusive more searching the answer the sort of answers that they gave were well firstly on a practical
01:11:16 gave were well firstly on a practical level it's not possible to keep such close tabs on UCOs and secondly as soon as you start checking for example their their phone billing that the the trust
01:11:30 their phone billing that the the trust evaporates between say the DS and their UCO and so what what is your response to that to DS is saying well we didn't we didn't know about it we just trusted the
01:11:42 didn't know about it we just trusted the UCOs and practically how are we going to check on them what would your response uh be directly to those DS's who gave evidence to that I think two twofold one is that the only
01:11:53 I think two twofold one is that the only truly practical way in which you could uncover the kind of relationships we're seeing here would be to subject the undercover officer to some kind of surveillance which would be obviously
01:12:05 surveillance which would be obviously resource intensive and would completely break the trust that should exist between the STS officer and and the management. Um but the second point is
01:12:16 management. Um but the second point is that as I've just remarked if a STS officer's conduct in the field is characterized by deceit, deception and subtifuge that's the that's the
01:12:28 and subtifuge that's the that's the stock in trade. that's the way they carry out their business. If they turn that against the office, no overtures from the cover officer are going to
01:12:39 from the cover officer are going to breach that because the um SDS officer, the UCO is going to be so determined to keep the knowledge of the elicit relationship secret, not least because
01:12:51 relationship secret, not least because exposure would lead to removal from the the team.
01:12:57 the team. in terms of basic checks for example on accommodation but also going back to to phone records you will remember and we will touch on
01:13:09 you will remember and we will touch on it in due course you'll remember HN53 did a lot of work investigating HN16 yes James Thompson but one of the basics things that he did
01:13:20 but one of the basics things that he did was just obtain the billing for the phone and then that reveals suddenly ly hundreds of calls to various various um uh women. It's a very uh
01:13:32 various um uh women. It's a very uh basic uh and practical uh uh step that in itself as well isn't is not particularly cost costly. Um again in terms of preventing this sort
01:13:43 again in terms of preventing this sort of conduct happening in a similar situation in the future um there are a number of uh practical steps that could be taken to for one of better phrasing keep tabs on the UCOs.
01:13:56 keep tabs on the UCOs. Yes, there are. I thought long and hard about this obviously with the evidence emerging from the inquiry and I still emphasize that the effectiveness of SDS
01:14:09 emphasize that the effectiveness of SDS depends solely upon trust both trust between the management and the officers and the cover officers who look after them, the DSS and DCs who look after them on a day-to-day on a day-to-day
01:14:22 them on a day-to-day on a day-to-day basis. So trust trumps everything and it will be very difficult to accompany a relationship of trust with um a declaration that you're going to
01:14:34 um a declaration that you're going to from time to time be monitored in terms of um credit card payments, phone bills, and your general conduct in your life as a UCO. this would appear to be uh
01:14:47 a UCO. this would appear to be uh intrusive, but I think knowing what we know now, this will probably be um the best way forward and will be declared at the outset of the deployment.
01:14:59 the outset of the deployment. What would you consider the reaction to be for all of those individuals that were spied on over many years by the
01:15:10 were spied on over many years by the SDS? uh in terms of all and you have seen uh reports describing the minutia of people's private lives. What do you think their reaction
01:15:21 think their reaction would be to say well you you you can't um keep too close an eye on these UCOs because it's intrusive given how intrusive the UCOs were in
01:15:35 given how intrusive the UCOs were in relation to their reporting. Yes. I mean, UCOs would um I think we've heard this a lot in the inquiry, be um putting their comprehensive reports in
01:15:46 putting their comprehensive reports in to the office and the word hoovering up has been used a lot. Um reporting activities or identities which aren't strictly related to the core target of
01:15:59 strictly related to the core target of the report. Um, we're saying effectively if we were to carry this through to its logical conclusion of telephone billing and checking up other aspects of the
01:16:10 and checking up other aspects of the UCO's life that SDS management would be applying the same kind of procedure as SDS UCOs were applying to target groups.
01:16:23 SDS UCOs were applying to target groups. I think you've described it as it is the jigsaw effect that well the officer it's not for the officer to determine whether a small piece of information is significant. It may well be in the future extremely significant.
01:16:35 future extremely significant. That's true. And and it's kind of pattern of life reporting which can be made sense of by those who are reviewing the reports and editing editing them and assessing them. Isn't a difficulty with that that it is
01:16:48 Isn't a difficulty with that that it is not uh compliant with the regulation of investigatory powers act? It's not ripper compliant because in if you are
01:16:59 ripper compliant because in if you are to say well you hoover up everything because you don't know the detail that will make the difference in the future. In that respect then how it how can you say that
01:17:12 respect then how it how can you say that the reporting is proportionate in necessary ho how how can you have uh essentially an instruction to the UCOs we want as much detail as possible as
01:17:24 we want as much detail as possible as much detail as possible but also to say well that's proportionate that's that's that's necessary yes I I think the UCO
01:17:35 yes I I think the UCO unavoidably will um in in working among the target group as a special branch officer um
01:17:46 as a special branch officer um take on board everything they see and hear and report it back to the office. I think the issue of proportionality and uh
01:17:56 uh uh collateral reporting is a matter for those in the STS office who receive the the raw report and from that generate a
01:18:07 the raw report and from that generate a conventional special branch report. So I think it's the those in the office who have a clearer picture of what's proportionate and what's reasonable um rather than the UCOs in the field.
01:18:22 But the evidence from those in the office was essentially to to pass it. Uh that's a matter for C squad. We'll provide all the the evidence to the intelligence to C squad. And if they
01:18:34 intelligence to C squad. And if they consider, well, we don't don't need to hear the details. We don't need all the ministry I the details of this relationship or or that that they will then make that decision because they have a better overall assessment. That's true. Yes. But of course, no one
01:18:46 That's true. Yes. But of course, no one from Squad ever contacted the SDS and said, "Well, none of this is necessary. None of this is proportionate." So, it's it's it's expecting someone else to uh
01:18:57 it's it's expecting someone else to uh provide that filter and it's never applied. Well, I I understand that entirely, but I would still argue that um the close relationship between, for example, C squad, the main recipient of
01:19:09 example, C squad, the main recipient of our STS intelligence and S squad, should have resulted in the kind of discussion about um material that we'd like more about, material that we'd like
01:19:22 like more about, material that we'd like less of in accordance with the requirements of Ripper about proportionality.
01:19:30 Just just to give an example, let's look at an example. Could we just bring up MPS treble 4908? So this is your tab B131.
01:19:46 Yes. So we have Dwayne Brooks as a report SDS intelligence report 19th of December 2000. And Dwayne Brook's civil case
01:19:57 2000. And Dwayne Brook's civil case against the Metropolitan Police continues unabated. He has been offered £75,000 in settlement. It's most unhappy with this derisory sum. He is after a
01:20:08 with this derisory sum. He is after a similar amount to that offered to the parents of Steven Lawrence, £300,000. However, there is the possibility that he will lose legal aid if he refuses the offer, if the barrista thinks that the offer is reasonable. Source comment.
01:20:20 offer is reasonable. Source comment. Brooks does not enjoy uh general black community support due to his lack of patronage for other similar causes. The Dwayne Brooks case is therefore unlikely to cause any future largecale uh public
01:20:32 to cause any future largecale uh public demonstration.
01:20:35 Yes, the source comment refers to public demonstration, but but the body of the report
01:20:45 is not um it's not RIPER uh compliant, is it? If you were going to give a a talk about what is and what isn't Ripper compliant, this would have be a good
01:20:57 compliant, this would have be a good example, wouldn't it, of what is not uh compliant. I I agree entirely. It's unreasonable. It's um inappropriate. It's intrusive
01:21:10 It's um inappropriate. It's intrusive collateral reporting. And all I can say is that um as a UCO myself, there's a there's an instinct to write about everything you see and
01:21:21 to write about everything you see and hear on the assumption and reliance that others will sort the wheat from the chaff. But this and this this as a a standalone document from a UCO in STS
01:21:35 standalone document from a UCO in STS does not comply with Ripper. This reflects the instinct of the UCO to report everything for others to work through and um detach those pieces of
01:21:47 through and um detach those pieces of intelligence which are inappropriate.
01:21:52 But there was there was never a filter there was never a ripper filter applied to any of it was there. No, there was there was no one who did that. Yes. I I I can see that the instinct of
01:22:03 Yes. I I I can see that the instinct of the officer in the field was to just as he had done before Ripper was implemented to report everything seen,
01:22:15 implemented to report everything seen, everything heard for others to rearrange into an acceptable RIPER compliant report.
01:22:23 report. And then you have a position where a number of reports um they start mounting up in relation to for example we we have here Dwayne Brooks but we
01:22:35 we we have here Dwayne Brooks but we know the reports on the Lawrenes uh because as you've indicated that was what the officers was there to do to to obtain as much
01:22:47 was there to do to to obtain as much information as possible and to put that into a report. But the result of that means that all of these individuals, completely innocent people, many of
01:22:58 completely innocent people, many of them, family of people who have been killed in terrible circumstances, they have special branch reports on them,
01:23:08 them, which is a is a huge uh invasion of indeed [clears throat] privacy. I think with every social justice campaign, the objective, as I think others have already declared, was to
01:23:20 already declared, was to monitor and report on um extremist groups which were seeking to use the campaign for their own extremist ends. Um my my point would be that um
01:23:34 Um my my point would be that um by the very nature of this kind of reporting there's going to be a great deal of intrusive collateral reporting which is unacceptable because as you rightly point out it draws completely
01:23:45 rightly point out it draws completely innocent people into the um umbrella of special branch reporting. C can you see from their um perspective that many of these justice groups um
01:23:58 that many of these justice groups um were black justice groups? Yes.
01:24:01 Yes. And so there's a disproportionate number of reports uh on black people. Yes.
01:24:07 Yes. And in terms of many of the justice campaigns, many of the justice campaigns related to what had been caused by
01:24:18 what had been caused by uh the police themselves. Maybe the most extreme one of the most extreme examples Jean Charles dozes. Yes. So he is shot by police and then reports are made in relation to the
01:24:32 reports are made in relation to the family justice campaign on the basis as you said well in case they may be in infiltrated by say left-wing wing groups and so would you understand their
01:24:43 and so would you understand their perspective that they do not need the assistance of the police to stop uh people infiltrating their justice their peaceful justice groups.
01:24:55 peaceful justice groups. quite capable of uh doing that on their own. And the the last people that they need to help them, the people that cause injustice in the first place, such as uh the Steven Lawrence case, Jean Charles
01:25:07 the Steven Lawrence case, Jean Charles de Manzes. Can can you understand that frustration completely? And it's worth perhaps also saying that um special branch officers
01:25:19 special branch officers invariably supported the cause being campaigned for. Everyone regrets deaths in police custody, for example. Our concern wasn't that wasn't the the
01:25:32 Our concern wasn't that wasn't the the campaign which we applauded. It was the activity of those around the campaign who seek to ferment disorder or disruption or encourage, persuade,
01:25:45 disruption or encourage, persuade, manipulate um truly innocent people involved in the campaign wanting nothing more than justice for those who had been injured or killed. um to engage in
01:25:58 or killed. um to engage in a wider more extremist reaction which could ferment um disorder on the street or crime. But is isn't it uh
01:26:09 or crime. But is isn't it uh patronizing to say that for example the Lawrence family were danger of being manipulated by by these groups and and again in terms of these justice groups
01:26:23 again in terms of these justice groups tend to be from the the black community. this the suggestion that well they might they may be manipulated in in some way is can can you see how it is perceived
01:26:35 is can can you see how it is perceived or or considered as as being discriminatory because these black justice groups they are spied on and the one of the bases is well they may be
01:26:46 one of the bases is well they may be manipulated. I do particularly in in the sense that um
01:26:53 um Neville Lawrence in particular had made it absolutely clear that um he had no interest in joining those in taking to the streets or engaging in any activity beyond that
01:27:06 or engaging in any activity beyond that of seeking justice for their murdered son, which is exactly of course what we wanted as well. But we had to follow the intelligence and evidence that we were
01:27:17 intelligence and evidence that we were receiving that groups around the Lawrence campaign were for their own reasons seeking to manipulate it. And I accept entirely that does seem that does seem
01:27:28 that does seem that does seem patronizing to Dorian and and Neville and their their close-knit associates and family members. But that was how he perceived things within C squad and the
01:27:40 perceived things within C squad and the branch.
01:27:42 branch. In terms of Dr. Neville Lawrence in the way in which you describe uh him is in accordance with this. It's very
01:27:53 accordance with this. It's very difficult to see what more he could have done to uh conduct a peaceful campaign. Yes. A and yet similar to the Dwayne Brooks report that
01:28:05 similar to the Dwayne Brooks report that we have up on screen, there are reports about
01:28:09 about British Telecom wanting to make a donation to his campaign and and details of that. And so the result is that someone perfectly innocent has all these
01:28:21 someone perfectly innocent has all these special branch reports uh on them. is part of the problem that the the forgetting the extreme nature of this
01:28:33 forgetting the extreme nature of this tactic the undercover tactic that what you have here is an extreme measure. So you are using an extreme measure of an undercover officer for many many years
01:28:46 undercover officer for many many years infiltrating the groups uh and it is completely over the top and and completely unjustified. Well, it depends on the on the basis for
01:28:57 Well, it depends on the on the basis for the deployment. If the indications are from C squad in this case that a particular group around a particular campaign is intent upon fermenting serious disorder on the streets to get
01:29:09 serious disorder on the streets to get people out on the streets to to hijack a perfectly honorable campaign, then we would have a duty to monitor that, infiltrate it, and report back. But I do
01:29:22 infiltrate it, and report back. But I do accept entirely your point that this could be seen as um an unnecessarily intrusive measure and a very um heavy-handed uh approach to take. But we felt um all
01:29:36 uh approach to take. But we felt um all our assessments were that in these particular cases the groups around them were intent on creating disorder and that was our duty as police officers to minimize or prevent.
01:29:47 minimize or prevent. But in terms of for example the Lawrence inquiry,
01:29:54 the very fact that there was spying on these groups during the Lawrence inquiry itself,
01:30:02 itself, that would be something that would be likely or possible to spark disorder. That the very fact that the police were
01:30:13 That the very fact that the police were spying on these groups at the very time of the Lawrence inquiry. So that is that action that might have provoked disorder had it been known at the time. Yes, I I see that I see that point
01:30:24 Yes, I I see that I see that point entirely. But um I still return to my own point that our our abiding duty um even during the inquiry was to minimize the risk of public disorder on on the
01:30:35 the risk of public disorder on on the street. Although that had accompanying risks as you've just described.
01:30:42 you referred earlier to something that could have been done more as perhaps more sort of dip sampling the deployments. So sort of going going in and every now and again doing a deep dive, maybe taking a UCO aside and we'll
01:30:55 dive, maybe taking a UCO aside and we'll we want to go into detail what you're up to at this point, but is it correct that you did uh carry out some degree of dip sampling when you were in the position of of
01:31:07 when you were in the position of of commander that you that you would uh attend the UCO offices and have a look at the documents, the reports and and speak to the some of the officers. Is is
01:31:18 speak to the some of the officers. Is is that right? That's true. I would visit from time to time. David Vanesse would visit from time to time. And it's worth perhaps saying here that um throughout its history from 1968,
01:31:29 history from 1968, every single commissioner had visited the SDS. So in in terms of responsibilities, commissioners who had responsibility for tens of thousands of officers would
01:31:42 tens of thousands of officers would spend the afternoon over an indifferent lunch with just 10 officers. So there was interest from the very top in the way that SDS carried out its work, in
01:31:53 way that SDS carried out its work, in the quality and caliber of the officers themselves and in the way they conducted themselves and made their reports and gathered their intelligence and so on. is that's the problem with that that
01:32:04 is that's the problem with that that these these visits that they are more of a a morale booster rather than any sort of uh check on what is happening. And so
01:32:18 of uh check on what is happening. And so in terms of any uh investigation into precisely what's happening, would you accept that they were superficial as far as that was
01:32:29 were superficial as far as that was concerned? And really the real benefit of those meetings was was a morale booster for for the UCOs. Yes, I accept that entirely. The the ob objective of a visit which I might make
01:32:42 objective of a visit which I might make or which David Vanesse might make with me was to
01:32:48 me was to first of all emphasize the value of the work they're doing to the to the Met to the special branch. Secondly to thank them for doing such a job in such
01:33:00 them for doing such a job in such difficult circumstances. Thirdly, for example, to thank them for the um sacrifices they and their families were were making, but very much um an overture of thanks and
01:33:13 um an overture of thanks and appreciation. It certainly could never count as a kind of a kind of deep dive to which you just referred. Was there any checking of documentation? So checking any training material or I I
01:33:28 So checking any training material or I I I'll provide the context of this because when he gave his evidence DS Steve Beals said that when you or Colin Black uh
01:33:39 said that when you or Colin Black uh would visit the way he put it was this that that you would conduct a a formal annual visit and during this visit they referring to you and Colin Black would dip sample files containing guidance and
01:33:52 dip sample files containing guidance and procedures. reports and authorizations by random selection. And so that sounds a little bit like a a a check. Um do you remember that that
01:34:04 a check. Um do you remember that that aspect of sort of well I want to have a look at this. Show me some reports. I do recall a couple of times when there would be as you arrived there would be reports um put before you to read
01:34:15 reports um put before you to read through. The most interesting of the intelligence perhaps created that that month. So you would look at it but I agree with you it was it was largely superficial. It was a means of saying
01:34:26 superficial. It was a means of saying this is an interesting report. Thank you to the officer who who produced it and can we have some more of the same if and when required from from Squad. So there
01:34:37 when required from from Squad. So there was a it was still very much uh an opportunity to say thank you we appreciate what you do and by looking at the materials we understand what you do and how you do it.
01:34:49 and how you do it. Do you remember seeing any actual reports? So maybe not completely processed like the example that we've just seen, but maybe some more raw reporting. Would you ever see any actual reporting in that that dip sampling in
01:35:00 reporting in that that dip sampling in that sort of exercise or or not? No raw raw um SDS reports weren't sent up to me unless they were of particular significance. Sorry to interrupt you just in in terms
01:35:12 Sorry to interrupt you just in in terms of those annual visits. So when you what um Steve Beals described when you sort of you visit and there's the dip sampling of the files did that ever include because
01:35:24 include because in his list of dip sampling of files containing guidance and procedures papers reports I know reports could also be perhaps description of file notes but that dip sampling didn't include here's
01:35:36 that dip sampling didn't include here's here are a few intel reports for you to have a look at okay but what what about the dip sampling ing of any guidance documents. Do do again this is going back a long time but do
01:35:47 this is going back a long time but do you remember ever asking well where's let's have a look at the guidance documents or what are you looking at there does that does that help you recall
01:35:58 recall those visits and maybe having a look at some of those types of document I don't recall that but the the venture has brought back the memory of the so-called tradecraftraft manual which is
01:36:10 so-called tradecraftraft manual which is alleged to have been a a a training tool. This is something that I recall as a field officer from the 80s which was a loose a loose leaf binder of random
01:36:23 loose a loose leaf binder of random aspects of cover and tradecraftraft and I was surprised to learn that it exist still existed in a more formalized form during my time as commander ops and
01:36:34 during my time as commander ops and commander. I hadn't ever seen this document and it certainly wasn't one of those which I would have studied in the um occasional visit. Well, we have seen for example in some of the documentation that new recruits, I think it's on day
01:36:47 that new recruits, I think it's on day two, what do they do on day two is to study the tradecraft manual after after all these years you've described seeing some version of the 80s, but in fact has
01:36:58 some version of the 80s, but in fact has been refined over the years. Could I ask I wonder if we can bring it up on screen. It's um MPS0527597, please.
01:37:13 We've heard your description is not dissimilar to, for example, we've heard from Detective Sergeant Bernie Greeny who described it as a collection of anecdotes the way he described it.
01:37:27 But isn't the difficulty with that that it's not described as a collection of anecdotes to the new recruits? So these are the new
01:37:39 recruits? So these are the new officers on the second day. They are told to study the document that we have up on screen. If we we look at it, it does look uh
01:37:52 it, it does look uh like an an official document. It doesn't look like a scrapbook or or a collection of anecdotes from from we can see the title page. And if we just turn over uh please,
01:38:05 please, we can see again. Is this what you're referring to? Is it's it's a it's a bit more sophisticated than you remember. We've got a table of contents here. If we uh go through perhaps if we turn to
01:38:16 we uh go through perhaps if we turn to page five of this and so just putting yourself in the position that you were in as a a a a new UCO it's your second day and you're told
01:38:27 UCO it's your second day and you're told to study this document and and you read the first sentence of it. This manual of tradecraft for the special demonstration squad is designed both for new members
01:38:40 squad is designed both for new members of the squad and also as a guide to best practice for members of the squad during their posting. And so if having read that sentence
01:38:53 if having read that sentence any UCO
01:38:54 any UCO would consider this as best practice. I've been asked to read this and study this tradecraftraft manual. It's described from the outset as a guide to best practice. So after all of those
01:39:07 best practice. So after all of those years and all of those managers, instead of this being disposed of right from the start, it has been developed and every single UCO who went
01:39:18 developed and every single UCO who went through the SDS would have been told to look at this and to study that. Isn't that looking back in terms of what you described earlier about blame, isn't the
01:39:31 described earlier about blame, isn't the blame in relation to how they acted um at least in part due to what they were provided with in terms of guidance and training?
01:39:40 training? Well, yes. The the loose leaf collection which I referred to during the 80s have been transformed into and developed into what looks to be a formal
01:39:52 what looks to be a formal um training document. That shouldn't have happened. I think the references to sexual relationships are um
01:40:03 are um wrong in every in every sense. No officer who joined SDS should have been encouraged or instructed to rely upon such Emanuel as his official form of
01:40:15 such Emanuel as his official form of guidance. But I return to the point that to engage in an illicit deceitful sexual relationship with a member of the public whilst working as an SDS UCO
01:40:29 whilst working as an SDS UCO is discreditable uh disreputable. is against the discipline code and the responsibility for that rests with the officer himself.
01:40:40 for that rests with the officer himself. Any indication within the tradecraftraft manual that this conduct is inevitable or to be expected is wrong. So the document I think should never have been
01:40:53 document I think should never have been allowed to persist through the years to become a formal quai training document. This should be really um a bunch of papers about
01:41:04 um a bunch of papers about tradecraftraft, the kind of accommodation to find to live in, the kind of employer who would best be able to serve your needs, the day-to-day
01:41:15 to serve your needs, the day-to-day um conduct of life as an SDSU. It should not become a training manual upon which you you would all rely. Isn't Isn't the problem
01:41:28 would all rely. Isn't Isn't the problem with the training in the SDS particularly for the new recruits? There was in fact there was no real training when officers when managers are asked about what training uh did the UCO
01:41:41 about what training uh did the UCO engage in the sort of answers that we've been provided with is the description of for example legend building of course is important and necessary for an undercovers deployment. That's different
01:41:52 undercovers deployment. That's different from training for the actual role. And we've also heard a number of DS's indicate, well, you know, these are special branch officers. They the the UCOs know essentially know what
01:42:05 the the UCOs know essentially know what they're doing. And and another answer is they learn from their peers. The best people to learn from are in fact the other UCOs in the field. And again, isn't that a problem that there's no
01:42:16 isn't that a problem that there's no proper training that instead all of these UCOs in addition to the tradecraft manual were said, "Well, have have a word with those already in the field." And you would appreciate looking at who
01:42:28 And you would appreciate looking at who those other people were. The last person that you would want a new UCO to be taught tradecraft from would be someone like James Thompson.
01:42:39 like James Thompson. Yes, I accept that. I accept that entirely. and we were in a difficult position here because it was a top secret unit. So to whom do you go to to seek a training program um
01:42:52 seek a training program um I think the best way to describe the training that was provided is that of a kind of appren apprenticeship where you would work alongside others who were already in the field who would guide you
01:43:03 already in the field who would guide you and advise you on the best way forward. when that officer is someone who's engaging in an illicit sexual relationship, that's obviously completely uns unsatisfactory. And it it's it's perhaps worth saying
01:43:15 And it it's it's perhaps worth saying that um as the director of the national undercover training course which was for SO10 and other officers around the country who were engaged in in
01:43:27 country who were engaged in in infiltrating existing criminal conspiracies. I I did consider and I think I asked HN53 to consider whether SDS could become part of that. But because our
01:43:39 become part of that. But because our role was to gather political and security intelligence over the long term rather than to gather evidence in the short term which would later be heard in court. It just wasn't practical both for
01:43:53 court. It just wasn't practical both for um security reasons and for reasons of substance to involve SDS in the national undercover training course. Am I right in thinking that your time in
01:44:05 Am I right in thinking that your time in your role as ops commander, commander head of special branch, you uniquely were in that that position having been an SDS UCO? Yes.
01:44:15 Yes. At the time when your DCI was HN58, who had also been an SDS UCO at the same time as the DI HN53 had also been an SDS
01:44:29 time as the DI HN53 had also been an SDS UCO. So you you have this unique position where those three levels in the hierarchy all of them had been SDS UCOs. Yes.
01:44:40 of them had been SDS UCOs. Yes. And over and above that you were responsible for training at extremely high level and that opportunity to say that well for security reasons we weren't able to
01:44:52 for security reasons we weren't able to provide any training that that that doesn't explain the lack of training does it? that there's security measures that that people It wasn't it wasn't just security
01:45:04 It wasn't it wasn't just security measures. was more about the substance of the course offered by the National Undercover Training Course, which was essentially for evidential reasons to train officers to infiltrate existing
01:45:16 train officers to infiltrate existing conspiracies, criminal conspiracies at huge risks to themselves actually in over a short term with a view to um gathering evidence from which
01:45:29 gathering evidence from which perpetrators could be arrested, charged, taken before the court. and the undercover officer might well appear to give evidence. That was completely different from the kind of role played
01:45:40 different from the kind of role played by special branch SDS officers who as I say were there to gather political and security intelligence over the long term. So there was a a kind of dissonance between the two um types of
01:45:53 dissonance between the two um types of training required and the difficulty for SDS was that there was no one else you could turn to outside the SDS without compromising the security of this top
01:46:04 compromising the security of this top secret unit. All of that experience of that the three of you. So you HN58 and HN53 all that experience as UCOs all of those years between you and also for HN58 and HN53 a
01:46:18 between you and also for HN58 and HN53 a as managers for HN53 for example almost seven years as a manager over and above uh his UCO deployment. we go back to the
01:46:29 uh his UCO deployment. we go back to the document we looked at at at the start that description of the of the boasting and and the talk that's uh going on in in the office. Would not they have a
01:46:43 in the office. Would not they have a perfect experience to give practical guidance because they know the problems? I mean, would it not have really been known that all of these officers or many officers were having affairs with those
01:46:55 officers were having affairs with those that they were spying on, that there was family breakdowns at home? Wouldn't they all all known about that? And wouldn't they be in a unique position to say, "I know exactly what you're going to go through because I've been through it
01:47:06 through because I've been through it myself. These are the the pitfalls. Do not under any circumstances uh sleep with an activist because there are no circumstances in which that would be acceptable." very very clear in relation
01:47:17 acceptable." very very clear in relation to practical problems in terms of the partners at home. These are these are HN53 and HM58 and you you know the
01:47:28 HN53 and HM58 and you you know the precise problems but again none of that was provided. It was a it was a vacuum as far as any guidance was, wasn't it? A complete vacuum. I think that has great merit. um we we
01:47:39 I think that has great merit. um we we just didn't know that these sexual relationships uh were in existence at the time. It only became evident much later. With hindsight, this certainly is an absolute
01:47:52 hindsight, this certainly is an absolute red flag, but also an opportunity for those with experience of SDS as UCOs who later became managers, including including me, to get together to work up
01:48:04 including me, to get together to work up a more effective and more formalized training program without reliance upon the what was a loose leaf folder uh now called the tradecraftraft manual.
01:48:15 called the tradecraftraft manual. Could we turn to page 27, please? in the in the document that we have
01:48:26 because what you have just said in in your evidence is that well we didn't know of the existence of these relationships but if we look at it here
01:48:38 but if we look at it here on day two UCO would read 5.6 Six, sexual liaison. The thorny issue of romantic entanglements during a tour is the cause of much soulsearching and concern. In
01:48:51 of much soulsearching and concern. In the past, emotional ties to the opposition have happened and caused all sorts of difficulties, including divorce, deception, and disciplinary charges. While it is not my place to
01:49:03 charges. While it is not my place to moralize, one should try to avoid the opposite sex for as long as possible. So, h how can you say that? Well, we didn't know this was in existence at the time when a UCO on day two would have
01:49:17 time when a UCO on day two would have known because he would have read presumably because he was told to study it, he would have it would have read all about the difficulties, the divorces, the disciplinary charges. So do you see
01:49:28 the disciplinary charges. So do you see that it it is maybe difficult for someone listening to your evidence to accept that you didn't know the SDS didn't know this was in existence because
01:49:40 because we have the description for example in HM123's partners of the what was discussed and talked about and there and there it is there in 5.6.1 6.1 to it was known about
01:49:52 to it was known about well I think this really relates to something that was that had been known from the very start known from the time when you um as a potential SDSU
01:50:03 when you um as a potential SDSU meet with your partner with the office that
01:50:08 entanglements involving illicit sexual relationships are high risk. Not that they had happened. They were a constant risk and they were when I was serving my
01:50:19 risk and they were when I was serving my deployment. But the for me the point was that from day one or day two as a deployed UCO, the catastrophic effect of a sexual
01:50:33 the catastrophic effect of a sexual relationship with a member of the public while serving as a an SDS UCO upon not just the officer himself, but his family is so great that you wouldn't even
01:50:46 is so great that you wouldn't even consider it because it would affect the rest of your life. apart from the effect on the woman who's being deceived. So my point would be from my own experience the risk of what's called here romantic
01:50:59 the risk of what's called here romantic entanglements I would call um deceptive sexual relationships is skyhigh but we didn't know that these had actually
01:51:10 didn't know that these had actually taken place and had we known had I known I'd have certain certainly taken action to deal with it because it was an absolute red flag not just for the officer not just for the woman deceived,
01:51:23 officer not just for the woman deceived, but for the officer's family and children and life ahead post deployment. Now, we've referred to the paragraph
01:51:34 Now, we've referred to the paragraph they're going to refer you to many many times, but I would want to ask your uh reaction to it. It's it's if we go to paragraph 5.6.3 uh please.
01:51:47 uh please. So,
01:51:48 So, thank you. Here we have and I think it's it goes on to the next page and I think yes
01:51:53 yes can in fact bring both of them up magnified. So thank you very much. While you may try to avoid any sexual encounter there may come a time when your lack of interest may become
01:52:04 your lack of interest may become suspicious in these circumstances. You can either try to introduce an appropriate male or female from your own relations or friends. Ju just pausing there in terms of that suggestion
01:52:16 there in terms of that suggestion that for example DS Bernie Greeny described as madness the suggestion that if someone was suspicious that you were single that an SDS officer would get
01:52:28 single that an SDS officer would get their friend of theirs or a relation to to stand in. Uh would you agree with that as being madness in terms of
01:52:39 madness in terms of Oh, entirely. And it's been it's been tried on numerous occasions to infiltrate, insert somebody, perhaps another SDS officer, a female SDS officer to pose as your girlfriend, and
01:52:52 officer to pose as your girlfriend, and all that happens is that the group tries to recruit the the girlfriend to the uh to the um target group. So, it doesn't work. It's it's madness and it isn't a way to deal with or reduce the risk of
01:53:06 way to deal with or reduce the risk of sexual entanglements as a an SDS UCO. But there are only two options, aren't there? And from a management perspective, either the managers didn't read this, managers didn't, and you've indicated in your position, you
01:53:17 indicated in your position, you I didn't read it. Yes. As a manager, or the managers did read it and didn't consider it incorrect advice.
01:53:29 advice. So essentially if we just look at the rest of both options are fraught with difficulty. You must make your own mind up about how to proceed. If you have no other option but to become involved with a weary you
01:53:41 to become involved with a weary you should try to have a fleeting disastrous relationship with individuals who are not important to your sources of information. One cannot be involved with the weary in a relationship for any period of time without risking serious
01:53:53 period of time without risking serious consequences. And so here it is giving green light. It's saying, well, look, if you've got no other option, uh, then, uh, you make your own mind up and if you're going to do it, make sure it's a
01:54:05 you're going to do it, make sure it's a short disastrous uh, relationship so essentially you you you retain your legend that you're no one's suspicious of you for being single. But was that
01:54:16 of you for being single. But was that not in fact the SDS policy that well if you want to improve your legend it's it's permitted
01:54:27 improve your legend it's it's permitted perhaps try and avoid it as long as possible but it's permitted you make your own mind up don't don't trouble us explicitly don't ask uh for explicit permission of this this is this is the
01:54:38 permission of this this is this is the guidance this is the trade craft manual just have just have a look at that wasn't that looking describing it now described as madness. No, that wasn't policy. It was just a collection of
01:54:49 policy. It was just a collection of anecdotes. But isn't the reality at the time before uh the the SDS uh was exposed, wasn't the reality that in fact this was the policy?
01:55:00 this was the policy? No, it wasn't. And I think the first point I'd make is that this is completely inappropriate. Um it shouldn't have been there. It shouldn't be there to be read by USS officers
01:55:11 be there to be read by USS officers about to enter the field. But secondly, more importantly, as I think the college of policing have subsequently stated, sex should never be used as an operational tactic. The
01:55:25 used as an operational tactic. The prohibition is there from the very start because the kind of activity we're contemplating here is discreditable conduct. It's against everything that um we stand for.
01:55:38 against everything that um we stand for. It's always doomed to failure both for the officer himself and his family. It carries terrible consequences and is
01:55:49 It carries terrible consequences and is to be avoided at all costs. So the advice should not be as stated here. The advice should be that if you feel you're coming under pressure to enter into a
01:56:01 coming under pressure to enter into a sexual relationship, you revert to the managers for advice and guidance. The risk of that is that the UCA may feel that the manager will pull you off from
01:56:13 that the manager will pull you off from the deployment rather than help you to ina to circumvent the risk. But that is the only way forward. That's part of the trust between the UCO and his handler
01:56:25 trust between the UCO and his handler and the SDS management at intermediate and senior level. What would you say to uh this as a proposition that the SDS was
01:56:38 proposition that the SDS was institutionally sexist? It was institutionally misogynist. Why? Because in a formal document, the tradecraft manual, you have a a a tactic that uh
01:56:53 manual, you have a a a tactic that uh discriminates against women because the majority of the UCAs were were men. And so the majority of the victims, and by that I mean those that these undercover officers uh had sex with in their cover
01:57:06 officers uh had sex with in their cover identity, that it is that action by the officers is sexist, misogynist, but because it's referred to in this way year after year after year. It survives in the tradecraftraft manual. The
01:57:17 in the tradecraftraft manual. The argument being it's SDS was institutionally sexist or or misogynist. What would you uh say to that as a proposition? Well, from the the the contents that you've
01:57:29 from the the the contents that you've you now have on the screen, that clearly does suggest that it's [snorts] it's an appalling um paragraph within the document which shouldn't be there. [gasps]
01:57:40 [gasps] It does suggest sexism and misogyny, but my own view is that within the team itself,
01:57:48 itself, um those characteristics didn't prevail, that women were treated decently as as one would expect them to be and that there wasn't a culture of sexism and misogyny. Had there been,
01:58:01 sexism and misogyny. Had there been, this would have been viewed as very serious and would have had taken steps to eradicate it. So in what way when you say they would treated decently in in what sort of way?
01:58:12 treated decently in in what sort of way? Well, treated with respect. Um there shouldn't be um language about uh a weary who keeps coming on to you and you may have to enter into a sexual
01:58:23 may have to enter into a sexual relationship. That is emphatically not the way forward. The way that was acknowledged at the time
01:58:32 time going back for many years was that a unique characteristic of a proposed SDS deployment was the risk the high risk at some stage during the deployment of
01:58:45 some stage during the deployment of sexual relationship arising. And the issue was the intractable problem was over a 4-year deployment, how would one deal with and diminish those constantly
01:58:57 deal with and diminish those constantly recurring risks? Because they were constantly recurring. You're you're a married person living the life of a an a single person. You're a
01:59:10 of a an a single person. You're a conventional officer being required to lead an unconventional life. These kind of issues were inevitable and they're important components of the trust between the STS officer and the SDS
01:59:22 between the STS officer and the SDS manager to resolve on a daily, weekly, monthly basis. Just to use an example, um James Thompson, we'll have a closer look at at
01:59:33 Thompson, we'll have a closer look at at his deployment uh in due course, but so he had two uh relationships in particular when he was deployed. what one of them we're calling Sara and she said in her
01:59:46 calling Sara and she said in her statement to this inquiry she said this I truly hope that whoever is responsible for allowing these relationships to happen may start to understand how
01:59:57 happen may start to understand how utterly shattering they are I hope he realizes the extent of the damage o of his appalling behavior it is shocking and unacceptable and the effects are devastating I know I'm dealing with the
02:00:10 devastating I know I'm dealing with the after effects uh and have had it impact my life for the last 20 years or or or more. And so in terms of the language used that treated decently,
02:00:23 used that treated decently, the impact in particular on women is is severe.
02:00:29 severe. I agree entirely and I just I I returned to my point earlier about the um effect on their lives of these relationships and the reaction that they've made
02:00:41 and the reaction that they've made through through TV through the books through interviews and through reporting um it's something that arouses deep sorrow and regret not just from us
02:00:53 deep sorrow and regret not just from us of course but from them their lives have been materially impacted by this uh this activity and as she says quite rightly it's [snorts] for 20 years. So life it's it's
02:01:06 for 20 years. So life it's it's life-changing not just for the officer but more importantly for the woman affected.
02:01:13 affected. So I don't know whether that's a convenient moment for a midm morning break.
02:01:19 Yes it is. I would like um uh to ask uh questions about two topics that you've asked so far. uh first the one we're dealing with at the
02:01:31 first the one we're dealing with at the moment
02:01:36 given uh all that I know about deployments and that you know both first hand and secondhand
02:01:46 the risk of uh sexual relationships developing undercover in the identity of the undercover officer
02:01:59 the undercover officer deceitful sexual relationships uh was plainly high. Yes.
02:02:09 Other than withdrawing the officer when it became apparent that the risk had reached a point at which it had become critical.
02:02:19 critical. Yes.
02:02:20 Yes. What could have been done?
02:02:25 I think if the officer reported to SDS management that he was encountering an increasing um
02:02:35 um a ratcheting of the risk of an approach from a woman that he should engage in a sexual relationship. Um
02:02:46 Um it may have come to the nuclear option of either redeployment or withdrawal of deployment. And I think sir that that's one of the reasons why SDS officers
02:02:58 one of the reasons why SDS officers facing this high risk didn't report to the their managers because they feared that they would lose their job essentially. Uh that I think it depends
02:03:09 essentially. Uh that I think it depends to a significant extent on the individual circumstances of the officer and the character of the individual officer. But the the plain fact is that the only method of dealing with it which
02:03:20 the only method of dealing with it which ensured that it would not occur was withdrawal. Yes. Yep.
02:03:42 The the Mr. Ramble, the other topic I want to deal with is the infiltration of justice groups. If you're going to return to that topic later. Yes, I will. I will defer my question until later. Yes, I will.
02:03:53 Yes, I will. Thank you. In which case we'll break for call from
02:23:25 Mr. Pierce, we we were considering your attitude towards UCOs's having relationships. I I wonder if um to to be fair to you, if we can just bring up, please Mr. Pierce's witness statement.
02:23:38 please Mr. Pierce's witness statement. Could we go to paragraph 177.5 which is on page 141, please?
02:23:52 So, I know you address this topic number of places in the statement, but here you set out that you did consider the sexual relationships as a disciplinary matter
02:24:03 relationships as a disciplinary matter in their own right. And you go on to say, "My understanding from my own UCO deployment and in my role as commander ops and commander head of special branch is that UCOs's were
02:24:14 of special branch is that UCOs's were not permitted to pursue sexual relationships whilst deployed unless explicitly authorized." Now ju just pausing there, who who would you when you talk about well not allowed unless
02:24:27 you talk about well not allowed unless explicit explicitly authorized. Who do you have in mind as the authorizing officer for for something like like this? So who would be responsible for
02:24:38 this? So who would be responsible for authorizing an undercover officer to uh engage in a sexual relationship or sexual encounter uh with a member of the public? Who who in the in the rankings I
02:24:50 public? Who who in the in the rankings I believe in view of the the seriousness anticipated of the relationship that that would be me. Okay. All right. Uh is it fair to say that no one ever sought your explicit authorization?
02:25:02 your explicit authorization? That's true. Um you go on it would only be granted in extreme extenuating circumstances and then you give some examples eg to uphold the UCO's credibility and cover where
02:25:15 the UCO's credibility and cover where their life was at risk uh for serious risk of public disorder likely to result in serious injury or damage of property or where terrorist activity was
02:25:27 or where terrorist activity was contemplated. is and so what what you're setting out here in your statement is a very high bar you're referring to the risk to someone's life. Yes.
02:25:37 Yes. All right. Even in case in which the exceptional threshold was met, it was a matter for the judgment and discretion of the authorizing officer that you've indicated would be yourself. Yes.
02:25:47 Yes. As to whether to authorize the sexual relationship or its continuation. And then you say this, the matters I believe you would need to be considered are set out and you refer to a couple of
02:25:59 are set out and you refer to a couple of pages in your Hearn in uh your witness statement you gave to Operation Hearn in 2013 and I wonder if you can just for completeness go to that
02:26:10 you can just for completeness go to that section. So it's MPS0722612 ju just so that we have from you your evidence as to when if ever uh it would
02:26:21 evidence as to when if ever uh it would be an acceptable tactic. So if we go to if we go from the last few lines of page seven and also have up page page eight
02:26:33 seven and also have up page page eight it's it's not very clear. We might need to expand it. So if we look at if we just read the last part of page seven. So as a
02:26:45 last part of page seven. So as a commander I would expect to be informed of long-term sexual relationships and have offered some considerations. Uh and then it's from unit managers and then if we just go over the page please.
02:26:58 we just go over the page please. So if we
02:27:00 So if we thank you. Risk to the officer including welfare and duty of care. risk to the operation, length and nature of the relationship, likely intelligence benefits uh from continuence especially where serious
02:27:12 continuence especially where serious crime is anticipated and whether that intelligence or evidence can be obtained from other means. Could you again just provide us with some assistance in relation to that what you're providing
02:27:23 relation to that what you're providing in your statement here is a set of criteria almost in terms of articulating uh when if ever uh it would be uh authorized but apart from appearing here
02:27:35 authorized but apart from appearing here in your Hearn statement is there any other document that contains any sort of criteria
02:27:43 criteria uh in which to judge whether authorization might or might not be provided.
02:27:50 provided. Well, I think just preface my remarks by um adding as others have done a health warning to her documentation which I think as we've heard were tended to be the result of informal conversations um
02:28:04 the result of informal conversations um briefings almost encouraging a a stream of consciousness or a freewheeling of officers to explain to the interviewing officers what SDS was and how it worked.
02:28:17 officers what SDS was and how it worked. and this would fall within that context. Although I do um support what I've written there and I would argue that um today um so that's as it stands. I would
02:28:31 today um so that's as it stands. I would say the closest answer to your question specifically, the closest um parallel authorization I could find would I suggest be the college of policing
02:28:42 suggest be the college of policing advice which I think is about 20 2012 which as I said before is that sexual relationship shouldn't never be used as a as a tactic but there are occasions
02:28:53 a as a tactic but there are occasions when they will be justified particularly around um risk to immediate risk or threat to life of the officer or others. But I should say these will be
02:29:05 others. But I should say these will be vanishingly rare. And I should also add that none of these criteria apply to any of the sexual relationships which have been revealed by the inquiry involving
02:29:16 been revealed by the inquiry involving STS officers. And so for example here we we can see and your point is that well when the statement's taken you're encouraged to free flow conversation then suddenly all
02:29:28 free flow conversation then suddenly all of these bullet points appear. It's not a full document in that sense, but we can see in terms of likely intelligence benefits from continuence of the relationship. But in terms of the relationships that
02:29:41 But in terms of the relationships that the inquiry has heard evidence of this this the circumstances are not such that the undercover officer is entering into the relationship in order to obtain in
02:29:53 the relationship in order to obtain in intelligence. That's true.
02:29:56 true. Essentially the officers are entering uh [snorts] into relationships for for sex. Yes. And so this is not a situation where um all of these officers um that
02:30:11 where um all of these officers um that Jim Boiling, James Thompson, Carlo Saraki,
02:30:15 Saraki, uh Rob Hastings that they're not entering these relationships to to spy on the women or the or or the people around them. It is it is for their own
02:30:26 around them. It is it is for their own um their own benefit. Yes. And it's been described, I think, elsewhere as a means of turbocharging your cover, which is obviously completely unacceptable. It's been um
02:30:39 completely unacceptable. It's been um described as an essential part of, you know, deep fishing, undercover officer who's a a deep swimmer. Deep swimmer. Um this isn't adequate. It isn't
02:30:51 this isn't adequate. It isn't applicable. It isn't It certainly isn't justified. The kind of situation I'm contemplating is intelligence which leads to exposure of most most likely a
02:31:04 leads to exposure of most most likely a terrorist attack or for example um a means of getting behind uh the production of a bomb or even a crude
02:31:15 production of a bomb or even a crude anarchist device. um means of entering or infiltrating um
02:31:23 um activity involving firearms. A means of infiltrating activity involving for example a breach of military bases with an intention to
02:31:34 of military bases with an intention to con inflict serious economic damage on as we've seen recently on aircraft. I'm contemplating for example breach of a
02:31:46 contemplating for example breach of a factory making a particular product to damage equipment in that factory and going equipped with for example sledgehammers with which you may injure a police officer. So I'm I'm
02:31:57 a police officer. So I'm I'm contemplating what might might produce the grounds for me to grant authorization, but I'm using existing examples which we've seen
02:32:08 existing examples which we've seen reported recently or fairly recently as the kinds of things which might justify that authorization. But I should add this would be taken with great care because it would impact upon the
02:32:20 because it would impact upon the officer, the woman deceived, the officer's family and h have other significant implications and would need to be carefully considered with commander ops
02:32:32 carefully considered with commander ops and with the SDS management team. Can we take that document down please? There's just one more account that I want to ask you about because you've
02:32:44 want to ask you about because you've been asked about this topic um a number of times by by a number of individuals, but I wonder if you can bring up on the screen UCPI 37384.
02:32:57 This is a a transcript or record of a BBC Radio 4 interview in July 2013. So
02:33:09 a BBC Radio 4 interview in July 2013. So this the 11th of July 2013 and you were asked a number of things you were asked about this topic during that interview. So we're just going to bring up part of that interview. If we
02:33:20 bring up part of that interview. If we could turn to page three. [clears throat]
02:33:33 [clears throat] I wonder if we can also have page four up by that, please. Thank you.
02:33:55 Now you can see in terms of the pageionation I wonder if we can yes sort of move over one if we can look at the page on towards the right can you see towards the bottom there's line numbers
02:34:07 towards the bottom there's line numbers can you see line 32 on yes
02:34:09 yes that page on the right so Miss Abbott the person interviewing you and she's saying speaking to Roger Pierce describing um that she's talking to you and she says, "I got the impression uh
02:34:21 and she says, "I got the impression uh providing officers didn't blow their cover and kept supplying intelligence, they had a fairly free reign. Uh for instance, there were no rules banning sexual relationships with people um
02:34:32 sexual relationships with people um people's groups you were infiltrating. So, was this behavior sanctioned?" You're asking a similar question to to the topics we've been addressing. And then this is your answer. uh unpalatable
02:34:44 then this is your answer. uh unpalatable though it is uh the state, the country, the government, the branch was inviting individual officers to live a force life for four, five or more years. Uh the false friendship can develop and
02:34:55 false friendship can develop and escalate into a sexual relationship. So it is and then you say is it almost inevitable that these took place and I'm making no moral judgment about them at
02:35:07 making no moral judgment about them at all. And so of course this is radio interview but it's the benefit of it. It's it's not a a hearn statement. So it is directly what you said but the
02:35:18 is directly what you said but the description of them being almost inevitable. Aren't you not saying here that rather than well we didn't know any anything about these relationships at all the way in which you describe it and
02:35:30 all the way in which you describe it and the reason for that because the undercover officers are deployed for so long.
02:35:35 long. You're not accepting that it is almost inevitable that these took place? No, I think the my my position would be that as stated earlier, the risk of
02:35:46 that as stated earlier, the risk of undercover operations resulting in sexual relationships forming was high. Um the inevitability of it I think comes
02:35:57 Um the inevitability of it I think comes from the fact that by this time by the time of this interview um various relationships have come to life revealed by the media and so I'm saying these were inevitable and I think um the
02:36:09 were inevitable and I think um the commissioner Bernard Hogan how had appeared before the social affairs committee
02:36:15 committee um home office committee and said that in SDS sexual relationships were inevitable. That wouldn't be my position. My position would be that the
02:36:26 position. My position would be that the risk of them was inevitable, but in the event they have taken place and so they were inevitable. So, it's perhaps a bad use of wording by me there, but that would be my my position.
02:36:38 would be my my position. Maybe overemphasizing a a single sentence, but it says, "So, it is almost inevitable that these took place. Then you say this, I'm making no moral judgment about them at all." Why? Why
02:36:49 judgment about them at all." Why? Why couldn't you make a moral judgment about them? Why why couldn't you say or why didn't you say they're completely immoral? Why take that neutral stance in
02:37:00 immoral? Why take that neutral stance in the context of this of this interview? Yes. My my specific reason for that was that the um there was a possibility as they emerged that some sexual relationships would have been found to
02:37:12 relationships would have been found to be justified. The Met appeared to not by this time have produced its settled opinion on the [snorts] app nature of these relationships and its um sorrow
02:37:24 these relationships and its um sorrow and regret about them. Those statements I think hadn't come through for all the relationships. There was the prospect there was the possibility that some of them would have fallen into the category I've described
02:37:36 fallen into the category I've described earlier in which retrospective authority may have been given to the officer to engage in a relationship of this type under the circumstances I talked about just now. But I would just finally
02:37:49 just now. But I would just finally distinguish between retrospective authority where the events we're concerned about are already happening and the officer confesses to a sexual relationship running parallel and the
02:38:02 relationship running parallel and the notion of prospective authority where the offer is officer is saying if I have this relationship I shall find out more about the potential terrorist attack. In that situation, we would
02:38:15 attack. In that situation, we would instruct the officer to to withdraw from that um proposed course of action and we would resolve the um anticipated attack or criminality by other police means
02:38:28 or criminality by other police means such as surveillance or technical attack and so on. Just in this passage, the next sentence, it goes on to say, you say this, it's
02:38:39 it goes on to say, you say this, it's the decision of the individual officer how he would conduct his time in the field. And then I wonder if you can just go a little further down in this transcript.
02:38:51 transcript. So it's the so we have it's the decision of the individual officer how he would conduct his time in the field. And then the next question that Mazabat asks is but what was that drumed into the
02:39:02 but what was that drumed into the officers who were going undercover and you say I don't think it was actually and then you say something similar I think each officer was invited to lead the life in the way he thought
02:39:14 to lead the life in the way he thought best now in terms of th those sentences they're saying it's the decision of the individual officer how he would conduct his time in the field we're not making any moral judgment and then saying I
02:39:26 any moral judgment and then saying I think each officer was invited to lead the life in the way he thought best. Would you agree that in fact that chimes with what was in that passage in the tradecraft manual that that we were
02:39:38 tradecraft manual that that we were looking at uh before the break, you must make your own mind up about how to proceed. So the advice in the tradecraftraft manual uh um you must make your own mind up how to proceed.
02:39:49 make your own mind up how to proceed. And then here all these years later when you're talking about this topic you're saying well it's I'm not making any moral judgments the decisions uh for the officer how he would conduct his time in the field. I think each officer was
02:40:01 the field. I think each officer was invited to lead the life in the way he thought best. So is isn't that moving away from these extreme scenarios that never arose that that here are you in
02:40:13 never arose that that here are you in fact not perhaps revealing more what the position was at the time in the SDS that not making any moral decision uh judgments that it's up to the individual
02:40:25 judgments that it's up to the individual officer how they proceed because there are similarities with that and and that paragraph in the tradeoff menu. I I understand. I think that the point I'm making here and also reflecting on my
02:40:37 making here and also reflecting on my own time in the field. Um it's really a reference in effect to the high degree of autonomy afforded each officer because of the inevitable
02:40:48 officer because of the inevitable inevitably [clears throat] inevitable result of leading a life for four years [snorts] undercover. Necessarily we had to grant them autonomy. That's
02:41:00 we had to grant them autonomy. That's really I think the statement I'm making there perhaps not in the in the clearest way but it was in fact it logically follows that because of the autonomy
02:41:12 follows that because of the autonomy each officer had to plot his own course through those four years and that plotting would involve escape from avoidance from the risk of
02:41:24 escape from avoidance from the risk of sexual relationships developing um because a married man being deployed as a single man with all the difficulties that involves
02:41:39 had you we'll come to some examples but had you known about explicitly so for example if we take DC Mark Jenner HN15 so just in terms of
02:41:51 Mark Jenner HN15 so just in terms of context so he was recruited 1994 began his deployment in 1995 five up until spring of 2000. He had a relationship with uh Allison
02:42:05 relationship with uh Allison [clears throat] from about spring of summer 95 all the way to uh towards the end of his deployment and he he lived with her from February 1996. Okay. Now
02:42:18 with her from February 1996. Okay. Now you have provided evidence in your statement that you knew nothing about this relationship. Nobody told you about it.
02:42:23 it. Correct.
02:42:25 Correct. What about if you had discovered it? So, you're in a position of uh commander ops or commander head of special branch. And let's say one of your uh DIs or DCI
02:42:37 let's say one of your uh DIs or DCI says, "I've got something to tell you." And let's say they explain to you this is what Mark Jenner has been up to. He's been he's been living with uh Allison since [snorts] 1996. He's in a long-term relationship with
02:42:49 He's in a long-term relationship with her. How would you have reacted to that at the time? What's what would you have done? you study what intelligence the officer is providing which we should know about anyway through the past reporting.
02:43:01 through the past reporting. The only effective method of dealing with that I believe is um to withdraw the officer in a very carefully calculated way
02:43:13 carefully calculated way because the damage to the woman deceived is so high. um the risk to the officer's family is so high that as the SDS
02:43:25 family is so high that as the SDS overseer which I was I couldn't tolerate that uh continuing um because of the collateral damage apart from the risk to the overall
02:43:37 apart from the risk to the overall operation. So that addresses withdrawal of the officer. Maybe wouldn't do it instantly because you don't want to um reveal uh
02:43:48 because you don't want to um reveal uh that he was an undercover officer, but your answer was that he would be withdrawn, but what about any disciplinary matters? Would that feature at all or or or not? Would it would with
02:44:00 at all or or or not? Would it would with withdrawal from the SDS itself be considered by you as an element of discipline in itself? I think withdrawal would be highly
02:44:11 think withdrawal would be highly punitive to the officer especially one who you [clears throat] just mentioned not Jenna is despite everything um involved in producing outstanding
02:44:23 involved in producing outstanding intelligence and my view would be with him and some others as well that the wrong they've done doesn't eradicate the good things
02:44:35 done doesn't eradicate the good things they've done. But despite all that, the overriding concern is that such a relationship couldn't be allowed to continue and the only effective method
02:44:47 continue and the only effective method of resolving the issue would be withdrawal of the officer.
02:44:54 Is that given what you know now about the impact on the women that these officers had
02:45:05 on the women that these officers had relationships with is just withdrawing them or bringing their deployment to an end. Is that is that really sufficient uh
02:45:16 that is that really sufficient uh punishment or in a way is it no no punishment at all? be moved on to another job in the in the police. As I said earlier, it amounts to discreditable conduct. It's against the
02:45:27 discreditable conduct. It's against the um
02:45:29 um every all all values of of policing. Um it is a disciplinary matter but one has to weigh that with the um possible
02:45:40 to weigh that with the um possible effect on the security of the unit of engaging in a formal process of discipline. My own view would be to to answer your question specifically that withdrawal from the unit would be seen
02:45:51 withdrawal from the unit would be seen by the officer and by those around him as a serious um disciplinary disciplinary action which has a serious punitive effect. That would stand on its
02:46:02 punitive effect. That would stand on its own as the um preferred course of action. I think when you say security of the unit, do you mean by that that there is a danger that if you uh start to take disciplinary action against a UCO for
02:46:15 disciplinary action against a UCO for [snorts]
02:46:15 [snorts] uh such misconduct, the real risk is is that they may give the game away. They may um talk about the SDS and become hostile to it. Is
02:46:26 the SDS and become hostile to it. Is that what you mean about the security of the of the unit? Yes, by and large. Yes. Yeah. And also the concern that if the officer is for example placed on on a discipline discipline board within the main body of
02:46:38 discipline board within the main body of the Met, there's a high risk that the SDS existence and practice becomes exposed.
02:46:46 exposed. Is that not almost saying that these officers to some extent are untouchable? putting it maybe in extreme language because well you can't discipline them because if you if you properly discipline them they'll they'll
02:46:58 discipline them they'll they'll blackmail the unit and they'll they'll they'll talk and so there's nothing really we can do. We can bring their deployment to an end but that that's about it because there's a danger they may blow the whistle on on the unit.
02:47:10 may blow the whistle on on the unit. Well yes there is that I think this this has been discussed in earlier evidence as well. It's the it's achieving the right balance and it's um also a matter of perception. How is this seen by
02:47:21 of perception. How is this seen by others affected by SDS work within special branch as a whole? Are they are officers who are defaulting seen as getting um a less ownorous punishment
02:47:34 getting um a less ownorous punishment than conventional special branch officers for example. But my own view would be that on balance this would be an effective way of dealing with and resolving a very serious problem.
02:47:47 resolving a very serious problem. If we look at another officer, Jim Boiling, so he was deployed between 1995 and withdrawn right at the beginning of January. He had
02:47:59 beginning of January. He had relationships with Monica, Ruth, a Rosa. In terms of the documentation which you have seen,
02:48:11 the documentation which you have seen, u do you recall for example that the the emails from Rosa trying to track Jim boiling down expressing uh her uh her
02:48:22 boiling down expressing uh her uh her love for him and reaching a stage where she phones the SDS duty phone and the office. Do you remember that? Yes, I do. at the time. What were you told of any
02:48:33 at the time. What were you told of any of this at the time? I I didn't know anything about it at the time.
02:48:39 time. Is are you What is your reaction to that? are to in terms of surprise or shock that a uh that Rosa calls the SDS office uh
02:48:54 uh that Rosa calls the SDS office uh trying to find uh Jim Jim Boiling and I think you've said from your reading of the documents as far as you're concerned looking at the in black and white it seems obvious that there had been a
02:49:06 seems obvious that there had been a relationship there but what's your reaction to not being told about any of I should have been Do you know why in terms of the culture that you weren't told? Because
02:49:19 that you weren't told? Because if is it because of the culture that just as a UCO you indicated wouldn't want to tell their managers, so the managers in turn perhaps wouldn't want to tell [clears throat] you to give you
02:49:30 to tell [clears throat] you to give you a bad news story. Was was that was there a danger of that culture existing or did that culture exist? Hence, you're not even told that Rose has phoned the the office.
02:49:42 office. Well, this would fall clearly into one of those criteria I described at the very start where um my involvement in SDS's as an o overseer, but I'd expect
02:49:53 SDS's as an o overseer, but I'd expect to know of any critical incidents or major problems developing or occurring. This would fall into that category. So I should have been told um
02:50:07 should have been told um I think I wasn't because they the SDS management team probably felt it could be resolved internally. They could get through this and um protect the
02:50:19 through this and um protect the operation. And there may thirdly have been a feeling that um knowing my attitude and that of Colin Black actually to um these kind of illicit sexual relationships
02:50:33 kind of illicit sexual relationships that this would arouse our strong displeasure and executive action to deal with the problem. What what is your and you you have um
02:50:44 What what is your and you you have um followed to some extent the evidence in this inquiry. Yes. So where you have and again generalizing but this is the evidence that we've heard. You have UCOs who say everyone knew this was going on.
02:50:56 who say everyone knew this was going on. You then have a level above them the DS's saying I had no idea this was all happening around me after all of these year after year I just didn't know. And then the DI saying well I was never told
02:51:07 then the DI saying well I was never told about this. The DCI saying the same thing. Uh and again in terms of what you have just described your position is well if it had happened they would have been withdrawn but I was never told and
02:51:18 been withdrawn but I was never told and so nothing nothing was done and so in terms of
02:51:24 terms of inevitably would you accept that there is there has been fingerpointing by by every level in terms of who's responsible for allowing this to have happened. But I think my my
02:51:37 this to have happened. But I think my my principal point in relation to that would be that looking at some of the evidence, it's quite clear to me that even the officers themselves who were involved in
02:51:48 involved in these deceitful sexual relationships weren't admitting to each other that they were doing so. This seems to have been done in complete complete secret probably because they feared um the
02:52:01 probably because they feared um the consequences of disclosure or declaration. So
02:52:06 So I really do believe that the STS managers did not know and were not informed about sexual relationships and even where there were conversations between the UCOs and their cover
02:52:20 between the UCOs and their cover officers the DS's who were closest to them and upon whom we heavily relied. Um there were not admissions or confessions made there. I I truly believe that the
02:52:34 made there. I I truly believe that the SDS operatives involved in these relationships kept them secret because they feared the consequences of exposure. But in relation to that, well, you know,
02:52:46 But in relation to that, well, you know, the these are undercover officers. They were they were trained to deceive. But those above them, the DC's, sorry, the DS's, the DIs, the DCIs, yourself,
02:53:00 the DS's, the DIs, the DCIs, yourself, you not naive individuals. You have you have lived that life. And so when uh for example, a DS says, I I just really I didn't know this was happening
02:53:12 really I didn't know this was happening around me. I can see it now. And it I just missed it. If someone were to react, you are not only a trained detective, but you've been an undercover officer. You spend your life spying on people, the minutia of people's lives.
02:53:26 people, the minutia of people's lives. That how do you explain that it was missed time and time again? How was it? Because these were experienced detectives, weren't they? Including yourself. How how could they miss it?
02:53:38 yourself. How how could they miss it? Yes. Yes, they were. And for my own part, I think as I described earlier, um I knew from firsthand from my second day of deployment that the prospect of a
02:53:50 of deployment that the prospect of a sexual relationship was so serious, so potentially damaging, so potentially catastrophic to one's job, but above all one's family
02:54:03 to one's job, but above all one's family and one's
02:54:05 and one's future life that you wouldn't contemplate because of that. So I think possibly I'm [snorts] impacted by and influenced by my own experience as a UCO that this
02:54:18 my own experience as a UCO that this would be completely beyond the pale um and could not even be contemplated withdrawal would be a better option than
02:54:29 withdrawal would be a better option than engaging in that kind of relationship. It was so fraud and we've seen from the officer's accounts um that not just was a dreadful effect on the women deceived,
02:54:43 a dreadful effect on the women deceived, not just a highly damaging effect on the officer's families, but to the officers themselves who admit to all kinds of emotional trauma as they find it almost
02:54:54 emotional trauma as they find it almost impossible to step away from their false life and get back into the comfort of their true lives. that they themselves went through absolute turmoil. And that just confirms
02:55:06 absolute turmoil. And that just confirms in me the fact that no officer would ever really contemplate that kind of deceitful life in addition to the stresses and strains of the operational
02:55:18 stresses and strains of the operational life as a UCO. So that clearly played on my mind I think. But it was easy, for example, for Carlo Saraki to live with Donna McClean for
02:55:32 Saraki to live with Donna McClean for years.
02:55:33 years. Yes.
02:55:34 Yes. And during [clears throat] his deployment, continually going to Italy, taking Lindsay on trips to Venice, Donna McClean to Bologna, and he's going on all of these trips.
02:55:47 and he's going on all of these trips. And his evidence essentially was, well, how how did you get authorization for all these trips? Oh, yeah. I just had to work on my legend. It was it helped with my legend. Yes.
02:55:55 Yes. And it was the easiest. It was easy for him to do that because he went through all of this living uh as as I said with Donna McClean, but but multiple trips abroad. And when the cover officers go
02:56:08 abroad. And when the cover officers go with him, there's no maybe there's there's one or two sightings, but that there's no supervision. The cover officers are there just in case anything goes wrong. Of course, nothing goes
02:56:19 goes wrong. Of course, nothing goes wrong because the officer is not not spying on anyone. He's having um having sex with uh [laughter] activists in his cover identity. And so you accept that
02:56:31 cover identity. And so you accept that the environments by this stage. So by the stage that you are commander head of special branch the the atmosphere made it very easy for these UCAs to have these not just short relationships but
02:56:44 these not just short relationships but over years it it so there was there was something wrong wasn't there with the environment in which these UCAs practiced by that stage. I think that's a very fair point and I think it um goes towards lack of
02:56:57 and I think it um goes towards lack of scrutiny
02:56:59 scrutiny or lack of sufficiently diligent um testing of the officers who were engaged in these relationships. C
02:57:07 C could [clears throat] I ask if we can take the document down that's currently on the screen. I just want to go back to something you said in your statement. It's if we can turn to page 217. It's paragraph 251.1.
02:57:19 paragraph 251.1. So the context of this is that uh DCI Mike Dell gave evidence that there was a stage
02:57:30 stage where he
02:57:32 where he started to become suspicious of James Thompson
02:57:36 Thompson and it was around the time of September the 11th terrorist attacks. Yeah. 2001. [snorts] And the way in which he described it was that Jim um that uh
02:57:47 described it was that Jim um that uh James Thompson was going to go to Indonesia in relation to part of his undercover operation. And because of September 11th, it was cancelled and he
02:57:59 September 11th, it was cancelled and he was told he he told Thompson, "You're not going there anymore." We know that James Thompson disobeyed that order. And I know you we we'll come on to that. But DCidell's evidence was
02:58:11 on to that. But DCidell's evidence was at that point he thought he's going to go anyway. And he started his the way in which he described in his evidence was that he started thinking that James Thompson was perhaps there was um
02:58:24 Thompson was perhaps there was um something going on there. And one of the thoughts that he had is the possibility of sexual relationships. and he described
02:58:32 described being very clear in a meeting after James Tosson returns from that trip laying down the law warning no UCOs to have any relationship uh under any
02:58:43 have any relationship uh under any circumstance be very clear so standing out in that meeting one of the things he said is that shortly afterwards in fact he was surprised that Carlos Saraki comes up to him
02:58:54 comes up to him yes
02:58:55 yes and says well and he doesn't tell the full truth of But he he refers to was there was a relationship. It's historical. It's all over now. And in terms of the indication that DCell gave
02:59:07 terms of the indication that DCell gave as essentially surprised that he'd actually sort of confessed to it, but because it was historical, no, no further disciplinary action was taken in relation to them. Now, that's a a long-winded way of introducing what you
02:59:19 long-winded way of introducing what you say in this paragraph because you say, "I had no knowledge of this relationship at the time. I note from paragraph 180 of DC Carlos Saraki's witness statement to the inquiry that he made disclosures regarding his sexual relationships to
02:59:30 regarding his sexual relationships to DCI Dell at the end of 2003. By this time I'd retired from the MPS. Okay. So this is not on your uh watch at that particular point. But you say however I
02:59:41 particular point. But you say however I regard DCEL's proper reaction to the late disclosure by DC Carlos Saraki as consistent with SDS management policy.
02:59:52 consistent with SDS management policy. Okay. Further DC Idel's reaction at that point in time may add weight to the inference that DCL had not been previously formed that view notwithstanding the fact that he was aware DC Carlos Saraki and Donna McClean
03:00:04 aware DC Carlos Saraki and Donna McClean had cohabited. But he doesn't he doesn't end Carlos Saraki's uh deployment. He doesn't discipline him. And so do we not have this
03:00:17 him. And so do we not have this situation that your evidence is didn't know about this, didn't know about that, didn't know about this, but had I had known, we would have withdrawn the officer from the field. But when it does
03:00:28 officer from the field. But when it does actually reach you or when it does uh become explicit, nothing's done. Nothing's done. Well, I think um the
03:00:40 the uh encounter between Sarra and Mike Dell um where Sarra made admissions about a relationship but was still deceitful about those
03:00:53 but was still deceitful about those admissions. Um, this was historical and I think I can't imagine Mike Dell's thinking here that um I know he he was deeply offended by that. He was deeply
03:01:06 deeply offended by that. He was deeply offended that he had been uh deceived as the manager of SDS but I don't know why he um didn't withdraw him. There may be other reasons for for that at that time
03:01:18 other reasons for for that at that time probably relating to the fact that this was historical. this had now ended and it might be operationally possible to continue with that damage being done to
03:01:29 continue with that damage being done to SDS irrespective of the damage to the woman deceived. Terms of the language you use, you don't say, "Well, I don't know why I didn't withdraw him." You say, "Well, I regard uh his uh you describe as a proper
03:01:40 uh his uh you describe as a proper reaction as a late disclosure as a proper reaction." But in in effect despite how uh shocked and disappointed DCI uh Dell uh indicated that he was
03:01:52 DCI uh Dell uh indicated that he was actually nothing is nothing is done about it nothing uh that would um approach disciplinary action in any way and doesn't that send a signal that uh
03:02:03 and doesn't that send a signal that uh carry on carry on maybe try and avoid it again going back to the trade craft manual so you know try and avoid it but if you have to do it then do Well, I think two things. One is that I think
03:02:14 think two things. One is that I think I've I've gone by now. So, I'm I'm reading this um post hawk and um making assumptions about it.
03:02:23 about it. It's more your description of it being a proper reaction. This is a proper Yes. So, so hypothetically if if you were there, you would have said, "Well, that's proper." Yes. But so, sorry. Yes. I think that um
03:02:34 Yes. But so, sorry. Yes. I think that um I've taken that view because it's historical. It's happened. It's in the past. Carlos Sarra I think is telling Mike Dell that it's been dealt with even though as it turns out he's doing this
03:02:45 though as it turns out he's doing this as cover for another relationship and on balance because of the time elapsed
03:02:54 elapsed the decision is taken I'm assuming that we continue as before he remains in the field and we can rely upon the fact because time has
03:03:06 can rely upon the fact because time has elapsed that there's there's No operational compromise here. Can we move to James Thompson now in relation to his deployment? So he is
03:03:18 relation to his deployment? So he is deployed between February 1997 until March 2002. So it's quite a big overlap with your time as commander ops and commander head
03:03:31 time as commander ops and commander head of special branch and his deployment. Now, of course, your position was not that of a a DSDI or DCI where you you're dealing with him on a on a daily basis, but I just want to go through some of
03:03:43 but I just want to go through some of where you do start to become involved with his deployment. I wonder if we can just bring up MPS 0526929. So, it's a document at your tab B128.
03:04:09 [snorts]
03:04:12 So this is we can see you'll be familiar with these uh forms and and you are the you're the authorizing officer uh for
03:04:24 you're the authorizing officer uh for the continuation of uh magenta triangle which is James Thompson's code name as you know. And so from this point here, we can see uh if
03:04:35 from this point here, we can see uh if we just turn over the page, please, we can see that you're there as the authorizing officer. Yes.
03:04:41 Yes. Here.
03:04:44 And wonder if we can just continue uh on. We can see on page eight.
03:04:58 uh and we can see sort of the standard. So you would be signing off his his the general authorizations for him. I think there's another signature of yours on page 19 if we went to page 19.
03:05:17 Thank you.
03:05:21 And so we can see this is this this is your signature at the end here. And this is 15th of January 2001 in the bottom right hand corner or
03:05:32 2001 in the bottom right hand corner or maybe sorry the 5th of January 2001. If
03:05:35 If if we just go back a couple of pages or just a page at a time.
03:05:45 Sorry if you can just keep going going back. So this is the the ripper form setting out the various stages. But we can see
03:05:55 operation line. That was the description given to this this operation and and you're familiar with operation and and so this is a a description of it and because of your position as commander
03:06:06 because of your position as commander you would have signed off. Yes.
03:06:08 Yes. On this now at the time that you're signing off these documents that's January 2001. the what James Thompson was doing that
03:06:19 the what James Thompson was doing that was presented to you um as essentially doing very good uh work indeed um preventing a a gun being brought into this country
03:06:32 a a gun being brought into this country and being used against someone. Yes. And so when you're signing off these author authorizations, as far as you're concerned, you're focused on what is set out in them. And what is set out
03:06:43 is set out in them. And what is set out in them is looks as though it's a genuine plot. Okay. But at this when you were reading and reviewing these, this is a little out of the ordinary for
03:06:55 this is a little out of the ordinary for uh these these types of deployments and particularly for James Thompson. Yes. Yes. And so do you remember that it at the time that it stood out to you when you you start authorizing this?
03:07:06 when you you start authorizing this? It did. It stood out to me as more akin to an SO10 authorization, many of which I was signing each day. I think for that reason in in other pages in this
03:07:18 reason in in other pages in this authorization I've initialed set parts of the um operation intended to show to those who are dealing with the case that I've noted and I'm aware of the
03:07:30 I've noted and I'm aware of the vulnerabilities around Magenta Triangle. [snorts] And the key um concern as always with any SO10 authorization is the safety of the officer potentially
03:07:42 the safety of the officer potentially going into a criminal and dangerous environment. So in terms of the chronology, so this is the beginning of 2001 where uh the at the time you must have
03:07:55 where uh the at the time you must have thought well this is a this is a great success. Um, yes.
03:07:59 yes. But then later in the year, as I've just described, September the 11th, don't go to Indonesia, DCell starts having concerns about James Thompson.
03:08:11 concerns about James Thompson. Yes.
03:08:11 Yes. And then, do you recall that it became clear that he had disobeyed a direct order not to go to Indonesia? Some receipts were found from Raffles Hotel in Singapore and a laptop showed he'd
03:08:22 in Singapore and a laptop showed he'd purchased that in Singapore. Do do you remember that that he'd been found out? I I do recall it in part. Yes. Okay. That he had been found out. Yes. Now, I wonder if you can turn to take that document down, please. And if we turn to MPS 0748359.
03:08:36 turn to MPS 0748359. So, at your tab 158.
03:08:51 So here we have file note uh James Thompson for information and as appropriate discussion on Friday the 16th. Um if you agree we could speak to
03:09:02 16th. Um if you agree we could speak to DS Thompson on Tuesday the 20th at South um which will be occupied by HN 53 only. And then if we just go to the next
03:09:13 And then if we just go to the next handwritten section,
03:09:18 I spoke to DS Thompson as arranged above in the company of DCell. Um I asked him why against instructions he had gone to
03:09:29 why against instructions he had gone to the Far East at the end of September, beginning of October and had lied to his controller about where he was. DS Thompson answered that it was a matter
03:09:40 Thompson answered that it was a matter of operational security and that he did not agree with the controllers's judgment and therefore went. I said that such action broke down the element of trust that had obtained in the policing
03:09:52 trust that had obtained in the policing operation of which he was part. I told him that his withdrawal plan would be adhered to as best we could, but that the proposed period um I would be would be shortened and that he would be
03:10:05 be shortened and that he would be redeployed by the end of January 2002. He said he felt he had little choice but to assist the office in making that plan work. The interview lasted between 5 and 10 minutes. We can see it says PTO. So,
03:10:17 10 minutes. We can see it says PTO. So, let's turn over the page, please. Uh, and we can see there that it there's a black redaction box and
03:10:28 it there's a black redaction box and it's labeled number four, but that's just because it's got your signature there. We've redacted your signature, but
03:10:33 but you're signing there commander special branch really to say that you you've read that or you would have read that. Is that correct? Yes.
03:10:40 Yes. Okay.
03:10:43 Okay. And then we can see below that uh we can see that there's Colin Black. He he's also um signed it and then addressed the DCI Dell. I wonder if we can move
03:10:55 DCI Dell. I wonder if we can move forward so we can see this second page but also the one after it. So pages two and three. So we can see what where it says DCI Dell under the number three that is that is in fact
03:11:08 that is that is in fact Mccclaclin writing that addressed to DCI Dell. Would you have seen this part of it or or impossible to say given the distance of time or would you would you have been privy to the all of everyone's
03:11:20 have been privy to the all of everyone's notes on on here? No, I I just saw up to minute two, I believe, which is the 20th of November minute, um, which relates to
03:11:31 of November minute, um, which relates to a very short interview on 14th of December, which um, Colin Black had with James Thomasson. And there was a question of whether the interview was too short. And my view was that because
03:11:42 too short. And my view was that because it only related to the travel to Indonesia and that James Thompson conceded to the comments or the arguments of Colin Black that the timing
03:11:54 arguments of Colin Black that the timing of the interview was about right. If we take that document down, just bring up another document around this time. It is MPS0749659 at sir your tab B159.
03:12:09 So this is dated the 14th of November. I wonder if we can do the same thing again so we can see the the second page of it as well.
03:12:20 see the the second page of it as well. So you can see this is DCIL's note and we've redacted it but we can see in the left hand column on the first page your initials and you're dating it and that's
03:12:31 initials and you're dating it and that's just to acknowledge that you've that you've read it and so
03:12:38 it looks as though um it's difficult part of it um not clear there but about a few days after maybe the 16th of November it given the note of this is
03:12:49 November it given the note of this is 14th of November that you would have seen this. It says DS James Thompson on Tuesday the 20th at South DS Black and DC Idel will confront DS Thompson with
03:13:00 DC Idel will confront DS Thompson with their knowledge of his presence under covert identity in the Far East in early October. This is without authority of Commander Black, acting commander Black, contrary to instruction by DCell, prejuditial to the security of his own
03:13:12 prejuditial to the security of his own operation and reckless disregard of DCell's uh risk assessment. And so is that a repetition essentially of what you were just describing that uh in terms of this discreet
03:13:27 that uh in terms of this discreet uh misconduct that it was misconduct that to some extent was admitted he admitted that well the evidence was clear that he disobeyed the order. All right. When he was giving I wonder
03:13:39 All right. When he was giving I wonder if you can take that down please. when when he was giving evidence to the inquiry on Monday, HN53 uh agreed with his earlier evidence that
03:13:53 uh agreed with his earlier evidence that um he that you were fully briefed at every stage of of events in terms of the investigation into James Thompson,
03:14:05 investigation into James Thompson, but would you accept that you were briefed at every stage as part one comment in your statement suggests that that you weren't necessarily briefed at every every stage. But HN53
03:14:18 every every stage. But HN53 said that you had he had regular one-to-one engagement uh with you. Do do you accept that that he HM53 had regular contact with you in terms of
03:14:30 regular contact with you in terms of certainly the investigation into James Thompson?
03:14:35 Thompson? What I recall is the interview of the 14th of November about the travel to Indonesia um and that James Thompson had conceded his mis his misconduct there. I think I
03:14:48 his mis his misconduct there. I think I have a recollection of um a fireac application financial investigation. Well, I'm going to I'm going to pause you there because so sorry.
03:14:58 so sorry. Just just because it's relevant to what you've just said. Could we bring up MPS 0748362?
03:15:04 0748362? Sorry to interrupt you, but it's just in relation to the application that you just mentioned. It may assist if we just have that on screen.
03:15:19 So, this is what you were just Is this is this what you were just describing? Yes. I think this this requires my authorization, but I don't I don't think I'm shown as having signed it. I wonder
03:15:30 I'm shown as having signed it. I wonder if we can turn to page five, please.
03:15:36 Um, so we can see application approved by Commander Roger Pierce. So if we go back to the doesn't have it's not dated there in
03:15:48 doesn't have it's not dated there in handwriting, but it appears that certainly at this stage. So March 2002, you you're approving special procedure order applications in relation to financial investigation into
03:16:00 financial investigation into So, is it right that as time went on, you were having more and more involvement in the investigation into James Thompson?
03:16:09 Thompson? Well, what I'm aware of from my recollection is that in James Thompson, we have the a full house of egregious conduct. Um, I think in five categories
03:16:21 conduct. Um, I think in five categories eventually. Um, and I'd say two things about that. One is that the interview of the 14th of November aside, I believe I only had the full
03:16:32 aside, I believe I only had the full written scope of James Thompson's misconduct in papers delivered to my office on 29th of December um 2001 2002
03:16:45 office on 29th of December um 2001 2002 rather which I read on I think 6th of January 2003 shortly before going to Canberra to to meet with the Australian
03:16:56 Canberra to to meet with the Australian um security service about proposals post 911. So from that I'm concluding that because I have a memory of this escalating misconduct,
03:17:09 escalating misconduct, I would have had briefings from Colin and
03:17:14 and HN53
03:17:15 HN53 who I knew pretty well and had done out outstanding work for me on another case as well. Um, but this wouldn't have been in written form. This might have been verbal briefings on the status of the
03:17:28 verbal briefings on the status of the investigation. And I just recall at the time that the the concern was how do we graduate the extraction of James Thompson from his deployment and there
03:17:39 Thompson from his deployment and there were there were intervening difficulties which we had to resolve before we could completely remove him from the squad and take action against him. So the the full the full picture I wonder if we can call
03:17:52 the full picture I wonder if we can call up please MPS07 treble 289. So your tab B206
03:18:04 and I wonder if I can go to perhaps page page 12 of this document.
03:18:17 So I'm going again just work backwards just to so we we have here and forunately we've well there's a redaction box over your signature but we can see commander SB and this was
03:18:28 can see commander SB and this was submitted by Colin Black in September02 and you said by the time you got to sign it off in terms of reading it was it was the other side o of the uh of the new
03:18:39 the other side o of the uh of the new year. It was just at the beginning of January. Is that right when it when it reached you? And if we if we go back please um
03:18:47 please um in this document to page if we go from page eight.
03:18:55 So we can see here again the summary of the inquiries. We're familiar now with um the extent of the misconduct that is reflected in
03:19:07 the misconduct that is reflected in these documents. But if we can just turn over the page please to page nine. and then 10. And here we have
03:19:18 And here we have following on from your evidence a few minutes ago these sort of five categories uh in particular that were brought to your attention in terms of intelligence
03:19:29 your attention in terms of intelligence product. We can see a operational security and if uh disobedience to orders and if we just go through this document please page 11
03:19:42 finance um and documents [clears throat] um
03:19:47 um you were having read that document um in no illusions as to the serious uh uh misconduct that James Thompson had had
03:20:00 misconduct that James Thompson had had committed. Yes. And you've explained that you also had other commitments um as you've just uh described. But would you agree that it's difficult
03:20:11 But would you agree that it's difficult to think of worse examples of of mis misconduct um in an SDS officer than than this? I agree entirely. Yes. And we know that ultimately
03:20:24 And we know that ultimately his deployment was marginally cut short. We've heard evidence that his vetting status reduced from developed vetting to security cleared.
03:20:35 developed vetting to security cleared. He went below security cleared. It's difficult to be in special branch without any security clearance, isn't it?
03:20:40 it? That's true. But ultimately he went on to have a very successful career. Yes.
03:20:46 Yes. And uh was not punished at all. What is your reaction uh to this that again it's a little it's a more
03:20:57 that again it's a little it's a more extreme version of Carlos Saraki isn't it that you have your clear evidence that this sexual relationship for example was unacceptable and that if there was any such misconduct someone
03:21:09 there was any such misconduct someone would they would be withdrawn from the field taken very seriously and then you were just simply not told about it or you'd never found out about it but in the times that it does go up the chain
03:21:20 the times that it does go up the chain for example to some extent DC Idel with Carlos Saraki's partial admission but here we have it has been brought to your attention it's very clear in terms of misconduct
03:21:32 misconduct you would have been aware for example of the billing data and all the calls to various women for example and when it is brought to your attention nothing's really done about it nothing's
03:21:44 nothing's really done about it nothing's done so in terms of saying didn't know about it had I known about it would have taken a a firm stance, but actually when you do have as clear an example as
03:21:55 when you do have as clear an example as you can get, there's there's no there's no sanction. There's no uh there's no punishment really, is there of James Thompson?
03:22:02 Thompson? Well, I think the first thing to say is is that any police officer in the country looking at this case in its totality would want to see this officer arrested, charged and placed before a
03:22:14 arrested, charged and placed before a disciplinary board. An irony of ironies, the DCI in charge of SCS at the time is an officer I hold in the highest regard,
03:22:25 an officer I hold in the highest regard, Mike Dell, who is a police officer every fiber. He's a a senior uniformed officer who's one of the fresh faces into brought into
03:22:36 the fresh faces into brought into special branch especially to manage its most secret unit. So I know that Mike Dell in every fiber of his being would have wanted this to be taken to its
03:22:47 have wanted this to be taken to its logical conclusion which as you described would be um criminal sanction and disciplinary sanction because he was in a different environment. He's thought beyond the
03:23:00 environment. He's thought beyond the immediate priorities of a police officer to what he would do as the manager of the the police services most secret unit
03:23:12 the the police services most secret unit and Colin Black's formed a view on what should be done. Um Mike Dell has has gone with that albeit I sense truly reluctantly. But it's not only a quest
03:23:25 reluctantly. But it's not only a quest in it, he's drawn up a a proposed plan for dealing with uh James Thompson. At the same time, HN53, who's done this most thorough
03:23:36 who's done this most thorough investigation into the five major points there of a 15page report, he as a a 27-year
03:23:48 27-year special branch officer, I believe, also wanted action taken against James Thompson in the conventional way, but it wasn't. Why?
03:24:00 conventional way, but it wasn't. Why? And this isn't just Colin Black's decision. It's one which I I endorsed. And I think I have you thinking back to the best of my recollection was that
03:24:11 the best of my recollection was that um we had to think not just of um the interest of justice here, but the sustainability of the unit, the threat
03:24:22 sustainability of the unit, the threat to
03:24:24 to its officers if it were to be closed closed down. the loss of vital intelligence which the best of SDS operatives were producing, much of which
03:24:37 operatives were producing, much of which is contained in the reducted sections of my my statement here in intelligence affecting national security and public [snorts] safety and all the things that we were there to do the job for.
03:24:50 we were there to do the job for. And
03:24:52 And thirdly, the vulnerability of James Thompson himself who we feared could self harm or um have a complete collapse.
03:25:03 collapse. So my conclusion was that in this very difficult balance which has been criticized by by the commissioner through council quite properly was balancing duty as a senior police
03:25:16 was balancing duty as a senior police officer with duty as a public servant as well and the in the public servant context. one has to think of um the
03:25:27 context. one has to think of um the public interest and I think we concluded that on balance it would be better for the SDS to survive this and continue producing high
03:25:39 survive this and continue producing high standard intelligence unobtainable from any other source and to do that we would deal with James Thompson in a particular and very explicit way and the way that
03:25:50 and very explicit way and the way that we wanted
03:25:52 we wanted was to reach a situation where He is punished because to lose DV clearance is within the special branch a quite serious punishment but in a way that we
03:26:04 serious punishment but in a way that we could keep an eye on him ensure ensure that he received treatment from the psychiatrist Dr. Mary Piper and that we could manage his career onwards. What I
03:26:17 could manage his career onwards. What I think just to finish, what I think the effect on SGS was that every single officer who was serving um
03:26:28 every single officer who was serving um in in an exemplary way considered that here was an officer who had placed the whole unit under threat and at great risk and placed it in enormous jeopardy
03:26:39 risk and placed it in enormous jeopardy and I think they had great resentment over that. So I take that our our our decision is lays itself open to criticism quite
03:26:51 lays itself open to criticism quite properly. But I still believe years down the line that in the totality of the circumstances prevailing it was the right decision to make. But how bad would a UCO's misconduct
03:27:04 But how bad would a UCO's misconduct have to be to receive any proper discipline? What what what more would they have had to what more would Jaden Thompson have to have done for you to take a different position and for the
03:27:16 take a different position and for the position to be well actually we're we're going to start misconduct proceeded we're going to what what more could you well it it's hard to think of more serious
03:27:24 serious a more serious sequence and of offenses. Um I think a great a great influence here was um James Thompson's moral um
03:27:35 here was um James Thompson's moral um mental state and the duty of care we had to him to towards him to um see him through this as well as resolve the various issues. So it's it's a very good
03:27:46 various issues. So it's it's a very good question. What more would anyone have to do to get taken off and for the unit to be closed down? In this particular case, all I can say is that um balancing all
03:27:57 all I can say is that um balancing all the factors I've just described, we wanted the SDS unit to endure because of the very good work it was doing. And to do that, we had to manage James
03:28:08 do that, we had to manage James Thomasson in a particular way. And the way we we chose was not to involve um outside authorities including department of professional standards but
03:28:21 department of professional standards but to handle this internally and I fully understand why this would be criticized but it's the kind of decision that someone in my position has to make. I want to ask you about far whether
03:28:32 I want to ask you about far whether you've you saw it at the time. It was something that was disclosed to you but I want to ask you if you remember seeing this at the time. It's NPS0719806.
03:28:43 So this is at your tab B186.
03:29:19 This is one of HN53's uh file uh notes and he says in the middle paragraph MT so James Thompson
03:29:30 middle paragraph MT so James Thompson also told him that he believed the most of the current suspicions about his operation stemmed from SDS management disapproval of field officers becoming involved in romantic relationships
03:29:41 involved in romantic relationships during the course of their operation. Um, according to HN1, MT did not go into any more detail. Uh, I reassured H1 that this aspect did not form any part of our suspicions about his operation. I also
03:29:53 suspicions about his operation. I also reminded him that it has been made crystal clear to generations of SDS field officers continues to be so that romantic sexual relationships with weareries are to be avoided at all costs. Even though this aspect was news
03:30:05 costs. Even though this aspect was news to the office, it may explain the high volume of phone traffic to at least two particular females. This reference to relationships being an aspect of the
03:30:17 relationships being an aspect of the misconduct, is that something that you recall
03:30:21 recall as well? I I do recall this document and I I don't recall anything though in the papers submitted to me before um the 6th of January 2003 anything at
03:30:33 um the 6th of January 2003 anything at all about sexual misconduct in relation to one of HN53's investigation documents talking about further investigation into relationships. Yes.
03:30:45 Yes. when he gave evidence to the inquiry, um James Thompson said that he when he's
03:30:56 um James Thompson said that he when he's questioned by DCS Black that he was asked about relationships and ju just to help in terms of
03:31:08 and ju just to help in terms of what he was asked. So he was asking questions the inappropriate relationships. can you help us with what you told so what HN16 told Detective Chief Superintendent Black about entering into inappropriate
03:31:19 entering into inappropriate relationships in the course of your work and he says as I recall it he said did you have a sexual relationship with those two and I said yes and he was asked well when you say those two can we
03:31:30 asked well when you say those two can we sorry Ellie and Sara any other women or just those two no just those two and when you said yes what was the response I can't remember were you asked for any details No, I
03:31:42 were you asked for any details No, I think it was clear he knew about those relationships. Were you asked whether either of those relationships were still continuing? Not that I can recall. No. Were you asked whether you were still in touch with either women? No, not that I
03:31:54 touch with either women? No, not that I can recall. So, James Thompson's evidence is that uh he mentioned the relationships to Colin Black.
03:32:03 Black. Did um he in turn mentioned that uh to you as well in terms of well he's I've spoken to him he's
03:32:14 he's yes
03:32:15 yes over and above everything else he's admitted to having uh not one but two two relationships. Does that do do you recall that? No, I understand that whole sequence, but um I didn't know about any
03:32:29 sequence, but um I didn't know about any sexual misconduct before the beginning of 2003. And the reason I can say that is um even after all this time that if there had been this would be as you say
03:32:40 there had been this would be as you say on the after everything else here's the worst complication of all because um the kind of relationships that he's admitting here have great impact on him
03:32:51 admitting here have great impact on him the women um his family and I think above all um that some of the subjects were leaving close to his home address which would have a major impact.
03:33:03 which would have a major impact. on any action we we could take. Did you have any input in the decision that HN53 took to speak to uh
03:33:17 that HN53 took to speak to uh officers who were investigating false documents, Operation Wisdom and DI uh DCI HN53, sorry, DI HN53 spoke to the
03:33:28 uh DCI HN53, sorry, DI HN53 spoke to the officers there and in terms of no action being taken against James Thompson for the use of the Kevin Crossland identity,
03:33:40 the use of the Kevin Crossland identity, driving license, passport, name on the electoral uh register. Uh in terms of again just in relation to that alone, uh
03:33:51 again just in relation to that alone, uh how is it justified that no further action was taken in relation to that conduct that any member of the public engaging uh would face serious criminal sanctions and imprisonment just for the
03:34:03 sanctions and imprisonment just for the document offenses? Yes, it's it's it's dreadful conduct particularly in view of the the crossland crossland history but I think I I revert to my earlier
03:34:14 I think I I revert to my earlier statement or comments for the reasons of for the reasons uh listing the action we we took.
03:34:23 we took. Can can you understand? So for example, Lisa Crossland. Yes.
03:34:29 Yes. Her one of the things she says in her statement is that is this. The more I learn, the more a gasast I am that Thompson has never faced criminal charges for his actions if any member of
03:34:41 charges for his actions if any member of the public did the same that they would face criminal conviction. And so c can can you see that um anyone um looking at the way in which James Thompson's
03:34:54 the way in which James Thompson's misconduct was dealt with, the feeling that had a member of the public uh committed those offenses involving firearms and ammunition offenses, they
03:35:06 firearms and ammunition offenses, they would be spending a long time in prison. But again, in terms of James Thompson, um as described, a slap on on the wrist. Can can you understand that the frustration and and the surprise and the
03:35:19 frustration and and the surprise and the be amusement? Oh, I I understand completely and um the circumstances of the Crossland identity acquisition um just exacerbate things. But um anybody
03:35:32 just exacerbate things. But um anybody else,
03:35:34 else, as she says, would have faced serious consequences. And under normal circumstances, every police officer would wish what she's describing there to happen to James Thompson. Um but for the reasons I
03:35:47 Thompson. Um but for the reasons I described earlier uh which could and have faced strong criticism, the the decision that Colin Black and I made was
03:35:59 decision that Colin Black and I made was that uh
03:36:01 that uh in all the circumstances um we should retain this man in special branch where he could be supervised and monitored and treated and that's what we elected to do. And it was really driven
03:36:13 elected to do. And it was really driven by um factors beyond our basic duty as police officers. But as public servants interested in sustaining the public
03:36:25 interested in sustaining the public interest and in the totality of things, we felt that the interest was served in SDS continuing to exist and to provide high-grade intelligence unobtainable
03:36:37 high-grade intelligence unobtainable from any other source. If we go to the if we look at the documents in terms of seeing on paper what you've you've described as the the thought process in terms of the disciplinary action or lack
03:36:49 terms of the disciplinary action or lack of it. Could we turn to MPS071970?
03:36:53 It's your tab B172. So this one of DCIL's file notes. It's dated 22nd of March 2002. And if you look at the bottom of page two, he he sets out and
03:37:06 bottom of page two, he he sets out and is this a reflection of what you've just described? Well, look, these are the options. Formal discipline, arrest and charge, or informal discipline. And then over the page,
03:37:18 over the page, the option chosen is informal discipline, but it says the benefits of preferred option. informal discipline avoiding public discussion o of the
03:37:29 avoiding public discussion o of the entire workings of a secret operation uh was preferred for the following reasons. Now ju just pausing there but why was it thought that there would that it would
03:37:40 thought that there would that it would end up with public discussion? Why could James Thompson not have been on the receiving end of any any disciplinary action without it um having to uh be
03:37:53 action without it um having to uh be made public? Could you just explain why disciplining James Thompson would result in all of the unit's work being made public?
03:38:04 public? Well, first of all, I can almost sense Mike Dell's discomfort coming through the pages here because I feel this wasn't the course of action he would have wanted taken as the manager of STS.
03:38:18 have wanted taken as the manager of STS. I think the fear was [laughter] that if he faced
03:38:21 he faced criminal prosecution, if he faced disciplinary action, both of these would involve bodies outside of SDS and special branch and there was a
03:38:35 SDS and special branch and there was a real risk of the existence of SDS being exposed and compromised by that being taken. So I think this is a this is a very much a practical uh reality which we have to take on board.
03:38:48 we have to take on board. But but in terms of what happened next, what what happened next was that James Thompson for many years continued
03:39:01 years continued um
03:39:03 um contact with uh Ellie and Wendy. And in relation to both of those uh individuals, his continued contact with
03:39:15 individuals, his continued contact with Ellie included continued sexual contact. But long after his deployment ended and long after this uh uh note that we have up on screen uh was set out that he
03:39:28 up on screen uh was set out that he continued to ask them about things like where they lived and continued to ask them about fellow activists and where those fellow activists lived and they
03:39:41 those fellow activists lived and they gave out this information. And so when they found out uh what had happened again de devastating consequences. Now I I read to you um earlier some of what
03:39:53 I read to you um earlier some of what Sara said in relation to the sexual relationship but not just sexual relationships but the effect that someone you think is a close friend for years.
03:40:04 years. And Wendy said since discovering James's true identity and position the mental effects on me have been significant. It has affected my ability to trust within all relationships, including with my
03:40:16 all relationships, including with my partner has made me relive all the events with my m mother. Memories of my mother and some of my last times with her are now forever tainted by being intermingled with the memory of him. His
03:40:29 intermingled with the memory of him. His conduct and then this his conduct and the fact the contact was allowed to continue after the deployment has impacted me in every respect of my life,
03:40:40 impacted me in every respect of my life, including choosing not to pursue a further goal of joining the RSPCA inspectorate upon the realization that many of the members are retired police officers and feeling unable to work in
03:40:51 officers and feeling unable to work in that environment. So when Wendy says, well, the fact that the contact was allowed to continue after the deployment, but this decision despite the in some sense of the sort of the hand ringing, the the concern and the
03:41:04 hand ringing, the the concern and the anger that DCI uh expressed, but the ultimate decision allowed continued harm to completely innocent people like Ellie and Wendy. So
03:41:16 innocent people like Ellie and Wendy. So the consequences of that that decision caused caused real harm to people's lives. Yes. And I hadn't been aware of this until fairly recently and certainly hadn't anticipated it. And when one
03:41:29 hadn't anticipated it. And when one hears evidence like that, it's as serious as described and um just feels you with a very deep regret. But I'm not and action should have been taken to
03:41:42 and action should have been taken to prevent this kind of contact continuing.
03:41:47 And in in terms of the the the timing of this, we can see sort of the benefits of the preferred uh action there. I wonder if we can just complete this document by just looking at the last uh section uh
03:41:59 just looking at the last uh section uh please.
03:42:01 please. And so the risks of the preferred option our action could be characterized as involving
03:42:09 involving and just going through this list. What was DCIL not spot on with these that our action could be characterized as involving neglect of duty? But wasn't there we're looking at this document
03:42:21 there we're looking at this document now?
03:42:22 now? Yes. Wasn't there neglect of duty in not uh disciplining taking action against James Thompson?
03:42:36 Or or is your answer that balancing it all as you've just indicated it was it was worth it?
03:42:46 Well, it's a quite it's a quite shocking case and all all of these apply. The risks of the preferred option all apply. They open us up to serious criticism.
03:42:58 They open us up to serious criticism. They resulted in the serious harm done to the women you've as you've just described which fills me with very great regret.
03:43:09 which fills me with very great regret. Um but it it's distilled down to really um how do we resolve the the egregious conduct of an under undercover officer
03:43:22 conduct of an under undercover officer within SDS whose behavior has jeopardized the whole unit and the decision taken after much consideration was as described earlier.
03:43:36 I is clear from the document itself without having the context of DCIDell's evidence that here was a senior police officer
03:43:47 that here was a senior police officer who was very concerned about the way in which
03:43:50 which yes very much that he was dealt with. Now this document that we're looking at here is dated the 22nd of March 2002.
03:44:02 here is dated the 22nd of March 2002. And so one of the justifications as you outlined uh was uh that concern about any of the SDS being made public.
03:44:13 any of the SDS being made public. Yes. And it's right, isn't it, that later the same year, so a matter of months after this document uh was produced, uh the true spies uh program
03:44:29 produced, uh the true spies uh program um three programs was aired on national television. Yes.
03:44:37 Yes. A and we we will uh return this afternoon to true spies. But but how do you maintain a justification that keeping this all under wraps, keeping
03:44:49 keeping this all under wraps, keeping this secret and not having any one of the reasons for not taking action against him was because well we didn't want any of this to get out and yet we move forward in time a few months and
03:45:02 move forward in time a few months and the very name of the program we find out was changed to True Spies as a result of the program makers contact with those in the SDS. H how do you explain the two? Well, quite simply
03:45:15 you explain the two? Well, quite simply because um the true true spies program was forced upon us by the admissions of a retired um special branch officer who
03:45:26 a retired um special branch officer who had notified Peter Taylor, the uh journalist who's just been awarded the CBES were on journalism and maintained secret sources in Northern
03:45:39 maintained secret sources in Northern Ireland and here the program was forced upon um we had to cooperate with it to um protect the SDS and protect the current
03:45:50 protect the SDS and protect the current operations being revealed. So it's an awkward balance with the James Thompson saga, but the two are different. Certainly you will be provided with an
03:46:01 Certainly you will be provided with an opportunity to go into more detail about True Spies, but so I wonder if that would be a convenient moment to break for lunch. Certainly. Um today is somewhat unusual. We will resume at uh 2:15 with a private
03:46:15 We will resume at uh 2:15 with a private hearing, will we not? And then at about 2:30 with the public hearings. Yes.
03:46:21 Yes. Thanks, sir.