Former Special Branch and SDS officer HN24 Stephen Beels is questioned about his years running C Squad's public order desk before joining the SDS, and later as a cover officer for undercover officers including HN18, HN104 and HN118. Counsel probes SDS reporting on the Stephen Lawrence Justice Campaign that reached Commissioner Condon's desk, deeply personal intelligence on activists and their families, and failures of supervision around exaggerated CHIS documents and the tradecraft manual's permissive guidance on sexual relationships undercover.
00:46:20 Good morning everybody. Uh this morning and for the first part of the afternoon we are going to hear uh live evidence which will be uh transmitted over the live link after a 15minute delay. Uh
00:46:33 live link after a 15minute delay. Uh those with um mobile telephones may use them to report what they hear in the hearing room, but only after 15 minutes have elapsed since the event that they're reporting. They may not be used
00:46:44 they're reporting. They may not be used for recording [clears throat] or photography. Yes.
00:46:51 Please stand. Please repeat after me. that I do solemnly
00:46:55 solemnly I do solemnly sincerely and truly sincerely and truly declare and affirm declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth
00:47:06 shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but and nothing but the truth
00:47:14 thank you can you give your full name to the inquiry please Steven John Beals um Mr. Beals, you have given a witness statement to the inquiry which is at MPS0749339.
00:47:26 It's at tab A1 of the bundles. Sir, um
00:47:33 that's the front page. And if we can go to the last page, please.
00:47:41 You signed um that statement on the 15th of March, 2024. Is that right? That's [clears throat] correct. Yes. And can you confirm that the contents of that statement is true and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief?
00:47:52 the best of your knowledge and belief? It is.
00:47:53 It is. Thank you. Um that can be taken down. Thank you. Um you tell us in your witness statement at uh paragraph 7 page three that you first joined the Metropolitan Police Service on the 3rd
00:48:04 Metropolitan Police Service on the 3rd of October 1977. Is that right? That's correct. You joined special branch in April 1982 as a detective constable. That's correct. and you worked in
00:48:15 That's correct. and you worked in various different um parts of special branch um at Heathrow airport dealing with Irish related terrorism then transferred to the home office for a short period. You were promoted to
00:48:27 short period. You were promoted to detective sergeant and went back into uniform for three years. Is that right? That's correct. And you came back into special branch as a detective sergeant in 1985. That's right. Yes. Um, you tell us that
00:48:40 That's right. Yes. Um, you tell us that you were posted to C Squad covering domestic extremism for four or four to five years. You then spent some time back at Heathrow airport and then moved back to C squad for three years before
00:48:53 back to C squad for three years before doing uh before transferring to E squad then B squad for four years doing general desk work and a more specialist role in B squad for some three years before um returning to C squad on the
00:49:06 before um returning to C squad on the public order desk concentrating on left-wing extremism but also dealing with right wing extremism for some three or four years before you joined the SDS. Is that right? That seems correct. Yes.
00:49:17 Is that right? That seems correct. Yes. Thank you. Um I want to ask you just a a bit about your time on the public order desk in Squad before you joined the SDS. Um you were on C squad before um joining
00:49:30 Um you were on C squad before um joining the SDS for some 3 to four years. Um you joined the SDS the inquiry understands in October 2001 or thereabouts. There.
00:49:41 There. Um do you think that's right? I remember because of 911 that I think my transfer to SDS was delayed for 2 or
00:49:53 my transfer to SDS was delayed for 2 or 3 months. Um obviously the implications for public order following 911. Uh I don't think the management wanted the detective sergeant in charge of the desk to move straight on to SDS. So I don't
00:50:06 to move straight on to SDS. So I don't think I took from detective sergeant Titty. That was the plan. But I don't think it was a, you know, he left Friday, I started Monday. I think there was a two or three month delay, which
00:50:17 was a two or three month delay, which may well have slipped into January 2002. Thank you. Um, so going by those sort of dates, you you I think you would have been on Squad public order desk from
00:50:29 been on Squad public order desk from sometime around the end of 1997 or the beginning of 1998. Do you think that's about right? About right. Yes. Um, and in your role on the public order desk in C squad
00:50:40 on the public order desk in C squad prior to joining the SDS, you remember that you received intelligence from the SDS. Is that right? Uh, yes.
00:50:47 Uh, yes. And you would have known that it came from that particular unit, would you? I would. Yes. Um, how was that intelligence relevant from a public order perspective to the work that you were doing at the time?
00:50:59 work that you were doing at the time? My role on C squad uh public order desk was as the sergeant in charge of three or four uh DC's constables who
00:51:11 three or four uh DC's constables who together were putting together threat assessments for our uniform colleagues. So we had to
00:51:22 our uniform colleagues. So we had to build up a good picture of what the um the threats to public order were. uh during that time. So we would be collecting sources from all collecting
00:51:34 collecting sources from all collecting information intelligence from all different sources of which SDS was obviously one part. We would then uh having collected that we would then assess it and then we would disseminate it in appropriate form to uh whoever the
00:51:47 it in appropriate form to uh whoever the customer was which was quite often the public the uniform public order branch whose title I can't quite remember something like to0 or co1.
00:51:58 something like to0 or co1. Thank you. Um, you say that you would have shared intelligence with customers and they would have told you if there was something urgent you needed to know because you were the desk point of contact for the SDS when you were on C
00:52:11 contact for the SDS when you were on C squad. Um, how were the requirements for intelligence um gathering set for the SDS?
00:52:18 SDS? Uh, they were set far above my level. They were uh the senior management from various squads would have a tasking and
00:52:30 various squads would have a tasking and coordinating um meetings I think regularly and there was a as far as I can recall there was a register of what the intelligence requirements were and I think from
00:52:42 requirements were and I think from memory on that register would be the groups that were to be monitored for threats to public order in in a sea squad case. Um so that intelligence
00:52:54 squad case. Um so that intelligence requirement would be something we were aware of on the desk and that's where we would diver direct our resources. And you say it was set far above your level. At what sort of level did you understand it was set?
00:53:07 understand it was set? I think certainly
00:53:11 squad chief level, the chief superintendent. Um but I know uh we come on to Mike Dell who in charge of the SDS unit would go along to these sort of
00:53:22 unit would go along to these sort of meetings and they would discuss what you know what what is the situation in London you know in terms of public order what are our requirements now how often they met I can't remember but I know
00:53:33 they met I can't remember but I know there would be you know intelligence requirement updates and we would then um at the desk level would
00:53:44 at the desk level would utilize all our different sources to to try and get the clearest complete picture of what the threat is and therefore we would produce assessments for our uniform colleagues when they
00:53:56 for our uniform colleagues when they were planning policing of events in London principally. So did you understand that SDS targeting was directed by C squad
00:54:08 largely? Yes. and and how was that um direction transmitted to the SDS from C squad?
00:54:20 I sorry. So my understanding was that the SDS would be present at these tasking meetings. So they would be aware C squad would be
00:54:31 So they would be aware C squad would be aware of what the intelligence requirements were. It's the best way I can explain [snorts] it. So were there direct requests to the SDS from C squad during those meetings?
00:54:44 SDS from C squad during those meetings? I wasn't present at the meetings. So was that your understanding? That's my understanding. Yes, I would say.
00:54:51 say. And I think you say in your witness statement at paragraph 11, you wouldn't know the officer who had collected intelligence, just the unit it had come from. So you didn't know the identities
00:55:02 from. So you didn't know the identities of particular UCOs. Is that right? I think that's fair to say. Yes. Yes. Um, paragraph 11 of your statement, page four, you say that um, on C squad public
00:55:15 four, you say that um, on C squad public order escalating, you were collecting intelligence for public order threat assessments and you say that sometimes you were told that intelligence was from the SDS because it would give it more value and credibility.
00:55:28 value and credibility. um why would it give it more value and credibility coming from the SDS rather than another source? Because they were um they were intelligence trained, developed, vetted
00:55:40 intelligence trained, developed, vetted police officers. They weren't informants that might be motivated um in different ways.
00:55:49 ways. How useful was the SDS intelligence in comparison to intelligence from other sources?
00:55:55 sources? Well, obviously intelligence you have to you have to assess it as as a whole. It's it's difficult to be a bit sort of selective to say, well, this bit of intelligence is much better than that
00:56:07 intelligence is much better than that because it comes from that source. I think and bear in mind all their intelligence reports are graded. So when we receive them, they would be generally graded like a B2. So we'd know that that
00:56:18 graded like a B2. So we'd know that that source was considered reliable. So in terms obviously if I knew it was coming from SDS my expectation would be that information would be reliable and
00:56:30 information would be reliable and accurate.
00:56:32 accurate. Um more accurate than intelligence coming from other sources in your view. Well, it's it's impossible to say. The grading for a source, let's say a CHIS
00:56:44 grading for a source, let's say a CHIS in a in a another in a group that intelligence might be just as accurate, might be just as reliable as an SDS. It would have to be taken, you know, on
00:56:56 would have to be taken, you know, on their own merits, but they might both be graded, say, B2, which is, you know, reliable and and accurate information. Uh so it's difficult but in my head the
00:57:07 Uh so it's difficult but in my head the motivation for somebody outside the SDS for a a normal member of public who might be a cheers their motivations haven't been a handler of informance can
00:57:18 haven't been a handler of informance can be totally different their motivations might be financial or something else in which case you know I have to assess the reliability in that sort of context whereas with a police officer given the
00:57:30 whereas with a police officer given the evidence of the intelligence rather um I I think I could have a a a safer degree of of reliance on that intelligence. And was that a view widely held in C
00:57:41 And was that a view widely held in C squad?
00:57:43 squad? Yes, it was. Yes.
00:57:46 Um what was the process in S squad for dealing with intelligence received from other sources that covered the same areas as the SDS intelligence?
00:57:57 areas as the SDS intelligence? uh well all intelligence on the u groups that were being monitored. So where there was an intelligence requirement all the source reports the intelligence
00:58:09 all the source reports the intelligence reports would come into us just through a a paper system and uh in the early days and um we would receive them and then we would make an assessment and
00:58:21 then we would make an assessment and that would then be informing our threat assessment. So we were, you know, we were keeping an eye on the public order situation for London, you know, every
00:58:32 situation for London, you know, every day. So, and the reports were coming in from different sources all the time. Bear in mind be open sources as well that would be looking at, you know, publications, media, um, members of the public phoning in. There'd be police
00:58:44 public phoning in. There'd be police officers on district who would be picking up information. They would feed that through. So all these bit of different pieces of information were coming in. we were having to assess them
00:58:55 coming in. we were having to assess them and then disseminate them in form of for example a threat assessment. And what did C squad do if intelligence from other sources contradicted that of the SDS intelligence?
00:59:06 the SDS intelligence? Uh well, we'd look at um we try and look at the context. So, you know, it's difficult without speaking about a specific example, but
00:59:17 speaking about a specific example, but we would look at the context. We look at the reliability of the source and and do whatever checks were possible. we might go back to the handler if it was a CHIS. Um, if it was an open source, we'd
00:59:28 Um, if it was an open source, we'd obviously be able to go to the the source ourselves. Um, if it was SDS, we'd be able to go back through the uh management or the cover officers to get some sort of uh better feel for filler intelligence.
00:59:40 intelligence. And was the accuracy and utility of SDS intelligence um fed back to the SDS? uh whether there was a formal process
00:59:51 uh whether there was a formal process I can't remember all these years but I would as the sergeant on the desk I was normally the first port of call when the cover officers came to Scotland Yard
01:00:02 cover officers came to Scotland Yard because they would come you know two three times a week with intelligence um and they would often sit down with me or one of my colleagues and and discuss you
01:00:13 one of my colleagues and and discuss you know the intelligence that they picked up during that time and be sharing with me. Uh so it was, you know, very much a sort of verbal interaction but supported
01:00:25 sort of verbal interaction but supported by the intelligence reports which they would hand over. And what happened to um SDS intelligence before it was um passed up the chain of of command or included in a in a threat
01:00:37 of command or included in a in a threat assessment? Um all the intelligence reports would be on a on a uh a file or a paper to a audit trail
01:00:51 uh a file or a paper to a audit trail where with a minute sheet. So it would come to us and then we would uh send it on. We would probably extract the information, the intelligence for our reports, but the actual report would then go up the chain to the squad chiefs
01:01:04 then go up the chain to the squad chiefs before it's then sent off to records for registration. And were reports that you received um on Squad before they were disseminated upwards, were they
01:01:15 disseminated upwards, were they sanitized or reviewed for content that was considered inappropriate uh disproportionate or not for a lawful purpose?
01:01:23 purpose? Was that part of the assessment at the C squad level? Yeah, I'm sure it would have been done, but usually the if it's chis source, the
01:01:35 usually the if it's chis source, the chis handler would be trained in in um ripper for instance. So I there would be an expectation by the time the intelligence got onto a report that came
01:01:47 intelligence got onto a report that came to sea squad, it'd been through some process. Same with SDS. You would expect them as obviously Cape on to know to have assessed the intelligence whether
01:01:58 have assessed the intelligence whether it was necessary proportionate whether there was collateral intrusion and then passed that [snorts] on to into the system. So at that stage you know there may be something jumped out at me said
01:02:09 may be something jumped out at me said that that's not right or is that necessary. Uh I can't think of specific examples but but that would be part of the process. Yes. So was collateral intr intrusion considered on C squad before
01:02:21 intrusion considered on C squad before intelligence was disseminated further? [sighs]
01:02:26 It wasn't part of I would say it wasn't part of the formal process because I think that part of the process was done when the report was was written up. Bear in mind SDS intelligence
01:02:37 in mind SDS intelligence would normally have been through the SDS um management before it came over to C squad. So I think by the time we were the recipients of the intelligence, we
01:02:48 the recipients of the intelligence, we weren't necessarily when I say I mean we may well have been but but not as a matter of course we're assessing each piece of intelligence for its ripper compliance. We would have expected that
01:02:59 compliance. We would have expected that to be done before it got to us but it may be something that stood out that that's you know that shouldn't be there type of thing. And what did you know um during your time on Sea Squad about um
01:03:11 during your time on Sea Squad about um SDS trade craft? Um for example, would there have been an interest in undercover officers taking on positions of responsibility in their target groups or being regular drivers for um the
01:03:24 or being regular drivers for um the group?
01:03:25 group? At the C squad level, we would we just wouldn't know, you know, unless I'd worked it out myself um but we wouldn't know. And was there ever any interrogation or questioning by C Squad
01:03:36 interrogation or questioning by C Squad of what means the SDS were using to obtain intelligence? No.
01:03:44 Um, did Squad have knowledge of the level of access to groups uh key individuals and how how deep a group how deeply a group had been infiltrated? Did you have that awareness?
01:03:55 you have that awareness? Uh, my awareness would be just simply by the nature of the reporting, you know. you would be able to read a report and not every time but but but from time to
01:04:08 not every time but but but from time to time you would be thinking well is this coming from a a source that's close to the leadership of a group. Bear in mind a lot of these reports weren't they
01:04:19 a lot of these reports weren't they weren't solitary reports. They would be a pattern. So you you'd probably work out yourself would be reasonably intelligent that that source is quite close or might be at that level of a
01:04:31 close or might be at that level of a group just just by working out but we weren't actually told. So you would have had an understanding from your own assessment of the level of proximity
01:04:40 proximity had to activists. Was there any ever any suspicion at that time of UCOs's um being in sexual relationships with activists? No, not at all. Um, I want to uh just ask you about um a
01:04:54 Um, I want to uh just ask you about um a meeting you had while you were on the public order desk in Squad with HN81 David Hagen um on the 14th of May uh 1998.
01:05:06 1998. Uh
01:05:08 Uh DS Steve Titty uh chairs the meeting. Um, three members of the public order desk are present at DI HN 1037, a DC and
01:05:20 desk are present at DI HN 1037, a DC and you. Um, there's a document which details the meeting. It's MPS treble01062. It's tab B27, sir, of the bundle at page
01:05:33 It's tab B27, sir, of the bundle at page one.
01:05:37 And we see there in the top line that um you're present in order to discuss matters of mutual interest and Mr. Titty St chaired the
01:05:48 interest and Mr. Titty St chaired the meeting. Do you have any recollection of this meeting? Now,
01:05:56 the first time I've seen this report and [clears throat] I obviously accept it's it's true and I was there. I've got no recollection of it.
01:06:05 it. Um, we understand [clears throat] that it took place in Detective Sergeant Titty's garden. Do you have any recollection of that? I have been to his house a few times. In
01:06:17 I have been to his house a few times. In fact, we became sort of social friends. So, I've been to his garden um and family events there. So, um, to have a meeting there, I can't recall. No. Would you have found um meeting for work
01:06:29 Would you have found um meeting for work purposes in someone's garden unusual? Uh, no. I mean, I had meetings in in my house when I was SDS because we risk assessed venues and sometimes, you know,
01:06:41 assessed venues and sometimes, you know, depending on the nature of the environment, it might be the safest option. Um, so it wasn't unusual to have meetings um
01:06:52 so it wasn't unusual to have meetings um either in your time on C squad or on the SDS in someone's house or garden. on C squad. This should stick out to me because I didn't regularly meet SDS officers. So, I'm just trying to think back, but obviously it's some time ago.
01:07:03 back, but obviously it's some time ago. Um, I think if it was in his garden, DST would have made appropriate arrangements that it was a secure operationally secure venue. I can't say more than that really.
01:07:15 I can't say more than that really. Um, do you have any recollection of of what S squad wanted to know from the SDS and in particular um HN81?
01:07:28 I know I can see there's one certainly four groups that would have been of uh interest to see squad in the second paragraph.
01:07:41 Yeah. Present a breakdown of the way.
01:07:47 Okay. Yeah. Sorry. What was the question about that? Um, do you recall what C Squad wanted to know from SDS and in particular HN81? Not specifically, no. I mean, presumably
01:07:58 Not specifically, no. I mean, presumably it was a an update on those groups and and you know, general public order implications. Um, the the third paragraph um records
01:08:10 Um, the the third paragraph um records that um the DI presented a breakdown of the way um Mr. Hagen's reports were being treated and how they were used, marketed and caveed and that reassured him as to the value that was being
01:08:22 him as to the value that was being placed on his report writing and developed into a lengthy discussion on disclosure. Do you have any recollection now about what was said about the dissemination of his reporting from the SDS?
01:08:33 SDS? No.
01:08:34 No. Um, do you recall where HN81's reports were being sent?
01:08:42 Where they were being sent? No who they were being disseminated to onwards from C squad. Uh from C squad as C squad is the recipient they would
01:08:53 as C squad is the recipient they would be
01:08:55 be uh the intelligence would be used for the the threat assessments. After [snorts] that it would normally it would go through the C squad uh management structure
01:09:06 management structure um who would then just probably place it on the file in in central registry. Um, [cough] DI HN1037 told Operation Hearn that this wasn't a
01:09:18 told Operation Hearn that this wasn't a tasking meeting. It was more a pat on the back meeting. Do you have that sort of impression? I can't remember. Sorry. Um, following this meeting, um, did
01:09:29 Um, following this meeting, um, did HN81's report become more focused on his involvement in Movement for Justice and their their involvement in the McFersonen inquiry?
01:09:40 Well, firstly, I don't remember this meeting, so it's bit difficult then to to assess where it was. All I can say is we were interested in the movement for justice, which we knew as the movement for justice by any means necessary as
01:09:51 for justice by any means necessary as their correct title at the time. Um, they were of interest of us because I think the intelligence was that they were trying to infiltrate
01:10:04 were trying to infiltrate possibly the Lawrence campaign with their sort of revolutionary ideas of building uh up the um the
01:10:15 the antagonistic mood if you like of any of any crowds that might be attending the inquiry.
01:10:22 inquiry. Um, just looking then at the Steven Lawrence campaign and the McFersonson inquiry, you say at paragraph 81, 181, sorry, at pages 75 to 76 of your
01:10:33 sorry, at pages 75 to 76 of your statement that the Steven Lawrence murder and the inquiry predated your time as a manager on the SDS. And you say, "As far as I'm aware, the SSDS's only role in relation to the Steven
01:10:44 only role in relation to the Steven Lawrence Justice Campaign and the McFersonson inquiry was in relation to public order assessments on groups potentially seeking to cause disorder at the inquiry itself. I'm not aware that
01:10:56 the inquiry itself. I'm not aware that such activity had um any impact on any justice campaigns." And you say at paragraph 182, as far as I'm aware, the SDS had not been tasked formally or
01:11:08 SDS had not been tasked formally or informally to obtain information relating to or stemming from the Steven Lawrence Justice Campaign. Is that right?
01:11:16 right? Yes, that's that's my understanding still. Yeah. Um on your time on C Squad, um you were aware of SDS reporting specifically on the Steven Lawrence campaign. Is that
01:11:28 the Steven Lawrence campaign. Is that right?
01:11:28 right? On the groups around the campaign. uh
01:11:35 in um MPS 072 320 0 on page 4 paragraph 2.5
01:11:47 paragraph 2.5 um you're described um in this uh report which is by and the author is an MPSC squad officer who says that they assisted with assessing compiling
01:11:59 assisted with assessing compiling [clears throat] reports on the Steven Lawrence campaign and the inquiry and liazed with relevant desks in C squad and you're described there as one of the main leads on intelligence relating to the Steven Lawrence campaign. Do you
01:12:11 the Steven Lawrence campaign. Do you agree with that? Uh I don't agree with the terminology. I know what the author is probably trying to say.
01:12:20 How would you describe yourself in terms of the intelligence relating to the Steven? I can see that gives the impression that we were we were interested in for some reason the actual
01:12:31 interested in for some reason the actual campaign itself. No, we were interested in what is the public order threat around the campaign particularly the McFersonen inquiry. You know when we
01:12:44 McFersonen inquiry. You know when we were getting regular, you know, crowds outside, you know, what is the threat that that was my principal concern is what do the uniform police need to know when the inquiry is sitting or any other
01:12:58 when the inquiry is sitting or any other elements of that where there might be public disorder. So the idea was that we would get the intelligence on some of the groups that we knew were active in in inciting public disorder. Get that
01:13:10 in inciting public disorder. Get that intelligence so we could tell the uniform either is a threat or there's not a threat or the threat is low or threat is high on a particular day or a particular event.
01:13:22 particular event. Thank you. That could be taken down now please. um you authored um a detailed report on the Steven Lawrence campaign and associated organizations. Um it's dated the 10th of September 1998 and
01:13:35 dated the 10th of September 1998 and it's at MPS0748392.
01:13:40 Um page two please. um reports on the Lawrence campaign and included
01:13:51 campaign and included so that's the the front page of the report we see the date and the title at the top Steven Lawrence campaign associated organizations and at the bottom the Lawrence family campaign group um is detailed and over the page
01:14:07 group um is detailed and over the page third paragraph Please. [clears throat]
01:14:14 This report includes quite deeply personal details and information about the Lawrence family itself, doesn't it? Yes.
01:14:26 Yes. Why was it necessary to report those details?
01:14:29 details? Um,
01:14:32 Um, I think for context, what is happening? uh is this going to have an effect on the campaign in any way? Um
01:14:44 way? Um I think it's important perhaps to understand that um special branch officers when they were trained in intelligence if if I can just say this just for uh
01:14:57 if if I can just say this just for uh context and for um understanding of the officers mindset when they do this reporting is that when an officer joins special branch
01:15:09 when an officer joins special branch they start a two to three week course, an induction course. During that course, they are made utterly clear that they have become part of the intelligence community that they are going to be working with the security services quite
01:15:21 working with the security services quite closely and that they have where they were previously police officers, you know, police in the streets somewhere, from now on they're more or less
01:15:32 from now on they're more or less intelligence officers and they need to understand what intelligence is. So we were trained intelligence is based on three essential principles. The need to know. So your intelligence
01:15:46 The need to know. So your intelligence must only be shared with those who need to know. Secondly, that that intelligence will be protected. So it will be classified under the protective marking scheme. So it be secret,
01:15:58 marking scheme. So it be secret, confidential, restricted or unrestricted. That gives the officer confidence that he's writing when he's writing intelligence reports that it's not going to end up in the public domain. It's not
01:16:10 to end up in the public domain. It's not going to end up on the internet or anything. So he has confidence that he's can report information that only available for those who need to know on strict
01:16:22 those who need to know on strict handling conditions. If if I can just finish. And then the third thing is that you're taught the intelligence is jigsaw that you should report everything
01:16:33 jigsaw that you should report everything you know on a particular subject um to get the complete picture. You know any piece of data it could be a um partial telephone number, partial email address
01:16:44 telephone number, partial email address might seem irrelevant at the time but could become very important later. a partial telephone number could could lead to a IRA terrorist cell for instance identified subjects. So the
01:16:55 instance identified subjects. So the point I'm trying to make is the officers were trained to to include as much data as possible in their intelligence reports. So the author of that whoever supplied the the source it of the
01:17:08 supplied the the source it of the information the intelligence may not have known what the full picture is so may have thought this might be relevant so would have put it in. But why why are deeply personal details about the family
01:17:20 deeply personal details about the family themselves and the campaign itself, not organizations connected it to it from the far left who are trying to infiltrate it and use it for their own purposes? Why are those details
01:17:31 purposes? Why are those details necessary and proportionate to include? I think because as I say the the the source has tried to um create the full
01:17:42 source has tried to um create the full picture and this is what's happening. and also that this information is not going to go outside restricted circles. So it's almost background briefing. You
01:17:55 So it's almost background briefing. You know, this is the mood of the campaign. This is happening. I can see now in the light of of the time from then to now. You know, with hindsight, it probably is it does look um
01:18:08 it does look um intrusive, discourteous, disrespectful. It's more than collateral reporting, isn't it? It's reporting directly on the family itself and the campaign. But as I say, the intention is is to
01:18:19 But as I say, the intention is is to create the full picture. Thank you. That can be taken down. Um, in 1999, you were still working on the public order desk in Squad. [snorts] Is
01:18:30 public order desk in Squad. [snorts] Is that right? I believe so. Yes. Um, there's a document MPS0749507,
01:18:38 please. Um, this is a CO 11 document and we understand CO11 to be the public order intelligence. That's right. Is that right? Yes. That's I was trying to think of
01:18:49 Yes. That's I was trying to think of earlier. Yes. Yes. At page five, paragraph 5.1,
01:18:59 your name spelled incorrectly, but is is that refer Yes. Is that referring to you?
01:19:04 you? Yes. Um and it says that you had nominated as the intelligence liaison oper off officer for uh this operation
01:19:15 oper off officer for uh this operation which was to uh
01:19:22 to pass intelligence from the SDS on the Steven Lawrence campaign and the McFersonen inquiry. Um, were you aware of requests for information on the
01:19:33 of requests for information on the Steven Lawrence campaign or the McFersonen inquiry being passed from the public order desk to the SDS specifically? Sorry, for the public order desk to the
01:19:44 Sorry, for the public order desk to the SDS
01:19:45 SDS for intelligence gathering purposes. Yes. To request for information on the Steven Lawrence campaign and the McFersonen inquiry.
01:19:57 is are we looking at this the highlighted paragraph somewhere? Um that's what the paragraph that deals with you. The document um if we go back to page one is entitled the Steven Lawrence inquiry report panco1
01:20:10 Lawrence inquiry report panco1 intelligence unit. Okay. And we can see there its purpose is stated to monitor events and gather intelligence on the likely public order implications arising from the publication of the McFersonson report
01:20:22 publication of the McFersonson report and to provide a daily briefing to gold London i.e. Commander Messenger. Do you see that?
01:20:27 see that? Yes. Yes.
01:20:29 Yes. Yes. So you were aware that CO11 and indeed the public order desk on C squad was interested in the McFersonen inquiry report its publication having the potential to spark this order.
01:20:42 potential to spark this order. That was the view at the time. Yes.
01:20:46 Um because you were nominated as the intelligence leaison officer for the operation described in this document. Yes. Correct. Um, did you make requests to the SDS to gather such intelligence?
01:21:01 to the SDS to gather such intelligence? I cannot recall, but I would accept that I may well have done. I would be looking for all sources of intelligence to get the complete picture as best I can of what the threat is when the report is
01:21:14 what the threat is when the report is issued. Um, so yes, I probably would have done. Yes. And do you think um in those requests you gave any guidance as to the need to
01:21:25 you gave any guidance as to the need to avoid collateral intrusion in relation to the family and the campaign? I don't think I did. No. Why not?
01:21:35 Why not? I think because
01:21:40 they we were dealing with SDS reports on a regular basis. So I wasn't laying down specific parameters each time we were looking for intelligence. I think there
01:21:52 looking for intelligence. I think there was the expectation was that the SDS would understand what collateral intrusion was and you know would restrict their reporting accordingly. I don't think I needed to tell them.
01:22:04 don't think I needed to tell them. Um we know from uh a document we don't need to put that can be taken down. Thank you. We don't need to put it on screen, but for reference, it's MPS0749538.
01:22:15 That you received a report from Plumstead Police Station regarding criminal damage to Steven Lawrence's memorial plaque by uh far-right criminal. Um and it's noted um it should
01:22:28 criminal. Um and it's noted um it should be kept the report should be kept with any other chorus presumably correspondence on the incident. Do you remember receiving such a report? I I remember the incident but I don't remember the report though.
01:22:39 remember the report though. Um assuming you did receive such a report um why do you think you were receiving that type of report on the criminal damage to the memorial the plaque? Yeah. because I would have
01:22:50 the plaque? Yeah. because I would have thought that had potential for serious public order problems from the if anything from the extreme right-wing and you know the anti- sort of fascist movements. And would such a report have been kept
01:23:02 And would such a report have been kept on file with all the other intelligence surrounding the campaign and the McFersonson uh inquiry? I don't know, but I would suspect so. Um and do you know what um
01:23:13 Um and do you know what um correspondence um the report was referring to? I don't know.
01:23:20 know. Um,
01:23:26 Mr. Hagen, HN81, um, gave some evidence to Operation Hearn. Um, we don't need it on screen, but for reference, it's MPS0721941.
01:23:39 Um and he said that he reported on public order aspects of the Steven Lawrence campaign to DS uh TDI Lambert and DCI HN58. And he said that he was informed at the
01:23:51 And he said that he was informed at the height of the McFersonson inquiry that his reporting was going straight to Sir Paul Condon's desk each morning via you. um and that DS Titty passed on to him
01:24:02 um and that DS Titty passed on to him from you congratulations from the commissioner for your excellent reporting
01:24:08 reporting and um DS Titty um gave some evidence that he didn't remember this but would have no reason to doubt that it was true um and that if you had said um something
01:24:20 um and that if you had said um something like that to him about the reporting of UCOs contributing to intelligence being sent to Squad then he would have passed that message on Um, were you passing intelligence directly to the
01:24:31 intelligence directly to the commissioner on the Steven Lawrence campaign and the McFersonson inquiry? I think firstly, well, I'd say no. Uh, I think the reason of that is I had no direct access to the commissioner. Um,
01:24:45 direct access to the commissioner. Um, if anything of that nature was submitted, it would go through management uh system. Um whether it was going to
01:24:56 whether it was going to sanitize form in to CO11 for instance then upwards to the commissioner I don't know.
01:25:03 know. And do you recall ever getting a message either directly from the commissioner or pass down through the chain of command from him to pass on to the SDS his congratulations for this excellent
01:25:14 congratulations for this excellent reporting? No, I think I'd remember you for something like that. If the if the top boss said thank you for a particular, you know, operation or something, I think I'd remember, but I I have no recollection.
01:25:26 recollection. Um,
01:25:27 Um, if you had um received that kind of feedback from above you in the chain of command, would you have passed it on to SDS?
01:25:35 to SDS? Yes.
01:25:37 Yes. Uh, I could think of no reason why I wouldn't, though.
01:25:43 Um, while on the public order desk in Squad, were you aware of requests for information on Roger Sylvester's funeral and inquest being passed to the SDS? Roger Sylvester was a black man who had
01:25:55 Roger Sylvester was a black man who had died in hospital after being restrained by eight police officers in 1999. I I remembered that, but I don't remember anything about reporting. No.
01:26:08 Were you aware of any requests for information on a family vigil being passed to the SDS? No.
01:26:16 No. Um what was um the public order desk's um or indeed CO11, the public order intelligence unit's um interest in the
01:26:28 intelligence unit's um interest in the Roger Sylvester family and its campaign? Uh
01:26:34 Uh I don't think we were
01:26:46 If we could look at uh please MPS0748489 at tab B28.
01:26:58 This is a file uh showing that it was referred to C squad which you can see from the left hand column uh
01:27:10 hand column uh around about the bottom bottom third of the page.
01:27:13 the page. So we can see C squad on the left hand side there. Page two shows that the intention was for intelligence to be be provided to CO24
01:27:26 intelligence to be be provided to CO24 which was the racial and violent crime task force about race crime. You can see that um at the top uh in the top paragraph. Yes.
01:27:35 Yes. Um at the bottom of page two um it shows that there was a minute sheet an attachment on the Steven Lawrence campaign.
01:27:43 campaign. Do you see that at the bottom? And at page three, there's a note by Colin Black that he would like to see a flow of suitable material to DS and the name is redacted um in CO24
01:27:57 is redacted um in CO24 uh the racial violent crime task force both tactical intelligence around the Lawrence inquiry and broader work on race crime. It's the the note at the top of the page. Do you see that?
01:28:08 of the page. Do you see that? Yes.
01:28:09 Yes. Um, were you aware of this at the time when you were on the public order desk in Squad that there was such a um a request?
01:28:17 request? Not in No, I have no recall. What would the purpose have been of providing the racial and violent crime task force intelligence or a flow of
01:28:28 task force intelligence or a flow of suitable material on the Lawrence inquiry?
01:28:31 inquiry? Uh it's difficult for me to assess with just this this in front of me but uh again I would think we were looking at context
01:28:41 context of the time and everything around it but I can't say more than that to be honest. Do you know what information was provided as a result of this policy implementation? I have no recollection.
01:28:52 I have no recollection. And so you you wouldn't know what the role of the SDS was in contributing to it?
01:28:58 it? Uh, this was when I was on Squad. Yes. No.
01:29:03 No. [snorts]
01:29:03 [snorts] Um, on page three at the bottom of the page, um, there's a note to, um, acting DI Beals. Is that you, do you think?
01:29:14 DI Beals. Is that you, do you think? Well, it must be. Yes. Well, yes. And it says, please note brief details of assessments supplied to date up to and including Ricky real March. Um, and then and return.
01:29:26 then and return. Um
01:29:28 Um please note brief details of assessment supplied today. Dr. Yes.
01:29:33 Yes. Um another document shows uh page 5 MPS0722486.
01:29:40 This is not in um your bundle but in HN85 sir um shows that you passed on various documents to as we see at the top there various documents to a DS
01:29:52 top there various documents to a DS McDall in CO24. Do you see that? Yes.
01:29:57 Yes. And they they seem to include threat threat assessments on the Steven Lawrence campaign. Um the McFersonson inquiry um and Ricky Real the Ricky Real
01:30:08 inquiry um and Ricky Real the Ricky Real um campaign. The threat assessment. Yes.
01:30:11 Yes. Um there's a threat assessment written by you on the Ricky Real March dated the 14th of October 1998. We don't need to see it on the screen, but it's at page 172 of MPS0722498.
01:30:26 Um, did threat assessments um written by you on the Steven Lawrence campaign and the Ricky Real March rely on SDS intelligence? Uh,
01:30:38 it's difficult to say because there could have been intelligence from all sorts of sources. And would you have briefed those above you in the in the chain um up to the
01:30:50 you in the in the chain um up to the commissioner as to the source or provenence of the intelligence underlying the threat assessment? Uh as to the nature of the source unlikely unless unless the the context
01:31:03 unlikely unless unless the the context of the source was relevant for those up the chain but not as a matter of routine. No. Thank you. That can be taken down now please. Um, so what was the policing
01:31:15 please. Um, so what was the policing purpose then for carrying out threat assessments on the Ricky Real campaign and the Steven Lawrence campaign? It would have been to see if there's um any likelihood of disorder associated
01:31:26 any likelihood of disorder associated with these campaigns perhaps from the extreme rightwing. And would did the intelligence you received contain information on the campaigns themselves?
01:31:38 campaigns themselves? Uh I'd have to be shown some some examples, but uh again I think any reporting on these campaigns um sounds like an old record, but it
01:31:49 um sounds like an old record, but it would be for context.
01:31:54 So did some of the intelligence go further than what was strictly necessary for a public order threat assessment? Again,
01:32:04 Again, I can't really say without any sort of specific examples put in front of me, but not not as a matter of routine, unless there was a specific request or requirement.
01:32:15 requirement. Um, in your witness statement at paragraph 172, it's page 73. Um, you describe, um, that many justice campaigns were fronts for or being
01:32:26 campaigns were fronts for or being exploited by more extremist groups. Um, was that an opinion you held while you were on the public order desk in Squad? I think that was our uh assessment based
01:32:38 I think that was our uh assessment based on um historical events for instance that we knew full well that there every time there was a campaign that was emotive
01:32:48 emotive um that had justice behind it then there would be self-serving groups who'd want to exploit those families and you know their grief because it would make
01:33:00 their grief because it would make headlines. it might mobilize you know public in which case there will be a public order threat. So that was the way that we viewed it.
01:33:11 the way that we viewed it. Um and was that an opinion widely held within the unit? I think so. Yes. Um did CO11 the public order intelligence unit um agree with that
01:33:22 intelligence unit um agree with that view?
01:33:23 view? Do you know?
01:33:28 I can't say. I knowing the little that I can remember from the Aison with CO 11, they were focused on how many people are going to be at this
01:33:39 how many people are going to be at this event on this day. What's the makeup of that group, you know, looking at uh the demographic makeup, the political makeup, you to get what like the the
01:33:51 makeup, you to get what like the the mood of the event, that type of that's that's what they were focused on. So, anything outside that would probably be highly irrelevant [clears throat] to them.
01:34:00 them. And the the campaigns that we've been talking about, the the Roger Sylvester Justice Campaign, the Ricky Real uh campaign, and the Steven Lawrence campaign, were were those the campaigns
01:34:11 campaign, were were those the campaigns that were identified and viewed as being fronts as you described in your statement? I think to use front might be a clumsy term. Um,
01:34:22 term. Um, and I don't think you [clears throat] were particularly selective of those campaigns. It may well be that they were the major campaigns at at any particular point in time that were presenting a
01:34:34 point in time that were presenting a potential threat to to public order, not by the campaign itself, but by those linked or associated or or attempting to to jump on the bandwagon. And was that an opinion you continued to
01:34:45 And was that an opinion you continued to hold whilst you you were on the SDS?
01:34:50 Yes, I think yes. And was that an opinion widely held within the SDS in the time you were there?
01:34:57 there? In terms of extremist groups, I mean, we were looking at revolutionary groups, if you like, who would seek as a as a tactic to use these campaigns. I think
01:35:10 tactic to use these campaigns. I think we accepted that was that was for these groups normal practice. Thank you. um want to look at then your your time um on the SDS and and who were your
01:35:22 um on the SDS and and who were your contemporaries um in the time that you were there. Um when you joined the detective inspector was HN53 and he was succeeded by HN72
01:35:34 and he was succeeded by HN72 and then eventually by DI Andrew Horley who I think you say in your witness statement you don't recall you remember the first
01:35:41 the first I think I was close to if not having retired
01:35:44 retired and in relation to the detective chief inspector when you joined it was um HN36 DCI Michael Dell and he was succeeded by DCI Julian McKini.
01:35:55 DCI Julian McKini. And then DCI Francis Flood. Is that right?
01:35:58 right? That's right. Um just in relation to DCI Dell, then you describe him in your witness statement at paragraph 46B at page 15 as a very effective manager because he was
01:36:10 a very effective manager because he was straightforward. He had a strong moral compass and was very clear in his instructions. And you say you worked with him on a daily basis. He chaired the twice weekly meetings. All management would be present um at those
01:36:22 management would be present um at those meetings. Um He was a manager um that you got on with and you and you respected. Is that right?
01:36:30 right? Yes, I'd worked with him before SDS any in any case. Um in contrast um you you say about um DCI McKini's management style that he was aloof, remote, abrupt, and lacking
01:36:42 was aloof, remote, abrupt, and lacking in empathy. You felt he didn't approve of the SDS, didn't respect it, and had a hidden agenda to shut it down. His management style was poor and it
01:36:53 management style was poor and it engendered a lack of trust and you only had occasional personal interaction with him. He attended the unit only once every couple of weeks. So you make a direct contrast between him and your previous DCI. Is that right?
01:37:05 previous DCI. Is that right? It is I'm very uncomfortable but I was asked the question. I don't like what was almost effectively the office gossip if you like but I understood the the
01:37:16 if you like but I understood the the reason for the questioning. So as I was asked by the inquiry, I felt I had to give an honest answer. Was there a sense um during his tenure that the SDS was quite resistant to
01:37:29 that the SDS was quite resistant to change or any external accountability to mckini? Uh resistance. I think when somebody new comes in at
01:37:40 I think when somebody new comes in at whatever level, how they present themselves can have an effect obviously and um his manner I think just got people's backs up straight away. Um but he was the manager
01:37:52 straight away. Um but he was the manager so you know police officers [snorts] you know is a a disciplined force you get on with the job. Um obviously
01:38:01 obviously his his style of management was something very different. Um and I think there was sort of resentment from what had been uh one style of management was
01:38:12 had been uh one style of management was was was being taken uh as I've said uh the fact that there were infrequent visits and and you know minimal contact with the officers you know obviously exacerbated that situation.
01:38:26 um in a a report commissioned by uh DCI flood carried out by DSHN1656 um as to how well the use of event logs
01:38:38 um as to how well the use of event logs were being received. Event logs I think were a new way of recording SDS intelligence. Is that right? And they were introduced towards the end of the SDS.
01:38:47 SDS. Do you recall event logs? Yeah,
01:38:48 Yeah, I have no recollection. Again, I may have been working towards retirement, the unit potentially closing down, so you know, might not been familiar with those.
01:38:58 those. Do you recall that there was a resistance by UCOs to their use? I don't remember what they were, so no, I can't.
01:39:09 Was there a sense that anything new coming in from outside the SDS would resist any type of change? No, I think that would be to paint um an
01:39:21 No, I think that would be to paint um an incorrect picture. um the officers that I dealt with the the the UCOs were very um
01:39:29 um [sighs] uh very aware of the situation very and and and we're very adaptable people and I think delivered in the right way where change is explained
01:39:41 right way where change is explained because we're all resistant to change but you know and particularly people in these highly sensitive situations you know high pressure situations
01:39:53 know high pressure situations They can be very sensitive to things, but I don't think that means they were resistant to change. I think the change just needed to be presented in a in a more professional manner. I just want to look briefly at your role
01:40:04 I just want to look briefly at your role in the SDS. You joined as a detective sergeant. Um, you say at paragraph 15, page five of your witness statement, that you considered yourself to be a supervisor in the SDS and not a manager.
01:40:16 supervisor in the SDS and not a manager. You considered the DI and the DCI to be managers of the unit. Um, what do you understand the distinction to be between being a supervisor and a manager?
01:40:28 being a supervisor and a manager? I think that was just across special branch. If you were a detective sergeant, you weren't normally you didn't attend management meetings. You know, you you were more shop floor. So I
01:40:39 know, you you were more shop floor. So I think I know other officers, my colleagues have referred to them as as managers, but just my personal understanding was management was a um, you know, the next level up. We were closer to the shop floor doing the
01:40:51 closer to the shop floor doing the supervision. Supervision of the UCA's themselves. Thank you. Um I want to look just briefly at training please. Um you say at paragraph 48, page 21 of your witness
01:41:04 at paragraph 48, page 21 of your witness statement that you didn't have any formal training for your role in the SDS. Is that right? I didn't. No. No. I didn't have formal training in terms of um managing
01:41:15 training in terms of um managing supervising UCOs. I was chain trained previously as an informant handler, chis handler, but not uh not UCOs's. Yes. You say you you'd undertaken the
01:41:26 Yes. You say you you'd undertaken the advanced level three informant covert human intelligence sources handling course prior to joining the SDS. That's right.
01:41:33 right. That's correct. I can't remember when, but yes, that's And did you find that training useful in your role at the SDS? in terms of um
01:41:46 very different type [snorts] of scenarios where you're dealing with um let's say a member of the public who's become an informant because a lot of the training would be about what is the motivation you know we didn't have that
01:41:57 motivation you know we didn't have that issue with um UCS was it useful I'm sure there were aspects of it that were useful you know we dealt with um public interest immunity issues for
01:42:08 public interest immunity issues for example and I had to present um we had to handle an informant over the period of of two weeks, build up um a case and present it to a real judge as a as a PIA
01:42:19 present it to a real judge as a as a PIA application. So it was that type of more crime oriented training that that was undertaken. It it it helped me in in in certain respects, but I don't think it was
01:42:30 respects, but I don't think it was obviously it was not focused on UCO type um work. Would you have found more bespoke training for the role you had in the SDS helpful at the time? Do you
01:42:42 the SDS helpful at the time? Do you think there should have been hindsight? Yes, definitely. Um, you also say in your witness statement at paragraph 50, pages 21 to 22 that after Steven Lawrence's murder, there was policewide race relations
01:42:54 there was policewide race relations training. Did you undertake that training?
01:42:56 training? I remember attending a a one or two day course. Yes. And and just briefly, what do you remember that training covering? I think I have said in my statement I seem to remember we were we group of police
01:43:08 remember we were we group of police officers from all different backgrounds. I think it was a special branch dedicated course. Um and we were addressed by um community representatives, community groups
01:43:21 representatives, community groups um from different ethnic backgrounds and given sort of history. And I remember the sort of example would be you know we would we were told that when you address a young African Caribbean male perhaps
01:43:34 a young African Caribbean male perhaps when you're you know a police officer you're stopping them that you can misread signals. So the fact that they wouldn't necessarily look you in the eye was was was was a cultural difference. It wasn't a matter of disrespect. So
01:43:47 It wasn't a matter of disrespect. So that was helping officers to understand that you know there are different approaches by different by people from different backgrounds that we needed to be aware of. It was that type of level of training.
01:43:58 of training. And so was that applicable? Was it relevant to your role in the SDS or was it more public facing oriented? It was probably more public facing, but what it did it was it it raised awareness.
01:44:12 did it was it it raised awareness. Um, you say at paragraph 54, page 23 of your statement that you didn't undertake any racial incident awareness training during the course of your tenure in the SDS, but you had done previously. Is that the training you're referring to?
01:44:24 that the training you're referring to? Yes.
01:44:30 um dealing with um your supervision of undercover officers then in your time at the SDS um at paragraph 65 page 27 of
01:44:41 the SDS um at paragraph 65 page 27 of your statement you say that the UCOs would generally produce intelligence orally to the DS responsible for them who would then prepare an intelligence report which would then go to HN53
01:44:52 report which would then go to HN53 andor DCI Dell and the DI andor DCI would see do the reporting and then either one or both of them were generally present at either one or both of the field meetings each week where
01:45:03 of the field meetings each week where UCOs would give a brief on their targeting. Is that right? Correct. Yes. Correct. Yes. Um, [clears throat]
01:45:11 you say at paragraph 73, page 29 of your statement, that in my supervisory role, I had daily contact with my designated UCOs who would phone in twice a day and
01:45:22 UCOs who would phone in twice a day and I would be on hand to take their calls and to respond to any issues they may have encountered. And you had the the twice weekly meetings with the UCOs as a diary fixture. And um all DS's would
01:45:36 diary fixture. And um all DS's would attend those meetings and you the meetings were conducted as a group and you would also meet with UCOs's you manage perhaps for a coffee or more private or individual meetings if necessary and you say I maintain contact
01:45:48 necessary and you say I maintain contact with the UCO's families from time to time and I would visit them on a six monthly or so basis. Um so how would you maintain contact with the UCO's
01:45:59 maintain contact with the UCO's families?
01:46:01 families? Uh it may be a phone call, it may be a personal visit. Um some the UCOs more often than than others. Um I would go along sometimes we would have
01:46:16 I would go along sometimes we would have an intelligence meeting if you like share of intelligence meeting but it might be at the family home and the spouse might be present in which case you know we would have a conversation there. Um there was no formal structure
01:46:27 there. Um there was no formal structure to it. It was just me being conscious that I should be you know seeing the family background etc. And were you would would the nature of the discussions also involve personal
01:46:39 the discussions also involve personal matters or not with
01:46:41 with with the family? Yes. If if if if it was relevant it also be just casual conversation as you would how how are you doing? you know, elder
01:46:53 how how are you doing? you know, elder children, that type of thing. And were you in try trying to ensure that partners were performing a welfare role in relation to supporting the UCO in their deployment? Yes.
01:47:10 Um, did you talk to UCOs about their personal lives? Yes.
01:47:18 Yes. And were you in your role as supervisor, were you interested in in trying to spot if there were issues or would you generally wait for a UCO to flag a particular issue with you?
01:47:30 particular issue with you? Uh well, I say it was a two-way process. I um
01:47:38 I've been a supervisor for something like 25 years. I was promoted to sergeant when I was a young 25year-old fresh-faced uniform police officer having to deal
01:47:50 uniform police officer having to deal with police constables at a police station who'd been working there for 20 odd years. So, you know, I had to adapt my supervisory style to to meet those
01:48:02 my supervisory style to to meet those needs. Um, so I sort of developed a style of supervision over over 20 odd years. Um I I would call it a sort of trust and observe type of um
01:48:16 trust and observe type of um supervision. So I think my default position would be one of trust but also keeping an eye on things, picking up any signals or any indicators that things
01:48:27 signals or any indicators that things weren't quite right. Um and that was the style I I used when I was in the SDS. Thank you. Um I want to look at just your role in terms of being a handler or
01:48:38 your role in terms of being a handler or cover officer for particular UCOs. Is there any difference between a handler and a cover officer or do they amount to the same thing? Uh no there is there's quite a
01:48:49 Uh no there is there's quite a substantial difference I suppose because um I saw my role as a a cover officer for UCOs as as dealing with um three
01:49:00 for UCOs as as dealing with um three aspects really. It was welfare obviously as priority operational security you know and a safe what are they doing how are they doing it and also intelligence management so
01:49:13 it and also intelligence management so you know collecting assessing and disseminating the intelligence so I had all those three aspects with a CHIS slightly different you know you weren't having daily contact so
01:49:26 you weren't having daily contact so terms of operational security the operational security only really was relevant when you're actually having a meeting with them or a communication with them. Um, welfare again, you know,
01:49:38 with them. Um, welfare again, you know, if they were informant, they weren't particularly interested in you speaking to their wives and partners, whatever. So, I would say you have quite a quite a difference. Um, at paragraph 80b at page
01:49:51 difference. Um, at paragraph 80b at page 32 of your statement, um, you say that you were handler for HN 104 Carlos Saraki and HN118 Simon Wellings, and you think for a short time HN79, is that
01:50:04 think for a short time HN79, is that right?
01:50:05 right? Do you recall them? Um, at paragraph 80B, you also say you may have been HN18 Rob Hastings handler for a short time
01:50:16 Rob Hastings handler for a short time before DS Gilbertson took responsibility for him. Do you think that's right? I think so. Yes. Um, and so what did being those particular UCOs's handler entail in
01:50:28 particular UCOs's handler entail in terms of your responsibilities for supervising them? Um well as I've said the three elements that I considered of of um welfare operational security
01:50:39 of um welfare operational security intelligence management they they were they were the bread and butter so you would have had an in-depth knowledge of the reporting of those UCOs for whom you were handler is that right? Yes.
01:50:51 Yes. Um you say at paragraph um 111A at page 45 of your statement that cover officers would generally know where their UCO would be and that usually during the
01:51:03 would be and that usually during the twice daily phone calls the UCO would say if they were staying at their douff their cover address um that night. Is that right? That's correct. And so would you be keeping tabs on where a UCO was say staying on a daily
01:51:14 where a UCO was say staying on a daily basis?
01:51:16 basis? It depends what you mean by keeping tabs. if I wasn't putting surveillance on them. Uh I wasn't phoning them at the address to make sure they were there. Um so keeping tabs on them would be just
01:51:28 so keeping tabs on them would be just understanding generally at the meetings they would have said on a Tuesday I'm spending a week here at the at the cover address or I'm attending these events or
01:51:39 address or I'm attending these events or there's an event that might be taking place. I might have to travel somewhere. That type of thing. And then obviously if they phoned in on the Friday and said something different that might be an
01:51:50 something different that might be an indicator that I need to check something. And so was there a safety consideration to knowing where they were each night? Yes.
01:52:01 Yes. And um if UCOs's were unable to state um in advance where they would be staying the night, would they be expected to tell their handler in the back office afterwards or not?
01:52:13 afterwards or not? Uh yes, I I would think generally yes. Um you say uh it was up to the UCO's judgments what was required when it came to them staying overnight at the homes
01:52:25 to them staying overnight at the homes of who they targeted. Is that right? Yes. I mean this was long-term surveillance if you like long-term undercover work where we couldn't
01:52:36 undercover work where we couldn't monitor them every day, every minute. Um so again it was a matter of putting your trust in them. There there's Edund of trust with any checks that could be done and all picking up any indicators that something wasn't quite right.
01:52:48 wasn't quite right. You say at um paragraph 111a that a written record was made of where um UCOs were staying. Um what was done
01:52:59 um UCOs were staying. Um what was done with that record? I might have been incorrect there. A written record was made of where they were staying. Is this on a daily basis when they checked in on their check-in call?
01:53:11 call? I remember the check in we would sort of tick and there would be a comment box. Yeah.
01:53:17 Yeah. Yeah. But that wouldn't necessarily say there I can't remember if unless you've got examples. I can't remember whether it said they are staying at Duff address or elsewhere. So it wouldn't necessarily record
01:53:30 So it wouldn't necessarily record particular addresses. No.
01:53:34 No. Was there any monitoring done generally of how much time a UCO was spending um at their cover address or other addresses of of activists?
01:53:46 addresses of of activists? No, I think best way I could explain is I think the cover officer in their conversations with the UCO would just have a general sense of right this week you've been
01:53:57 sense of right this week you've been staying there or you've been at home, you know, next week if if if they were staying at an address that we weren't, you know, we weren't sure what was going
01:54:08 you know, we weren't sure what was going on for a long period of time, then that would obviously perhaps raise a red flag, that type of thing. just by sort of the general conversation, general knowledge, them phoning in each day. Um,
01:54:20 phoning in each day. Um, so would would UCOs's understand that they they did have to they were expected to tell their handler or someone in the back office of where they were going to be staying? Yes.
01:54:31 Yes. Um, and and was the recording of of where they were staying um a new approach or practice or had that was that something you inherited and had been in place for a long time?
01:54:42 been in place for a long time? I'll be honest with you, I can't remember that it was actually recorded, but if you say it was, then then I accept that. Um, and I can't remember if it was an old practice, a new practice. The cover officer would generally know.
01:54:55 The cover officer would generally know. Somebody said to me, "Where is so and so today? Do you know?" You generally would know. He said, "Well, he was planning on staying here for two days and then going back home." That type of situation.
01:55:07 back home." That type of situation. Thank you. Um, I want to move on then to another topic. Um, I'll come back to dealing with your time in the SDS um, in a moment, but I'd like to go back to when you first joined the Metropolitan
01:55:19 when you first joined the Metropolitan Police in the first place. That was in 1977, I think. Is that right? Yes.
01:55:24 Yes. Um, you were a uniformed officer until you joined special branch as a constable in 1982.
01:55:30 in 1982. Correct. Um, in the late 70s and early 80s, the world was a very different place in terms of racism and race discrimination. Would you accept that than it is today? Absolutely. Yeah.
01:55:41 Absolutely. Yeah. Um, there was more widespread overt racism within society. Would you agree with that? I think so. Yes. Yes. And for example, a number of racist attacks in London throughout the 1970s,
01:55:54 attacks in London throughout the 1970s, 80s, and indeed into the '90s. Yes.
01:55:58 Yes. Um, and in terms of racial diversity within the Metropolitan Police Service amongst officers when you joined, um, the less diverse than than today,
01:56:10 the less diverse than than today, less diverse, but there was still diversity. And particularly less diverse amongst senior Metropolitan Police officers.
01:56:21 senior Metropolitan Police officers. Yes.
01:56:23 Yes. Um, and there were some issues with within the MPS with disproportionate stop and search of young black men. Do you recall that? Correct.
01:56:32 Correct. Um, and there was a sense in the Metropolitan Police Service that black people, particularly young black men, were more likely to be seen as criminals or violent. Would you agree with that?
01:56:43 or violent. Would you agree with that? No. [snorts] Um, how well equipped do you think you were to spot racism um back in that time?
01:56:51 time? Um
01:56:56 well I obviously wasn't trained because I didn't think we had training back then. Um
01:57:02 then. Um I worked in King's Cross for 5 years which was back then um quite again diverse. We had quite a large back then
01:57:14 diverse. We had quite a large back then um African Caribbean population uh in the community. So where I worked, it wasn't really a major
01:57:25 where I worked, it wasn't really a major problem in terms of race. If you ask me about my racial awareness personally, I' I've never considered myself a racist or anything of that nature. I think my
01:57:37 or anything of that nature. I think my family is quite diverse and I think they'd laugh if they heard me described in that way. Did you have an understanding then, for example, of the difference between conscious and subconscious racism?
01:57:49 subconscious racism? I'm not sure any of us did back then. Uh direct between unconscious conscious and unconscious. Understood. Yeah. Sorry, my my mistake. Um and do did you
01:58:01 Sorry, my my mistake. Um and do did you have an understanding of the difference between direct and indirect discrimination?
01:58:07 Well, at some point I did. It depends if you ask me when back in the late '7s early I don't know. I had colleagues from
01:58:19 I don't know. I had colleagues from different ethnic backgrounds who wasn't in an issue. I had a colleague who was subsequently found to be a member of the National Front and was sacked and that
01:58:30 National Front and was sacked and that was in the early 80s um because of being identified at a National Front demonstration. Um so you know we were aware of these issues
01:58:41 you know we were aware of these issues but uh but certainly you know the the the past is a foreign land. They they do things differently now. During your time um in the SDS did you
01:58:53 During your time um in the SDS did you ever come to know of anyone making a complaint about racism? Uh no.
01:58:58 Uh no. What about in special branch? No. um in uniform. Complaints about racism. Not that I can recall. No.
01:59:10 Not that I can recall. No. How likely are you to have remembered?
01:59:15 If they'd impacted me personally, I'd remember them. If it was part of a general thing, I probably wouldn't remember. No. Does a lack of complaints indicate a tolerance of racism within the police at
01:59:27 tolerance of racism within the police at that time? Goodness. Um, I can't say I mean that's a sort of high level conversation really. Uh, did you witness any of your
01:59:38 Uh, did you witness any of your uniformed colleagues saying or doing anything racist? Um, no. I just gave you one example where a colleague was actually on my shift who I think we were uncomfortable
01:59:50 shift who I think we were uncomfortable around to be fair and someone had reported him strangely enough to special branch who identified him at um national front demonstrations as a steward
02:00:03 front demonstrations as a steward and when confronted with this he was he was asked to resign. So there was an awareness
02:00:10 um in special branch between uh 1982 and joining the SDS in sometime late 2001 or early 2002 appreciating you did have some time in uniform in that period of
02:00:22 some time in uniform in that period of time. Did you witness any of your special branch colleagues um saying or doing anything racist? No.
02:00:32 Was there a contrast between your experience in uniform then and your experience in special branch in terms of race awareness or racism?
02:00:44 in terms of race awareness or racism? No, not I can recall. No.
02:00:50 In your time uh in special branch before the SDS you it involved some work on E squad. Is that right? Yes. Not for long. Not for long. No. Um,
02:01:01 Yes. Not for long. Not for long. No. Um, did that involve um working with the seat community at all? Not that I remember. No. Um, did you ever hear any racist comments or knee squad? No, we No, we we were working, you know,
02:01:15 No, we No, we we were working, you know, with all different nationalities. We were we were providing threat assessments on risk to embassies. So, we were having to deal with all the different uh nations that were, you know, present in London.
02:01:27 know, present in London. Um, in your time working on B Squad, were there any prejudice comments or derogatory comments made about Irish people?
02:01:36 people? No.
02:01:37 No. Or or Catholics in general? No.
02:01:41 No. Um, there was though, you've told us about a feeling that justice campaign campaigns might be manipulated by groups from the far left. Is that right? And that was something that it it was
02:01:52 that was something that it it was important to look out for. Yes.
02:01:56 Yes. Um and and what was the significance of the possibility of manipulation of justice campaigns by the far-left? What what did you understand them to be doing or for what purpose? Um public order implications, incitement
02:02:09 Um public order implications, incitement to public disorder. [laughter] Uh so coming to your back to your time in the SDS then did you ever witness any racist jokes or banter or stereotyping
02:02:20 racist jokes or banter or stereotyping amongst UCOs or managers? No, I think to to try and create a picture of of of of special branch, I think they were a group of very
02:02:33 they were a group of very um
02:02:35 um uh professional officers and detectives. We went through if if I can explain that when you joined or applied for special branch I'm not going to use the word elitist cuz that's wrong but you were applying
02:02:48 cuz that's wrong but you were applying for something that was um different and special was in the name so you went through a rigorous process when you joined which was um quite a a difficult
02:03:01 joined which was um quite a a difficult exam and it was the only department within the whole of the Metropon police where you had to sit an exam before you could even get to an interview stage and then you were rigorously interviewed by
02:03:12 then you were rigorously interviewed by three senior police officers. You would then go through a developed vetting process which is very intrusive and all that put together with the deduction
02:03:24 all that put together with the deduction training you had a special you had a very professional group of officers and I think this sort of attitude of of racism perhaps you'll come on to misogyny um just just wasn't part of the
02:03:37 misogyny um just just wasn't part of the picture.
02:03:39 picture. Were were racist or misogynist jokes ever told at SDS social gatherings? No. Did you ever hear racial slurs or derogatory language used? No.
02:03:50 No. Um, you were in serving in Special Branch when Steven Lawrence was murdered in 1993. Can you remember the reaction within Special Branch when that happened?
02:04:02 I can't remember where I was then, but it might put context down. Um, I I just can't I know we were all aware of it
02:04:11 of it reaction. I mean, we're all horrified. I think that's gen generally fair to say on on a number of levels and we dealt with some of your time um
02:04:22 and we dealt with some of your time um on the public order desk in S squad but but generally speaking was special branch interested in receiving intelligence at that early stage on the Lawrence family and the campaign?
02:04:34 Lawrence family and the campaign? I can't remember. Do you think there was any distinction drawn between information about public disorder and information about the Lawrence family and the campaign itself more generally?
02:04:47 I don't think so. I think as I said before, rightly or wrongly, we were creating a full intelligence picture. So officers weren't told not to report
02:04:58 So officers weren't told not to report private or personal information concerning the Lawrence family. Is this on CCO or SDS? uh in your time in special branch in special branch
02:05:09 in special branch from 93 onwards. I I have no specific recollection of being told or or telling that. Um did you hear um talk in special branch about Dwayne Brooks?
02:05:23 branch about Dwayne Brooks? I knew of Dwayne Brooks and the events surrounding that, but I I can't remember specific conversations about it. No. Did you ever hear anyone pronounce his first
02:05:35 you ever hear anyone pronounce his first name very slowly? No.
02:05:38 No. Did you ever hear anyone say that he was a coward for running away? Which accusation is wholly unjustified? No.
02:05:47 No. While you were in Special Branch, did um Special Branch generally accept that the murder of Steven Lawrence and the attack on Mr. Brooks was racist? Absolutely. Um, and what was your understanding of
02:05:58 Um, and what was your understanding of the significance of the Lawrence case to the Metropolitan Police and its reputation? Uh, it was damning and quite rightly so. Um, on on the levels of of um, as as the
02:06:11 Um, on on the levels of of um, as as the report said, institutional racism, you know, the the structures, procedures, processes were were were considered racist, racist outcomes from those. And
02:06:23 racist, racist outcomes from those. And I think we were all intelligent um officers. We we understood that. And on a second level was the corruption, incompetence, whatever it
02:06:34 corruption, incompetence, whatever it was in terms of the investigation. So yes, we were very aware. And was there a sense that it was a case which had the capacity to spark public disorder?
02:06:42 disorder? Yes.
02:06:45 Yes. And you would have been aware that the there had been a number of racially motivated attacks in Southeast London prior to the murder of Steven Lawrence, for example, Roland Adams on the 21st of
02:06:57 for example, Roland Adams on the 21st of February 1991. I can't remember that. No. Were you aware generally that there had been a number of racist attacks? Well, afterwards, yes. Or when all part
02:07:08 Well, afterwards, yes. Or when all part of the reporting around it, but actually when they occurred, no. Um, and as a special branch officer, what was your experience of what special branch was doing about those racist
02:07:19 branch was doing about those racist attacks
02:07:21 attacks in 1991?
02:07:23 in 1991? from your time during the the 1990s um either immediately before Steven Lawrence's murder or afterwards uh in terms of
02:07:35 uh in terms of in terms of racism uh or racial attacks I think you're talking about um our interest as a special branch would be if there were any organized groups
02:07:47 be if there were any organized groups involved in this and the [clears throat] extreme right wing would be of crucial interest during
02:07:58 wing would be of crucial interest during that time.
02:08:01 Um the inquest was halted in December 1993 and there was a private prosecution brought by the family of those suspected of murdering Steven Lawrence and there
02:08:13 of murdering Steven Lawrence and there was quite a lot of publicity about the collapse of that prosecution. Was was that a talking point in [clears throat] special branch? I have no recollection. Sorry.
02:08:24 Did senior special branch and NPS officers express an interest in intelligence concerning the Steven Lawrence campaign so far as you were aware?
02:08:33 aware? Not that I was aware of. No.
02:08:37 [snorts] Uh in February 1997, there was an inquest verdict which predictably found that Steven had been unlawfully killed by racist murderers and the Daily Mail famously printed the headline murderers
02:08:48 famously printed the headline murderers the following day. Do you recall that being a topic of conversation in special branch?
02:08:53 branch? Not a conversation, but we would we would obviously be aware. Yes. But I can't remember any conversation. Was there an acceptance that the inquest verdict was correct? Yes, I'm sure. Yes.
02:09:05 Yes, I'm sure. Yes. Had there been conversation up to that point as to whether or not Steven Lawrence and Dwayne Brooks were wholly innocent?
02:09:14 innocent? Well, I think there was acceptance everywhere as far as I was aware. Um, in March 1997, the complete police complaints authority launched an investigation and went on to conclude
02:09:26 investigation and went on to conclude that there had been failings in the investigation of Steven's murder. Um, can you recall that conclusion being the subject of conversation in special branch
02:09:34 branch as a general conclusion? Yes. Which was of great embarrassment if you were a police officer? Uh, and in July 1997, the Steven Lawrence inquiry was announced. what what sort of views were expressed about
02:09:45 what sort of views were expressed about that
02:09:47 that in special graph? Uh I can't remember specific views but you know we would have just uh accepted that was a necessary um result of what had happened. Were there were any views expressed
02:09:58 Were there were any views expressed about the home secretary Jack Straw's attitude towards the police? No. And I can't remember what his attitude was. No. Do you recall there being any difference in approach to the
02:10:09 being any difference in approach to the Steven Lawrence campaign as compared to other family justice campaigns? No.
02:10:18 Um whi which particular customers in special branch were interested in the intelligence on black justice campaigns or the Steven Lawrence campaign?
02:10:29 the C squ public order desk would be the the main customer in terms of as I explained earlier the the the groups that were being monitored around the campaign.
02:10:41 Um it was clear at the time um that the Lawrence family themselves didn't want any confrontation with the police other than on purely political grounds, wasn't
02:10:52 than on purely political grounds, wasn't it?
02:10:52 it? It's my understanding now. I can't remember but yes. Do you think that was accepted at the time? no reason why it shouldn't be. No. Um,
02:11:02 Um, was there concern that because this was a racial issue, it was potentially particularly explosive? Yes.
02:11:09 Yes. Um, from a public order perspective, but also from a police reputational perspective. Um, I can only speak for myself really. I didn't really care about the
02:11:20 I didn't really care about the reputational aspects of it. I think the reputation was was already damaged. I'm not sure what our sort of monitoring or anything would would how that would alter or affect
02:11:34 would how that would alter or affect that.
02:11:35 that. Was the racial dimension a reason for paying particular attention to the Lawrenes?
02:11:39 Lawrenes? No.
02:11:50 Did you get a sense that reputational damage on a racial ground, at least from those more senior to you in the MPS, was a reason why the SDS was taking a
02:12:01 a reason why the SDS was taking a particular interest in the Lawrence family's actions? No.
02:12:05 No. Do you um accept that there was intrusive reporting on the Lawrence family themselves? Uh I think [clears throat] it comes back to what I said earlier that as we look at it now it would it would seem the
02:12:18 at it now it would it would seem the case if we went back with with with hindsight with the knowledge that I have now. Um yes at the time I think the officers reporting it felt everything
02:12:29 officers reporting it felt everything was relevant. We had to create a complete picture.
02:12:34 Um just dealing then finally before we break for the morning with the McFersonson inquiry. Uh in February 1999, the McFersonson [clears throat] inquiry report was published and its
02:12:46 inquiry report was published and its defining conclusion was that institutionalized racism existed in the Metropolitan Police Service. And that was defined as a the collective failure of an organization to provide an
02:12:57 of an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their color, culture, or ethnic origin through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping.
02:13:08 and racist stereotyping. It also found that the initial investigation suffered from a succession of fundamental errors and that there were failures of leadership and mistreatment of the Lawrenes and Dwayne Brooks as victims. Can you recall that
02:13:20 Brooks as victims. Can you recall that um report and that particular conclusion being the subject of conversation? Yes, it was. Yes, I do. And and what sort of views were being expressed about it? Well, I think on different levels
02:13:33 Well, I think on different levels obviously it depends who you spoke to, but yeah, of course there was I would say
02:13:38 say The first reaction was people people misunderstood what McFersonen was saying and everybody you know felt I'm not a racist. You know every officer 27,000 officers in in the
02:13:51 every officer 27,000 officers in in the Met I should imagine most of them thought well you know I'm not racist. Why are we being only when they realized that actually we're talking about the institution and the structures and the outcomes of of of those processes. I
02:14:04 outcomes of of of those processes. I think then when that but there was an acceptance. Yes, you got it absolutely right.
02:14:11 right. Um,
02:14:12 Um, John Grieve, who was the DAC, I think at the time, um, in his witness statement, we don't need to bring it up, but just for reference, it's MPS0749658
02:14:22 at paragraph 46 at pages 29 and 30 of his statement. He states that there were people who [snorts] didn't like that he had accepted the allegation of institutional racism and that he was receiving hate mail internally and
02:14:34 receiving hate mail internally and externally and was called a traitor by some officers. Were you aware of that type of attitude at the time? Is that what you were just referring to? Not in my immediate um you know sort of network. the officers around me know I
02:14:46 network. the officers around me know I mean I think there was I could say every officer that I was aware of we we just accepted yes got it badly badly wrong for many many years going back to
02:14:57 for many many years going back to scarman in fact do you think that racist attitudes affected how special branch and later SDS managers and officers approached black people and black justice campaigns
02:15:09 black people and black justice campaigns including assumptions that they were more likely to be criminal violent or disorderly No. Um, did such attitudes affect how the Lawrence family um were perceived by the
02:15:21 Lawrence family um were perceived by the special?
02:15:22 special? I didn't accept I didn't accept that. No.
02:15:25 No. Um, were those attending the Lawrence family home supporting the family or campaigning on their behalf assumed to be a public order threat? No. Were
02:15:38 No. Were you ever aware of any discussions about disclosing the SDS's activities in terms of reporting uh on the Lawren's the Lawrence um family campaign and the McFersonson inquiry to the McFersonson
02:15:50 McFersonson inquiry to the McFersonson inquiry
02:15:50 inquiry to the McFersonen inquiry on the family itself? No.
02:15:55 No. Were you were you aware of any discussions about disclosing the SDS activities in terms of reporting on them to the McFersonen? Sorry. No.
02:16:06 Sorry. No. Um, do you consider their reporting that activities ought to have been disclosed to the McFersonson inquiry?
02:16:16 That's difficult for me to say. I'm sure that's at a more senior sort of policy strategic level, but um again with benefit of hindsight probably yes, but probably at the time we we would have
02:16:29 probably at the time we we would have argued we're just looking out for public order.
02:16:32 order. Thank you. Sir, is that a convenient moment for a break? Certainly. Um, we have a 15minute break uh in in the middle of each session. Now is the time.
02:34:43 Thank you, sir. [clears throat] Um, before I move on, I just want to go back to one document and ask you another couple of questions about it, please, if I may. It's MPS0748392.
02:34:55 Um this is the detailed report that you wrote um on um Steven Lawrence campaign and associated organizations
02:35:07 and
02:35:10 we could go to page two please. So there we see the first page of um the report there and you can see underneath
02:35:21 report there and you can see underneath the uh title it says this note is produced for the information of the commissioner of police DAC Grievant
02:35:32 commissioner of police DAC Grievant Thornton. It contains secret and delicate source material. There should be no downwards dissemination of this document without reference to the detective superintendent SO2 C squad. Do you see that? I do. Yes. Um I I wanted to ask you
02:35:45 I do. Yes. Um I I wanted to ask you about the circumstances in which you came to produce this report for that particular audience. Um do you recall who asked you to prepare this?
02:35:59 I I don't have any recollection of how I was asked. All I can say is that normally this would come down on a a request like on a minute sheet from uh
02:36:12 request like on a minute sheet from uh probably through chief superintendent C squad from I don't know in this case probably the commissioner's office or I don't know who superintendent Thornton is but um that would be the normal just
02:36:25 is but um that would be the normal just come down to the desk they say they want a a note on the campaign and its associated organizations and so to have recorded these particular three people um as being the report the
02:36:39 three people um as being the report the note to be produced for the information of those three. Yes.
02:36:42 Yes. You would have been asked specifically um
02:36:47 um to address this report to them. That wouldn't have been your choice. It would have been a request made to you. Is that right?
02:36:53 right? Yes. And you think because it is produced for the information of the commissioner of police, it was likely his office that had requested that down through the chain of command.
02:37:04 down through the chain of command. Yeah. I don't know that for fact, but there would be a reasonable assumption. Yes.
02:37:08 Yes. Thank you. And the sources you were working from in order to um produce this report, would that have included SDS reporting?
02:37:21 Yes. No reason why it wouldn't. No. And would you have known um which particular UCO for example would you have known if it was HN81 David Hagen's reporting that was being relied on
02:37:32 reporting that was being relied on at this stage? Uh not sure what the date was and when my knowledge was of um that individual. Well, this this report dated the 10th of
02:37:44 Well, this this report dated the 10th of September 1998. Um, I can't remember specifically, but it it it would have included the whole intelligence picture as we knew it,
02:37:55 intelligence picture as we knew it, which obviously would include SDS. I wouldn't know where specifically in SDS that come from. What other sources would you have been relying on to produce this particular report?
02:38:06 report? Well, as I said earlier, we get we get reporting from all all sorts. We can get reporting from uniform officers who've got picked up local information through um just normal community liaison. We
02:38:19 um just normal community liaison. We would have got information from um open source information uh might be publications, media reporting, local newspapers. It might be chis reporting
02:38:31 newspapers. It might be chis reporting either locally or in special branch if there were sources like that. So, a whole raft of sources. Um, do you recall if you received any
02:38:42 Um, do you recall if you received any feedback on in relation to this report once you'd submitted it? I don't know. No. Um,
02:38:50 Um, in relation to a report like this, would you have expected to receive um any kind of feedback from those you'd addressed it to, including the commissioner, or not?
02:38:59 not? Not necessarily. No. I think this obviously was quite an important document for us if it's being requested by the Metro Police, but we're also dealing with a myriad of threat assessments for other events that were
02:39:10 assessments for other events that were occurring at any particular time. So, we would have sent that off and be moving on to the to the next threat assessment or whatever. Okay, thank you. That can be taken down now. Thank you.
02:39:24 Um, I want to look at please MPS 0062785.
02:39:30 It's tab B85 of the bundle. Sir,
02:39:41 uh, and if we could go to page five, please.
02:39:49 Uh this is a report uh from HN 104 Carlos Saraki. Uh and uh we can see here that there was reporting included on the
02:40:01 that there was reporting included on the Socialist Party and the Demanes shooting campaign, the John Charles Demanz family camp family justice campaign. Um, does this report again demonstrate the view
02:40:12 this report again demonstrate the view that justice campaigns might be manipulated by groups from the far left here, the Socialist Party?
02:40:22 I think that's a fair assessment. Yes. And um, that was one of the things to look out for. And there's a further report MPS0065522
02:40:34 tab 88. It doesn't need to be shown on screen. That can be taken down. Um and that's reporting on a particular individual and the justice for Jean campaign and a mention recorded on the
02:40:45 campaign and a mention recorded on the 19th of April 2006. And then if we can just look at please MPS 0064378. It's a tab B87 of the bundle. And this
02:40:57 It's a tab B87 of the bundle. And this is a report dated the 22nd of November 2005.
02:41:02 2005. And if we can just enlarge the top half of the page please. Um so we see here that at number two information has been received relating to the shooting by
02:41:14 received relating to the shooting by police of John Charles de Mennez. A coalition to campaign for the end of the shoot tokill policy has been formed. And then the gist over the redacted section says that what's been redacted is
02:41:25 says that what's been redacted is further information includes address details and email address details. And then at the very bottom of the page, the information at two was not passed to the desk to prevent any danger of
02:41:37 desk to prevent any danger of unnecessary intrusion. So it seems that at least by this time in 2005 when this report was written, there was some recognition and understanding by SDS
02:41:49 recognition and understanding by SDS managers that justice campaigns involving police accountability raised obvious risks of disproportionate intrusion. Do you agree? I agree there. Yeah, but there were risks obviously. Yes.
02:42:01 risks obviously. Yes. And they those risks seem to be recognized here because the information that was that was personal um at the redacted section at two wasn't passed on
02:42:12 redacted section at two wasn't passed on was to to the desk as we see from the bottom of the note. Would you agree? So is this a SDS report? Sorry. Yeah. Okay.
02:42:20 Okay. Yes, I'd agree with that. Um but that wasn't something you recognized at the time. uh in your time at the SDS
02:42:31 at the SDS uh in terms of that campaigns involving police accountability raised obvious risks of disproportionate intrusion. Uh [groaning] I think there was always a um a risk and
02:42:45 I think there was always a um a risk and we were always treading a a fine line. So you know intelligence gathering is is risk assessment is is necessary part of that. Um
02:42:57 that. Um it may be that you know we were straying onto the wrong side at some point and it looks from here that somebody is I don't know who the author is obviously has has
02:43:09 know who the author is obviously has has brought it back to what we consider now to be the right side. Yes. Thank you. [snorts] Uh that can be taken down now. Thank you.
02:43:20 Uh, in your witness statement at paragraph 80b at page 32, you say that you may have been um HN18's handler for a short time before DAS Gilbertson took
02:43:31 a short time before DAS Gilbertson took um responsibility for him. Did you play any role in the decision that HN18 should infiltrate the international solidarity movement? No.
02:43:41 No. Whose decision would that have been? Uh
02:43:47 I would be guessing so probably not a good thing to do but I would imagine uh Ron Gilbertson would have been part of the process and and DC I think may have covered that
02:43:58 and and DC I think may have covered that I don't know. Was the choice of DS Gilbertson to take over um from you as HN18's handler due to his work um on the Palestinian desk?
02:44:09 to his work um on the Palestinian desk? Do you know? Well on on Equad. Yes. Yeah. Um, did you ever discuss with um, DS Gilbertson his views on Islamic extremism in relation to advocacy for Palestinian rights?
02:44:23 to advocacy for Palestinian rights? If I did, I can't remember, but it's it's not the sort of thing we would discuss generally. I think we were just aware that post 911 there was there was a demand to to get intelligence, you
02:44:34 a demand to to get intelligence, you know, beyond just domestic extremism. Was there a view that the Palestinian issue was starting to become associated with Islamic fundamentalism?
02:44:45 with Islamic fundamentalism? I can't remember now. Sorry. Um I want to look at um HN18's um performance development review please that um you undertook. The document is
02:44:57 that um you undertook. The document is MPS 0031990 at tab B69 of the bundle.
02:45:13 Um this is a performance development review that um on the 8th of March 2004 um you've you've signed um the document in the relevant place. Um it records um
02:45:25 in the relevant place. Um it records um if we go over the page please
02:45:31 um and again
02:45:37 it records there at the top um box objectives for the coming year. Do you see that? And it says develop with DSP's a long-term targeting strategy for Operation Morocco. Do you recall what
02:45:50 Operation Morocco. Do you recall what Operation Morocco was? No, I obviously wrote that, but there's no recollection of what that meant. Um, so you wouldn't have um any
02:46:01 Um, so you wouldn't have um any you won't be able to help us with why there was a need to develop a long-term targeting strategy for it. [laughter] Um, not after all these years. No. Um,
02:46:13 Um, it seems that um all of the boxes in this um performance development review are ticked as two, which means competent. um with no particular uh comment associated with them. Um were
02:46:28 comment associated with them. Um were these reviews essentially a tickbox exercise?
02:46:32 exercise? No.
02:46:33 No. So um what was done to evaluate HN18's um performance, actual performance? uh whenever we were doing um
02:46:46 uh whenever we were doing um performance reviews, we would obviously know the officer quite well. We would know, you know, what their performance had been personally. So, we were able to to to
02:46:57 personally. So, we were able to to to comment accordingly. Um this one I can't I haven't seen. Can you show me the Yeah, if you go over the page again
02:47:15 I think let's let's see what is one and what is two? I can't remember. Three. Well, we know that um two is is deemed
02:47:26 Well, we know that um two is is deemed competent. Okay.
02:47:29 Okay. So I mean that reflects my judgment at the time. He was competent in those qualities that we were assessing. And h how would you how would you perform that assessment? Um again because you're working closely
02:47:42 Um again because you're working closely with him. You're receiving his reports. You're
02:47:46 You're meeting with him regularly. You're attending meetings where he's present. So you would understand what he's producing and how he's producing it. So
02:47:58 producing and how he's producing it. So what his performance is. So it grade grade it accordingly.
02:48:04 Um thank you. That can be taken down.
02:48:09 Uh in your witness statement at paragraph 186 C at page 78, you say in relation to Mr. Atif Chowry that you have no particular knowledge of him, but
02:48:21 have no particular knowledge of him, but activists who had been assessed as having the potential to cause serious disorder would be monitored. Um, we know that there was extensive personal reporting by HN18 on Mr. Chowdery AC
02:48:33 reporting by HN18 on Mr. Chowdery AC across the period of management by you, albeit that you may not have have always been his handler. Um, were you unaware of that reporting um on
02:48:46 were you unaware of that reporting um on him at the time or would you have known about it?
02:48:49 about it? I have no recollection of that whatsoever. Um, has Ron Gillson taken over at this point? Do we know or um I think well the the reporting spans
02:49:01 um I think well the the reporting spans a um a a period of time. Um and for some of that period certainly DS Gilbertson was likely to have taken over from you
02:49:12 over from you which might explain why I I have no knowledge. Rom was considered the expert in this area. So we've very much left for him to get on and address that. So,
02:49:23 for him to get on and address that. So, and would would that reporting have been discussed at the weekly meetings? Probably if there was intelligence of of relevance.
02:49:35 relevance. There's various reporting that's very personal on him in relation to his girlfriend, in relation to his family and their employment, and in relation to um his company um which imported
02:49:48 um his company um which imported Palestinian olive oil, Zetun. Um do you now accept that that reporting is inappropriate given its personal nature?
02:49:59 inappropriate given its personal nature? I can only sound like the record from earlier that you know the reporting then with the officers were encouraged to report as much as possible. It it may well now with hindsight strayed into
02:50:11 well now with hindsight strayed into areas where they shouldn't have done but I think at the time our thinking was we need the full picture. Um, given that you didn't have any
02:50:22 Um, given that you didn't have any particular knowledge of him, um, how how do you say that he was an activist who had been assessed as having the potential to cause serious disorder such that he needed monitoring?
02:50:33 that he needed monitoring? Sorry, did I say that in the statement? You did. Yes, it's paragraph 186 C at page 78.
02:50:48 I can only assume that was that's mistaken. I've just Sorry, what paragraph again? 186 C at page 78. So I have no
02:50:59 186 C at page 78. So I have no particular knowledge of a teeth chowry, but activists who had been assessed as having the potential to cause serious disorder would be monitored. I think that's just a general observation. I think that's in particular to any individual or
02:51:11 particular to any individual or it's not a view you formed personally about him in particular. No, perhaps that was clumsily written. Um, you were HN118's handler and he reported erroneously uh
02:51:23 handler and he reported erroneously uh on Mr. Chowry as being a leading light of the international solidarity movement. Um, how were you not aware of his reporting if you were his handler? Because I can't remember. Sorry.
02:51:34 Because I can't remember. Sorry. Okay.
02:51:37 Okay. Um if we could look at please MPS 00031 940.
02:51:44 940. Um this isn't in um your bundle but it is in HN118's bundle at tab C 285. And if we can look please at paragraph 4
02:51:56 And if we can look please at paragraph 4 on page one. This is a report uh on globalized resistance and it then says at this paragraph, these ismemmers,
02:52:08 says at this paragraph, these ismemmers, the international solidarity movement uh and a small core have recently returned uh from Gaza independent activists are extremely radical in outlook. Perhaps
02:52:19 extremely radical in outlook. Perhaps not surprisingly, as many of them have spent considerable periods of time in the Bilasa refugee camp and Gaza and other areas of the occupied territories. direct action is in their blood and if they get organized they would become a
02:52:31 they get organized they would become a potent new force on the London activist scene. Do you think you were aware of this report given you were HN118's handler?
02:52:40 handler? I was his handler but I have no recollection of that reporting at all. Um
02:52:47 Um the language there used extremely radical and um in their blood. Um, is that a language influenced by a discriminatory perception in relation to
02:52:58 discriminatory perception in relation to Palestinians and Muslims?
02:53:02 I don't think so. I could think that term could be used for for anybody. You wouldn't have considered giving feedback on this report to HM118
02:53:13 feedback on this report to HM118 that um he had a racial bias in this reporting. If I thought he had, I would guess,
02:53:20 guess, but not in relation to this report. If you think this language is appropriate, he's talking about direct action. I don't think he's talking about any particular
02:53:32 particular um
02:53:34 um ethnic quality. Is he talking about the group or the the activists themselves? The activists themselves described as extremely radical in outlook and direct action is in their blood.
02:53:47 and direct action is in their blood. Um, I think is perhaps just a careless phrase.
02:53:52 phrase. Um, I don't think it's it's uh anything more than more than that really.
02:54:07 HN118 um commented on that there was a benefit to the UK in actively collaborating in intelligence sharing with other national police authorities. Did you understand
02:54:18 police authorities. Did you understand part of his role was gathering information which could be shared with Israeli state authorities? No, I have no knowledge of that.
02:54:32 And would you have understood that the maintenance of the UK's relationship with Israel formed part of the SDS function or his tasking? Not that I was aware of. No.
02:54:46 What policing purpose did HN118's reporting which didn't involve um ISM London activists but involved ISM Palestine serve? It couldn't be a public
02:54:58 Palestine serve? It couldn't be a public order purpose relating to policing London, could it? Uh,
02:55:03 Uh, at this stage, I don't know. It may have been, not knowing the fuller context, there may have been some relevance, but unless I have the fuller context, I I can't really comment. Thank you. That can be taken down.
02:55:17 Thank you. That can be taken down. Um, I want to move on to HN18. um Robert Hastings arrest uh on the 11th of September 2007. He was arrested at the DSEI Arms Fair
02:55:31 He was arrested at the DSEI Arms Fair demonstration at the XL Center and was subsequently charged with aggravated trespass and released on bail to attend Stratford Magistrate's Court on the 21st of September 2007.
02:55:42 of September 2007. Do you recall that? I do.
02:55:45 I do. Um, you deal with this in paragraph 259A of your witness statement at page 108. And you say that you were the duty officer that weekend, which is why you
02:55:56 officer that weekend, which is why you would have been contacted by him and told of his arrest. And you say you can't recall uh specific details. Um if we uh look at NPS 0076134.
02:56:11 Um if we uh look at NPS 0076134. So tab B 108 of the bundle uh at page 8 please.
02:56:22 This is the operational direction for DC Hastings HN18. And it appears um there that you were contacted at about 11:30 at night on
02:56:36 contacted at about 11:30 at night on Tuesday the 11th of September. Is that your recollection? Yes.
02:56:40 Yes. Um what was your role in supervising him as duty cover officer um before he was arrested in relation to this particular protest?
02:56:51 protest? As duty officer, I would have had no particular involvement in his role. That would have been a cover officer. Um, I would be I would have been briefed as the duty officer that that out of hours
02:57:04 the duty officer that that out of hours he's involved in a a demonstration or something of that nature. So, I would just have an awareness that, you know, I've got the phone, I may be contacted. And again, at paragraph 259A, page 108
02:57:17 And again, at paragraph 259A, page 108 of your witness statement, you you say that he'd been advised and briefed by you on the previous day, Monday the 10th of September. um as per this document and specifically
02:57:28 and specifically um the the entry on the 12th of September 2007 you say I reminded him not to act outside his authorization and to maintain a passive role. This would have been part of the risk assessment.
02:57:40 have been part of the risk assessment. He would have known to only act within the authorization he had been given which he was reminded of. So what was the limit of his his authorization so far as participation in this pro protest
02:57:52 far as participation in this pro protest was so far as you were concerned? Well, as generally with with the UTOS, they were briefed that they weren't to get involved in crime unless they they'd already got um prior authority. There
02:58:04 already got um prior authority. There was a recognition obviously that there were circumstances where it's unavoidable. Um but they take all necessary action they can to not get involved. So to have an excuse, have an
02:58:17 involved. So to have an excuse, have an exit strategy if something does start to go wrong. So he might have been reminded of that um in those sort of terms. Um would you have told him not to get arrested?
02:58:28 arrested? To avoid arrest as much as possible or as best as possible? Um what [clears throat] was the purpose of his participation um in the protest? That I can't remember because um one he
02:58:41 That I can't remember because um one he wasn't my officer. um he was think at this stage he was wrong Gilbertson's. So
02:58:49 So I was just the conduit really when when there was a an issue that needed escalating. Um we can see from page seven of this document that his participation included
02:59:00 document that his participation included plans to socialize with activists um giving them dinner at his flat and staying overnight with them. What was the reason for that? I can't remember.
02:59:12 I can't remember. um all um intelligence potentially relevant to public order policing had been provided by Sunday the 9th of September, hadn't it? We can see at page
02:59:24 September, hadn't it? We can see at page seven. Um and it was already known that there would undoubtedly be a strong police presence at the protest. Right. So what was the public order policing benefit um for him to socialize
02:59:38 policing benefit um for him to socialize with activists, stay overnight with them and then participate in this protest? Um just so we have the intelligence from the inside as as to what their attentions could change at any any point and they could go off to do cause
02:59:50 and they could go off to do cause trouble somewhere else. So if we've got somebody on the inside then that gets useful intelligence. Um, HN72
02:59:58 Um, HN72 uh writes in his witness statement, we don't need to bring it up, but for reference, it's MPS0749345,
03:00:06 uh, paragraph 400 A, little I, page 184. Um, he says that you told him that Rob was locked on with his target group in
03:00:17 was locked on with his target group in the East End. Do you recall telling him that?
03:00:19 that? I don't know, sir. [clears throat] Do you Is locked on the sort of um, language you would use? No, I don't recognize it. I'm not exactly sure what it
03:00:28 it Do you know what it means? Locked on. No. Well, close to perhaps, but I'll be guessing. Um
03:00:44 and in terms of your um supervision of him following the briefing and and him attending the protest um did your supervision amount to waiting by the
03:00:55 supervision amount to waiting by the phone as duty officer? Yes.
03:00:59 Yes. And once you'd received um the phone call in relation to his arrest, what was your role in supervising him after that? Uh I can't remember specifically, but
03:01:12 Uh I can't remember specifically, but obviously I would be concerned what his arrangements were from that point onwards to presumably having a meeting with his cover officer or the DI at the earliest possible
03:01:26 or the DI at the earliest possible opportunity. But I I think effectively I can't remember the the set circumstances but the duty officer me on this occasion would normally sort of step back if if
03:01:37 would normally sort of step back if if the cover officer is is [clears throat] taking over or the DI becomes involved. So
03:01:44 So I can't add any more detail. Thank you. That can be taken down now. You you say at paragraph 259, page 108 of your witness statement that you told him not to declare himself to the
03:01:56 him not to declare himself to the custody sergeant. You say that that was because he may endanger him himself. It wasn't yet necessary as he'd not yet been charged and may not have been charged ultimately. Is that right?
03:02:07 charged ultimately. Is that right? Yes.
03:02:07 Yes. And you immediately for informed your DI HN72?
03:02:11 HN72? Yes. Um would you have expected um HN72 then to inform the DCI? Yes.
03:02:21 Yes. And if he'd done so, would you have expected the DCI to report it up the chain of command or would it stop at DCI?
03:02:29 DCI? Uh no, it would I would expect it to go up the up the chain at some point. There would be consultations obviously and and perhaps legal advice depending on how things were progressing. Um, and to what
03:02:40 things were progressing. Um, and to what sort of level would you expect it to go up?
03:02:43 up? Uh,
03:02:45 Uh, I mean once it got to DCI, I'm not involved anymore. So, what conversations would be had? It would I'm think certainly would go to the head of the squad. So, in this case, E squad.
03:02:59 the squad. So, in this case, E squad. Um, I think yes, that mean the head of the squad would want to know an officer's been arrested one of the events that they're gathering intelligence on. So certainly up up to I would say squad chief superintendent.
03:03:10 would say squad chief superintendent. Okay. Um you said that you think your involvement in the matter cease because it was probably passed back to HN30 who was HN18's cover officer. Is that right?
03:03:21 was HN18's cover officer. Is that right? I I I assume that would be the process. Yes. Um, we know that he was subsequently charged and you go on to say in your witness statement that you don't know if there would have been time
03:03:34 don't know if there would have been time for his cover officer or the DI to intervene prior to him being charged. Um, we know also that HN72 was um removed from the unit after this and you
03:03:47 removed from the unit after this and you say uh in your witness statement at paragraph 261C at page 110 that you think the arrest may have presented DCI Flood who had a poor working relationship with HN72
03:03:59 relationship with HN72 an opportunity to remove him. And you also hold a suspicion that DCI flood and detective superintendent McKini used this as an excuse to close the SDS. Why
03:04:12 this as an excuse to close the SDS. Why is it you think that? Again, I'm uncomfortable talking about this because it does sound a bit like sort of office gossip because I've got no facts to back this up. But just
03:04:24 no facts to back this up. But just knowing that my assessment and I think the assessment of others on on the unit for instance were had a consciousness that there was going
03:04:35 had a consciousness that there was going to be the unit was probably going to be closed down that and you know the fact that I think there was quite viciferous arguments between 72 and either flood or
03:04:49 arguments between 72 and either flood or McKini I can't remember that my perception, nothing more than that, was that they've they found, oh, we've got a good opportunity here to either close
03:05:00 good opportunity here to either close the unit or to to to turn it into our own particular model, but I've got no facts to base that. Thank you. Um, I just want to look at um HN18's
03:05:11 HN18's reporting as you were his um cover officer. Um, could we have MPS 0073489?
03:05:20 um on the screen please. It's in HN118's bundle. Um
03:05:28 this is um a UCO ring who is HN118. Um it's entitled access document and it says at the very top in the first paragraph that it seeks to briefly
03:05:41 paragraph that it seeks to briefly detail the individuals and groups to which UCO Ringra has access for the purpose of intelligence reporting. Um, HN118 was asked about this in in
03:05:52 HN118 was asked about this in in evidence and accepted that throughout this document, uh,
03:05:58 uh, it was exaggerated in that, um, his level of access, uh, his level of of infiltration into the groups described was was exaggerated.
03:06:10 was was exaggerated. Um,
03:06:11 Um, did you do you know if you wrote this document as his cover officer, his handler? Uh,
03:06:19 I don't recognize the document. I don't even recognize the format to be honest. Um,
03:06:25 Um, do you recall seeing it at the time? No, I do know we were interested in the G8 in Germany. [clears throat] Uh, so we we I think we'd had a request.
03:06:38 Uh, so we we I think we'd had a request. Is there any intelligence on that? So, this report is probably, you know, part of that intelligence gathering plan. Uh, if Ring Wraith 118, sorry, says, um,
03:06:53 Uh, if Ring Wraith 118, sorry, says, um, it's exaggerated, then I obviously accept that. He's a, you know, I've got every respect for him. Um, which makes me think I didn't write it
03:07:04 which makes me think I didn't write it because I've worked closely with him. I would have would have known. So, this may be some third party writing. I It seems strange. I know. As his handler though, wouldn't you have
03:07:15 As his handler though, wouldn't you have seen if it's not your document, wouldn't you have seen it at the time? I should have done. Yes. And um [clears throat] how do you think this this document came to give such an exaggerated account of of the level of
03:07:28 exaggerated account of of the level of access he had in relation to these groups when those in the group say they barely knew him in some cases? That's a very good question. Um,
03:07:38 it would be helpful. I knew who the author was. Obviously, um, if one of the other cover officers had been asked to write a note very urgently
03:07:50 been asked to write a note very urgently or something of a nature, they might have just got a quick verbal um, update or something. I I I honestly, you know, I'm struggling to understand
03:08:01 you know, I'm struggling to understand because if 118 and I were trying to provide an intelligence assessment overview, um we would have discussed it. I would have you run it past him. I would have had
03:08:13 you run it past him. I would have had the knowledge probably any any case. So this seems a sort of rather random document that somebody may have produced
03:08:24 document that somebody may have produced urgently might have got a phone call say we need something on this without really consultation but I'm I'm guessing if it's prepared by someone in the SDS back office a manager
03:08:36 back office a manager or supervisor given um HN118's evidence that it's um wholly exaggerated that represents a failure in oversight of and supervision
03:08:48 failure in oversight of and supervision of of him, doesn't it, that this document comes to be created in such exaggerated form. [clears throat] I agree absolutely. I'd like to see where, you know, where it's exaggerated
03:09:00 where, you know, where it's exaggerated to what degree. I mean, it's obviously a general overview. Um,
03:09:04 Um, well, it describes, for example, on the first page in in relation to the descent network, excellent, comprehensive, and in-depth access to the remnants of the UK descent network. Um yeah,
03:09:15 yeah, he has accepted that his level of access to groups is exaggerated throughout this document.
03:09:22 document. Well, I think we may well come on to it, but but the Glenn Eagles G8 2005 descent network he was he was he was part of. So I mean that's reasonable to say unless he's um misunderstood. He was
03:09:36 he's um misunderstood. He was uh involved. The UK descent network is not
03:09:42 not such an organized structure. It's a group of activists from all over who sort of go under a banner. So, it's difficult to say what your access is because you'd need to know there was a
03:09:53 because you'd need to know there was a structure, a hierarchy, that type of thing. Weren't there like a bunch of anarchists or extreme leftwing activists? So, your access may depend on
03:10:04 activists? So, your access may depend on what part of the network you're in. So I think if I'd written that I would have perhaps explained it that way. So in relation to that could be taken down. Thank you. In relation to um HM118's um
03:10:17 Thank you. In relation to um HM118's um cheers authorization document um your name um appears um in that as as the handler um officer. Um again, HM118
03:10:30 handler um officer. Um again, HM118 accepted um that his CHIS authorization um was exaggerated in terms of um overexaggerating what access he had to his um groups that he was targeting. Um
03:10:43 his um groups that he was targeting. Um what role did you have in providing information for CHIS authorization documents for HN118? Was it you who wrote them up? It would be normally. Yes. And where did you get that information
03:10:55 And where did you get that information from? Was it solely from HM118? If it was his Yes. for his authorization. Yes. So again, [snorts] if he was exaggerating and you included that
03:11:06 exaggerating and you included that exaggerated account in a cheers authorization document, um that represents a failure in supervision of him in that you didn't realize that's what you were doing. If that's what happened, then yes, I
03:11:18 If that's what happened, then yes, I accept that. [laughter] So that would then the consequence of that would mean that the authorization itself was based on misleading information. If that was true, yes. Thank you. Um I'd like to move on then
03:11:32 Thank you. Um I'd like to move on then um to the tradecraftraft manual. Um, you deal with this at paragraph 150, page 64, uh, of your witness statement and you say, "I was aware of a
03:11:44 and you say, "I was aware of a tradecraftraft manual in the office which I understood to be a combination of general guidance, best practice, and regulations during my initial briefings on the SDS. I would have been told about it, although I cannot recall this
03:11:56 it, although I cannot recall this explicitly because I became familiar with it."
03:12:00 with it." uh tradecraft was part of our bread and butter and cover officers would have been required to know tradecraftraft issues just as much as the UCOs's. The manual contained both binding rules and general guidance and I do not recall
03:12:12 general guidance and I do not recall specifically its contents but the contents generally covered how to deal with tradecraftraft issues. So, so far as you recall, you would have read this
03:12:23 as you recall, you would have read this manual um when you joined the SDS as a Yes. I mean, it would have been normal to to have read it. I have to say it was never considered as an authoritative
03:12:36 never considered as an authoritative document. I mean, the way it's even put together was was like musings, you know, um of different officers. There was no structure, as far as I can remember, to it. Um, so it's the sort of thing we we
03:12:51 it. Um, so it's the sort of thing we we look at, but I don't think it was what what drove the SDS in terms of tradecraftraft. It was just something it looked to me, if I remember, as as individual officers who sat down and
03:13:03 individual officers who sat down and thought, "Oh, that might be useful. I'll put that in and update it that way." But it was no structure. There was no one supervisor or manager in charge of it who was directing it. Um it was it's a
03:13:14 who was directing it. Um it was it's a loose assembly of documents put into one folder which from my memory was stuck in a you know in a in a cupboard out the way
03:13:23 way but it was important for you to be familiar with it because it was giving guidance to the UCOs who you were were supervising. Yeah.
03:13:30 Yeah. And were you told at the time or did you appreciate at the time that it contained guidance to UCOs about sexual liaison? only since I've read that on the inquiry.
03:13:41 inquiry. Um, were you involved in new UCO recruits training at all? Uh, yes, a couple of times. And would that have included instructing them to read the tradecraftraft manual?
03:13:53 them to read the tradecraftraft manual? [clears throat] Unfortunately, it may have done. Yes. Um, because it would be important for all new recruits to be familiar with the tradecraftraft guidance. Yes. Again, I don't think I would have
03:14:04 Yes. Again, I don't think I would have put a lot of weight on it. um would have you know here's here's some ideas some guys have written down you know have a look at it but I don't I would not have presented it as this is the definitive code of practice for SDS tradecraftraft
03:14:17 code of practice for SDS tradecraftraft despite the fact that that's what the introduction says yes I think it's I don't know how long ago it had been written but certainly the my view and I think others may shared a view was that it wasn't the
03:14:30 shared a view was that it wasn't the definitive codes of practice it was it was more almost discussion documents Can we have a look at it please? MPS0527597.
03:14:40 It's at tab B5 of the bundle. If we can look at pages 27 and 28 please.
03:14:55 So we see at paragraph 5.6.1 6.1 um under the heading sexual liaison. The thorny issue of romantic entanglements during a tour is the cause
03:15:07 entanglements during a tour is the cause of much soulsearching and concern. In the past, emotional ties to the opposition have happened and caused all sorts of difficulties including divorce, deception, and disciplinary charges.
03:15:19 deception, and disciplinary charges. While it is not my place to moralize one should try to avoid the opposite sex for as long as possible. And then if we look at paragraph 5.6.3, 6.3.
03:15:32 While you may try to avoid any sexual encounter, there may come a time your [clears throat] when your lack of interest may become suspicious. In these circumstances, you can either try to
03:15:43 circumstances, you can either try to introduce an appropriate male or female from your own relations or friends to meet the wearies on a few occasions or ask the officer if they can find an ex SDS operative to fill such a role. If you have no other option but to become
03:15:55 you have no other option but to become involved with a weary, you should try to have fleeting, disastrous relationships with individuals who are not important to your sources of information. So just looking at the language used here, it's
03:16:06 looking at the language used here, it's not prohibitive of sexual relationships, is it? It's permissive of them. It is. Yes. And it clearly contemplates sexual relationships in some circumstances, doesn't it? Such as it being necessary to maintain a UCO's cover.
03:16:19 to maintain a UCO's cover. That's what it says. Yes. And it certainly doesn't prohibit long-term relationships. And indeed, it doesn't prohibit any form of sexual activity with an with a non-activist, does it? That's I accept that's what it says.
03:16:31 That's I accept that's what it says. Yes.
03:16:31 Yes. Um, in fact, it encourages sexual liaison with people not important to the UCO sources, doesn't it? It does.
03:16:39 It does. And which would be consider a considered decision to enter into a deceitful sexual relationship with a chosen person.
03:16:47 person. Yes. and to manipulate that relationship to make sure it was fleeting and disastrous. That's what it says. Yes. Um you say at paragraph 224,
03:16:59 Um you say at paragraph 224, page 92 of your witness statement that um this was an old document that does not reflect the policy or my understanding of the policy at the time I was on the unit. Is that right?
03:17:11 I was on the unit. Is that right? That's correct. Um, so your evidence is that this section on sexual liaison liaison in the tradecraftraft manual had been superseded by the time you were in the
03:17:22 superseded by the time you were in the SDS.
03:17:23 SDS. Oh, great. Yes. And um was it had been superseded was that by DCI Dell's instruction express? Yes.
03:17:33 Yes. I'm going to come back to further details of that um in a moment. But if that's correct, um, giving the tradecraftraft manual to UCOs's to read or even having it available to read in
03:17:44 or even having it available to read in the office would have given the UCOs a confused picture of SDS management's attitude to sexual relationships, wouldn't it? Yes. It's a terrible mistake. It should not have been left there. It should have been shredded.
03:17:57 been shredded. Um, so
03:17:59 Um, so if you'd appreciated that contradictory advice having read this section of the the manual, um, what would you have done about it?
03:18:11 about it? I I would have shredded this. Yes, I would have got rid of it. And and why didn't you do you think if if you accept that you would have read it on arriving at the SDS?
03:18:24 I can't explain. I I would have read it, yes, but when I read it again since this choir, I was horrified. So whether I didn't read it dutifully, um I can't I
03:18:38 didn't read it dutifully, um I can't I can't recall obviously. Um but it should not have been there except that uh and it just did not reflect the culture at the time and the instructions as um DCL
03:18:51 the time and the instructions as um DCL had clearly laid down. It should have been got rid of and it shouldn't have been shown to any new officers. I think it was um if I had done that it was probably lazy.
03:19:03 probably lazy. Um
03:19:06 Um when were you first aware of the prohibition on sexual relationships undercover? Was it Was it clear from the outset of your time on the unit? It was. Um I
03:19:19 It was. Um I I'd worked with Mike Dell before. I I knew knew him well. So I knew his moral stance on things. I knew and I' have no
03:19:30 stance on things. I knew and I' have no doubt he would have when he briefing me on joining the unit, he would have made absolutely clear what the the boundaries are and that would have been quite clear to me.
03:19:39 to me. Um clear from him from him. Yes. Um so you would have understood from that express um prohibition that the SDS
03:19:52 express um prohibition that the SDS management acknowledged that there was a risk of of sexual relationships undercover because why why was a prohibition an express prohibition necessary otherwise? Yes. No except the you know there was a
03:20:04 Yes. No except the you know there was a risk. Yes.
03:20:09 And was that risk um of sexual relationships discussed openly amongst management in the SDS office? Not specifically to my recollection. No,
03:20:20 Not specifically to my recollection. No, there was there was an understanding. We all knew, you know, where we stood on the on the on these issues. Um the ECI Dell's direction to the UCOs.
03:20:33 Um the ECI Dell's direction to the UCOs. As I said, I'd come back to the details of that direction. Um, you recall him giving a direction to [clears throat] UCOs that sexual relationships in their undercover identity were not permitted.
03:20:46 undercover identity were not permitted. Um, when did when did he give that direction to UCOs?
03:20:52 Um, it may well have been before I joined. I can't remember unless you have a date. I know you talked about the plenary session. Um,
03:21:04 session. Um, I can't even remember if I was at the plenary session as such. I just knew from the outset. I mean, it it didn't really take Mike Dell to tell me. I mean, this is a breach of their their
03:21:15 mean, this is a breach of their their vetting if nothing else. You know, they were developed vetting officers. If they were to engage in an awful sex inappropriate sexual relationships, you know, that's that's a matter for the vetting officer as well to be to be
03:21:26 vetting officer as well to be to be informed. So, it's just not something that we would have um permitted. in terms of his direction to UCOs's in your witness statement at paragraph 89 C
03:21:37 your witness statement at paragraph 89 C at page 35 you say um at that interview and you're referring there to the for formal interview for recruitment of S of UCOs to the SDS DCI generally would be
03:21:50 UCOs to the SDS DCI generally would be the one who would lay down the law on the ethics of undercover policing as required by the SDS including criminal activities sexual relationships and drug taking. he would be quite clear on those
03:22:01 taking. he would be quite clear on those issues at this stage. So it was before even recruiting a UCO that that direction was given to them. Is that right?
03:22:10 right? That's right. I remember going to one Oh well that's a part of the recruitment process. I'm going to go on to talk about visiting at the family home but yes and so was was it also given in that
03:22:22 yes and so was was it also given in that meeting at the family home with the UCO's partner? Yeah, I can't remember who, but I remember specifically sitting with Mike Dell and and him telling um the female partner of whichever officer
03:22:36 the female partner of whichever officer it was that he considered the SDS had a contract with her and with the UCO, the and and if that contract was broken by the UCO,
03:22:50 if that contract was broken by the UCO, that the contract that we have with the partner would be to tell them that he was basically off the unit because of misbehavior or inappropriate conduct. So in what what DCI Dell [clears throat]
03:23:03 So in what what DCI Dell [clears throat] was telling both the UCO and their partner, would the partner have been uh have understood that there was indeed a risk of sexual relationships developing undercover?
03:23:14 undercover? I think that's a natural development of of anybody understanding how human beings operate. Did DCIDell um reiterate that
03:23:25 Did DCIDell um reiterate that prohibition at the beginning of each's deployment in training? He would have done. I can't remember specifically, but that's just that's the way he worked. He would. Yes.
03:23:37 way he worked. He would. Yes. So the prohibition was given on your evidence a number of times to to any given UCO before they deployed into the field. Is that right?
03:23:49 field. Is that right? I can't remember if it was a number of times. It's just it's it's just something that was understood by all. It was a prohibition. Now, how often that was said and in what context, I can't remember.
03:24:00 remember. Um, in your witness statement at paragraphs 108b and 115 at pages 47 um to 48 um you
03:24:13 to 48 um you um refer to legend assessments that can be taken down. Thank you. um where the a UCO's legend would be tested effectively in in the office before they deployed into the field. Do you recall that?
03:24:25 into the field. Do you recall that? Yes, vaguely. Um and
03:24:30 Um and why then wasn't there anything built into legends to prevent uh sexual relationships developing when the risk was so clearly being acknowledged by this express prohibition?
03:24:43 this express prohibition? Just because there was a risk didn't mean we wouldn't go ahead. Um it's not a riskfree environment. We would expect the officers and majority of them did
03:24:54 the officers and majority of them did build into their legends reasons for not getting engaged in relationships left to the officer
03:25:05 left to the officer in consultation with the with the cover officer probably in terms of developing right well if if this happens I'm going to have um you know I've had a
03:25:17 to have um you know I've had a um a fallout or something with a a previous partner. I've been, you know, hurt emotionally, you know, I just just, you know, something of that nature. I
03:25:28 you know, something of that nature. I mean, yes, it would be left largely to the officer because he knows his network, his situation to think to come up with some strategy that was relevant to his situation to to avoid those sort
03:25:40 to his situation to to avoid those sort of situations. Um, this this is what we expected. Obviously, it failed on occasions. Isn't that a management failure also? Yes.
03:25:49 Yes. That that mitigation the mitigation should have been put in place more specifically by management. Yes.
03:25:58 Yes. Um in your witness statement um at paragraph 115 you say the mechanism put in place to mitigate this risk was a clear prohibition on doing so from the SDS management. There were clear
03:26:09 SDS management. There were clear instructions from the outset of their deployment that it was not allowed. That mitigation clearly was completely inadequate with the benefit of hindsight, wasn't it? In in certain cases, it was. Yes. Um, did DCI Dell reiterate the
03:26:24 Um, did DCI Dell reiterate the prohibition at any time throughout a UCO's deployment or was it only at the beginning? He
03:26:31 He I I can't recall. He may have done personally, you know, one to one when speaking to the officer or something because there's a reason for it to to have come up. He might have said at a meeting. I just I just can't recall but
03:26:42 meeting. I just I just can't recall but it might have come up at a week meeting culturally if you like within the organization it just was it was a no no go area.
03:26:51 go area. Were inquiries ever made of any UCOs as to whether this had become an issue for them individually? Uh not in my experience. You you didn't make any
03:27:03 You you didn't make any any sort of inquiries of UCOs as to whether they were having um an issue with arrest sexual relationship. Um,
03:27:13 Um, no I I have thought about this quite a lot is you know what should be the supervisory approach in these circumstances and
03:27:25 and I struggle to come up with an answer to it to be honest. Um my approach and I can only speak for myself is one really as I said earlier I think of of trust and observe. Now
03:27:36 think of of trust and observe. Now that's not blind trust. I just see trust as part of the supervision in that, you know, an officer is more likely to either open up, share, but also, you
03:27:48 either open up, share, but also, you know, give indicators if if I can have a [snorts] relationship with them, you know, where I can see them when they're relaxed, when they're not on the defensive, if I then [clears throat]
03:27:59 defensive, if I then [clears throat] turn around and say, "Shan, how are you?" I'm all right. Um, you know, what you up to at the moment? Oh, not much. How are you? All right. I said, "Are you having an affair with an
03:28:10 said, "Are you having an affair with an activist?" He say, "What?" I said, "Are you having an affair with an activist?" He would say, "Well, no, of course not." And then, you know, I think the trust
03:28:22 And then, you know, I think the trust would have been undermined. I' I envision a situation where, you know, I've got this in my mind. that I've I've said this to him when he's at
03:28:33 I've I've said this to him when he's at home and his wife and children are are out somewhere and they've come back and then he's he's there looking a bit shocked