Opening Statements - MPS Wrongdoing Acknowledgment

Full transcript

00:25:19 Good afternoon, Mr. Skelton.

00:25:32 Can Mr. Skelton be heard? Can he hear us? Yes.

00:25:35 Yes. Can you Can you hear me? Yes. Thank you. I can. I'm very sorry. I I I was seeking to indicate but by the shortest possible method that uh now is your turn to make the your opening statement. Thank you sir.

00:25:50 Thank you sir. Sir um as in charge 2 on behalf of the MPS um I wish to acknowledge from the outset the serious wrongdoing by some UCOs and the serious mismanagement by

00:26:01 UCOs and the serious mismanagement by SDS and special branch managers during the tranch 3 period judged not in hindsight but by the standards that should have prevailed at the time. I'm so I'm going to focus today on the

00:26:12 I'm so I'm going to focus today on the seven failings examined in detail in the MPS's written opening statement. Uh, first managers in the SDS special branch and the MPS should not have allowed UCOs to secretly obtain and

00:26:26 allowed UCOs to secretly obtain and report information on the intentions and activities of family justice or police

00:26:39 activities of family justice or police accountability campaigns or information about individual family members. They presented no risk of criminality or public disorder. On the contrary, campaigns such as that by Steven Lawrence's family actively sought to distance themselves from violent groups and discouraged public disorder.

00:26:51 and discouraged public disorder. in so far as senior MPS officers had legitimate concerns about a lack of trust between the police and minority ethnic communities or about public disorder associated with justice

00:27:03 disorder associated with justice campaigns. Having seen, for example, how the Nation of Islam forcibly disrupted the hearings in the Steven Lawrence inquiry on the 29th and 30th of June 1998, they did not warrant the deployment of UCOs.

00:27:16 deployment of UCOs. Instead, the MPS's efforts and resources should have been spent on using non-intrusive methods to engage more with community forums and other forms of local liaison, properly resourcing the

00:27:32 local liaison, properly resourcing the prevent prevention and investigation of racist violence and repairing the rel relationship between the police and minority ethnic communities. So the contemporaneous document suggests that reporting on family justice campaigns including information about Baroness Dorian Lawrence and Dr. Neville

00:27:50 Baroness Dorian Lawrence and Dr. Neville Lawrence AB was known to senior officers in special branch and the MPS although there is no basis for concluding that any information about them was gathered for the purpose of smearing them in the public eye as has been alleged by former UCO DC Peter Francis.

00:28:03 UCO DC Peter Francis. The inquiry will in due course hear from those senior officers and the SCS's managers as to precisely what they knew and whether they authorized such reporting or as they should have done questioned its appropriateness.

00:28:16 questioned its appropriateness. However, it is clear that there was a collective failure to exercise ethical

00:28:27 collective failure to exercise ethical judgment about the purpose of undercover policing and the propriety of reporting on family justice campaigns. This is reflective of of an us against them culture that prevailed within the MPS at that time which didn't properly distinguish between legitimate intelligence targets such as groups

00:28:38 intelligence targets such as groups committed to inciting serious public disorder and illegitimate targets such as grieving black and Asian families who are complaining about injustice and the actions of the police.

00:28:50 actions of the police. It also demonstrates a failure of corporate governance within the MPS and special branch whose most senior

00:29:02 special branch whose most senior officers oversaw that culture and should have exercised the power to change it. The MPS sincerely apologizes to the family of Steven Lawrence, Dwayne Books, Obie, the family of Ricky Real, and the

00:29:13 Obie, the family of Ricky Real, and the other individuals, families, and family members who were the subject of this improper reporting during the T3 period. So a second, sexual relationships. As the MPS said at the start of trans 2,

00:29:26 As the MPS said at the start of trans 2, the sexual relationships entered into by SDS UCOs were a gross violation of privacy and human rights. They were abusive, deceitful, manipulative, and wrong. The MPS apologizes again

00:29:41 wrong. The MPS apologizes again unreservably to the individuals whose lives have been and continue to be affected.

00:29:43 affected. Further, as the NPS said in its

00:29:50 Further, as the NPS said in its preliminary closing statement at the end of tranch 2, sexual relationships and the poor management that facilitated them were unacceptable even by the standards of any time and amounted to serious failings. Each such relationship would constitute discreditable

00:30:04 would constitute discreditable discreditable conduct and should have been the subject to a proper disciplinary process. The knowledge of the managers of the SDS and more senior officers about these relationships is a matter for phase three and the topic will be considered

00:30:17 three and the topic will be considered in more detail then. However, there is considerable evidence that managers within the SDS and special branch during the phase one and T3 period either knew

00:30:28 the phase one and T3 period either knew or should have known or of at least some of the relationships that occurred. Their attitude to sexual relationships is exemplified by the guidance given to

00:30:40 is exemplified by the guidance given to UCOs's in the 1995 tradecraftraft manual which was inadequate, misguided, sexist and offensive. It demonstrated a complete disregard for the sexual autonomy of the individuals who were being deceived into sexual relationships and the emotional and psychological

00:30:53 and the emotional and psychological consequences of that deception on them. Instead, its self-serving focus was on the unwelcome serious consequences for the UCOs themselves. It was also

00:31:04 the UCOs themselves. It was also predicated on the false premise that it will be the UCO civilian targets and their associates who will want and initiate sexual relationships rather than the UCOs themselves. This allowed and encouraged UCOs to abregate

00:31:15 and encouraged UCOs to abregate responsibility for their own predatory actions.

00:31:18 actions. So it is the result of the efforts of many of the women who were deceived into sexual relationships by UCOs in the SDS and the national public order unit um that senior police officers in the

00:31:32 um that senior police officers in the MPS and other police services would now be expected to recognize sexual misconduct as an abuse of power and to understand the significant effects that it has on the people who are manipulated and deceived. It is a matter of deep regret that such recognition and

00:31:44 regret that such recognition and understanding was not part of the prevailing culture within the MPS during the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, no consideration was given at that time, as

00:31:57 consideration was given at that time, as it would now be today, to contacting the individual women to inform them that they had been deceived.

00:32:04 So third, during the T3P3 period, senior special branch and SDS managers repeatedly failed to ensure that the activities of the UCOs were compliant with the obligations of the Home Office

00:32:17 with the obligations of the Home Office 1986 consolidated circular to the police to the police on crime and kindred matters. Sorry, I should say the whole of the T3 period and the applicable SDS policies which included prohibitions against actively engaging in and

00:32:28 against actively engaging in and committing crimes and against misleading the courts in any subsequent legal proceedings. Examples of this are set out in the MPS's written opening statement. They include DCHN26's

00:32:40 statement. They include DCHN26's participation in an Animal Liberation Front action in 1998, which involved trespassing on Crowill Mink Farm near Ringwood, Hampshire, and releasing between 3,000 and 6,000 m into the

00:32:52 between 3,000 and 6,000 m into the countryside. They also include the arrest of several UCOs in their undercover identities. None of these incidents were handled by the SDS's management in accordance with the Home

00:33:03 management in accordance with the Home Office circular or the policies then in operation and several of them involved misleading a court which was wholly improper. It should have been obvious to the senior police officers aware of those arrests that they mustn't be managed in any way that involved misleading a court and that in many

00:33:17 misleading a court and that in many cases decisions about disclosure were required.

00:33:20 required. Evidence about these issues will be heard in phase three. Sir fourth in TR three there was a general failure on the part of the SCS's management to impose discipline on UCOs

00:33:34 management to impose discipline on UCOs officers who behaved unprofessionally or dishonestly were not subject to misconduct proceedings and there was no proper recognition that their lack of professionalism and integrity created security risks which made them unsuitable for further sensitive work

00:33:46 unsuitable for further sensitive work within special branch or elsewhere in the MPS. This led to a culture in which misconduct was tolerated wrongly in order to protect the continuation of the secret work of the unit. And as set out

00:33:58 secret work of the unit. And as set out in the MPS's written opening statement, the handling of DS Thompson's misconduct exemplifies this failure.

00:34:10 So fifth, the use of deceased person's identities. In November 1994, the SCS ended regular use of the identities of deceased individuals to form false undercover identities. The prompt for this change

00:34:21 identities. The prompt for this change was the advent of computerized birth and death records in the 1990s. However, the method used by the SDS after 1994 could

00:34:32 method used by the SDS after 1994 could and should have been used earlier if the SDS's managers had considered the ethical propriety of using deceased persons identities. The MPS wishes to repeat the apologies

00:34:44 The MPS wishes to repeat the apologies it made at the end of tranch one and the start of tranch 2 and to extend those apologies to the families of the people whose identities were used by SDS officers in tranch 3. I'll quote the MPS accepts that the managers of the SDS

00:34:58 accepts that the managers of the SDS failed to recognize the hurt, distress, and anger that the use of deceased children's identities would cause the families of the children and the public concern that would result if the practice had been revealed. It apologizes unreservedly to the families

00:35:11 apologizes unreservedly to the families for this. It also wishes to acknowledge that their distress will have been compounded by the revelation that some SCS officers behaved indefensively while using their children's names.

00:35:23 using their children's names. So, as Mr. Bar has explained when DS Thompson was in special branch prior to joining the SDS, he obtained a copy of the birth certificate of a child Kevin

00:35:36 the birth certificate of a child Kevin Crossland who had died with his mother and sister in an airplane crash in Yugoslavia in 1966. After DS Thompson joined the SDS, he then used that birth certificate to obtain a driving license and to create a second false identity. There was no

00:35:53 second false identity. There was no justification whatsoever for the misuse of Kevin Crossland's name and identity in this way. As set out in the MPS's written statement, the MPS respects and supports the objectives of Lisa Crossland and Mark Crossland, Kevin

00:36:08 Crossland and Mark Crossland, Kevin Crossen's relatives, to get answers and accountability for why and how this happened.

00:36:15 So sixth, welfare of UCOs. By the early trunch 3 era, there was an increasing awareness both within special branch and in the wider intelligence community of the unique stresses and risks to mental health that could be

00:36:27 risks to mental health that could be caused by undercover work. Work was done to improve welfare for UCOs in the 1990s, but too often the operational security of the unit took priority and in general there was a failure to

00:36:39 in general there was a failure to recognize the significant psychological effects of undercover work, including the constant stress of living in a false identity. and for some the direct

00:36:50 identity. and for some the direct experience of physical violence or the chronic fear of being exposed and physically attacked. The MPS regrets that it took until 2001 to implement compulsory professional

00:37:04 to implement compulsory professional psychological rep um support in the unit which was one of the most important and effective welfare measures for serving and former UCOs. It acknowledges that some UCOs, including DC Francis and others, suffered significant psychological harm

00:37:16 suffered significant psychological harm as a result of their work and that more could and should have been done to prevent this.

00:37:24 So, seventh and finally, I turn to the spouses, partners, and families of the UCOs.

00:37:26 UCOs. Undercover deployments always placed great stress on UCOs and their spouses and families. This was particularly the case in the SDS whose deployments lasted

00:37:37 case in the SDS whose deployments lasted several years, far longer than routinely required of officers deployed in other fields. UCOs were required to work long hours away from home, living in their false identities every working day.

00:37:52 false identities every working day. Security risks and fear of exposure also led to some UCOs and their families having to undergo the upheaval of relocating their homes and lives to protect their and their families safety. However, the severity of the negative impact on spouses, partners, and

00:38:03 impact on spouses, partners, and families was contributed to by the SDS managers failure to provide sufficient support and psychological welfare, which exacerbated the mental stress suffered

00:38:16 exacerbated the mental stress suffered by some UCOs and thereby damaged their ability to readjust and function normally at home. The sexual infidelity of some of the UCOs also caused serious harm to their families which was similarly contributed to by managers

00:38:32 similarly contributed to by managers failures to prevent sexual misconduct from occurring and to discipline the officers concerned. So some of the spouses of the UCOs's entrance 3 are or have been core

00:38:43 entrance 3 are or have been core participants in this inquiry and it's understood that one of them may give evidence at the forthcoming hearings. The MPS wishes to apologize unreservedly to them and to all the partners and

00:38:55 to them and to all the partners and former partners of SDSUs for its failure to better protect them from the effects of the SDS's work and the misconduct of its officers.

00:39:06 So, may I finally say this on behalf of the NPS.

00:39:08 the NPS. Undercover policing is an extremely

00:39:17 Undercover policing is an extremely valuable means of gathering intelligence for the purposes of protecting national security, preventing serious crime, preserving public order, and other important public policing purposes. It is however an exceptionally invasive form of policing that should only be used where the need for intelligence is

00:39:32 used where the need for intelligence is sufficient to justify the high level of intrusion into the lives of the individuals targeted and those not targeted who are subject to collateral intrusion.

00:39:43 intrusion. Undercover operations also necessitate high standards of conduct, ethics and governance on the part of UCOs and their managers. This is essential to avoid the unacceptable risk that the tactic will be exploited for improper purposes or

00:39:59 be exploited for improper purposes or that UCOs will act unprofessionally and abuse the positions of power in which they are placed. During the 1990s, as in previous decades, some of the SDS's targeting was justifiable and some UCS produced

00:40:17 justifiable and some UCS produced valuable intelligence during challenging and at times dangerous deployments. But some of the SCS's deployments wrongly gathered intelligence on individual groups and campaigns that should never have been the subject of undercover reporting.

00:40:29 undercover reporting. As I have stated, some UCOs also engaged in disgraceful conduct that warranted but didn't receive the strongest disciplinary response from senior officers due to a lack of proper management. They also engaged in

00:40:41 management. They also engaged in criminal conduct and with the criminal justice system in ways that were inexcusable. In short, sir, the SDS became a dysfunctional undercover unit. The human toll of the SCS's dysfunction

00:40:57 The human toll of the SCS's dysfunction has been severe and wide ranging. misuse of deceased people's identities, wrongful intrusion into into individuals private and political lives, grievous sexual exploitation, damaged

00:41:09 sexual exploitation, damaged relationships, broken families, and widespread anger, distress, and psychological harm, including to some of the officers themselves. So the MPS recognizes how important it

00:41:21 So the MPS recognizes how important it is to understand the damage that the SDS has caused to hear directly from the people who have been affected and for the inquiry to hold those responsible to account.

00:41:38 Thank you sir. Thank you very much. uh the um opening remarks that you have just made are entirely consistent with those that you

00:41:52 entirely consistent with those that you made in the opening parts of uh tranch 2 and um I'm I and others will be pleased to hear them reiterated and to be reiterated authoritatively on behalf of the commissioner. Thank you very much.

00:42:03 the commissioner. Thank you very much. I'm grateful sir. Um, as you know, there is an issue that I intend to raise with Mr. Sanders for the uh DL team. Um, and I would ask that uh you

00:42:16 I would ask that uh you should listen to what is said and I will give the opportunity of saying anything uh in consequence that you may wish to. I shall. Thank you. Thank you.

00:42:30 Do you want me now to rise while we reconstitute or do we go straight on to Mr. Sanders?

00:42:42 We can resume straight away. Right, we're good to go.

00:42:52 [Applause]

00:43:02 Sir, I hope it's me you're intending to hear from next and not Mr. Sanders. I think I'm down on the I do apologize. I' I've I've got myself in a muddle and um I was in fact

00:43:13 in a muddle and um I was in fact expecting to hear from Mr. Sanders, but that's my mistake. Uh please continue. I'm very grateful, sir. So, in fact, we're very grateful uh in the first place for the opportunity to make this brief oral opening statement on behalf

00:43:24 brief oral opening statement on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Uh in her capacity, as you will be aware, as a core participant, as distinct from her role as the sponsor of your inquiry,

00:43:38 your inquiry, um as you are also aware, sir, we've provided you with a set of written submissions, which we hope will be of some systems. Yes, I I have them and I read them. Thank you. I'm grateful. Uh sir, this is the first opportunity that the current home

00:43:53 opportunity that the current home secretary has had to make submissions to your inquiry. And so whilst this has been said before on behalf of a number of her predecessors during the life of the inquiry, let me make clear at the outset that the home secretary is

00:44:06 outset that the home secretary is appalled by the historical allegations under consideration by your inquiry and considers it vital that we now swiftly

00:44:18 considers it vital that we now swiftly get to the truth about what happened and ensure the appropriate lessons are learned for the future. As you've just heard from Mr. skeleton. Undercover policing is a crucial tool in tackling serious crime and keeping the

00:44:32 tackling serious crime and keeping the public safe, but there is and never can be any excuse or justification for the type of conduct that is at the heart of this inquiry. And although the process will inevitably be difficult for many of those concerned,

00:44:44 those concerned, particularly those whose lives have been irreparably damaged by the misconduct of undercover officers, it is important that these matters are subjected as far

00:44:57 that these matters are subjected as far as possible to unsparing public scrutiny and the home office will continue to cooperate fully with that process as it has done since the inception of your inquiry.

00:45:06 inquiry. All that said, sir, the extent of the direct involvement of the home office in the subject matter of this tranch of the inquiries hearings, focused as they are on the special demonstration squad

00:45:18 on the special demonstration squad officers and civilians affected by deployments between 1993 and 2007, would appear to be small. No home office witness appears on your

00:45:37 No home office witness appears on your witness list for this tranch of hearings and no statements have been requested from former home office ministers or officials. Uh that position entirely reflects our understanding of the current state of the tranch 3 phase 1 evidence or at least that part of it with which we have

00:45:51 least that part of it with which we have been provided to date and have thus been in a position to analyze. uh that analysis sir enables two points to be made at this stage in respect of the role of the home office in the

00:46:03 the role of the home office in the subject matter of this phase at least of the inquiry's work. First, whilst the home office appears to have remained a recipient of indirect SDS intelligence, we have not seen any

00:46:20 SDS intelligence, we have not seen any cogent evidence of direct tasking of the SDS by the home office. This is consistent with the evidence considered in tranches 1 and two. As noted in the former home secretary's

00:46:34 As noted in the former home secretary's opening statement for the TRE 2 phase 2 hearings, paragraph 34, there was a single witness who suggested that there

00:46:45 single witness who suggested that there may have been home office involvement in determining whether a group or individual was subversive, namely HN78 in his statement of April 2022.

00:46:53 2022. HN78's evidence was to the effect that the Home Office or the Home Secretary, it wasn't entirely clear, deemed the Socialist Workers Party a subversive

00:47:07 Socialist Workers Party a subversive organization andor must have considered the SWP appropriate to infiltrate.

00:47:18 the SWP appropriate to infiltrate. However, when questioned by your council on the 31st of July, 2024 about the basis for his view, HN78 did not identify any evidence to support his assertion, and nor is the home office

00:47:29 assertion, and nor is the home office aware of any corroborating evidence from any other source. So, that was the only piece of evidence that even suggested direct tasking. And so by the conclusion of the tranch 2

00:47:40 so by the conclusion of the tranch 2 hearings, the evidential position was that there was no cogent evidence of SDS tasking by the home office. That remains

00:47:57 tasking by the home office. That remains the position on the current state of the trunk three evidence which we have seen and as it stands today. In the event that any witnesses suggest during the course of this phase of the hearings that tasking of the SDS by the

00:48:11 hearings that tasking of the SDS by the home office did occur, we have no doubt at all that any such suggestion will also be rigorously tested by council to the inquiry and the basis upon which it is made clearly identified.

00:48:22 is made clearly identified. So we also have made no doubt that council to the inquir inquiry will keep clearly in mind that the government is comprised of numerous different

00:48:34 comprised of numerous different departments and agencies of which the home office is only one and we would

00:48:44 home office is only one and we would invite the same care to be taken on this issue by all other participants in the hearing. On several occasions during your tranch to hear him, there were questions and/or references to quote the government without it being made clear whether the reference was intended to relate to the home office specifically

00:49:00 relate to the home office specifically or some other branch of the government. Uh instead the home office should not be seen as shorthand for government in general or as a euphemism for the security services and if it is being asserted by anyone

00:49:15 and if it is being asserted by anyone that home office ministers or officials did something or knew something that needs to be clearly stated so that the assertion can be properly understood and tested.

00:49:28 tested. So the second general observation on the evidence is that at the time of making this opening statement, the home office is not aware of any evidence to suggest

00:49:39 is not aware of any evidence to suggest that the home office or any home office ministers

00:49:40 ministers or officials were aware of firstly instances of SDS officers being involved in criminality within the transfer period.

00:49:55 period. Secondly, the use of deceased children's identities to form undercover legends and or thirdly the particular issue of sexual misconduct of SDS officers.

00:50:07 sexual misconduct of SDS officers. In addition, there is no evidence that we have seen that the Home Office or its ministers or officials were aware of conduct by SDS undercover police officers leading to miscarriages of

00:50:20 officers leading to miscarriages of justice or potential miscarriages of justice. So, you've heard me make these points before behalf of the home office in earlier tranches and phases of the inquiry, but they are critical as you

00:50:32 inquiry, but they are critical as you will recognize for my client. and so I do not apologize for making them again. It is important that everyone keeps in

00:50:43 It is important that everyone keeps in mind by respectful submission what the evidence does and perhaps more importantly does not demonstrate in this regard.

00:50:51 regard. So that is all I propose to say about the evidence at this stage at least. But there is one further matter of substance which I would like to address you on briefly if I may by way of opening submissions and that concerns the

00:51:02 submissions and that concerns the legislative and regulatory framework of policing during the transfer period i.e. 1993

00:51:10 1993 uh to 2007.

00:51:17 Um we have set out the position in our written submissions. I don't propose to rehearse the detail this afternoon. The inquiry will no doubt be aware of the legislative background and we will make our and and no doubt we'll make our

00:51:29 our and and no doubt we'll make our written submissions publicly available in the usual way but I do wish to emphasize the significance of what occurred during the tranch 3 period in this respect because it represented a

00:51:43 this respect because it represented a radical reform in the way in which the deployment of undercover officers was authorized and regulated. In particular, we see in this period a

00:51:55 In particular, we see in this period a fundamental shift away from the conduct and deployment of undercover officers being regulated by an aggregation of non-stutory guidance, codes of practice, judicial precedent towards a framework of statutory standards and requirements.

00:52:10 standards and requirements. The key legislative development in this regard was the regulation of investigatory powers act 2000 ripper which came into force in October 2000 right in the middle of the period which you are currently concerned.

00:52:24 you are currently concerned. The purpose of rebirth was to ensure that the investigatory powers to which it applied were used in accordance with

00:52:37 it applied were used in accordance with human rights in light of the coming into force of the human rights act 1998 at about the same time. Part two addressed surveillance and the conduct and use of covert human intelligence sources.

00:52:48 intelligence sources. And it introduced for the first time a statutory scheme for the authorization of informants and undercover police officers.

00:53:04 officers. By section 292 of Ripler, the activities of a CHIS could be authorized if three requirements were met. These concern firstly the authorization's necessity, secondly its proportionality

00:53:16 secondly its proportionality and thirdly the oversight of cheers in question during authorization. The legislation was extensive and detailed and I'm conscious so that you will be very familiar with it from this inquiry and from other um work in which

00:53:28 inquiry and from other um work in which you've been engaged over the years. The short point for present purposes is that it reflected a recognition of the need for a clear statutory framework to

00:53:42 for a clear statutory framework to ensure that rights were protected and standards were upheld. The same impetus is reflected in the legislative development specifically concerning the police.

00:53:55 concerning the police. The tranch 3 period saw the introduction of the police act 1997 part three of which introduced for the first time a statutory system of regulation with respect to police

00:54:09 regulation with respect to police interference with property use of listening devices and wireless telegraphy. The police conduct regulations of 1999 came into force on the 1st of April that year and they established an investigation procedure for where a

00:54:25 investigation procedure for where a complaint or allegation that a member of the force did not meet the appropriate standard was received by the chief officer of the relevant police force. That procedure included the appointment of an investigating officer who was

00:54:38 of an investigating officer who was required to produce a report which could result in a hearing being convened following which the officers conducting the hearing had the power to impose sanctions up to dismissal from the force.

00:54:48 force. Schedule one to the regulations contained a code of conduct for police officers which included requirements of honesty and integrity under paragraph

00:55:02 honesty and integrity under paragraph one which applied whether the officer was on duty or off duty and stated it is of paramount importance that the public has faith in the honesty and integrity of police officers.

00:55:15 integrity of police officers. Officers should therefore be open and truthful in their dealings, avoid being improperly beholden to any person or

00:55:26 improperly beholden to any person or institution, and discharge their duties with integrity. Further, under paragraph 12 entitled general conduct, it stated whether on or off duty, police officers should not

00:55:40 off duty, police officers should not behave in a way which is likely to bring discredit upon the police service. On the 1st of April 2004 towards the end of the tranch 3 period the 1999

00:55:53 of the tranch 3 period the 1999 regulations were revoked and replaced by the police conduct regulations of 2004 which were to a broadly similar effect and incorporated equivalent standards. So in addition to those significant

00:56:07 So in addition to those significant developments in terms of primary and secondary legislation, the tranch 3 period also saw the substantial progress in the promulgation of codes of practice and guidance relating to the

00:56:18 and guidance relating to the authorization of CHIS including undercover officers and the work of special branches more generally.

00:56:29 special branches more generally. The covert human intelligence sources code of practice 2002 known as the CHIZ code was issued pursuant to section 71 of RIPER and

00:56:40 pursuant to section 71 of RIPER and applied to every authorization of CHIS under part two of RIPER providing guidance on the use and conduct of CHIS by public authorities. This CHIS code, which has since been

00:56:53 This CHIS code, which has since been updated on several occasions, outlined the procedures for authorizing and handling information obtained through cheers, ensuring compliance with the relevant legislation and human rights.

00:57:06 relevant legislation and human rights. It echoed the requirements in RIPER and it gave guidance for the authorizing officer in particular perhaps and of relevance at this stage of the inquiry. It required that firstly when

00:57:17 It required that firstly when considering authorizations, the person granting an authorization must believe that CHI's use is necessary for a legitimate aim and proportionate to the

00:57:33 legitimate aim and proportionate to the intelligence being sought. And secondly, consideration must be given to the risk

00:57:44 consideration must be given to the risk of collateral intrusion on the rights of individuals who are not direct targets. The tranch 3 period also saw the promulgation in 2004 of the home office guidelines on the work of a special branch in Great Britain.

00:57:56 branch in Great Britain. The guidelines reflected what they themselves described as quotes radical reform in this area and they contain a neat summary of the key developments

00:58:09 neat summary of the key developments over the preceding years at paragraph three which if you'll forgive me sir I'll read out because it's a shortcut to what is otherwise quite an extensive um legislative uh set of developments

00:58:24 uh set of developments since the publication of the previous guidance. lines in 1994. Several significant legislative changes have taken place within the United Kingdom.

00:58:35 taken place within the United Kingdom. Most notably, the Human Rights Act came into force on the 2nd of October 2000, incorporating the key provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights into the United Kingdom domestic law.

00:58:46 the United Kingdom domestic law. This legislation clearly regulates the activities of public bodies such as the police service including special branch across the United Kingdom. Moreover, the covert activities of law

00:58:59 Moreover, the covert activities of law enforcement agencies have seen radical legislative reform with the passing of RIPER and the regulation of investigatory powers Scotland Act.

00:59:15 investigatory powers Scotland Act. Special branch staff, like other members of the police service, must comply with these pieces of legislation. In particular, and in support of the overriding principle of protecting human rights, the use of the powers and

00:59:26 rights, the use of the powers and authorities provided to the police service by virtue of these acts are regulated subject to inspection and oversight by two independent commissions.

00:59:38 commissions. special branch as with all other areas of policing is subject to the provisions contained within the data protection act and more recently the freedom of information act.

00:59:51 information act. The guidelines also emphasized the nature and extent of the threat which had clearly developed following 911 and

01:00:02 had clearly developed following 911 and the continued importance of human source reporting in meeting that threat. So sir, the introduction of a statutory framework for the authorization and regulation of undercover policing along

01:00:13 regulation of undercover policing along with the associated guidelines and codes of practice were in no way indicative of a reduction in the threat to the public

01:00:24 a reduction in the threat to the public or the importance of undercover policing in helping to meet that threat. They reflected instead the recognition of a need for clear and enforcable standards in order both to meet changing societal

01:00:39 in order both to meet changing societal expectations of policing and to prevent findings of violations of rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. So by way of final observation on this topic, I would invite the inquiry to note that there is nothing to indicate

01:00:57 note that there is nothing to indicate that any of these important developments were motivated by any knowledge on the part of legislators or those responsible for the home office guidance of any specific problems regarding the conduct of undercover police officers, such as

01:01:08 police officers, such as disproportionate interference in the privacy of others or misconduct issues of the type with which your inquiry is concerned.

01:01:22 concerned. The point is simply that by the end of the tranch 3 period, the landscape of legislation, codes of practice and guidelines concerning the authorization and regulation of undercover policing was radically different to that which pertained at the start.

01:01:38 pertained at the start. A contrast which is of course even more stark today. So that is all I propose to say by way of opening the submission at this stage. Excuse me. Can I simply conclude by

01:01:51 Excuse me. Can I simply conclude by saying that the home office supports the inquiry's aims as indeed does the home secretary of person and is committed to her department continuing to cooperate fully with its investigations.

01:02:02 fully with its investigations. She notes and welcomes your commitment to provide an SDS interim report and to continue to drive progress forward

01:02:14 continue to drive progress forward across all areas of the inquiry's work. She awaits the inquiry's findings and any recommendations you may make with interest.

01:02:21 interest. Given this is the last opportunity or probably the last opportunity I will have to address you in a public hearing, may I also take the opportunity to acknowledge on behalf of the home

01:02:32 acknowledge on behalf of the home secretary your many years of hard work in investigating the important issues with which this inquiry is concerned. So, thank you very much. Thank you um in particular for your kind words at the end. But uh as uh they

01:02:44 words at the end. But uh as uh they recognize the inquiry is a long and difficult process. We're doing our best. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you, sir.

01:03:00 Thank you, sir. Sir, I'm told that um Mr. Sanders is timetabled for half 3. Yes. And it isn't going to be possible to bring that forward. So, may we now adjourn until half 3, please?

01:54:38 Mr. Sanders, good afternoon. Your opening day, sir.

01:54:44 Are you hearing me? Okay, I can hear you perfectly. Yes. Wonderful. Thank you. Shall I just go ahead then? Certainly. Please do. Right. So um so I appear as you know on behalf of the designated lawyer officer

01:55:09 behalf of the designated lawyer officer core participant group. We have filed a brief written opening for the upcoming trans 3 phase one hearings. Uh and I propose to be even briefer now in

01:55:24 propose to be even briefer now in addressing you orally. Um aside from Mr. Gun and hopefully Mr. Felen, there are no uh designated lawyer witnesses uh giving oral evidence in the in the upcoming hearings. Uh and even Mr. Gun and Mr. Felen are strictly speaking

01:55:37 and Mr. Felen are strictly speaking tranch two witnesses rather than tranch three phase one witnesses. Um

01:55:40 Um the undercover officers who are giving oral evidence were of course managed by clients of mine. Um but we will address management oversight of all the open

01:55:53 management oversight of all the open deployments when it comes to the tranch 3 phase three openings. Uh so for the purposes today what I propose to do is address you on on three

01:56:06 propose to do is address you on on three uh short matters uh that correspond with the matters raised in our written opening. So that's first just a handful of general points and then briefly to

01:56:20 of general points and then briefly to address you on uh the claims made by Mr. Francis uh and finally to deal with uh HN81

01:56:24 HN81 who is a client of mine but is not giving oral evidence. Uh first sir, in relation to the the general points as we've set out in writing, we say it's important not to lose sight of the fact that there were

01:56:39 lose sight of the fact that there were more closed deployments in tranch 3 than in tranches one and two. Uh and not withstanding the obvious failings of the SDS during tranch 3, it also did some of its most challenging and uh valuable

01:56:55 its most challenging and uh valuable work during that era. This won't be in Oaken, but it shouldn't be in my submission shouldn't be forgotten and it should always be borne in mind uh that

01:57:06 should always be borne in mind uh that the managers uh dealing with the offices that you're going to be hearing from before Christmas uh were also dealing with other matters um and had a lot more on their plate than just the open offices.

01:57:21 offices. Um in addition to that the tranch 3 period which uh certainly the the upcoming phase which is still pre-

01:57:33 upcoming phase which is still pre- ripper was one where there were attempts by management to modernize the unit. Um so these included the intro in introduction of psychometric testing for new recruits, psychiatric or psychological support for undercover officers and former

01:57:46 undercover officers and former undercover officers. uh the introduction of a mentoring scheme um which we've heard about um the

01:57:57 um which we've heard about um the introduction of performance indicators and customer feedback surveys

01:58:01 surveys um the introduction of designated cover officers and specific undercover officers um and changes to the way in which uh undercover identities were made. So at this time um I'm not seeking

01:58:22 made. So at this time um I'm not seeking to minimize the um issues that did arise there were attempts within the unit to to modernize it and to uh improve its systems.

01:58:27 systems. The second uh matter as I've indicated that I want to address you on sir is just that the question of the claims made by Mr. Francis. Um, as I've set out in our in our opening, um,

01:58:39 opening, um, I had more than 130 clients. A lot of them didn't come across Mr. Francis at all. Some of them did, some more close had more involvement with him than others, and opinions vary. So, I don't

01:58:56 others, and opinions vary. So, I don't have a single position to set out about him, and I make no comment on his sincerity or motivations. What I do say is that there are reasons to be cautious about his claims um particularly the lack of

01:59:13 um particularly the lack of corroboration from other witnesses and from contemporary documents. Um

01:59:15 Um also what he has very candidly said about the impact of his deployment on him uh and the issues he has uh dealt

01:59:30 him uh and the issues he has uh dealt with as a result um and his consequent feelings about the unit and about the police more generally. Um in terms of the accuracy or truthfulness regardless of questions of um why he's making these claims. we say

01:59:43 um why he's making these claims. we say that they are a lot of them a mixture of fact, fiction and fantasy. Uh and that's particularly the case in relation to three topics that I just want to touch on briefly now.

02:00:02 on briefly now. First sir, the claim that there were high level concerns within the SDS within special branch about black justice groups generally or the Steven Lawrence family campaign in particular

02:00:16 Lawrence family campaign in particular presenting a a risk to public order and in particular a risk of quote unquote race riots. Uh this claim is not supported by any contemporaneous documents. In fact, it

02:00:28 contemporaneous documents. In fact, it is again saved by the SDS annual reports from the time. Um, and those reports make clear that the main public order concern was with confrontations between

02:00:43 concern was with confrontations between the far right and the far left. So, this is the era of just after the so-called battle of Waterloo, the riots at Welling, the election of Derek Beacon and so on.

02:01:01 The second uh batch of claims uh relates to um first an allegation that the the special demonstration squad uh was inquiring into visitors to the Lawrence family home in the immediate aftermath

02:01:13 family home in the immediate aftermath of the murder of Steven Lawrence. Uh and secondly, an allegation that uh there was an attempt to smear the Lawrence family or Lawrence family campaign. Uh so no other officer or document supports this at all. In fact, all of the

02:01:28 this at all. In fact, all of the evidence points the other way. Um were it true, it would have been an extraordinary and unprecedented tasking. It's not consistent with anything else

02:01:41 It's not consistent with anything else the SDS did. Uh and the lack of records is also not consistent with SDS practice.

02:01:43 practice. Um and finally, it would have required not only an extraordinary degree of bad faith, but a degree of foresight about where the family campaign would lead, which no one in the M in the

02:01:55 which no one in the M in the Metropolitan Police had in 1993 94, which is when Mr. Francis claims he was given and undertook this tasking. Um and thirdly, the final matter are

02:02:12 Um and thirdly, the final matter are just the claims that Mr. Francis makes a relations with the mccurs and guaran uh and as we've set out we say it's inconceivable that any SDS intelligence from 1993 94 would have

02:02:26 from 1993 94 would have passed to Richard Walton in 1998 um and

02:02:34 um and what he says about a request that sir William McFersonen be told about FDS tasking um firstly his rule nine statements says something different to what he said to the Ellison review. And secondly, the timings in terms of a conversation with Keith Edmonson

02:02:50 Keith Edmonson and his departure um relative to the announcement of the inquiry and the inquiry chair, the timings just don't add up. Um and we say in relation to all three of these matters that without

02:03:01 three of these matters that without commenting on why Mr. Francis is saying, they are not true.

02:03:11 Finally, sir, just in relation to HN81, who is a client of mine and is, as you as you know, not well enough to give evidence, and it's a very short point and one that's of great importance to him. He was not quote unquote a spy in

02:03:27 him. He was not quote unquote a spy in the Lawrence family camp, and the claim that he was has had a devastating and unfair impact on him. Um that claim that um sound bite about Bob spy in the Lawrence family camp comes from the Ellison review. Um and

02:03:49 comes from the Ellison review. Um and that review the report defines what was meant by quote unquote camp as being those involved in the conduct and tactical aspects of the inquiry proceedings. Um it is in fact clear from the from the the totality of the review and the evidence on all sides

02:04:03 evidence on all sides uh that the organization infiltrated by HN81 which was the revolutionary internationalist league or specifically its front organization the movement for justice that it was not part of the

02:04:17 justice that it was not part of the Lawrence family camp and was in fact nowhere close to being So

02:04:25 HN81 never met or spoke to any member of the Lawrence family. Um and it's clear that from his evidence but also from the evidence of uh the statements of Dr.

02:04:36 evidence of uh the statements of Dr. Lawrence and of Suresh Grover and from Baroness Lawrence's book uh that movement for justice wasn't part of the Lawrence family account. Now, to be

02:04:48 Lawrence family account. Now, to be clear, sir, that doesn't mean that there are no issues for you about what ended up being recorded at the time or the justification for this or that there are no lessons to be learned from what happened. Um, it simply means that the

02:05:01 happened. Um, it simply means that the headline about the spy in the Lawrence family camp, um, however attention grabbing it may have been, was not true, uh, and is not fair on 1881.

02:05:14 uh, and is not fair on 1881. So those were the only points I wanted to

02:05:28 address you on today. Thank you very much. Uh there is, as I believe you've been forewarned, an issue that I'm going to invite you to address today. And forgive me, it'll take me a little time to explain it, but not only you, but the wider public must understand it as well. It concerns HN86.

02:05:44 As you know, on the 30th of July 2018, I made a restriction order in respect both of his cover name while he was deployed and his real name.

02:06:01 while he was deployed and his real name. Uh he was both an undercover officer for a short period and a manager of the SDS for a longer period. On the 4th of May 2018, the designated lawyers on his behalf uh

02:06:17 the designated lawyers on his behalf uh made the following statements in uh the application for the restriction order which I made. I quote from in the first place paragraph 12 C. It is in the public interest for HN86

02:06:31 public interest for HN86 to be enabled to participate as fully as possible in providing evidence to the

02:06:43 possible in providing evidence to the inquiry and restriction would assist in activating this end by mitigating personal harm to HN86 that might otherwise prevent engagement. Paragraph 14. The evidence that HN86 is likely to be asked to give to this inquiry is likely to be of relevance to the inquiry's terms of reference. The

02:07:00 the inquiry's terms of reference. The chairman will have to weigh carefully the public interest in disclosure of HN86's identity against the risks identified above and the impact they may

02:07:11 identified above and the impact they may have with HN86's capacity to engage with the inquiry process. Paragraph 16B. There is a public interest in mitigating the risk of harm to HN86 in furtherance

02:07:27 the risk of harm to HN86 in furtherance of the terms of reference to the inquiry in light of the evidence that HN86 may be asked to provide. Uh I issued a minded note on 23rd of May 2018

02:07:36 2018 uh in which I said amongst other things the following. I infer from that statement, which is that which I've read from 12C, that he is willing to provide evidence to the inquiry, provided proper steps are taken to protect his health

02:07:48 steps are taken to protect his health and welfare, including the making of a restriction order in respect of his real and cover name. I stated in terms that I thought that it was more important to

02:08:00 thought that it was more important to receive his evidence as a manager than it was uh to uh reveal his identity to those who might have encountered him during his deployment.

02:08:16 during his deployment. on the those who instruct you notified the inquiry that

02:08:20 that that he

02:08:27 that he did not intend uh to provide any oral evidence to the inquiry. Uh this prompted a short exchange as to what the reason was. in particular an inquiry by by the inquiry team about uh whether or

02:08:39 by the inquiry team about uh whether or not the reason was health that prompted uh uh the following response on the 24th of September 2025. We are not applying for HN86 to be excluded on medical grounds.

02:09:00 You either have or are about to is to uh judicial review proceedings challenging uh the decision made by the inquiry and put into effect to serve on him through you a notice under section 21 of the

02:09:24 you a notice under section 21 of the inquiries act requiring him to give oral evidence to the inquiry in July. The um inquiry has indicated that it would be perfectly content to receive his evidence remotely uh and in any manner which would make it easier for him to give uh the oral evidence that the

02:09:39 give uh the oral evidence that the inquiry seeks. As you know, the or his oral evidence uh concerns one of the critical issues which I must decide uh namely what if anything uh uh happened about the

02:09:51 about the Lawrence family campaign and those who supported it and in particular whether there was any uh input by the SDS uh

02:10:02 there was any uh input by the SDS uh into the Lawrence family campaign and any wish to obtain evidence about it uh principally uh by but not allegedly

02:10:17 principally uh by but not allegedly exclusively by means of the deployment of HN81.

02:10:37 There is an aspect of the evidence upon which there is only uh the word of HN86 and uh HN 43 Francis uh about

02:10:44 uh about it. That is what HN86 said to

02:10:54 said to Mr. Francis during uh the repeated trips uh that they made uh into London from the area in which they both resided.

02:11:16 the um step or actuality of bringing judicial review proceedings uh in respect of the uh section 21 notice

02:11:25 notice uh must I think cause three groups of people to reflect upon what should occur. The first uh will be the mayor's office for policing and crime who have

02:11:42 office for policing and crime who have been notified of the of what is about to take place or what is taking place now in the inquiries proceedings as to whether or not uh that office uh

02:11:52 uh will fund will continue to fund or

02:12:08 has been asked to fund the proceedings which are designed not to uh enable the inquiry to fulfill its purpose but to serve an alternative purpose and the consequence of which will will be to

02:12:19 consequence of which will will be to make it more difficult for the inquiry to fulfill its purpose. Uh the second is me and the inquiry legal team which will have to reconsider whether or not the restriction order made on the 30th of

02:12:36 restriction order made on the 30th of July 2018 should remain in place if uh HN86

02:12:38 HN86 cannot be persuaded by any means to provide oral evidence to the inquiry. And the third uh group of people who need to reflect and I want to preede

02:12:52 need to reflect and I want to preede what I have to say about that by these remarks.

02:12:57 remarks. The designated lawyers have throughout been uh efficient, professional, uh have behaved with utter propriety in their dealings with the inquiry and I

02:13:10 their dealings with the inquiry and I have I hold them in high regard. uh but they I think may have to reflect upon whether or not having made the statements in support of uh the application of 18 HN86

02:13:23 application of 18 HN86 for uh the restriction order uh can now properly uh play a part in bringing proceedings

02:13:35 play a part in bringing proceedings whose consequence is to frustrate uh the um purpose indicated in their application.

02:13:41 As I say, I make that remark to invite them to reflect rather than by way of criticism. I do not make any such criticism. I invite your response. If you want time

02:13:54 I invite your response. If you want time to reflect upon it before responding, uh then by all means take um half an hour an hour to do so. But um if you are able

02:14:05 an hour to do so. But um if you are able to respond having been forewarned of the gist of what I might be able to say uh then I invite you to do so. Now

02:14:14 I was so just one brief point. H86 didn't

02:14:16 didn't overlap with HN81. Uh I I don't know if that was just a slip on your part, but I just wanted to to clarify that. So he wouldn't be able

02:14:28 to clarify that. So he wouldn't be able to assist with anything to do with 1881 or matters that took place that time.

02:14:35 He he was um

02:14:47 let me reflect carefully upon what I I want to say.

02:15:05 Nothing that I've said should be taken in any way to affect the position of HN81. I have made uh the order that I have done uh in so as to preserve his health and well-being uh in

02:15:25 health and well-being uh in circumstances that have been explained to me. As you know, that has caused a certain amount of comment from other parties in the inquiry, but I have nothing further to say about that. The thrust of my comment uh observations to you uh concerns the uh

02:15:46 allegations that are made by uh Peter Francis

02:15:57 and uh the response to those allegations that have been has been made by H& 1986 uh in the light of the comments in his application to which I've drawn your attention.

02:16:11 Yes. So at the time of the restriction order application um HN86 said and I don't have the words in front of me but words to the effect that he would he found it very difficult to

02:16:34 he would he found it very difficult to think about the prospect of giving oral evidence to the inquiry. Um but it is correct that he was keen to cooperate

02:16:36 cooperate uh and contribute so far as he was possibly able to do so. and he has, as you know, from from the country where he resides, he's produced

02:16:52 resides, he's produced a rule N statement um answering written questions from the inquiry in the same way as other overseas designated lawyer officers did. So for example, HM 33, HM88,

02:17:08 example, HM 33, HM88, he's been invited to give oral evidence and he has declined to do so. The question in the judicial review is whether or not the inquiry as a

02:17:22 is whether or not the inquiry as a matter of law under the acts has power to compel

02:17:36 to compel um 1886 to leave his home and his home country and return to the UK um and give oral evidence since 2018. Um I think a number of obviously a

02:17:52 Um I think a number of obviously a number of years have passed. 1886 is now older than he was. He has suffered two serious

02:17:56 serious uh conditions with his physical health. Um he doesn't um feel able to um to give oral evidence.

02:18:10 um to give oral evidence. um and that's why he's defined to do so. So in terms of doing everything he possibly can uh he feels he has done everything he possibly can. Um the question, the legal question with

02:18:25 the question, the legal question with regard to your power under section 21 of the act to compel someone who is overseas to return here and give oral evidence or to give evidence via a video link as a as a fallback

02:18:36 link as a as a fallback is um is a live issue. Um and my understanding is you accept that it's

02:18:48 understanding is you accept that it's arguable and that the claim should have permission and should be resolved. Um, and

02:18:53 we will have to see where we are. But in the light of the outcome of that, um, I appreciate it's a it's a disappointment for for you and for the inquiry and for others. Um,

02:19:06 others. Um, equally, I've spoken to H&86 and all I can do is I can advise him and uh take his instructions and and represent him. And the same goes for my instructing solister and her team. Um

02:19:17 instructing solister and her team. Um these are not uh our decisions. Um but it is our position and has always been our position that the inquiry has no power to compel overseas witnesses. We

02:19:32 power to compel overseas witnesses. We understood it was your your position. Uh it's a fairly orthodox position across inquiries generally. Um there's no point us trying to litigate it now, argue it out now. Um

02:19:48 out now. Um but that's that that's where we are. Um in terms of funding, there is a public inquiry into undercover policing. Um and the consequence of that is the people who were involved in it are

02:20:03 who were involved in it are all participants or witnesses. Uh and they're entitled to representation. Um, and a corollery of that is that there may be circumstances where they would where there will be a

02:20:16 where they would where there will be a disagreement about the law and a need to have that resolved by the high court. That's that's simply due process and the rule of law. And we've we've hit this point or certainly my team and the inquiry have hit this

02:20:32 my team and the inquiry have hit this point three times before. I think this is our third judicial review. um and

02:20:37 um and uh there's a disagreement about the law and it's it's resolved by the by the court or by way of settlement. Um that's in my submission the appropriate way to proceed.

02:20:53 Uh I don't think there's any good purpose in us exchanging views further now but I am going to ask Mr. Skelton for the commissioner uh if he has any observation to make about the issue. Could

02:21:07 Mr. Skelton be uh invited to come to the screen, please?

02:21:15 Sir, can you hear me? Yes, I can. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. I'm so sorry. I I was looking away from the screen when you came on. Apologies. Thank you, sir. Um, so you'll be aware that the correspondence relating to the

02:21:28 that the correspondence relating to the judicial review um was passed to the MPS late last week. Yes. And in those circumstances, I haven't had the opportunity to take instructions from the commissioner, nor have I had the opportunity to apprise myself of the full background, some of which you have outlined today, to the

02:21:42 which you have outlined today, to the original restriction order application, the basis on which it was put, and HN86's present circumstances, which Mr. Sanders has just inated are relevant to his personal decision to not provide

02:21:54 his personal decision to not provide oral evidence remotely from wherever it is he lives. So in those circumstances, absent instructions, so I don't think I can really assist on whether or not

02:22:06 can really assist on whether or not there is a conflict or what position the MPS might take in respect of the judicial review or indeed whether funding should or shouldn't be continued. I'm sorry to to give rather a non-answer, but I think I have to

02:22:22 non-answer, but I think I have to maintain uh my um cautious approach until I get instructions from the commissioner. I entirely understand that. I if and when you do have instructions from the commissioner, could you relay them to uh the inquiry?

02:22:33 the inquiry? Yes, of course. Thank you very much indeed. I might ask you to do so on screen uh if if you are able to obtain them in the very near future.

02:22:44 future. So I don't think it will be while we are going through the opening statements because it takes a little time to get some access to the commissioners. You appreciate

02:22:55 appreciate of course he has far many many other tasks. I readily appreciate that. Um, but it may be that I will ask you to come onto the screen or indeed if you're in here in person to say something in person uh about the issue when you have instructions.

02:23:07 instructions. Understood. Thank you. But in any event, I'd be grateful if you communicate it in writing if need be or by email or however it's done

02:23:18 by email or however it's done electronically um before that occurs. Thank you. I will. Thank you. That I think concludes today's business, does it not?

02:23:29 does it not? It does, sir. Uh we resume tomorrow at 10 when we will hear uh submissions from a number of core participants.