Powerful closing statement from counsel representing Tariq Ali, Ernie Tate, and Piers Corbyn examining systematic political policing during 1968-1982. The submission argues the SDS was fundamentally incompatible with democracy, unlawful from inception, and primarily served MI5's political intelligence gathering rather than legitimate law enforcement. Detailed analysis of police violence at Southall, failure to target far-right extremism, Rick Clark's infiltration and destabilization of the Troops Out Movement, government knowledge and direction through secret committees, and evidence of blacklisting.
00:09:38 foreign good morning uh I I say I think good day to you because I believe you're in a different time zone I am
00:09:44 you're welcome in any event um I'm grateful for you grounding permission to do for me to do this from outside the jurisdiction not at all we have technology and
00:09:55 not at all we have technology and sometimes it's useful as it is on this occasion please begin
00:10:02 in our first opening statement in November 2020 we analyzed the history and politics of undercover policing in Britain and specifically the formation in early years of the special demonstration Squad the SDS
00:10:15 demonstration Squad the SDS we did so largely in an evidential vacuum as the inquiry had only disclosed a limited amount of material by then consequently our analysis was primarily
00:10:29 consequently our analysis was primarily based on our study of publicly available literature produced by academics journalists and activists on secret political policing by the police and the security service MI5
00:10:42 security service MI5 in summary in that opening statement we made the following assertions one undercover policing in Britain is established by special branch in 1968 and institutionalized in subsequent
00:10:58 and institutionalized in subsequent years as a weapon in the Arsenal of the state was fundamentally incompatible with the norms and values of a Democratic Society two whilst the SDS was very much a part of a tradition of secret political
00:11:09 of a tradition of secret political policing dating back centuries the SDS did Mark a departure in that the systemic deployment of officers to infiltrate political groups on a
00:11:21 infiltrate political groups on a long-term basis had not been done before with the odd possible exception three
00:11:26 three the primary objective of the SDS was never to prevent crime or engage in genuine law enforcement it was always to spy on those perceived to be political opponents of the state or the status quo
00:11:41 opponents of the state or the status quo it was always to prevent positive social change and allow the established order to thrive
00:11:43 to thrive four
00:11:59 four the non-state core participants had been targeted by the police and MI5 because of their politics and their ideas not because of Any engagement in crime subversion or public disorder but
00:12:03 but as a result of the oblique approach that encouraged the SDS to sweep wide and infiltrate groups that were of no threat as part of a strategy to provide cover-up of penetrating other groups of Interest everybody was fair game
00:12:15 Interest everybody was fair game hundreds of left-wing Progressive and Community organizations were targeted and reported on by the secret state the extent of the Espionage was staggering
00:12:26 staggering six
00:12:28 six insofar as the period between 1968 and 1982 was marked by an upsurge in unrest the preponderance of the violence was
00:12:39 the preponderance of the violence was inflicted by the police on protesters and not vice versa seven the SDS was never politically neutral it had a clear political orientation on the right of the
00:12:52 orientation on the right of the political Spectrum it represented the hard end of the state apparatus naturally conservative in culture politics and Outlook and its officers were politically vetted by special Branch so to be
00:13:03 Branch so to be eight
00:13:05 eight the targets of the SDS were almost exclusively on the left of the political spectrum and were routinely and wrongly labeled as domestic extremists
00:13:21 labeled as domestic extremists any spying on the far right is minimal and very much an afterthought nine
00:13:22 nine policing against ethnic minority
00:13:35 policing against ethnic minority communities in Britain has always been blighted by an entrenched racism that permeates the culture ranks and structures of the police 10.
00:13:36 10. whilst the SDS was Kept Secret from the public it was completely integrated into the established security apparatus of
00:13:50 the established security apparatus of the state with a strict chain of command through the senior ranks of the police to the highest levels at MI5 and the government 11. the SDS had more than simply a close working relationship with MI5 it was subordinate to MI5
00:14:01 subordinate to MI5 12. nobody in policing or government apparently had the slightest concern about the illegality or immorality of what police spies were doing in the name
00:14:16 what police spies were doing in the name of Law and Order or national security or the defense of the realm the FTS was given free reign to engage in intrusive Espionage regardless of the consequences for those targeted or for our Democratic
00:14:30 for those targeted or for our Democratic norms and values and finally 13 there is nothing to suggest that the police and MI5 have learned lessons and moved on or that the secret state is now subject to proper and rigorous judicial and
00:14:44 proper and rigorous judicial and parliamentary scrutiny and oversight now since that opening statement in November 2020 the inquiry has disclosed a considerable amount of further material in fact 272 documents totaling some
00:14:57 272 documents totaling some 3287 pages of material have been disclosed since December last year including 43 documents totaling 1630 pages of material which were
00:15:12 1630 pages of material which were disclosed as recently as February 15th just a week ago the inquiry has also held three phases of open hearings and one phase of closed hearings some of the trans1 modules 2B and 2C documents in the recent
00:15:24 and 2C documents in the recent disclosure in December and January about the role of those in the higher echelons of the police the home office in the cabinet office are particularly revealing
00:15:37 revealing whilst it is deeply regrettable that we've had so little time to read consider and digest all the recent disclosure and that no live evidence is to be called to exploring great to detail the more interesting even
00:15:51 detail the more interesting even shocking and unexpected matters raised by some of this disclosure it is now clear Beyond doubt that not only were the assertions we made more than two years ago entirely accurate but secret
00:16:05 years ago entirely accurate but secret political policing between 1968 and 1982 was even more extensive invasive and uncontrolled than we had asserted in several notable respects one
00:16:20 several notable respects one the Espionage on an industrial scale in which the SDS engage was unlawful from the very outset there was never any lawful justification for the criminal acts of undercover police officers committed in the name of preventing public order
00:16:32 public order whilst the inquiry is we of course accept Bound by section 2 of the inquiries act 2005 that prohibits any determination of criminal or civil liability
00:16:41 liability the inquiry is not prohibited from reaching robust findings of fact or making strident recommendations from which liability from which excuse me liability could inevitably be inferred
00:16:57 liability could inevitably be inferred by others we trust the inquiry will do so and we trust that the inquiry will not be intimidated by these State Corps participants into reaching uncritical conclusions and making Bland
00:17:11 conclusions and making Bland recommendations that change nothing of substance
00:17:12 substance two
00:17:18 two the real threat to democracy and the nation's safety and well-being were those engaged in unwanted State Espionage against the people and not those targeted spied on or infiltrated by the state three
00:17:28 three the state's approach to subversion whether Guided by the Maxwell Fife directive of 1952 all Lord Harris's 1975
00:17:42 directive of 1952 all Lord Harris's 1975 definition was overbroad it extended Way Beyond activity that represented a real threat to parliamentary democracy or the security of the nation it encompassed perfectly lawful and peaceful activity activity that should have been
00:17:56 activity that should have been encouraged and celebrated in a Democratic Society Lord Dennings sensible and proportionate definition of subversion namely that political opinions are only subversive
00:18:08 political opinions are only subversive if they contemplate the overthrow of the government by unlawful means was deliberately ignored in fact it is now clear from the recent disclosure that merely being critical of the police or
00:18:24 merely being critical of the police or demanding Democratic accountability of the police were sufficient to attract the interest of the police and MI5 four although there were senior police officers and civil servants at the home office
00:18:42 office sir Gerald Hayden Phillips in particular who recognized and were critical of the dangers of an overbroad approach to subversion no political action was taken to curb the excesses of the SDS and MI5 and finally five
00:18:54 and finally five not only did the police fail to Target the far right who were a real and growing threat to public order during the 1970s and specifically a real and growing threat to ethnic minority
00:19:10 growing threat to ethnic minority communities but they were also guilty of it on occasion of active political collaboration with the far right obvious examples were the Battle of lewisham on the 13th of August 1977 and the killing of Blair peach by a police officer in South Pole on the 23rd of
00:19:29 officer in South Pole on the 23rd of April 1979. both of which were a direct result of the fascist National front holding deliberately provocative political events in communities with large ethnic minority populations during which the police openly sided with the national front and used brutal and
00:19:43 national front and used brutal and gratuitous violence against anti-racist and anti-fascists turning then briefly to the submissions of others we commend and endorse the
00:19:55 of others we commend and endorse the detailed closing submissions on behalf of the cooperating group of non-state Corp participants this fully referenced and painstaking analysis of undercover
00:20:06 and painstaking analysis of undercover policing is the final damning indictment of the SDS and its covert operations in the circumstances we have not sought to replicate the same in our closing
00:20:20 replicate the same in our closing submissions instead our approach is more discursive and focuses on the political and ideological reality of undercover policing by the police and MI5 between 1968 and 1982.
00:20:32 1968 and 1982. we also welcome the fact that Council to the inquiry has been driven to the conclusion by the sheer weight of the available evidence that there is a strong case now for concluding that the home office should have
00:20:48 that the home office should have disbanded the SDS in 1976 when reviewing its activities and objectives whilst we agree we would go considerably further and say that the SDS should never have been set up in the first place it was a plainly illegitimate and disproportionate response to what was
00:21:02 disproportionate response to what was fundamentally a failure of public order policing as opposed to a failure of police intelligence at the demonstration against the Vietnam War in London on the 17th of March 1968.
00:21:14 17th of March 1968. the Metropolitan Police including its special Branch already had all the necessary tools at its disposal to ensure that similar public disorder did not occur again
00:21:26 not occur again the intrusive Espionage in which the STS subsequently engaged was neither necessary for public order policing purposes no legally justifiable
00:21:37 purposes no legally justifiable detective Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon's fantasy of give me a dozen men half a million pounds and a free hand should never have been indulged either by his
00:21:49 never have been indulged either by his superiors in the metropolitan police or by politicians and civil servants and government as we stated in our first opening statement the lie that the violence at the March 1968 demonstrations was due to
00:22:00 the March 1968 demonstrations was due to a failure of police intelligence was the original sin that led to the establishment and establishment and continuation of the special demonstration Squadron during tranche 1 of this inquiry we
00:22:16 during tranche 1 of this inquiry we represented three individuals Tariq Ali Ernie Tate and Pierce Corbin tarikali and Pierce Corbin gave evidence to the inquiry learning tanks could not attend for reasons of ill health but his statement was read into evidence
00:22:30 statement was read into evidence sadly Ernie Tate who was one of the founding members of the Vietnam solidarity campaign passed away in February 2021. his widow Jess McKenzie remains engaged with us over the
00:22:47 remains engaged with us over the findings and conclusions of the inquiry in short there was no lawful policing purpose for spying on Tariq Ali Ernie Tate or Pierce Coleman none of them nor the organizations in which they were involved notably the Vietnam solidarity campaign and the
00:22:59 solidarity campaign and the international Marxist group posed a public order Threat all were engaged in subversive activity however defined or
00:23:12 subversive activity however defined or were undermining parliamentary democracy or were contemplating the overthrow of the government by unlawful means or otherwise a danger to the safety and well-being of the nation Tariq Ali
00:23:25 Tariq Ali Ernie Tate and Pierce Corbin were public political figures who were always open and transparent about their politics they had nothing to hide they should never have been targeted by undercover
00:23:38 never have been targeted by undercover police officers as Roy creamer a former SDS officer rightly observed in one of his witness statements these were the days of Tariq Island but on the other hand them being firebrands was not really actionable in any way what he was saying was perfectly legal
00:23:53 saying was perfectly legal the state core participants have failed to this day to provide any credible justification for why it was lawful or otherwise permissible to spy on Tariq
00:24:04 otherwise permissible to spy on Tariq Ali Ernie Tate or Pierce Corbin Tariq Ali and Pierce Corbin remained politically active today are they still under surveillance more than 50 years after registry files were first opened
00:24:18 after registry files were first opened them and why are they still being denied access to those files even during this inquiry into undercovered police
00:24:32 turning next Circle to a discrete and important chapter in namely 1979 and southcorn the policing
00:24:46 Sir Mr Menon may just have temporarily uh Frozen what we'll do is we'll take five minutes and try and get him back on the call very well
00:25:33 thank you so I believe Mr Menon is back
00:25:50 I can't see him yes here we go I think with a
00:25:52 with a Mr Man I think the shortcomings of Technology were Illustrated but uh you are now restored and we can hear you
00:26:09 Mr Ben can you hear me
00:26:18 so I think we better take maybe a longer break and see if Mr menon's uh internet yeah I can I can now hear you I'm sorry this shows the shortcomings of Technology the things go wrong every now and then but I can now hear you and you
00:26:29 and then but I can now hear you and you can now hear me so um uh if you are able to proceed would you please do so I will do so I'm sorry I think it was electricity fluctuation of my um uh these things happen don't worry thank
00:26:43 these things happen don't worry thank you um I was just about to turn to 1979 in South Pole the policing of the counter demonstration against the national front election meeting at Southall town hall on the 23rd of April
00:26:57 Southall town hall on the 23rd of April 1979. during which led Peach a socialist and anti-racious anti-racist school teacher was killed by a police officer from the infamous special Patrol group is a stark microcosm of both violent
00:27:11 is a stark microcosm of both violent political policing against the left and violent and racist political policing against a multi-racial community with a substantial ethnic minority population it is essential that the events in Southall are examined at length to
00:27:25 Southall are examined at length to understand how political policing at its worst Works in practice in his witness statement Tariq Ali described the police killing of Blair Beach and the subsequent institutional
00:27:37 Beach and the subsequent institutional cover-up as one of the most despicable events in the history of the Metropolitan Police he was right moreover the recent disclosure provides
00:27:48 moreover the recent disclosure provides yet more evidence of the depths to which the police and others were prepared to sink in seeking to deflect blame unto others for the violence and unrest of the police undoubtedly caused in Southall
00:27:59 Southall Tarak Ali was there he attended the counter demonstration against the national front and its Nazi sympathizers in southbound at the time he was the
00:28:10 in southbound at the time he was the Socialist Unity parliamentary candidate for Southall the general election took place on the 3rd of May 10 days later special Branch provided briefings in the days prior to the National front meeting and counter demonstration one stated that the young ones within
00:28:25 one stated that the young ones within the community of Southall will provide the policing problem of the future aggravated by the color of the skin and the culture and stimulated by outside
00:28:39 the culture and stimulated by outside influences of left-wing origin another instructed officers to act firmly and actively from the start a debrief on the day itself stated that it is generally recognized that Asians can be extremely emotional volatile and
00:28:53 can be extremely emotional volatile and violent on occasions and noted there was an insignificant number of white supporters probably less than 100. tensions were high in South Pole on the bay shops were closed the anti-nazi
00:29:05 bay shops were closed the anti-nazi league had called for a picket of the Town Hall
00:29:09 Town Hall thousands of local people anti-fascists from across London attended including veterans from the Battle of cable Street in 1936 against Oswald Mosley and the British Union of fascists after speaking at the rally Tariq Ali and others were
00:29:23 at the rally Tariq Ali and others were taken by the organizers to the People's United Center on Parkview Road as the organizers were worried that the police were getting out of control the police later attacked this safe house where those injured by the police
00:29:35 house where those injured by the police were being brought for medical treatment smashed up the premises dragged out the occupants beat them with truncheons and arrested them Tara County was bleeding from the head and knocked unconscious by a police officer Clarence Baker a member of the
00:29:48 officer Clarence Baker a member of the Misty and Roots reggae band was so badly injured by a police officer that he went into a coma and spent three weeks in hospital
00:29:55 hospital Jack drumming at the time a senior official of the transport and general workers union and later a labor Member of Parliament from 2010 to 2022
00:30:09 of Parliament from 2010 to 2022 told an inquiry by the National Council of civil liberties that he had never seen such unrestrained violence against demonstrators special Patrol group were just running wild
00:30:21 wild Tarik alley was not even present on the streets when according to eyewitnesses unrest predictably broke out after the police went berserk drove van straight into the crowd deployed mounted officers and indiscriminately attacked those who
00:30:35 and indiscriminately attacked those who were demonstrating against the national front
00:30:36 front nevertheless in a report recently disclosed dated the 24th of April 1979
00:30:48 disclosed dated the 24th of April 1979 entitled demonstration with disorder and death Southall Monday the 23rd of April 1979. detective assistant commissioner Helm accused Tariq Ali of being one of the Prime movers of the disorder and
00:31:01 the Prime movers of the disorder and Civil Disobedience this was a Brazen lie furthermore detective assistant commissioner Helm paved in an entirely false picture of what happened in South Golden
00:31:13 Golden exonerating the police in the National front and placing the blame for the unrest squarely on Asian Youth anti-fascists and bizarrely on some Rastafarian squatters in Southborough he even blamed Asian youth for seriously
00:31:29 even blamed Asian youth for seriously injuring a man who was believed to be a National Fund sympathizer although he mentioned in passing Blair Peach suffering from a head injury from which he subsequently died he disingenuously added that the circumstances of this death are not fully known
00:31:41 death are not fully known detective assistant commissioner Helm knew perfectly well even the day after that that bland Peach had been killed by one of his officers the blame game had begun although Sir Charles Pollard a Chief
00:31:57 although Sir Charles Pollard a Chief Inspector in A8 in 1979 acknowledged that the special Patrol group occasionally went over the top it seems clear that the order of the day was to crack down with brutality on the local ethnic minority community and their
00:32:14 ethnic minority community and their left-wing supporters and inflict as much pain physical and psychological as possible
00:32:15 possible the political and cultural alignment of the police and the national front could not have been starving there is now plenty of credible evidence in the public domain about what really
00:32:26 in the public domain about what really happened in Southport despite repeated attempts over the years to suppress the truth by amongst others the Metropolitan Police and the coroner Dr John Burton who conducted the inquest into the death
00:32:42 who conducted the inquest into the death of Brad Peach David renton's article the killing of black Peach is an excellent
00:32:54 killing of black Peach is an excellent expose in the London Review of Books and highlights the Salient facts one on the 23rd of April 1979 2875 officers including 94 on Horseback were deployed to Southall to protect the rights of assembly of less than 100 National front sporters some of whom gave Nazi salutes
00:33:10 sporters some of whom gave Nazi salutes as they entered and exited the town hall two
00:33:12 two 14 eyewitnesses saw black Peach struck on the head with a truncheon by a police officer ten of whom gave evidence of the inquest
00:33:20 inquest black Peach was admitted to intensive care with a fractured skull he died in hospital
00:33:26 hospital three some 700 protesters against the national front were arrested and some 342 were charged most of them were young Asians from Southborough not a single
00:33:40 Asians from Southborough not a single National front supporter was arrested or charged
00:33:41 charged four
00:33:42 four Commander John Cass chief of the Metropolitan police's complaints investigation Bureau conducted an internal inquiry into the killing of blackbeach in June 1979 Commander Cass
00:34:02 blackbeach in June 1979 Commander Cass concluded in his first report that Vlad Peach was killed by one of six special Patrol group officers however he anonymized their names in September uh three months later the commander Cass set out further evidence in a second report implicating the six offices
00:34:13 offices five
00:34:20 five the director of public prosecutions Sir Thomas Hetherington decided that no police officer would be prosecuted either for the murder of Blair peach or of conspiracy to provoke the course of Justice
00:34:27 Justice six although the coroner Dr Burton had a copy of the first pass report he refused to disclose it to the family or their
00:34:38 to disclose it to the family or their lawyers during the inquist this was we submitted an outrageous breach of due process not to mention blatant judicial bias
00:34:44 bias seven
00:34:49 seven in June 1979 the lockers of the special Patrol room officers who were in Southall on the day were raided numerous offensive weapons were found including a leather covered skin two knives a very
00:35:03 leather covered skin two knives a very large truncheon a metal Kosh a crowbar and a whip eight
00:35:09 eight the cast reports were only published in April 2010 31 years after black Peach was killed the extraordinary delay in making these reports available to the
00:35:23 making these reports available to the public was indefensible and amounted we submit to a concerted cover-up by the state
00:35:24 state no
00:35:29 no David Renton names six special Patrol group officers in his article one of whom killed Blair Peach as Inspector Alan Murray police Constable greville bent police Constable James Scotto police Constable Anthony Richardson
00:35:42 police Constable Anthony Richardson police Constable Michael Freestone and police Constable Raymond white inspector Murray was commander cast's fine Prime subspect
00:35:59 subspect 10. in June 1980 Dr Burton sent the home office a draft of a controversial paper that he had written entitled The Blair Peach inquest the unpublished story this is subsequently come into the public domain in that paper he blamed the
00:36:10 domain in that paper he blamed the protesters against the national front for the killing of blood Beach he was at pains to stress that the national front acted peacefully and that one of their number had been seriously injured on his way home
00:36:24 way home he accused the civilian Witnesses at the inquest of fabrication claiming that they told palpable lies and did not have experience of the English system sufficient to give credible evidence he
00:36:36 sufficient to give credible evidence he went even further and accused protesters of bombarding the police with bricks despite the racism and lunacy of this paper Dr Burton was rewarded by the state and later became coroner of the Queen's household from 1987 to 2002.
00:36:54 Queen's household from 1987 to 2002. further support for the contention that the violence in public disorder in Southall was instigated and pre-planned by the police can be found in the material disclosed by The Enquirer
00:37:09 material disclosed by The Enquirer when he gave evidence during tranche one phase four the closed session hn 41 an SDS officer in 1979 says that he was warned by senior special Branch officers not to go to Southpaw with his Target group because the uniform police were going to clamp down on the
00:37:28 going to clamp down on the demonstrations and management considered the dangers were more than normal in short and in summary the police acted with impunity in Southco on the 23rd of April 1979. this was a full-scale
00:37:39 April 1979. this was a full-scale police instigated Riot against the local Asian community on the left Vlad Peach was killed at least three anti-fascists suffered fractured skulls and yet no
00:37:50 suffered fractured skulls and yet no police officer has ever been prosecuted for the killing of Blair peach or the serious assaults on Clarence Baker Tariq Ali and dozens of others who were beaten severely on the day or for any other offense for that magic
00:38:01 offense for that magic this itself speaks volumes about the reality of political policing and the role of the prosecuting authorities during this particular period turning briefly to the relevant legal
00:38:14 turning briefly to the relevant legal framework we are conscious that others are dealing with this in in far greater length it should be remembered that the United Kingdom government um had signed the European convention on human rights in 1951 and was one of the
00:38:28 human rights in 1951 and was one of the Prime movers in this significant attempt to uphold fundamental human rights following the defeat of fascism in the Second World War aside from this what protections did individual citizens of the UK have in
00:38:39 individual citizens of the UK have in the 1960s and 70s there was of course the Bill of Rights 1689 a court document of our unfortified constitution but a partial document at best that was principally drawn up to protect the
00:38:51 principally drawn up to protect the interests of the Protestant aristocracy in the city of London has represented at the time through Parliament and the crown and there was common law a Barney of Unwritten laws based on judicial
00:39:02 of Unwritten laws based on judicial precedence arising from the Appellate decisions of the court of appeal in the House of Lords over the past 300 years the inquiry will of course be carefully considering the relevant legal frame
00:39:16 considering the relevant legal frame rate the roles played by the highest echelons of the constabulary and by senior civil servants and politicians will be of particular interest to you sir other non-state Corp participants
00:39:27 sir other non-state Corp participants are making detailed submissions on these matters
00:39:28 matters whilst we welcome any findings or recommendations by The Inquirer that would allow the illegality of undercover policing to be inferred we want to
00:39:43 policing to be inferred we want to concentrate on the reasons why those in command of the institutions of the British state in 1968 um were more than happy to countenance intrusive Espionage on an industrial scale and why they were obsessed with secretly secrecy not just from the
00:39:58 secretly secrecy not just from the public but from Parliament too lest they be found out the reason is simple it's political of course all the institutions of the British state had a natural right-wing
00:40:09 British state had a natural right-wing bias their professed liberalism was only skin deep
00:40:10 skin deep importantly the leadership of both the labor party and the trade unions at the time were no exception to this innate conservativism they too were more than happy to collude with the police MI5 and
00:40:28 happy to collude with the police MI5 and other state institutions in opposing any threat to their control from the left one cannot ignore the fact that the special demonstrations Squad was formed in 1968 under the labor government apparel Wilson and under the direct
00:40:39 apparel Wilson and under the direct authority of James Callahan the then labor Home Secretary who later became prime minister in 1976. the
00:40:49 the initial justification in 1968 for setting up the SDS was of
00:41:02 in 1968 for setting up the SDS was of course the supposed public order threat from the Vietnam solidarity campaign demonstration in London against the Vietnam war that was planned for the 27th of October in fact
00:41:15 in fact MI5 had identified a change in political temperature and mood the previous year with the occupation of the Greek Embassy on the 28th of April 1967 which in turn was a response to the fascist coup by
00:41:29 was a response to the fascist coup by the Greek military just a week earlier the Greek dictatorship proceeded to torture and murder workers and students
00:41:40 torture and murder workers and students until it was finally overthrown in 1974. now the importance of the Greek Embassy occupation has not come to the foreign however it was clearly of importance to the police and MI5 the Royal Hellenic Embassy as it was officially called was situated in Upper
00:41:55 officially called was situated in Upper Brook Street only 30 yards away from the United States Embassy in Roman Square
00:42:09 United States Embassy in Roman Square this occupation of course had nothing to do with the Vietnam solidarity campaign it was largely organized by anarchists and members of the committee of 100 a British anti-war group nevertheless the occupation of an embassy in the heart of London and the prospect of the same happening to the U.S embassy triggered a certain amount of panic
00:42:21 triggered a certain amount of panic in the highest Circles of the British establishment it is also important to remember the background to events in 1968 when
00:42:34 the background to events in 1968 when the SDS was formed the sympathies of the British State at the time were not just with the democracies of Western Europe and the United States the United Kingdom was also in Alliance with fascist Portugal and fascist degrees both NATO
00:42:49 Portugal and fascist degrees both NATO members of the Giant and although Franco Spain another fascist country in Europe did not join NATO until 1982 it still enjoyed friendly ties at the time with the U.S and the UK
00:43:01 the U.S and the UK and of course between half a million and one and a half million people were killed during the Vietnam war after the United States invaded Vietnam in 1965. it was a combination of these close
00:43:18 it was a combination of these close alliances relationship and world events and many others I um this is a a short list of what was going on at the time that influenced the Outlook of those in power at the heart of the British State be they police officers civil servants soldiers spies or politicians
00:43:30 soldiers spies or politicians now there's one matter in relation to this not touched on anywhere not least because we accepted this beyond the remit of this inquiry namely the
00:43:42 remit of this inquiry namely the involvement of the U.S in spying on the Vietnam soil Galaxy campaign particularly their Central Intelligence Agency the CIA both through links with their counterparts in MI5 and through
00:43:56 their counterparts in MI5 and through diplomatic channels in 1967 the CIA had set up the chaos program to counter anti-war groups in the U.S this entailed investigations into some 7 000 anti-war
00:44:08 investigations into some 7 000 anti-war protesters there this program was later characterized as a massive and legal domestic intelligence operation against the anti-war movement and other discipline groups it is interesting that the first major Target for the novel spying operation
00:44:27 Target for the novel spying operation launched in London in 1968 was also an anti-war room namely the VSC there is little doubt that the CIA spied on American activists in London who were active in the VSC and we can fairly assume we submit that they were given SDS product via MI5
00:44:43 SDS product via MI5 it has always been our contention that the public order justification for setting up the SDS was a smoke stream for a simple public order failure by the police and we repeat that again we invited the inquiry to obtain
00:44:55 we invited the inquiry to obtain evidence from the National Council for civil liberties archives which are held at the University of Holland that was declined but we have had various news clippings
00:45:08 clippings from the press and some TV reports uploaded onto the system contemporaneous from the time these mainstream media reports were necessarily partial and subject to the prejudices of the day
00:45:25 in the recent disclosure the inquiry released several documents concerning the role of civil servants in the home office together with MI5 and others in setting up committees on subversion and public life
00:45:39 life some of these documents allude to the role of the information research Department the ird a shadow shadowy unit within the foreign Commonwealth office specifically tasked to plan stories in
00:45:51 specifically tasked to plan stories in the media by political opposition from the left
00:45:57 the left certain newspapers and of course the BBC who had a dedicated MI5 agent working within their premises to monitor material pre-broadcast we're happy to ask as actors conduits for ird misinformation we know that various media heads met
00:46:11 we know that various media heads met directly with the Home Secretary James Callahan for the purposes of being on side with the government's plan for the VSC demonstration in October of 1968
00:46:27 VSC demonstration in October of 1968 they were directly briefed however we do not know what stories were planted in the media by the ird or even by the Metropolitan Police themselves we posit that the hype and hysteria about the demonstration in October was a product of state agencies with a complicit media
00:46:38 complicit media it made good copy and it provided for the establishment and continuation of the SDS it was a virtuous circle for the police as it provided the necessary
00:46:51 police as it provided the necessary justification for the new unit they were setting out another result of the unrest at Grosvenor Square in March 1968 was the setting up of a small unit of a dozen
00:47:05 setting up of a small unit of a dozen officers in New Scotland Yard called A8 under superintendent Kenneth Newman initially reporting to the deputy assistant commissioner for operations and dedicated to public order planning the uniform branch of the Metropolitan
00:47:22 the uniform branch of the Metropolitan Police was unhappy understandably about what had happened in Grosvenor square and did not wish to rely simply on better intelligence their complaints to the commander of special abroads Vic Gilbert that they did not get Top Class intelligence about the VSC in advance of the March 1968
00:47:34 the VSC in advance of the March 1968 demonstration it was a Blame Game to cover up their own public order failures in Grosvenor Square ah was the response of the uniform
00:47:51 ah was the response of the uniform branch and it was clearly effective on its own terms regardless of any Top Class intelligence or any other intelligence for that matter John krakno a former senior officer in A8
00:48:00 A8 states that their own intelligence was based on reading the morning star and simply meeting with protest organizers which he calls a very good mechanism for gathering information Tony speed while stating for the record
00:48:13 Tony speed while stating for the record that ah heavily relied on special Branch credit assessments for operational planning in fact puts little real value on those very same threat assessments
00:48:25 on those very same threat assessments indeed he says that special Branch would occasionally overstate matters and they were not always right many years later in 1997 the association of chief police officers recommended that all public order intelligence be taken over by the uniform Branch such
00:48:41 taken over by the uniform Branch such little value would take place on special Branch intelligence Sir Charles Pollard mentioned previously involved in the heart of AAA planning was also
00:48:54 heart of AAA planning was also dismissive of the intelligence provided by special groups this is what he says it was irrelevant to me to know about planned violence as I had to prepare for the worst case scenario in any event it was it was about covering our backs in evidential terms it's a shame that
00:49:12 in evidential terms it's a shame that the entire A8 archive seems to have been lost or destroyed this would have shown that special Branch input was only a minor part of a8's public order planning and did not provide any justification for SDS activity and so we reiterate again there was no
00:49:27 and so we reiterate again there was no need for the SDS to be formed even after the events um at Grosvenor Square in March 68. in tranche 1 phase three we were fortunate to hear live evidence from Roy creamer a former a former SDS officer
00:49:40 former a former SDS officer um an officer who the inquiry had initially decided not to call but um after several of the non-state Corp participant teams recognizes recognizing his importance asked for reconsideration
00:49:57 his importance asked for reconsideration of that decision we are pleased that the decision was reversed and Roy cream Roy creamer was able to give evidence and it's fair to say Sir that he has been one of the few special Branch voices from whom the inquiries heard was given
00:50:10 from whom the inquiries heard was given some credible evidence about the events between 1968 and 1982. Roy creamer was of the view that the SDS will be wound
00:50:23 of the view that the SDS will be wound up after the largely peaceful conclusion to the October 68 March he was the of the view that the SDS could not pick up any valuable public order intelligence by undercover methods the old school methods as far as he was
00:50:36 old school methods as far as he was concerned were perfectly sufficient he found the idea that ah would benefit from special Branch threat assessments laughable and he was right
00:50:48 laughable and he was right there was never any genuine public order justification for the setting up of the secret unit it is of note that a later special Branch report from 1977 reflecting on the successful successful policing of the VSC demonstration in
00:51:05 policing of the VSC demonstration in October 1968 stated that Mutual aid from other police forces ensuring that the police were always present in massive numbers was the key to success that
00:51:21 numbers was the key to success that finally ended the very violent Demos in Grosvenor Square in other words it was just sensible public order policing based on obvious tactical tactical considerations that stopped public disorder it had nothing to do with intelligence obtained by undercover offices
00:51:35 offices Council to the inquiry in his closing State accepts that it is difficult to assess the actual contribution of undercover policing to the outcome of the VSC
00:51:46 policing to the outcome of the VSC demonstration in October 1968 but he
00:51:57 demonstration in October 1968 but he adds we say too generously that it might be said that the SDS reports on the VSC were timely and authoritative and consequently provided Assurance to those planning the police response thereby helping to avoid an overreaction unsurprisingly Council for the
00:52:09 unsurprisingly Council for the Metropolitan Police Service and the designated lawyer officer Group Well considerably further and maintain in their closing statements that the
00:52:20 their closing statements that the contribution of SD and S intelligence to the outcome of the October 1968 demonstration was significant and yet no
00:52:31 demonstration was significant and yet no specific pieces of intelligence obtained by the SDS prior to the October 1968 demonstration had been identified by anybody
00:52:37 anybody that contributed to there having been only limited public disorder in October by contrast with March
00:52:49 by contrast with March and that's a significant point we submit the idea that the SDS were gathering
00:53:01 the idea that the SDS were gathering intelligence to prevent public disorder was a convenient fiction a joke played on their own officers hn 41 just one example
00:53:05 example um it was one of many officers who simply did not understand that the SDS officers on the ground were being manipulated by forces way above their pay grade
00:53:18 their pay grade turning next sir to an important discrete topic which others have touched upon already as well
00:53:30 as well namely the policing of the far right why is it
00:53:34 why is it that throughout the period from 1968 to 1982.
00:53:36 1982. the SDS did not deploy a single undercover officer into any far-right organizations other than the accidental deployment of an officer who had
00:53:49 deployment of an officer who had infiltrated the workers revolutionary party and was deployed by them to infiltrate the national front why despite the growth excuse me up the far right
00:54:02 excuse me up the far right despite their increasing extremism during the 1970s and despite the concomitant rise in racist violence nationally where was the supposed regard of the SDS for public order when it came to
00:54:15 for public order when it came to fascists and now these Nazis supporters now the answer I'm afraid is to be found in the very nature of Institutions like
00:54:26 in the very nature of Institutions like the police special Branch MI5 the armed forces and the Civil Service the Inconvenient Truth is that there was a national a natural crossover between far-right organizations like the
00:54:37 far-right organizations like the national front and the British movement and key institutions of the British State it's true we accept that special Branch had e-squad um a squad that was partially dedicated to maintaining a watch on the far right
00:54:49 to maintaining a watch on the far right but throughout this period in any event senior officers we would say incredibly viewed the national front as a legitimate political organization that
00:55:03 legitimate political organization that was neither a threat to public order nor subversive despite the fact that the national front from its very Inception in 1967
00:55:16 in 1967 was a party of self-avowed fascists and white supremacists committed to the expulsion of all nine non-white immigrants from the United Kingdom and former SDS officer Angus McIntosh
00:55:28 and former SDS officer Angus McIntosh said that the SDS was standing ready to infiltrate the far right if necessary but this was never approved or ordered in his time he believed that this was a high-level policy decision
00:55:40 high-level policy decision as an example and it's but one of the respectful relationship between the police and the far right
00:55:55 between the police and the far right there is an Illuminating special Branch report from September 1968. when an SDS officer hn332 and a detective inspector on the direction of a chief superintendent visited Lady Jane Burwood birdwood a
00:56:08 visited Lady Jane Burwood birdwood a notorious fascist and anti-semite and had a chat with her in her garden while she railed against the Vietnam sauderity campaign it was all politeness and deference when the officers even
00:56:24 deference when the officers even thanking her for her interest what a far cry from how the police treat to this day ordinary left-wing activists
00:56:37 activists later in July 1977 a special Branch detective inspector visited Martin Webster a national front leader at their Teddington headquarters to inquire about their plans for their forthcoming lewisham demonstration
00:56:51 lewisham demonstration only to find Mr Webster's attitude uncooperative this did not however provoke special Branch to infiltrate a national front the inquiry must ask itself we submit
00:57:12 the inquiry must ask itself we submit why the sdns was so uninterested in the far right between 1968 and 1982 given the far rights Neo-Nazi politics and their undoubted role in fueling the sharp rise of racist attacks against ethnic minorities Nationals an obvious answer is that the police were themselves institutionally racist and
00:57:32 themselves institutionally racist and right-win one might even go further and say that the police were in natural recruiting ground for far-right organizations one of the inevitable and tragic consequences of the failure of the police that tackle the far right
00:57:48 police that tackle the far right was that the number of racist attacks against ethnic minorities in this country continue to increase dramatically during the 1970s 1980s and
00:58:00 dramatically during the 1970s 1980s and 1990s as we shall see uh in branches two and three
00:58:10 and three cut the police taken steps to crack down on the far right during the 1970s and the perpetrators of racist violence generally
00:58:11 generally lives that was subsequently lost over the years could potentially have been saved
00:58:20 saved the other side of the coin is of course racist policing a serious problem that has plagued relations between the police and ethnic minority communities for decades this again will come more to
00:58:37 decades this again will come more to light in future tranches and we submit continues to be a largely unresolved problem to this day there was also far-right Terror against the left with the fire bombing of left-wing premises and bookshops
00:58:49 left-wing premises and bookshops in 1979 a member of the national front Alan Berkeley was charged with possession of explosives linked to 24 such attacks targets included in the anarchist Bookshop freedom Houseman Bookshop news from nowhere
00:59:05 Houseman Bookshop news from nowhere Bookshop Brighton resource center and the home of Peter hay the full story of far-right terror in the UK has not been told because it's
00:59:17 the UK has not been told because it's organized nature was largely ignored by the police and the prosecuting authorities during this period almost all of those arrested and prosecuted of a far-right persuasion were conveniently mischaracterized as lone wolves no
00:59:29 mischaracterized as lone wolves no wonder the police were viewed by the left as sympathetic to the far right they were
00:59:39 there is no question standing back and looking at this period now many years later that the failure of the police to crack down on the far right led directly to violence on the
00:59:56 right led directly to violence on the streets as the violence fled the police inevitably called for greater funding and more Weaponry by 1982 following uprisings in many cities in the UK the police were openly calling for armored vehicles rubber bullets CS Gas and Water cabinets and indeed Chief Constable
01:00:14 cabinets and indeed Chief Constable James anderton of the greater Manchester police ordered submachine guns for his officers in 1981 acting he said under the Royal prerogative but without any authorization from his own police Authority
01:00:25 Authority in the circumstances it's difficult not to postulate whether the apparent blindness of the police to increasing far-right violence and criminality during the 1970s was not in fact a
01:00:38 during the 1970s was not in fact a deliberate tactic a strategy of tension if you will to enhance the role and power of the police while simultaneously blaming unrest and public disorder on the left finally on this topic we note what
01:00:52 finally on this topic we note what council to the inquiry and Council for the designated lawyer officer group said in their closing statements about why the SDS did not Target the fire far right between 1968 and 1982. helpful to
01:01:10 right between 1968 and 1982. helpful to the inquiries said that the most likely reason was that there were alternative sources of intelligence available on the far right
01:01:16 far right Council for the designated lawyer officer group said that the reason that the SDS did not Target the far right was not because of political bias it was
01:01:29 not because of political bias it was because there was no need to do so there were other secret and reliable sources of Intelligence on the far right now all of this is rather cryptic what other sources of intelligence are we talking
01:01:51 sources of intelligence are we talking about special Branch intelligence are we talking about other Metropolitan Police intelligence I'll be talking about MI5 intelligence why not even this is a public environment inquiry into undercover policing spell it out openly and transparently so that the inquiry can properly evaluate whether political
01:02:09 can properly evaluate whether political bias was at play as we submitted was and if so to what extent there is
01:02:10 there is I'm afraid something more Sinister at play here we raise it whether the inquiry is prepared to
01:02:23 whether the inquiry is prepared to countenance it or not because we believe it is important we submit that far from being concerned about violence on the streets many in
01:02:34 about violence on the streets many in the metropolitan police both senior and Junior officers positively relish it it would be extraordinarily naive to believe
01:02:42 believe as Council for the designated lawyer officer group posited on Monday in his closing statement that the police were politically neutral and caught in the middle between the left and the right
01:02:57 middle between the left and the right the history of the British police being used in a political context has always always been to attack the working class and the left be it Bloody Sunday in Trafalgar Square in 1887.
01:03:14 Trafalgar Square in 1887. the Tony Pandy riots in 1910 and 1911 the general strike of 1926 the national hunger March in 1932 the Battle of cable Street in 1936 the attacks on CND and other left
01:03:37 the attacks on CND and other left protesters in the 1960s or endless other examples that we could have provided the SDS annual reports in the 1970s contained that the more militant protests of the 1960s had in fact died Away by the 1970s and as such the
01:03:48 Away by the 1970s and as such the supposed public order threat from the left had receded
01:03:59 left had receded counsel to the inquiries conclusion that there was a strong case that SDS should have been disbanded in 1976 is clearly consistent with that evidence
01:04:13 we now have further disclosure from A8 officers and their assessment of the relevance of special Branch threat assessments the prospect of violence during a protest was almost entirely dependent on the attitude of the police the pickets and protests that turned violence sometimes began with pushing
01:04:26 violence sometimes began with pushing and shoving this was fairly routine on pickets and protests and something unified police would normally handle without Resort attractions but time and time again senior police officers were happy to create the conditions for
01:04:44 happy to create the conditions for violence by ordering weapons to be drawn and ordering charges on unarmed protesters the sea squad intelligence sent to A8 acted on the minds of senior officers
01:04:56 acted on the minds of senior officers and produced we say a mindset that the only people on protests were a marginalized bunch of long-haired students and trotskys who the police love
01:05:05 love the senior officers the A8 made their plans for Red Lion Square in 1974 the Brunswick dispute from 1976 to 1978
01:05:19 Brunswick dispute from 1976 to 1978 lewisham in 1977 South all in 1979 and many other um demonstrations and protests without taking the slightest notice of any sea squad threat Assessments in fact the opposite was the case the c-squad threat
01:05:31 opposite was the case the c-squad threat assessments acted as a justification for the police attacking with impunity those who they perceived as their political opponents the police would protect
01:05:43 opponents the police would protect National front marches but fight with anti-fascist counter protesters having effective control over the narrative through a compliant media ensured that the police could
01:05:55 ensured that the police could subsequently justify their actions the relationship between special Branch specifically sea squad and a h is worth further scrutiny Roy creamer again
01:06:08 Roy creamer again has provided three witness statements in the inquiry as well as giving live evidence he recalled that the threat assessments provided by sea squad to A8 were telling them what they knew
01:06:19 were telling them what they knew it was not necessary in his opinion to provide intelligence to A8 as they already had it from local divisions and more significantly from the organizers of the protest themselves he did not ever recall getting feedback
01:06:33 he did not ever recall getting feedback from A8 on the intelligence provided by c-spawn
01:06:34 c-spawn so Charles Pollard formerly in A8 and later a detective assistant commissioner supports what Roy creamer has to say
01:06:46 supports what Roy creamer has to say to quote him if we found out about an upcoming demo from the organizers we would inform special branch and tell them what was going to happen rather amusingly on a Thursday we would then get a file marked secret with exactly
01:06:59 get a file marked secret with exactly the same information we had given them the result of all of this was extraordinary levels of police violence at Redline Square in 1974 we say a Mounted Police Officer was almost
01:07:10 Mounted Police Officer was almost certainly responsible for the death of Kevin gatesley regardless of what Lord scarmon's report may say about the matter
01:07:21 matter before the Battle of lewisham in 1977 looking at that briefly the local MP and the bishop of Southern amongst others urged the new Metropolitan Police Commissioner David McNee to ban the upcoming National front March through
01:07:38 upcoming National front March through illusion it was clearly provocative and would inevitably meet with resistance from the local community special Branch intelligence was quite clear
01:07:51 clear the quote the scene is set for a violent afternoon quote a potentially ugly and violent confrontation must be anticipating but even without this intelligence it was blindingly obvious that the national front marching through a multi-racial community with a high ethnic minority
01:08:07 community with a high ethnic minority population in 1977 was bound to lead to trouble now this was hardly rocket science
01:08:12 science Roy creamer was surprised as he thought it was clear that the national front March should be banned but but commissioner mcnean and assistant commissioner Gibson opposed the ban according to assistant commissioner Gibson there was a good
01:08:27 commissioner Gibson there was a good case for resisting any call for a ban on the National Fund March as if the March was banned a precedent would be set and the National Fund would be unable to hold any marches in London but ban would
01:08:40 hold any marches in London but ban would be welcomed by the left and presented by the right
01:08:41 the right those quotes by assistant commissioner
01:08:53 those quotes by assistant commissioner Gibson tell you sir all you need to know about the ideology of the police in the 1970s and their policing priorities as commissioner mcnean refused to exercise his powers under the public order act 1936 the case was taken to the
01:09:04 order act 1936 the case was taken to the high court by the local MP and others in response commissioner McNeese submitted an affidavit remarkably and mendaciously he stated that no serious public disorder would ensue and no information
01:09:24 disorder would ensue and no information was available as to the counter protest consequently the high court refused to order a ban a political decision had been deliberately engineered by the police at the highest level the national French March would be looked after by the Metropolitan Police and police
01:09:40 the Metropolitan Police and police serials equipped with riot shields for the very first time in England when responsible the containment of the counter protesters is it any surprise that the events of the day are recorded by history as the battle of lewisham as
01:10:00 by history as the battle of lewisham as any fair-minded objective Observer could grimly have predicted what happened Master's daughter broke out on the streets of lewisham the Metropolitan Police took the opportunity to test their new public order tactics and the labor government failed to intervene the
01:10:22 labor government failed to intervene the subsequent killing of Blair peach by the police in Southall two years later was the apogee of this period of police brutality against the left ultimately both protest and public disorder arise from objective conditions they cannot be willed into existence
01:10:37 willed into existence occasionally this has been recognized by the police only occasionally but at least occasionally a special Branch report into the Brixton Riots of 1981 for example
01:10:49 Riots of 1981 for example an event that bookends charge one of the inquiring concluded that there was almost no involvement by the left in these events in fact they had almost no
01:11:01 these events in fact they had almost no presence in the local community it was a purely spontaneous Uprising by local people
01:11:02 people triggered by racist targeting by the Metropolitan Police against a background of years and years of racist policing and deprivation once again the involvement of the
01:11:16 once again the involvement of the special control group here is part of operation swamp as the trigger for serious violence in Brixton simply
01:11:27 serious violence in Brixton simply underlines the brutal nature of British political policing during this period turning next to the relationship between the SDS and MI5
01:11:33 MI5 the true role of the SDS we say was spying on behalf of the MI5 MI5 had seen the value of this new unit from the
01:11:46 the value of this new unit from the outset and no doubt could not believe their luck in 1968 mi5's domestic counter subversion effort was primarily concentrated on the Communist Party of Great Britain they had little coverage
01:12:00 Great Britain they had little coverage of other groups on the left or Anarchist groups mainly because such groups represented no serious threat in a 1967 report on subversion MI5 assessed
01:12:11 report on subversion MI5 assessed trotskyism in the UK as presenting only a limited threat but once MI5
01:12:24 a limited threat but once MI5 saw how the SDS worked in operation with that collateral approach of sweeping wide they realized that they could Hoover up via the SDS large amounts of Intelligence on his range of groups regardless of their political importance
01:12:35 political importance five years previously
01:12:48 five years previously in 1963 whilst investigating the profumo affair Lord Denning had pronounced it a cardinal principle that MI5 operations and I quote are to be used for one purpose and one purpose only the defense of the realm they are not to be used so
01:13:00 of the realm they are not to be used so as to pry into any man's private conduct or business Affairs or even into his political opinions except even so far as they are subversing that is they would contemplate the Overflow of the government by and law for means most
01:13:16 government by and law for means most people in this country would I am sure wholeheartedly support this principle for it would be intolerable to us to have anything in the nature of a Gestapo
01:13:28 have anything in the nature of a Gestapo or secret beliefs to Snoop into all that we do let alone into our borrowers and quote
01:13:29 quote now whether Lord Denning um was being disingenuous or whether he was simply ignorant of the role of the M of MI5 we do not know
01:13:40 of MI5 we do not know but he was plainly wrong industrial scale snooping did not begin with the SDS
01:13:56 with the SDS by 1968 the MI5 registry already had a card index system of fires that kept information on between six hundred thousand and a million people in the UK it is reported in the recent disclosure that the police hardly ever refused a
01:14:11 that the police hardly ever refused a request from MI5 numerous reports show how MI5 wind and down special Branch offices in the local pubs of Mayfair and the special Branch offices locked it up
01:14:24 the special Branch offices locked it up of course for MI5 the SDS had discovered offered plausible deniability it was purely a police operation and the Metropolitan Police could hop on about public order as their justification it was a perfect MI5 operation product of almost every single SDS
01:14:36 product of almost every single SDS report went to MI5 thousands of files were up of course MI5 did not believe everything they were told they had their own agents and could cross-check information and produce a more recent
01:14:47 information and produce a more recent analysis they were probably cognizant of the fact that undercover police officers needed on occasion to over elaborate to justify their continued existence
01:14:59 justify their continued existence however the significance of this vast intelligence operation was that thousands of ordinary citizens who had done nothing more than go to a meeting or a demonstration or join a lawful left-wing organization were reported at
01:15:12 left-wing organization were reported at an occasion denied employment and even a career
01:15:13 career lives were damaged even destroyed let's make no bones about it and the police in MI5 simply didn't care because their targets were as Margaret Thatcher when
01:15:27 targets were as Margaret Thatcher when prime minister later declared the Enemy Within
01:15:30 Within it's for this reason that Tariq Ali was shocked when he appeared on the BBC troop spies documentary in 2002 to learn that the VSC and the international Marxist group had been infiltrated by undercover police officers he fully
01:15:44 undercover police officers he fully expected the routine surveillance as described by Roy creamer the simple monitoring of meetings and literature telephone tapping even informers but to infiltrate themselves into people's lives and homes even their bets as
01:16:02 lives and homes even their bets as long-term agents was not something even the Metropolitan Police had ever done before
01:16:03 before this relationship between the SDS and MI5 was described by Roy creamer as a master servant one and we submit this was entirely correct Roy creamer felt that c-squad were very much treated as
01:16:15 that c-squad were very much treated as messenger Boys by MI5 he recalled that 80 of the bread and butter work of most c-squad officers was fulfilling MI5
01:16:26 c-squad officers was fulfilling MI5 requests as he put in we would not take the initiative on political extremists we were guided entirely by what MI5 felt to be subversed
01:16:38 to be subversed in 1984 sir Brian coven permanent under Secretary of State at the home office query whether a chief Constable could in fact as opposed to in theory declined to accept a task which MI5 wished special Branch to carry out
01:16:54 special Branch SDS reporting on activists gave MI5 a huge base of information for their vetting activity a major concern at the state has always been to keep left-wingers or those
01:17:06 been to keep left-wingers or those deemed subversive out of the civil servants the media and Industry of course we do not know what other use was made of the information gathering but we know the information included the
01:17:18 but we know the information included the slightest details about people's private lives their Partners their sexual orientation the sort of title tackle that could easily be used to unsettle or even blacken it Black Ops is a normal part of intelligence work
01:17:42 notwithstanding that's Soviet relationship the met and special Branch were occasionally uneasy about MI5 and sought to protect their undercover officers they didn't fully Express their MI5 all the time and hence did not share information about the identity of their
01:17:55 information about the identity of their undercover offices in the field and this is the reason why uh the reports list undercover officers that attendees frequently to hide their identity the worry was that as MI5 relied on both informers and long-term agents the officers might be compromised perhaps
01:18:14 officers might be compromised perhaps even to build up an MI5 agent's cover the murky world of spine was a dirty business indeed during the 1970s some labor MPS encounters up and down the country finally began raising questions about the conduct of the
01:18:28 questions about the conduct of the police including special Branch outside London the counties had police authorities and police annual reports Were Meant to go to them but these reports were largely silent about special Branch activity MPS and counselors wanted Democratic
01:18:40 MPS and counselors wanted Democratic accountability of the police including special branch in London of course the situation was different the Home Secretary was the police Authority for the metropolis and hence the
01:18:51 the metropolis and hence the Metropolitan Police was accountable to an elected politician in 1981 Ken Livingston was elected
01:19:02 in 1981 Ken Livingston was elected leader of the greater London Council the GLC a campaign later began to make the GLC the police Authority for the Metropolis in line with other police forces around the country concurrently Parliament was persuaded to examine the
01:19:13 Parliament was persuaded to examine the activity of special branch and gave this work to the home Affairs select committee these two actions led to Fury and Terror within the heart of the British establishment the Met akpo MI5 and home office civil servants
01:19:24 and home office civil servants effectively colluded to mislead Parliament and cover up the existence of the SDS they feared political embarrassment because they knew what
01:19:35 embarrassment because they knew what they were doing was anti-democratic and wrong sir I note the time I think I'll just be about two three minutes more I hope that's okay foreign
01:19:51 special branch in MI5 went into overdrive to spy on and report on the GLC and those engaged in police monitoring horrified at the idea that the police could be democratically
01:20:02 the police could be democratically accountable at all at all let alone to a left meaning GLC will undoubtedly hear more about this in tranche too our Democratic elected politicians sadly were hoodricked they were assured by the blandishments of the executive the civil
01:20:17 blandishments of the executive the civil servants and the police that nothing was admits had they in fact been allowed to pursue their mandate properly and had they discovered the existence of the SDS and their spying operations it is almost certain that the SDS would have been wound up and heads would have wrote
01:20:30 wound up and heads would have wrote notwithstanding the best efforts of the police and their allies in government nothing could stop the sheer momentum of those campaigning for greater police accountability and during tranches two and three we will undoubtedly discover the full extent of that spying on
01:20:44 the full extent of that spying on Justice campaigns and others at the Forefront of this um important movement in conclusion sir there was we submit something rotten at the heart of the
01:20:59 something rotten at the heart of the British State between 1968 and 1982 as secret political policing became increasingly entrenched within the security apparatus of the state the greatest lie in this inquiry
01:21:11 the greatest lie in this inquiry is that SDS and MI5 operations were to prevent public disorder and protect parliamentary democracy this was just a veneer the police MI5 and their allies in the Civil Service and government
01:21:24 in the Civil Service and government above all served their own interests if there is something called the British establishment it is this concurrence of political and ideological interests that are so profoundly anti-democratic in nature if there was any threat
01:21:41 nature if there was any threat to parliamentary democracy post 1968 it was never from the left so that completes our tranche one closing statement on behalf of Tariq Ali Ernie Tate and Pierce Coleman thank you very much indeed and um
01:21:56 thank you very much indeed and um I'm grateful to you for finishing nearly on time thank you
01:31:23 Mr Scooby thank you sir I appear with Piers Mark with some dirty Street Chambers and Paul Herron of public interest Law Center and this is
01:31:39 public interest Law Center and this is our closing submission for tranche one of the undercover policing inquiry on behalf of our Three core participants Richard chesum Mary and Lindsay German
01:31:56 Mary and Lindsay German an issue has been raised in respect of our submissions potentially breaching parliamentary privilege accordingly uh perhaps cautiously we have for the for the time being made redactions to our submissions we will
01:32:12 redactions to our submissions we will consider the law on the issue and return to these areas at the beginning of the tranche 2 period we address the key issues on behalf of Richard Chisholm and Mary in our phase two opening statement
01:32:25 two opening statement on our phase three opening statement we focused on Lindsey German who was a member of the Socialist Workers Party from 1972 with roles on the Central Committee of that party for more than 30 years
01:32:39 years we ask at this closing statement this is right alongside those documents we are grateful to the inquiry for allowing us additional time to present our closing submission however we ask
01:32:50 our closing submission however we ask those who are listening to consider this statement alongside the published written version which is detailed fully referenced and available on the public interest Law Center website
01:33:02 interest Law Center website in this closing statement we'll demonstrate six principal points number one the Rick Clark deployment was not simply an intelligence gathering exercise it was designed with the
01:33:22 exercise it was designed with the knowledge and approval of special branch managers and MI5 to undermine a democratic organization
01:33:33 democratic organization Point number two this undermining of a democratic organization was one of a range of countermeasures endorsed by government but number three post 1972 the principal purpose of the SDS was not to assist with maintaining public order
01:33:49 with maintaining public order its task in conjunction with MI5 was to spy on citizens who were politically active particularly in the Trade union movement
01:34:04 movement Point number four government new and approved encouraged and enabled the continuation of the SDS 0.5 from as early as 1975 the SDS management knew of undercover officer
01:34:15 management knew of undercover officer sexual relationships with their targets and six point number six the the public
01:34:26 and six point number six the the public were continually deceived by government as to the function and tasking of special branch part one the Rick Clark deployment this inquiry started with a
01:34:37 this inquiry started with a preconception that the deployment of hn297 Richard Clark Rick Gibson was unremarkable the evidence of Richard Chatham and Mary was critical in
01:34:49 Chatham and Mary was critical in demonstrating that that preconception was misconceived and that led to recognition from the inquiry that a mistake had been made in that prejudging of a deployment
01:35:04 of a deployment that recognition was both welcome and encouraging the known facts about Clark's deployment are as follows he dishonestly appropriated the identity of a child who had died
01:35:16 a child who had died he was deployed directly into a university with the troop side movement as his pre-deployment Target he
01:35:29 as his pre-deployment Target he established a branch of the troop side movement where one had not previously existed
01:35:30 existed he encouraged others to assist him in that endeavor when they did so he opened files on them and reported on them in
01:35:42 files on them and reported on them in Richard chesson's case that led to his lifelong blacklisting Clark spent time in the home addresses of these people abusing their hospitality and embarking on sexual
01:35:54 hospitality and embarking on sexual relationships with at least two of them he rose incrementally to the top of the troop side movement taking over higher
01:36:06 troop side movement taking over higher positions of responsibility within the movement an undertaking executive actions that can only have destabilized it
01:36:16 it and we're plainly likely to destabilize it he then attempted to use that position to decapitate the whole movement whilst ingratiating himself with big flame and embarking on at least
01:36:35 with big flame and embarking on at least two further sexual relationships he only stopped because his activity was discovered big flame activities activists confronted him with his birth and death certificates the outing of Richard Clark was so significant for the SDS then it went
01:36:48 significant for the SDS then it went down and SDS folklore and was used as a
01:37:00 down and SDS folklore and was used as a cautionary tale for decades all of that is now established and because it is established a more important set of issues arises in respect of each one of Clark's actions and his objectives the question is why
01:37:13 is why ultimately why was this officer put where he was to do what he did Richard chesson was able to come to educated conclusions about some of the reasons for what Clarke did
01:37:28 reasons for what Clarke did basing those conclusions on his first hand experience of the man and the movement and on the documents that have been displaced ultimately Jason could not give any definitive answer as to why
01:37:45 definitive answer as to why nor of course could Clark himself he died some years ago Jeffrey Kraft was the SDS inspector from early 1974. until some point in 1976
01:37:56 early 1974. until some point in 1976 when he became the Chief Inspector a role that he remained until the Autumn of
01:38:03 of 1977. he was there for a managing officer of the SDS throughout Clark's deployment which lasted from December 1974 to September 1970 to 1976
01:38:28 1974 to September 1970 to 1976 in addition 1981 to 1983 draft was Chief superintendent special branch in charge of s-squad with the SDS as his biggest responsibility craft was best placed to assist the inquiry in respect to Rick Clark's
01:38:40 inquiry in respect to Rick Clark's remarkable deployment anything that is remarkable is likely to be memorable
01:38:51 remarkable is likely to be memorable we submitted over 70 pages of questions for Council to the inquiry to ask Jeffrey craft each question was supported by reference documentary evidence setting a context
01:39:04 documentary evidence setting a context foundation and rationale for asking it we have published the full set of questions on the public interest Law Center website those questions were key to
01:39:17 those questions were key to understanding both the Rick Clark deployment and because it was so significant all of the deployments that followed
01:39:25 followed because of that significance we submitted those questions to the inquiry far in advance to the deadline for doing so to ensure they could be properly
01:39:40 so to ensure they could be properly considered and included in canceled the inquiries questions
01:39:51 inquiries questions many of the key questions were not asked we don't know why it may be that the inquiry already has in mind the documentary evidence and the strong inferences that can be drawn from them but if there had been preconceptions about Jeffrey Kraft based perhaps on his career trajectory or the
01:40:08 perhaps on his career trajectory or the subjective character references of some of the officers who served under him we asked the inquiry to exercise great caution the Rick Clark deployment is very important to this inquiry
01:40:20 very important to this inquiry it is far-reaching implications in respect of the use to which the unit was put
01:40:27 put and the tactics that it used it will be very fortunate and convenient for many of the state core participants if the inquiry were to find that Clark
01:40:43 if the inquiry were to find that Clark was a Maverick officer who was acting on his own
01:40:48 his own on the evidence that is not a realistic conclusion it is not sustainable to conclude that Clark did what he did off his own bat or was running wild we are going to reference as much of
01:41:00 we are going to reference as much of that documentary ever evidence that we included in our questions as we can in the time available then we're going to
01:41:14 the time available then we're going to invite you to draw conclusions from them that we suggest are inescapable positions of responsibility the key aspect to Rick Clark's deployment was that he set up a branch as a troop side movement and some
01:41:25 as a troop side movement and some subsequently Rose to the top of the movement nationally Mr Craft's position as that set out in his statement was that he knew absolutely nothing about it
01:41:37 absolutely nothing about it in his oral evidence to the inquiry he conceded
01:41:43 conceded as he had to that if an officer were to take a position of high office in a political organization that would risk influencing the freedom of expression and political action of the group
01:41:56 the group he was then asked the following question Mr craft
01:42:03 Mr craft if you had known that Richard Clark had risen to high office in the troop side movement
01:42:11 movement including becoming the convener to the National Secretariat would you have approved
01:42:15 approved unsurprisingly following such a leading question
01:42:16 question he answered no
01:42:22 no that question is as interesting as the answer it presupposes that Kraft was telling the truth when he said that he knew nothing at all it also presupposes that Rick Clark did what he did
01:42:33 that Rick Clark did what he did without approval these are dangerous preconceptions they bury the truth they
01:42:48 preconceptions they bury the truth they set Rick Clark up to take the fall for a deployment that did impact on the political action and freedom of expression of the troop side movement they are as wrong as the preconception that his deployment was unremarkable
01:43:00 unremarkable Chief Inspector craft did know that Clark had targeted the movement and set up the branch he did know that Clark had risen to the highest office in the in the in the movement and he did prove it
01:43:17 the in the movement and he did prove it he also did know that Clark undertook a number of actions that inevitably impacted on the political action and freedom of expression of the movement he approved that to of course there's the obvious
01:43:35 of course there's the obvious inconsistency between the account of a Chief Inspector maintaining that he employed the highest levels of monitoring and supervision while simultaneously not noticing an officer's 21-month meteoric rise to the movements hierarchy
01:43:50 movements hierarchy to accept that will be stretching credulity the breaking point it's all the more incredible when one looks at Craft's code of how often he looked at the reports of his officers
01:44:06 looked at the reports of his officers he would only see reports if there was something particularly interesting in them and would not sign them unless there was something specifically to sign the fact is that the report from Clark that dealt with his involvement in
01:44:18 that dealt with his involvement in establishing the South East London branch of the troop side movement was so particularly interesting that craft did indeed sign it off
01:44:29 indeed sign it off personally there are four reports within a month of each other dealing with Clark's elections as Branch Secretary as a delegate to the London Coordinating
01:44:49 delegate to the London Coordinating Committee the all London meeting and the national Coordinating Committee all of those were interesting enough to have been signed off by Craft Superior DCI Neil
01:44:57 DCI Neil the next month craft was signing off for reports that indicated Clarke had achieved those positions plot and signed off the report dealing with clerks further election a delegate to London Coordinating Committee
01:45:11 to London Coordinating Committee Neil signed off a further election as Delegate for National Coordinating Committee and Clark's attendance at a private meeting with Jerry Lawless the head of the movement
01:45:24 head of the movement bookcraft was back signing for the next election election two weeks later Neil signed off the election to a national position on the organizing committee for London his election as London organizer his nomination for a
01:45:39 London organizer his nomination for a position on the national Secretariat and his role as organizer of the national rally but it was Kraft who signed off his election for a role on the Press
01:45:51 his election for a role on the Press committee and most importantly when Rick Clark took lawless's position as convener of the Secretariat and took charge of the whole movement its cross signature on the report
01:46:07 its cross signature on the report Neil signed off those reports in dealing with Clark's early attempts to create Division and descent when he severely criticized another section of the movement and launched a scathing attack on some members
01:46:19 on some members but once in place at the top when he insisted on the removal of of troop site movement press officer from the Secretariat when his convener he delayed
01:46:37 Secretariat when his convener he delayed a long-planned trade Union delegation to Ireland severely criticized another member and prepared documents for circulation to the Press draft signed off every report when as convener farx censured another
01:46:49 when as convener farx censured another very prominent member of The Troop site movement
01:46:51 movement once again it was craft who signed the report and when it was reported that four months at the Clark's leadership at least one prominent organization
01:47:03 least one prominent organization withdrew its support for troop site movement because the atmosphere was increasingly reformist again it was Kraft signing off
01:47:17 Kraft signing off when serious descent was noted with an international Marxist group over the postponement of the delegation of Northern Ireland and that by the time Lawless returned two members of the
01:47:30 Lawless returned two members of the Secretariat had resigned there at the bottom of the report is craft signature Rick Clark conspired with members of big flame
01:47:41 conspired with members of big flame support opposition and resistance to the leadership of the troop site movement he facilitated that even to the extent of risking the security of the SDS by
01:47:54 of risking the security of the SDS by holding the meeting at his police cover flat
01:47:58 flat that critical report was also signed off by Kraft
01:48:03 by Kraft on the 2nd of September 1976 shortly before his identity was discovered Clark held a meeting which the major aim of the nine attendees was the defeat of the present leadership of troop side
01:48:19 the present leadership of troop side movement and the replacement of them by independent members thought was described as influential and was named as the second of five proposed new leaders
01:48:30 new leaders it was a coup signed off by Jeffrey Kraft in our first opening statement to the inquiry we warned of the risk of
01:48:44 inquiry we warned of the risk of individual officers being scapegoated and made to carry the can this was precisely why we did save none of those documents were put to
01:48:55 none of those documents were put to craft and none of those questions were asked even though we spoon-fed the inquiry with them instead craft was led by the hand to say that he neither knew nor approved
01:49:09 nor approved craft should not have had his hand held on any issue but certainly not the one
01:49:20 on any issue but certainly not the one not one as important as this craft knew that that Clark went to the top of the troop side movement and conspired to destabilize it his continued approval an authority for it is stamped on the bottom of every report his Superior
01:49:36 bottom of every report his Superior officers knew as well their stamps of approval and Authority are there too the dispersal of the knowledge and approval can be followed up the Metropolitan Police hierarchy just by looking at the minute sheets
01:49:50 just by looking at the minute sheets critically every single one of those reports will send to MI5 box 500. they saw them all
01:50:01 saw them all if they were asked MI5 would not be able to pretend they did not know that an SDS officer had rapidly risen through the ranks of the troops that movement right to the very top
01:50:13 to the very top they could not pretend that they did not know that an SDS officer was plotting to destabilize a democratic movement they
01:50:25 destabilize a democratic movement they could not say they were unaware of the source of the reports their knowledge that Rick Clark as Rick Gibson was an SDS agent is clearly stated in a
01:50:41 SDS agent is clearly stated in a security services minute sheet they knew who he was and they knew what he was doing
01:50:44 doing the likelihood is that the knowledge and approval
01:50:45 approval went higher than that we should deal with that aspect more generally at a later stage in these submissions
01:50:58 submissions Richard Walker detective Sergeant in the SDS back office throughout Clark's deployment was conscious that the reporting was likely to go not just to the security services but to the home office as well this inquiry cannot be complicit in
01:51:12 this inquiry cannot be complicit in scapegoating Rick Clark where the craft remembers it or not the evidence overwhelmingly shows that Clark was not acting alone the Clark deployment conclusively
01:51:24 the Clark deployment conclusively demonstrates the Metropolitan Police and the security services were using a secret police unit to destabilize and decapitate a democratic movement
01:51:37 decapitate a democratic movement the SDS would authorize and encouraged to do exactly that that is a fat the inquiry cannot shy away from that
01:51:50 the inquiry cannot shy away from that we do not expect it will do so the fact that that fact has far-reaching implications for every aspect of this inquiry it raises questions about the
01:52:03 inquiry it raises questions about the true function of the SDS it cannot be argued that it was simply an intelligence gathering organization when it plainly was not additionally it raises questions as to the true State and purpose of the SDS
01:52:16 the true State and purpose of the SDS it's impossible to argue this activity had any role in preventing disorder or countering subversion however one chooses to Define
01:52:30 chooses to Define that conveniently fluid concept it casts a shadow Over The credibility of any witness who protests that somehow the SDS was a protector of our right to
01:52:45 the SDS was a protector of our right to free speech and our Democratic right to organize
01:52:46 organize it is a stark reminder that dishonesty is the lifeblood of these people they sought out a career that was
01:52:59 they sought out a career that was founded on deceit and that is success or otherwise
01:53:04 otherwise depended on how dishonest they could be it puts a perspective on the tactics that were used by the SDS be they the dishonest appropriation of dead
01:53:21 dishonest appropriation of dead children's identities the cultivation of false friendships or sexual exploitation of activists a state
01:53:27 a state that is prepared to undermine the very democracy that it loudly reports to be protecting
01:53:40 protecting is a state with very few qualms at all The Troop side movement The Troop side movement was established in 1973 as a campaign group whose aim was publicly stated and straightforward
01:53:56 straightforward self-determination for the Irish people and the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland their methods were lobbying members of parliament drafting alternative
01:54:09 parliament drafting alternative legislation and raising awareness with the occasional low-key demonstration talks and film screenings it had already been infiltrated by the SDS when Clark was sent in hn298 Mike Scott was reporting on the
01:54:28 hn298 Mike Scott was reporting on the movement in 1974 and was withdrawn after he broke his finger punching Jerry Lawless in the face very shortly after Scott stopped reporting on the troop start movement Rick Clark was sent in we know
01:54:42 we know there were other SDS infiltrations after Club
01:54:46 Club detective inspector Macintosh who served in the SDS between April 1976 and ordered 1979 noted that the successful
01:54:59 ordered 1979 noted that the successful infiltration of the movement and implied infiltrations other than Clark in the period up to 1979. the SDS was certainly supplying the security services with Intelligence on the troop site movement in the summer of 1980
01:55:13 1980 the officer concern was involved enough to have been enclosed meetings it's referred to in a liaison file but no disclosure has been provided in respect to the officer who sourced the
01:55:26 respect to the officer who sourced the information or his role in the movement towards the end of 1980 hm 96 Michael James began reporting on the troop site
01:55:39 James began reporting on the troop site movement having been encouraged to do so by the SDS management he was elected to the National steering committee in November and December 1981 taking the position of national membership secretary secondary to the National
01:55:53 secretary secondary to the National convener he reported on the troop site movement from that position well into 1983.
01:55:57 1983. Mike Scott concluded that the troop side movement had no subversive objectives
01:56:10 movement had no subversive objectives and did not employ or approve the use prove of the use of violence there is nothing in any of Rick Clark's reporting to suggest subversion or any public order risk the same is true of the reporting of Michael James
01:56:22 of Michael James generally there has been no reporting suggesting public disorder at any troop side movement event interestingly Jeffrey Kraft was the SDS
01:56:35 interestingly Jeffrey Kraft was the SDS detective inspector and Chief Inspector for both the Scott and Clark deployments he was the chief superintendent of s-squad with the SDS as his biggest
01:56:50 s-squad with the SDS as his biggest responsibility in that role at the time of the James deployment graft himself agreed that the
01:57:02 graft himself agreed that the organization was not subversive and the public order risk was just in case or trying as he put it to be ahead of the game I.E
01:57:13 I.E there was no public order risk but it was conceivable that there might be one day
01:57:20 one day that argument might have a shred of credibility for a one-year deployment to assess a situation that craft head
01:57:32 assess a situation that craft head offices in there for at least seven of the ten years between 1974 and 1983 clearly there was no game to be ahead of it's worth noting that that under the
01:57:44 it's worth noting that that under the just in case theory of public disorder prevention special Branch could try to retrospectively justify any infiltration of any protest or campaign group
01:58:01 of any protest or campaign group they did not have to be a genuine risk of disorder or even a suggestion of one graph call this the ultimate defense line
01:58:10 line that would prevent any embarrassment if the SDS existence were ever to become public knowledge
01:58:22 public knowledge another way of phrasing ultimate defense line
01:58:23 line is Ultimate excuse and it is the excuse that we have heard repeated
01:58:31 repeated time and time again absent a subversion or a public order justification the forward justification for the repeated infiltrations of the
01:58:50 for the repeated infiltrations of the troop site movement seems to be that it might have provided Intelligence on Irish Republicans particularly the light of a policy decision not to infiltrate any actual Irish Republican movement it was a soft option
01:59:04 it was a soft option along the lines of the policy decision not to infiltrate fascists because they were too dangerous and criminal for a police officer to infiltrate an interest in possible Irish
01:59:15 an interest in possible Irish Republicans does not explain why it was that Richard chesham Mary and countless others
01:59:27 others had special Branch files created on them and the detail of the minutiae of their lives passed on to the security services with life-changing consequences
01:59:42 with life-changing consequences it does not explained why Authority and approval was given to undermine the troop side movement to the extent that it was undermined
01:59:53 it was undermined if big flame had not discovered an outed Rick Clark when they did there would have been a coup it may or may not have been successful but it would inevitably have had consequences for the movement
02:00:05 consequences for the movement what is clear is that the troop side movement was Riven to the extent that it was widely due and as being too busy fighting amongst themselves to do any good work on the troop side issue
02:00:19 good work on the troop side issue it had had undercover offices running the movement for at least five of its first 10 years by the time they left
02:00:31 by the time they left it was a shell of a movement its registered office was a cancer flat just south of King's cross tragically
02:00:42 tragically more than three and a half thousand people lost their lives in the troubles before the troops eventually left Mary
02:00:55 Mary there are a number of inconsistencies at the heart of crafts evidence about sexual relationships on the one hand craft emphasizes careful recruitment of SDS officers based on the results of
02:01:07 SDS officers based on the results of their vetting and their good reputation within a small special Branch where
02:01:18 within a small special Branch where everyone had a reputation very quickly on the other hand graph claims not to have known about Richard Clark's reputation within that same small special branch as being a bit of a lad a womanizer and
02:01:33 as being a bit of a lad a womanizer and a carnivore despite evidence of it being generally well known among the existing SDS officers craft emphasized the very close officer supervision and close camaraderie of the SDS yet claimed to have had no knowledge of any sexual relationships at all
02:01:52 of any sexual relationships at all despite the proliferation of them under his command and two officers being honest enough to say that managers knew either with certainty or in all likelihood craft was asked about the particular
02:02:06 craft was asked about the particular risk of an undercover officer being put directly into a university situation where he would inevitably be involved with young single women
02:02:17 with young single women he replied that he did not think of that at the time but accepted that with hindsight of course he recognized the risk that concession was inevitable it's
02:02:29 that concession was inevitable it's difficult to imagine how anyone could not recognize the risk it's even more difficult to square the his account that he a 40 year old detected Chief
02:02:40 he a 40 year old detected Chief Inspector the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was too naive to recognize it but somehow since then he
02:02:53 recognize it but somehow since then he acquired the necessary life experience to see what is already planned to the rest of us craft put an undercover officer undercover police officer into a University at a time when a sexual
02:03:05 University at a time when a sexual Revolution was well underway a more permissive attitudes to sexual Liberation particularly at a universal setting in a university setting were commonplace and common knowledge
02:03:18 commonplace and common knowledge he did so in the full knowledge that his success or failure as an undercover officer was dependent on him forming relationships with activists
02:03:29 relationships with activists Graf was also in the unique position of actually reading and signing off the reports that Rick Clark was generating yet somehow he did not see the red flags
02:03:45 he did not see the red flags Clark's first six reports included personal details of single female students and made it clear that he was spending time at home with them you don't have to be detected that'll
02:03:58 you don't have to be detected that'll end up detective Chief Inspector to have an alarm bell ring when those reports arrive in your desk every one of those reports was signed off by Chief Inspector Graf at a time when he was closely monitoring his officers
02:04:11 closely monitoring his officers particularly one it only just entered the field
02:04:16 the field those reports along with all the others went up to another senior officer who also signed them off before being sent to the security service it'll be interesting to hear every one of them played naivety
02:04:31 of them played naivety the real insight into grass approach to sexual relationships came in the unguarded moments of his exculpatory belittling assertions that sexual activity does not require an exchange of CVS and that these things happen
02:04:49 CVS and that these things happen truth about his recognition of risk came in his acknowledgment of what he actually saw as an inevitability how does one prevent it the line between an accepted
02:05:02 the line between an accepted inevitability and knowledge is very thin indeed particularly for a night for an organization that mastered in deceived that are no qualms about using people generally
02:05:21 generally Graham Coates hm 304 had no doubt that all of the SDS managers were aware of Rick Clark having had at least one sexual relationship it was made quite plain the jokes and banter that they knew we knew and management knew what was going
02:05:43 knew and management knew what was going on craft used repeated denial as his own ultimate defense line in the same way that he denied all knowledge of the anti-democratic activity that he repeatedly signed off big flame and Rick Clark's discovery the conspicuous hole in crafts evidence was in relation to the discovery of Rick
02:05:55 was in relation to the discovery of Rick Clark's identity by members of big flame Graf had a very close involvement in the creation of undercover office identities and was personally involved in the
02:06:08 and was personally involved in the creation of Rick Clark's cover identity he was very aware of the Paramount importance placed on the secrecy of the SDS and the need to avoid the political embarrassment that would befall the
02:06:22 embarrassment that would befall the Metropolitan Police and the home office should the operation become public he cited his own recognition of the political sensitivity when personally
02:06:35 political sensitivity when personally assuring the home office that officers were provided with the strongest possible cover backgrounds impassable with the modern computer age Graf was also very much involved in the
02:06:47 Graf was also very much involved in the exfiltration of SDS officers discussing with them how they would come out of the field
02:06:54 field what their story would be and how it would be explained he considered it to be a serious master the impact of big Flames discovery of
02:07:10 the impact of big Flames discovery of Ritz Rick Clark's death certificate must have been ground shaking for the Metropolitan Police their computer-age compliance security had been breached the assurances they had given the home office in respect of it were worthless
02:07:30 office in respect of it were worthless the protracted police applications for anonymity in this inquiry suggested danger to these officers and their undercover roles
02:07:43 undercover roles if that were true every F SDS officer in the field would have would have been at risk if as Mr Clark Mr Kraft suggests Clark's deployment is the troop side movement involved Intelligence on Irish republicanism the police would have been
02:08:02 republicanism the police would have been fraught with concern about repercussions most importantly the compromise risks the public outing of the SDS and the inevitable political Fallout that political Fallout would have been all the more terrifying because special Branch activity was the subject of particular public scrutiny at the time
02:08:17 particular public scrutiny at the time the impact would have been all the more significant in the context of a deployment into a broad-based single issue movement that could not be justified on either subversion or public order grounds
02:08:34 subversion or public order grounds it was also in the context of an officer who'd been engaged in blatantly anti-democratic activity within the knowledge of those who outed him and with a paper trail that
02:08:46 him and with a paper trail that confirmed the knowledge and approval of both the Metropolitan Police and the security services they would have been heads rolling all the way up the hierarchy how far up it went would have only
02:08:57 how far up it went would have only depended on the extent to which it could be covered up for craft as the Chief Inspector in charge it would have been career ending he would have been remembered as the officer who presided over the demise of the unit
02:09:13 the unit a full decade later in June 1986 special Branch was so concerned about the details of Rich Clark Rick Clark's deployment been made public that the commander issued a memorandum directed
02:09:25 commander issued a memorandum directed the attention of all officers to Richard chesson
02:09:27 chesson warning them that he was speaking to a freelance investigative journalist about Clark and big flame
02:09:38 Clark and big flame we did not know exactly when in 1986 Mr craft retired but if he was still working in the summer of that year he himself would have received the alert the incident was such a key moment in the SDS history that 20 years later
02:09:56 the SDS history that 20 years later every single officer was familiar with the story of an SDS officer being confronted with his own death certificate and yet the statements of the two officers in charge of the SDS at the time attempted Chief Inspector craft a detective
02:10:13 Chief Inspector craft a detective inspector Macintosh are silent on the issue
02:10:15 issue conspicuously silent the early reference craft made to the compromise in his statement was a single sentence in the middle of a paragraph on officer welfare he referred to an
02:10:28 officer welfare he referred to an occasion Rick Clark thought he had been rumbled and was called to a meeting in a pub
02:10:35 pub in the section on the use of disease of deceased children's identities there is no reference to it at all McIntosh started in the SDS in April
02:10:53 McIntosh started in the SDS in April 1976 and was well in place and working September 1976. in a statement about exfiltration generally he said I do not remember one actual filtration causing any trouble at all in a section of his statement where he
02:11:06 in a section of his statement where he was asked specifically about Rick Clark he makes no reference at all to the discovery of the death certificate or his exfiltration these are striking omissions
02:11:23 these are striking omissions senior officers who are at best being deliberately unforthcoming couple with that in is the the bizarre insistence from both officers that neither of them recalls ever having worked with the other
02:11:35 having worked with the other despite there being an 18-month period when they were together in charge of the SDS craft States
02:11:53 SDS craft States he did not overlap with Macintosh at all in the SDS and Macintosh states he does not remember ever working with craft they clearly were working with each other and they were definitely working together in September 1976 the very month in class outing
02:12:05 month in class outing there is documentary evidence to put that Beyond question Kraft maintained his memory block throughout his oral evidence and was
02:12:21 throughout his oral evidence and was unable to explain it but conceded in the face of the documentary evidence that they must have been working together Macintosh began by maintaining his memory block he put it down to being away for Long training courses during his deployment when he would have
02:12:34 his deployment when he would have overlapped with craft particularly for major incidents that account does not correlate with the actual periods of training Macintosh is recorded as having done which only account for four months of the 18-month
02:12:52 account for four months of the 18-month overlap and which took place in the year after the outing of DC Clark however
02:12:53 however almost imperceptibly Mr McIntosh slipped up in the middle of his evidence having maintained his zero record
02:13:05 having maintained his zero record recollection of working with craft he was asked some questions about the management style of DCI Mike Ferguson he was asked if he recalled Ferguson's rigorous testing of new officers on their identities
02:13:16 their identities was that something common did Mike Ferguson tend to do that with undercover officers when they first started his reply
02:13:26 his reply Jeff Kraft as well in a split second he let it be known that he remembered working with Jeff Kraft only too well
02:13:37 Kraft only too well that slip was not followed up by counts to the inquiry that's unfortunate there's a contrived Mutual memory loss is very convenient
02:13:49 is very convenient it prevents questioning and inquiry um on the way in which management discussed and decided to deal with events as significant as Rick Clark's icing or very shortly afterwards in
02:14:03 icing or very shortly afterwards in November 1976 the antics of hn 300 Jim Pickford
02:14:10 Pickford both craft and making sure Macintosh did expand on their Recollections of the Clark outing in their oral evidence both recalled going to a pub because Clark had been uncovered
02:14:21 Clark had been uncovered cross that he'd gone with Derek Neal but Clark given an excuse that big flame appeared to have accepted all appeared to be well he and Neil had debriefed Clark the following day and decided to withdraw
02:14:40 following day and decided to withdraw him anyway essentially craft down played the problem and put himself with a more senior officer who is now dead and therefore unable to assist McIntosh said he had gone with a surveillance team he did not know any details of the potential compromise
02:14:51 details of the potential compromise he illogically prevaricated on Craft presence or otherwise presume that Jeff Crawford had dealt with it with another
02:15:05 Crawford had dealt with it with another unnamed member of Staff which was why he said he did not remember working with craft
02:15:09 craft before remembering it leased to the best of his belief he accepted that it was an event of great significance operationally that without dirt the SDS would have been very concerned about it
02:15:25 very concerned about it he just said it had nothing to do with him
02:15:26 him both were reluctant to refer to the production of a death certificate death certificate graft did so obliquely when pressed Macintosh
02:15:43 obliquely when pressed Macintosh maintained that he was not aware of of one being produced at the time neither a kind was credible but both were framed to ensure that any questions on the internal inquiry into
02:15:56 questions on the internal inquiry into the reason for the compromise were not going to lead anywhere fortunately there's an official confirmation of both production of the
02:16:12 confirmation of both production of the death certificate and how disturbing the compromise was for the Metropolitan Police senior officers Mr Kraft's account that Clark came out of the pub giving no indication of any concern
02:16:22 concern so they wait until the next day for a debrief and then decided there was little point in leaving him out there does not fit any of the surroundings
02:16:35 does not fit any of the surroundings Richard chesson's account orbit second hand that Clark went white as a sheet and that his cover flat was stripped overnight is the response that's far more in keeping with the reality of fear that must have gripped the SDS
02:16:46 that must have gripped the SDS this was the biggest risk to their security into the true spies program there must have been extensive
02:16:58 there must have been extensive internal inquiry talk must have been asked how it was that he came to be rumbled and his account must have been vigorously examined bearing in mind that Kraft was aware that people did talk all the time
02:17:09 the time and the SDS was much more open than special plants they must have have asked other officers what they knew Clark told several offices but two
02:17:21 Clark told several offices but two sexual relationships had led to his compromise at least two officers gave evidence about that account in the closed hearings one of them gave a character reference for craft unable to
02:17:36 character reference for craft unable to believe that he would have known another believed that it was generally well known among the existing SDS officers including at least some of the managers the last would have been consistent with the Graham Coates account
02:17:48 the Graham Coates account of wider managerial knowledge hn126 Paul Gray confirmed when he joined the SDS just one year after Clark's
02:17:59 the SDS just one year after Clark's exfiltration the unearthing of the death certificate certificate was very much in the minds of all officers when they
02:18:11 the minds of all officers when they joined the squad and that he was aware that the security breach was said to come about because Clark had an affair with an activist
02:18:23 with an activist a further strong indicator of wider managerial knowledge of the sexual relationships leading to the compromise comes from the method of Clark's exfiltration Commander Watts urged that Clark's
02:18:35 Commander Watts urged that Clark's withdrawal must be under suitable cover I.E using appropriate methods to ensure that his tracks were covered a key feature of that cover was Clark
02:18:57 a key feature of that cover was Clark sending a note to one of the women that he'd had a relationship with giving a false explanation as to why you've suddenly left there was no Explorer exploration of that with craft despite his close
02:19:08 that with craft despite his close involvement in exfiltration tactics the dump the documentary evidence conclusively demonstrates that Clark was not a Maverick officer acting in isolation
02:19:20 isolation a conclusion that his that this letter was unauthorized and sent without managerial knowledge would be a suspect
02:19:31 managerial knowledge would be a suspect as a conclusion that his anti-democratic activity was similarly unknown and unapproved the Rick Clark lesser was not an outpouring of honesty revealing his true status and expressing his heartfelt regret
02:19:42 regret it was a tactic designed to reinforce the LIE underlining the exfiltration and therefore to prevent further inquiry
02:19:54 therefore to prevent further inquiry from activists it was part of Clark's suitable cover ultimately the cover worked of course despite what craft referred to as Ingenuity of the Sinister big flame that was not publicly uncovered as an
02:20:09 that was not publicly uncovered as an SDS officer the letter writing tactic lived on
02:20:11 lived on in the postcard sent to Madeline by Vincent Harvey and the many May letters that were sent to the victims of undercover officers thereafter in the circumstances of the clerk
02:20:22 in the circumstances of the clerk compromise that letter is the evidence that breaks through the thin line from inevitable risk of sexual relationships into definitive knowledge of them
02:20:37 into definitive knowledge of them the Rick Clark deployment is indeed remarkable on a personal level it demonstrates the extent to which the SDS were prepared to use people
02:20:55 use people to get into their homes to deceive and sexually exploit them on a political level it proves the LIE that that is the public order of justification there was none
02:21:09 there was none it proves the lie that a subversive was anyone other than someone who was supposed who was opposed to State interests in this case the single issue of demilitarization it demonstrates that SDS deployments
02:21:27 it demonstrates that SDS deployments were being used for far more than simply intelligence gathering and finally it shows who was pulling strings part two masters and servants both craft and Macintosh were unwilling to assist with the extent of their liaison with
02:21:40 with the extent of their liaison with the security services during that time as managers Groff said that he did not have much communication with the security service whilst on the SDS when am I five wrote
02:21:54 whilst on the SDS when am I five wrote to him to convey their gratitude for the flow of information he was sending them on the activities of the swp there was no formality Not only was Kraft on first name terms with MI5 they used the diminutive of his first name Jeff
02:22:09 diminutive of his first name Jeff but craft does not remember going to the party the MI5 threw for the SDS naughty remember taking di Pride to meet MI5 and introduced them to him
02:22:21 introduced them to him notice you remember being specifically called to meeting with MI5 to be informed that the existence of the SDS was widely known much Regional special branches
02:22:29 branches Macintosh was also very reluctant to accept SDS engagement with the security services despite MI5 describing his last visit to them as routine
02:22:41 visit to them as routine whether they remember them or not SDS engagement with the security service was increasingly was increasing steadily
02:22:52 increasingly was increasing steadily from 1972 at the same time as the public order ultimate defense line for deployments was decreasing Roy creamer described 80 percent perhaps more of C's squad's work as being
02:23:04 squad's work as being a sea squad's work as being for MI5 it was the bread and butter work of most sea squad officers that figure would be an underestimate on the face of the documents displays to
02:23:22 the face of the documents displays to the inquiry where reports dealing with public order are few and far between is the kind that the relationship between sea squad and the security service is best described as Master servant
02:23:38 servant security service was the master is born out by the MI5 briefings which the SDS were very ready to accept the primary objective was not public order as Mr craft stated it was the service
02:23:52 it was the service MI5 requests for infiltrations Into The Troop site movement and for high grade political intelligence particularly on the swp
02:24:01 the swp the ultimate defense line the national front in our last opening statement we addressed the six obvious ways in which the Metropolitan Police could have improved policing and eliminated the
02:24:17 improved policing and eliminated the risk of public disorder between fascists and fascists and those who opposed oppose them how those methods been adopted the disorder Red Lion Square
02:24:28 adopted the disorder Red Lion Square Starfall and lewisham would not have happened
02:24:29 happened without those events the Metropolitan Police would have lost their ultimate defense line
02:24:40 defense line for rationalizing their infiltration and surveillance of the Socialist Workers Party
02:24:48 Party there is no evidence of any intelligence from the SDS impacting on the policing of those demonstrations recent disclosure to the inquiry has shown the one piece of information reliably thought to have come from the SCS respected lewisham actually came
02:25:02 SCS respected lewisham actually came from a press release from the counter demonstrations add or organizing committee that press release was the basis of the special Branch threat assessment the home office requested
02:25:13 assessment the home office requested the only solely SDS intelligence that made it into the threat assessment was the possibility that smoke bombs uh flower paint and eggs might be used
02:25:27 flower paint and eggs might be used at Southall the disorder and violence was not only predicted by the police but in reality pre-planned by them undercover officers were warned off attending
02:25:41 attending to avoid the police violence that ultimately killed Blair Peach that government did not need the SDS to tell them there was going to be trouble at Red Lion Square Lucian
02:25:53 Lucian the law of the land May well have entitled The National front to make use of those places at the time but this was a fascist organization with its roots in the party that supported Hitler's rise
02:26:08 the party that supported Hitler's rise to power and the genocidal violence that followed
02:26:12 followed it was staging deliberately intimidating marches in minority communities the genocidal violence was fresh in the memories of the sons and dorsals of those who'd fought against it was even more fresh than the memories of
02:26:26 was even more fresh than the memories of the communities who faced that Vance day after day on the streets and in their businesses and homes the violence was so
02:26:41 businesses and homes the violence was so extreme that it was apparently the basis for the high-level policy decision that stopped the SDS from infiltrating the national front special Branch were too frightened of violent crime to infiltrate the national front
02:26:50 front yet the people who were suffering that violence were expected to be silent and tolerate the national front marching in
02:27:08 tolerate the national front marching in their hundreds through their communities it was obvious that those communities should have been listened to and the Marxist should have been banned detective inspector Roy creamer felt so
02:27:19 detective inspector Roy creamer felt so strongly the Lewis and March should have been bad that he refused to do the special Branch threat assessment even the Daily Express and Sun newspapers call for the national French march to be banned inevitably the people of those communities and those that
02:27:32 of those communities and those that supported them were not going to let the fascists pass those three demonstrations have become the ultimate defense line for the Metropolitan Police when trying to justify the infiltrations of the
02:27:48 justify the infiltrations of the Socialist Workers Party it was the focus of the state's rule 10 questions of Lindsey German underpinning the theatrical repetition of the word overthrow
02:27:55 overthrow there is no Metropolitan Police acknowledgment of expulsion to the squadus or the policies of discipline student that the undercover officers
02:28:06 student that the undercover officers themselves were sometimes involved in there is no acknowledgment of the Contemporary police recognition that the Socialist Workers Party does not get
02:28:19 Socialist Workers Party does not get involved in violence as an organization of course there's no reference to the community campaigning and political work the Marxist left did to counteract the fascist threat there is certainly no
02:28:32 fascist threat there is certainly no acknowledgment that the threat of the national front only finally subsided because the anti-nazi league held firm against them the national front had the disruption of any form of democracy as a primary
02:28:44 any form of democracy as a primary intention their action throughout the transform period was a clear threat to public order it was also politically violent they
02:28:56 it was also politically violent they were following the Nazi Playbook from the early 1930s by attempting to dominate and control the streets fascist activity that fulfilled within special branches remid however it was defined from the 1967 tasking and the
02:29:10 defined from the 1967 tasking and the Denning definition to the 1970 72 and 84 adaptations all of which would deal with below
02:29:21 below the lack of SDS interest in fascists was was darkness in part due to fear the institutionalized racism at the Metropolitan Police inevitably also
02:29:32 Metropolitan Police inevitably also played a part the racist language used in many of the SDS reports firmly indicates a mindset that was shared by the national front infiltrations of fascists that generated the scale of
02:29:47 fascists that generated the scale of personal data that was obtained on the left would have caused such vetting problems to the Metropolitan Police they would have struggled to fill their own ranks
02:29:56 ranks but the cabinet disclosure points to a far more significant rationale for the lack of SDS infiltration of fascists they were anti-fraid Union
02:30:11 they were anti-fraid Union fascists had no interest in furthering their aims to an industrial context following the successful strikes of the miners Dockers and building workers in 1972 government's primary focus in
02:30:24 1972 government's primary focus in relation to intelligence catering was on trade unions and Industry the Socialist Workers Party and militant trade unionist campaigned for better wages and against National wage
02:30:38 wages and against National wage restraint unsafe working conditions unemployment and poverty ultimately those campaigns led into National actions against wage restraint and restriction of Trade union
02:30:55 and restriction of Trade union organizations this inevitably impacted on the concerns of Big Industry and national government subversives in our opening statement to the last phase of the inquiry we undertook an analysis the way in which the state shifted the role of the
02:31:09 the state shifted the role of the Metropolitan Police away from policing duties into Political policing duties we emphasized the starting point in 1967
02:31:23 we emphasized the starting point in 1967 that special Branch officers were tasked with the preventions of crimes directed against the state a clear task entirely consistent with the established principles of policing that was followed by the shift in 1970
02:31:39 that was followed by the shift in 1970 with new terms of reference to defending the realm from actions of persons and organizations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the state
02:31:51 the security of the state this was a job description taken directly from the security service directive of 1952. from the then Home Secretary David Maxwell five the shift was accompanied
02:32:07 Maxwell five the shift was accompanied by a definition of subversive behavior that was intention specific and designed to be loose and capable of wide interpretation broadly speaking any
02:32:20 wide interpretation broadly speaking any organization or individual whose purpose is the undermining or overthrow of the established Democratic order those terms of reference were classified confidential and never released to the public
02:32:30 public the emphasis of potentially subversive organizations and individuals could at
02:32:41 organizations and individuals could at least to some extent be tempered by the careful application of the Denning definition of subversion under that very public definition actions were only subversive if they were unlawful
02:32:55 if they were unlawful achieve comfortable concern with real policing
02:32:56 policing could apply that definition if action was not under unlawful it could not be subversive crucially the public perspective was
02:33:07 crucially the public perspective was that it was MI5 who were tasked with dealing with subversives in defense of the realm against those breaking the law in 1972 MI5 redefined the concept
02:33:24 in 1972 MI5 redefined the concept subversion became activities threatening the safety or well being of the state
02:33:35 the safety or well being of the state and intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political Industrial or violent means that definition was given some forced legitimacy in 1975
02:33:46 given some forced legitimacy in 1975 when the security service briefed it for adoption
02:33:47 adoption by the House of Lords branding it the Harris definition a misnomer for what was in reality the MI5 definition importantly that public rebranding
02:33:59 importantly that public rebranding included reassurances the definition only applied to those who broke the law because the freedom to join together to express and further views was
02:34:13 express and further views was fundamental to our Democratic traditions people could sleep easily secure on the
02:34:23 people could sleep easily secure on the knowledge that what was happening in the United Kingdom was so very different to what was happening with Stasi in East Germany later 1979 Leon Britain attempted to calm concerns but a rampant special Branch by stressing a strict application of the MI5 definition
02:34:41 application of the MI5 definition before they could be called subversive a personal group had to have a desire to overthrow that state and be an actual threat to the state like Lord Harris Britain stressed that special Branch was concerned with
02:34:52 special Branch was concerned with offenses against the security of the state implicitly equating subversion with terrorism thereby reinforcing the fallacy for the consumption of the
02:35:07 fallacy for the consumption of the public that in Britain Police an adult with Brian this was retrospective retrospective window dressing and a cover-up
02:35:18 window dressing and a cover-up there have been no strict application and neither would there be the state was fully conscious that the reality did not match the facade
02:35:36 reality did not match the facade it was appropriately orwellian that the delayed special Branch guidelines were finally published by the Thatcher government in 1984. those guidelines were carefully constructed to continue with the deception by once again implicitly
02:35:50 deception by once again implicitly equating subversion with terrorism at least as far as the public were concerned the confidential correspondence accompany the guidelines made it clear that the MI5 definition had never been read to include an actual threat to this state
02:36:02 threat to this state the home office assured every Chief Constable that an organization currently operating within the law May
02:36:22 operating within the law May nevertheless be subversive because it's long-term aims satisfy the definition virtually the guidelines were widely drafted with the clear but secret intention of enabling the police to continue to Target those who were not
02:36:39 continue to Target those who were not engaged in subversion as long as they may become subversive in the future in other words those who were potentially potential subversive the truth is that the words broadly speaking
02:36:51 speaking May undermine well-being political industrial operating within within the law and long term enabled the
02:37:07 law and long term enabled the Metropolitan Police to be as flexible and intrusive as MI5 and government wanted them to be back in 1975 and importantly for our
02:37:22 back in 1975 and importantly for our core participants the very moment that Lord Harris was was releasing the MI5 definition Rick Clark was engaged in unveiling his way to Richard chestland's home the hierarchy of the troop side movement and Mary's bed
02:37:33 and Mary's bed government cannibals successive governments were well aware there was no actual threat to the state in January 1969 the official committee on subversion at home was
02:37:46 committee on subversion at home was established in the direction of the Prime Minister Harold Wilson it was composed of key government government departments and immediately concluded that at no time were the aims of subverses as they were then defined
02:38:05 subverses as they were then defined within measurable distance of attainment instead the focus of the committee was mainly on Industrial issues and trade unions their concern more often than not was about the size of recent wage settlements and the increase in their frequency
02:38:17 frequency it's telling that a committee is specifically designed to deal with subversion spent much of their time worrying about people who were dedicated to improving standards of living the Wilson government nevertheless
02:38:32 the Wilson government nevertheless encouraged the extension of intelligence gathering activity and the existing intimate relations between the security services and special branch that government was fully aware that
02:38:44 that government was fully aware that those intimate relations included the SDS and the work they were doing the SDS and its continuation had been raised in discussion as at the subversion at home Committee in 1969
02:38:59 subversion at home Committee in 1969 in the presence of representatives from the main government Ministries Ministries many of whom remained in the group or if various incarnations over the following years
02:39:14 the following years it is unrealistic to suggest that that inter-departmental knowledge of the sds's existence was restricted to the individuals present or was forgotten without question
02:39:25 without question over the following years the government was also aware that the security service were reluctant to use their res their resources to investigate the behavior of individual of
02:39:36 the behavior of individual of individuals who however politically repugnant and socially objectionable
02:39:48 repugnant and socially objectionable they may be are not seeking to overthrow the established Constitution by extra political
02:39:50 political means
02:39:52 means the solution to that conundrum was to expand the role of special branches one of the last acts of the Wilson government just four days for the 1970
02:40:03 government just four days for the 1970 general election was the introduction of the 1970 special Branch terms of reference which made the relationship with MI5 and the SDS ever more intimate in March 1972 Security Service report
02:40:16 in March 1972 Security Service report sent that prime minister Edward Heath concluded that Troublesome though these groups are they do not constitute
02:40:27 groups are they do not constitute anything in the nature of an organized conspiracy against the state the following month a letter from the cabin cabinet office to the Prime Minister expressed The View that there was no genuinely subversive threat to society
02:40:40 genuinely subversive threat to society instead there was a pervasive climate of opinion which is the posing principle to most forms of established Authority not necessarily a conscious and organized threat
02:40:56 organized threat that letter concerned a ministerial meeting
02:40:57 meeting uh
02:41:04 uh instigated by the Prime Minister himself for consideration to be given to the question of subversive activity in society particularly in the industrial context
02:41:10 context the nation's ruling Elite attended Home Secretary foreign Commonwealth secretary Secretary of State for defense law president secretary of state for
02:41:22 law president secretary of state for employment the cabinet office raised two areas for consideration first as there was no subversive threat to the security of the state um MI5 were limited in The Help they
02:41:35 um MI5 were limited in The Help they could offer so could MI5 be persuaded to adopt a more aggressive approach secondly could the government respond to The Reluctant conclusion that there was no threat with pervasive
02:41:47 no threat with pervasive oblique and unattributable action sometimes supplemented by more covert forms of activity
02:41:58 forms of activity the conundrum was the same as that faced by the Wilson government two years before the response this time was to change the definition of subversion the MI5 definition combined with the 1970
02:42:10 MI5 definition combined with the 1970 terms of reference ensure that special branch and in particular the SDS will be doing mi530 work for them pervasively obliquely
02:42:21 obliquely covertly and of course unattributably by August 1972 he's the slightly renamed group on subversion in public life SPL
02:42:32 group on subversion in public life SPL was formed to improve the coordination of Intelligence on the redefined concept of subversion
02:42:44 of subversion its formation was directed by the Prime Minister Edward Heath it included the same Departments of State as its predecessor but for the first time in recognition of the change in rural provided by the new definition of the version it also included the
02:42:56 version it also included the Metropolitan Police Special branch the first special Branch attendee at SPL meetings was Deputy assistant commissioner Gilbert he was promptly
02:43:12 commissioner Gilbert he was promptly informed of the new definition including the brand new emphasis on the political and Industrial the SDS were not being tasked with infiltrated organizations to count a genuine threat to the state
02:43:23 genuine threat to the state they were being tasked to infiltrate in order to counter opinion be it political opinion or industrial opinion the role
02:43:34 opinion or industrial opinion the role the SPL was to supervise and direct the collection of intelligence particularly in industry the chairman was the James waddle in case there's any doubt about the
02:43:47 in case there's any doubt about the origin of the intelligence that was being collected the oversight of the SDS annual report and the decision to continue funding them was signed off in 1969 1971 1972 1974 by Sir James waddle government
02:44:03 1974 by Sir James waddle government knowledge of the SDS role in gathering that intelligence is graphically illustrated by an MI5 policy note from December 1972. those who attended the world group meetings knew that special branch and
02:44:18 meetings knew that special branch and MI5 were under increasing pressure from Whitehall for more and more detailed information about the versus influence in braids unions they knew that special Branch at MI5
02:44:32 they knew that special Branch at MI5 were being pressured to increase agent coverage of industrial Affairs particularly in the metropolitan area what was needed was long-term agent
02:44:48 what was needed was long-term agent penetration of subversive groups active in the unions rather than casual informed sources wattle's continued authorization of the SDS guaranteed that long-term
02:45:03 SDS guaranteed that long-term penetration that long-term penetration that policy note made it clear it was not only the SDS to use long-term undercover offices provincial forces also had some success in that field Regional police forces not only knew of the existence of the SDS
02:45:17 only knew of the existence of the SDS but were using the same method from at least 1972 that's a particular importance for the infiltrations of the
02:45:28 importance for the infiltrations of the constituency office of the former member of parliament Dave Nellis by the West Midlands police prime minister Edward Heath attached particularly importance to ministers receiving comprehensive reviews at
02:45:41 receiving comprehensive reviews at regular interviews at regular intervals the existence and the work of the SBR was to be regarded as entirely secret it's little wonder that the sdl SDS
02:45:53 it's little wonder that the sdl SDS repeatedly reassured the home office of their awareness of the political sensitivity of their existence as well
02:46:06 sensitivity of their existence as well as their computer age and plant security the close association between the SPL and the SDS continued after Edward Heath's government in 1970 after it was his government 1975 Sir James waddle was succeeded as chair by Robert Armstrong
02:46:23 succeeded as chair by Robert Armstrong who signed off the SDS annual report to 1976 and 1977. special Branch retained membership of the SPL group The Peculiar sensitivity of the subject and prime minister Wilson's close interest in it ensured that it remained classified as top secret
02:46:36 classified as top secret we've not been provided uh with the SPL documents that cover Wilson's government nor that of James Callahan who've been
02:46:47 nor that of James Callahan who've been the Home Secretary who both co-created the SDS in 1969 and oversaw the introduction of the 1970 terms of reference the inquiry has seen them and then the limited just evidence that
02:47:02 and then the limited just evidence that we have had disclosed confirmed that DAC Gilbert
02:47:03 Gilbert consistently attended the the
02:47:14 consistently attended the the SPL meetings March 1974 to June 1977 off with James waddle chairing special Branch Senior officers with responsibility for the SDS were recipients of the sbl reports and
02:47:30 recipients of the sbl reports and minutes the inquiry is not in possession of any documentation from the group Between 1979 and 1982 although it clearly remained operational however in December 1979 the security service rebuffed any discussion about amendments to the special Branch term sort of reference by arguing that the
02:47:47 sort of reference by arguing that the then Home Secretary William whitelall had no doubt about the work being carried out by special branches including the work for MI5 white law was de facto Deputy Prime Minister to Margaret Thatcher White Law successfully on Britain had a
02:47:58 White Law successfully on Britain had a very strong interest in the 1984 special Branch guidelines his role in both their Drafting and the Tactical considerations surrounding their disclosure to the home Affairs selection committee suggests
02:48:09 Affairs selection committee suggests that the appetite for intelligence or potential subversives has certainly not declined
02:48:16 declined Security Service had repeatedly vetoed any attempts to amend the 1970 special Branch terms of reference and the home office said delay consideration because
02:48:34 office said delay consideration because there'd be no public pressure in respect to special branch in the early 1980s that changed in 1984 when a working party of the police panel of the association of Metropolitan authorities started asking oh good questions about special branches special Branch conduct
02:48:46 special branches special Branch conduct she accounts became increasingly nervous the pressure was on and work on the guidelines commenced a key difference between the 1970 terms the 1984 replacement was the section on the
02:49:00 replacement was the section on the special Branch relationship with MI5 the 1970 terms read in consultation with the security service to collect process and record information about subversive or
02:49:14 information about subversive or potentially subversive organizations or individuals in practice as we've heard from almost every officer that meant hoovering up every possible piece of information about anyone who so much has brought a
02:49:27 about anyone who so much has brought a copy of the Socialist worker newspaper
02:49:42 copy of the Socialist worker newspaper the 1984 terms uh read a special Branch provides information about extremists and terrorist groups to the security service
02:49:49 service the 1984 terms draw attention away from the wholesale collecting and recording of personal information and distracts with the word provides as if to suggests that intelligence was just the byproduct of other work
02:50:03 of other work align the SDS Witnesses have been trying unpersuasively to hold firm on importantly it hides the words potentially subversive and instead
02:50:16 potentially subversive and instead suggests that only extremists who are equated with terrorists have their information passed on it's extraordinary dishonest substitute to try to hide 14 years of sinister persecution of harmless citizens for
02:50:30 persecution of harmless citizens for political reasons and nefarious activity conducted for their masters at MI5 the reality was very different at the time special Branch records division hell files of over a million individuals
02:50:47 hell files of over a million individuals when the guidelines were sent to achieve constables they were accompanied by a confidential covering letter paragraph five of that letter had been specifically included by the security service and included
02:51:02 the security service and included widening of the subversion definition to include long-term aims applicable to those who may become subversive in the future paragraph seven dropped any mention of threat at all
02:51:18 threat at all the special Branch officers deciding whether militant trade unionism constituted subversion the home office Security Services and police connived to ensure that those engaged in a law-abiding non-violent
02:51:30 engaged in a law-abiding non-violent enrollable and long violent activities could continue to be infiltrated we ask the inquiry to be conscious this all-pervading duplicity when engaging with government about their
02:51:47 with government about their authorization and knowledge of the SDS count as a version of democratic assistance the acknowledged lack of any diversive threat coupled with the expansion of special Branch intelligence gathering capability raises an obvious question
02:52:05 capability raises an obvious question to what use was the SD intelligence put it's been a key feature of the SDS evidence that first they gathered everything they could and secondly they never received complaints about the intelligence they were gathering they
02:52:19 intelligence they were gathering they generated vast demands for the benefit of their customers many of whom have been the subject of redactions what is clear from the cabinet office disclosure is that the various inter-d departmental groups in government were
02:52:35 departmental groups in government were customers be they direct as a result of special Branch membership of those groups of 1972 or
02:52:44 or circulated via the security service as a product of their intimate relationship the purpose of these groups was not simply to gather intelligence but to use it for what they called kind of subversion bearing in mind the lack of any threat the organization's targeted and the
02:52:56 the organization's targeted and the methods adopted count as subversive activity would be more appropriately termed
02:53:02 termed anti-democratic activity that actively took a number of different forms many of which are mirrored in the deployment deployments of undercover offices
02:53:17 deployments of undercover offices disruption it was why you recognize in government that internal quarrels and descent were a great disabling factor for political groups in August 1968 the official committee on communism home
02:53:31 official committee on communism home working group on countermeasures held a meeting in respect to the upcoming October demonstration the first two main points of discussion were a recognition of dissension within the organizing committee
02:53:44 committee and then a stated aim to exploit that descent
02:53:52 descent the object should be to allow it to be a demonstrable failure by encouraging the process of disruption among the organizers and thus minimizing its chances of success
02:54:03 chances of success now in mind the Primacy of their aim in the discussion there must have been additional consideration on the methods that could be used to achieve it what's the best way of encouraging disruption in a group and minimizing its chances of success
02:54:17 success the participants in that meeting like those that followed including representatives of the cabinet office foreign and Commonwealth office home office Departments of education and
02:54:30 office Departments of education and employment and of course the security service all United in their aim of encouraging disruption the SDS have been founded in the preceding month chances of undercover officers having a
02:54:43 chances of undercover officers having a disruptive impact on the organizers I.E those at the higher levels of the organizations involved were limited by the short time available before the demonstration
02:54:56 demonstration however the potential must have been noted
02:55:02 noted the key ministerial Representatives that 1968 meeting were also present at the meeting of the subversion at home committee the following year in which the continuation the SDS was discussed Trend Richard thistlethwaite from MI5
02:55:17 Trend Richard thistlethwaite from MI5 John Tara from the foreign office David Heaton as secretary and of course the home office representative Sir James waddle the growing potential that became with longer deployments and deeper infiltrations cannot fail to be noticed by individuals who have been
02:55:30 by individuals who have been specifically tasked to counter subversion there may not be evidence of disruption being caused by undercover officers in 1968 but there is the clearest possible evidence of disruption being caused in
02:55:46 evidence of disruption being caused in 1975 and 1976 by Rick Clark's deployment into the troop side movement the paper trial for that deployment leads to the inescapable conclusion that the disruption was known and approved of by
02:55:59 disruption was known and approved of by social by special Branch management and security service the time of Clark's deployment Commander Rollo watts and Matt Roger were on the recipient list of
02:56:13 Matt Roger were on the recipient list of lists of the SPL reports and minutes and DAC Gilbert was a frequent attendee at the meetings the focus of the inquiries so far has been on SDs intelligence gathering however since at least 1972 the Metropolitan Police
02:56:24 Metropolitan Police special Branch was directly involved via the SPL with those involved in using intelligence for counter subversion
02:56:36 intelligence for counter subversion further and very importantly at some point between 1970 and 80 1984 the general remit special branch in respect to subversion changed
02:56:51 to subversion changed in 1970 Bishop Branch was tasked with Gathering intelligence and security service
02:56:52 service by 1984 the tasking was widened to include not only intelligence gathering but also assistance Clark deployment stands out as a
02:57:14 Clark deployment stands out as a demonstrative example of assistance in counter subversion by disruption and destabilization there is nothing comparable in any of the other undercover deployments in Tronics one it may be that as an over confident deployment that nearly ended in disaster
02:57:29 deployment that nearly ended in disaster for everyone on the SDS up to government a decision was taken to turn down that kind of activity it may simply be that the example stood out because the troops aren't moved as
02:57:40 out because the troops aren't moved as an umbrella organization was an easier Target for disruption than others the larger Democratic centralist Socialist Workers Party for example would have been a much harder Target the Clark deployment is not the only example of assistance another much more
02:57:56 example of assistance another much more another much more proximate to the 1984 guideline drafting is Security Service liaison node detailing a meeting between MI5 and Chief Inspector short of the SDS in 1983 MI5 passed on a brief
02:58:13 of the SDS in 1983 MI5 passed on a brief to the SDS on instructions in respect to the Socialist Workers Party short informed MI5 that Phil Cooper hn155 had all had infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party head courses is
02:58:27 Socialist Workers Party head courses is brewing around HQ that line though short is important first it is directly indicative of assistance rather than intelligence gathering secondly it's an example of disruptive assistance aimed at the swp thirdly was relevant enough
02:58:47 at the swp thirdly was relevant enough for the SDS MI5 relationship for a Chief Inspector to refer to it an MI5 to note and record it fall through the fact that the right that the Rye was brewing demonstrates that it was an ongoing action the reference to it uh the reference to it
02:59:00 reference to it uh the reference to it and noting of it are plainly indicative of approval finally for a Chief Inspector to know of the disruptive assistance it must have been reported to him lack of additional supporting
02:59:13 him lack of additional supporting evidence does not mean it did not happen it shows that the reports have not been
02:59:28 it shows that the reports have not been disclosed by the Metropolitan Police or MI5 the best way to ensure the inquiry concludes there is no evidence of an activity or tactic is to provide no evidence of it membership propaganda and electoral interference it's no coincidence that special Branch membership of the
02:59:43 special Branch membership of the committee on subversion and public life immediately follow the introduction of the MI5 definition and its focus on political and Industrial activity the very first report the special Branch received from the SPL was titled the impact of subversive groups on Trade union activity
02:59:54 union activity it was sent to Deputy assistant commissioner Gilbert as well as a number of other recipients who were specifically tasked with counters aversion by their committed memberships
03:00:17 aversion by their committed memberships a significant Focus from the perspective of special branch in the SDS was on the Socialist Workers Party in particular their main objective to attract new recruits by the virulence of their propaganda this was followed by some detail on the circulation and influence the Socialist worker newspaper which contributed to
03:00:29 worker newspaper which contributed to the propagation of militant attitudes in Industry generally the emphasis was on the was on the first the ability of the Socialist workspace
03:00:41 the ability of the Socialist workspace to increase its membership and secondly the quality and effectiveness of its media
03:00:46 media the membership figures of the Socialist Workers Party were a constant fixation of government each River media more generally was a Fascination for the various kind of subversion groups the cabinet office documents detail a number of examples of government manipulation of the
03:00:58 government manipulation of the mainstream media to further its ends it's not a surprise the government was so fixated the Socialist Workers Party were not advocating a push they were advocating a process of heightening
03:01:14 advocating a process of heightening awareness and winning people over to try to achieve a more Democratic Society a significant part of that campaigning worked in and around 1972 was an
03:01:25 worked in and around 1972 was an industry was proving very effective the study of the range of possible conservation measures must have included consideration of methods to Limit party membership and newspaper circulation it's no coincidence that post 1972 a
03:01:37 it's no coincidence that post 1972 a large number of the many SDS officers who infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party took positions as either membership secretaries or newspaper organized newspaper organizers
03:01:49 organized newspaper organizers the office of tendency Tendencies to downplay these roles as menial are in Conflict the government's preoccupation they have a key roles
03:02:02 they have a key roles the role of the membership secretary in an organization is not simply not to Simply recall membership but to engage with and encourage that membership
03:02:13 with and encourage that membership the role of the paper organization in the Socialist Workers Party was to promote the sales of the newspaper which was the foundation on which the party was built it's a very very Central role the SDS taking positions of
03:02:25 the SDS taking positions of responsibility within organization's fitted the government requirement for pervasive oblique and unattributable
03:02:38 pervasive oblique and unattributable action it is self-evident that it would be destabilizing and anti-democratic whether it led to orchestrated disruption or simply put an uncommitted individual in a role that would have been more productively taken by someone else
03:02:50 else the Lassa was consistent with the government view that low-level counteraction was often effective trade unions the main concerned in special Grant's first SPL briefing was the extent to
03:03:03 first SPL briefing was the extent to which the influence and standing of many right-wing Trade union leaders have been reduced
03:03:11 reduced became a general swing in major Union major unions away from moderate or right-wing policies and the difficulties that National officials were having controlling shop stewards and The Wider Trade union membership the government
03:03:22 Trade union membership the government problem was with Trade union militancy and the challenge it it raised to their social policy and state legislation government's car aim was to put an end
03:03:36 government's car aim was to put an end to it secret counters version documents bursted about the success that government had hired in 1971 included in influencing certain key Trade union elections
03:03:45 elections the successful strike action 1972 had shown that electoral interference in the trade Union was not enough the rank and file an unofficial
03:03:57 the rank and file an unofficial factory-based leadership were immune to it the governments had difficulty putting agents directly onto the Shop's law certain parliamentarians and trade
03:04:08 law certain parliamentarians and trade unionists were very alive for the threat strike action sit-ins and unwillingness to negotiate were not unlawful but the extensionless pressure Branch Powers by the industrial addition to the subversion definition allowed for widespread indirect
03:04:22 allowed for widespread indirect infiltration and monitoring of the Trade union Rank and file any organization MI5 said was potentially subversive could be infiltrated and so any campaign designed to
03:04:36 and so any campaign designed to challenge government policy could be dealt with as it were designed to overthrow the state militant trade unionism was the target target behind the pretense of dealing with subversion
03:04:51 with subversion the specific exclusion of any subversive threat in relation to infiltrations of militant trade unionism in the 1984 guidelines cannot have been an accident of drafting was simply a continuation of what had been happening since 1972.
03:05:03 what had been happening since 1972. the Associate's workers party's campaign such as the rank and file organizing committee and the right to work campaign were in the words of the SDS themselves to fight for the rights of trade unions individuals and groups of workers
03:05:14 individuals and groups of workers against the oppression of management and government in particular at this time of high unemployment an anti-union legislation the aim again in the SDS his
03:05:32 legislation the aim again in the SDS his own words was for fresh to be brought to bear against management and government when fighting short-term work working redundancies and unemployment or demanding improved pay and or conditions that was exactly what government was worried about and their various groups were designed to deal with
03:05:46 were designed to deal with that was why the serious Workers Party was infiltrated at the headquarters level and the direct orders of MI5 and why the right to work campaign was specifically targeted Colin Clark and Phil Cooper harvested intelligence
03:06:01 Phil Cooper harvested intelligence on the organizational structure the Socialist Workers Party its Administration Finance as a membership they use their attendance almost every National delegate conference annual skegness rallied
03:06:16 skegness rallied 1977-83 to gather and capture personal details of hundreds of attendees they use the access the party headquarters and computer system to steal the organization's data and the date of its
03:06:34 organization's data and the date of its members even going so far as controlling finances as ordered by MI5 um
03:06:40 so we've got a few more pages to go I'm aware that it's we're approaching one o'clock um can I be allowed to finish it off or
03:06:52 um can I be allowed to finish it off or or of course thank you very much indeed thank you I apologize to everyone for delaying their lunch thank you sir blacklisting the focus of all the reporting was employment education and Trade union related When government Rings its hands about Trade union militancy and orders positive character
03:07:05 militancy and orders positive character action against key subversive groups and individuals what possible explanation is there for the repeated targeted and obsessive harvesting of that specific information
03:07:17 information the ultimate anti-democratic countermeasure is blacklisting we dealt with the evidence on this topic extensively in our last opening statement
03:07:28 statement well Lindsay German was questioned by cancer inquiry on the apparent inconsistency between the Socialist Workers Party being an open organization and the need for security measures at
03:07:39 and the need for security measures at the 1978 National delegates conference it was a state-led line of questioning designed to suggest that there was something sinister about the party
03:07:51 something sinister about the party taking security measures it was somewhat ridiculous bear in mind that the state had comprehensively infiltrated the conference and was fully aware there was nothing remotely Sinister going on the principle the principal reason the
03:08:05 the principle the principal reason the for the security was fear of the threat the blacklisting by the late 1970s it was common knowledge that people were being sacked and could not find work because of their political opinions blacklisting was a countermeasure not only did it take politically active
03:08:17 only did it take politically active people out of the workplace it made people afraid to be politically active or Millicent they're only anywhere else we recognize the step in the right
03:08:30 we recognize the step in the right direction that Council of The Inquirer is taken on this topic but the conclusions do not go far enough on a considered analysis of the evidence and the inferences that that can be drawn from it
03:08:40 from it there is no doubt the SDS intelligence reports were used for vetting purposes the evidence for the managing officers was clear on the vetting value to MI5 or the SDS reporting vetting did not apply
03:08:59 the SDS reporting vetting did not apply to work and government departments that not only apply to work and government Partners but also applied to public corporations list X firms private corporations engaged on government Security Contracts the list of those private corporations was extensive and they covered all sectors of the economy
03:09:11 they covered all sectors of the economy there is no doubt SDS reports were used for blacklisting government accepted and excused uh the inevitability of it employers pleaded for intelligence and
03:09:25 employers pleaded for intelligence and when a special Branch officer is seeking help from an employer or from a union official is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably it is engaged in a one-way traffic it should not be asking a good deal to
03:09:41 it should not be asking a good deal to expect a police officer to abide by the criminal law on bribery and Corruption it's interesting that Sir James wattle thought that it was that he was prepared to share that view so openly with the Home Secretary himself
03:09:55 Home Secretary himself I'm surprised I'm surprised in the government's own approach was consistently uh duplicitous the rules May prevent it but where there was overt evidence that a subversive
03:10:10 was overt evidence that a subversive employee was likely to change the scene of his operations it was possible to ensure that this was given enough unofficial publicity to serve as an adequate warning to firms who might be at risk the government simply directed employers to non-official organizations such as the
03:10:28 non-official organizations such as the economic League or Industrial Research and Information Services Limited Iris Iris was The Unofficial body the government's Countess diversion groups to liaise with influence Trade union elections they were all working hand in glove the SDS reporting on the national
03:10:40 glove the SDS reporting on the national membership and Trade union affiliations the Socialist Works party was ordered by the security service the details was were provided by the security service and from there there
03:10:54 security service and from there there was no limit on the onward dissemination conclusion in the early 1990s in the early 1970s
03:11:05 in the early 1990s in the early 1970s there was a fundamental change in what the SDS was to be and what it was expected to deliver it would no longer be a case of an officer sitting at the back of a public meeting and taking notes it was a squad it was driven to be deep undercover to
03:11:21 it was driven to be deep undercover to draft reports on anything and everything officers were assigned to organizations for four to five years using the names dead children to establish their Legend
03:11:32 dead children to establish their Legend it was a squad that would it that would report extensively on trade unionists socialist anti-apartile activities activists Communists and those who wanted troops out of Ireland officers such as Rick Clark only entered an organization he instigated and helped
03:11:45 organization he instigated and helped establish a branch of that organization The Troop side movement following the new direction of what was expected of an SDS officer he then fought his way to
03:11:56 SDS officer he then fought his way to the top of the movement along the way he was happy to use people as stepping stones he invaded people's lives and used sex as a tactic to build his credibility he abused friendships and
03:12:19 credibility he abused friendships and undermined activists who were genuinely committed to the cause Rick Clark was not a rogue officer he was a foot soldier to the news strategy his activities were understood known and crucially directed they became a blueprint for officers as they joined campaigns and political parties and moved their way to positions of
03:12:32 moved their way to positions of influence Rick Clark is important to this inquiry as an example of what was to come from the early 1970s he represented the new strategy of not just the SDS but the British
03:12:48 just the SDS but the British establishment an establishment that had already opened a million files on its citizens
03:12:49 citizens a disclosure we have reviewed demonstrates that political policing was organized on a scale that should shock everyone
03:13:04 everyone not just because of what was being done but the impact it had on the lives of ordinary people it was this it was surveillance and spying on an industrial
03:13:19 surveillance and spying on an industrial scale the new strategy was built on deep infiltration of campaigns and political parties by SDS officers funded and directed by a cabal of State institutions from special branches to the security services from the home office the foreign Commonwealth office it included a cast a senior civil
03:13:33 it included a cast a senior civil servants an outside bodies such as the economic League this Army of surveillance LED all the way from the door's successive cabinet ministers and successive prime ministers in their defense the British establishment
03:13:50 defense the British establishment claimed to be defending democracy but it was not a defense of democracy it was the undermining of democracy in defense of the establishment
03:14:01 in defense of the establishment so thank you very much for allowing us to finish
03:14:03 to finish thank you for finishing within a reasonable time even though not the letter of the mid-second of the time that you were originally allocated thank you beautiful too for completing your
03:14:16 you beautiful too for completing your submissions with the efficiency that you have we will now resume uh we'll now pause and resume at two o'clock or um further submissions
03:14:28 further submissions beginning with those of Mr Greenland thank you